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Merge pull request #1463 from drwetter/shortcurt_vulns 

Shortcuts for vulnerability tests for TLS 1.3 only servers
This commit is contained in:
Dirk Wetter 2020-01-22 15:37:11 +01:00 committed by GitHub
parent c08250d1bb d4d5a61a0b
commit 2181061c6e
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GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
2 changed files with 127 additions and 56 deletions
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11
t/08_isHTML_valid.t
View File

@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ use Data::Dumper;
my $tests = 0; my $tests = 0;
my $prg="./testssl.sh"; my $prg="./testssl.sh";
my $uri="badssl.com"; my $uri="heise.de";
my $out=""; my $out="";
my $html=""; my $html="";
my $debughtml=""; my $debughtml="";
my $edited_html=""; my $edited_html="";
my $check2run="--color 0 --htmlfile tmp.html"; my $check2run="--ip=one --color 0 --htmlfile tmp.html";
die "Unable to open $prg" unless -f $prg; die "Unable to open $prg" unless -f $prg;
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ printf "\n%s\n", "Doing HTML output checks";
unlink 'tmp.html'; unlink 'tmp.html';
#1 #1
printf "%s\n", " .. running $prg against $uri to create HTML and terminal outputs (may take 2~3 minutes)"; printf "%s\n", " .. running $prg against \"$uri\" to create HTML and terminal outputs (may take ~2 minutes)";
# specify a TERM_WIDTH so that the two calls to testssl.sh don't create HTML files with different values of TERM_WIDTH # specify a TERM_WIDTH so that the two calls to testssl.sh don't create HTML files with different values of TERM_WIDTH
$out = `TERM_WIDTH=120 $prg $check2run $uri`; $out = `TERM_WIDTH=120 $prg $check2run $uri`;
$html = `cat tmp.html`; $html = `cat tmp.html`;
@ -44,12 +44,11 @@ $edited_html =~ s/>/>/g;
$edited_html =~ s/"/"/g; $edited_html =~ s/"/"/g;
$edited_html =~ s/'/'/g; $edited_html =~ s/'/'/g;
printf "\n%s\n", " .. comparing HTML and terminal outputs";
cmp_ok($edited_html, "eq", $out, "HTML file matches terminal output"); cmp_ok($edited_html, "eq", $out, "HTML file matches terminal output");
$tests++; $tests++;
#2 #2
printf "\n%s\n", " .. running $prg against $uri with --debug 4 to create HTML output (may take another 2~3 minutes)"; printf "\n%s\n", " .. running again $prg against \"$uri\", now with --debug 4 to create HTML output (may take another ~2 minutes)";
# Redirect stderr to /dev/null in order to avoid some unexplained "date: invalid date" error messages # Redirect stderr to /dev/null in order to avoid some unexplained "date: invalid date" error messages
$out = `TERM_WIDTH=120 $prg $check2run --debug 4 $uri 2> /dev/null`; $out = `TERM_WIDTH=120 $prg $check2run --debug 4 $uri 2> /dev/null`;
$debughtml = `cat tmp.html`; $debughtml = `cat tmp.html`;
@ -68,8 +67,8 @@ $debughtml =~ s/HTTP clock skew \+?-?[0-9]* /HTTP clock skew
$debughtml =~ s/ Pre-test: .*\n//g; $debughtml =~ s/ Pre-test: .*\n//g;
$debughtml =~ s/.*OK: below 825 days.*\n//g; $debughtml =~ s/.*OK: below 825 days.*\n//g;
$debughtml =~ s/.*DEBUG:.*\n//g;
printf "\n%s\n", " .. checking that using the --debug option doesn't affect the HTML file";
cmp_ok($debughtml, "eq", $html, "HTML file created with --debug 4 matches HTML file created without --debug"); cmp_ok($debughtml, "eq", $html, "HTML file created with --debug 4 matches HTML file created without --debug");
$tests++; $tests++;

130
testssl.sh
View File

@ -8789,7 +8789,7 @@ certificate_info() {
else else
# All is fine with valididy period # All is fine with valididy period
# We ignore for now certificates < 2018/03/01. On the screen we only show debug info # We ignore for now certificates < 2018/03/01. On the screen we only show debug info
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln "${spaces}DEBUG: all is fine with certificate life time" [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln "${spaces}DEBUG: all is fine with total certificate life time"
fileout "cert_validityPeriod${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No finding" fileout "cert_validityPeriod${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No finding"
fi fi
@ -12480,7 +12480,7 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
# If the ClientHello included a supported_versions extension, then check that the # If the ClientHello included a supported_versions extension, then check that the
# $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION appeared in the list offered in the ClientHello. # $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION appeared in the list offered in the ClientHello.
