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Merge pull request #1726 from drwetter/fix_1725_SCIR 

Fix Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation false positive (3.1dev)
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Dirk Wetter 2020-09-16 20:13:10 +02:00 committed by GitHub
parent d4a3a67f70 ade010d4e7
commit 8d4042c6b6
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1 changed files with 8 additions and 2 deletions
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testssl.sh
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@ -15951,7 +15951,6 @@ run_renego() {
;; # all ok
esac
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
@ -15973,7 +15972,14 @@ run_renego() {
else
# second try in the foreground as we are sure now it won't hang
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
sec_client_renego=$? # 0=client is renegotiating & doesn't return an error --> vuln!
sec_client_renego=$?
# 0 means client is renegotiating & doesn't return an error --> vuln!
# 1 means client tried to renegotiating but the server side errored then. You still see RENEGOTIATING in the output
if tail -5 $TMPFILE| grep -qa '^closed'; then
# Exemption from above: server closed the connection but return value was zero
# See https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1725 and referenced issue @haproxy
sec_client_renego=1
fi
case "$sec_client_renego" in
0) # We try again if server is HTTP. This could be either a node.js server or something else.
# node.js has a mitigation which allows 3x R and then blocks. So we test 4x