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Merge pull request #1304 from drwetter/renego_fixes

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Fix misleading CVE in Secure Renegotiation
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Dirk Wetter 2019-08-09 19:38:56 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 5fed82f4c2
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1 changed files with 34 additions and 19 deletions
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testssl.sh
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@ -14050,35 +14050,37 @@ run_ticketbleed() {
return $ret
}
# Overview @ http://www.exploresecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/custom/SSL_manual_cheatsheet.html
#
run_renego() {
# no SNI here. Not needed as there won't be two different SSL stacks for one IP
local legacycmd="" proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
local insecure_renogo_str="Secure Renegotiation IS NOT"
local sec_renego sec_client_renego
local -i ret=0
local cve="CVE-2009-3555"
local cve=""
local cwe="CWE-310"
local hint=""
local jsonID=""
# No SNI needed here as there won't be two different SSL stacks for one IP
"$HAS_TLS13" && [[ -z "$proto" ]] && proto="-no_tls1_3"
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Renegotiation vulnerabilities " && outln
pr_bold " Secure Renegotiation "; out "($cve) " # and RFC 5746, OSVDB 59968-59974
jsonID="secure_renego" # community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2009/11/05/ssl-and-tls-authentication-gap-vulnerability-discovered
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI $PROXY") 2>&1 </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
pr_bold " Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) "
jsonID="secure_renego"
# first fingerprint for the Line "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" or "Secure Renegotiation IS "
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") 2>&1 </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
grep -iaq "$insecure_renogo_str" $TMPFILE
grep -iaq "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" $TMPFILE
sec_renego=$? # 0= Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
#FIXME: didn't occur to me yet but why not also to check on "Secure Renegotiation IS supported"
# grep -iaq "Secure Renegotiation IS supported"
#FIXME: didn't occur to me yet but why not also to check on "Secure Renegotiation IS supported"
case $sec_renego in
0) prln_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
0) prln_svrty_critical "Not supported / VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
;;
1) prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
1) prln_svrty_best "supported (OK)"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "supported" "$cve" "$cwe"
;;
*) prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_renego"
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "FIXME (bug) $sec_renego" "$cve" "$cwe"
@ -14089,10 +14091,18 @@ run_renego() {
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed" "$cve" "$cwe"
fi
# see: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks
# http://blog.ivanristic.com/2009/12/testing-for-ssl-renegotiation.html -- head/get doesn't seem to be needed though
pr_bold " Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation " # RFC 5746
# FIXME: Basically this can be done with sockets and we might have that information already
# see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.4: 'The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info"
# extension, or the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV signaling cipher suite value in the ClientHello. [..]
# When a ServerHello is received, the client MUST check if it includes the "renegotiation_info" extension:
# If the extension is not present, the server does not support secure renegotiation'
pr_bold " Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation "
jsonID="secure_client_renego"
# see: https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks
# http://blog.ivanristic.com/2009/12/testing-for-ssl-renegotiation.html -- head/get doesn't seem to be needed though
# https://archive.fo/20130415224936/http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/, https://vincent.bernat.ch/en/blog/2011-ssl-dos-mitigation
case "$OSSL_VER" in
0.9.8*) # we need this for Mac OSX unfortunately
case "$OSSL_VER_APPENDIX" in
@ -14112,6 +14122,7 @@ run_renego() {
;; # all ok
esac
if "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then
prln_warning "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
@ -14119,7 +14130,7 @@ run_renego() {
else
# We need up to two tries here, as some LiteSpeed servers don't answer on "R" and block. Thus first try in the background
# msg enables us to look deeper into it while debugging
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS $legacycmd $STARTTLS -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE &
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS $legacycmd $STARTTLS -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE &
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then
pr_svrty_good "likely not vulnerable (OK)"; outln ", timed out" # it hung
@ -14127,10 +14138,10 @@ run_renego() {
sec_client_renego=1
else
# second try in the foreground as we are sure now it won't hang
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
sec_client_renego=$? # 0=client is renegotiating & doesn't return an error --> vuln!
case "$sec_client_renego" in
0) if [[ $SERVICE == "HTTP" ]]; then
0) if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]]; then
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", DoS threat"
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
else
@ -14151,7 +14162,11 @@ run_renego() {
fi
fi
#FIXME Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation is missing ==> sockets
#pr_bold " Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation " # pre-RFC 5746, CVE-2009-3555
#jsonID="insecure_client_renego"
#
# https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#y2009. It can only be tested with OpenSSL <=0.9.8k
# Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation is missing ==> sockets. When we complete the handshake ;-)
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
return $ret