merge upstream
This commit is contained in:
Magnus Larsen
commit
985e647cdf
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@ -11,10 +11,12 @@
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* Added several ciphers to colored ciphers
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* Percent output char problem fixed
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* Several display/output fixes
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* BREACH check: list all compression methods and add brotli
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* Security fix: DNS input
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* Don't use external pwd anymore
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* STARTTLS: XMPP server support
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* Rating (SSL Labs, not complete)
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* Added support for certificates with EdDSA signatures and pubilc keys
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### Features implemented / improvements in 3.0
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378
testssl.sh
378
testssl.sh
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@ -1038,8 +1038,18 @@ set_key_str_score() {
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"$do_rating" || return 0
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<<<<<<< HEAD
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if [[ $type == EC ]]; then
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if [[ $size -lt 123 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -gt 40 ]]; then
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=======
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# TODO: We need to get the size of DH params (follows the same table as the "else" clause)
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# For now, verifying the key size will do...
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if [[ $type == EC || $type == EdDSA ]]; then
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if [[ $size -lt 110 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -gt 20 ]]; then
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let KEY_EXCH_SCORE=20
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set_grade_cap "F" "Using an insecure key"
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elif [[ $size -lt 123 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -gt 40 ]]; then
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>>>>>>> upstream/3.1dev
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let KEY_EXCH_SCORE=40
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set_grade_cap "F" "Using an insecure key"
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elif [[ $size -lt 163 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -gt 80 ]]; then
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@ -6241,7 +6251,15 @@ read_dhtype_from_file() {
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# arg1: certificate file
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read_sigalg_from_file() {
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$OPENSSL x509 -noout -text -in "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; exit; }'
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local sig_alg
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sig_alg="$(strip_leading_space "$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -text -in "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; exit; }')")"
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case "$sig_alg" in
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1.3.101.112|ED25519) tm_out "Ed25519" ;;
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1.3.101.113|ED448) tm_out "Ed448" ;;
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*) tm_out "$sig_alg" ;;
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esac
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}
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@ -6985,7 +7003,11 @@ cipher_pref_check() {
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! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
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done
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[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
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if "$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
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tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
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else
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tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
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fi
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[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break
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cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
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for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
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@ -7533,12 +7555,12 @@ get_server_certificate() {
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"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
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CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false
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if [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3" ]]; then
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if [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3 ]]; then
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[[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 1 ]] && return 1
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if "$HAS_TLS13" && "$HAS_SIGALGS"; then
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if [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3_RSA" ]]; then
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if "$HAS_TLS13" && "$HAS_SIGALGS" && [[ ! "$1" =~ tls1_3_EdDSA ]]; then
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if [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
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$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -tls1_3 -tlsextdebug -status -msg -sigalgs PSS+SHA256:PSS+SHA384") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
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elif [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3_ECDSA" ]]; then
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elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then
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$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -tls1_3 -tlsextdebug -status -msg -sigalgs ECDSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA384") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
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else
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return 1
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@ -7552,10 +7574,12 @@ get_server_certificate() {
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# For STARTTLS protcols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
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if ( [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ ldap ]] || [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]] ); then
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return 1
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elif [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3_RSA" ]]; then
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elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
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tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,10,00,0e,08,04,08,05,08,06,04,01,05,01,06,01,02,01"
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elif [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3_ECDSA" ]]; then
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elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then
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tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,0a,00,08,04,03,05,03,06,03,02,03"
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elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_EdDSA ]]; then
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tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,06,00,04,08,07,08,08"
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else
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return 1
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fi
