Fix spelling
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CHANGELOG.md
32
CHANGELOG.md
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
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* Detect better when no STARTTLS is offered
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* Rating (SSL Labs, not complete)
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* Don't penalize missing trust in rating when CA not in Java store
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* Added support for certificates with EdDSA signatures and pubilc keys
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* Added support for certificates with EdDSA signatures and public keys
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* --add-ca can also now be a directory with \*.pem files
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* Warning of 398 day limit for certificates issued after 2020/9/1
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* Added environment variable for amount of attempts for ssl renegotiation check
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@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
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* Socket timeouts (``--connect-timeout``)
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* IDN/IDN2 servername/URI + emoji support, supposed libidn/idn2 is installed and DNS resolver is recent) support
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* Initial support for certificate compression
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* Better JSON output: renamed IDs and findings shorter/better parsable, also includes certficate
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* Better JSON output: renamed IDs and findings shorter/better parsable, also includes certificate
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* JSON output now valid also for non-responding servers
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* Testing now per default 370 ciphers
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* Further improving the robustness of TLS sockets (sending and parsing)
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@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
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* Support for NNTP and LMTP via STARTTLS, fixes for MySQL and PostgresQL
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* Support for SNI and STARTTLS
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* More robustness for any STARTTLS protocol (fall back to plaintext while in TLS caused problems)
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* Renegotiation checks improved, also no false potive for Node.js anymore
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* Renegotiation checks improved, also no false positive for Node.js anymore
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* Major update of client simulations with self-collected up-to-date data
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* Update of CA certificate stores
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* Lots of bug fixes
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@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
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* Way better coverage of ciphers as most checks are done via bash sockets where ever possible
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* Further tests via TLS sockets and improvements (handshake parsing, completeness, robustness)
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* Testing 359 default ciphers (``testssl.sh -e/-E``) with a mixture of sockets and openssl. Same speed as with openssl only but addtional ciphers such as post-quantum ciphers, new CHAHA20/POLY1305, CamelliaGCM etc.
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* Testing 359 default ciphers (``testssl.sh -e/-E``) with a mixture of sockets and openssl. Same speed as with openssl only but additional ciphers such as post-quantum ciphers, new CHAHA20/POLY1305, CamelliaGCM etc.
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* TLS 1.2 protocol check via sockets in production
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* Finding more TLS extensions via sockets
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* TLS Supported Groups Registry (RFC 7919), key shares extension
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@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
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* Even more compatibility improvements for FreeBSD, NetBSD, Gentoo, RH-ish, F5 and Cisco systems
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* Considerable speed improvements for each cipher runs (-e/-E)
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* More robust SSLv2 + TLS socket interface
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* seperate check for curves
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* separate check for curves
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* OpenSSL 1.1.0 compliant
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* check for DROWN
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* Whole number of bugs squashed
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@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
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* (HTTP) proxy support! Also with sockets -- thx @jnewbigin
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* Extended validation certificate detection
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* Run in default mode through all ciphers at the end of a default run
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* will test multiple IP adresses of one supplied server name in one shot, --ip= restricts it accordingly
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* will test multiple IP addresses of one supplied server name in one shot, --ip= restricts it accordingly
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* new mass testing file option --file option where testssl.sh commands are being read from, see https://twitter.com/drwetter/status/627619848344989696
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* TLS time and HTTP time stamps
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* TLS time displayed also for STARTTLS protocols
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@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ Full changelog @ https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/commits/2.2/testssl.sh
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* tests ciphers per protocol
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* HSTS
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* web and application server banner
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* server prefereences
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* server preferences
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* TLS server extensions
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* server key size
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* cipher suite mapping from openssl to RFC
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@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ Full changelog @ https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/commits/2.2/testssl.sh
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- IPv6 display fix
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1.111
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- NEW: tested unter FreeBSD (works with exception of xxd in CCS)
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- NEW: tested under FreeBSD (works with exception of xxd in CCS)
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- getent now works under Linux and FreeBSD
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- sed -i in hsts sacrificed for compatibility
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- reomved query for IP for finishing banner, is now called once in parse_hn_port
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- removed query for IP for finishing banner, is now called once in parse_hn_port
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- GOST warning after banner
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- empty build date is not displayed anymore
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- long build date strings minimized
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@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ Full changelog @ https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/commits/2.2/testssl.sh
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1.91
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- replaced most lcyan to brown (=not really bad but somehow)
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- empty server string better displayed
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- prefered CBC TLS 1.2 cipher is now brown (lucky13)
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- preferred CBC TLS 1.2 cipher is now brown (lucky13)
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1.90
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- fix for netweaver banner (server is lowercase)
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@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ Full changelog @ https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/commits/2.2/testssl.sh
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1.89
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- reordered! : protocols + cipher come first
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- colorized prefered server preference (e.g. CBC+RC4 is light red now, TLSv1.2 green)
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- colorized preferred server preference (e.g. CBC+RC4 is light red now, TLSv1.2 green)
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- SSLv3 is now light cyan
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- NEW: -P|--preference now in help menu
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- light cyan is more appropriate than red for HSTS
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@ -362,10 +362,10 @@ Full changelog @ https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/commits/2.2/testssl.sh
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- headline of -V / PFS+RC4 ciphers unified
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1.82
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- NEW: output for -V now better (bits seperate, spacing improved)
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- NEW: output for -V now better (bits separate, spacing improved)
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1.81
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- output for RC4+PFS now better (with headline, bits seperate, spacing improved)
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- output for RC4+PFS now better (with headline, bits separate, spacing improved)
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- both also sorted by encr. strength .. umm ..err bits!
