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ssh-audit/ssh-audit.py

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
The MIT License (MIT)
Copyright (C) 2017-2020 Joe Testa (jtesta@positronsecurity.com)
Copyright (C) 2017 Andris Raugulis (moo@arthepsy.eu)
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
THE SOFTWARE.
"""
import base64
import binascii
import errno
import getopt
import hashlib
import io
import json
import os
import random
import re
import select
import socket
import struct
import sys
# pylint: disable=unused-import
from typing import Dict, List, Set, Sequence, Tuple, Iterable
from typing import Callable, Optional, Union, Any
VERSION = 'v2.2.1-dev'
SSH_HEADER = 'SSH-{0}-OpenSSH_8.0' # SSH software to impersonate
try: # pragma: nocover
from colorama import init as colorama_init
colorama_init(strip=False) # pragma: nocover
except ImportError: # pragma: nocover
pass
def usage(err: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
uout = Output()
p = os.path.basename(sys.argv[0])
uout.head('# {} {}, https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit\n'.format(p, VERSION))
if err is not None and len(err) > 0:
uout.fail('\n' + err)
uout.info('usage: {} [-1246pbcnjvlt] <host>\n'.format(p))
uout.info(' -h, --help print this help')
uout.info(' -1, --ssh1 force ssh version 1 only')
uout.info(' -2, --ssh2 force ssh version 2 only')
uout.info(' -4, --ipv4 enable IPv4 (order of precedence)')
uout.info(' -6, --ipv6 enable IPv6 (order of precedence)')
uout.info(' -p, --port=<port> port to connect')
uout.info(' -b, --batch batch output')
uout.info(' -c, --client-audit starts a server on port 2222 to audit client\n software config (use -p to change port;\n use -t to change timeout)')
uout.info(' -n, --no-colors disable colors')
uout.info(' -j, --json JSON output')
uout.info(' -v, --verbose verbose output')
uout.info(' -l, --level=<level> minimum output level (info|warn|fail)')
uout.info(' -t, --timeout=<secs> timeout (in seconds) for connection and reading\n (default: 5)')
uout.sep()
sys.exit(1)
class AuditConf:
# pylint: disable=too-many-instance-attributes
def __init__(self, host: Optional[str] = None, port: int = 22) -> None:
self.host = host
self.port = port
self.ssh1 = True
self.ssh2 = True
self.batch = False
self.client_audit = False
self.colors = True
self.json = False
self.verbose = False
self.level = 'info'
self.ipvo = () # type: Sequence[int]
self.ipv4 = False
self.ipv6 = False
self.timeout = 5.0
self.timeout_set = False # Set to True when the user explicitly sets it.
def __setattr__(self, name: str, value: Union[str, int, float, bool, Sequence[int]]) -> None:
valid = False
if name in ['ssh1', 'ssh2', 'batch', 'client_audit', 'colors', 'verbose', 'timeout_set', 'json']:
valid, value = True, bool(value)
elif name in ['ipv4', 'ipv6']:
valid = False
value = bool(value)
ipv = 4 if name == 'ipv4' else 6
if value:
value = tuple(list(self.ipvo) + [ipv])
else: # pylint: disable=else-if-used
if len(self.ipvo) == 0:
value = (6,) if ipv == 4 else (4,)
else:
value = tuple([x for x in self.ipvo if x != ipv])
self.__setattr__('ipvo', value)
elif name == 'ipvo':
if isinstance(value, (tuple, list)):
uniq_value = utils.unique_seq(value)
value = tuple([x for x in uniq_value if x in (4, 6)])
valid = True
ipv_both = len(value) == 0
object.__setattr__(self, 'ipv4', ipv_both or 4 in value)
object.__setattr__(self, 'ipv6', ipv_both or 6 in value)
elif name == 'port':
valid, port = True, utils.parse_int(value)
if port < 1 or port > 65535:
raise ValueError('invalid port: {}'.format(value))
value = port
elif name in ['level']:
if value not in ('info', 'warn', 'fail'):
raise ValueError('invalid level: {}'.format(value))
valid = True
elif name == 'host':
valid = True
elif name == 'timeout':
value = utils.parse_float(value)
if value == -1.0:
raise ValueError('invalid timeout: {}'.format(value))
valid = True
if valid:
object.__setattr__(self, name, value)
@classmethod
def from_cmdline(cls, args: List[str], usage_cb: Callable[..., None]) -> 'AuditConf': # pylint: disable=too-many-statements
# pylint: disable=too-many-branches
aconf = cls()
try:
sopts = 'h1246p:bcnjvl:t:'
lopts = ['help', 'ssh1', 'ssh2', 'ipv4', 'ipv6', 'port=', 'json',
'batch', 'client-audit', 'no-colors', 'verbose', 'level=', 'timeout=']
opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(args, sopts, lopts)
except getopt.GetoptError as err:
usage_cb(str(err))
aconf.ssh1, aconf.ssh2 = False, False
oport = None
for o, a in opts:
if o in ('-h', '--help'):
usage_cb()
elif o in ('-1', '--ssh1'):
aconf.ssh1 = True
elif o in ('-2', '--ssh2'):
aconf.ssh2 = True
elif o in ('-4', '--ipv4'):
aconf.ipv4 = True
elif o in ('-6', '--ipv6'):
aconf.ipv6 = True
elif o in ('-p', '--port'):
oport = a
elif o in ('-b', '--batch'):
aconf.batch = True
aconf.verbose = True
elif o in ('-c', '--client-audit'):
aconf.client_audit = True
elif o in ('-n', '--no-colors'):
aconf.colors = False
elif o in ('-j', '--json'):
aconf.json = True
elif o in ('-v', '--verbose'):
aconf.verbose = True
elif o in ('-l', '--level'):
if a not in ('info', 'warn', 'fail'):
usage_cb('level {} is not valid'.format(a))
aconf.level = a
elif o in ('-t', '--timeout'):
aconf.timeout = float(a)
aconf.timeout_set = True
if len(args) == 0 and aconf.client_audit is False:
usage_cb()
if aconf.client_audit is False:
if oport is not None:
host = args[0] # type: Optional[str]
else:
mx = re.match(r'^\[([^\]]+)\](?::(.*))?$', args[0])
if mx is not None:
host, oport = mx.group(1), mx.group(2)
else:
s = args[0].split(':')
if len(s) > 2:
host, oport = args[0], '22'
else:
host, oport = s[0], s[1] if len(s) > 1 else '22'
if not host:
usage_cb('host is empty')
else:
host = None
if oport is None:
oport = '2222'
port = utils.parse_int(oport)
if port <= 0 or port > 65535:
usage_cb('port {} is not valid'.format(oport))
aconf.host = host
aconf.port = port
if not (aconf.ssh1 or aconf.ssh2):
aconf.ssh1, aconf.ssh2 = True, True
return aconf
class Output:
LEVELS = ('info', 'warn', 'fail') # type: Sequence[str]
COLORS = {'head': 36, 'good': 32, 'warn': 33, 'fail': 31}
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.batch = False
self.verbose = False
self.use_colors = True
self.json = False
self.__level = 0
self.__colsupport = 'colorama' in sys.modules or os.name == 'posix'
@property
def level(self) -> str:
if self.__level < len(self.LEVELS):
return self.LEVELS[self.__level]
return 'unknown'
@level.setter
def level(self, name: str) -> None:
self.__level = self.get_level(name)
def get_level(self, name: str) -> int:
cname = 'info' if name == 'good' else name
if cname not in self.LEVELS:
return sys.maxsize
return self.LEVELS.index(cname)
def sep(self) -> None:
if not self.batch:
print()
@property
def colors_supported(self) -> bool:
return self.__colsupport
@staticmethod
def _colorized(color: str) -> Callable[[str], None]:
return lambda x: print(u'{}{}\033[0m'.format(color, x))
def __getattr__(self, name: str) -> Callable[[str], None]:
if name == 'head' and self.batch:
return lambda x: None
if not self.get_level(name) >= self.__level:
return lambda x: None
if self.use_colors and self.colors_supported and name in self.COLORS:
color = '\033[0;{}m'.format(self.COLORS[name])
return self._colorized(color)
else:
return lambda x: print(u'{}'.format(x))
class OutputBuffer(list):
def __enter__(self) -> 'OutputBuffer':
# pylint: disable=attribute-defined-outside-init
self.__buf = io.StringIO()
self.__stdout = sys.stdout
sys.stdout = self.__buf
return self
def flush(self, sort_lines: bool = False) -> None:
# Lines must be sorted in some cases to ensure consistent testing.
if sort_lines:
self.sort()
for line in self:
print(line)
def __exit__(self, *args: Any) -> None:
self.extend(self.__buf.getvalue().splitlines())
sys.stdout = self.__stdout
class SSH2: # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
class KexDB: # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
# pylint: disable=bad-whitespace
WARN_OPENSSH74_UNSAFE = 'disabled (in client) since OpenSSH 7.4, unsafe algorithm'
WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY = 'disabled (in client) since OpenSSH 7.2, legacy algorithm'
FAIL_OPENSSH70_LEGACY = 'removed since OpenSSH 7.0, legacy algorithm'
FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK = 'removed (in server) and disabled (in client) since OpenSSH 7.0, weak algorithm'
FAIL_OPENSSH70_LOGJAM = 'disabled (in client) since OpenSSH 7.0, logjam attack'
INFO_OPENSSH69_CHACHA = 'default cipher since OpenSSH 6.9.'
FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE = 'removed (in server) since OpenSSH 6.7, unsafe algorithm'
FAIL_OPENSSH61_REMOVE = 'removed since OpenSSH 6.1, removed from specification'
FAIL_OPENSSH31_REMOVE = 'removed since OpenSSH 3.1'
FAIL_DBEAR67_DISABLED = 'disabled since Dropbear SSH 2015.67'
FAIL_DBEAR53_DISABLED = 'disabled since Dropbear SSH 0.53'
FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER = 'deprecated cipher'
FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER = 'using weak cipher'
FAIL_WEAK_ALGORITHM = 'using weak/obsolete algorithm'
FAIL_PLAINTEXT = 'no encryption/integrity'
FAIL_DEPRECATED_MAC = 'deprecated MAC'
WARN_CURVES_WEAK = 'using weak elliptic curves'
WARN_RNDSIG_KEY = 'using weak random number generator could reveal the key'
WARN_MODULUS_SIZE = 'using small 1024-bit modulus'
WARN_HASH_WEAK = 'using weak hashing algorithm'
WARN_CIPHER_MODE = 'using weak cipher mode'
WARN_BLOCK_SIZE = 'using small 64-bit block size'
WARN_CIPHER_WEAK = 'using weak cipher'
WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC = 'using encrypt-and-MAC mode'
WARN_TAG_SIZE = 'using small 64-bit tag size'
WARN_TAG_SIZE_96 = 'using small 96-bit tag size'
WARN_EXPERIMENTAL = 'using experimental algorithm'
ALGORITHMS = {
# Format: 'algorithm_name': [['version_first_appeared_in'], [reason_for_failure1, reason_for_failure2, ...], [warning1, warning2, ...]]
'kex': {
'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1': [['2.3.0,d0.28,l10.2', '6.6', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE, FAIL_OPENSSH70_LOGJAM], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'gss-group1-sha1-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE, FAIL_OPENSSH70_LOGJAM], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'gss-gex-sha1-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'gss-gex-sha1-': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'gss-group1-sha1-': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'gss-group14-sha1-': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'gss-group14-sha1-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'gss-group14-sha256-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[]],
'gss-group15-sha512-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group14-sha1': [['3.9,d0.53,l10.6.0'], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'diffie-hellman-group14-sha256': [['7.3,d2016.73']],
'diffie-hellman-group14-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group15-sha256': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group15-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group15-sha384@ssh.com': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group15-sha512': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group16-sha256': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group16-sha384@ssh.com': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group16-sha512': [['7.3,d2016.73']],
'diffie-hellman-group16-sha512@ssh.com': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group17-sha512': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group18-sha512': [['7.3']],
'diffie-hellman-group18-sha512@ssh.com': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1': [['2.3.0', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256': [['4.4']],
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha512@ssh.com': [[]],
'ecdh-sha2-curve25519': [[], []],
'ecdh-sha2-nistb233': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistb409': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistk163': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistk233': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistk283': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistk409': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistp192': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistp224': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistp256': [['5.7,d2013.62,l10.6.0'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistp384': [['5.7,d2013.62'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistp521': [['5.7,d2013.62'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-nistt571': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
'ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10': [[]], # ECDH over secp256k1 (i.e.: the Bitcoin curve)
'curve25519-sha256@libssh.org': [['6.5,d2013.62,l10.6.0']],
'curve25519-sha256': [['7.4,d2018.76']],
'curve448-sha512': [[]],
'kexguess2@matt.ucc.asn.au': [['d2013.57']],
'rsa1024-sha1': [[], [], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'rsa2048-sha256': [[]],
'sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org': [['8.0'], [], [WARN_EXPERIMENTAL]],
'ext-info-c': [[]], # Extension negotiation (RFC 8308)
'ext-info-s': [[]], # Extension negotiation (RFC 8308)
},
'key': {
'ssh-rsa1': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_ALGORITHM]],
'rsa-sha2-256': [['7.2']],
'rsa-sha2-512': [['7.2']],
'ssh-ed25519': [['6.5,l10.7.0']],
'ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['6.5']],
'ssh-rsa': [['2.5.0,d0.28,l10.2'], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'ssh-dss': [['2.1.0,d0.28,l10.2', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256': [['5.7,d2013.62,l10.6.4'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp384': [['5.7,d2013.62,l10.6.4'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp521': [['5.7,d2013.62,l10.6.4'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'ecdsa-sha2-1.3.132.0.10': [[], [], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]], # ECDSA over secp256k1 (i.e.: the Bitcoin curve)
'x509v3-sign-dss': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'x509v3-sign-rsa': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'x509v3-sign-rsa-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
'x509v3-ssh-dss': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'x509v3-ssh-rsa': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com': [['5.4', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_LEGACY], []],
'ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com': [['5.4', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_LEGACY], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.6']],
'ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.6', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.7'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.7'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.7'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['7.8']],
'rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['7.8']],
'ssh-rsa-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
'sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['8.2'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com': [['8.2'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
'sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['8.2']],
'sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com': [['8.2']],
},
'enc': {
'none': [['1.2.2,d2013.56,l10.2'], [FAIL_PLAINTEXT]],
'des': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'des-cbc': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'des-cbc-ssh1': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'3des': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH74_UNSAFE, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'3des-cbc': [['1.2.2,d0.28,l10.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH74_UNSAFE, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'3des-ctr': [['d0.52'], [FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER]],
'blowfish': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_ALGORITHM], [WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'blowfish-cbc': [['1.2.2,d0.28,l10.2', '6.6,d0.52', '7.1,d0.52'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE, FAIL_DBEAR53_DISABLED], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'blowfish-ctr': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE, FAIL_DBEAR53_DISABLED], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'twofish-cbc': [['d0.28', 'd2014.66'], [FAIL_DBEAR67_DISABLED], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'twofish128-cbc': [['d0.47', 'd2014.66'], [FAIL_DBEAR67_DISABLED], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'twofish192-cbc': [[], [], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'twofish256-cbc': [['d0.47', 'd2014.66'], [FAIL_DBEAR67_DISABLED], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'twofish-ctr': [[]],
'twofish128-ctr': [['d2015.68']],
'twofish192-ctr': [[]],
'twofish256-ctr': [['d2015.68']],
'serpent128-cbc': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'serpent192-cbc': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'serpent256-cbc': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'serpent128-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
'serpent192-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
'serpent256-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
'idea-cbc': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'idea-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
'cast128-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
'cast128-cbc': [['2.1.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
'arcfour': [['2.1.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK]],
'arcfour128': [['4.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK]],
'arcfour256': [['4.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK]],
'aes128-cbc': [['2.3.0,d0.28,l10.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'aes192-cbc': [['2.3.0,l10.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'aes256-cbc': [['2.3.0,d0.47,l10.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'rijndael128-cbc': [['2.3.0', '3.0.2'], [FAIL_OPENSSH31_REMOVE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'rijndael192-cbc': [['2.3.0', '3.0.2'], [FAIL_OPENSSH31_REMOVE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'rijndael256-cbc': [['2.3.0', '3.0.2'], [FAIL_OPENSSH31_REMOVE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se': [['2.3.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'aes128-ctr': [['3.7,d0.52,l10.4.1']],
'aes192-ctr': [['3.7,l10.4.1']],
'aes256-ctr': [['3.7,d0.52,l10.4.1']],
'aes128-gcm': [[]],
'aes256-gcm': [[]],
'AEAD_AES_128_GCM': [[]],
'AEAD_AES_256_GCM': [[]],
'aes128-gcm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
'aes256-gcm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
'chacha20-poly1305': [[], [], [], [INFO_OPENSSH69_CHACHA]],
'chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com': [['6.5'], [], [], [INFO_OPENSSH69_CHACHA]],
'camellia128-cbc': [[], [], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'camellia128-ctr': [[]],
'camellia192-cbc': [[], [], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'camellia192-ctr': [[]],
'camellia256-cbc': [[], [], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
'camellia256-ctr': [[]],
},
'mac': {
'none': [['d2013.56'], [FAIL_PLAINTEXT]],
'hmac-sha1': [['2.1.0,d0.28,l10.2'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'hmac-sha1-96': [['2.5.0,d0.47', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'hmac-sha2-56': [[], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha2-224': [[], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha2-256': [['5.9,d2013.56,l10.7.0'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha2-256-96': [['5.9', '6.0'], [FAIL_OPENSSH61_REMOVE], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha2-384': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha2-512': [['5.9,d2013.56,l10.7.0'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha2-512-96': [['5.9', '6.0'], [FAIL_OPENSSH61_REMOVE], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha3-224': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha3-256': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha3-384': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha3-512': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha256': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha256-96@ssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_TAG_SIZE]],
'hmac-sha256@ssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha512': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha512@ssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-md5': [['2.1.0,d0.28', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'hmac-md5-96': [['2.5.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'hmac-ripemd': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_MAC], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-ripemd160': [['2.5.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com': [['2.1.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'umac-64@openssh.com': [['4.7'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_TAG_SIZE]],
'umac-128@openssh.com': [['6.2'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
'hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2'], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'hmac-sha2-256-96-etm@openssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE_96]], # Despite the @openssh.com tag, it doesn't appear that this was ever shipped with OpenSSH; it is only implemented in AsyncSSH (?).
