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Merge pull request #2561 from drwetter/fix_1312

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Fix 1312
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Dirk Wetter 2024-09-06 18:55:24 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 30f80cf9b3
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5 changed files with 56 additions and 25 deletions
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1
CHANGELOG.md
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@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
* Don't use external pwd command anymore * Don't use external pwd command anymore
* Doesn't hang anymore when there's no local resolver * Doesn't hang anymore when there's no local resolver
* Added --mtls feature to support client authentication * Added --mtls feature to support client authentication
* If a TLS 1.3 host is tested and e.g. /usr/bin/openssl supports it, it'll automagically will switch to it
### Features implemented / improvements in 3.0 ### Features implemented / improvements in 3.0

6
doc/testssl.1
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@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ Any single check switch supplied as an argument prevents testssl\.sh from doing
.P .P
\fB\-f, \-\-fs, \-\-nsa, \-\-forward\-secrecy\fR Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange\. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here\. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks\. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1\.2 and TLS 1\.3)\. \fB\-f, \-\-fs, \-\-nsa, \-\-forward\-secrecy\fR Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange\. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here\. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks\. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1\.2 and TLS 1\.3)\.
.P .P
\fB\-p, \-\-protocols\fR checks TLS/SSL protocols SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1\.0 through TLS 1\.3 and for HTTP: SPDY (NPN) and ALPN, a\.k\.a\. HTTP/2\. For TLS 1\.3 several drafts (from 18 on) and final are supported and being tested for\. \fB\-p, \-\-protocols\fR checks TLS/SSL protocols SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1\.0 through TLS 1\.3 and for HTTP: SPDY (NPN) and ALPN, a\.k\.a\. HTTP/2\. For TLS 1\.3 several drafts (from 18 on) and final are supported and being tested for\. Note the supplied openssl\-bad version doesn't support TLS 1\.3 \. As the check for TLS 1\.3 will be done in sockets this normally does not pose a problem\. However if a TLS\-1\.3\-only host is encountered and to have a complete test coverage (e.g. header checks) \fB/usr/bin/openssl\fR (or the content of \fBOPENSSL2\fR) is checked for existence and support of TLS 1\.3 and if those tests succeeded it will be switched to this binary\. A message will notify you\.
.P .P
\fB\-P, \-\-server\-preference, \-\-preference\fR displays the servers preferences: cipher order, with used openssl client: negotiated protocol and cipher\. If there's a cipher order enforced by the server it displays it for each protocol (openssl+sockets)\. If there's not, it displays instead which ciphers from the server were picked with each protocol\. \fB\-P, \-\-server\-preference, \-\-preference\fR displays the servers preferences: cipher order, with used openssl client: negotiated protocol and cipher\. If there's a cipher order enforced by the server it displays it for each protocol (openssl+sockets)\. If there's not, it displays instead which ciphers from the server were picked with each protocol\.
.P .P
@ -418,6 +418,10 @@ MAX_SOCKET_FAIL: A number which tells testssl\.sh how often a TCP socket connect
MAX_OSSL_FAIL: A number which tells testssl\.sh how often an OpenSSL s_client connect may fail before the program gives up and terminates\. The default is 2\. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like \fIFatal error: repeated TCP connect problems, giving up\fR\. MAX_OSSL_FAIL: A number which tells testssl\.sh how often an OpenSSL s_client connect may fail before the program gives up and terminates\. The default is 2\. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like \fIFatal error: repeated TCP connect problems, giving up\fR\.
.IP "\[ci]" 4 .IP "\[ci]" 4
MAX_HEADER_FAIL: A number which tells testssl\.sh how often a HTTP GET request over OpenSSL may return an empty file before the program gives up and terminates\. The default is 3\. Also here you can increase the threshold when you spot messages like \fIFatal error: repeated HTTP header connect problems, doesn't make sense to continue\fR\. MAX_HEADER_FAIL: A number which tells testssl\.sh how often a HTTP GET request over OpenSSL may return an empty file before the program gives up and terminates\. The default is 3\. Also here you can increase the threshold when you spot messages like \fIFatal error: repeated HTTP header connect problems, doesn't make sense to continue\fR\.