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1.80
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@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ Full changelog @ https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/commits/2.2/testssl.sh
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- removed legacy code (PROD_REL var)
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1.76
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- bash was gone!! desaster for Ubuntu, fixed
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- bash was gone!! disaster for Ubuntu, fixed
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- starttls+rc4 check: bottom line was wrong
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- starttls had too much output (certificate) at first a/v check
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@ -480,13 +480,13 @@ Full changelog @ https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/commits/2.2/testssl.sh
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1.19
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* bugfix
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1.18
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* Rearragement of arguments: URL comes now always last!
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* Rearrangement of arguments: URL comes now always last!
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* small code cleanups for readability
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* individual cipher test is now with bold headline, not blue
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* NOPARANOID flag tells whether medium grade ciphers are ok. NOW they are (=<1.17 was paranoid)
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1.17
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* SSL tests now for renegotiation vulnerabilty!
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* SSL tests now for renegotiation vulnerability!
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* version detection of testssl.sh
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* program has a banner
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* fixed bug leading to a file named "1"
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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### Contributions / participation
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is always welcome, here @ gihub or via e-mail.
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is always welcome, here @ github or via e-mail.
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Note please the following
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@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Full contribution, see git log.
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- LibreSSL patch
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* Jean Marsault
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- client auth: ideas, code snipplets
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- client auth: ideas, code snippets
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* Thomas Martens
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- adding colorblind option
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@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ Please note that \fBfname\fR has to be in Unix format\. DOS carriage returns won
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\fB\-\-mode <serial|parallel>\fR\. Mass testing to be done serial (default) or parallel (\fB\-\-parallel\fR is shortcut for the latter, \fB\-\-serial\fR is the opposite option)\. Per default mass testing is being run in serial mode, i\.e\. one line after the other is processed and invoked\. The variable \fBMASS_TESTING_MODE\fR can be defined to be either equal \fBserial\fR or \fBparallel\fR\.
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.
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.P
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\fB\-\-warnings <batch|off>\fR\. The warnings parameter determines how testssl\.sh will deal with situations where user input normally will be necessary\. There are two options\. \fBbatch\fR doesn\'t wait for a confirming keypress when a client\- or server\-side probem is encountered\. As of 3\.0 it just then terminates the particular scan\. This is automatically chosen for mass testing (\fB\-\-file\fR)\. \fBoff\fR just skips the warning, the confirmation but continues the scan, independent whether it makes sense or not\. Please note that there are conflicts where testssl\.sh will still ask for confirmation which are the ones which otherwise would have a drastic impact on the results\. Almost any other decision will be made in the future as a best guess by testssl\.sh\. The same can be achieved by setting the environment variable \fBWARNINGS\fR\.
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\fB\-\-warnings <batch|off>\fR\. The warnings parameter determines how testssl\.sh will deal with situations where user input normally will be necessary\. There are two options\. \fBbatch\fR doesn\'t wait for a confirming keypress when a client\- or server\-side problem is encountered\. As of 3\.0 it just then terminates the particular scan\. This is automatically chosen for mass testing (\fB\-\-file\fR)\. \fBoff\fR just skips the warning, the confirmation but continues the scan, independent whether it makes sense or not\. Please note that there are conflicts where testssl\.sh will still ask for confirmation which are the ones which otherwise would have a drastic impact on the results\. Almost any other decision will be made in the future as a best guess by testssl\.sh\. The same can be achieved by setting the environment variable \fBWARNINGS\fR\.
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.
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.P
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\fB\-\-connect\-timeout <seconds>\fR This is useful for socket TCP connections to a node\. If the node does not complete a TCP handshake (e\.g\. because it is down or behind a firewall or there\'s an IDS or a tarpit) testssl\.sh may usually hang for around 2 minutes or even much more\. This parameter instructs testssl\.sh to wait at most \fBseconds\fR for the handshake to complete before giving up\. This option only works if your OS has a timeout binary installed\. CONNECT_TIMEOUT is the corresponding environment variable\.
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@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ Security headers (X\-Frame\-Options, X\-XSS\-Protection, Expect\-CT,\.\.\. , CSP
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\fB\-g, \-\-grease\fR checks several server implementation bugs like tolerance to size limitations and GREASE, see RFC 8701\. This check doesn\'t run per default\.
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.
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.SS "VULNERABILITIES"
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\fB\-U, \-\-vulnerable, \-\-vulnerabilities\fR Just tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities\. The environment variable \fBVULN_THRESHLD\fR determines after which value a separate headline for each vulnerability is being displayed\. Default is \fB1\fR which means if you check for two vulnerabilities, only the general headline for vulnerabilities section is displayed \-\- in addition to the vulnerability and the result\. Otherwise each vulnerability or vulnerability section gets its own headline in addition to the output of the name of the vulnerabilty and test result\. A vulnerability section is comprised of more than one check, e\.g\. the renegotiation vulnerability check has two checks, so has Logjam\.
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\fB\-U, \-\-vulnerable, \-\-vulnerabilities\fR Just tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities\. The environment variable \fBVULN_THRESHLD\fR determines after which value a separate headline for each vulnerability is being displayed\. Default is \fB1\fR which means if you check for two vulnerabilities, only the general headline for vulnerabilities section is displayed \-\- in addition to the vulnerability and the result\. Otherwise each vulnerability or vulnerability section gets its own headline in addition to the output of the name of the vulnerability and test result\. A vulnerability section is comprised of more than one check, e\.g\. the renegotiation vulnerability check has two checks, so has Logjam\.
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.
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.P
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\fB\-H, \-\-heartbleed\fR Checks for Heartbleed, a memory leakage in openssl\. Unless the server side doesn\'t support the heartbeat extension it is likely that this check runs into a timeout\. The seconds to wait for a reply can be adjusted with \fBHEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK\fR\. 8 is the default\.
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@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ host.example.com:631
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<p><code>--mode <serial|parallel></code>. Mass testing to be done serial (default) or parallel (<code>--parallel</code> is shortcut for the latter, <code>--serial</code> is the opposite option). Per default mass testing is being run in serial mode, i.e. one line after the other is processed and invoked. The variable <code>MASS_TESTING_MODE</code> can be defined to be either equal <code>serial</code> or <code>parallel</code>.</p>
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<p><code>--warnings <batch|off></code>. The warnings parameter determines how testssl.sh will deal with situations where user input normally will be necessary. There are two options. <code>batch</code> doesn't wait for a confirming keypress when a client- or server-side probem is encountered. As of 3.0 it just then terminates the particular scan. This is automatically chosen for mass testing (<code>--file</code>). <code>off</code> just skips the warning, the confirmation but continues the scan, independent whether it makes sense or not. Please note that there are conflicts where testssl.sh will still ask for confirmation which are the ones which otherwise would have a drastic impact on the results. Almost any other decision will be made in the future as a best guess by testssl.sh.
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<p><code>--warnings <batch|off></code>. The warnings parameter determines how testssl.sh will deal with situations where user input normally will be necessary. There are two options. <code>batch</code> doesn't wait for a confirming keypress when a client- or server-side problem is encountered. As of 3.0 it just then terminates the particular scan. This is automatically chosen for mass testing (<code>--file</code>). <code>off</code> just skips the warning, the confirmation but continues the scan, independent whether it makes sense or not. Please note that there are conflicts where testssl.sh will still ask for confirmation which are the ones which otherwise would have a drastic impact on the results. Almost any other decision will be made in the future as a best guess by testssl.sh.
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The same can be achieved by setting the environment variable <code>WARNINGS</code>.</p>
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<p><code>--connect-timeout <seconds></code> This is useful for socket TCP connections to a node. If the node does not complete a TCP handshake (e.g. because it is down or behind a firewall or there's an IDS or a tarpit) testssl.sh may usually hang for around 2 minutes or even much more. This parameter instructs testssl.sh to wait at most <code>seconds</code> for the handshake to complete before giving up. This option only works if your OS has a timeout binary installed. CONNECT_TIMEOUT is the corresponding environment variable.</p>
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@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ Also for multiple server certificates are being checked for as well as for the c
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<h3 id="VULNERABILITIES">VULNERABILITIES</h3>
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<p><code>-U, --vulnerable, --vulnerabilities</code> Just tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities. The environment variable <code>VULN_THRESHLD</code> determines after which value a separate headline for each vulnerability is being displayed. Default is <code>1</code> which means if you check for two vulnerabilities, only the general headline for vulnerabilities section is displayed -- in addition to the vulnerability and the result. Otherwise each vulnerability or vulnerability section gets its own headline in addition to the output of the name of the vulnerabilty and test result. A vulnerability section is comprised of more than one check, e.g. the renegotiation vulnerability check has two checks, so has Logjam.</p>
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<p><code>-U, --vulnerable, --vulnerabilities</code> Just tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities. The environment variable <code>VULN_THRESHLD</code> determines after which value a separate headline for each vulnerability is being displayed. Default is <code>1</code> which means if you check for two vulnerabilities, only the general headline for vulnerabilities section is displayed -- in addition to the vulnerability and the result. Otherwise each vulnerability or vulnerability section gets its own headline in addition to the output of the name of the vulnerability and test result. A vulnerability section is comprised of more than one check, e.g. the renegotiation vulnerability check has two checks, so has Logjam.</p>
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<p><code>-H, --heartbleed</code> Checks for Heartbleed, a memory leakage in openssl. Unless the server side doesn't support the heartbeat extension it is likely that this check runs into a timeout. The seconds to wait for a reply can be adjusted with <code>HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK</code>. 8 is the default.</p>
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`--mode <serial|parallel>`. Mass testing to be done serial (default) or parallel (`--parallel` is shortcut for the latter, `--serial` is the opposite option). Per default mass testing is being run in serial mode, i.e. one line after the other is processed and invoked. The variable `MASS_TESTING_MODE` can be defined to be either equal `serial` or `parallel`.
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`--warnings <batch|off>`. The warnings parameter determines how testssl.sh will deal with situations where user input normally will be necessary. There are two options. `batch` doesn't wait for a confirming keypress when a client- or server-side probem is encountered. As of 3.0 it just then terminates the particular scan. This is automatically chosen for mass testing (`--file`). `off` just skips the warning, the confirmation but continues the scan, independent whether it makes sense or not. Please note that there are conflicts where testssl.sh will still ask for confirmation which are the ones which otherwise would have a drastic impact on the results. Almost any other decision will be made in the future as a best guess by testssl.sh.
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`--warnings <batch|off>`. The warnings parameter determines how testssl.sh will deal with situations where user input normally will be necessary. There are two options. `batch` doesn't wait for a confirming keypress when a client- or server-side problem is encountered. As of 3.0 it just then terminates the particular scan. This is automatically chosen for mass testing (`--file`). `off` just skips the warning, the confirmation but continues the scan, independent whether it makes sense or not. Please note that there are conflicts where testssl.sh will still ask for confirmation which are the ones which otherwise would have a drastic impact on the results. Almost any other decision will be made in the future as a best guess by testssl.sh.
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The same can be achieved by setting the environment variable `WARNINGS`.
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`--connect-timeout <seconds>` This is useful for socket TCP connections to a node. If the node does not complete a TCP handshake (e.g. because it is down or behind a firewall or there's an IDS or a tarpit) testssl.sh may usually hang for around 2 minutes or even much more. This parameter instructs testssl.sh to wait at most `seconds` for the handshake to complete before giving up. This option only works if your OS has a timeout binary installed. CONNECT_TIMEOUT is the corresponding environment variable.
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### VULNERABILITIES
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`-U, --vulnerable, --vulnerabilities` Just tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities. The environment variable `VULN_THRESHLD` determines after which value a separate headline for each vulnerability is being displayed. Default is `1` which means if you check for two vulnerabilities, only the general headline for vulnerabilities section is displayed -- in addition to the vulnerability and the result. Otherwise each vulnerability or vulnerability section gets its own headline in addition to the output of the name of the vulnerabilty and test result. A vulnerability section is comprised of more than one check, e.g. the renegotiation vulnerability check has two checks, so has Logjam.
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`-U, --vulnerable, --vulnerabilities` Just tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities. The environment variable `VULN_THRESHLD` determines after which value a separate headline for each vulnerability is being displayed. Default is `1` which means if you check for two vulnerabilities, only the general headline for vulnerabilities section is displayed -- in addition to the vulnerability and the result. Otherwise each vulnerability or vulnerability section gets its own headline in addition to the output of the name of the vulnerability and test result. A vulnerability section is comprised of more than one check, e.g. the renegotiation vulnerability check has two checks, so has Logjam.
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`-H, --heartbleed` Checks for Heartbleed, a memory leakage in openssl. Unless the server side doesn't support the heartbeat extension it is likely that this check runs into a timeout. The seconds to wait for a reply can be adjusted with `HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK`. 8 is the default.
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#!/usr/bin/env perl
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# Basics: is there a synatx error where alerady bash hiccups on?
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# Basics: is there a syntax error where already bash hiccups on?
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use strict;
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use Test::More;
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#!/usr/bin/env perl
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# Basics: is there a synatx error where already bash hiccups on?
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# Basics: is there a syntax error where already bash hiccups on?
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# --banner is equal to --version
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use strict;
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#!/usr/bin/env perl
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# Just a functional test, whether ~/etc/client-simulation.txt
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# doesn't have any synatx errors
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# doesn't have any syntax errors
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use strict;
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use Test::More;
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$openssl_out = `$prg --ssl-native $check2run $uri 2>&1`;
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$openssl_json = json('tmp.json');
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unlink "tmp.json";
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# With Google only we somtimes encounter an error as they return a 0 char with openssl, so we white list this pattern here:
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# With Google only we sometimes encounter an error as they return a 0 char with openssl, so we white list this pattern here:
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# It should be fixed in the code though so we comment this out
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# $openssl_out =~ s/testssl.*warning: command substitution: ignored null byte in input\n//g;
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unlike($openssl_out, qr/$openssl_regex_bl/, "via OpenSSL");
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# cert_serialNumber, cert_fingerprintSHA1, cert_fingerprintSHA256, cert
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# cert_expirationStatus, cert_notBefore, cert_notAfter, cert_caIssuers, intermediate_cert
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#
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# help is apreciated here
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# help is appreciated here
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use strict;
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use Test::More;
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96
testssl.sh
96
testssl.sh
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# Main contributions from David Cooper. Further contributors see CREDITS.md .
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#
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# License: GPLv2, see https://opensource.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.php and
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# ccompanying license "LICENSE.txt". Redistribution + modification under this
|
||||
# accompanying license "LICENSE.txt". Redistribution + modification under this
|
||||
# license permitted.
|
||||
# If you enclose this program or parts of it in your software, it has to be
|
||||
# accompanied by the same license (see link). Do not violate the license.
|
||||
|
|
@ -269,11 +269,11 @@ KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=false # We need OpenSSL a few times. This vari
|
|||
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" # .. as hex string, e.g. 0300 or 0303
|
||||
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="" # Information about the application traffic keys for a TLS 1.3 connection.
|
||||
TLS13_ONLY=false # Does the server support TLS 1.3 ONLY?
|
||||
OSSL_SHORTCUT=${OSSL_SHORTCUT:-false} # Hack: if during the scan turns out the OpenSSL binary suports TLS 1.3 would be a better choice, this enables it.
|
||||
OSSL_SHORTCUT=${OSSL_SHORTCUT:-false} # Hack: if during the scan turns out the OpenSSL binary supports TLS 1.3 would be a better choice, this enables it.
|
||||
TLS_EXTENSIONS=""
|
||||
V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH=0
|
||||
declare -r NPN_PROTOs="spdy/4a2,spdy/3,spdy/3.1,spdy/2,spdy/1,http/1.1"
|
||||
# alpn_protos needs to be space-separated, not comma-seperated, including odd ones observed @ facebook and others, old ones like h2-17 omitted as they could not be found
|
||||
# alpn_protos needs to be space-separated, not comma-separated, including odd ones observed @ facebook and others, old ones like h2-17 omitted as they could not be found
|
||||
declare -r ALPN_PROTOs="h2 spdy/3.1 http/1.1 grpc-exp h2-fb spdy/1 spdy/2 spdy/3 stun.turn stun.nat-discovery webrtc c-webrtc ftp"
|
||||
TEMPDIR=""
|
||||
TMPFILE=""
|
||||
|
|
@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ echo A | sed -E 's/A//' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
