mgeeky-Penetration-Testing-.../red-teaming/Handy-BloodHound-Cypher-Que...

368 lines
22 KiB
Markdown
Raw Normal View History

- Returns computer names and their operating system for statistics purposes
```
MATCH (c:Computer) WHERE c.operatingsystem is not null RETURN c.name as Name, c.operatingsystem as OS
```
- Returns a summary report of machines grouped by their operating systems versions, along with number of machines running specific OS version:
```
MATCH (c:Computer) WHERE c.operatingsystem is not null MATCH (n:Computer {operatingsystem: c.operatingsystem}) RETURN c.operatingsystem as OS, count(distinct n) AS Number ORDER BY Number DESC
```
- Returns non-DC computers that enable unconstrained delegation along with their LDAP DN paths and operating systems.:
```
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation: True}), (g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with 'DOMAIN CONTROLLERS' MATCH (c) WHERE NOT (c)-[:MemberOf]->(g) RETURN c.name, c.distinguishedname, c.operatingsystem
```
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
- Returns a list of OUs along with their members count (source: [hausec.com](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) )
```
MATCH (o:OU)-[:Contains]->(c) RETURN o.name,o.guid, COUNT(c) ORDER BY COUNT(c) DESC
```
- Returns all objects that have SPNs set and checks whether they are allowed to delegate, have admincount set or can be used for unconstrained delegation:
```
MATCH (c {hasspn: True}) RETURN c.name as name, c.allowedtodelegate as AllowedToDelegate, c.unconstraineddelegation as UnconstrainedDelegation, c.admincount as AdminCount, c.serviceprincipalnames as SPNs
```
- Counts various Active Directory weaknesses such as users with Password Not Required of a domain named `contoso.com` (leave `ENDS WITH ""` to run through all the domains collected):
```
MATCH (u {pwdneverexpires: True}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" RETURN "Password Never Expires" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u {passwordnotreqd: True}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" RETURN "Password Not Required" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u {dontreqpreauth: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" RETURN "Pre-Authentication Not Required" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" AND NOT u.name STARTS WITH 'KRBTGT' RETURN "Kerberoastable" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" RETURN "ASREProastable" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u {admincount: True}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" RETURN "adminCount=1" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" AND u.userpassword =~ ".+" RETURN "userPassword Not Empty" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u:Computer {unconstraineddelegation: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" RETURN "Unconstrained Delegation Computers" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u {owned: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" RETURN "Owned Principals" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL
MATCH (u {highvalue: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "contoso.com" RETURN "High Value" AS what, count(u) AS number
```
- Pulls users eligible for ASREP roasting
```
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth: true}) RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
```
- Shortest path from ASREP roastable users to Domain Admins
```
MATCH (A:User {dontreqpreauth: true}), (B:Group), x=shortestPath((A)-[*1..]->(B)) WHERE B.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN ADMINS' RETURN x
```
- Pulls users with `adminCount=1`
```
MATCH (u:User {admincount: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
```
- Pulls users with `PasswordNeverExpires` set.
```
MATCH (u:User {pwdneverexpires: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
```
- Pulls kerberoastable users with `adminCount=1`
```
MATCH (u:User {admincount: True, hasspn: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.displayname, u.hasspn as Kerberoastable, u.description, u.objectid
```
- Pulls users with `adminCount=1` and displays whether they're Kerberoastable, ASREPRoastable or Owned
```
MATCH (u:User {admincount: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.displayname, u.owned as owned, u.hasspn as Kerberoastable, u.dontreqpreauth as ASREPRoastable, u.description, u.objectid
```
- Pulls users eligible for Kerberoasting
```
MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
```
- Shortest path from Kerberoastable users to Domain Admins
```
MATCH (A:User),(B:Group),p=shortestPath((A)-[*1..]->(B)) WHERE A.hasspn=true AND B.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN ADMINS' RETURN p
```
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
- Pull GPOs linked to users being member of a specified group:
```
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
MATCH p = (:GPO)-[:GpLink]->(d)-[:Contains*1..]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:'GROUP_NAME@CONTOSO.LOCAL'}) RETURN p
```
- Return enabled users that have PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED flag set in their UserAccountControl field (thus they have an empty password set)
```
MATCH (u:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}) RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
```
- Find enabled users not requiring Pre-Authentication (their passwords will be a lot easier to crack):
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
```
MATCH (u:User {enabled: True, dontreqpreauth: true}) RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
```
- Find a shortest path from any user that has PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED set to Domain Admins group:
```
MATCH (m:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}), (n:Group), p = shortestPath((m)-[*1..]->(n)) WHERE n.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN ADMINS' RETURN p
```
- Shortest path from any user that has PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED set to any computer
```
MATCH (m:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}), (n:Computer), p = shortestPath((m)-[*1..]->(n)) RETURN p
```
- Find all users that have userPassword attribute not empty
```
MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.userpassword =~ ".+" RETURN u.samaccountname, u.name, u.userpassword, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
```
- Counts unrolled members of Tier-0 privileged AD groups (copy all query lines, as they are UNION ALL joined):
```
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "ENTERPRISE ADMINS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN ADMINS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "SCHEMA ADMIN" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "ACCOUNT OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "BACKUP OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "PRINT OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "SERVER OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "READ-ONLY DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "GROUP POLICY CREATOR OWNERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DISTRIBUTED COM USERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted
```
- Retrieves nodes having particular juicy keywords in their description properties:
```
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'pass' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'secret' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'admin' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'sensitive' RETURN n.name, n.description
```
- Show only owned nodes of the above ones:
```
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'pass' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'secret' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'admin' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'sensitive' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS '\\' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description
```
- Retrieves nodes that contain UNC paths to SMB shares in their description fields:
```
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS '\\\\' RETURN n.name, n.description
```
- Returns shortest path from any of owned nodes to any of highvalue nodes:
```
RETURN shortestPath((O:{owned:True})-[*1..]->(H {highvalue: True}))
```
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
- Find all users that have direct or indirect admin privileges over a computer:
```
MATCH (u:User)-[r:AdminTo|MemberOf*1..]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name
```
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
- Print GPO names and their container paths:
```
MATCH (n:GPO) return n.name,n.gpcpath
```
- Print GPOs with interesting words in their names along with their container paths:
```
unwind ["360totalsecurity", "access", "acronis", "adaware", "admin", "admin", "aegislab", "ahnlab", "alienvault", "altavista", "amsi", "anti-virus", "antivirus", "antiy", "apexone", "applock", "arcabit", "arcsight", "atm", "atp", "av", "avast", "avg", "avira", "baidu", "baiduspider", "bank", "barracuda", "bingbot", "bitdefender", "bluvector", "canary", "carbon", "carbonblack", "certificate", "check", "checkpoint", "citrix", "clamav", "code42", "comodo", "countercept", "countertack", "credential", "crowdstrike", "custom", "cyberark", "cybereason", "cylance", "cynet360", "cyren", "darktrace", "datadog", "defender", "druva", "drweb", "duckduckbot", "edr", "egambit", "emsisoft", "encase", "endgame", "ensilo", "escan", "eset", "exabot", "exception", "f-secure", "f5", "falcon", "fidelis", "fireeye", "firewall", "fix", "forcepoint", "forti", "fortigate", "fortil", "fortinet", "gdata", "gravityzone", "guard", "honey", "huntress", "identity", "ikarussecurity", "insight", "ivanti", "juniper", "k7antivirus", "k7computing", "kaspersky", "kingsoft", "kiosk", "laps", "lightcyber", "logging", "logrhythm", "lynx", "malwarebytes", "manageengine", "mass", "mcafee", "microsoft", "mj12bot", "msnbot", "nanoav", "nessus", "netwitness", "office365", "onedrive", "orion", "palo", "paloalto", "paloaltonetworks", "panda", "pass", "powershell", "proofpoint", "proxy", "qradar", "rdp", "rsa", "runasppl", "sandboxe", "sap", "scanner", "scanning", "sccm", "script", "secret", "secureage", "secureworks", "security", "sensitive", "sentinel", "sentinelone", "slurp", "smartcard", "sogou", "solarwinds", "sonicwall", "sophos", "splunk", "superantispyware", "symantec", "tachyon", "temporary", "tencent", "totaldefense", "transfer", "trapmine", "trend micro", "trendmicro", "trusteer", "trustlook", "uac", "vdi", "virusblokada", "virustotal", "virustotalcloud", "vpn", "vuln", "webroot", "whitelist", "wifi", "winrm", "workaround", "yubikey", "zillya", "zonealarm", "zscaler"] as word match (n:GPO) where toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word) RETURN word, n.name, n.description, n.gpcpath ORDER BY n.name
```
- Print **Security Solutions** (think SIEM, EDRs, AVs, Anomaly detection systems, etc) deployed in the company by searching for keywords in _name, description, distinguishedname_ of all objects (User, Group, Computer, OU, ...)
```
UNWIND ["360totalsecurity", "acronis", "adaware", "aegislab", "ahnlab", "alienvault", "altavista", "anti-virus", "antivirus", "antiy", "apexone", "arcabit", "arcsight", "attivo", "avast", "avg", "avira", "baidu", "baiduspider", "barracuda", "bingbot", "bitdefender", "bitdefender", "bluecoat", "bluvector", "canary", "carbon", "carbonblack", "carbonblack", "check", "checkpoint", "clamav", "code42", "comodo", "cortex", "countercept", "countertack", "crowdstrike", "cyberark", "cybereason", "cylance", "cynet360", "cyren", "darktrace", "datadog", "defender", "druva", "drweb", "duckduckbot", "edr", "egambit", "emsisoft", "encase", "endgame", "ensilo", "escan", "eset", "exabot", "f-secure", "f5", "falcon", "fidelis", "fireeye", "forcepoint", "fortigate", "fortil", "fortinet", "gdata", "gdata", "gravityzone", "honey", "huntress", "ia_archiver", "ikarussecurity", "ivanti", "juniper", "k7antivirus", "k7computing", "kaspersky", "kingsoft", "lightcyber", "lynx", "malwarebytes", "mcafee", "microsoft", "mj12bot", "morphisec", "msnbot", "nanoav", "nessus", "netwitness", "office365", "palo", "paloalto", "paloaltonetworks", "panda", "proofpoint", "qradar", "sandboxe", "scanner", "scanning", "secureage", "secureworks", "security", "sentinelone", "simplepie", "slurp", "sogou", "solarwinds", "sonicwall", "sophos", "splunk", "superantispyware", "symantec", "tachyon", "tencent", "totaldefense", "trapmine", "trend", "trendmicro", "trusteer", "trustlook", "virus", "virustotal", "virustotalcloud", "webroot", "zillya", "zonealarm", "zscaler"] AS word MATCH (n) WHERE toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word) OR toLower(n.description) CONTAINS toLower(word) OR toLower(n.distinguishedname) CONTAINS toLower(word) RETURN word as keyword, LABELS(n)[1] as type, n.name, n.description, n.distinguishedname ORDER BY n.name
```
- Returns Top 20 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **First Degree Object Control** principals in domain:
```
MATCH p=(u)-[r1]->(n) WHERE r1.isacl=true
WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type,
COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
WHERE name IS NOT NULL
RETURN type, name, controlled
ORDER BY controlled DESC
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
LIMIT 20
```
- Returns Top 20 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Group Delegated Object Control** principals in domain and whether that object is member of high privileged group (such a `Domain Admins` or `Domain Controllers`):
```
MATCH p=(u)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[r2]->(n) WHERE r2.isacl=true
WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, g.highvalue as highly_privileged,
COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
WHERE name IS NOT NULL
RETURN type, name, highly_privileged, controlled
ORDER BY controlled DESC
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
LIMIT 20
```
- Returns Top 10 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Transitive Object Control** in domain (TAKES ENORMOUS TIME TO COMPUTE! You were warned):
```
MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[r1:MemberOf|AddMember|AllExtendedRights|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns*1..]->(n))
WHERE u<>n
WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type,
COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
WHERE name IS NOT NULL
RETURN type, name, controlled
ORDER BY controlled DESC
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
LIMIT 10
```
- Pulls Kerberoastable users and returns their **Outbound Control Rights** --> **First Degree Object Control** in domain:
```
MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}), p=(u)-[r1]->(n)
WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' AND r1.isacl=true
WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type,
COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
WHERE name IS NOT NULL
RETURN type, name, controlled
ORDER BY controlled DESC
```
- Pulls Kerberoastable users and returns their **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Group Delegated Object Control** in domain and whether that object is member of high privileged group (such a `Domain Admins` or `Domain Controllers`):
```
MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}), p=(u)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[r2]->(n)
WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' AND r2.isacl=true
WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, g.highvalue as highly_privileged,
COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
WHERE name IS NOT NULL
RETURN type, name, highly_privileged, controlled
ORDER BY controlled DESC
```
- Pulls Kerberoastable users and returns their **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Transitive Object Control** in domain (TAKES ENORMOUS TIME TO COMPUTE! You were warned):
```
MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}), p=shortestPath((u)-[r1:MemberOf|AddMember|AllExtendedRights|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns*1..]->(n))
WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' AND u<>n
WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type,
COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
WHERE name IS NOT NULL
RETURN type, name, controlled
ORDER BY controlled DESC
```
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
- Returns username and number of computers where it has admin rights to for top 10 users (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ):
```
MATCH
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
(U:User)-[r:MemberOf|AdminTo*1..]->(C:Computer)
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
WITH
U.name as n,
COUNT(DISTINCT(C)) as c
RETURN n,c
ORDER BY c DESC
LIMIT 10
```
- Returns group and number of computers that group has admin rights to - for top 10 groups (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ):
```
MATCH
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
(G:Group)-[r:MemberOf|AdminTo*1..]->(C:Computer)
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
WITH
G.name as n,
COUNT(DISTINCT(C)) as c
RETURN n,c
ORDER BY c DESC
LIMIT 10
```
- Show all users that are administrators on more than one machine (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ):
```
MATCH
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
(U:User)-[r:MemberOf|AdminTo*1..]->(C:Computer)
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
WITH
U.name as n,
COUNT(DISTINCT(C)) as c
WHERE c>1
RETURN n
ORDER BY c DESC
```
- Show all users that are administrative on at least one machine, ranked by the number of machines they are admin on. (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ):
```
MATCH (u:User)
WITH u
OPTIONAL MATCH (u)-[r:AdminTo]->(c:Computer)
WITH u,COUNT(c) as expAdmin
OPTIONAL MATCH (u)-[r:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[r2:AdminTo]->(c:Computer)
WHERE NOT (u)-[:AdminTo]->(c)
WITH u,expAdmin,COUNT(DISTINCT(c)) as unrolledAdmin
RETURN u.name,expAdmin,unrolledAdmin,expAdmin + unrolledAdmin as totalAdmin
ORDER BY totalAdmin ASC
```
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
- Find the most privileged groups on the domain (author: [hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) ):
```
MATCH (g:Group) OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer) OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c2:Computer) WITH g, COLLECT(c1) + COLLECT(c2) AS tempVar UNWIND tempVar AS computers RETURN g.name AS GroupName,COUNT(DISTINCT(computers)) AS AdminRightCount ORDER BY AdminRightCount DESC
```
- Find groups with most local admins (either explicit admins or derivative/unrolled) (modified version of query taken from almighty [hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) ):
```
MATCH (g:Group) WITH g OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[r:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer) WITH g,COUNT(c1) as explicitAdmins OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[r:MemberOf*1..]->(a:Group)-[r2:AdminTo]->(c2:Computer) WITH g,explicitAdmins,COUNT(DISTINCT(c2)) as unrolledAdmins where g.name IS NOT NULL AND (explicitAdmins + unrolledAdmins) > 0 RETURN g.name,explicitAdmins,unrolledAdmins, explicitAdmins + unrolledAdmins as totalAdmins ORDER BY totalAdmins DESC
```
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
- Find all other Rights Domain Users shouldn't have (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ):
```
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
MATCH p=(m:Group)-[r:Owns|WriteDacl|GenericAll|WriteOwner|ExecuteDCOM|GenericWrite|AllowedToDelegate|ForceChangePassword]->(n:Computer) WHERE m.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN USERS' RETURN p
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
```
- Riccardo Ancarani's cypher queries (src: [GPOPowerParser](https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/GPOPowerParser)) useful for any lateral movement insights:
- Find all the NTLM relay opportunities for computer accounts:
```
MATCH (u1:Computer)-[:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer {signing: false}) RETURN u1.name, c1.name
MATCH (u2)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c2 {signing: false}) RETURN u2.name, c2.name
```
- Find all the users that can RDP into a machine where they have special privileges:
```
MATCH (u:User)-[:CanRDP]->(c:Computer) WITH u,c
OPTIONAL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[:CanRDP]->(c) WITH u,c
MATCH (u)-[:CanPrivesc]->(c) RETURN u.name, c.name
```
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
## CREATE Nodes and Edges
- Mark High Value all members of High Value groups:
```
MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf]->(n {highvalue: true}) SET u.highvalue = true
```
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
- Add `HasSession` edge for user `ALICE@DOMAIN` being logged onto `COMPUTER@DOMAIN` :
```
MATCH (A:Computer {name: "COMPUTER@DOMAIN"})
MATCH (B:User {name: "ALICE@DOMAIN"})
CREATE (A)-[:HasSession]->(B)
```
- Adds `HasSession` relationship on all domain controllers to Domain Admins group:
```
MATCH (u:Computer)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN CONTROLLERS"
MATCH (h:Group) WHERE h.name starts with "DOMAIN ADMINS"
CREATE (u)-[:HasSession]->(h)
```
- Adds `AdminTo` relationship from User to Computer:
```
MATCH (A:User {name: "ALICE@DOMAIN"})
MATCH (B:Computer {name: "COMPUTER.DOMAIN"})
CREATE (A)-[:AdminTo]->(B)
```
2022-02-28 10:20:22 +01:00
- Authored by **Knavesec** on a #cypher_queries Bloodhound slack: Prints graph paths of the returns yielded by query in `p` variable. Modify the first line to determine paths you would like to be printed (for later grepping, searching). Example:
```
match p=shortestPath((g:Group)-[*1..]->(n {highvalue:true})) where g.objectid ends with "-513"
WITH [node in nodes(p) | coalesce(node.name, '')] as nodeLabels,
[rel in relationships(p) | type(rel)] as relationshipLabels,
length(p) as path_len
WITH reduce(path='', x in range(0,path_len-1) | path + nodeLabels[x] + ' - ' + relationshipLabels[x] + ' -> ') as path,
nodeLabels[path_len] as final_node
return distinct path + final_node as full_path
limit 3
```
Example output:
```
DOMAIN USERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - AdminTo -> SECWWKS1000000.WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - GenericAll -> ELMER_GUERRERO@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - MemberOf -> DOMAIN CONTROLLERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL
DOMAIN USERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - AdminTo -> SECWWKS1000000.WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - GenericAll -> GENARO_PARKER@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - MemberOf -> GROUP POLICY CREATOR OWNERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL
```
2021-05-25 11:49:02 +02:00
## Other sources of great Cypher Queries:
- Hausec - https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/
- Jeffmcjunkin - https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12
- seajaysec - https://gist.github.com/seajaysec/c7f0995b5a6a2d30515accde8513f77d