'hmac-sha2-512-96-etm@openssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE_96]], # Despite the @openssh.com tag, it doesn't appear that this was ever shipped with OpenSSH; it is only implemented in AsyncSSH (?).
'hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
'hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
'hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
'hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY]],
'umac-32@openssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_TAG_SIZE]], # Despite having the @openssh.com suffix, this may never have shipped with OpenSSH (!).
'umac-64-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2'], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE]],
'umac-96@openssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]], # Despite having the @openssh.com suffix, this may never have shipped with OpenSSH (!).
'umac-128-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
'aes128-gcm': [[]],
'aes256-gcm': [[]],
'chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com': [[]], # Despite the @openssh.com tag, this was never shipped as a MAC in OpenSSH (only as a cipher); it is only implemented as a MAC in Syncplify.
}
} # type: Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]]
class KexParty:
def __init__(self, enc: List[str], mac: List[str], compression: List[str], languages: List[str]) -> None:
self.__enc = enc
self.__mac = mac
self.__compression = compression
self.__languages = languages
@property
def encryption(self) -> List[str]:
return self.__enc
@property
def mac(self) -> List[str]:
return self.__mac
@property
def compression(self) -> List[str]:
return self.__compression
@property
def languages(self) -> List[str]:
return self.__languages
class Kex:
def __init__(self, cookie: bytes, kex_algs: List[str], key_algs: List[str], cli: 'SSH2.KexParty', srv: 'SSH2.KexParty', follows: bool, unused: int = 0) -> None:
self.__cookie = cookie
self.__kex_algs = kex_algs
self.__key_algs = key_algs
self.__client = cli
self.__server = srv
self.__follows = follows
self.__unused = unused
self.__rsa_key_sizes = {} # type: Dict[str, Tuple[int, int]]
self.__dh_modulus_sizes = {} # type: Dict[str, Tuple[int, int]]
self.__host_keys = {} # type: Dict[str, bytes]
@property
def cookie(self) -> bytes:
return self.__cookie
@property
def kex_algorithms(self) -> List[str]:
return self.__kex_algs
@property
def key_algorithms(self) -> List[str]:
return self.__key_algs
# client_to_server
@property
def client(self) -> 'SSH2.KexParty':
return self.__client
# server_to_client
@property
def server(self) -> 'SSH2.KexParty':
return self.__server
@property
def follows(self) -> bool:
return self.__follows
@property
def unused(self) -> int:
return self.__unused
def set_rsa_key_size(self, rsa_type: str, hostkey_size: int, ca_size: int = -1) -> None:
self.__rsa_key_sizes[rsa_type] = (hostkey_size, ca_size)
def rsa_key_sizes(self) -> Dict[str, Tuple[int, int]]:
return self.__rsa_key_sizes
def set_dh_modulus_size(self, gex_alg: str, modulus_size: int) -> None:
self.__dh_modulus_sizes[gex_alg] = (modulus_size, -1)
def dh_modulus_sizes(self) -> Dict[str, Tuple[int, int]]:
return self.__dh_modulus_sizes
def set_host_key(self, key_type: str, hostkey: bytes) -> None:
self.__host_keys[key_type] = hostkey
def host_keys(self) -> Dict[str, bytes]:
return self.__host_keys
def write(self, wbuf: 'WriteBuf') -> None:
wbuf.write(self.cookie)
wbuf.write_list(self.kex_algorithms)
wbuf.write_list(self.key_algorithms)
wbuf.write_list(self.client.encryption)
wbuf.write_list(self.server.encryption)
wbuf.write_list(self.client.mac)
wbuf.write_list(self.server.mac)
wbuf.write_list(self.client.compression)
wbuf.write_list(self.server.compression)
wbuf.write_list(self.client.languages)
wbuf.write_list(self.server.languages)
wbuf.write_bool(self.follows)
wbuf.write_int(self.__unused)
@property
def payload(self) -> bytes:
wbuf = WriteBuf()
self.write(wbuf)
return wbuf.write_flush()
@classmethod
def parse(cls, payload: bytes) -> 'SSH2.Kex':
buf = ReadBuf(payload)
cookie = buf.read(16)
kex_algs = buf.read_list()
key_algs = buf.read_list()
cli_enc = buf.read_list()
srv_enc = buf.read_list()
cli_mac = buf.read_list()
srv_mac = buf.read_list()
cli_compression = buf.read_list()
srv_compression = buf.read_list()
cli_languages = buf.read_list()
srv_languages = buf.read_list()
follows = buf.read_bool()
unused = buf.read_int()
cli = SSH2.KexParty(cli_enc, cli_mac, cli_compression, cli_languages)
srv = SSH2.KexParty(srv_enc, srv_mac, srv_compression, srv_languages)
kex = cls(cookie, kex_algs, key_algs, cli, srv, follows, unused)
return kex
# Obtains host keys, checks their size, and derives their fingerprints.
class HostKeyTest:
# Tracks the RSA host key types. As of this writing, testing one in this family yields valid results for the rest.
RSA_FAMILY = ['ssh-rsa', 'rsa-sha2-256', 'rsa-sha2-512']
# Dict holding the host key types we should extract & parse. 'cert' is True to denote that a host key type handles certificates (thus requires additional parsing). 'variable_key_len' is True for host key types that can have variable sizes (True only for RSA types, as the rest are of fixed-size). After the host key type is fully parsed, the key 'parsed' is added with a value of True.
HOST_KEY_TYPES = {
'ssh-rsa': {'cert': False, 'variable_key_len': True},
'rsa-sha2-256': {'cert': False, 'variable_key_len': True},
'rsa-sha2-512': {'cert': False, 'variable_key_len': True},
'ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com': {'cert': True, 'variable_key_len': True},
'ssh-ed25519': {'cert': False, 'variable_key_len': False},
'ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com': {'cert': True, 'variable_key_len': False},
}
@staticmethod
def run(s: 'SSH.Socket', server_kex: 'SSH2.Kex') -> None:
KEX_TO_DHGROUP = {
'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1': KexGroup1,
'diffie-hellman-group14-sha1': KexGroup14_SHA1,
'diffie-hellman-group14-sha256': KexGroup14_SHA256,
'curve25519-sha256': KexCurve25519_SHA256,
'curve25519-sha256@libssh.org': KexCurve25519_SHA256,
'diffie-hellman-group16-sha512': KexGroup16_SHA512,
'diffie-hellman-group18-sha512': KexGroup18_SHA512,
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1': KexGroupExchange_SHA1,
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256': KexGroupExchange_SHA256,
'ecdh-sha2-nistp256': KexNISTP256,
'ecdh-sha2-nistp384': KexNISTP384,
'ecdh-sha2-nistp521': KexNISTP521,
# 'kexguess2@matt.ucc.asn.au': ???
}
# Pick the first kex algorithm that the server supports, which we
# happen to support as well.
kex_str = None
kex_group = None
for server_kex_alg in server_kex.kex_algorithms:
if server_kex_alg in KEX_TO_DHGROUP:
kex_str = server_kex_alg
kex_group = KEX_TO_DHGROUP[kex_str]()
break
if kex_str is not None and kex_group is not None:
SSH2.HostKeyTest.perform_test(s, server_kex, kex_str, kex_group, SSH2.HostKeyTest.HOST_KEY_TYPES)
@staticmethod
def perform_test(s: 'SSH.Socket', server_kex: 'SSH2.Kex', kex_str: str, kex_group: 'KexDH', host_key_types: Dict[str, Dict[str, bool]]) -> None:
hostkey_modulus_size = 0
ca_modulus_size = 0
# For each host key type...
for host_key_type in host_key_types:
# Skip those already handled (i.e.: those in the RSA family, as testing one tests them all).
if 'parsed' in host_key_types[host_key_type] and host_key_types[host_key_type]['parsed']:
continue
# If this host key type is supported by the server, we test it.
if host_key_type in server_kex.key_algorithms:
cert = host_key_types[host_key_type]['cert']
variable_key_len = host_key_types[host_key_type]['variable_key_len']
# If the connection is closed, re-open it and get the kex again.
if not s.is_connected():
s.connect()
unused = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
unused2 = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
unused, unused2, err = s.get_banner()
if err is not None:
s.close()
return
# Parse the server's initial KEX.
packet_type = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet()
SSH2.Kex.parse(payload)
# Send the server our KEXINIT message, using only our
# selected kex and host key type. Send the server's own
# list of ciphers and MACs back to it (this doesn't
# matter, really).
client_kex = SSH2.Kex(os.urandom(16), [kex_str], [host_key_type], server_kex.client, server_kex.server, False, 0)
s.write_byte(SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXINIT)
client_kex.write(s)
s.send_packet()
# Do the initial DH exchange. The server responds back
# with the host key and its length. Bingo. We also get back the host key fingerprint.
kex_group.send_init(s)
host_key = kex_group.recv_reply(s, variable_key_len)
if host_key is not None:
server_kex.set_host_key(host_key_type, host_key)
hostkey_modulus_size = kex_group.get_hostkey_size()
ca_modulus_size = kex_group.get_ca_size()
# Close the socket, as the connection has
# been put in a state that later tests can't use.
s.close()
# If the host key modulus or CA modulus was successfully parsed, check to see that its a safe size.
if hostkey_modulus_size > 0 or ca_modulus_size > 0:
# Set the hostkey size for all RSA key types since 'ssh-rsa',
# 'rsa-sha2-256', etc. are all using the same host key.
# Note, however, that this may change in the future.
if cert is False and host_key_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
for rsa_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
server_kex.set_rsa_key_size(rsa_type, hostkey_modulus_size)
elif cert is True:
server_kex.set_rsa_key_size(host_key_type, hostkey_modulus_size, ca_modulus_size)
# Keys smaller than 2048 result in a failure. Update the database accordingly.
if (cert is False) and (hostkey_modulus_size < 2048):
for rsa_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
alg_list = SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS['key'][rsa_type]
alg_list.append(['using small %d-bit modulus' % hostkey_modulus_size])
elif (cert is True) and ((hostkey_modulus_size < 2048) or (ca_modulus_size > 0 and ca_modulus_size < 2048)): # pylint: disable=chained-comparison
alg_list = SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS['key'][host_key_type]
min_modulus = min(hostkey_modulus_size, ca_modulus_size)
min_modulus = min_modulus if min_modulus > 0 else max(hostkey_modulus_size, ca_modulus_size)
alg_list.append(['using small %d-bit modulus' % min_modulus])
# If this host key type is in the RSA family, then mark them all as parsed (since results in one are valid for them all).