if [[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:0:2}" == "01" ]]; then if [[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:0:2}" == 01 ]]; then
# get position of cipher lists (just after session id) # get position of cipher lists (just after session id)
offset=78+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:76:2}") offset=78+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:76:2}")
# get position of compression methods # get position of compression methods
@ -12496,7 +12496,7 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
offset+=6 offset+=6
tls_protocol2="$(tolower "$tls_protocol2")" tls_protocol2="$(tolower "$tls_protocol2")"
for (( j=0; j < extension_len-2; j=j+4 )); do for (( j=0; j < extension_len-2; j=j+4 )); do
[[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}" == "$tls_protocol2" ]] && break [[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}" == $tls_protocol2 ]] && break
offset+=4 offset+=4
done done
if [[ $j -eq $extension_len-2 ]]; then if [[ $j -eq $extension_len-2 ]]; then
@ -14333,6 +14333,14 @@ run_renego() {
pr_bold " Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) " pr_bold " Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) "
jsonID="secure_renego" jsonID="secure_renego"
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
# https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2018/02/08/tlsv1.3/
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
outln
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe"
else
# first fingerprint for the Line "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" or "Secure Renegotiation IS " # first fingerprint for the Line "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" or "Secure Renegotiation IS "
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") 2>&1 </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") 2>&1 </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
@ -14355,6 +14363,7 @@ run_renego() {
prln_warning "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed" prln_warning "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed"
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed" "$cve" "$cwe" fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed" "$cve" "$cwe"
fi fi
fi
# FIXME: Basically this can be done with sockets and we might have that information already # FIXME: Basically this can be done with sockets and we might have that information already
# see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.4: 'The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info" # see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.4: 'The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info"
@ -14368,7 +14377,8 @@ run_renego() {
cve="CVE-2011-1473" cve="CVE-2011-1473"
# see: https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks # see: https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks
# http://blog.ivanristic.com/2009/12/testing-for-ssl-renegotiation.html -- head/get doesn't seem to be needed though # http://blog.ivanristic.com/2009/12/testing-for-ssl-renegotiation.html -- head/get doesn't seem to be needed though
# https://archive.fo/20130415224936/http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/, https://vincent.bernat.ch/en/blog/2011-ssl-dos-mitigation # https://archive.fo/20130415224936/http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/
# https://vincent.bernat.ch/en/blog/2011-ssl-dos-mitigation
case "$OSSL_VER" in case "$OSSL_VER" in
0.9.8*) # we need this for Mac OSX unfortunately 0.9.8*) # we need this for Mac OSX unfortunately
case "$OSSL_VER_APPENDIX" in case "$OSSL_VER_APPENDIX" in
@ -14389,7 +14399,12 @@ run_renego() {
esac esac
if "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
outln
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
elif "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then
prln_warning "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested" prln_warning "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested" fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
sec_client_renego=1 sec_client_renego=1
@ -14404,7 +14419,7 @@ run_renego() {
sec_client_renego=1 sec_client_renego=1
else else
# second try in the foreground as we are sure now it won't hang # second try in the foreground as we are sure now it won't hang
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
sec_client_renego=$? # 0=client is renegotiating & doesn't return an error --> vuln! sec_client_renego=$? # 0=client is renegotiating & doesn't return an error --> vuln!
case "$sec_client_renego" in case "$sec_client_renego" in
0) # We try again if server is HTTP. This could be either a node.js server or something else. 0) # We try again if server is HTTP. This could be either a node.js server or something else.