|
|||
declare -r HAS_SED_E=true || \
|
||||
declare -r HAS_SED_E=false
|
||||
|
||||
########### Terminal defintions
|
||||
########### Terminal definitions
|
||||
tty -s && \
|
||||
declare -r INTERACTIVE=true || \
|
||||
declare -r INTERACTIVE=false
|
||||
|
|
@ -962,10 +962,10 @@ get_cipher() {
|
|||
# This and two other following instances are not best practice and normally a useless use of "cat", see
|
||||
# https://web.archive.org/web/20160711205930/http://porkmail.org/era/unix/award.html#uucaletter
|
||||
# However there seem to be cases where the preferred $(< "$1") logic has a problem.
|
||||
# Esepcially with bash 3.2 (Mac OS X) and when on the server side binary chars
|
||||
# Especially with bash 3.2 (Mac OS X) and when on the server side binary chars
|
||||
# are returned, see https://stackoverflow.com/questions/7427262/how-to-read-a-file-into-a-variable-in-shell#22607352
|
||||
# and https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1292
|
||||
# Performance measurements showed no to barely measureable penalty (1s displayed in 9 tries).
|
||||
# Performance measurements showed no to barely measurable penalty (1s displayed in 9 tries).
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ Cipher\ *:\ ([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+|SSL_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]]; then
|
||||
cipher="${BASH_REMATCH##* }"
|
||||
|
|
@ -2054,7 +2054,7 @@ elif "$HAS_FREEBSDDATE"; then # FreeBSD, OS X and newer (~6.6) OpenBSD vers
|
|||
LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -j -f "$3" "$2" "$1"
|
||||
}
|
||||
elif "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
||||
# We bascially echo it as a conversion as we want it is too difficult. Approach for that would be:
|
||||
# We basically echo it as a conversion as we want it is too difficult. Approach for that would be:
|
||||
# printf '%s\n' "$1" | awk '{ printf "%04d%02d%02d\n", $4, $2, (index("JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec",$1)+2)/3}'
|
||||
# 4: year, 1: month, 2: day, $3: time (e.g. "Dec 8 10:16:13 2016")
|
||||
# This way we could also kind of convert args to epoch but as newer OpenBSDs "date" behave like FreeBSD
|
||||
|
|
@ -3309,7 +3309,7 @@ run_security_headers() {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# #1: string with 2 opensssl codes, output is same in NSS/ssllabs terminology
|
||||
# #1: string with 2 openssl codes, output is same in NSS/ssllabs terminology
|
||||
normalize_ciphercode() {
|
||||
if [[ "${1:2:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
||||
tm_out "$(tolower "x${1:7:2}")"
|
||||
|
|
@ -3521,7 +3521,7 @@ neat_list(){
|
|||
[[ "$enc" == ChaCha20-Poly1305 ]] && enc="CHACHA20(256)"
|
||||
[[ "$enc" == GOST-28178-89-CNT ]] && enc="GOST(256)"
|
||||
|
||||
strength="${enc//\)/}" # retrieve (). first remove traling ")"
|
||||
strength="${enc//\)/}" # retrieve (). first remove trailing ")"
|
||||
strength="${strength#*\(}" # exfiltrate (VAL
|
||||
enc="${enc%%\(*}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -4674,7 +4674,7 @@ client_simulation_sockets() {
|
|||
# robustness to the implementation
|
||||
# see also https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/797
|
||||
if [[ "${1:0:4}" == 1603 ]]; then
|
||||
# Extact list of cipher suites from SSLv3 or later ClientHello
|
||||
# Extract list of cipher suites from SSLv3 or later ClientHello
|
||||
sid_len=4*$(hex2dec "${data:174:2}")
|
||||
offset1=178+$sid_len
|
||||
offset2=182+$sid_len
|
||||
|
|
@ -4682,7 +4682,7 @@ client_simulation_sockets() {
|
|||
offset1=186+$sid_len
|
||||
code2network "$(tolower "${data:offset1:len}")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format
|
||||
else
|
||||
# Extact list of cipher suites from SSLv2 ClientHello
|
||||
# Extract list of cipher suites from SSLv2 ClientHello
|
||||
len=2*$(hex2dec "${clienthello:12:2}")
|
||||
for (( i=22; i < 22+len; i+=6 )); do
|
||||
offset1=$i+2
|
||||
|
|
@ -5115,7 +5115,7 @@ run_prototest_openssl() {
|
|||
add_proto_offered() {
|
||||
# the ":" is mandatory here (and @ other places), otherwise e.g. tls1 will match tls1_2
|
||||
if [[ "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $1: ]]; then
|
||||
# we got that protcol already
|
||||
# we got that protocol already
|
||||
:
|
||||
else
|
||||
PROTOS_OFFERED+="${1}:$2 "
|
||||
|
|
@ -7322,7 +7322,7 @@ determine_trust() {
|
|||
notok_was="${certificate_file[i]} $code $notok_was"
|
||||
if ! [[ ${certificate_file[i]} =~ Java ]]; then
|
||||
# Exemption for Java AND rating, as this store doesn't seem to be as complete.
|
||||
# We won't penelize this but we still need to raise a red flag. See #1648
|
||||
# We won't penalize this but we still need to raise a red flag. See #1648
|
||||
set_grade_cap "T" "Issues with chain of trust $code"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
|
@ -7707,7 +7707,7 @@ get_server_certificate() {
|
|||
extract_stapled_ocsp
|
||||
success=$?
|
||||
else
|
||||
# For STARTTLS protcols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
|
||||
# For STARTTLS protocols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
|
||||
if ( [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ ldap ]] || [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]] ); then
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -7794,7 +7794,7 @@ get_server_certificate() {
|
|||
cp $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt $TMPFILE
|
||||
|
||||
# When "$2" is empty, get_server_certificate() is being called with SNI="".
|
||||
# In case the extensions returned by the server differ depending on wheter
|
||||
# In case the extensions returned by the server differ depending on whether
|
||||
# SNI is provided or not, don't collect extensions when SNI="" (unless
|
||||
# no DNS name was provided at the command line).
|
||||
[[ -z "$2" ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
||||
|
|
@ -8147,7 +8147,7 @@ etsi_ets_visibility_info() {
|
|||
# OpenSSL 1.1.1 and earlier displays all names of type otherName as "othername:<unsupported>".
|
||||
# As certificates will rarely include a name encoded as an otherName, check the
|
||||
# text version of the certificate for "othername:<unsupported>" before calling
|
||||
# external functions to obtain the DER encoded certficate.
|
||||
# external functions to obtain the DER encoded certificate.
|
||||
if [[ "$cert_txt" =~ X509v3\ Subject\ Alternative\ Name:.*othername:\<unsupported\> ]] || \
|
||||
[[ "$cert_txt" =~ X509v3\ Subject\ Alternative\ Name:.*othername:\ 0.4.0.3523.3.1 ]]; then
|
||||
dercert="$($OPENSSL x509 -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert" | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
||||
|
|
@ -8343,19 +8343,19 @@ certificate_transparency() {
|
|||
local ciphers=""
|
||||
local extra_extns=""
|
||||
local -i success
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certifiate with an RSA (signature) public key
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (signature) public key
|
||||
local -r a_rsa="cc,13, cc,15, c0,30, c0,28, c0,14, 00,9f, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,39, c0,77, 00,c4, 00,88, c0,45, c0,4d, c0,53, c0,61, c0,7d, c0,8b, 16,b7, 16,b9, c0,2f, c0,27, c0,13, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,67, 00,33, c0,76, 00,be, 00,9a, 00,45, c0,44, c0,4c, c0,52, c0,60, c0,7c, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,12, 00,16, 00,15, 00,14, c0,10"
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certifiate with an RSA (encryption) public key
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (encryption) public key
|
||||
local -r e_rsa="00,b7, c0,99, 00,ad, cc,ae, 00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, 00,95, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,69, c0,6f, c0,7b, c0,93, ff,01, 00,ac, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,b6, 00,96, 00,41, c0,98, 00,07, 00,94, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,68, c0,6e, c0,7a, c0,92, 00,05, 00,04, 00,92, 00,0a, 00,93, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,2e, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, ff,00"
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certifiate with a DSA public key
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DSA public key
|
||||
local -r a_dss="00,a3, 00,6a, 00,38, 00,c3, 00,87, c0,43, c0,57, c0,81, 00,a2, 00,40, 00,32, 00,bd, 00,99, 00,44, c0,42, c0,56, c0,80, 00,66, 00,13, 00,63, 00,12, 00,65, 00,11"
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certifiate with a DH public key
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DH public key
|
||||
local -r a_dh="00,a5, 00,a1, 00,69, 00,68, 00,37, 00,36, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,86, 00,85, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,55, c0,59, c0,7f, c0,83, 00,a4, 00,a0, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,31, 00,30, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,98, 00,97, 00,43, 00,42, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,54, c0,58, c0,7e, c0,82, 00,10, 00,0d, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certifiate with an ECDH public key
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDH public key
|
||||
local -r a_ecdh="c0,32, c0,2e, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, c0,4b, c0,4f, c0,5f, c0,63, c0,89, c0,8d, c0,31, c0,2d, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, c0,4a, c0,4e, c0,5e, c0,62, c0,88, c0,8c, c0,0c, c0,02, c0,0d, c0,03, c0,0b, c0,01"
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certifiate with an ECDSA public key
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDSA public key
|
||||
local -r a_ecdsa="cc,14, c0,2c, c0,24, c0,0a, cc,a9, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,73, c0,49, c0,5d, c0,87, 16,b8, 16,ba, c0,2b, c0,23, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,72, c0,48, c0,5c, c0,86, c0,07, c0,08, c0,06"
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certifiate with a GOST public key
|
||||
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a GOST public key
|
||||
local -r a_gost="00,80, 00,81, 00,82, 00,83"
|
||||
|
||||
# First check whether signed certificate timestamps (SCT) are included in the
|
||||
|
|
@ -10901,7 +10901,7 @@ starttls_mysql_dialog() {
|
|||
# 1 is the timeout value which only MySQL needs. Note, there seems no response whether STARTTLS
|
||||
# succeeded. We could try harder, see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/apps/s_client.c
|
||||
# but atm this seems sufficient as later we will fail if there's no STARTTLS.
|
||||
# BUT: there seeem to be cases when the handshake fails (8S01Bad handshake --> 30 38 53 30 31 42 61 64 20 68 61 6e 64 73 68 61 6b 65).
|
||||
# BUT: there seem to be cases when the handshake fails (8S01Bad handshake --> 30 38 53 30 31 42 61 64 20 68 61 6e 64 73 68 61 6b 65).
|
||||
# also there's a banner in the reply "<version><somebytes>mysql_native_password"
|
||||
# TODO: We could detect if the server supports STARTTLS via the "Server Capabilities"
|
||||
# bit field, but we'd need to parse the binary stream, with greater precision than regex.
|
||||
|
|
@ -10965,7 +10965,7 @@ fd_socket() {
|
|||
pr_warning "Unable to open a socket to $NODEIP:$PORT. "
|
||||
return 6
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Now comes the the usual case
|
||||
# Now comes the usual case
|
||||
elif ! exec 5<>/dev/tcp/$nodeip/$PORT; then
|
||||
((NR_SOCKET_FAIL++))
|
||||
connectivity_problem $NR_SOCKET_FAIL $MAX_SOCKET_FAIL "TCP connect problem" "repeated TCP connect problems, giving up"
|
||||
|
|
@ -11777,7 +11777,7 @@ derive-handshake-secret() {
|
|||
|
||||
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
||||
# arg2: handshake secret
|
||||
# arg3: transcipt
|
||||
# arg3: transcript
|
||||
# arg4: "client" or "server"
|
||||
derive-handshake-traffic-keys() {
|
||||
local cipher="$1" handshake_secret="$2" transcript="$3"
|
||||
|
|
@ -11870,7 +11870,7 @@ derive-master-secret() {
|
|||
|
||||
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
||||
# arg2: master secret
|
||||
# arg3: transcipt
|
||||
# arg3: transcript
|
||||
# arg4: "client" or "server"
|
||||
derive-application-traffic-keys() {
|
||||
local cipher="$1" master_secret="$2" transcript="$3"
|
||||
|
|
@ -13418,7 +13418,7 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|||
tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
||||
tls_serverhello_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
||||
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 08 ]]; then
|
||||
# Add excrypted extensions (now decrypted) to end of extensions in SeverHello
|
||||
# Add excrypted extensions (now decrypted) to end of extensions in ServerHello
|
||||
tls_encryptedextensions_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
||||
tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
||||
if [[ $msg_len -lt 2 ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -14240,7 +14240,7 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|||
offset=$((len1+8))
|
||||
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ge $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
||||
# The SignatureAndHashAlgorithm won't be present in an anonymous
|
||||
# key exhange.
|
||||
# key exchange.
|
||||
peering_signing_digest="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:2}"
|
||||
peer_signature_type="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:$((offset+2)):2}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
|
@ -14340,7 +14340,7 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|||
offset+=$((len1+4))
|
||||
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ge $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
||||
# The SignatureAndHashAlgorithm won't be present in an anonymous
|
||||
# key exhange.
|
||||
# key exchange.
|
||||
peering_signing_digest="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:2}"
|
||||
peer_signature_type="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:$((offset+2)):2}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
|
@ -14832,7 +14832,7 @@ prepare_tls_clienthello() {
|
|||
for (( i=0x$tls_low_byte; i >=0; i=i-1 )); do
|
||||
if [[ 0x$i -eq 4 ]]; then
|
||||
# FIXME: The ClientHello currently advertises support for various
|
||||
# draft versions of TLSv1.3. Eventually it should only adversize
|
||||
# draft versions of TLSv1.3. Eventually it should only advertise
|
||||
# support for the final version (0304).
|
||||
if [[ "$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" == 33 ]]; then
|
||||
extension_supported_versions+=", 03, 04, 7f, 1c, 7f, 1b, 7f, 1a, 7f, 19, 7f, 18, 7f, 17"
|
||||
|
|
@ -15780,7 +15780,7 @@ run_ccs_injection(){
|
|||
tm_out "\nsending payload #1 with TLS version $tls_hexcode: "
|
||||
fi
|
||||
rm "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
||||
# ... and then send the a change cipher spec message
|
||||
# ... and then send the change cipher spec message
|
||||
socksend "$ccs_message" 1 || ok_ids
|
||||
sockread_serverhello 4096 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
||||
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -15826,7 +15826,7 @@ run_ccs_injection(){
|
|||
elif [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" == "1503" ]]; then
|
||||
if [[ ! "${tls_hello_ascii:5:2}" =~ [03|02|01|00] ]]; then
|
||||
pr_warning "test failed "
|
||||
out "no proper TLS repy (debug info: protocol sent: 1503${tls_hexcode#x03, x}, reply: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:14}"
|
||||
out "no proper TLS reply (debug info: protocol sent: 1503${tls_hexcode#x03, x}, reply: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:14}"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around line $LINENO, debug info (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
||||
ret=1
|
||||
elif [[ "$byte6" == "15" ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -15897,7 +15897,7 @@ run_ticketbleed() {
|
|||
local tls_hexcode tls_proto=""
|
||||
local session_tckt_tls=""
|
||||
local -i len_ch=300 # fixed len of prepared clienthello below
|
||||
local sid="x00,x0B,xAD,xC0,xDE,x00," # some abitratry bytes
|
||||
local sid="x00,x0B,xAD,xC0,xDE,x00," # some arbitrary bytes
|
||||
local len_sid="$(( ${#sid} / 4))"
|
||||
local xlen_sid="$(dec02hex $len_sid)"
|
||||
local -i len_tckt_tls=0 nr_sid_detected=0
|
||||
|
|
@ -16907,7 +16907,7 @@ run_tls_fallback_scsv() {
|
|||
# support SSLv3 and it is known that SSLv3 is the fallback protocol ($low_proto), then
|
||||
# the test cannot be performed. Similarly, if SSLv3 could be the fallback protocol, but
|
||||
# support for SSLv3 is unknown, then the test cannot be performed.
|
||||
# NOTE: This check assumes that any server that suppports SSLv3 and either TLS 1.2 or
|
||||
# NOTE: This check assumes that any server that supports SSLv3 and either TLS 1.2 or
|
||||
# TLS 1.1 would also support TLS 1. So, if $high_proto is not TLS 1, then it is assumed
|
||||
# that either (1) $low_proto has already been set (to TLS1.1 or TLS 1) or (2) no protocol
|
||||
# lower than $high_proto is offered.
|
||||
|
|
@ -17140,7 +17140,7 @@ get_common_prime() {
|
|||
return 1
|
||||
else
|
||||
dh_p="$(toupper "$dh_p")"
|
||||
# In the previous line of the match is bascially the hint we want to echo
|
||||
# In the previous line of the match is basically the hint we want to echo
|
||||
# the most elegant thing to get the previous line [ awk '/regex/ { print x }; { x=$0 }' ] doesn't work with gawk
|
||||
lineno_matched=$(grep -n "$dh_p" "$common_primes_file" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '{ print $1 }')
|
||||
if [[ "$lineno_matched" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -17408,7 +17408,7 @@ run_drown() {
|
|||
if [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
||||
sslv2_sockets
|
||||
else
|
||||
[[ aaa == bbb ]] # provoke retrurn code=1
|
||||
[[ aaa == bbb ]] # provoke return code=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
case $? in
|
||||
|
|
@ -17854,7 +17854,7 @@ run_winshock() {
|
|||
done
|
||||
fi
|
||||
#FIXME: The catch is that when a user didn't invoke run_fs() before, this wasn't processed + CURVES_OFFERED
|
||||
# is empty. So we could call it like above but need to move curves detection into a seperate function
|
||||
# is empty. So we could call it like above but need to move curves detection into a separate function
|
||||
# (~ sub_check_curves) which is some work. But also for the sake of clean code this needs to be done.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -17875,7 +17875,7 @@ run_winshock() {
|
|||
if [[ -n "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]]; then
|
||||
# Check whether there are any TLS extension which should not be available under <= Windows 2012 R2
|
||||
for tls_ext in $TLS_EXTENSIONS; do
|
||||
# We use the whole array, got to be careful when the array becomes bigger (unintented match)
|
||||
# We use the whole array, got to be careful when the array becomes bigger (unintended match)
|
||||
if [[ ${forbidden_tls_ext[@]} =~ $tls_ext ]]; then
|
||||
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - TLS extension $tls_ext detected"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - TLS extension $tls_ext detected" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
|
|
@ -19233,7 +19233,7 @@ find_openssl_binary() {
|
|||
|
||||
$OPENSSL ciphers -s 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || OSSL_CIPHERS_S="-s"
|
||||
|
||||
# This and all other occurences we do a little trick using "invalid." to avoid plain and
|
||||
# This and all other occurrences we do a little trick using "invalid." to avoid plain and
|
||||
# link level DNS lookups. See issue #1418 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6761#section-6.4
|
||||
$OPENSSL s_client -ssl2 -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_SSL2=true
|
||||
$OPENSSL s_client -ssl3 -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_SSL3=true
|
||||
|
|
@ -19406,7 +19406,7 @@ check_bsd_mount() {
|
|||
# This sets the PRINTF command for writing into TCP sockets. It is needed because
|
||||
# The shell builtin printf flushes the write buffer at every \n, ("\x0a") which
|
||||
# in turn means a new TCP fragment. That causes a slight performance penalty and
|
||||
# and some F5s to hiccup, see #1113. Unfortunately this can be used only with GNU's
|
||||
# some F5s to hiccup, see #1113. Unfortunately this can be used only with GNU's
|
||||
# and OpenBSD's /usr/bin/printf -- FreeBSD + OS X can't do this. Thus here we need
|
||||
# to pipe through dd or cat, see socksend() and socksend_clienthello(). An empty
|
||||
# $PRINTF signals the bash internal printf which then uses cat as a stdout buffer.
|
||||
|
|
@ -20147,7 +20147,7 @@ get_a_record() {
|
|||
return 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if is_ipv4addr "$1"; then
|
||||
# This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachabale DNS
|
||||
# This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachable DNS
|
||||
echo $1
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
|
@ -20188,7 +20188,7 @@ get_aaaa_record() {
|
|||
[[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && return 0 # if no DNS lookup was instructed, leave here
|
||||
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
||||
if is_ipv6addr "$1"; then
|
||||
# This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachabale DNS
|
||||
# This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachable DNS
|
||||
echo "$1"
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
elif is_ipv4addr "$1"; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -20884,7 +20884,7 @@ determine_optimal_proto() {
|
|||
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=10
|
||||
else
|
||||
# dirty hack but an idea for the future to be implemented upfront: Now we know, we'll better off
|
||||
# with the OS supplied openssl binary. We need to inittialize variables / arrays again though.
|
||||
# with the OS supplied openssl binary. We need to initialize variables / arrays again though.
|
||||
# And the service detection can't be made up for now
|
||||
outln ", \n proceeding with /usr/bin/openssl"
|
||||
OPENSSL=/usr/bin/openssl
|
||||
|
|
@ -21064,12 +21064,12 @@ determine_sizelimitbug() {
|
|||
local overflow_cipher='C0,86'
|
||||
local -i nr_ciphers
|
||||
|
||||
# For STARTTLS protcols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
|
||||
# For STARTTLS protocols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
|
||||
# Fixme: find out whether we can't skip this in general for STARTTLS
|
||||
[[ "$STARTTLS" =~ ldap ]] && return 0
|
||||
[[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]] && return 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Only with TLS 1.2 offered at the server side it is possible to hit this bug, in practise. Thus
|
||||
# Only with TLS 1.2 offered at the server side it is possible to hit this bug, in practice. Thus
|
||||
# we assume if TLS 1.2 is not supported, the server has no cipher size limit bug. It still may,
|
||||
# theoretically, but in a regular check with testssl.sh we won't hit this limit with lower protocols.
|
||||
# Upon calling this function we already know whether TLS 1.2 is supported. If TLS 1.2 is supported, we
|
||||
|
|
@ -21738,7 +21738,7 @@ run_rating() {
|
|||
|
||||
[[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]] && set_grade_cap "T" "Encryption via STARTTLS is not mandatory (opportunistic)."
|
||||
|
||||
# Sort the reasons. This is just nicer to read in genereal
|
||||
# Sort the reasons. This is just nicer to read in general
|
||||
IFS=$'\n' sorted_reasons=($(sort -ru <<<"${GRADE_CAP_REASONS[*]}"))
|
||||
IFS=$'\n' sorted_warnings=($(sort -u <<<"${GRADE_WARNINGS[*]}"))
|
||||
IFS=$old_ifs
|
||||
|
|
@ -21781,7 +21781,7 @@ run_rating() {
|
|||
c1_best=0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# get worst score, by searching for the worst protcol, until a hit occurs
|
||||
# get worst score, by searching for the worst protocol, until a hit occurs
|
||||
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
||||
c1_worst=0
|
||||
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue