renamed pr_yellow to pr_svrty_minor

This commit is contained in:
Thomas Martens 2016-03-01 20:41:03 +01:00
parent ff9f1632e4
commit dbfa66e6c7

View File

@ -344,8 +344,8 @@ pr_done_goodln() { pr_done_good "$1"; outln; }
pr_done_best() { [[ "$COLOR" -eq 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && out "\033[1;34m$1" || out "\033[1;32m$1" ) || out "$1"; pr_off; } # This is the best
pr_done_bestln() { pr_done_best "$1"; outln; }
pr_yellow() { [[ "$COLOR" -eq 2 ]] && out "\033[1;33m$1" || out "$1"; pr_off; } # academic or minor problem
pr_yellowln() { pr_yellow "$1"; outln; }
pr_svrty_minor() { [[ "$COLOR" -eq 2 ]] && out "\033[1;33m$1" || out "$1"; pr_off; } # academic or minor problem
pr_svrty_minorln() { pr_svrty_minor "$1"; outln; }
pr_brown() { [[ "$COLOR" -eq 2 ]] && out "\033[0;33m$1" || out "$1"; pr_off; } # it is not a bad problem but you shouldn't do this
pr_brownln() { pr_brown "$1"; outln; }
@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@ run_server_preference() {
fileout "order_cipher" "OK" "Default cipher: $default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE") (OK) $remark4default_cipher"
;; # best ones
ECDHE*AES*)
pr_yellow "$default_cipher"
pr_svrty_minor "$default_cipher"
fileout "order_cipher" "WARN" "Default cipher: $default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE") (cbc) $remark4default_cipher"
;; # it's CBC. --> lucky13
"")
@ -3238,7 +3238,7 @@ certificate_info() {
out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP stapling "
if grep -a "OCSP response" <<<"$ocsp_response" | grep -q "no response sent" ; then
pr_yellow "--"
pr_svrty_minor "--"
fileout "${json_prefix}ocsp_stapling" "INFO" "OCSP stapling : not offered"
else
if grep -a "OCSP Response Status" <<<"$ocsp_response_status" | grep -q successful; then
@ -3377,7 +3377,7 @@ run_server_defaults() {
lifetime=$(echo $sessticket_str | grep -a lifetime | sed 's/[A-Za-z:() ]//g')
unit=$(echo $sessticket_str | grep -a lifetime | sed -e 's/^.*'"$lifetime"'//' -e 's/[ ()]//g')
out "$lifetime $unit "
pr_yellowln "(PFS requires session ticket keys to be rotated <= daily)"
pr_svrty_minorln "(PFS requires session ticket keys to be rotated <= daily)"
fileout "session_ticket" "INFO" "TLS session tickes RFC 5077 valid for $lifetime $unit (PFS requires session ticket keys to be rotated at least daily)"
fi
@ -4997,7 +4997,7 @@ run_beast(){
neat_list $HEXC $cbc_cipher $kx $enc
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
[[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]] && \
pr_yellowln "available" || \
pr_svrty_minorln "available" || \
pr_brownln "available"
else
@ -5025,7 +5025,7 @@ run_beast(){
! "$first" && out "$spaces"
out "$(toupper $proto):"
[[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]] && \
pr_yellowln "$detected_cbc_ciphers" || \
pr_svrty_minorln "$detected_cbc_ciphers" || \
pr_brownln "$detected_cbc_ciphers"
detected_cbc_ciphers="" # empty for next round
first=false
@ -5047,11 +5047,11 @@ run_beast(){
if "$WIDE"; then
outln
# NOT ok seems too harsh for me if we have TLS >1.0
pr_yellow "VULNERABLE"
pr_svrty_minor "VULNERABLE"
outln " -- but also supports higher protocols (possible mitigation):$higher_proto_supported"
else
out "$spaces"
pr_yellow "VULNERABLE"
pr_svrty_minor "VULNERABLE"
outln " -- but also supports higher protocols (possible mitigation):$higher_proto_supported"
fi
fileout "beast" "NOT OK" "BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) : VULNERABLE -- but also supports higher protocols (possible mitigation):$higher_proto_supported"