if host_key_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
for rsa_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
host_key_types[rsa_type]['parsed'] = True
else:
host_key_types[host_key_type]['parsed'] = True
# Performs DH group exchanges to find what moduli are supported, and checks
# their size.
class GEXTest:
# Creates a new connection to the server. Returns True on success, or False.
@staticmethod
def reconnect(s: 'SSH.Socket', gex_alg: str) -> bool:
if s.is_connected():
return True
s.connect()
unused = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
unused2 = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
unused, unused2, err = s.get_banner()
if err is not None:
s.close()
return False
# Parse the server's initial KEX.
packet_type = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
kex = SSH2.Kex.parse(payload)
# Send our KEX using the specified group-exchange and most of the
# server's own values.
client_kex = SSH2.Kex(os.urandom(16), [gex_alg], kex.key_algorithms, kex.client, kex.server, False, 0)
s.write_byte(SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXINIT)
client_kex.write(s)
s.send_packet()
return True
# Runs the DH moduli test against the specified target.
@staticmethod
def run(s: 'SSH.Socket', kex: 'SSH2.Kex') -> None:
GEX_ALGS = {
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1': KexGroupExchange_SHA1,
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256': KexGroupExchange_SHA256,
}
# The previous RSA tests put the server in a state we can't
# test. So we need a new connection to start with a clean
# slate.
if s.is_connected():
s.close()
# Check if the server supports any of the group-exchange
# algorithms. If so, test each one.
for gex_alg in GEX_ALGS:
if gex_alg in kex.kex_algorithms:
if SSH2.GEXTest.reconnect(s, gex_alg) is False:
break
kex_group = GEX_ALGS[gex_alg]()
smallest_modulus = -1
# First try a range of weak sizes.
try:
kex_group.send_init_gex(s, 512, 1024, 1536)
kex_group.recv_reply(s, False)
# Its been observed that servers will return a group
# larger than the requested max. So just because we
# got here, doesn't mean the server is vulnerable...
smallest_modulus = kex_group.get_dh_modulus_size()
except Exception:
pass
finally:
s.close()
# Try an array of specific modulus sizes... one at a time.
reconnect_failed = False
for bits in [512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096]:
# If we found one modulus size already, but we're about
# to test a larger one, don't bother.
if bits >= smallest_modulus > 0:
break
if SSH2.GEXTest.reconnect(s, gex_alg) is False:
reconnect_failed = True
break
try:
kex_group.send_init_gex(s, bits, bits, bits)
kex_group.recv_reply(s, False)
smallest_modulus = kex_group.get_dh_modulus_size()
except Exception:
# import traceback
# print(traceback.format_exc())
pass
finally:
# The server is in a state that is not re-testable,
# so there's nothing else to do with this open
# connection.
s.close()
if smallest_modulus > 0:
kex.set_dh_modulus_size(gex_alg, smallest_modulus)
# We flag moduli smaller than 2048 as a failure.
if smallest_modulus < 2048:
text = 'using small %d-bit modulus' % smallest_modulus
lst = SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS['kex'][gex_alg]
# For 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256', add
# a failure reason.
if len(lst) == 1:
lst.append([text])
# For 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1', delete
# the existing failure reason (which is vague), and
# insert our own.
else:
del lst[1]
lst.insert(1, [text])
if reconnect_failed:
break
class SSH1:
class CRC32:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._table = [0] * 256
for i in range(256):
crc = 0
n = i
for _ in range(8):
x = (crc ^ n) & 1
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (x * 0xedb88320)
n = n >> 1
self._table[i] = crc
def calc(self, v: bytes) -> int:
crc, length = 0, len(v)
for i in range(length):
n = ord(v[i:i + 1])
n = n ^ (crc & 0xff)
crc = (crc >> 8) ^ self._table[n]
return crc
_crc32 = None # type: Optional[SSH1.CRC32]
CIPHERS = ['none', 'idea', 'des', '3des', 'tss', 'rc4', 'blowfish']
AUTHS = ['none', 'rhosts', 'rsa', 'password', 'rhosts_rsa', 'tis', 'kerberos']
@classmethod
def crc32(cls, v: bytes) -> int:
if cls._crc32 is None:
cls._crc32 = cls.CRC32()
return cls._crc32.calc(v)
class KexDB: # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
# pylint: disable=bad-whitespace
FAIL_PLAINTEXT = 'no encryption/integrity'
FAIL_OPENSSH37_REMOVE = 'removed since OpenSSH 3.7'
FAIL_NA_BROKEN = 'not implemented in OpenSSH, broken algorithm'
FAIL_NA_UNSAFE = 'not implemented in OpenSSH (server), unsafe algorithm'
TEXT_CIPHER_IDEA = 'cipher used by commercial SSH'
ALGORITHMS = {
'key': {
'ssh-rsa1': [['1.2.2']],
},
'enc': {
'none': [['1.2.2'], [FAIL_PLAINTEXT]],
'idea': [[None], [], [], [TEXT_CIPHER_IDEA]],
'des': [['2.3.0C'], [FAIL_NA_UNSAFE]],
'3des': [['1.2.2']],
'tss': [[''], [FAIL_NA_BROKEN]],
'rc4': [[], [FAIL_NA_BROKEN]],
'blowfish': [['1.2.2']],
},
'aut': {
'rhosts': [['1.2.2', '3.6'], [FAIL_OPENSSH37_REMOVE]],
'rsa': [['1.2.2']],
'password': [['1.2.2']],
'rhosts_rsa': [['1.2.2']],
'tis': [['1.2.2']],
'kerberos': [['1.2.2', '3.6'], [FAIL_OPENSSH37_REMOVE]],
}
} # type: Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]]
class PublicKeyMessage:
def __init__(self, cookie: bytes, skey: Tuple[int, int, int], hkey: Tuple[int, int, int], pflags: int, cmask: int, amask: int) -> None:
if len(skey) != 3:
raise ValueError('invalid server key pair: {}'.format(skey))
if len(hkey) != 3:
raise ValueError('invalid host key pair: {}'.format(hkey))
self.__cookie = cookie
self.__server_key = skey
self.__host_key = hkey
self.__protocol_flags = pflags
self.__supported_ciphers_mask = cmask
self.__supported_authentications_mask = amask
@property
def cookie(self) -> bytes:
return self.__cookie
@property
def server_key_bits(self) -> int:
return self.__server_key[0]
@property
def server_key_public_exponent(self) -> int:
return self.__server_key[1]
@property
def server_key_public_modulus(self) -> int:
return self.__server_key[2]
@property
def host_key_bits(self) -> int:
return self.__host_key[0]
@property
def host_key_public_exponent(self) -> int:
return self.__host_key[1]
@property
def host_key_public_modulus(self) -> int:
return self.__host_key[2]
@property
def host_key_fingerprint_data(self) -> bytes:
# pylint: disable=protected-access
mod = WriteBuf._create_mpint(self.host_key_public_modulus, False)
e = WriteBuf._create_mpint(self.host_key_public_exponent, False)
return mod + e
@property
def protocol_flags(self) -> int:
return self.__protocol_flags
@property
def supported_ciphers_mask(self) -> int:
return self.__supported_ciphers_mask
@property
def supported_ciphers(self) -> List[str]:
ciphers = []
for i in range(len(SSH1.CIPHERS)):
if self.__supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << i) != 0:
ciphers.append(utils.to_text(SSH1.CIPHERS[i]))
return ciphers
@property
def supported_authentications_mask(self) -> int:
return self.__supported_authentications_mask
@property
def supported_authentications(self) -> List[str]:
auths = []
for i in range(1, len(SSH1.AUTHS)):
if self.__supported_authentications_mask & (1 << i) != 0:
auths.append(utils.to_text(SSH1.AUTHS[i]))
return auths
def write(self, wbuf: 'WriteBuf') -> None:
wbuf.write(self.cookie)
wbuf.write_int(self.server_key_bits)
wbuf.write_mpint1(self.server_key_public_exponent)
wbuf.write_mpint1(self.server_key_public_modulus)
wbuf.write_int(self.host_key_bits)
wbuf.write_mpint1(self.host_key_public_exponent)
wbuf.write_mpint1(self.host_key_public_modulus)
wbuf.write_int(self.protocol_flags)
wbuf.write_int(self.supported_ciphers_mask)
wbuf.write_int(self.supported_authentications_mask)
@property
def payload(self) -> bytes:
wbuf = WriteBuf()
self.write(wbuf)
return wbuf.write_flush()
@classmethod
def parse(cls, payload: bytes) -> 'SSH1.PublicKeyMessage':
buf = ReadBuf(payload)
cookie = buf.read(8)
server_key_bits = buf.read_int()
server_key_exponent = buf.read_mpint1()
server_key_modulus = buf.read_mpint1()
skey = (server_key_bits, server_key_exponent, server_key_modulus)
host_key_bits = buf.read_int()
host_key_exponent = buf.read_mpint1()
host_key_modulus = buf.read_mpint1()
hkey = (host_key_bits, host_key_exponent, host_key_modulus)
pflags = buf.read_int()
cmask = buf.read_int()
amask = buf.read_int()
pkm = cls(cookie, skey, hkey, pflags, cmask, amask)
return pkm
class ReadBuf:
def __init__(self, data: Optional[bytes] = None) -> None:
super(ReadBuf, self).__init__()
self._buf = io.BytesIO(data) if data is not None else io.BytesIO()
self._len = len(data) if data is not None else 0
@property
def unread_len(self) -> int:
return self._len - self._buf.tell()
def read(self, size: int) -> bytes:
return self._buf.read(size)
def read_byte(self) -> int:
v = struct.unpack('B', self.read(1))[0] # type: int
return v
def read_bool(self) -> bool:
return self.read_byte() != 0
def read_int(self) -> int:
v = struct.unpack('>I', self.read(4))[0] # type: int
return v
def read_list(self) -> List[str]:
list_size = self.read_int()
return self.read(list_size).decode('utf-8', 'replace').split(',')
def read_string(self) -> bytes:
n = self.read_int()
return self.read(n)
@classmethod
def _parse_mpint(cls, v: bytes, pad: bytes, f: str) -> int:
r = 0
if len(v) % 4 != 0:
v = pad * (4 - (len(v) % 4)) + v
for i in range(0, len(v), 4):
r = (r << 32) | struct.unpack(f, v[i:i + 4])[0]
return r
def read_mpint1(self) -> int:
# NOTE: Data Type Enc @ http://www.snailbook.com/docs/protocol-1.5.txt
bits = struct.unpack('>H', self.read(2))[0]
n = (bits + 7) // 8
return self._parse_mpint(self.read(n), b'\x00', '>I')
def read_mpint2(self) -> int:
# NOTE: Section 5 @ https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4251.txt
v = self.read_string()
if len(v) == 0:
return 0
pad, f = (b'\xff', '>i') if ord(v[0:1]) & 0x80 != 0 else (b'\x00', '>I')
return self._parse_mpint(v, pad, f)
def read_line(self) -> str:
return self._buf.readline().rstrip().decode('utf-8', 'replace')
def reset(self) -> None:
self._buf = io.BytesIO()
self._len = 0
class WriteBuf:
def __init__(self, data: Optional[bytes] = None) -> None:
super(WriteBuf, self).__init__()
self._wbuf = io.BytesIO(data) if data is not None else io.BytesIO()
def write(self, data: bytes) -> 'WriteBuf':
self._wbuf.write(data)
return self
def write_byte(self, v: int) -> 'WriteBuf':
return self.write(struct.pack('B', v))
def write_bool(self, v: bool) -> 'WriteBuf':
return self.write_byte(1 if v else 0)
def write_int(self, v: int) -> 'WriteBuf':
return self.write(struct.pack('>I', v))
def write_string(self, v: Union[bytes, str]) -> 'WriteBuf':
if not isinstance(v, bytes):
v = bytes(bytearray(v, 'utf-8'))
self.write_int(len(v))
return self.write(v)
def write_list(self, v: List[str]) -> 'WriteBuf':
return self.write_string(u','.join(v))
@classmethod
def _bitlength(cls, n: int) -> int:
try:
return n.bit_length()
except AttributeError:
return len(bin(n)) - (2 if n > 0 else 3)
@classmethod
def _create_mpint(cls, n: int, signed: bool = True, bits: Optional[int] = None) -> bytes:
if bits is None:
bits = cls._bitlength(n)
length = bits // 8 + (1 if n != 0 else 0)
ql = (length + 7) // 8
fmt, v2 = '>{}Q'.format(ql), [0] * ql
for i in range(ql):
v2[ql - i - 1] = n & 0xffffffffffffffff
n >>= 64
data = bytes(struct.pack(fmt, *v2)[-length:])
if not signed:
data = data.lstrip(b'\x00')
elif data.startswith(b'\xff\x80'):
data = data[1:]
return data
def write_mpint1(self, n: int) -> 'WriteBuf':
# NOTE: Data Type Enc @ http://www.snailbook.com/docs/protocol-1.5.txt
bits = self._bitlength(n)
data = self._create_mpint(n, False, bits)
self.write(struct.pack('>H', bits))
return self.write(data)
def write_mpint2(self, n: int) -> 'WriteBuf':
# NOTE: Section 5 @ https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4251.txt
data = self._create_mpint(n)
return self.write_string(data)
def write_line(self, v: Union[bytes, str]) -> 'WriteBuf':
if not isinstance(v, bytes):
v = bytes(bytearray(v, 'utf-8'))
v += b'\r\n'
return self.write(v)
def write_flush(self) -> bytes:
payload = self._wbuf.getvalue()
self._wbuf.truncate(0)
self._wbuf.seek(0)
return payload
def reset(self) -> None:
self._wbuf = io.BytesIO()
class SSH: # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
class Protocol: # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
# pylint: disable=bad-whitespace
SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY = 2
MSG_DEBUG = 4
MSG_KEXINIT = 20
MSG_NEWKEYS = 21
MSG_KEXDH_INIT = 30
MSG_KEXDH_REPLY = 31
MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REQUEST = 34
MSG_KEXDH_GEX_GROUP = 31
MSG_KEXDH_GEX_INIT = 32
MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY = 33
class Product: # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
OpenSSH = 'OpenSSH'
DropbearSSH = 'Dropbear SSH'
LibSSH = 'libssh'
TinySSH = 'TinySSH'
PuTTY = 'PuTTY'
class Software:
def __init__(self, vendor: Optional[str], product: str, version: str, patch: Optional[str], os_version: Optional[str]) -> None:
self.__vendor = vendor
self.__product = product
self.__version = version
self.__patch = patch
self.__os = os_version
@property
def vendor(self) -> Optional[str]:
return self.__vendor
@property
def product(self) -> str:
return self.__product
@property
def version(self) -> str:
return self.__version
@property
def patch(self) -> Optional[str]:
return self.__patch
@property
def os(self) -> Optional[str]:
return self.__os
def compare_version(self, other: Union[None, 'SSH.Software', str]) -> int:
# pylint: disable=too-many-branches
if other is None:
return 1
if isinstance(other, SSH.Software):
other = '{}{}'.format(other.version, other.patch or '')
else:
other = str(other)
mx = re.match(r'^([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)$', other)
if mx is not None:
oversion, opatch = mx.group(1), mx.group(2).strip()
else:
oversion, opatch = other, ''
if self.version < oversion:
return -1
elif self.version > oversion:
return 1
spatch = self.patch or ''
if self.product == SSH.Product.DropbearSSH:
if not re.match(r'^test\d.*$', opatch):
