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https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh.git
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Merge branch '3.1dev' into chore/dockerfile-simplify-user
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commit
64ae161218
@ -128,13 +128,15 @@ Any single check switch supplied as an argument prevents testssl\.sh from doing
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.IP "\[ci]" 4
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\fBExport ciphers\fR (w/o the preceding ones): 'EXPORT:!ADH:!NULL'
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.IP "\[ci]" 4
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\fBLOW\fR (64 Bit + DES ciphers, without EXPORT ciphers): 'LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL'
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\fBLOW\fR (64 Bit + DES ciphers, without EXPORT ciphers): 'LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:MD5:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL:!AECDH'
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.IP "\[ci]" 4
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\fB3DES + IDEA Ciphers\fR: '3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH'
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\fB3DES + IDEA ciphers\fR: '3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH:!MD5'
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.IP "\[ci]" 4
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\fBAverage grade Ciphers\fR: 'HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL'
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\fBObsoleted CBC ciphers\fR: 'HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL:!MD5'
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.IP "\[ci]" 4
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\fBStrong grade Ciphers\fR (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM8:AESCCM'
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\fBStrong ciphers with no FS\fR (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kEECDH:!kEDH:!kDHE:!kDHEPSK:!kECDHEPSK:!aNULL'
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.IP "\[ci]" 4
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\fBForward Secrecy strong ciphers\fR (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kPSK:!kRSAPSK:!kRSA:!kDH:!kECDH:!aNULL'
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.IP "" 0
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.P
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\fB\-f, \-\-fs, \-\-nsa, \-\-forward\-secrecy\fR Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange\. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here\. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks\. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1\.2 and TLS 1\.3)\.
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@ -247,13 +247,15 @@ in <code>/etc/hosts</code>. The use of the switch is only useful if you either
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<li>
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<code>Export ciphers</code> (w/o the preceding ones): 'EXPORT:!ADH:!NULL'</li>
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<li>
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<code>LOW</code> (64 Bit + DES ciphers, without EXPORT ciphers): 'LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL'</li>
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<code>LOW</code> (64 Bit + DES ciphers, without EXPORT ciphers): 'LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:MD5:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL:!AECDH'</li>
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<li>
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<code>3DES + IDEA Ciphers</code>: '3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH'</li>
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<code>3DES + IDEA ciphers</code>: '3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH:!MD5'</li>
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<li>
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<code>Average grade Ciphers</code>: 'HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL'</li>
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<code>Obsoleted CBC ciphers</code>: 'HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL:!MD5'</li>
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<li>
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<code>Strong grade Ciphers</code> (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM8:AESCCM'</li>
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<code>Strong ciphers with no FS</code> (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kEECDH:!kEDH:!kDHE:!kDHEPSK:!kECDHEPSK:!aNULL'</li>
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<li>
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<code>Forward Secrecy strong ciphers</code> (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kPSK:!kRSAPSK:!kRSA:!kDH:!kECDH:!aNULL'</li>
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</ul>
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<p><code>-f, --fs, --nsa, --forward-secrecy</code> Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3).</p>
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@ -166,10 +166,11 @@ Any single check switch supplied as an argument prevents testssl.sh from doing a
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* `NULL encryption ciphers`: 'NULL:eNULL'
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* `Anonymous NULL ciphers`: 'aNULL:ADH'
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* `Export ciphers` (w/o the preceding ones): 'EXPORT:!ADH:!NULL'
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* `LOW` (64 Bit + DES ciphers, without EXPORT ciphers): 'LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL'
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* `3DES + IDEA Ciphers`: '3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH'
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* `Average grade Ciphers`: 'HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL'
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* `Strong grade Ciphers` (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM8:AESCCM'
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* `LOW` (64 Bit + DES ciphers, without EXPORT ciphers): 'LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:MD5:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL:!AECDH'
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* `3DES + IDEA ciphers`: '3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH:!MD5'
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* `Obsoleted CBC ciphers`: 'HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL:!MD5'
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* `Strong ciphers with no FS` (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kEECDH:!kEDH:!kDHE:!kDHEPSK:!kECDHEPSK:!aNULL'
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* `Forward Secrecy strong ciphers` (AEAD): 'AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kPSK:!kRSAPSK:!kRSA:!kDH:!kECDH:!aNULL'
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`-f, --fs, --nsa, --forward-secrecy` Checks robust forward secrecy key exchange. "Robust" means that ciphers having intrinsic severe weaknesses like Null Authentication or Encryption, 3DES and RC4 won't be considered here. There shouldn't be the wrong impression that a secure key exchange has been taking place and everything is fine when in reality the encryption sucks. Also this section lists the available elliptical curves and Diffie Hellman groups, as well as FFDHE groups (TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3).
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19
testssl.sh
19
testssl.sh
@ -535,11 +535,11 @@ html_reserved(){
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local output
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"$do_html" || return 0
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#sed -e 's/\&/\&/g' -e 's/</\</g' -e 's/>/\>/g' -e 's/"/\"/g' -e "s/'/\'/g" <<< "$1"
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output="${1//&/&}"
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output="${output//</<}"
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output="${output//>/>}"
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output="${output//\"/"}"
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output="${output//\'/'}"
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output="${1//&/$'&'amp;}"
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output="${output//</$'&'lt;}"
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output="${output//>/$'&'gt;}"
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output="${output//\"/$'&'quot;}"
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output="${output//\'/$'&'apos;}"
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printf -- "%s" "$output"
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return 0
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}
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@ -9416,10 +9416,11 @@ certificate_info() {
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out "$indent"; pr_bold " Chain of trust"; out " "
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jsonID="cert_chain_of_trust"
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if [[ "$issuer_O" =~ StartCom ]] || [[ "$issuer_O" =~ WoSign ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" =~ StartCom ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" =~ WoSign ]]; then
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# Shortcut for this special case here.
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pr_italic "WoSign/StartCom"; out " are " ; prln_svrty_critical "not trusted anymore (NOT ok)"
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fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "Issuer not trusted anymore (WoSign/StartCom)"
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# Looks for CA's that have their trust removed by the first part of their Organization Name, add multiple with ^(TrustCor Systems|WoSign) etc.
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if [[ "$issuer_O" =~ ^(TrustCor Systems) ]]; then
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# Shortcut for this special case here. There is a difference between not being in a root store and being removed from a root store.
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pr_italic "$issuer_O"; out " is " ; prln_svrty_critical "actively removed from one or more root stores (NOT ok)"
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fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "Issuer removed from one or more root stores ($issuer_O)"
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set_grade_cap "T" "Untrusted certificate chain"
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else
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# Also handles fileout, keep error if happened
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