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	1200s: ciphers=>inactive #237
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							@@ -663,13 +663,11 @@ user_pref("browser.tabs.remote.allowLinkedWebInFileUriProcess", false);
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   vector, see [1] (It's quite technical but the first part is easy to understand
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					   vector, see [1] (It's quite technical but the first part is easy to understand
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   and you can stop reading when you reach the second section titled "Enter Bro")
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					   and you can stop reading when you reach the second section titled "Enter Bro")
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   Option 1: Use our settings to tighten up encryption options. It *is* a fingerprinting attack
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					   Option 1: Use Firefox defaults for the 1260's items (item 1260 default for SHA-1, is local
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             vector, and we certainly do want to reduce any attack surface, but this is not how
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					             only anyway). There is nothing *weak* about Firefox's defaults, but Mozilla (and
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             you *DEFEAT* fingerprinting - to do that you need large numbers to buy into the same
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					             other browsers) will always lag for fear of breakage and upset end-users
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             enforced browser-wide settings (such as TBB), and/or you use OpSec.
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					   Option 2: Disable the ciphers in 1261, 1262 and 1263. These shouldn't break anything.
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   Option 2: Use Firefox defaults for the 1260's items (item 1260 default for SHA-1, is local only
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					             Optionally, disable the ciphers in 1264.
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             anyway). There is nothing *weak* about Firefox's defaults, but Mozilla (and other
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             browsers) will always lag for fear of breakage and upset end-users
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   [1] https://www.securityartwork.es/2017/02/02/tls-client-fingerprinting-with-bro/
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					   [1] https://www.securityartwork.es/2017/02/02/tls-client-fingerprinting-with-bro/
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 ***/
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					 ***/
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@@ -779,15 +777,15 @@ user_pref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 1);
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 * [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3des#Security
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					 * [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3des#Security
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 * [2] http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Meet-in-the-middle_attack
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					 * [2] http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Meet-in-the-middle_attack
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 * [3] https://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html ***/
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					 * [3] https://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html ***/
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user_pref("security.ssl3.rsa_des_ede3_sha", false);
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					   // user_pref("security.ssl3.rsa_des_ede3_sha", false);
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/* 1262: disable 128 bits ***/
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					/* 1262: disable 128 bits ***/
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user_pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", false);
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					   // user_pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", false);
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user_pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", false);
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					   // user_pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", false);
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/* 1263: disable DHE (Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange)
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					/* 1263: disable DHE (Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange)
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 * [WARNING] May break obscure sites, but not major sites, which should support ECDH over DHE
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					 * [WARNING] May break obscure sites, but not major sites, which should support ECDH over DHE
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 * [1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/how-to-protect-yourself-from-nsa-attacks-1024-bit-DH ***/
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					 * [1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/how-to-protect-yourself-from-nsa-attacks-1024-bit-DH ***/
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user_pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", false);
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					   // user_pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", false);
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user_pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", false);
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					   // user_pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", false);
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/* 1264: disable the remaining non-modern cipher suites as of FF52
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					/* 1264: disable the remaining non-modern cipher suites as of FF52
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 * [NOTE] Commented out because it still breaks too many sites ***/
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					 * [NOTE] Commented out because it still breaks too many sites ***/
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   // user_pref("security.ssl3.rsa_aes_128_sha", false);
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					   // user_pref("security.ssl3.rsa_aes_128_sha", false);
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