Addressed comments by @drwetter
It is OK for a site to pin a CA that is not part of the chain (like github.com does) This is a provision against a CA compromise (like diginotar) which could lead to a briked site in case of CA compromise. GitHub has built in multiple levels of security they have both backup pins for host certs and back pins for CAs (and I wouldn;t be surprised if they have a backup intermediate pin too).
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dd10194977
20
testssl.sh
20
testssl.sh
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@ -1056,8 +1056,8 @@ run_hpkp() {
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nrsaved=$(count_words "$(echo $TEMPDIR/level?.crt 2>/dev/null)")
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rm $TEMPDIR/level0.crt 2>/dev/null
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echo -n > "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes"
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if [[ nrsaved -ge 2 ]]; then
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echo -n "" > "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes"
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for cert_fname in $TEMPDIR/level?.crt; do
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hpkp_key_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert_fname" -pubkey -noout | grep -v PUBLIC | $OPENSSL base64 -d |
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$OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -binary | $OPENSSL enc -base64)"
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@ -1067,14 +1067,11 @@ run_hpkp() {
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echo "$hpkp_key_ca $hpkp_name" >> "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes"
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done
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fi
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rm $TEMPDIR/level*.crt 2>/dev/null
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# I'd like to keep all certs retrieved for debugging
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# Get keys from Root CAs
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# This is where the matching magic happens...
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pins_match=false
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for hpkp_key in $(echo $pins); do
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# exho needed here? ^^^^
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has_backup_pin=false
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for hpkp_key in $pins; do
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key_found=false
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# compare pin against the host certificate
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if [[ "$hpkp_key_hostcert" == "$hpkp_key" ]] || [[ "$hpkp_key_hostcert" == "$hpkp_key=" ]]; then
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@ -1089,7 +1086,6 @@ run_hpkp() {
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# Check for intermediate match
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if ! $key_found; then
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# doesn't work, "grep: /tmp/ssltester.Dp2ovS/intermediate.hashes: No such file or directory" if teested against testss.sh
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hpkp_matches=$(grep "$hpkp_key" $TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes 2>/dev/null)
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if [[ -n $hpkp_matches ]]; then
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# We have a match
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@ -1122,7 +1118,7 @@ run_hpkp() {
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out " (part of the chain)"
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fileout "hpkp_$hpkp_key" "INFO" "Root CA key matches a key pinned in the HPKP header. Key/OS/CA: $hpkp_matches. The CA is part of the chain"
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else
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# there's a root CA match for github AND this message.
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has_backup_pin=true
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out "\n$spaces This CA is not part of the chain and likely a backup PIN"
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fileout "hpkp_$hpkp_key" "INFO" "Root CA key matches a key pinned in the HPKP header. Key/OS/CA: $hpkp_matches. The CA is not part of the chain, this is a backup PIN"
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fi
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@ -1131,6 +1127,7 @@ run_hpkp() {
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if ! $key_found; then
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# Most likely a backup pin
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has_backup_pin=true
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out "\n\n$spaces Unmatched key: "
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out "$hpkp_key"
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out "\n$spaces (This is OK for a backup pin of a host cert)"
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@ -1143,6 +1140,11 @@ run_hpkp() {
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pr_svrty_high " No matching key for pins found "
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fileout "hpkp_keymatch" "NOT ok" "None of the HPKP PINS match your host certificate, intermediate CA or known root CAs. You may have bricked this site"
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fi
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if ! $has_backup_pin; then
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pr_svrty_high " No backup pins found. Loss/compromise of the currently pinned key(s) will lead to bricked site. "
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fileout "hpkp_backup" "NOT ok" "No backup pins found. Loss/compromise of the currently pinned key(s) will lead to bricked site."
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fi
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else
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out "--"
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fileout "hpkp" "INFO" "No support for HTTP Public Key Pinning"
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