### General - Counts various Active Directory statistics and weaknesses. (Change `ENDS WITH ""` to `ENDS WITH "contoso.com"` to limit results to specified domain): ``` MATCH (u:User) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "Users in total" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u:Computer) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "Computers in total" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u:Group) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "Groups in total" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u:Domain) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "Domains in total" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u:OU) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "OUs in total" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u:GPO) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "GPOs in total" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u {pwdneverexpires: True}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "Password Never Expires" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u {passwordnotreqd: True}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "Password Not Required" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u {dontreqpreauth: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "Pre-Authentication Not Required" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" AND NOT u.name STARTS WITH 'KRBTGT' RETURN "Kerberoastable" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "ASREProastable" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u {admincount: True}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "adminCount=1" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" AND u.userpassword =~ ".+" RETURN "userPassword Not Empty" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u:Computer {unconstraineddelegation: True}), (g:Group) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" AND g.name starts with 'DOMAIN CONTROLLERS' MATCH (u) WHERE (u)-[:MemberOf]->(g) RETURN "Unconstrained Delegation Computers" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u {owned: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "Owned Principals" AS what, count(u) AS number UNION ALL MATCH (u {highvalue: true}) WHERE toLower(u.name) ENDS WITH "" RETURN "High Value" AS what, count(u) AS number ``` - Returns all objects that have SPNs set and checks whether they are allowed to delegate, have admincount set or can be used for unconstrained delegation: ``` MATCH (c {hasspn: True}) RETURN c.name as name, c.allowedtodelegate as AllowedToDelegate, c.unconstraineddelegation as UnconstrainedDelegation, c.admincount as AdminCount, c.serviceprincipalnames as SPNs ``` - Returns Top 100 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **First Degree Object Control** principals in domain: ``` MATCH p=(u)-[r1]->(n) WHERE r1.isacl=true WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled WHERE name IS NOT NULL RETURN type, name, controlled ORDER BY controlled DESC LIMIT 100 ``` - Returns Top 100 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Group Delegated Object Control** principals in domain and whether that object is member of high privileged group (such a `Domain Admins` or `Domain Controllers`): ``` MATCH p=(u)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[r2]->(n) WHERE r2.isacl=true WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, g.highvalue as highly_privileged, COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled WHERE name IS NOT NULL RETURN type, name, highly_privileged, controlled ORDER BY controlled DESC LIMIT 100 ``` - Returns Top 50 **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Transitive Object Control** in domain (TAKES ENORMOUS TIME TO COMPUTE! You were warned): ``` MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[r1:MemberOf|AddMember|AllExtendedRights|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns*1..]->(n)) WHERE u<>n WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled WHERE name IS NOT NULL RETURN type, name, controlled ORDER BY controlled DESC LIMIT 50 ``` ### Users - Pulls users eligible for ASREP roasting ``` MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth: true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Shortest path from ASREP roastable users to Domain Admins ``` MATCH (A:User {dontreqpreauth: true}), (B:Group), x=shortestPath((A)-[*1..]->(B)) WHERE B.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN ADMINS' RETURN x ``` - Pulls users with `adminCount=1` ``` MATCH (u:User {admincount: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Pulls users with `PasswordNeverExpires` set. ``` MATCH (u:User {pwdneverexpires: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Pulls kerberoastable users with `adminCount=1` ``` MATCH (u:User {admincount: True, hasspn: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.hasspn as Kerberoastable, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Pulls users with `adminCount=1` and displays whether they're Kerberoastable, ASREPRoastable or Owned ``` MATCH (u:User {admincount: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.owned as owned, u.hasspn as Kerberoastable, u.dontreqpreauth as ASREPRoastable, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Pulls users eligible for Kerberoasting ``` MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Return Kerberoastable users with a path to High Value groups: ``` MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {hasspn: true})-[r:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highvalue: true})) RETURN u.name AS kerberoastable_user, g.name AS high_value_group, u.displayname AS user_displayname ``` - Shortest path from Kerberoastable users to Domain Admins ``` MATCH (A:User),(B:Group),p=shortestPath((A)-[*1..]->(B)) WHERE A.hasspn=true AND B.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN ADMINS' RETURN p ``` - Shortest path from any user that has PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED set to any computer ``` MATCH (m:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}), (n:Computer), p = shortestPath((m)-[*1..]->(n)) RETURN p ``` - Find all users that have userPassword attribute not empty ``` MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.userpassword =~ ".+" RETURN u.name, u.userpassword, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Return enabled users that have PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED flag set in their UserAccountControl field (thus they have an empty password set) ``` MATCH (u:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Find enabled users not requiring Pre-Authentication (their passwords will be a lot easier to crack): ``` MATCH (u:User {enabled: True, dontreqpreauth: true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname, u.description, u.objectid ``` - Find a shortest path from any user that has PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED set to Domain Admins group: ``` MATCH (m:User {enabled: True, passwordnotreqd: True}), (n:Group), p = shortestPath((m)-[*1..]->(n)) WHERE n.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN ADMINS' RETURN p ``` - Find all users that have direct or indirect admin privileges over a computer: ``` MATCH (u:User)-[r:AdminTo|MemberOf*1..]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name ``` - Find all the users that can RDP into a machine where they have special privileges: ``` MATCH (u:User)-[:CanRDP]->(c:Computer) WITH u,c OPTIONAL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[:CanRDP]->(c) WITH u,c MATCH (u)-[:CanPrivesc]->(c) RETURN u.name, c.name ``` - Pulls Kerberoastable users and returns their **Outbound Control Rights** --> **First Degree Object Control** in domain: ``` MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}), p=(u)-[r1]->(n) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' AND r1.isacl=true WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled WHERE name IS NOT NULL RETURN type, name, controlled ORDER BY controlled DESC ``` - Pulls Kerberoastable users and returns their **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Group Delegated Object Control** in domain and whether that object is member of high privileged group (such a `Domain Admins` or `Domain Controllers`): ``` MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}), p=(u)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[r2]->(n) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' AND r2.isacl=true WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, g.highvalue as highly_privileged, COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled WHERE name IS NOT NULL RETURN type, name, highly_privileged, controlled ORDER BY controlled DESC ``` - Pulls Kerberoastable users and returns their **Outbound Control Rights** --> **Transitive Object Control** in domain (TAKES ENORMOUS TIME TO COMPUTE! You were warned): ``` MATCH (u:User {hasspn: True}), p=shortestPath((u)-[r1:MemberOf|AddMember|AllExtendedRights|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns*1..]->(n)) WHERE NOT u.name starts with 'KRBTGT' AND u<>n WITH u.name as name, LABELS(u)[1] as type, COUNT(DISTINCT(n)) as controlled WHERE name IS NOT NULL RETURN type, name, controlled ORDER BY controlled DESC ``` - Returns username and number of computers where it has admin rights to for top 10 users (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ): ``` MATCH (U:User)-[r:MemberOf|AdminTo*1..]->(C:Computer) WITH U.name as n, COUNT(DISTINCT(C)) as c RETURN n,c ORDER BY c DESC LIMIT 10 ``` - Returns group and number of computers that group has admin rights to - for top 10 groups (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ): ``` MATCH (G:Group)-[r:MemberOf|AdminTo*1..]->(C:Computer) WITH G.name as n, COUNT(DISTINCT(C)) as c RETURN n,c ORDER BY c DESC LIMIT 10 ``` - Show all users that are administrators on more than one machine (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ): ``` MATCH (U:User)-[r:MemberOf|AdminTo*1..]->(C:Computer) WITH U.name as n, COUNT(DISTINCT(C)) as c WHERE c>1 RETURN n ORDER BY c DESC ``` - Show all users that are administrative on at least one machine, ranked by the number of machines they are admin on. (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ): ``` MATCH (u:User) WITH u OPTIONAL MATCH (u)-[r:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) WITH u,COUNT(c) as expAdmin OPTIONAL MATCH (u)-[r:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[r2:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) WHERE NOT (u)-[:AdminTo]->(c) WITH u,expAdmin,COUNT(DISTINCT(c)) as unrolledAdmin RETURN u.name,expAdmin,unrolledAdmin,expAdmin + unrolledAdmin as totalAdmin ORDER BY totalAdmin ASC ``` - Returns shortest path from any of owned nodes to any of highvalue nodes: ``` RETURN shortestPath((O:{owned:True})-[*1..]->(H {highvalue: True})) ``` ### Groups - Find the most privileged groups on the domain (author: [hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) ): ``` MATCH (g:Group) OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer) OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c2:Computer) WITH g, COLLECT(c1) + COLLECT(c2) AS tempVar UNWIND tempVar AS computers RETURN g.name AS GroupName,COUNT(DISTINCT(computers)) AS AdminRightCount ORDER BY AdminRightCount DESC ``` - Find groups with most local admins (either explicit admins or derivative/unrolled) (modified version of query taken from almighty [hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) ): ``` MATCH (g:Group) WITH g OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[r:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer) WITH g,COUNT(c1) as explicitAdmins OPTIONAL MATCH (g)-[r:MemberOf*1..]->(a:Group)-[r2:AdminTo]->(c2:Computer) WITH g,explicitAdmins,COUNT(DISTINCT(c2)) as unrolledAdmins where g.name IS NOT NULL AND (explicitAdmins + unrolledAdmins) > 0 RETURN g.name,explicitAdmins,unrolledAdmins, explicitAdmins + unrolledAdmins as totalAdmins ORDER BY totalAdmins DESC ``` - Counts unrolled members of Tier-0 privileged AD groups (copy all query lines, as they are UNION ALL joined): ``` MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "ENTERPRISE ADMINS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN ADMINS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "SCHEMA ADMIN" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "ACCOUNT OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "BACKUP OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "PRINT OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "SERVER OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "READ-ONLY DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "GROUP POLICY CREATOR OWNERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATORS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted UNION ALL MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DISTRIBUTED COM USERS" RETURN g.name AS GroupName, count(u) AS MembersCounted ``` ### Computers - Returns computer names and their operating system for statistics purposes ``` MATCH (c:Computer) WHERE c.operatingsystem is not null RETURN c.name as Name, c.operatingsystem as OS ``` - Returns a summary report of machines grouped by their operating systems versions, along with number of machines running specific OS version: ``` MATCH (c:Computer) WHERE c.operatingsystem is not null MATCH (n:Computer {operatingsystem: c.operatingsystem}) RETURN c.operatingsystem as OS, count(distinct n) AS Number ORDER BY Number DESC ``` - Returns non-DC computers that enable unconstrained delegation along with their LDAP DN paths and operating systems.: ``` MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation: True}), (g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with 'DOMAIN CONTROLLERS' MATCH (c) WHERE NOT (c)-[:MemberOf]->(g) RETURN c.name, c.distinguishedname, c.operatingsystem ``` - Riccardo Ancarani's cypher queries (src: [GPOPowerParser](https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/GPOPowerParser)) useful for any lateral movement insights: - Find all the NTLM relay opportunities for computer accounts: ``` MATCH (u1:Computer)-[:AdminTo]->(c1:Computer {signing: false}) RETURN u1.name, c1.name MATCH (u2)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c2 {signing: false}) RETURN u2.name, c2.name ``` ### GPOs - Print GPO names and their container paths: ``` MATCH (n:GPO) return n.name,n.gpcpath ``` - Pull GPOs linked to users being member of a specified group: ``` MATCH p = (:GPO)-[:GpLink]->(d)-[:Contains*1..]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:'GROUP_NAME@CONTOSO.LOCAL'}) RETURN p ``` - Print GPOs with interesting words in their names along with their container paths: ``` unwind ["360totalsecurity", "access", "acronis", "adaware", "admin", "admin", "aegislab", "ahnlab", "alienvault", "altavista", "amsi", "anti-virus", "antivirus", "antiy", "apexone", "applock", "arcabit", "arcsight", "atm", "atp", "av", "avast", "avg", "avira", "baidu", "baiduspider", "bank", "barracuda", "bingbot", "bitdefender", "bluvector", "canary", "carbon", "carbonblack", "certificate", "check", "checkpoint", "citrix", "clamav", "code42", "comodo", "countercept", "countertack", "credential", "crowdstrike", "custom", "cyberark", "cybereason", "cylance", "cynet360", "cyren", "darktrace", "datadog", "defender", "druva", "drweb", "duckduckbot", "edr", "egambit", "emsisoft", "encase", "endgame", "ensilo", "escan", "eset", "exabot", "exception", "f-secure", "f5", "falcon", "fidelis", "fireeye", "firewall", "fix", "forcepoint", "forti", "fortigate", "fortil", "fortinet", "gdata", "gravityzone", "guard", "honey", "huntress", "identity", "ikarussecurity", "insight", "ivanti", "juniper", "k7antivirus", "k7computing", "kaspersky", "kingsoft", "kiosk", "laps", "lightcyber", "logging", "logrhythm", "lynx", "malwarebytes", "manageengine", "mass", "mcafee", "microsoft", "mj12bot", "msnbot", "nanoav", "nessus", "netwitness", "office365", "onedrive", "orion", "palo", "paloalto", "paloaltonetworks", "panda", "pass", "powershell", "proofpoint", "proxy", "qradar", "rdp", "rsa", "runasppl", "sandboxe", "sap", "scanner", "scanning", "sccm", "script", "secret", "secureage", "secureworks", "security", "sensitive", "sentinel", "sentinelone", "slurp", "smartcard", "sogou", "solarwinds", "sonicwall", "sophos", "splunk", "superantispyware", "symantec", "tachyon", "temporary", "tencent", "totaldefense", "transfer", "trapmine", "trend micro", "trendmicro", "trusteer", "trustlook", "uac", "vdi", "virusblokada", "virustotal", "virustotalcloud", "vpn", "vuln", "webroot", "whitelist", "wifi", "winrm", "workaround", "yubikey", "zillya", "zonealarm", "zscaler"] as word match (n:GPO) where toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word) RETURN word, n.name, n.description, n.gpcpath ORDER BY n.name ``` ### OUs - Returns a list of OUs along with their members count (source: [hausec.com](https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/) ) ``` MATCH (o:OU)-[:Contains]->(c) RETURN o.name,o.guid, COUNT(c) ORDER BY COUNT(c) DESC ``` ### Other - Retrieves nodes having particular juicy keywords in their name or description properties: ``` UNWIND ["admin", "amministratore", "contrase", "empfidlich", "geheim", "hasło", "important", "azure", "MSOL", "Kennwort", "parol", "parola", "pass", "passe", "secret", "secreto", "segreto", "sekret", "sensibil", "sensibile", "sensible", "sensitive", "wrażliw"] AS word MATCH (n) WHERE (toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word)) OR (toLower(n.description) CONTAINS toLower(word)) RETURN word, n.name, n.description ORDER BY n.name ``` - Retrieves nodes that contain UNC paths to SMB shares in their description fields: ``` MATCH (n) WHERE n.description CONTAINS '\\\\' RETURN n.name, n.description ``` - Print **Security Solutions** (think SIEM, EDRs, AVs, Anomaly detection systems, etc) deployed in the company by searching for keywords in _name, description, distinguishedname_ of all objects (User, Group, Computer, OU, ...) ``` UNWIND ["360totalsecurity", "acronis", "adaware", "aegislab", "ahnlab", "alienvault", "altavista", "anti-virus", "antivirus", "antiy", "apexone", "arcabit", "arcsight", "attivo", "avast", "avg", "avira", "baidu", "baiduspider", "barracuda", "bingbot", "bitdefender", "bitdefender", "bluecoat", "bluvector", "canary", "carbon", "carbonblack", "carbonblack", "check", "checkpoint", "clamav", "code42", "comodo", "cortex", "countercept", "countertack", "crowdstrike", "cyberark", "cybereason", "cylance", "cynet360", "cyren", "darktrace", "datadog", "defender", "druva", "drweb", "duckduckbot", "edr", "egambit", "emsisoft", "encase", "endgame", "ensilo", "escan", "eset", "exabot", "f-secure", "f5", "falcon", "fidelis", "fireeye", "forcepoint", "fortigate", "fortil", "fortinet", "gdata", "gdata", "gravityzone", "honey", "huntress", "ia_archiver", "ikarussecurity", "ivanti", "juniper", "k7antivirus", "k7computing", "kaspersky", "kingsoft", "lightcyber", "lynx", "malwarebytes", "mcafee", "microsoft", "mj12bot", "morphisec", "msnbot", "nanoav", "nessus", "netwitness", "office365", "palo", "paloalto", "paloaltonetworks", "panda", "proofpoint", "qradar", "sandboxe", "scanner", "scanning", "secureage", "secureworks", "security", "sentinelone", "simplepie", "slurp", "sogou", "solarwinds", "sonicwall", "sophos", "splunk", "superantispyware", "symantec", "tachyon", "tencent", "totaldefense", "trapmine", "trend", "trendmicro", "trusteer", "trustlook", "virus", "virustotal", "virustotalcloud", "webroot", "zillya", "zonealarm", "zscaler"] AS word MATCH (n) WHERE toLower(n.name) CONTAINS toLower(word) OR toLower(n.description) CONTAINS toLower(word) OR toLower(n.distinguishedname) CONTAINS toLower(word) RETURN word as keyword, LABELS(n)[1] as type, n.name, n.description, n.distinguishedname ORDER BY n.name ``` - Find all other Rights Domain Users shouldn't have (author: [jeffmcjunkin](https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12) ): ``` MATCH p=(m:Group)-[r:Owns|WriteDacl|GenericAll|WriteOwner|ExecuteDCOM|GenericWrite|AllowedToDelegate|ForceChangePassword]->(n:Computer) WHERE m.name STARTS WITH 'DOMAIN USERS' RETURN p ``` --- ## CREATE Nodes and Edges - Mark nodes as Owned: ``` MATCH (u) WHERE toLower(u.name) = "user1@contoso.com" SET u.owned RETURN 1 UNION MATCH (u) WHERE toLower(u.name) = "group2@contoso.com" SET u.owned RETURN 1 UNION MATCH (u) WHERE toLower(u.name) = "computer3@contoso.com" SET u.owned RETURN 1 ``` - Mark High Value all members of High Value groups: ``` MATCH (u)-[:MemberOf]->(n {highvalue: true}) SET u.highvalue = true ``` - Add `HasSession` edge for user `ALICE@DOMAIN` being logged onto `COMPUTER@DOMAIN` : ``` MATCH (A:Computer {name: "COMPUTER@DOMAIN"}) MATCH (B:User {name: "ALICE@DOMAIN"}) CREATE (A)-[:HasSession]->(B) ``` - Adds `HasSession` relationship on all domain controllers to Domain Admins group: ``` MATCH (u:Computer)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group) WHERE g.name starts with "DOMAIN CONTROLLERS" MATCH (h:Group) WHERE h.name starts with "DOMAIN ADMINS" CREATE (u)-[:HasSession]->(h) ``` - Adds `AdminTo` relationship from User to Computer: ``` MATCH (A:User {name: "ALICE@DOMAIN"}) MATCH (B:Computer {name: "COMPUTER.DOMAIN"}) CREATE (A)-[:AdminTo]->(B) ``` - Authored by **Knavesec** on a #cypher_queries Bloodhound slack: Prints graph paths of the returns yielded by query in `p` variable. Modify the first line to determine paths you would like to be printed (for later grepping, searching). Example: ``` match p=shortestPath((g:Group)-[*1..]->(n {highvalue:true})) where g.objectid ends with "-513" WITH [node in nodes(p) | coalesce(node.name, '')] as nodeLabels, [rel in relationships(p) | type(rel)] as relationshipLabels, length(p) as path_len WITH reduce(path='', x in range(0,path_len-1) | path + nodeLabels[x] + ' - ' + relationshipLabels[x] + ' -> ') as path, nodeLabels[path_len] as final_node return distinct path + final_node as full_path limit 3 ``` Example output: ``` DOMAIN USERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - AdminTo -> SECWWKS1000000.WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - GenericAll -> ELMER_GUERRERO@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - MemberOf -> DOMAIN CONTROLLERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL DOMAIN USERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - AdminTo -> SECWWKS1000000.WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - GenericAll -> GENARO_PARKER@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL - MemberOf -> GROUP POLICY CREATOR OWNERS@WINDOMAIN.LOCAL ``` --- ## Other sources of great Cypher Queries - Hausec - https://hausec.com/2019/09/09/bloodhound-cypher-cheatsheet/ - Jeffmcjunkin - https://gist.github.com/jeffmcjunkin/7b4a67bb7dd0cfbfbd83768f3aa6eb12 - seajaysec - https://gist.github.com/seajaysec/c7f0995b5a6a2d30515accde8513f77d