opatch = 'z{}'.format(opatch)
if not re.match(r'^test\d.*$', spatch):
spatch = 'z{}'.format(spatch)
elif self.product == SSH.Product.OpenSSH:
mx1 = re.match(r'^p\d(.*)', opatch)
mx2 = re.match(r'^p\d(.*)', spatch)
if not (bool(mx1) and bool(mx2)):
if mx1 is not None:
opatch = mx1.group(1)
if mx2 is not None:
spatch = mx2.group(1)
if spatch < opatch:
return -1
elif spatch > opatch:
return 1
return 0
def between_versions(self, vfrom: str, vtill: str) -> bool:
if bool(vfrom) and self.compare_version(vfrom) < 0:
return False
if bool(vtill) and self.compare_version(vtill) > 0:
return False
return True
def display(self, full: bool = True) -> str:
r = '{} '.format(self.vendor) if bool(self.vendor) else ''
r += self.product
if bool(self.version):
r += ' {}'.format(self.version)
if full:
patch = self.patch or ''
if self.product == SSH.Product.OpenSSH:
mx = re.match(r'^(p\d)(.*)$', patch)
if mx is not None:
r += mx.group(1)
patch = mx.group(2).strip()
if bool(patch):
r += ' ({})'.format(patch)
if bool(self.os):
r += ' running on {}'.format(self.os)
return r
def __str__(self) -> str:
return self.display()
def __repr__(self) -> str:
r = 'vendor={}, '.format(self.vendor) if bool(self.vendor) else ''
r += 'product={}'.format(self.product)
if bool(self.version):
r += ', version={}'.format(self.version)
if bool(self.patch):
r += ', patch={}'.format(self.patch)
if bool(self.os):
r += ', os={}'.format(self.os)
return '<{}({})>'.format(self.__class__.__name__, r)
@staticmethod
def _fix_patch(patch: str) -> Optional[str]:
return re.sub(r'^[-_\.]+', '', patch) or None
@staticmethod
def _fix_date(d: str) -> Optional[str]:
if d is not None and len(d) == 8:
return '{}-{}-{}'.format(d[:4], d[4:6], d[6:8])
else:
return None
@classmethod
def _extract_os_version(cls, c: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
if c is None:
return None
mx = re.match(r'^NetBSD(?:_Secure_Shell)?(?:[\s-]+(\d{8})(.*))?$', c)
if mx is not None:
d = cls._fix_date(mx.group(1))
return 'NetBSD' if d is None else 'NetBSD ({})'.format(d)
mx = re.match(r'^FreeBSD(?:\slocalisations)?[\s-]+(\d{8})(.*)$', c)
if not bool(mx):
mx = re.match(r'^[^@]+@FreeBSD\.org[\s-]+(\d{8})(.*)$', c)
if mx is not None:
d = cls._fix_date(mx.group(1))
return 'FreeBSD' if d is None else 'FreeBSD ({})'.format(d)
w = ['RemotelyAnywhere', 'DesktopAuthority', 'RemoteSupportManager']
for win_soft in w:
mx = re.match(r'^in ' + win_soft + r' ([\d\.]+\d)$', c)
if mx is not None:
ver = mx.group(1)
return 'Microsoft Windows ({} {})'.format(win_soft, ver)
generic = ['NetBSD', 'FreeBSD']
for g in generic:
if c.startswith(g) or c.endswith(g):
return g
return None
@classmethod
def parse(cls, banner: 'SSH.Banner') -> Optional['SSH.Software']:
# pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
software = str(banner.software)
mx = re.match(r'^dropbear_([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
v = None # type: Optional[str]
if mx is not None:
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
v, p = 'Matt Johnston', SSH.Product.DropbearSSH
v = None
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, None)
mx = re.match(r'^OpenSSH[_\.-]+([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
if mx is not None:
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
v, p = 'OpenBSD', SSH.Product.OpenSSH
v = None
os_version = cls._extract_os_version(banner.comments)
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, os_version)
mx = re.match(r'^libssh-([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
if mx is not None:
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
v, p = None, SSH.Product.LibSSH
os_version = cls._extract_os_version(banner.comments)
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, os_version)
mx = re.match(r'^libssh_([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
if mx is not None:
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
v, p = None, SSH.Product.LibSSH
os_version = cls._extract_os_version(banner.comments)
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, os_version)
mx = re.match(r'^RomSShell_([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
if mx is not None:
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
v, p = 'Allegro Software', 'RomSShell'
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, None)
mx = re.match(r'^mpSSH_([\d\.]+\d+)', software)
if mx is not None:
v, p = 'HP', 'iLO (Integrated Lights-Out) sshd'
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), None, None)
mx = re.match(r'^Cisco-([\d\.]+\d+)', software)
if mx is not None:
v, p = 'Cisco', 'IOS/PIX sshd'
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), None, None)
mx = re.match(r'^tinyssh_(.*)', software)
if mx is not None:
return cls(None, SSH.Product.TinySSH, mx.group(1), None, None)
mx = re.match(r'^PuTTY_Release_(.*)', software)
if mx:
return cls(None, SSH.Product.PuTTY, mx.group(1), None, None)
return None
class Banner:
_RXP, _RXR = r'SSH-\d\.\s*?\d+', r'(-\s*([^\s]*)(?:\s+(.*))?)?'
RX_PROTOCOL = re.compile(re.sub(r'\\d(\+?)', r'(\\d\g<1>)', _RXP))
RX_BANNER = re.compile(r'^({0}(?:(?:-{0})*)){1}$'.format(_RXP, _RXR))
def __init__(self, protocol: Tuple[int, int], software: Optional[str], comments: Optional[str], valid_ascii: bool) -> None:
self.__protocol = protocol
self.__software = software
self.__comments = comments
self.__valid_ascii = valid_ascii
@property
def protocol(self) -> Tuple[int, int]:
return self.__protocol
@property
def software(self) -> Optional[str]:
return self.__software
@property
def comments(self) -> Optional[str]:
return self.__comments
@property
def valid_ascii(self) -> bool:
return self.__valid_ascii
def __str__(self) -> str:
r = 'SSH-{}.{}'.format(self.protocol[0], self.protocol[1])
if self.software is not None:
r += '-{}'.format(self.software)
if bool(self.comments):
r += ' {}'.format(self.comments)
return r
def __repr__(self) -> str:
p = '{}.{}'.format(self.protocol[0], self.protocol[1])
r = 'protocol={}'.format(p)
if self.software is not None:
r += ', software={}'.format(self.software)
if bool(self.comments):
r += ', comments={}'.format(self.comments)
return '<{}({})>'.format(self.__class__.__name__, r)
@classmethod
def parse(cls, banner: str) -> Optional['SSH.Banner']:
valid_ascii = utils.is_print_ascii(banner)
ascii_banner = utils.to_print_ascii(banner)
mx = cls.RX_BANNER.match(ascii_banner)
if mx is None:
return None
protocol = min(re.findall(cls.RX_PROTOCOL, mx.group(1)))
protocol = (int(protocol[0]), int(protocol[1]))
software = (mx.group(3) or '').strip() or None
if software is None and (mx.group(2) or '').startswith('-'):
software = ''
comments = (mx.group(4) or '').strip() or None
if comments is not None:
comments = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', comments)
return cls(protocol, software, comments, valid_ascii)
class Fingerprint:
def __init__(self, fpd: bytes) -> None:
self.__fpd = fpd
@property
def md5(self) -> str:
h = hashlib.md5(self.__fpd).hexdigest()
r = u':'.join(h[i:i + 2] for i in range(0, len(h), 2))
return u'MD5:{}'.format(r)
@property
def sha256(self) -> str:
h = base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(self.__fpd).digest())
r = h.decode('ascii').rstrip('=')
return u'SHA256:{}'.format(r)
class Algorithm:
class Timeframe:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.__storage = {} # type: Dict[str, List[Optional[str]]]
def __contains__(self, product: str) -> bool:
return product in self.__storage
def __getitem__(self, product): # type: (str) -> Sequence[Optional[str]]
return tuple(self.__storage.get(product, [None] * 4))
def __str__(self) -> str:
return self.__storage.__str__()
def __repr__(self) -> str:
return self.__str__()
def get_from(self, product: str, for_server: bool = True) -> Optional[str]:
return self[product][0 if bool(for_server) else 2]
def get_till(self, product: str, for_server: bool = True) -> Optional[str]:
return self[product][1 if bool(for_server) else 3]
def _update(self, versions: Optional[str], pos: int) -> None:
ssh_versions = {} # type: Dict[str, str]
for_srv, for_cli = pos < 2, pos > 1
for v in (versions or '').split(','):
ssh_prod, ssh_ver, is_cli = SSH.Algorithm.get_ssh_version(v)
if not ssh_ver or (is_cli and for_srv) or (not is_cli and for_cli and ssh_prod in ssh_versions):
continue
ssh_versions[ssh_prod] = ssh_ver
for ssh_product, ssh_version in ssh_versions.items():
if ssh_product not in self.__storage:
self.__storage[ssh_product] = [None] * 4
prev = self[ssh_product][pos]
if (prev is None or (prev < ssh_version and pos % 2 == 0) or (prev > ssh_version and pos % 2 == 1)):
self.__storage[ssh_product][pos] = ssh_version
def update(self, versions: List[Optional[str]], for_server: Optional[bool] = None) -> 'SSH.Algorithm.Timeframe':
for_cli = for_server is None or for_server is False
for_srv = for_server is None or for_server is True
vlen = len(versions)
for i in range(min(3, vlen)):
if for_srv and i < 2:
self._update(versions[i], i)
if for_cli and (i % 2 == 0 or vlen == 2):
self._update(versions[i], 3 - 0**i)
return self
@staticmethod
def get_ssh_version(version_desc: str) -> Tuple[str, str, bool]:
is_client = version_desc.endswith('C')
if is_client:
version_desc = version_desc[:-1]
if version_desc.startswith('d'):
return SSH.Product.DropbearSSH, version_desc[1:], is_client
elif version_desc.startswith('l1'):
return SSH.Product.LibSSH, version_desc[2:], is_client
else:
return SSH.Product.OpenSSH, version_desc, is_client
@classmethod
def get_since_text(cls, versions: List[Optional[str]]) -> Optional[str]:
tv = []
if len(versions) == 0 or versions[0] is None:
return None
for v in versions[0].split(','):
ssh_prod, ssh_ver, is_cli = cls.get_ssh_version(v)
if not ssh_ver:
continue
if ssh_prod in [SSH.Product.LibSSH]:
continue
if is_cli:
ssh_ver = '{} (client only)'.format(ssh_ver)
tv.append('{} {}'.format(ssh_prod, ssh_ver))
if len(tv) == 0:
return None
return 'available since ' + ', '.join(tv).rstrip(', ')
class Algorithms:
def __init__(self, pkm: Optional[SSH1.PublicKeyMessage], kex: Optional[SSH2.Kex]) -> None:
self.__ssh1kex = pkm
self.__ssh2kex = kex
@property
def ssh1kex(self) -> Optional[SSH1.PublicKeyMessage]:
return self.__ssh1kex
@property
def ssh2kex(self) -> Optional[SSH2.Kex]:
return self.__ssh2kex
@property
def ssh1(self) -> Optional['SSH.Algorithms.Item']:
if self.ssh1kex is None:
return None
item = SSH.Algorithms.Item(1, SSH1.KexDB.ALGORITHMS)
item.add('key', [u'ssh-rsa1'])
item.add('enc', self.ssh1kex.supported_ciphers)
item.add('aut', self.ssh1kex.supported_authentications)
return item
@property
def ssh2(self) -> Optional['SSH.Algorithms.Item']:
if self.ssh2kex is None:
return None
item = SSH.Algorithms.Item(2, SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS)
item.add('kex', self.ssh2kex.kex_algorithms)
item.add('key', self.ssh2kex.key_algorithms)
item.add('enc', self.ssh2kex.server.encryption)
item.add('mac', self.ssh2kex.server.mac)
return item
@property
def values(self) -> Iterable['SSH.Algorithms.Item']:
for item in [self.ssh1, self.ssh2]:
if item is not None:
yield item
@property
def maxlen(self) -> int:
def _ml(items: Sequence[str]) -> int:
return max(len(i) for i in items)
maxlen = 0
if self.ssh1kex is not None:
maxlen = max(_ml(self.ssh1kex.supported_ciphers),
_ml(self.ssh1kex.supported_authentications),
maxlen)
if self.ssh2kex is not None:
maxlen = max(_ml(self.ssh2kex.kex_algorithms),
_ml(self.ssh2kex.key_algorithms),
_ml(self.ssh2kex.server.encryption),
_ml(self.ssh2kex.server.mac),
maxlen)
return maxlen
def get_ssh_timeframe(self, for_server: Optional[bool] = None) -> 'SSH.Algorithm.Timeframe':
timeframe = SSH.Algorithm.Timeframe()
for alg_pair in self.values:
alg_db = alg_pair.db
for alg_type, alg_list in alg_pair.items():
for alg_name in alg_list:
alg_name_native = utils.to_text(alg_name)
alg_desc = alg_db[alg_type].get(alg_name_native)
if alg_desc is None:
continue
versions = alg_desc[0]
timeframe.update(versions, for_server)
return timeframe
def get_recommendations(self, software: Optional['SSH.Software'], for_server: bool = True) -> Tuple[Optional['SSH.Software'], Dict[int, Dict[str, Dict[str, Dict[str, int]]]]]:
# pylint: disable=too-many-locals,too-many-statements
vproducts = [SSH.Product.OpenSSH,
SSH.Product.DropbearSSH,
SSH.Product.LibSSH,
SSH.Product.TinySSH]
# Set to True if server is not one of vproducts, above.
unknown_software = False
if software is not None:
if software.product not in vproducts:
unknown_software = True
# The code below is commented out because it would try to guess what the server is,
# usually resulting in wild & incorrect recommendations.
# if software is None:
# ssh_timeframe = self.get_ssh_timeframe(for_server)
# for product in vproducts:
# if product not in ssh_timeframe:
# continue
# version = ssh_timeframe.get_from(product, for_server)
# if version is not None:
# software = SSH.Software(None, product, version, None, None)
# break
rec = {} # type: Dict[int, Dict[str, Dict[str, Dict[str, int]]]]
if software is None:
unknown_software = True
for alg_pair in self.values:
sshv, alg_db = alg_pair.sshv, alg_pair.db
rec[sshv] = {}
for alg_type, alg_list in alg_pair.items():
if alg_type == 'aut':
continue
rec[sshv][alg_type] = {'add': {}, 'del': {}, 'chg': {}}
for n, alg_desc in alg_db[alg_type].items():
versions = alg_desc[0]
empty_version = False
if len(versions) == 0 or versions[0] is None:
empty_version = True
else:
matches = False
if unknown_software:
matches = True
for v in versions[0].split(','):
ssh_prefix, ssh_version, is_cli = SSH.Algorithm.get_ssh_version(v)
if not ssh_version:
continue
if (software is not None) and (ssh_prefix != software.product):
continue
if is_cli and for_server:
continue
if (software is not None) and (software.compare_version(ssh_version) < 0):
continue
matches = True
break
if not matches:
continue
adl, faults = len(alg_desc), 0
for i in range(1, 3):
if not adl > i:
continue
fc = len(alg_desc[i])
if fc > 0:
faults += pow(10, 2 - i) * fc
if n not in alg_list:
# Don't recommend certificate or token types; these will only appear in the server's list if they are fully configured & functional on the server.
if faults > 0 or (alg_type == 'key' and (('-cert-' in n) or (n.startswith('sk-')))) or empty_version:
continue
rec[sshv][alg_type]['add'][n] = 0
else:
if faults == 0:
continue
if n in ['diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256', 'rsa-sha2-256', 'rsa-sha2-512', 'ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com']:
rec[sshv][alg_type]['chg'][n] = faults
else:
rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'][n] = faults
# If we are working with unknown software, drop all add recommendations, because we don't know if they're valid.
if unknown_software:
rec[sshv][alg_type]['add'] = {}
add_count = len(rec[sshv][alg_type]['add'])
del_count = len(rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'])
chg_count = len(rec[sshv][alg_type]['chg'])
new_alg_count = len(alg_list) + add_count - del_count
if new_alg_count < 1 and del_count > 0:
mf = min(rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'].values())
new_del = {}
for k, cf in rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'].items():
if cf != mf:
new_del[k] = cf
if del_count != len(new_del):
rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'] = new_del
new_alg_count += del_count - len(new_del)
if new_alg_count < 1:
del rec[sshv][alg_type]
else:
if add_count == 0:
del rec[sshv][alg_type]['add']
if del_count == 0:
del rec[sshv][alg_type]['del']
if chg_count == 0:
del rec[sshv][alg_type]['chg']
if len(rec[sshv][alg_type]) == 0:
del rec[sshv][alg_type]
if len(rec[sshv]) == 0:
del rec[sshv]
return software, rec
class Item:
def __init__(self, sshv: int, db: Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]]) -> None:
self.__sshv = sshv
self.__db = db
self.__storage = {} # type: Dict[str, List[str]]
@property
def sshv(self) -> int:
return self.__sshv
@property
def db(self) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]]:
return self.__db
def add(self, key: str, value: List[str]) -> None:
self.__storage[key] = value
def items(self) -> Iterable[Tuple[str, List[str]]]:
return self.__storage.items()
class Security: # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
# Format: [starting_vuln_version, last_vuln_version, affected, CVE_ID, CVSSv2, description]
# affected: 1 = server, 2 = client, 4 = local
# Example: if it affects servers, both remote & local, then affected
# = 1. If it affects servers, but is a local issue only,
# then affected = 1 + 4 = 5.
# pylint: disable=bad-whitespace
CVE = {
'Dropbear SSH': [
['0.0', '2018.76', 1, 'CVE-2018-15599', 5.0, 'remote users may enumerate users on the system'],
['0.0', '2017.74', 5, 'CVE-2017-9079', 4.7, 'local users can read certain files as root'],
['0.0', '2017.74', 5, 'CVE-2017-9078', 9.3, 'local users may elevate privileges to root under certain conditions'],
['0.0', '2016.73', 5, 'CVE-2016-7409', 2.1, 'local users can read process memory under limited conditions'],
['0.0', '2016.73', 1, 'CVE-2016-7408', 6.5, 'remote users can execute arbitrary code'],
['0.0', '2016.73', 5, 'CVE-2016-7407', 10.0, 'local users can execute arbitrary code'],
['0.0', '2016.73', 1, 'CVE-2016-7406', 10.0, 'remote users can execute arbitrary code'],
['0.44', '2015.71', 1, 'CVE-2016-3116', 5.5, 'bypass command restrictions via xauth command injection'],
['0.28', '2013.58', 1, 'CVE-2013-4434', 5.0, 'discover valid usernames through different time delays'],
['0.28', '2013.58', 1, 'CVE-2013-4421', 5.0, 'cause DoS via a compressed packet (memory consumption)'],
['0.52', '2011.54', 1, 'CVE-2012-0920', 7.1, 'execute arbitrary code or bypass command restrictions'],
['0.40', '0.48.1', 1, 'CVE-2007-1099', 7.5, 'conduct a MitM attack (no warning for hostkey mismatch)'],
['0.28', '0.47', 1, 'CVE-2006-1206', 7.5, 'cause DoS via large number of connections (slot exhaustion)'],
['0.39', '0.47', 1, 'CVE-2006-0225', 4.6, 'execute arbitrary commands via scp with crafted filenames'],
['0.28', '0.46', 1, 'CVE-2005-4178', 6.5, 'execute arbitrary code via buffer overflow vulnerability'],
['0.28', '0.42', 1, 'CVE-2004-2486', 7.5, 'execute arbitrary code via DSS verification code']],
'libssh': [
['0.6.4', '0.6.4', 1, 'CVE-2018-10933', 6.4, 'authentication bypass'],
['0.7.0', '0.7.5', 1, 'CVE-2018-10933', 6.4, 'authentication bypass'],
['0.8.0', '0.8.3', 1, 'CVE-2018-10933', 6.4, 'authentication bypass'],
['0.1', '0.7.2', 1, 'CVE-2016-0739', 4.3, 'conduct a MitM attack (weakness in DH key generation)'],
['0.5.1', '0.6.4', 1, 'CVE-2015-3146', 5.0, 'cause DoS via kex packets (null pointer dereference)'],
['0.5.1', '0.6.3', 1, 'CVE-2014-8132', 5.0, 'cause DoS via kex init packet (dangling pointer)'],
['0.4.7', '0.6.2', 1, 'CVE-2014-0017', 1.9, 'leak data via PRNG state reuse on forking servers'],
['0.4.7', '0.5.3', 1, 'CVE-2013-0176', 4.3, 'cause DoS via kex packet (null pointer dereference)'],
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-6063', 7.5, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code via sftp (double free)'],
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-4562', 7.5, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code (overflow check)'],
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-4561', 5.0, 'cause DoS via unspecified vectors (invalid pointer)'],
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-4560', 7.5, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code (buffer overflow)'],
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-4559', 6.8, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code (double free)']],
'OpenSSH': [
['7.2', '7.2p2', 1, 'CVE-2016-6515', 7.8, 'cause DoS via long password string (crypt CPU consumption)'],
['1.2.2', '7.2', 1, 'CVE-2016-3115', 5.5, 'bypass command restrictions via crafted X11 forwarding data'],
['5.4', '7.1', 1, 'CVE-2016-1907', 5.0, 'cause DoS via crafted network traffic (out of bounds read)'],
['5.4', '7.1p1', 2, 'CVE-2016-0778', 4.6, 'cause DoS via requesting many forwardings (heap based buffer overflow)'],
['5.0', '7.1p1', 2, 'CVE-2016-0777', 4.0, 'leak data via allowing transfer of entire buffer'],
['6.0', '7.2p2', 5, 'CVE-2015-8325', 7.2, 'privilege escalation via triggering crafted environment'],
['6.8', '6.9', 5, 'CVE-2015-6565', 7.2, 'cause DoS via writing to a device (terminal disruption)'],
['5.0', '6.9', 5, 'CVE-2015-6564', 6.9, 'privilege escalation via leveraging sshd uid'],
['5.0', '6.9', 5, 'CVE-2015-6563', 1.9, 'conduct impersonation attack'],
['6.9p1', '6.9p1', 1, 'CVE-2015-5600', 8.5, 'cause Dos or aid in conduct brute force attack (CPU consumption)'],
['6.0', '6.6', 1, 'CVE-2015-5352', 4.3, 'bypass access restrictions via a specific connection'],
['6.0', '6.6', 2, 'CVE-2014-2653', 5.8, 'bypass SSHFP DNS RR check via unacceptable host certificate'],
['5.0', '6.5', 1, 'CVE-2014-2532', 5.8, 'bypass environment restrictions via specific string before wildcard'],
['1.2', '6.4', 1, 'CVE-2014-1692', 7.5, 'cause DoS via triggering error condition (memory corruption)'],
['6.2', '6.3', 1, 'CVE-2013-4548', 6.0, 'bypass command restrictions via crafted packet data'],
['1.2', '5.6', 1, 'CVE-2012-0814', 3.5, 'leak data via debug messages'],
['1.2', '5.8', 1, 'CVE-2011-5000', 3.5, 'cause DoS via large value in certain length field (memory consumption)'],
['5.6', '5.7', 2, 'CVE-2011-0539', 5.0, 'leak data or conduct hash collision attack'],
['1.2', '6.1', 1, 'CVE-2010-5107', 5.0, 'cause DoS via large number of connections (slot exhaustion)'],
['1.2', '5.8', 1, 'CVE-2010-4755', 4.0, 'cause DoS via crafted glob expression (CPU and memory consumption)'],
['1.2', '5.6', 1, 'CVE-2010-4478', 7.5, 'bypass authentication check via crafted values'],
['4.3', '4.8', 1, 'CVE-2009-2904', 6.9, 'privilege escalation via hard links to setuid programs'],
['4.0', '5.1', 1, 'CVE-2008-5161', 2.6, 'recover plaintext data from ciphertext'],
['1.2', '4.6', 1, 'CVE-2008-4109', 5.0, 'cause DoS via multiple login attempts (slot exhaustion)'],
['1.2', '4.8', 1, 'CVE-2008-1657', 6.5, 'bypass command restrictions via modifying session file'],
['1.2.2', '4.9', 1, 'CVE-2008-1483', 6.9, 'hijack forwarded X11 connections'],
['4.0', '4.6', 1, 'CVE-2007-4752', 7.5, 'privilege escalation via causing an X client to be trusted'],
['4.3p2', '4.3p2', 1, 'CVE-2007-3102', 4.3, 'allow attacker to write random data to audit log'],
['1.2', '4.6', 1, 'CVE-2007-2243', 5.0, 'discover valid usernames through different responses'],
['4.4', '4.4', 1, 'CVE-2006-5794', 7.5, 'bypass authentication'],
['4.1', '4.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2006-5229', 2.6, 'discover valid usernames through different time delays'],
['1.2', '4.3p2', 1, 'CVE-2006-5052', 5.0, 'discover valid usernames through different responses'],
['1.2', '4.3p2', 1, 'CVE-2006-5051', 9.3, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code (double free)'],
['4.5', '4.5', 1, 'CVE-2006-4925', 5.0, 'cause DoS via invalid protocol sequence (crash)'],
['1.2', '4.3p2', 1, 'CVE-2006-4924', 7.8, 'cause DoS via crafted packet (CPU consumption)'],
['3.8.1p1', '3.8.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2006-0883', 5.0, 'cause DoS via connecting multiple times (client connection refusal)'],
['3.0', '4.2p1', 1, 'CVE-2006-0225', 4.6, 'execute arbitrary code'],
['2.1', '4.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2005-2798', 5.0, 'leak data about authentication credentials'],
['3.5', '3.5p1', 1, 'CVE-2004-2760', 6.8, 'leak data through different connection states'],
['2.3', '3.7.1p2', 1, 'CVE-2004-2069', 5.0, 'cause DoS via large number of connections (slot exhaustion)'],
['3.0', '3.4p1', 1, 'CVE-2004-0175', 4.3, 'leak data through directoy traversal'],
['1.2', '3.9p1', 1, 'CVE-2003-1562', 7.6, 'leak data about authentication credentials'],
['3.1p1', '3.7.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2003-0787', 7.5, 'privilege escalation via modifying stack'],
['3.1p1', '3.7.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2003-0786', 10.0, 'privilege escalation via bypassing authentication'],
['1.0', '3.7.1', 1, 'CVE-2003-0695', 7.5, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code'],
['1.0', '3.7', 1, 'CVE-2003-0693', 10.0, 'execute arbitrary code'],
['3.0', '3.6.1p2', 1, 'CVE-2003-0386', 7.5, 'bypass address restrictions for connection'],
['3.1p1', '3.6.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2003-0190', 5.0, 'discover valid usernames through different time delays'],
['3.2.2', '3.2.2', 1, 'CVE-2002-0765', 7.5, 'bypass authentication'],
['1.2.2', '3.3p1', 1, 'CVE-2002-0640', 10.0, 'execute arbitrary code'],
['1.2.2', '3.3p1', 1, 'CVE-2002-0639', 10.0, 'execute arbitrary code'],
['2.1', '3.2', 1, 'CVE-2002-0575', 7.5, 'privilege escalation'],
['2.1', '3.0.2p1', 2, 'CVE-2002-0083', 10.0, 'privilege escalation'],
['3.0', '3.0p1', 1, 'CVE-2001-1507', 7.5, 'bypass authentication'],
['1.2.3', '3.0.1p1', 5, 'CVE-2001-0872', 7.2, 'privilege escalation via crafted environment variables'],
['1.2.3', '2.1.1', 1, 'CVE-2001-0361', 4.0, 'recover plaintext from ciphertext'],
['1.2', '2.1', 1, 'CVE-2000-0525', 10.0, 'execute arbitrary code (improper privileges)']],
'PuTTY': [
['0.0', '0.72', 2, 'CVE-2019-17069', 5.0, 'potential DOS by remote SSHv1 server'],
['0.71', '0.72', 2, 'CVE-2019-17068', 5.0, 'xterm bracketed paste mode command injection'],
['0.52', '0.72', 2, 'CVE-2019-17067', 7.5, 'port rebinding weakness in port forward tunnel handling'],
['0.0', '0.71', 2, 'CVE-2019-XXXX', 5.0, 'undefined vulnerability in obsolete SSHv1 protocol handling'],
['0.0', '0.71', 6, 'CVE-2019-XXXX', 5.0, 'local privilege escalation in Pageant'],
['0.0', '0.70', 2, 'CVE-2019-9898', 7.5, 'potential recycling of random numbers'],
['0.0', '0.70', 2, 'CVE-2019-9897', 5.0, 'multiple denial-of-service issues from writing to the terminal'],
['0.0', '0.70', 6, 'CVE-2019-9896', 4.6, 'local application hijacking through malicious Windows help file'],
['0.0', '0.70', 2, 'CVE-2019-9894', 6.4, 'buffer overflow in RSA key exchange'],
['0.0', '0.69', 6, 'CVE-2016-6167', 4.4, 'local application hijacking through untrusted DLL loading'],
['0.0', '0.67', 2, 'CVE-2017-6542', 7.5, 'buffer overflow in UNIX client that can result in privilege escalation or denial-of-service'],
['0.0', '0.66', 2, 'CVE-2016-2563', 7.5, 'buffer overflow in SCP command-line utility'],
['0.0', '0.65', 2, 'CVE-2015-5309', 4.3, 'integer overflow in terminal-handling code'],
]
} # type: Dict[str, List[List[Any]]]
TXT = {
'Dropbear SSH': [
['0.28', '0.34', 1, 'remote root exploit', 'remote format string buffer overflow exploit (exploit-db#387)']],
'libssh': [
['0.3.3', '0.3.3', 1, 'null pointer check', 'missing null pointer check in "crypt_set_algorithms_server"'],
['0.3.3', '0.3.3', 1, 'integer overflow', 'integer overflow in "buffer_get_data"'],
['0.3.3', '0.3.3', 3, 'heap overflow', 'heap overflow in "packet_decrypt"']]
} # type: Dict[str, List[List[Any]]]
class Socket(ReadBuf, WriteBuf):
class InsufficientReadException(Exception):
pass
SM_BANNER_SENT = 1
def __init__(self, host: Optional[str], port: int, ipvo: Optional[Sequence[int]] = None, timeout: Union[int, float] = 5, timeout_set: bool = False) -> None:
super(SSH.Socket, self).__init__()
self.__sock = None # type: Optional[socket.socket]
self.__sock_map = {} # type: Dict[int, socket.socket]
self.__block_size = 8
self.__state = 0
self.__header = [] # type: List[str]
self.__banner = None # type: Optional[SSH.Banner]
if host is None:
raise ValueError('undefined host')
nport = utils.parse_int(port)
if nport < 1 or nport > 65535:
raise ValueError('invalid port: {}'.format(port))
self.__host = host
self.__port = nport
if ipvo is not None:
self.__ipvo = ipvo
else:
self.__ipvo = ()
self.__timeout = timeout
self.__timeout_set = timeout_set
self.client_host = None
self.client_port = None
def _resolve(self, ipvo: Sequence[int]) -> Iterable[Tuple[int, Tuple[Any, ...]]]:
ipvo = tuple([x for x in utils.unique_seq(ipvo) if x in (4, 6)])
ipvo_len = len(ipvo)
prefer_ipvo = ipvo_len > 0
prefer_ipv4 = prefer_ipvo and ipvo[0] == 4
if ipvo_len == 1:
family = socket.AF_INET if ipvo[0] == 4 else socket.AF_INET6
else:
family = socket.AF_UNSPEC
try:
stype = socket.SOCK_STREAM
r = socket.getaddrinfo(self.__host, self.__port, family, stype)
if prefer_ipvo:
r = sorted(r, key=lambda x: x[0], reverse=not prefer_ipv4)
check = any(stype == rline[2] for rline in r)
for af, socktype, _proto, _canonname, addr in r:
if not check or socktype == socket.SOCK_STREAM:
yield af, addr
except socket.error as e:
out.fail('[exception] {}'.format(e))
sys.exit(1)
# Listens on a server socket and accepts one connection (used for
# auditing client connections).
def listen_and_accept(self) -> None:
try:
# Socket to listen on all IPv4 addresses.
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.bind(('0.0.0.0', self.__port))
s.listen()
self.__sock_map[s.fileno()] = s
except Exception:
print("Warning: failed to listen on any IPv4 interfaces.")
try:
# Socket to listen on all IPv6 addresses.
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 1)
s.bind(('::', self.__port))
s.listen()
self.__sock_map[s.fileno()] = s
except Exception:
print("Warning: failed to listen on any IPv6 interfaces.")
# If we failed to listen on any interfaces, terminate.
if len(self.__sock_map.keys()) == 0:
print("Error: failed to listen on any IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces!")
sys.exit(-1)
# Wait for an incoming connection. If a timeout was explicitly
# set by the user, terminate when it elapses.
fds = None
time_elapsed = 0.0
interval = 1.0
while True:
# Wait for a connection on either socket.
fds = select.select(self.__sock_map.keys(), [], [], interval)
time_elapsed += interval
# We have incoming data on at least one of the sockets.
if len(fds[0]) > 0:
break
if self.__timeout_set and time_elapsed >= self.__timeout:
print("Timeout elapsed. Terminating...")
sys.exit(-1)
# Accept the connection.
c, addr = self.__sock_map[fds[0][0]].accept()
self.client_host = addr[0]
self.client_port = addr[1]
c.settimeout(self.__timeout)
self.__sock = c
def connect(self) -> None:
err = None
for af, addr in self._resolve(self.__ipvo):
s = None
try:
s = socket.socket(af, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.settimeout(self.__timeout)
s.connect(addr)
self.__sock = s
return
except socket.error as e:
err = e
self._close_socket(s)
if err is None:
errm = 'host {} has no DNS records'.format(self.__host)
else:
errt = (self.__host, self.__port, err)
errm = 'cannot connect to {} port {}: {}'.format(*errt)
out.fail('[exception] {}'.format(errm))
sys.exit(1)
def get_banner(self, sshv: int = 2) -> Tuple[Optional['SSH.Banner'], List[str], Optional[str]]:
if self.__sock is None:
return self.__banner, self.__header, 'not connected'
banner = SSH_HEADER.format('1.5' if sshv == 1 else '2.0')
if self.__state < self.SM_BANNER_SENT:
self.send_banner(banner)
# rto = self.__sock.gettimeout()
# self.__sock.settimeout(0.7)
s, e = self.recv()
# self.__sock.settimeout(rto)
if s < 0:
return self.__banner, self.__header, e
e = None
while self.__banner is None:
if not s > 0:
s, e = self.recv()
if s < 0:
break
while self.__banner is None and self.unread_len > 0:
line = self.read_line()
if len(line.strip()) == 0:
continue
if self.__banner is None:
self.__banner = SSH.Banner.parse(line)
if self.__banner is not None:
continue
self.__header.append(line)
s = 0
return self.__banner, self.__header, e
def recv(self, size: int = 2048) -> Tuple[int, Optional[str]]:
if self.__sock is None:
return -1, 'not connected'
try:
data = self.__sock.recv(size)
except socket.timeout:
return -1, 'timed out'
except socket.error as e:
if e.args[0] in (errno.EAGAIN, errno.EWOULDBLOCK):
return 0, 'retry'
return -1, str(e.args[-1])
if len(data) == 0:
return -1, None
pos = self._buf.tell()
self._buf.seek(0, 2)
self._buf.write(data)
self._len += len(data)
self._buf.seek(pos, 0)
return len(data), None
def send(self, data: bytes) -> Tuple[int, Optional[str]]:
if self.__sock is None:
return -1, 'not connected'
try:
self.__sock.send(data)
return 0, None
except socket.error as e:
return -1, str(e.args[-1])
self.__sock.send(data)
def send_banner(self, banner: str) -> None:
self.send(banner.encode() + b'\r\n')
if self.__state < self.SM_BANNER_SENT:
self.__state = self.SM_BANNER_SENT
def ensure_read(self, size: int) -> None:
while self.unread_len < size:
s, e = self.recv()
if s < 0:
raise SSH.Socket.InsufficientReadException(e)
def read_packet(self, sshv: int = 2) -> Tuple[int, bytes]:
try:
header = WriteBuf()
self.ensure_read(4)
packet_length = self.read_int()
header.write_int(packet_length)
# XXX: validate length
if sshv == 1:
padding_length = 8 - packet_length % 8
self.ensure_read(padding_length)
padding = self.read(padding_length)
header.write(padding)
payload_length = packet_length
check_size = padding_length + payload_length
else:
self.ensure_read(1)
padding_length = self.read_byte()
header.write_byte(padding_length)
payload_length = packet_length - padding_length - 1
check_size = 4 + 1 + payload_length + padding_length
if check_size % self.__block_size != 0:
out.fail('[exception] invalid ssh packet (block size)')
sys.exit(1)
self.ensure_read(payload_length)
if sshv == 1:
payload = self.read(payload_length - 4)
header.write(payload)
crc = self.read_int()
header.write_int(crc)
else:
payload = self.read(payload_length)
header.write(payload)
packet_type = ord(payload[0:1])
if sshv == 1:
rcrc = SSH1.crc32(padding + payload)
if crc != rcrc:
out.fail('[exception] packet checksum CRC32 mismatch.')
sys.exit(1)
else:
self.ensure_read(padding_length)
padding = self.read(padding_length)
payload = payload[1:]
return packet_type, payload
except SSH.Socket.InsufficientReadException as ex:
if ex.args[0] is None:
header.write(self.read(self.unread_len))
e = header.write_flush().strip()
else:
e = ex.args[0].encode('utf-8')
return -1, e
def send_packet(self) -> Tuple[int, Optional[str]]:
payload = self.write_flush()
padding = -(len(payload) + 5) % 8
if padding < 4:
padding += 8
plen = len(payload) + padding + 1
pad_bytes = b'\x00' * padding
data = struct.pack('>Ib', plen, padding) + payload + pad_bytes
return self.send(data)
def is_connected(self) -> bool:
"""Returns true if this Socket is connected, False otherwise."""
return self.__sock is not None
def close(self) -> None:
self.__cleanup()
self.reset()
self.__state = 0
self.__header = []
self.__banner = None
def _close_socket(self, s: Optional[socket.socket]) -> None: # pylint: disable=no-self-use
try:
if s is not None:
s.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
s.close() # pragma: nocover
except Exception:
pass
def __del__(self) -> None:
self.__cleanup()
def __cleanup(self) -> None:
self._close_socket(self.__sock)
for fd in self.__sock_map:
self._close_socket(self.__sock_map[fd])
self.__sock = None
class KexDH: # pragma: nocover
def __init__(self, kex_name: str, hash_alg: str, g: int, p: int) -> None:
self.__kex_name = kex_name
self.__hash_alg = hash_alg
self.__g = 0
self.__p = 0
self.__q = 0
self.__x = 0
self.__e = 0
self.set_params(g, p)
self.__ed25519_pubkey = None # type: Optional[bytes]
self.__hostkey_type = None # type: Optional[bytes]
self.__hostkey_e = 0
self.__hostkey_n = 0
self.__hostkey_n_len = 0 # Length of the host key modulus.
self.__ca_n_len = 0 # Length of the CA key modulus (if hostkey is a cert).
def set_params(self, g: int, p: int) -> None:
self.__g = g
self.__p = p
self.__q = (self.__p - 1) // 2
self.__x = 0
self.__e = 0
def send_init(self, s: SSH.Socket, init_msg: int = SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT) -> None:
r = random.SystemRandom()
self.__x = r.randrange(2, self.__q)
self.__e = pow(self.__g, self.__x, self.__p)
s.write_byte(init_msg)
s.write_mpint2(self.__e)
s.send_packet()
# Parse a KEXDH_REPLY or KEXDH_GEX_REPLY message from the server. This
# contains the host key, among other things. Function returns the host
# key blob (from which the fingerprint can be calculated).
def recv_reply(self, s, parse_host_key_size=True):
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
# Skip any & all MSG_DEBUG messages.
while packet_type == SSH.Protocol.MSG_DEBUG:
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
if packet_type != -1 and packet_type not in [SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY]: # pylint: disable=no-else-raise
# TODO: change Exception to something more specific.
raise Exception('Expected MSG_KEXDH_REPLY (%d) or MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY (%d), but got %d instead.' % (SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY, packet_type))
elif packet_type == -1:
# A connection error occurred. We can't parse anything, so just
# return. The host key modulus (and perhaps certificate modulus)
# will remain at length 0.
return None
hostkey_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
hostkey_type_len = hostkey_e_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
key_id_len = principles_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
critical_options_len = extensions_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
nonce_len = ca_key_len = ca_key_type_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
ca_key_len = ca_key_type_len = ca_key_e_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
key_id = principles = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
critical_options = extensions = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
nonce = ca_key = ca_key_type = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
ca_key_e = ca_key_n = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
# Get the host key blob, F, and signature.
ptr = 0
hostkey, hostkey_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(payload, ptr)
# If we are not supposed to parse the host key size (i.e.: it is a type that is of fixed size such as ed25519), then stop here.
if not parse_host_key_size:
return hostkey
_, _, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(payload, ptr)
_, _, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(payload, ptr)
# Now pick apart the host key blob.
# Get the host key type (i.e.: 'ssh-rsa', 'ssh-ed25519', etc).
ptr = 0
self.__hostkey_type, hostkey_type_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
# If this is an RSA certificate, skip over the nonce.
if self.__hostkey_type.startswith(b'ssh-rsa-cert-v0'):
nonce, nonce_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
# The public key exponent.
hostkey_e, hostkey_e_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
self.__hostkey_e = int(binascii.hexlify(hostkey_e), 16)
# Here is the modulus size & actual modulus of the host key public key.
hostkey_n, self.__hostkey_n_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
self.__hostkey_n = int(binascii.hexlify(hostkey_n), 16)
# If this is an RSA certificate, continue parsing to extract the CA
# key.
if self.__hostkey_type.startswith(b'ssh-rsa-cert-v0'):
# Skip over the serial number.
ptr += 8
# Get the certificate type.
cert_type = int(binascii.hexlify(hostkey[ptr:ptr + 4]), 16)
ptr += 4
# Only SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST (2) makes sense in this context.
if cert_type == 2:
# Skip the key ID (this is the serial number of the
# certificate).
key_id, key_id_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
# The principles, which are... I don't know what.
principles, principles_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
# Skip over the timestamp that this certificate is valid after.
ptr += 8
# Skip over the timestamp that this certificate is valid before.
ptr += 8
# TODO: validate the principles, and time range.
# The critical options.
critical_options, critical_options_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
# Certificate extensions.
extensions, extensions_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
# Another nonce.
nonce, nonce_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
# Finally, we get to the CA key.
ca_key, ca_key_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
# Last in the host key blob is the CA signature. It isn't
# interesting to us, so we won't bother parsing any further.
# The CA key has the modulus, however...
ptr = 0
# 'ssh-rsa', 'rsa-sha2-256', etc.
ca_key_type, ca_key_type_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(ca_key, ptr)
# CA's public key exponent.
ca_key_e, ca_key_e_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(ca_key, ptr)
# CA's modulus. Bingo.
ca_key_n, self.__ca_n_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(ca_key, ptr)
return hostkey
@staticmethod
def __get_bytes(buf: bytes, ptr: int) -> Tuple[bytes, int, int]:
num_bytes = struct.unpack('>I', buf[ptr:ptr + 4])[0]
ptr += 4
return buf[ptr:ptr + num_bytes], num_bytes, ptr + num_bytes
# Converts a modulus length in bytes to its size in bits, after some
# possible adjustments.
@staticmethod
def __adjust_key_size(size: int) -> int:
size = size * 8
# Actual keys are observed to be about 8 bits bigger than expected
# (i.e.: 1024-bit keys have a 1032-bit modulus). Check if this is
# the case, and subtract 8 if so. This simply improves readability
# in the UI.
if (size >> 3) % 2 != 0:
size = size - 8
return size
# Returns the size of the hostkey, in bits.
def get_hostkey_size(self) -> int:
return KexDH.__adjust_key_size(self.__hostkey_n_len)
# Returns the size of the CA key, in bits.
def get_ca_size(self) -> int:
return KexDH.__adjust_key_size(self.__ca_n_len)
# Returns the size of the DH modulus, in bits.
def get_dh_modulus_size(self) -> int:
# -2 to account for the '0b' prefix in the string.
return len(bin(self.__p)) - 2
class KexGroup1(KexDH): # pragma: nocover
def __init__(self) -> None:
# rfc2409: second oakley group
p = int('ffffffffffffffffc90fdaa22168c234c4c6628b80dc1cd129024e088a67cc74020bbea63b139b22514a08798e3404ddef9519b3cd3a431b302b0a6df25f14374fe1356d6d51c245e485b576625e7ec6f44c42e9a637ed6b0bff5cb6f406b7edee386bfb5a899fa5ae9f24117c4b1fe649286651ece65381ffffffffffffffff', 16)
super(KexGroup1, self).__init__('KexGroup1', 'sha1', 2, p)
class KexGroup14(KexDH): # pragma: nocover
def __init__(self, hash_alg: str) -> None:
# rfc3526: 2048-bit modp group
p = int('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', 16)
super(KexGroup14, self).__init__('KexGroup14', hash_alg, 2, p)
class KexGroup14_SHA1(KexGroup14):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super(KexGroup14_SHA1, self).__init__('sha1')
class KexGroup14_SHA256(KexGroup14):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super(KexGroup14_SHA256, self).__init__('sha256')
class KexGroup16_SHA512(KexDH):
def __init__(self) -> None:
# rfc3526: 4096-bit modp group
p = int('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', 16)
super(KexGroup16_SHA512, self).__init__('KexGroup16_SHA512', 'sha512', 2, p)
class KexGroup18_SHA512(KexDH):
def __init__(self) -> None:
# rfc3526: 8192-bit modp group
p = int('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', 16)
super(KexGroup18_SHA512, self).__init__('KexGroup18_SHA512', 'sha512', 2, p)
class KexCurve25519_SHA256(KexDH):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super(KexCurve25519_SHA256, self).__init__('KexCurve25519_SHA256', 'sha256', 0, 0)
# To start an ED25519 kex, we simply send a random 256-bit number as the
# public key.
def send_init(self, s: 'SSH.Socket', init_msg: int = SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT) -> None:
self.__ed25519_pubkey = os.urandom(32)
s.write_byte(init_msg)
s.write_string(self.__ed25519_pubkey)
s.send_packet()
class KexNISTP256(KexDH):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super(KexNISTP256, self).__init__('KexNISTP256', 'sha256', 0, 0)
# Because the server checks that the value sent here is valid (i.e.: it lies
# on the curve, among other things), we would have to write a lot of code
# or import an elliptic curve library in order to randomly generate a
# valid elliptic point each time. Hence, we will simply send a static
# value, which is enough for us to extract the server's host key.
def send_init(self, s: 'SSH.Socket', init_msg: int = SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT) -> None:
s.write_byte(init_msg)
s.write_string(b'\x04\x0b\x60\x44\x9f\x8a\x11\x9e\xc7\x81\x0c\xa9\x98\xfc\xb7\x90\xaa\x6b\x26\x8c\x12\x4a\xc0\x09\xbb\xdf\xc4\x2c\x4c\x2c\x99\xb6\xe1\x71\xa0\xd4\xb3\x62\x47\x74\xb3\x39\x0c\xf2\x88\x4a\x84\x6b\x3b\x15\x77\xa5\x77\xd2\xa9\xc9\x94\xf9\xd5\x66\x19\xcd\x02\x34\xd1')
s.send_packet()
class KexNISTP384(KexDH):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super(KexNISTP384, self).__init__('KexNISTP384', 'sha256', 0, 0)
# See comment for KexNISTP256.send_init().
def send_init(self, s: 'SSH.Socket', init_msg: int = SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT) -> None:
s.write_byte(init_msg)
s.write_string(b'\x04\xe2\x9b\x84\xce\xa1\x39\x50\xfe\x1e\xa3\x18\x70\x1c\xe2\x7a\xe4\xb5\x6f\xdf\x93\x9f\xd4\xf4\x08\xcc\x9b\x02\x10\xa4\xca\x77\x9c\x2e\x51\x44\x1d\x50\x7a\x65\x4e\x7e\x2f\x10\x2d\x2d\x4a\x32\xc9\x8e\x18\x75\x90\x6c\x19\x10\xda\xcc\xa8\xe9\xf4\xc4\x3a\x53\x80\x35\xf4\x97\x9c\x04\x16\xf9\x5a\xdc\xcc\x05\x94\x29\xfa\xc4\xd6\x87\x4e\x13\x21\xdb\x3d\x12\xac\xbd\x20\x3b\x60\xff\xe6\x58\x42')
s.send_packet()
class KexNISTP521(KexDH):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super(KexNISTP521, self).__init__('KexNISTP521', 'sha256', 0, 0)
# See comment for KexNISTP256.send_init().
def send_init(self, s: 'SSH.Socket', init_msg: int = SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT) -> None:
s.write_byte(init_msg)
s.write_string(b'\x04\x01\x02\x90\x29\xe9\x8f\xa8\x04\xaf\x1c\x00\xf9\xc6\x29\xc0\x39\x74\x8e\xea\x47\x7e\x7c\xf7\x15\x6e\x43\x3b\x59\x13\x53\x43\xb0\xae\x0b\xe7\xe6\x7c\x55\x73\x52\xa5\x2a\xc1\x42\xde\xfc\xf4\x1f\x8b\x5a\x8d\xfa\xcd\x0a\x65\x77\xa8\xce\x68\xd2\xc6\x26\xb5\x3f\xee\x4b\x01\x7b\xd2\x96\x23\x69\x53\xc7\x01\xe1\x0d\x39\xe9\x87\x49\x3b\xc8\xec\xda\x0c\xf9\xca\xad\x89\x42\x36\x6f\x93\x78\x78\x31\x55\x51\x09\x51\xc0\x96\xd7\xea\x61\xbf\xc2\x44\x08\x80\x43\xed\xc6\xbb\xfb\x94\xbd\xf8\xdf\x2b\xd8\x0b\x2e\x29\x1b\x8c\xc4\x8a\x04\x2d\x3a')
s.send_packet()
class KexGroupExchange(KexDH):
def __init__(self, classname: str, hash_alg: str) -> None:
super(KexGroupExchange, self).__init__(classname, hash_alg, 0, 0)
def send_init(self, s: 'SSH.Socket', init_msg: int = SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REQUEST) -> None:
self.send_init_gex(s)
# The group exchange starts with sending a message to the server with
# the minimum, maximum, and preferred number of bits are for the DH group.
# The server responds with a generator and prime modulus that matches that,
# then the handshake continues on like a normal DH handshake (except the
# SSH message types differ).
def send_init_gex(self, s: 'SSH.Socket', minbits: int = 1024, prefbits: int = 2048, maxbits: int = 8192) -> None:
# Send the initial group exchange request. Tell the server what range
# of modulus sizes we will accept, along with our preference.
s.write_byte(SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REQUEST)
s.write_int(minbits)
s.write_int(prefbits)
s.write_int(maxbits)
s.send_packet()
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
if (packet_type != SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_GROUP) and (packet_type != SSH.Protocol.MSG_DEBUG): # pylint: disable=consider-using-in
# TODO: replace with a better exception type.
raise Exception('Expected MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY (%d), but got %d instead.' % (SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY, packet_type))
# Skip any & all MSG_DEBUG messages.
while packet_type == SSH.Protocol.MSG_DEBUG:
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
# Parse the modulus (p) and generator (g) values from the server.
ptr = 0
p_len = struct.unpack('>I', payload[ptr:ptr + 4])[0]
ptr += 4
p = int(binascii.hexlify(payload[ptr:ptr + p_len]), 16)
ptr += p_len
g_len = struct.unpack('>I', payload[ptr:ptr + 4])[0]
ptr += 4
g = int(binascii.hexlify(payload[ptr:ptr + g_len]), 16)
ptr += g_len
# Now that we got the generator and modulus, perform the DH exchange
# like usual.
super(KexGroupExchange, self).set_params(g, p)
super(KexGroupExchange, self).send_init(s, SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_INIT)
class KexGroupExchange_SHA1(KexGroupExchange):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super(KexGroupExchange_SHA1, self).__init__('KexGroupExchange_SHA1', 'sha1')
class KexGroupExchange_SHA256(KexGroupExchange):
def __init__(self) -> None:
super(KexGroupExchange_SHA256, self).__init__('KexGroupExchange_SHA256', 'sha256')
def output_algorithms(title: str, alg_db: Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]], alg_type: str, algorithms: List[str], unknown_algs: List[str], maxlen: int = 0, alg_sizes: Optional[Dict[str, Tuple[int, int]]] = None) -> None:
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
for algorithm in algorithms:
output_algorithm(alg_db, alg_type, algorithm, unknown_algs, maxlen, alg_sizes)
if len(obuf) > 0:
out.head('# ' + title)
obuf.flush()
out.sep()
def output_algorithm(alg_db: Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]], alg_type: str, alg_name: str, unknown_algs: List[str], alg_max_len: int = 0, alg_sizes: Optional[Dict[str, Tuple[int, int]]] = None) -> None:
prefix = '(' + alg_type + ') '
if alg_max_len == 0:
alg_max_len = len(alg_name)
padding = '' if out.batch else ' ' * (alg_max_len - len(alg_name))
# If this is an RSA host key or DH GEX, append the size to its name and fix
# the padding.
alg_name_with_size = None
if (alg_sizes is not None) and (alg_name in alg_sizes):
hostkey_size, ca_size = alg_sizes[alg_name]
if ca_size > 0:
alg_name_with_size = '%s (%d-bit cert/%d-bit CA)' % (alg_name, hostkey_size, ca_size)
padding = padding[0:-15]
else:
alg_name_with_size = '%s (%d-bit)' % (alg_name, hostkey_size)
padding = padding[0:-11]
texts = []
if len(alg_name.strip()) == 0:
return
alg_name_native = utils.to_text(alg_name)
if alg_name_native in alg_db[alg_type]:
alg_desc = alg_db[alg_type][alg_name_native]
ldesc = len(alg_desc)
for idx, level in enumerate(['fail', 'warn', 'info']):
if level == 'info':
versions = alg_desc[0]
since_text = SSH.Algorithm.get_since_text(versions)
if since_text is not None and len(since_text) > 0:
texts.append((level, since_text))
idx = idx + 1
if ldesc > idx:
for t in alg_desc[idx]:
if t is None:
continue
texts.append((level, t))
if len(texts) == 0:
texts.append(('info', ''))
else:
texts.append(('warn', 'unknown algorithm'))
unknown_algs.append(alg_name)
alg_name = alg_name_with_size if alg_name_with_size is not None else alg_name
first = True
for level, text in texts:
f = getattr(out, level)
comment = (padding + ' -- [' + level + '] ' + text) if text != '' else ''
if first:
if first and level == 'info':
f = out.good
f(prefix + alg_name + comment)
first = False
else: # pylint: disable=else-if-used
if out.verbose:
f(prefix + alg_name + comment)
elif text != '':
comment = (padding + ' `- [' + level + '] ' + text)
f(' ' * len(prefix + alg_name) + comment)
def output_compatibility(algs: SSH.Algorithms, client_audit: bool, for_server: bool = True) -> None:
# Don't output any compatibility info if we're doing a client audit.
if client_audit:
return
ssh_timeframe = algs.get_ssh_timeframe(for_server)
comp_text = []
for ssh_prod in [SSH.Product.OpenSSH, SSH.Product.DropbearSSH]:
if ssh_prod not in ssh_timeframe:
continue
v_from = ssh_timeframe.get_from(ssh_prod, for_server)
v_till = ssh_timeframe.get_till(ssh_prod, for_server)
if v_from is None:
continue
if v_till is None:
comp_text.append('{} {}+'.format(ssh_prod, v_from))
elif v_from == v_till:
comp_text.append('{} {}'.format(ssh_prod, v_from))
else:
software = SSH.Software(None, ssh_prod, v_from, None, None)
if software.compare_version(v_till) > 0:
tfmt = '{0} {1}+ (some functionality from {2})'
else:
tfmt = '{0} {1}-{2}'
comp_text.append(tfmt.format(ssh_prod, v_from, v_till))
if len(comp_text) > 0:
out.good('(gen) compatibility: ' + ', '.join(comp_text))
def output_security_sub(sub: str, software: Optional[SSH.Software], client_audit: bool, padlen: int) -> None:
secdb = SSH.Security.CVE if sub == 'cve' else SSH.Security.TXT
if software is None or software.product not in secdb:
return
for line in secdb[software.product]:
vfrom = '' # type: str
vtill = '' # type: str
vfrom, vtill = line[0:2]
if not software.between_versions(vfrom, vtill):
continue
target = 0 # type: int
name = '' # type: str
target, name = line[2:4]
is_server = target & 1 == 1
is_client = target & 2 == 2
# is_local = target & 4 == 4
# If this security entry applies only to servers, but we're testing a client, then skip it. Similarly, skip entries that apply only to clients, but we're testing a server.
if (is_server and not is_client and client_audit) or (is_client and not is_server and not client_audit):
continue
p = '' if out.batch else ' ' * (padlen - len(name))
if sub == 'cve':
cvss = 0.0 # type: float
descr = '' # type: str
cvss, descr = line[4:6]
# Critical CVSS scores (>= 8.0) are printed as a fail, otherwise they are printed as a warning.
out_func = out.warn
if cvss >= 8.0:
out_func = out.fail
out_func('(cve) {}{} -- (CVSSv2: {}) {}'.format(name, p, cvss, descr))
else:
descr = line[4]
out.fail('(sec) {}{} -- {}'.format(name, p, descr))
def output_security(banner: Optional[SSH.Banner], client_audit: bool, padlen: int) -> None:
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
if banner is not None:
software = SSH.Software.parse(banner)
output_security_sub('cve', software, client_audit, padlen)
output_security_sub('txt', software, client_audit, padlen)
if len(obuf) > 0:
out.head('# security')
obuf.flush()
out.sep()
def output_fingerprints(algs: SSH.Algorithms, sha256: bool = True) -> None:
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
fps = []
if algs.ssh1kex is not None:
name = 'ssh-rsa1'
fp = SSH.Fingerprint(algs.ssh1kex.host_key_fingerprint_data)
# bits = algs.ssh1kex.host_key_bits
fps.append((name, fp))
if algs.ssh2kex is not None:
host_keys = algs.ssh2kex.host_keys()
for host_key_type in algs.ssh2kex.host_keys():
if host_keys[host_key_type] is None:
continue
fp = SSH.Fingerprint(host_keys[host_key_type])
# Workaround for Python's order-indifference in dicts. We might get a random RSA type (ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, or rsa-sha2-512), so running the tool against the same server three times may give three different host key types here. So if we have any RSA type, we will simply hard-code it to 'ssh-rsa'.
if host_key_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
host_key_type = 'ssh-rsa'
# Skip over certificate host types (or we would return invalid fingerprints).
if '-cert-' not in host_key_type:
fps.append((host_key_type, fp))
# Similarly, the host keys can be processed in random order due to Python's order-indifference in dicts. So we sort this list before printing; this makes automated testing possible.
fps = sorted(fps)
for fpp in fps:
name, fp = fpp
fpo = fp.sha256 if sha256 else fp.md5
# p = '' if out.batch else ' ' * (padlen - len(name))
# out.good('(fin) {0}{1} -- {2} {3}'.format(name, p, bits, fpo))
out.good('(fin) {}: {}'.format(name, fpo))
if len(obuf) > 0:
out.head('# fingerprints')
obuf.flush()
out.sep()
# Returns True if no warnings or failures encountered in configuration.
def output_recommendations(algs: SSH.Algorithms, software: Optional[SSH.Software], padlen: int = 0) -> bool:
ret = True
# PuTTY's algorithms cannot be modified, so there's no point in issuing recommendations.
if (software is not None) and (software.product == SSH.Product.PuTTY):
max_vuln_version = 0.0
max_cvssv2_severity = 0.0
# Search the CVE database for the most recent vulnerable version and the max CVSSv2 score.
for cve_list in SSH.Security.CVE['PuTTY']:
vuln_version = float(cve_list[1])
cvssv2_severity = cve_list[4]
if vuln_version > max_vuln_version:
max_vuln_version = vuln_version
if cvssv2_severity > max_cvssv2_severity:
max_cvssv2_severity = cvssv2_severity
fn = out.warn
if max_cvssv2_severity > 8.0:
fn = out.fail
# Assuming that PuTTY versions will always increment by 0.01, we can calculate the first safe version by adding 0.01 to the latest vulnerable version.
current_version = float(software.version)
upgrade_to_version = max_vuln_version + 0.01
if current_version < upgrade_to_version:
out.head('# recommendations')
fn('(rec) Upgrade to PuTTY v%.2f' % upgrade_to_version)
out.sep()
ret = False
return ret
for_server = True
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
software, alg_rec = algs.get_recommendations(software, for_server)
for sshv in range(2, 0, -1):
if sshv not in alg_rec:
continue
for alg_type in ['kex', 'key', 'enc', 'mac']:
if alg_type not in alg_rec[sshv]:
continue
for action in ['del', 'add', 'chg']:
if action not in alg_rec[sshv][alg_type]:
continue
for name in alg_rec[sshv][alg_type][action]:
p = '' if out.batch else ' ' * (padlen - len(name))
chg_additional_info = ''
if action == 'del':
an, sg, fn = 'remove', '-', out.warn
ret = False
if alg_rec[sshv][alg_type][action][name] >= 10:
fn = out.fail
elif action == 'add':
an, sg, fn = 'append', '+', out.good
elif action == 'chg':
an, sg, fn = 'change', '!', out.fail
ret = False
chg_additional_info = ' (increase modulus size to 2048 bits or larger)'
b = '(SSH{})'.format(sshv) if sshv == 1 else ''
fm = '(rec) {0}{1}{2}-- {3} algorithm to {4}{5} {6}'
fn(fm.format(sg, name, p, alg_type, an, chg_additional_info, b))
if len(obuf) > 0:
if software is not None:
title = '(for {})'.format(software.display(False))
else:
title = ''
out.head('# algorithm recommendations {}'.format(title))
obuf.flush(True) # Sort the output so that it is always stable (needed for repeatable testing).
out.sep()
return ret
# Output additional information & notes.
def output_info(software: Optional['SSH.Software'], client_audit: bool, any_problems: bool) -> None:
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
# Tell user that PuTTY cannot be hardened at the protocol-level.
if client_audit and (software is not None) and (software.product == SSH.Product.PuTTY):
out.warn('(nfo) PuTTY does not have the option of restricting any algorithms during the SSH handshake.')
# If any warnings or failures were given, print a link to the hardening guides.
if any_problems:
out.warn('(nfo) For hardening guides on common OSes, please see: <https://www.ssh-audit.com/hardening_guides.html>')
if len(obuf) > 0:
out.head('# additional info')
obuf.flush()
out.sep()
def output(banner: Optional[SSH.Banner], header: List[str], client_host: Optional[str] = None, kex: Optional[SSH2.Kex] = None, pkm: Optional[SSH1.PublicKeyMessage] = None) -> None:
client_audit = client_host is not None # If set, this is a client audit.
sshv = 1 if pkm is not None else 2
algs = SSH.Algorithms(pkm, kex)
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
if client_audit:
out.good('(gen) client IP: {}'.format(client_host))
if len(header) > 0:
out.info('(gen) header: ' + '\n'.join(header))
if banner is not None:
out.good('(gen) banner: {}'.format(banner))
if not banner.valid_ascii:
# NOTE: RFC 4253, Section 4.2
out.warn('(gen) banner contains non-printable ASCII')
if sshv == 1 or banner.protocol[0] == 1:
out.fail('(gen) protocol SSH1 enabled')
software = SSH.Software.parse(banner)
if software is not None:
out.good('(gen) software: {}'.format(software))
else:
software = None
output_compatibility(algs, client_audit)
if kex is not None:
compressions = [x for x in kex.server.compression if x != 'none']
if len(compressions) > 0:
cmptxt = 'enabled ({})'.format(', '.join(compressions))
else:
cmptxt = 'disabled'
out.good('(gen) compression: {}'.format(cmptxt))
if len(obuf) > 0:
out.head('# general')
obuf.flush()
out.sep()
maxlen = algs.maxlen + 1
output_security(banner, client_audit, maxlen)
# Filled in by output_algorithms() with unidentified algs.
unknown_algorithms = [] # type: List[str]
if pkm is not None:
adb = SSH1.KexDB.ALGORITHMS
ciphers = pkm.supported_ciphers
auths = pkm.supported_authentications
title, atype = 'SSH1 host-key algorithms', 'key'
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, ['ssh-rsa1'], unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
title, atype = 'SSH1 encryption algorithms (ciphers)', 'enc'
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, ciphers, unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
title, atype = 'SSH1 authentication types', 'aut'
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, auths, unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
if kex is not None:
adb = SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS
title, atype = 'key exchange algorithms', 'kex'
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, kex.kex_algorithms, unknown_algorithms, maxlen, kex.dh_modulus_sizes())
title, atype = 'host-key algorithms', 'key'
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, kex.key_algorithms, unknown_algorithms, maxlen, kex.rsa_key_sizes())
title, atype = 'encryption algorithms (ciphers)', 'enc'
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, kex.server.encryption, unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
title, atype = 'message authentication code algorithms', 'mac'
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, kex.server.mac, unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
output_fingerprints(algs, True)
perfect_config = output_recommendations(algs, software, maxlen)
output_info(software, client_audit, not perfect_config)
# If we encountered any unknown algorithms, ask the user to report them.
if len(unknown_algorithms) > 0:
out.warn("\n\n!!! WARNING: unknown algorithm(s) found!: %s. Please email the full output above to the maintainer (jtesta@positronsecurity.com), or create a Github issue at <https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit/issues>.\n" % ','.join(unknown_algorithms))
class Utils:
@classmethod
def _type_err(cls, v: Any, target: str) -> TypeError:
return TypeError('cannot convert {} to {}'.format(type(v), target))
@classmethod
def to_bytes(cls, v: Union[bytes, str], enc: str = 'utf-8') -> bytes:
if isinstance(v, bytes):
return v
elif isinstance(v, str):
return v.encode(enc)
raise cls._type_err(v, 'bytes')
@classmethod
def to_text(cls, v: Union[str, bytes], enc: str = 'utf-8') -> str:
if isinstance(v, str):
return v
elif isinstance(v, bytes):
return v.decode(enc)
raise cls._type_err(v, 'unicode text')
@classmethod
def _is_ascii(cls, v: str, char_filter: Callable[[int], bool] = lambda x: x <= 127) -> bool:
r = False
if isinstance(v, str):
for c in v:
i = cls.ctoi(c)
if not char_filter(i):
return r
r = True
return r
@classmethod
def _to_ascii(cls, v: str, char_filter: Callable[[int], bool] = lambda x: x <= 127, errors: str = 'replace') -> str:
if isinstance(v, str):
r = bytearray()
for c in v:
i = cls.ctoi(c)
if char_filter(i):
r.append(i)
else:
if errors == 'ignore':
continue
r.append(63)
return cls.to_text(r.decode('ascii'))
raise cls._type_err(v, 'ascii')
@classmethod
def is_ascii(cls, v: str) -> bool:
return cls._is_ascii(v)
@classmethod
def to_ascii(cls, v: str, errors: str = 'replace') -> str:
return cls._to_ascii(v, errors=errors)
@classmethod
def is_print_ascii(cls, v: str) -> bool:
return cls._is_ascii(v, lambda x: 126 >= x >= 32)
@classmethod
def to_print_ascii(cls, v: str, errors: str = 'replace') -> str:
return cls._to_ascii(v, lambda x: 126 >= x >= 32, errors)
@classmethod
def unique_seq(cls, seq: Sequence[Any]) -> Sequence[Any]:
seen = set() # type: Set[Any]
def _seen_add(x: Any) -> bool:
seen.add(x)
return False
if isinstance(seq, tuple):
return tuple(x for x in seq if x not in seen and not _seen_add(x))
else:
return [x for x in seq if x not in seen and not _seen_add(x)]
@classmethod
def ctoi(cls, c: Union[str, int]) -> int:
if isinstance(c, str):
return ord(c[0])
else:
return c
@staticmethod
def parse_int(v: Any) -> int:
try:
return int(v)
except Exception: # pylint: disable=bare-except
return 0
@staticmethod
def parse_float(v: Any) -> float:
try:
return float(v)
except Exception: # pylint: disable=bare-except
return -1.0
def build_struct(banner, kex=None, pkm=None, client_host=None):
res = {
"banner": {
"raw": str(banner),
"protocol": banner.protocol,
"software": banner.software,
"comments": banner.comments,
},
}
if client_host is not None:
res['client_ip'] = client_host
if kex is not None:
res['compression'] = kex.server.compression
res['kex'] = []
alg_sizes = kex.dh_modulus_sizes()
for algorithm in kex.kex_algorithms:
entry = {
'algorithm': algorithm,
}
if (alg_sizes is not None) and (algorithm in alg_sizes):
hostkey_size, ca_size = alg_sizes[algorithm]
entry['keysize'] = hostkey_size
if ca_size > 0:
entry['casize'] = ca_size
res['kex'].append(entry)
res['key'] = []
alg_sizes = kex.rsa_key_sizes()
for algorithm in kex.key_algorithms:
entry = {
'algorithm': algorithm,
}
if (alg_sizes is not None) and (algorithm in alg_sizes):
hostkey_size, ca_size = alg_sizes[algorithm]
entry['keysize'] = hostkey_size
if ca_size > 0:
entry['casize'] = ca_size
res['key'].append(entry)
res['enc'] = kex.server.encryption
res['mac'] = kex.server.mac
res['fingerprints'] = []
host_keys = kex.host_keys()
# Normalize all RSA key types to 'ssh-rsa'. Otherwise, due to Python's order-indifference dictionary types, we would iterate key types in unpredictable orders, which interferes with the docker testing framework (i.e.: tests would fail because elements are reported out of order, even though the output is semantically the same).
for host_key_type in host_keys.keys():
if host_key_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
val = host_keys[host_key_type]
del host_keys[host_key_type]
host_keys['ssh-rsa'] = val
for host_key_type in sorted(host_keys):
if host_keys[host_key_type] is None:
continue
fp = SSH.Fingerprint(host_keys[host_key_type])
# Skip over certificate host types (or we would return invalid fingerprints).
if '-cert-' in host_key_type:
continue
entry = {
'type': host_key_type,
'fp': fp.sha256,
}
res['fingerprints'].append(entry)
else:
res['key'] = ['ssh-rsa1']
res['enc'] = pkm.supported_ciphers
res['aut'] = pkm.supported_authentications
res['fingerprints'] = [{
'type': 'ssh-rsa1',
'fp': SSH.Fingerprint(pkm.host_key_fingerprint_data).sha256,
}]
return res
def audit(aconf: AuditConf, sshv: Optional[int] = None) -> None:
out.batch = aconf.batch
out.verbose = aconf.verbose
out.level = aconf.level
out.use_colors = aconf.colors
s = SSH.Socket(aconf.host, aconf.port, aconf.ipvo, aconf.timeout, aconf.timeout_set)
if aconf.client_audit:
s.listen_and_accept()
else:
s.connect()
if sshv is None:
sshv = 2 if aconf.ssh2 else 1
err = None
banner, header, err = s.get_banner(sshv)
if banner is None:
if err is None:
err = '[exception] did not receive banner.'
else:
err = '[exception] did not receive banner: {}'.format(err)
if err is None:
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(sshv)
if packet_type < 0:
try:
if payload is not None and len(payload) > 0:
payload_txt = payload.decode('utf-8')
else:
payload_txt = u'empty'
except UnicodeDecodeError:
payload_txt = u'"{}"'.format(repr(payload).lstrip('b')[1:-1])
if payload_txt == u'Protocol major versions differ.':
if sshv == 2 and aconf.ssh1:
audit(aconf, 1)
return
err = '[exception] error reading packet ({})'.format(payload_txt)
else:
err_pair = None
if sshv == 1 and packet_type != SSH.Protocol.SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY:
err_pair = ('SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY', SSH.Protocol.SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY)
elif sshv == 2 and packet_type != SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXINIT:
err_pair = ('MSG_KEXINIT', SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXINIT)
if err_pair is not None:
fmt = '[exception] did not receive {0} ({1}), ' + \
'instead received unknown message ({2})'
err = fmt.format(err_pair[0], err_pair[1], packet_type)
if err is not None:
output(banner, header)
out.fail(err)
sys.exit(1)
if sshv == 1:
pkm = SSH1.PublicKeyMessage.parse(payload)
if aconf.json:
print(json.dumps(build_struct(banner, pkm=pkm), sort_keys=True))
else:
output(banner, header, pkm=pkm)
elif sshv == 2:
kex = SSH2.Kex.parse(payload)
if aconf.client_audit is False:
SSH2.HostKeyTest.run(s, kex)
SSH2.GEXTest.run(s, kex)
if aconf.json:
print(json.dumps(build_struct(banner, kex=kex, client_host=s.client_host), sort_keys=True))
else:
output(banner, header, client_host=s.client_host, kex=kex)
utils = Utils()
out = Output()
def main() -> None: # printed text is still None
conf = AuditConf.from_cmdline(sys.argv[1:], usage)
audit(conf)
if __name__ == '__main__': # pragma: nocover
main()
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