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@ -8320,8 +8344,16 @@ certificate_info() {
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GOOD_CA_BUNDLE=""
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cert_sig_algo="$(awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; if (++Match >= 1) exit; }' <<< "$cert_txt")"
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cert_sig_algo="${cert_sig_algo// /}"
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case "$cert_sig_algo" in
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1.3.101.112|ED25519) cert_sig_algo="Ed25519" ;;
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1.3.101.113|ED448) cert_sig_algo="Ed448" ;;
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esac
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cert_key_algo="$(awk -F':' '/Public Key Algorithm:/ { print $2; if (++Match >= 1) exit; }' <<< "$cert_txt")"
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cert_key_algo="${cert_key_algo// /}"
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case "$cert_key_algo" in
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1.3.101.112|E[Dd]25519) cert_key_algo="Ed25519"; cert_keysize=253 ;;
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1.3.101.113|E[Dd]448) cert_key_algo="Ed448"; cert_keysize=456 ;;
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esac
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out "$indent" ; pr_bold " Signature Algorithm "
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jsonID="cert_signatureAlgorithm"
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@ -8429,6 +8461,10 @@ certificate_info() {
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fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD5"
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set_grade_cap "F" "Supports a insecure signature (MD5)"
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;;
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Ed25519|Ed448)
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prln_svrty_good "$cert_sig_algo"
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fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "$cert_sig_algo"
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;;
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*)
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out "$cert_sig_algo ("
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pr_warning "FIXME: can't tell whether this is good or not"
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@ -8449,6 +8485,7 @@ certificate_info() {
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case $cert_key_algo in
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*RSA*|*rsa*) short_keyAlgo="RSA";;
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*ecdsa*|*ecPublicKey) short_keyAlgo="EC";;
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*Ed25519*|*Ed448*) short_keyAlgo="EdDSA";;
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*DSA*|*dsa*) short_keyAlgo="DSA";;
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*GOST*|*gost*) short_keyAlgo="GOST";;
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*dh*|*DH*) short_keyAlgo="DH" ;;
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@ -8511,6 +8548,10 @@ certificate_info() {
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((ret++))
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fi
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set_key_str_score "$short_keyAlgo" "$cert_keysize"
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elif [[ $cert_key_algo == Ed* ]]; then
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pr_svrty_good "$cert_key_algo"
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json_rating="OK"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_key_algo"
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set_key_str_score "$short_keyAlgo" "$cert_keysize"
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else
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out "$cert_key_algo + $cert_keysize bits ("
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@ -8574,19 +8615,19 @@ certificate_info() {
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cert_keyusage="$(strip_leading_space "$(awk '/X509v3 Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "$cert_txt")")"
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if [[ -n "$cert_keyusage" ]]; then
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outln "$cert_keyusage"
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if ( [[ " $cert_type " =~ " RSASig " ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ " DSA " ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ " ECDSA " ]] ) && \
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[[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ "Digital Signature" ]]; then
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if ( [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ RSASig\ ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ DSA\ ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ ECDSA\ ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ EdDSA\ ]] ) && \
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[[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Digital\ Signature ]]; then
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prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for digital signatures"
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fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for digital signatures: \"$cert_keyusage\""
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outok=false
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fi
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if [[ " $cert_type " =~ " RSAKMK " ]] && [[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ "Key Encipherment" ]]; then
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if [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ RSAKMK\ ]] && [[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Key\ Encipherment ]]; then
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prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for key encipherment"
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fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for key encipherment: \"$cert_keyusage\""
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outok=false
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fi
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if ( [[ " $cert_type " =~ " DH " ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ " ECDH " ]] ) && \
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[[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ "Key Agreement" ]]; then
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if ( [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ DH\ ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ ECDH\ ]] ) && \
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[[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Key\ Agreement ]]; then
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prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for key agreement"
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fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for key agreement: \"$cert_keyusage\""
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outok=false
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@ -9245,27 +9286,28 @@ run_server_defaults() {
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ciphers_to_test[7]=""
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ciphers_to_test[8]="tls1_3_RSA"
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ciphers_to_test[9]="tls1_3_ECDSA"
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ciphers_to_test[10]="tls1_3_EdDSA"
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certificate_type[1]="" ; certificate_type[2]=""
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certificate_type[3]=""; certificate_type[4]=""
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certificate_type[5]="" ; certificate_type[6]=""
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certificate_type[7]="" ; certificate_type[8]="RSASig"
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certificate_type[9]="ECDSA"
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certificate_type[9]="ECDSA" ; certificate_type[10]="EdDSA"
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for (( n=1; n <= 16 ; n++ )); do
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for (( n=1; n <= 17 ; n++ )); do
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# Some servers use a different certificate if the ClientHello
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# specifies TLSv1.1 and doesn't include a server name extension.