.IP "\[ci]" 4
OPENSSL2 can be used to supply an alternative openssl version\. This only makes sense if you want to amend the supplied version in \fBbin/\fR which lacks TLS 1\.3 support with a version which does not and is not in \fB/usr/bin/openssl\fR.
.IP "\[ci]" 4
OSSL_SHORTCUT can be set to true when you run interactively and don't want to switch automatically to \fB/usr/bin/openssl\fR (\fBOPENSSL2\fR) if you encounter a TLS 1\.3-only host\.
.IP "" 0 .IP "" 0
.SS "RATING" .SS "RATING"
This program has a near\-complete implementation of SSL Labs's 'SSL Server Rating Guide \fIhttps://github\.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL\-Server\-Rating\-Guide\fR'\. This program has a near\-complete implementation of SSL Labs's 'SSL Server Rating Guide \fIhttps://github\.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL\-Server\-Rating\-Guide\fR'\.

4
doc/testssl.1.html
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@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ in <code>/etc/hosts</code>. The use of the switch is only useful if you either
<p><code>-f, --fs, --nsa, --forward-secrecy</code> Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3).</p> <p><code>-f, --fs, --nsa, --forward-secrecy</code> Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3).</p>
<p><code>-p, --protocols</code> checks TLS/SSL protocols SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.0 through TLS 1.3 and for HTTP: SPDY (NPN) and ALPN, a.k.a. HTTP/2. For TLS 1.3 several drafts (from 18 on) and final are supported and being tested for.</p> <p><code>-p, --protocols</code> checks TLS/SSL protocols SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.0 through TLS 1.3 and for HTTP: SPDY (NPN) and ALPN, a.k.a. HTTP/2. For TLS 1.3 several drafts (from 18 on) and final are supported and being tested for. Note the supplied openssl-bad version doesn't support TLS 1.3 . As the check for TLS 1.3 will be done in sockets this normally does not pose a problem. However if a TLS-1.3-only host is encountered and to have a complete test coverage (e.g. header checks) `/usr/bin/openssl` (or the content of `OPENSSL2`) is checked for existence and support of TLS 1.3 and if those tests succeeded it will be switched to this binary. A message will notify you.</p>
<p><code>-P, --server-preference, --preference</code> displays the servers preferences: cipher order, with used openssl client: negotiated protocol and cipher. If there's a cipher order enforced by the server it displays it for each protocol (openssl+sockets). If there's not, it displays instead which ciphers from the server were picked with each protocol.</p> <p><code>-P, --server-preference, --preference</code> displays the servers preferences: cipher order, with used openssl client: negotiated protocol and cipher. If there's a cipher order enforced by the server it displays it for each protocol (openssl+sockets). If there's not, it displays instead which ciphers from the server were picked with each protocol.</p>
@ -501,6 +501,8 @@ Rating automatically gets disabled, to not give a wrong or misleading grade, whe
<li>MAX_SOCKET_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often a TCP socket connection may fail before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 2. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like <em>Fatal error: repeated openssl s_client connect problem, doesn't make sense to continue</em>.</li> <li>MAX_SOCKET_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often a TCP socket connection may fail before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 2. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like <em>Fatal error: repeated openssl s_client connect problem, doesn't make sense to continue</em>.</li>
<li>MAX_OSSL_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often an OpenSSL s_client connect may fail before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 2. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like <em>Fatal error: repeated TCP connect problems, giving up</em>.</li> <li>MAX_OSSL_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often an OpenSSL s_client connect may fail before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 2. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like <em>Fatal error: repeated TCP connect problems, giving up</em>.</li>
<li>MAX_HEADER_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often a HTTP GET request over OpenSSL may return an empty file before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 3. Also here you can increase the threshold when you spot messages like <em>Fatal error: repeated HTTP header connect problems, doesn't make sense to continue</em>.</li> <li>MAX_HEADER_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often a HTTP GET request over OpenSSL may return an empty file before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 3. Also here you can increase the threshold when you spot messages like <em>Fatal error: repeated HTTP header connect problems, doesn't make sense to continue</em>.</li>
<li>OPENSSL2 can be used to supply an alternative openssl version. This only makes sense if you want to amend the supplied version in <code>bin/</code> which lacks TLS 1.3 support with a version which does not and is not in <code>/usr/bin/openssl</code>.</li>
<li>OSSL_SHORTCUT can be set to true when you run interactively and don't want to switch automatically to <code>/usr/bin/openssl</code> (<code>OPENSSL2</code>) if you encounter a TLS 1.3-only host.
</ul> </ul>
<h3 id="RATING">RATING</h3> <h3 id="RATING">RATING</h3>

5
doc/testssl.1.md
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@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ Any single check switch supplied as an argument prevents testssl.sh from doing a
`-f, --fs, --nsa, --forward-secrecy` Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3). `-f, --fs, --nsa, --forward-secrecy` Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3).
`-p, --protocols` checks TLS/SSL protocols SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.0 through TLS 1.3 and for HTTP: SPDY (NPN) and ALPN, a.k.a. HTTP/2. For TLS 1.3 several drafts (from 18 on) and final are supported and being tested for. `-p, --protocols` checks TLS/SSL protocols SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.0 through TLS 1.3 and for HTTP: SPDY (NPN) and ALPN, a.k.a. HTTP/2. For TLS 1.3 several drafts (from 18 on) and final are supported and being tested for. Note the supplied openssl-bad version doesn't support TLS 1.3 . As the check for TLS 1.3 will be done in sockets this normally does not pose a problem. However if a TLS-1.3-only host is encountered and to have a complete test coverage (e.g. header checks) `/usr/bin/openssl` (or the content of `OPENSSL2`) is checked for existence and support of TLS 1.3 and if those tests succeeded it will be switched to this binary. A message will notify you.
`-P, --server-preference, --preference` displays the servers preferences: cipher order, with used openssl client: negotiated protocol and cipher. If there's a cipher order enforced by the server it displays it for each protocol (openssl+sockets). If there's not, it displays instead which ciphers from the server were picked with each protocol. `-P, --server-preference, --preference` displays the servers preferences: cipher order, with used openssl client: negotiated protocol and cipher. If there's a cipher order enforced by the server it displays it for each protocol (openssl+sockets). If there's not, it displays instead which ciphers from the server were picked with each protocol.
@ -403,6 +403,9 @@ Except the environment variables mentioned above which can replace command line
* MAX_SOCKET_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often a TCP socket connection may fail before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 2. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like *Fatal error: repeated openssl s_client connect problem, doesn't make sense to continue*. * MAX_SOCKET_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often a TCP socket connection may fail before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 2. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like *Fatal error: repeated openssl s_client connect problem, doesn't make sense to continue*.
* MAX_OSSL_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often an OpenSSL s_client connect may fail before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 2. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like *Fatal error: repeated TCP connect problems, giving up*. * MAX_OSSL_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often an OpenSSL s_client connect may fail before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 2. You can increase it to a higher value if you frequently see a message like *Fatal error: repeated TCP connect problems, giving up*.
* MAX_HEADER_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often a HTTP GET request over OpenSSL may return an empty file before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 3. Also here you can increase the threshold when you spot messages like *Fatal error: repeated HTTP header connect problems, doesn't make sense to continue*. * MAX_HEADER_FAIL: A number which tells testssl.sh how often a HTTP GET request over OpenSSL may return an empty file before the program gives up and terminates. The default is 3. Also here you can increase the threshold when you spot messages like *Fatal error: repeated HTTP header connect problems, doesn't make sense to continue*.
* OPENSSL2 can be used to supply an alternative openssl version. This only makes sense if you want to amend the supplied version in `bin/` which lacks TLS 1.3 support with a version which doesn not and is not in `/usr/bin/openssl`.
* OSSL_SHORTCUT can be set to true when you run interactively and don't want to switch automatically to `/usr/bin/openssl` (`OPENSSL2`) if you encounter a TLS 1.3-only host.
### RATING ### RATING

63
testssl.sh
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@ -243,9 +243,10 @@ SYSTEM2="" # currently only being used for WSL = ba
PRINTF="" # which external printf to use. Empty presets the internal one, see #1130 PRINTF="" # which external printf to use. Empty presets the internal one, see #1130
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="" CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE=""
TLS_DATA_FILE="" # mandatory file for socket-based handshakes TLS_DATA_FILE="" # mandatory file for socket-based handshakes
OPENSSL="" # If you run this from GitHub it's ~/bin/openssl.$(uname).$(uname -m) otherwise /usr/bin/openssl OPENSSL="" # ~/bin/openssl.$(uname).$(uname -m) if you run this from GitHub. Linux otherwise probably /usr/bin/openssl
OPENSSL2="" # When running from GitHub, this will be openssl version >=1.1.1 (auto determined) OPENSSL2=${OPENSSL2:-/usr/bin/openssl} # This will be openssl version >=1.1.1 (auto determined) as opposed to openssl-bad (OPENSSL)
OPENSSL2_HAS_TLS_1_3=false # If we run with supplied binary AND /usr/bin/openssl supports TLS 1.3 this is set to true OPENSSL2_HAS_TLS_1_3=false # If we run with supplied binary AND $OPENSSL2 supports TLS 1.3 this will be set to true
OSSL_SHORTCUT=${OSSL_SHORTCUT:-true} # Hack: if during the scan turns out the OpenSSL binary supports TLS 1.3 would be a better choice
OPENSSL_LOCATION="" OPENSSL_LOCATION=""
IKNOW_FNAME=false IKNOW_FNAME=false
FIRST_FINDING=true # is this the first finding we are outputting to file? FIRST_FINDING=true # is this the first finding we are outputting to file?
@ -275,7 +276,6 @@ KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=false # We need OpenSSL a few times. This vari
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" # .. as hex string, e.g. 0300 or 0303 DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" # .. as hex string, e.g. 0300 or 0303
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="" # Information about the application traffic keys for a TLS 1.3 connection. APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="" # Information about the application traffic keys for a TLS 1.3 connection.
TLS13_ONLY=false # Does the server support TLS 1.3 ONLY? TLS13_ONLY=false # Does the server support TLS 1.3 ONLY?
OSSL_SHORTCUT=${OSSL_SHORTCUT:-false} # Hack: if during the scan turns out the OpenSSL binary supports TLS 1.3 would be a better choice, this enables it.
TLS_EXTENSIONS="" TLS_EXTENSIONS=""
TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS="" TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS=""
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE="" CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE=""
@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ END_TIME=0 # .. ended
SCAN_TIME=0 # diff of both: total scan time SCAN_TIME=0 # diff of both: total scan time
LAST_TIME=0 # only used for performance measurements (MEASURE_TIME=true) LAST_TIME=0 # only used for performance measurements (MEASURE_TIME=true)
SERVER_COUNTER=0 # Counter for multiple servers SERVER_COUNTER=0 # Counter for multiple servers
OPEN_MSG="" # Null the poor man's implementation of a message stack
TLS_LOW_BYTE="" # For "secret" development stuff, see -q below TLS_LOW_BYTE="" # For "secret" development stuff, see -q below
HEX_CIPHER="" # -- " -- HEX_CIPHER="" # -- " --
@ -2405,7 +2406,7 @@ service_detection() {
;; ;;
esac esac
outln "\n" outln
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
return 0 return 0
} }
@ -20297,7 +20298,6 @@ find_openssl_binary() {
# not check /usr/bin/openssl -- if available. This is more a kludge which we shouldn't use for # not check /usr/bin/openssl -- if available. This is more a kludge which we shouldn't use for
# every openssl feature. At some point we need to decide which with openssl version we go. # every openssl feature. At some point we need to decide which with openssl version we go.
# We also check, whether there's /usr/bin/openssl which has TLS 1.3 # We also check, whether there's /usr/bin/openssl which has TLS 1.3
OPENSSL2=/usr/bin/openssl
if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ ! $OSSL_VER =~ 1.1.1 ]] && [[ ! $OSSL_VER_MAJOR =~ 3 ]]; then if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ ! $OSSL_VER =~ 1.1.1 ]] && [[ ! $OSSL_VER_MAJOR =~ 3 ]]; then
if [[ -x $OPENSSL2 ]]; then if [[ -x $OPENSSL2 ]]; then
$OPENSSL2 s_client -help 2>$s_client_has2 $OPENSSL2 s_client -help 2>$s_client_has2
@ -21015,6 +21015,9 @@ EOF
# arg1: text to display before "-->" # arg1: text to display before "-->"
# arg2: arg needed to accept to continue # arg2: arg needed to accept to continue
# ret=0 : arg was accepted to continue (batch mode doesn't do this,or warnings are turned off)
# 1 : arg was not accepted by user or we're in bacth mode
ignore_no_or_lame() { ignore_no_or_lame() {
local a local a
@ -22033,21 +22036,26 @@ determine_optimal_proto() {
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
elif "$all_failed" && ! "$ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS"; then elif "$all_failed" && ! "$ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS"; then
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$TLS13_ONLY"; then if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_magenta " $NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY. You better use --openssl=<path_to_openssl_supporting_TLS_1.3>" if "$OPENSSL2_HAS_TLS_1_3"; then
if ! "$OSSL_SHORTCUT" || [[ ! -x /usr/bin/openssl ]] || /usr/bin/openssl s_client -tls1_3 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then if "$OSSL_SHORTCUT" || [[ "$WARNINGS" == batch ]]; then
outln # switch w/o asking
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY, but $OPENSSL does not support TLS 1.3" OPEN_MSG=" $NODE:$PORT appeared to support TLS 1.3 ONLY. Thus switched implicitly from\n \"$OPENSSL\" to \"$OPENSSL2\"."
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed with $OPENSSL and accept all scan problems" "yes" fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY, switching from $OPENSSL to $OPENSSL2 was implicitly enforced"
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS OPENSSL="$OPENSSL2"
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=10 find_openssl_binary
else prepare_arrays
# dirty hack but an idea for the future to be implemented upfront: Now we know, we'll better off else
# with the OS supplied openssl binary. We need to initialize variables / arrays again though. # now we need to ask the user
# And the service detection can't be made up for now ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed with \"$OPENSSL2\" OR accept all scan problems" "yes"
outln ", \n proceeding with /usr/bin/openssl" if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
OPENSSL=/usr/bin/openssl fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY, switching from $OPENSSL to $OPENSSL2 by the user"
find_openssl_binary OPENSSL="$OPENSSL2"
prepare_arrays find_openssl_binary
prepare_arrays
else
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY, switching from $OPENSSL to $OPENSSL2 was denied by user"
fi
fi
fi fi
elif ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -ne 0 ]] && \ elif ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -ne 0 ]] && \
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -ne 0 ]] &&
@ -22092,6 +22100,18 @@ determine_optimal_proto() {
} }
# Check messages which needed to be processed. I.e. those which would have destroyed the nice
# screen output and thus havve been postponed. This is just an idea and is only used once
# but can be extended in the future. An array might be more handy
#
check_msg() {
if [[ -n "$OPEN_MSG" ]]; then
outln "$OPEN_MSG"
OPEN_MSG=""
fi
}
# arg1 (optional): ftp smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap, sieve, xmpp, xmpp-server, telnet, ldap, postgres, mysql, irc, nntp (maybe with trailing s) # arg1 (optional): ftp smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap, sieve, xmpp, xmpp-server, telnet, ldap, postgres, mysql, irc, nntp (maybe with trailing s)
# #
determine_service() { determine_service() {
@ -22132,6 +22152,7 @@ determine_service() {
determine_optimal_proto determine_optimal_proto
# returns always 0: # returns always 0:
service_detection $OPTIMAL_PROTO service_detection $OPTIMAL_PROTO
check_msg
else # STARTTLS else # STARTTLS
if [[ "$1" == postgres ]] || [[ "$1" == sieve ]]; then if [[ "$1" == postgres ]] || [[ "$1" == sieve ]]; then
protocol="$1" protocol="$1"