@ -14415,7 +14430,7 @@ run_renego() {
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, potential DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, potential DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
else else
(for i in {1..4}; do echo R; sleep 1; done) | \ (for i in {1..4}; do echo R; sleep 1; done) | \
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
case $? in case $? in
0) pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", DoS threat" 0) pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", DoS threat"
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
@ -14461,15 +14476,23 @@ run_crime() {
local cwe="CWE-310" local cwe="CWE-310"
local hint="" local hint=""
# in a nutshell: don't offer TLS/SPDY compression on the server side # In a nutshell: don't offer TLS/SPDY compression. This tests for CRIME Vulnerability on HTTPS only,
# This tests for CRIME Vulnerability (www.ekoparty.org/2012/juliano-rizzo.php) on HTTPS, not SPDY (yet) # not SPDY or ALPN (yet). Please note that it is an attack where you need client side control, so in
# Please note that it is an attack where you need client side control, so in regular situations this # regular situations this # means anyway "game over", with or without CRIME.
# means anyway "game over", w/wo CRIME #
# www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Vulnerability-in-SSL-encryption-is-barely-exploitable-1708604.html # https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2012/09/14/crime-information-leakage-attack-against-ssltls
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CRIME vulnerability " && outln [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CRIME vulnerability " && outln
pr_bold " CRIME, TLS " ; out "($cve) " pr_bold " CRIME, TLS " ; out "($cve) "
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no compression in TLS 1.3 only servers"
outln
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe"
return 0
fi
if ! "$HAS_ZLIB"; then if ! "$HAS_ZLIB"; then
if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks zlib support" prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks zlib support"
@ -14488,20 +14511,21 @@ run_crime() {
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
sclient_success=$? sclient_success=$?
fi fi
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
pr_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)" pr_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)"
fileout "CRIME_TLS" "WARN" "Check failed, couldn't connect" "$cve" "$cwe" fileout "CRIME_TLS" "WARN" "Check failed, couldn't connect" "$cve" "$cwe"
ret=1 ret=1
elif grep -a Compression $TMPFILE | grep -aq NONE >/dev/null; then elif grep -a Compression $TMPFILE | grep -aq NONE >/dev/null; then
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
if [[ $SERVICE != "HTTP" ]] && ! "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && ! "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then
out " (not using HTTP anyway)" out " (not using HTTP anyway)"
fileout "CRIME_TLS" "OK" "not vulnerable (not using HTTP anyway)" "$cve" "$cwe" fileout "CRIME_TLS" "OK" "not vulnerable (not using HTTP anyway)" "$cve" "$cwe"
else else
fileout "CRIME_TLS" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" fileout "CRIME_TLS" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
fi fi
else else
if [[ $SERVICE == "HTTP" ]] || "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
fileout "CRIME_TLS" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" fileout "CRIME_TLS" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
else else
@ -14646,13 +14670,21 @@ run_sweet32() {
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SWEET32 (Birthday Attacks on 64-bit Block Ciphers) " && outln [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SWEET32 (Birthday Attacks on 64-bit Block Ciphers) " && outln
pr_bold " SWEET32"; out " (${cve// /, }) " pr_bold " SWEET32"; out " (${cve// /, }) "
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
# Unfortunately there's no restriction using TLS 1.2 with $sweet32_ciphers
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", TLS 1.3 doesn't offer such ciphers"
outln
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
return 0
fi
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing). # The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing).
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here # Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here.
if "$using_sockets"; then if "$using_sockets"; then
for proto in 03 02 01 00; do for proto in 03 02 01 00; do
"$FAST" && [[ "$proto" != 03 ]] && break [[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue
! "$FAST" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue
tls_sockets "$proto" "${sweet32_ciphers_hex}, 00,ff" tls_sockets "$proto" "${sweet32_ciphers_hex}, 00,ff"
sclient_success=$? sclient_success=$?
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
@ -14766,6 +14798,14 @@ run_ssl_poodle() {
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SSLv3 POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) " && outln [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SSLv3 POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) " && outln
pr_bold " POODLE, SSL"; out " ($cve) " pr_bold " POODLE, SSL"; out " ($cve) "
if "$TLS13_ONLY" || [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -ne 0 ]]; then
# one condition should normally suffice but we don't know when run_poddle() was called
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
outln ", no SSLv3 support"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSLv3" "$cve" "$cwe"
return 0
fi
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK and KRB5 ciphers are typically missing). # The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK and KRB5 ciphers are typically missing).
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here # Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here
@ -14878,10 +14918,9 @@ run_tls_fallback_scsv() {
return 0 return 0
;; ;;
*) if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 0 ]]; then *) if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 0 ]]; then
# If the server supports TLS 1.3, and does not support TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, # If the server supports TLS 1.3, and does not support TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1,
# or TLS 1, then assume it does not support SSLv3, even if SSLv3 cannot # then assume it does not support SSLv3, even if SSLv3 cannot be tested.
# be tested. pr_svrty_good "No fallback possible (OK)"; outln ", TLS 1.3 is the only protocol"
prln_svrty_good "No fallback possible, TLS 1.3 is the only protocol (OK)"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "only TLS 1.3 supported" fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "only TLS 1.3 supported"
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 1 ]] && \ elif [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 1 ]] && \
( [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]] || "$HAS_SSL3" ); then ( [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]] || "$HAS_SSL3" ); then
@ -14894,8 +14933,8 @@ run_tls_fallback_scsv() {
# If the server does not support TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1, and # If the server does not support TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1, and
# support for SSLv3 cannot be tested, then treat it as HIGH severity, since # support for SSLv3 cannot be tested, then treat it as HIGH severity, since
# it is very likely that SSLv3 is the only supported protocol. # it is very likely that SSLv3 is the only supported protocol.
prln_svrty_high "No fallback possible, TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 not supported" pr_svrty_high "NOT ok, no fallback possible"; outln ", TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.1 and 1.0 not supported"
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 not supported" fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.1, 1.0 not supported"
else else
# TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 are not supported, but can't tell whether TLS 1.3 is supported. # TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 are not supported, but can't tell whether TLS 1.3 is supported.
# This could be a TLS 1.3 only server, an SSLv3 only server (if SSLv3 support cannot be tested), # This could be a TLS 1.3 only server, an SSLv3 only server (if SSLv3 support cannot be tested),
@ -14924,7 +14963,7 @@ run_tls_fallback_scsv() {
if ! "$HAS_SSL3" && \ if ! "$HAS_SSL3" && \
( [[ "$low_proto" == ssl3 ]] || \ ( [[ "$low_proto" == ssl3 ]] || \
( [[ "$high_proto" == tls1 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -eq 2 ]] ) ); then ( [[ "$high_proto" == tls1 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 2 ]] ) ); then
# If the protocol that the server would fall back to is SSLv3, but $OPENSSL does # If the protocol that the server would fall back to is SSLv3, but $OPENSSL does
# not support SSLv3, then the test cannot be performed. So, if $OPENSSL does not # not support SSLv3, then the test cannot be performed. So, if $OPENSSL does not
# support SSLv3 and it is known that SSLv3 is the fallback protocol ($low_proto), then # support SSLv3 and it is known that SSLv3 is the fallback protocol ($low_proto), then
@ -14941,7 +14980,7 @@ run_tls_fallback_scsv() {
if [[ -z "$low_proto" ]]; then if [[ -z "$low_proto" ]]; then
case "$high_proto" in case "$high_proto" in
"tls1_2") "tls1_2")
prln_svrty_good "No fallback possible, no protocol below $high_proto_str offered (OK)" pr_svrty_good "No fallback possible (OK)"; outln ", no protocol below $high_proto_str offered"
;; ;;
*) outln "No fallback possible, no protocol below $high_proto_str offered (OK)" *) outln "No fallback possible, no protocol below $high_proto_str offered (OK)"
;; ;;
@ -15026,6 +15065,14 @@ run_freak() {
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for FREAK attack " && outln [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for FREAK attack " && outln
pr_bold " FREAK"; out " ($cve) " pr_bold " FREAK"; out " ($cve) "
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", TLS 1.3 only server"
outln
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
return 0
fi
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
if "$using_sockets"; then if "$using_sockets"; then
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_words "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex")+$(count_words "$exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex") nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_words "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex")+$(count_words "$exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex")
@ -15473,7 +15520,6 @@ run_beast(){
local hint="" local hint=""
local jsonID="BEAST" local jsonID="BEAST"
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
outln outln
pr_headlineln " Testing for BEAST vulnerability " pr_headlineln " Testing for BEAST vulnerability "
@ -15481,6 +15527,14 @@ run_beast(){
fi fi
pr_bold " BEAST"; out " ($cve) " pr_bold " BEAST"; out " ($cve) "
if "$TLS13_ONLY" || ( [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 1 ]] ); then
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
outln ", no SSL3 or TLS1"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
return 0
fi
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
# $cbc_ciphers_hex has 126 ciphers, we omitted SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA bc the trailing 00,ff below will pose # $cbc_ciphers_hex has 126 ciphers, we omitted SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA bc the trailing 00,ff below will pose
# a problem for ACE loadbalancers otherwise. So in case we know this is not true, we'll re-add it # a problem for ACE loadbalancers otherwise. So in case we know this is not true, we'll re-add it
! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" & "$using_sockets" && cbc_ciphers_hex="$cbc_ciphers_hex, C0,20" ! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" & "$using_sockets" && cbc_ciphers_hex="$cbc_ciphers_hex, C0,20"
@ -15564,12 +15618,14 @@ run_beast(){
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then # protocol supported? if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then # protocol supported?
if "$continued"; then # second round: we hit TLS1 if "$continued"; then # second round: we hit TLS1
if "$HAS_SSL3" || "$using_sockets"; then if "$HAS_SSL3" || "$using_sockets"; then
prln_svrty_good "no SSL3 or TLS1 (OK)" pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" ; out ", no SSL3 or TLS1"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe" fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
else else
prln_svrty_good "no TLS1 (OK)" prln_svrty_good "no TLS1 (OK)"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe" fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
fi fi
set +x
exit 0
return 0 return 0
else # protocol not succeeded but it's the first time else # protocol not succeeded but it's the first time
continued=true continued=true
@ -15597,7 +15653,7 @@ run_beast(){
sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
done done
while true; do while true; do
[[ "$proto" == "ssl3" ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && break [[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && break
ciphers_to_test="" ciphers_to_test=""
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && "${ossl_supported[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}" ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && "${ossl_supported[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
@ -15695,7 +15751,7 @@ run_beast(){
detected_cbc_ciphers="" # empty for next round detected_cbc_ciphers="" # empty for next round
first=false first=false
else else
[[ $proto == "tls1" ]] && ! $first && echo -n "$spaces " [[ $proto == tls1 ]] && ! $first && echo -n "$spaces "
prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto) (OK)" prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto) (OK)"
first=false first=false
fi fi
@ -15762,6 +15818,14 @@ run_lucky13() {
fi fi
pr_bold " LUCKY13"; out " ($cve), experimental " pr_bold " LUCKY13"; out " ($cve), experimental "
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no CBC ciphers in TLS 1.3 only servers"
outln
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
return 0
fi
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing). # The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing).
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here # Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here
@ -15841,6 +15905,14 @@ run_rc4() {
fi fi
pr_bold " RC4"; out " (${cve// /, }) " pr_bold " RC4"; out " (${cve// /, }) "
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no RC4 support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
outln
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
return 0
fi
# get a list of all the cipher suites to test # get a list of all the cipher suites to test
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do