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testssl.sh
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Complete shortcut checks (Renegotiation and CRIME) 

This also makes a short exit when the server side
supports TLS 1.3 only as this protocol doesn't support
TLS renegotiation or compression.

Also it fixes the logic flaw from the previous
commit that "-no_tls1_3" has to be supplied.

Furthermore, it unifies the output presented to the user.
This commit is contained in:
Dirk 2020-01-18 12:31:38 +01:00
parent 747fb039ed
commit 8c24d1a6f2
1 changed files with 17 additions and 11 deletions
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28
testssl.sh
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@ -14334,9 +14334,9 @@ run_renego() {
pr_bold " Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) "
jsonID="secure_renego"
if "$TLS13_ONLY" && [[ "$proto" == -no_tls1_3 ]]; then
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
# https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2018/02/08/tlsv1.3/
prln_svrty_best "no support in TLS 1.3 only servers (OK)"
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe"
else
# first fingerprint for the Line "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" or "Secure Renegotiation IS "
@ -14396,13 +14396,13 @@ run_renego() {
esac
if "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
elif "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then
prln_warning "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
sec_client_renego=1
elif "$TLS13_ONLY" && [[ "$proto" == -no_tls1_3 ]]; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " (TLS 1.3 only server)"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
else
# We need up to two tries here, as some LiteSpeed servers don't answer on "R" and block. Thus first try in the background
# msg enables us to look deeper into it while debugging
@ -14471,15 +14471,21 @@ run_crime() {
local cwe="CWE-310"
local hint=""
# in a nutshell: don't offer TLS/SPDY compression on the server side
# This tests for CRIME Vulnerability (www.ekoparty.org/2012/juliano-rizzo.php) on HTTPS, not SPDY (yet)
# Please note that it is an attack where you need client side control, so in regular situations this
# means anyway "game over", w/wo CRIME
# www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Vulnerability-in-SSL-encryption-is-barely-exploitable-1708604.html
# In a nutshell: don't offer TLS/SPDY compression. This tests for CRIME Vulnerability on HTTPS only,
# not SPDY or ALPN (yet). Please note that it is an attack where you need client side control, so in
# regular situations this # means anyway "game over", with or without CRIME.
#
# https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2012/09/14/crime-information-leakage-attack-against-ssltls
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CRIME vulnerability " && outln
pr_bold " CRIME, TLS " ; out "($cve) "
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln ", no compression in TLS 1.3 only servers"
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe"
return 0
fi
if ! "$HAS_ZLIB"; then
if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks zlib support"