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# So, for each public key type for which a certificate was found,
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# try again, but only with TLSv1.1 and without SNI.
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if [[ $n -ne 1 ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
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ciphers_to_test[n]=""
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elif [[ $n -ge 10 ]]; then
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elif [[ $n -ge 11 ]]; then
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ciphers_to_test[n]=""
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[[ ${success[n-9]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -ne 1 ]] && \
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ciphers_to_test[n]="${ciphers_to_test[n-9]}" && certificate_type[n]="${certificate_type[n-9]}"
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[[ ${success[n-10]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -ne 1 ]] && \
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ciphers_to_test[n]="${ciphers_to_test[n-10]}" && certificate_type[n]="${certificate_type[n-10]}"
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fi
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if [[ -n "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" ]]; then
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if [[ $n -ge 10 ]]; then
|
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if [[ $n -ge 11 ]]; then
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sni="$SNI"
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SNI=""
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get_server_certificate "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" "tls1_1"
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|
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@ -9276,7 +9318,7 @@ run_server_defaults() {
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success[n]=$?
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fi
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if [[ ${success[n]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then
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[[ $n -ge 10 ]] && [[ ! -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]] && cp $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.nosni
|
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[[ $n -ge 11 ]] && [[ ! -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]] && cp $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.nosni
|
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cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.get_server_certificate.txt" $TMPFILE
|
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>$ERRFILE
|
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if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -9358,7 +9400,7 @@ run_server_defaults() {
|
|||
fi
|
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i=$((i + 1))
|
||||
done
|
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if ! "$match_found" && [[ $n -ge 10 ]] && [[ $certs_found -ne 0 ]]; then
|
||||
if ! "$match_found" && [[ $n -ge 11 ]] && [[ $certs_found -ne 0 ]]; then
|
||||
# A new certificate was found using TLSv1.1 without SNI.
|
||||
# Check to see if the new certificate should be displayed.
|
||||
# It should be displayed if it is either a match for the
|
||||
|
|
@ -9415,7 +9457,7 @@ run_server_defaults() {
|
|||
[[ -n "${previous_intermediates[certs_found]}" ]] && [[ -r $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem ]] && \
|
||||
previous_hostcert_issuer[certs_found]=$(cat $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem)
|
||||
previous_ordering_problem[certs_found]=$CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM
|
||||
[[ $n -ge 10 ]] && sni_used[certs_found]="" || sni_used[certs_found]="$SNI"
|
||||
[[ $n -ge 11 ]] && sni_used[certs_found]="" || sni_used[certs_found]="$SNI"
|
||||
tls_version[certs_found]="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
||||
previous_hostcert_type[certs_found]=" ${certificate_type[n]}"
|
||||
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -10726,7 +10768,15 @@ get_pub_key_size() {
|
|||
"$HAS_PKEY" || return 1
|
||||
|
||||
# OpenSSL displays the number of bits for RSA and ECC
|
||||
pubkeybits=$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text 2>>$ERRFILE | awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }')
|
||||
pubkeybits=$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text 2>>$ERRFILE)
|
||||
if [[ "$pubkeybits" =~ E[Dd]25519 ]]; then
|
||||
echo "Server public key is 253 bit" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
elif [[ "$pubkeybits" =~ E[Dd]448 ]]; then
|
||||
echo "Server public key is 456 bit" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
pubkeybits=$(awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }' <<< "$pubkeybits")
|
||||
if [[ -n $pubkeybits ]]; then
|
||||
# remainder e.g. "256 bit)"
|
||||
pubkeybits="${pubkeybits//\)/}"
|
||||
|
|
@ -12788,6 +12838,7 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|||
local len1 len2 len3 key_bitstring="" pem_certificate
|
||||
local dh_p dh_param ephemeral_param rfc7919_param
|
||||
local -i dh_p_len dh_param_len
|
||||
local peering_signing_digest=0 peer_signature_type=0
|
||||
|
||||
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=""
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && echo > $TMPFILE
|
||||
|
|
@ -13021,6 +13072,14 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|||
fi
|
||||
tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
||||
tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
||||
elif [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0F ]]; then
|
||||
if [[ $msg_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
||||
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained malformed certificate_verify message."
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Extract just the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm from the CertificateVerify message.
|
||||
peering_signing_digest="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}"
|
||||
peer_signature_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:$((i+2)):2}"
|
||||
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 16 ]]; then
|
||||
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_status_ascii" ]]; then
|
||||
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one certificate_status handshake message."
|
||||
|
|
@ -13799,12 +13858,24 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|||
29) dh_bits=253 ; named_curve_str="X25519" ;;
|
||||
30) dh_bits=448 ; named_curve_str="X448" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then
|
||||
# Skip over the public key to get to the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
||||
# This is TLS 1.2-only, as this field does not appear in earlier versions.
|
||||
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:6:2}")
|
||||
offset=$((len1+8))
|
||||
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ge $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
||||
# The SignatureAndHashAlgorithm won't be present in an anonymous
|
||||
# key exhange.
|
||||
peering_signing_digest="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:2}"
|
||||
peer_signature_type="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:$((offset+2)):2}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && [[ $named_curve -ne 29 ]] && [[ $named_curve -ne 30 ]]; then
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits\n"
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
||||
echo "Server Temp Key: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
elif [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits\n"
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
||||
echo "Server Temp Key: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_DHE_ ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_DH_anon ]] || \
|
||||
|
|
@ -13863,9 +13934,72 @@ parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|||
[[ "$ephemeral_param" != "$rfc7919_param" ]] && named_curve_str=""
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits\n"
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits"
|
||||
[[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo "Server Temp Key: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then
|
||||
# Skip over the public key (P, G, Y) to get to the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
||||
# This is TLS 1.2-only, as this field does not appear in earlier versions.
|
||||
offset=$((dh_p_len+4))
|
||||
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
||||
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
||||
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
||||
offset+=$((len1+4))
|
||||
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
||||
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
||||
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
||||
offset+=$((len1+4))
|
||||
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ge $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
||||
# The SignatureAndHashAlgorithm won't be present in an anonymous
|
||||
# key exhange.
|
||||
peering_signing_digest="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:2}"
|
||||
peer_signature_type="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:$((offset+2)):2}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -eq 8 ]] && \
|
||||
[[ 0x$peer_signature_type -ge 4 ]] && [[ 0x$peer_signature_type -le 11 ]]; then
|
||||
case $peer_signature_type in
|
||||
04) peering_signing_digest="SHA256"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
||||
05) peering_signing_digest="SHA384"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
||||
06) peering_signing_digest="SHA512"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
||||
07) peering_signing_digest=""; peer_signature_type="Ed25519" ;;
|
||||
08) peering_signing_digest=""; peer_signature_type="Ed448" ;;
|
||||
09) peering_signing_digest="SHA256"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
||||
0A) peering_signing_digest="SHA384"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
||||
0B) peering_signing_digest="SHA512"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
if [[ -n "$peering_signing_digest" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type\n"
|
||||
elif [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -ge 1 ]] && [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -le 6 ]] && \
|
||||
[[ 0x$peer_signature_type -ge 1 ]] && [[ 0x$peer_signature_type -le 3 ]]; then
|
||||
case $peering_signing_digest in
|
||||
01) peering_signing_digest="MD5" ;;
|
||||
02) peering_signing_digest="SHA1" ;;
|
||||
03) peering_signing_digest="SHA224" ;;
|
||||
04) peering_signing_digest="SHA256" ;;
|
||||
05) peering_signing_digest="SHA384" ;;
|
||||
06) peering_signing_digest="SHA512" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
case $peer_signature_type in
|
||||
01) peer_signature_type="RSA" ;;
|
||||
02) peer_signature_type="DSA" ;;
|
||||
03) peer_signature_type="ECDSA" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
echo "Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest"
|
||||
echo "Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type" >> $TMPFILE
|
||||
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type\n"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -14183,10 +14317,10 @@ prepare_tls_clienthello() {
|
|||
|
||||
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -le 0x03 ]]; then
|
||||
extension_signature_algorithms="
|
||||
00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 5246
|
||||
00, 20, 00,1e, # lengths
|
||||
00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 5246 and RFC 8422
|
||||
00, 24, 00,22, # lengths
|
||||
06,01, 06,02, 06,03, 05,01, 05,02, 05,03, 04,01, 04,02, 04,03,
|
||||
03,01, 03,02, 03,03, 02,01, 02,02, 02,03"
|
||||
03,01, 03,02, 03,03, 02,01, 02,02, 02,03, 08,07, 08,08"
|
||||
else
|
||||
extension_signature_algorithms="
|
||||
00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 8446
|
||||
|
|
@ -15876,14 +16010,48 @@ run_crime() {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# BREACH is a HTTP-level compression & an attack which works against any cipher suite and is agnostic
|
||||
# to the version of TLS/SSL, more: http://www.breachattack.com/ . Foreign referrers are the important thing here!
|
||||
|
||||
# As the name says. It expects as arg1 a GET command string. It returns 1
|
||||
# when GET command was stalled or killed (which is no not always used)
|
||||
# and echos "warn_*". It return 0 when everything went ok and echos the
|
||||
# compression if any.
|
||||
sub_breach_helper() {
|
||||
local get_command="$1"
|
||||
local detected_compression=""
|
||||
local -i was_killed=0
|
||||
|
||||
safe_echo "$get_command" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 1>$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE &
|
||||
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
||||
was_killed=$? # !=0 when it was killed
|
||||
detected_compression=$(grep -ia ^Content-Encoding: $TMPFILE)
|
||||
detected_compression="$(strip_lf "$detected_compression")"
|
||||
detected_compression="${detected_compression#*:}"
|
||||
detected_compression="$(strip_spaces "$detected_compression")"
|
||||
if [[ ! -s $TMPFILE ]]; then
|
||||
if [[ $was_killed -eq 0 ]]; then
|
||||
echo "warn_stalled"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "warn_killed"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
elif [[ -z $detected_compression ]]; then
|
||||
echo "no_compression"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "$detected_compression"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# BREACH is a HTTP-level compression & an attack which works against any cipher suite and is agnostic to the
|
||||
# version of TLS/SSL, more: http://www.breachattack.com/ . External referrers are the important thing here!
|
||||
# Mitigation: see https://community.qualys.com/message/20360
|
||||
# Any URL can be vulnerable. Here only the given URL is tested. See also $when_makesense
|
||||
#
|
||||
run_breach() {
|
||||
local header
|
||||
local -i ret=0
|
||||
local -i was_killed=0
|
||||
local referer useragent
|
||||
local url="$1"
|
||||
local spaces=" "
|
||||
|
|
@ -15891,8 +16059,12 @@ run_breach() {
|
|||
local when_makesense=" Can be ignored for static pages or if no secrets in the page"
|
||||
local cve="CVE-2013-3587"
|
||||
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
||||
local hint=""
|
||||
local hint="" c=""
|
||||
local jsonID="BREACH"
|
||||
local compressions="gzip deflate compress br"
|
||||
local has_compression=()
|
||||
local detected_compression=""
|
||||
local get_command=""
|
||||
|
||||
[[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && ! "$CLIENT_AUTH" && return 7
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -15903,13 +16075,6 @@ run_breach() {
|
|||
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "was not tested, server side requires x509 authentication" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -ge $MAX_HEADER_FAIL ]]; then
|
||||
# pr_warning "Retrieving HTTP header failed before. Skipping."
|
||||
# fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "HTTP response was wampty before" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
# outln
|
||||
# return 1
|
||||
# fi
|
||||
|
||||
[[ -z "$url" ]] && url="/"
|
||||
disclaimer=" - only supplied \"$url\" tested"
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -15917,33 +16082,80 @@ run_breach() {
|
|||
[[ "$NODE" =~ google ]] && referer="https://yandex.ru/" # otherwise we have a false positive for google.com
|
||||
useragent="$UA_STD"
|
||||
$SNEAKY && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY"
|
||||
tm_out "GET $url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nReferer: $referer\r\nConnection: Close\r\nAccept-encoding: gzip,deflate,compress\r\nAccept: text/*\r\n\r\n" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 1>$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE &
|
||||
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
||||
was_killed=$? # !=0 was killed
|
||||
result=$(awk '/^Content-Encoding/ { print $2 }' $TMPFILE)
|
||||
result=$(strip_lf "$result")
|
||||
debugme grep '^Content-Encoding' $TMPFILE
|
||||
if [[ ! -s $TMPFILE ]]; then
|
||||
pr_warning "failed (HTTP header request stalled or empty return"
|
||||
if [[ $was_killed -ne 0 ]]; then
|
||||
pr_warning " and was terminated"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP request stalled and was terminated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
else
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP response was empty" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
prln_warning ") "
|
||||
|
||||
# Assemble the GET command with all available compressions and send them all, initially.
|
||||
# If the result is negative: we can just tell the finding and return. If it's
|
||||
# positive: We already have identified 1x compression
|
||||
get_command="GET $url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nReferer: $referer\r\nConnection: Close\r\nAccept-encoding: ${compressions// /,}\r\nAccept: text/*\r\n\r\n"
|
||||
detected_compression=$(sub_breach_helper "$get_command")
|
||||
case "$detected_compression" in
|
||||
warn_stalled)
|
||||
pr_warning "First request failed (HTTP header request stalled and was terminated)"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as first HTTP request stalled and was terminated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
ret=1
|
||||
elif [[ -z $result ]]; then
|
||||
pr_svrty_best "no HTTP compression (OK) "
|
||||
;;
|
||||
warn_failed)
|
||||
pr_warning "First request failed (HTTP header request was empty)"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as first HTTP response was empty" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
ret=1
|
||||
;;
|
||||
no_compression)
|
||||
pr_svrty_best "no gzip/deflate/compress/br HTTP compression (OK) "
|
||||
outln "$disclaimer"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no HTTP compression $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no gzip/deflate/compress/br HTTP compression $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
ret=0
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*) # Now assemble the remaining compressions in $compressions and loop through them
|
||||
has_compression+=("$detected_compression:yes")
|
||||
compressions="${compressions//$detected_compression/}"
|
||||
for c in $compressions; do
|
||||
get_command="GET $url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nReferer: $referer\r\nConnection: Close\r\nAccept-encoding: ${c}\r\nAccept: text/*\r\n\r\n"
|
||||
detected_compression=$(sub_breach_helper "$get_command")
|
||||
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
||||
# This failure unlikely here. The initial request must have succeeded and this one then
|
||||
# failed but we'd rather treat this correctly (e.d. IDS which triggers later). Not also
|
||||
# we exit on the first stalled request. So if the first one with all compressions failed,
|
||||
# we don't get here. It seems very unlikely the first failed and subsequent will succeed.
|
||||
has_compression+=("$c:$compressions")
|
||||
elif [[ "$detected_compression" =~ no_compression ]]; then
|
||||
has_compression+=("$c:no")
|
||||
debugme echo "has_compression: $c: no"
|
||||
elif [[ -n "detected_compression" ]]; then
|
||||
has_compression+=("$c:yes")
|
||||
debugme echo "has_compression: $c: yes"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pr_svrty_high "potentially NOT ok, uses $result HTTP compression."
|
||||
outln "$disclaimer"
|
||||
outln "$spaces$when_makesense"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "potentially VULNERABLE, uses $result HTTP compression $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
||||
prln_fixme "strange reply around line $((LINENO)) from sub_breach_helper()"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Any URL can be vulnerable. I am testing now only the given URL!
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Final verdict (if not happened preemptively before). We reuse $detected_compression here
|
||||
detected_compression=""
|
||||
if [[ ${has_compression[@]} =~ warn ]]; then
|
||||
# warn_empty / warn_stalled
|
||||
if [[ ${has_compression[@]} =~ warn_empty ]]; then
|
||||
pr_warning "At least 1/4 checks failed (HTTP header request was empty, debug: ${has_compression[@]}"
|
||||
out ", debug: ${has_compression[@]})"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP response was empty, debug: ${has_compression[@]}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
else # warn_stalled
|
||||
pr_warning "At least 1/4 checks failed (HTTP header request stalled and was terminated"
|
||||
out ", debug: ${has_compression[@]})"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP request stalled and was terminated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
for c in ${has_compression[@]}; do
|
||||
if [[ $c =~ yes ]]; then
|
||||
detected_compression+="${c%:*} "
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
detected_compression="$(strip_trailing_space "$detected_compression")"
|
||||
pr_svrty_high "potentially NOT ok, \"$detected_compression\" HTTP compression detected."
|
||||
outln "$disclaimer"
|
||||
outln "${spaces}${when_makesense}"
|
||||
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "potentially VULNERABLE, $detected_compression HTTP compression detected $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
debugme outln "${spaces}has_compression: ${has_compression[@]}"
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
||||
return $ret
|
||||
|
|
@ -16998,7 +17210,7 @@ run_beast(){
|
|||
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
||||
done
|
||||
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
||||
if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
||||
if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
||||
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
||||
else
|
||||
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
||||
|
|
@ -19347,7 +19559,7 @@ get_caa_rr_record() {
|
|||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# watch out: $1 can also be a cname! --> all checked
|
||||
# arg1: domain to check for. Returned will be the MX record as a string
|
||||
get_mx_record() {
|
||||
local mx=""
|
||||
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
||||
|
|
@ -19357,21 +19569,49 @@ get_mx_record() {
|
|||
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
||||
# we need the last two columns here
|
||||
if "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
||||
mxs="$(host -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/is handled by/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')"
|
||||
mx="$(host -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/is handled by/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')"
|
||||
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
||||
mxs="$(dig +short $noidnout -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1" "$2 }')"
|
||||
mx="$(dig +short $noidnout -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1" "$2 }')"
|
||||
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
||||
mxs="$(drill mx $1 | awk '/IN[ \t]MX[ \t]+/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')"
|
||||
mx="$(drill mx $1 | awk '/IN[ \t]MX[ \t]+/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')"
|
||||
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
||||
mxs="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/mail exchanger/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')")"
|
||||
mx="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/mail exchanger/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')")"
|
||||
else
|
||||
# shouldn't reach this, as we checked in the top
|
||||
fatal "No dig, host, drill or nslookup" $ERR_DNSBIN
|
||||
fi
|
||||
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf"
|
||||
echo "$mxs"
|
||||
echo "$mx"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# arg1: domain / hostname. Returned will be the TXT record as a string which can be multilined
|
||||
# (one entry per line), for e.g. non-MTA-STS records.
|
||||
# Is supposed to be used by MTA STS in the future like get_txt_record _mta-sts.DOMAIN.TLD
|
||||
get_txt_record() {
|
||||
local record=""
|
||||
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
||||
local noidnout=""
|
||||
|
||||
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
||||
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
||||
# we need the last two columns here and strip any remaining double quotes later
|
||||
if "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
||||
record="$(host -t TXT "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F\" '/descriptive text/ { print $(NF-1) }')"
|
||||
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
||||
record="$(dig +short $noidnout -t TXT "$1" 2>/dev/null)"
|
||||
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
||||
record="$(drill txt $1 | awk -F\" '/^[a-z0-9].*TXT/ { print $(NF-1) }')"
|
||||
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
||||
record="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F= '/text/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')")"
|
||||
else
|
||||
# shouldn't reach this, as we checked in the top
|
||||
fatal "No dig, host, drill or nslookup" $ERR_DNSBIN
|
||||
fi
|
||||
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf"
|
||||
echo "${record//\"/}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# set IPADDRs and IP46ADDRs
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue