Updated Handy BloodHound Cypher Queries.
This commit is contained in:
Mariusz B. / mgeeky
parent
2308b12826
commit
29e7f890a5
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@ -1,27 +1,4 @@
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- Returns computer names and their operating system for statistics purposes
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```
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MATCH (c:Computer) WHERE c.operatingsystem is not null RETURN c.name as Name, c.operatingsystem as OS
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```
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- Returns a summary report of machines grouped by their operating systems versions, along with number of machines running specific OS version:
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```
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MATCH (c:Computer) WHERE c.operatingsystem is not null MATCH (n:Computer {operatingsystem: c.operatingsystem}) RETURN c.operatingsystem as OS, count(distinct n) AS Number ORDER BY Number DESC
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```
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- Returns non-DC computers that enable unconstrained delegation along with their LDAP DN paths and operating systems.:
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```
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MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation: True}), (g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with 'DOMAIN CONTROLLERS' MATCH (c) WHERE NOT (c)-[:MemberOf]->(g) RETURN c.name, c.distinguishedname, c.operatingsystem
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```
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- Returns a list of OUs along with their members count (source: [hausec.com](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) )
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```
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MATCH (o:OU)-[:Contains]->(c) RETURN o.name,o.guid, COUNT(c) ORDER BY COUNT(c) DESC
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```
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- Returns all objects that have SPNs set and checks whether they are allowed to delegate, have admincount set or can be used for unconstrained delegation:
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```
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MATCH (c {hasspn: True}) RETURN c.name as name, c.allowedtodelegate as AllowedToDelegate, c.unconstraineddelegation as UnconstrainedDelegation, c.admincount as AdminCount, c.serviceprincipalnames as SPNs
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```
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### General
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- Counts various Active Directory statistics and weaknesses. (Change `ENDS WITH ""` to `ENDS WITH "contoso.com"` to limit results to specified domain):
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```
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@ -43,6 +20,47 @@ MATCH (u {owned: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN
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MATCH (u {highvalue: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "High Value" AS what, count(u) AS number
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```
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- Returns all objects that have SPNs set and checks whether they are allowed to delegate, have admincount set or can be used for unconstrained delegation:
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```
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MATCH (c {hasspn: True}) RETURN c.name as name, c.allowedtodelegate as AllowedToDelegate, c.unconstraineddelegation as UnconstrainedDelegation, c.admincount as AdminCount, c.serviceprincipalnames as SPNs
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```
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- Returns Top 20 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **First Degree Object Control** principals in domain:
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```
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MATCH p=(u)-[r1]->(n) WHERE r1.isacl=true
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WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type,
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COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
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WHERE name IS NOT NULL
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RETURN type, name, controlled
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ORDER BY controlled DESC
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LIMIT 20
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```
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- Returns Top 20 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Group Delegated Object Control** principals in domain and whether that object is member of high privileged group (such a `Domain Admins` or `Domain Controllers`):
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```
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MATCH p=(u)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[r2]->(n) WHERE r2.isacl=true
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WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, g.highvalue as highly_privileged,
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COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
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WHERE name IS NOT NULL
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RETURN type, name, highly_privileged, controlled
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ORDER BY controlled DESC
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LIMIT 20
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```
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- Returns Top 10 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Transitive Object Control** in domain (TAKES ENORMOUS TIME TO COMPUTE! You were warned):
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```
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MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[r1:MemberOf|AddMember|AllExtendedRights|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns*1..]->(n))
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WHERE u<>n
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WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type,
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COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
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WHERE name IS NOT NULL
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RETURN type, name, controlled
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ORDER BY controlled DESC
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LIMIT 10
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```
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### Users
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- Pulls users eligible for ASREP roasting
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```
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MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth: true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
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@ -88,9 +106,14 @@ MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {hasspn: true})-[r:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highval
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MATCH (A:User),(B:Group),p=shortestPath((A)-[*1..]->(B)) WHERE A.hasspn=true AND B.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN ADMINS' RETURN p
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```
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- Pull GPOs linked to users being member of a specified group:
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- Shortest path from any user that has PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED set to any computer
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```
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MATCH p = (:GPO)-[:GpLink]->(d)-[:Contains*1..]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:'GROUP_NAME@CONTOSO.LOCAL'}) RETURN p
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MATCH (m:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}), (n:Computer), p = shortestPath((m)-[*1..]->(n)) RETURN p
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```
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- Find all users that have userPassword attribute not empty
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```
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MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.userpassword =~ ".+" RETURN u.name, u.userpassword, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
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```
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- Return enabled users that have PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED flag set in their UserAccountControl field (thus they have an empty password set)
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@ -108,111 +131,16 @@ MATCH (u:User {enabled: True, dontreqpreauth: true}) RETURN u.name, u.displaynam
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MATCH (m:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}), (n:Group), p = shortestPath((m)-[*1..]->(n)) WHERE n.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN ADMINS' RETURN p
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```
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- Shortest path from any user that has PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED set to any computer
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```
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MATCH (m:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}), (n:Computer), p = shortestPath((m)-[*1..]->(n)) RETURN p
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```
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- Find all users that have userPassword attribute not empty
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```
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MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.userpassword =~ ".+" RETURN u.name, u.userpassword, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid
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```
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- Counts unrolled members of Tier-0 privileged AD groups (copy all query lines, as they are UNION ALL joined):
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```
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "ENTERPRISE ADMINS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN ADMINS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "SCHEMA ADMIN" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "ACCOUNT OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "BACKUP OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "PRINT OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "SERVER OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "READ-ONLY DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "GROUP POLICY CREATOR OWNERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DISTRIBUTED COM USERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted
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```
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- Retrieves nodes having particular juicy keywords in their description properties:
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```
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'pass' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'secret' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'admin' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'sensitive' RETURN n.name, n.description
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```
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- Show only owned nodes of the above ones:
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```
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'pass' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'secret' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'admin' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'sensitive' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS '\\' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description
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```
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- Retrieves nodes that contain UNC paths to SMB shares in their description fields:
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```
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MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS '\\\\' RETURN n.name, n.description
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```
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- Returns shortest path from any of owned nodes to any of highvalue nodes:
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```
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RETURN shortestPath((O:{owned:True})-[*1..]->(H {highvalue: True}))
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```
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- Find all users that have direct or indirect admin privileges over a computer:
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```
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MATCH (u:User)-[r:AdminTo|MemberOf*1..]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name
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```
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- Print GPO names and their container paths:
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- Find all the users that can RDP into a machine where they have special privileges:
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```
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MATCH (n:GPO) return n.name,n.gpcpath
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```
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- Print GPOs with interesting words in their names along with their container paths:
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```
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unwind ["360totalsecurity", "access", "acronis", "adaware", "admin", "admin", "aegislab", "ahnlab", "alienvault", "altavista", "amsi", "anti-virus", "antivirus", "antiy", "apexone", "applock", "arcabit", "arcsight", "atm", "atp", "av", "avast", "avg", "avira", "baidu", "baiduspider", "bank", "barracuda", "bingbot", "bitdefender", "bluvector", "canary", "carbon", "carbonblack", "certificate", "check", "checkpoint", "citrix", "clamav", "code42", "comodo", "countercept", "countertack", "credential", "crowdstrike", "custom", "cyberark", "cybereason", "cylance", "cynet360", "cyren", "darktrace", "datadog", "defender", "druva", "drweb", "duckduckbot", "edr", "egambit", "emsisoft", "encase", "endgame", "ensilo", "escan", "eset", "exabot", "exception", "f-secure", "f5", "falcon", "fidelis", "fireeye", "firewall", "fix", "forcepoint", "forti", "fortigate", "fortil", "fortinet", "gdata", "gravityzone", "guard", "honey", "huntress", "identity", "ikarussecurity", "insight", "ivanti", "juniper", "k7antivirus", "k7computing", "kaspersky", "kingsoft", "kiosk", "laps", "lightcyber", "logging", "logrhythm", "lynx", "malwarebytes", "manageengine", "mass", "mcafee", "microsoft", "mj12bot", "msnbot", "nanoav", "nessus", "netwitness", "office365", "onedrive", "orion", "palo", "paloalto", "paloaltonetworks", "panda", "pass", "powershell", "proofpoint", "proxy", "qradar", "rdp", "rsa", "runasppl", "sandboxe", "sap", "scanner", "scanning", "sccm", "script", "secret", "secureage", "secureworks", "security", "sensitive", "sentinel", "sentinelone", "slurp", "smartcard", "sogou", "solarwinds", "sonicwall", "sophos", "splunk", "superantispyware", "symantec", "tachyon", "temporary", "tencent", "totaldefense", "transfer", "trapmine", "trend micro", "trendmicro", "trusteer", "trustlook", "uac", "vdi", "virusblokada", "virustotal", "virustotalcloud", "vpn", "vuln", "webroot", "whitelist", "wifi", "winrm", "workaround", "yubikey", "zillya", "zonealarm", "zscaler"] as word match (n:GPO) where toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word) RETURN word, n.name, n.description, n.gpcpath ORDER BY n.name
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```
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- Print **Security Solutions** (think SIEM, EDRs, AVs, Anomaly detection systems, etc) deployed in the company by searching for keywords in _name, description, distinguishedname_ of all objects (User, Group, Computer, OU, ...)
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```
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UNWIND ["360totalsecurity", "acronis", "adaware", "aegislab", "ahnlab", "alienvault", "altavista", "anti-virus", "antivirus", "antiy", "apexone", "arcabit", "arcsight", "attivo", "avast", "avg", "avira", "baidu", "baiduspider", "barracuda", "bingbot", "bitdefender", "bitdefender", "bluecoat", "bluvector", "canary", "carbon", "carbonblack", "carbonblack", "check", "checkpoint", "clamav", "code42", "comodo", "cortex", "countercept", "countertack", "crowdstrike", "cyberark", "cybereason", "cylance", "cynet360", "cyren", "darktrace", "datadog", "defender", "druva", "drweb", "duckduckbot", "edr", "egambit", "emsisoft", "encase", "endgame", "ensilo", "escan", "eset", "exabot", "f-secure", "f5", "falcon", "fidelis", "fireeye", "forcepoint", "fortigate", "fortil", "fortinet", "gdata", "gdata", "gravityzone", "honey", "huntress", "ia_archiver", "ikarussecurity", "ivanti", "juniper", "k7antivirus", "k7computing", "kaspersky", "kingsoft", "lightcyber", "lynx", "malwarebytes", "mcafee", "microsoft", "mj12bot", "morphisec", "msnbot", "nanoav", "nessus", "netwitness", "office365", "palo", "paloalto", "paloaltonetworks", "panda", "proofpoint", "qradar", "sandboxe", "scanner", "scanning", "secureage", "secureworks", "security", "sentinelone", "simplepie", "slurp", "sogou", "solarwinds", "sonicwall", "sophos", "splunk", "superantispyware", "symantec", "tachyon", "tencent", "totaldefense", "trapmine", "trend", "trendmicro", "trusteer", "trustlook", "virus", "virustotal", "virustotalcloud", "webroot", "zillya", "zonealarm", "zscaler"] AS word MATCH (n) WHERE toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word) OR toLower(n.description) CONTAINS toLower(word) OR toLower(n.distinguishedname) CONTAINS toLower(word) RETURN word as keyword, LABELS(n)[1] as type, n.name, n.description, n.distinguishedname ORDER BY n.name
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```
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- Returns Top 20 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **First Degree Object Control** principals in domain:
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```
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MATCH p=(u)-[r1]->(n) WHERE r1.isacl=true
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WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type,
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COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
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WHERE name IS NOT NULL
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RETURN type, name, controlled
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ORDER BY controlled DESC
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LIMIT 20
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```
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- Returns Top 20 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Group Delegated Object Control** principals in domain and whether that object is member of high privileged group (such a `Domain Admins` or `Domain Controllers`):
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```
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MATCH p=(u)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[r2]->(n) WHERE r2.isacl=true
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WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, g.highvalue as highly_privileged,
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COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
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WHERE name IS NOT NULL
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RETURN type, name, highly_privileged, controlled
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ORDER BY controlled DESC
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LIMIT 20
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```
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- Returns Top 10 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Transitive Object Control** in domain (TAKES ENORMOUS TIME TO COMPUTE! You were warned):
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```
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MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[r1:MemberOf|AddMember|AllExtendedRights|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns*1..]->(n))
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WHERE u<>n
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WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type,
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COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled
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WHERE name IS NOT NULL
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RETURN type, name, controlled
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ORDER BY controlled DESC
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LIMIT 10
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MATCH (u:User)-[:CanRDP]->(c:Computer) WITH u,c
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OPTIONAL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[:CanRDP]->(c) WITH u,c
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MATCH (u)-[:CanPrivesc]->(c) RETURN u.name, c.name
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```
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- Pulls Kerberoastable users and returns their **Outbound Control Rights** --> **First Degree Object Control** in domain:
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@ -297,6 +225,14 @@ RETURN u.name,expAdmin,unrolledAdmin,expAdmin + unrolledAdmin as totalAdmin
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ORDER BY totalAdmin ASC
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```
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- Returns shortest path from any of owned nodes to any of highvalue nodes:
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```
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RETURN shortestPath((O:{owned:True})-[*1..]->(H {highvalue: True}))
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```
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### Groups
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- Find the most privileged groups on the domain (author: [hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) ):
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```
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MATCH (g:Group) OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer) OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c2:Computer) WITH g, COLLECT(c1) + COLLECT(c2) AS tempVar UNWIND tempVar AS computers RETURN g.name AS GroupName,COUNT(DISTINCT(computers)) AS AdminRightCount ORDER BY AdminRightCount DESC
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@ -307,9 +243,37 @@ MATCH (g:Group) OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer) OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-
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MATCH (g:Group) WITH g OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[r:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer) WITH g,COUNT(c1) as explicitAdmins OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[r:MemberOf*1..]->(a:Group)-[r2:AdminTo]->(c2:Computer) WITH g,explicitAdmins,COUNT(DISTINCT(c2)) as unrolledAdmins where g.name IS NOT NULL AND (explicitAdmins + unrolledAdmins) > 0 RETURN g.name,explicitAdmins,unrolledAdmins, explicitAdmins + unrolledAdmins as totalAdmins ORDER BY totalAdmins DESC
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```
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- Find all other Rights Domain Users shouldn't have (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ):
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- Counts unrolled members of Tier-0 privileged AD groups (copy all query lines, as they are UNION ALL joined):
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```
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MATCH p=(m:Group)-[r:Owns|WriteDacl|GenericAll|WriteOwner|ExecuteDCOM|GenericWrite|AllowedToDelegate|ForceChangePassword]->(n:Computer) WHERE m.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN USERS' RETURN p
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "ENTERPRISE ADMINS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN ADMINS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "SCHEMA ADMIN" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "ACCOUNT OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "BACKUP OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "PRINT OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "SERVER OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "READ-ONLY DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "GROUP POLICY CREATOR OWNERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL
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MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DISTRIBUTED COM USERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted
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```
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### Computers
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- Returns computer names and their operating system for statistics purposes
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```
|
||||
MATCH (c:Computer) WHERE c.operatingsystem is not null RETURN c.name as Name, c.operatingsystem as OS
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Returns a summary report of machines grouped by their operating systems versions, along with number of machines running specific OS version:
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH (c:Computer) WHERE c.operatingsystem is not null MATCH (n:Computer {operatingsystem: c.operatingsystem}) RETURN c.operatingsystem as OS, count(distinct n) AS Number ORDER BY Number DESC
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Returns non-DC computers that enable unconstrained delegation along with their LDAP DN paths and operating systems.:
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation: True}), (g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with 'DOMAIN CONTROLLERS' MATCH (c) WHERE NOT (c)-[:MemberOf]->(g) RETURN c.name, c.distinguishedname, c.operatingsystem
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Riccardo Ancarani's cypher queries (src: [GPOPowerParser](https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/GPOPowerParser)) useful for any lateral movement insights:
|
||||
|
|
@ -319,13 +283,68 @@ MATCH (u1:Computer)-[:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer {signing: false}) RETURN u1.name, c
|
|||
MATCH (u2)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c2 {signing: false}) RETURN u2.name, c2.name
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Find all the users that can RDP into a machine where they have special privileges:
|
||||
### GPOs
|
||||
|
||||
- Print GPO names and their container paths:
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH (u:User)-[:CanRDP]->(c:Computer) WITH u,c
|
||||
OPTIONAL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[:CanRDP]->(c) WITH u,c
|
||||
MATCH (u)-[:CanPrivesc]->(c) RETURN u.name, c.name
|
||||
MATCH (n:GPO) return n.name,n.gpcpath
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Pull GPOs linked to users being member of a specified group:
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH p = (:GPO)-[:GpLink]->(d)-[:Contains*1..]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:'GROUP_NAME@CONTOSO.LOCAL'}) RETURN p
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Print GPOs with interesting words in their names along with their container paths:
|
||||
```
|
||||
unwind ["360totalsecurity", "access", "acronis", "adaware", "admin", "admin", "aegislab", "ahnlab", "alienvault", "altavista", "amsi", "anti-virus", "antivirus", "antiy", "apexone", "applock", "arcabit", "arcsight", "atm", "atp", "av", "avast", "avg", "avira", "baidu", "baiduspider", "bank", "barracuda", "bingbot", "bitdefender", "bluvector", "canary", "carbon", "carbonblack", "certificate", "check", "checkpoint", "citrix", "clamav", "code42", "comodo", "countercept", "countertack", "credential", "crowdstrike", "custom", "cyberark", "cybereason", "cylance", "cynet360", "cyren", "darktrace", "datadog", "defender", "druva", "drweb", "duckduckbot", "edr", "egambit", "emsisoft", "encase", "endgame", "ensilo", "escan", "eset", "exabot", "exception", "f-secure", "f5", "falcon", "fidelis", "fireeye", "firewall", "fix", "forcepoint", "forti", "fortigate", "fortil", "fortinet", "gdata", "gravityzone", "guard", "honey", "huntress", "identity", "ikarussecurity", "insight", "ivanti", "juniper", "k7antivirus", "k7computing", "kaspersky", "kingsoft", "kiosk", "laps", "lightcyber", "logging", "logrhythm", "lynx", "malwarebytes", "manageengine", "mass", "mcafee", "microsoft", "mj12bot", "msnbot", "nanoav", "nessus", "netwitness", "office365", "onedrive", "orion", "palo", "paloalto", "paloaltonetworks", "panda", "pass", "powershell", "proofpoint", "proxy", "qradar", "rdp", "rsa", "runasppl", "sandboxe", "sap", "scanner", "scanning", "sccm", "script", "secret", "secureage", "secureworks", "security", "sensitive", "sentinel", "sentinelone", "slurp", "smartcard", "sogou", "solarwinds", "sonicwall", "sophos", "splunk", "superantispyware", "symantec", "tachyon", "temporary", "tencent", "totaldefense", "transfer", "trapmine", "trend micro", "trendmicro", "trusteer", "trustlook", "uac", "vdi", "virusblokada", "virustotal", "virustotalcloud", "vpn", "vuln", "webroot", "whitelist", "wifi", "winrm", "workaround", "yubikey", "zillya", "zonealarm", "zscaler"] as word match (n:GPO) where toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word) RETURN word, n.name, n.description, n.gpcpath ORDER BY n.name
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### OUs
|
||||
|
||||
- Returns a list of OUs along with their members count (source: [hausec.com](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) )
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH (o:OU)-[:Contains]->(c) RETURN o.name,o.guid, COUNT(c) ORDER BY COUNT(c) DESC
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Other
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Retrieves nodes having particular juicy keywords in their description properties:
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'pass' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'secret' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'admin' RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'sensitive' RETURN n.name, n.description
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Show only owned nodes of the above ones:
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'pass' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'secret' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'admin' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS 'sensitive' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description UNION
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS '\\' and n.owned = TRUE RETURN n.name, n.description
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Retrieves nodes that contain UNC paths to SMB shares in their description fields:
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS '\\\\' RETURN n.name, n.description
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Print **Security Solutions** (think SIEM, EDRs, AVs, Anomaly detection systems, etc) deployed in the company by searching for keywords in _name, description, distinguishedname_ of all objects (User, Group, Computer, OU, ...)
|
||||
```
|
||||
UNWIND ["360totalsecurity", "acronis", "adaware", "aegislab", "ahnlab", "alienvault", "altavista", "anti-virus", "antivirus", "antiy", "apexone", "arcabit", "arcsight", "attivo", "avast", "avg", "avira", "baidu", "baiduspider", "barracuda", "bingbot", "bitdefender", "bitdefender", "bluecoat", "bluvector", "canary", "carbon", "carbonblack", "carbonblack", "check", "checkpoint", "clamav", "code42", "comodo", "cortex", "countercept", "countertack", "crowdstrike", "cyberark", "cybereason", "cylance", "cynet360", "cyren", "darktrace", "datadog", "defender", "druva", "drweb", "duckduckbot", "edr", "egambit", "emsisoft", "encase", "endgame", "ensilo", "escan", "eset", "exabot", "f-secure", "f5", "falcon", "fidelis", "fireeye", "forcepoint", "fortigate", "fortil", "fortinet", "gdata", "gdata", "gravityzone", "honey", "huntress", "ia_archiver", "ikarussecurity", "ivanti", "juniper", "k7antivirus", "k7computing", "kaspersky", "kingsoft", "lightcyber", "lynx", "malwarebytes", "mcafee", "microsoft", "mj12bot", "morphisec", "msnbot", "nanoav", "nessus", "netwitness", "office365", "palo", "paloalto", "paloaltonetworks", "panda", "proofpoint", "qradar", "sandboxe", "scanner", "scanning", "secureage", "secureworks", "security", "sentinelone", "simplepie", "slurp", "sogou", "solarwinds", "sonicwall", "sophos", "splunk", "superantispyware", "symantec", "tachyon", "tencent", "totaldefense", "trapmine", "trend", "trendmicro", "trusteer", "trustlook", "virus", "virustotal", "virustotalcloud", "webroot", "zillya", "zonealarm", "zscaler"] AS word MATCH (n) WHERE toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word) OR toLower(n.description) CONTAINS toLower(word) OR toLower(n.distinguishedname) CONTAINS toLower(word) RETURN word as keyword, LABELS(n)[1] as type, n.name, n.description, n.distinguishedname ORDER BY n.name
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Find all other Rights Domain Users shouldn't have (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ):
|
||||
```
|
||||
MATCH p=(m:Group)-[r:Owns|WriteDacl|GenericAll|WriteOwner|ExecuteDCOM|GenericWrite|AllowedToDelegate|ForceChangePassword]->(n:Computer) WHERE m.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN USERS' RETURN p
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## CREATE Nodes and Edges
|
||||
|
||||
- Mark nodes as Owned:
|
||||
|
|
@ -380,7 +399,10 @@ DOMAIN USERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - AdminTo -> SECWWKS1000000.WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - Gener
|
|||
DOMAIN USERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - AdminTo -> SECWWKS1000000.WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - GenericAll -> GENARO_PARKER@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - MemberOf -> GROUP POLICY CREATOR OWNERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Other sources of great Cypher Queries:
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Other sources of great Cypher Queries
|
||||
|
||||
- Hausec - https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/
|
||||
- Jeffmcjunkin - https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12
|
||||
- seajaysec - https://gist.github.com/seajaysec/c7f0995b5a6a2d30515accde8513f77d
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue