The Postgres protocol uses STARTTLS with a custom start packet. This
functionality is supported by openssl s_client in the current openssl
master branch but not yet in any released version.
This patch detects whether the given openssl binary supports postgres
and runs the default tests against a postgres server.
Example of no openssl support:
~/bin/testssl$ ./testssl.sh --quiet
--openssl=/opt/openssl/openssl-1.1.0c/bin/openssl --starttls=postgres
test.postgres.server.com:5432
Start 2016-12-07 18:03:24 -->> ip.add.re.ss:5432
(test.postgres.server.com:5432) <<--
Fatal error: Your /opt/openssl/openssl-1.1.0c/bin/openssl does not
support the "-starttls postgres" option
Example of openssl support:
~/bin/testssl$ ./testssl.sh --quiet
--openssl=/opt/openssl/openssl-2016-12-07/bin/openssl --startt ls=postgres
test.postgres.server.com:5432
Start 2016-12-07 18:06:03 -->> ip.add.re.ss:5432
(test.postgres.server.com:5432) <<--
Service set: STARTTLS via POSTGRES
Testing protocols (via openssl, SSLv2 via sockets)
SSLv2 not offered (OK)
SSLv3 offered (NOT ok)
TLS 1 offered
TLS 1.1 offered
TLS 1.2 offered (OK)
SPDY/NPN (SPDY is an HTTP protocol and thus not tested here)
HTTP2/ALPN (HTTP/2 is a HTTP protocol and thus not tested
here)
...
This PR implements `run_pfs()` in a manner similar to `run_allciphers()`. It uses OpenSSL followed by `tls_sockets()` to test for both supported PFS cipher suites as well as elliptic curves offered.
I made an attempt at addressing #548 by using different colors to print the different curve names, depending on strength. The colors chosen are exactly the same as those that would be chosen by `read_dhbits_from_file()`:
```
# bits <= 163: pr_svrty_medium
163 < # bits <= 193: pr_svrty_minor
193 < # bits <= 224: out
# bits > 224: pr_done_good
```
I also added code for #464 to create a list of the DH groups from RFC 7919 that a server supports. However, since no servers seem to support this at the moment (except with TLS 1.3), I marked this code to only run if the $EXPERIMENTAL flag is set.
For several elliptic curves the number of bits, as indicated by OpenSSL, is slightly different than the name implies. For example, for sect239k1 OpenSSL outputs: `Server Temp Key: ECDH, sect239k1, 238 bits`.
This PR aligns the output created by `parse_tls_serverhello()` with OpenSSL.
When the cipher-mapping.txt file is read, the contents of the "Mac=..." column is placed in `TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT` rather than the contents of the "export" column. This PR fixes that.
This PR address a problem in `run_drown()` when the server does not support SSLv2, but does support multiple certificates or doesn't have an RSA certificate.
One example of the problem can be seen with www.facebook.com. If `run_server_preferences()` is run before `run_drown()`, then the results of `run_drown()` are:
```
DROWN (2016-0800, CVE-2016-0703) not vulnerable on this port (OK)
make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services
https://censys.io/ipv4?q=A626B154CC65634181250B810B1BD4C89EC277CEA08D785EEBE7E768BDA7BB00 SHA256 A3F474FB17509AE6C5B6BA5E46B79E0DE6AF1BF1EEAA040A6114676E714C9965 could help you to find out
```
If only `run_drown()` is performed, then the result is:
```
DROWN (2016-0800, CVE-2016-0703) not vulnerable on this port (OK)
make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services
https://censys.io/ipv4?q=A626B154CC65634181250B810B1BD4C89EC277CEA08D785EEBE7E768BDA7BB00 could help you to find out
```
However, A626B154CC65634181250B810B1BD4C89EC277CEA08D785EEBE7E768BDA7BB00 is the fingerprint of Facebook's ECDSA certificate, not its RSA certificate.
In addition, as noted in the "FIXME," `run_drown()` will display the warning "make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services" even if the server doesn't have an RSA certificate, even though SSLv2 can only use RSA certificates.
This PR fixes this issue by only showing the warning if the server has an RSA certificate and by ensuring that the `$cert_fingerprint_sha2` used to construct the "https://censys.io/ipv4?q=..." URL only contains a single SHA256 fingerprint and that it is the fingerprint of the server's RSA certificate.
This PR modifies `cipher_pref_check()` to use `tls_sockets()`. As with similar PRs for `run_allciphers()`, `run_cipher_per_proto()`, and `run_rc4()`, it also makes use of `$OPENSSL s_client`, since `$OPENSSL s_client` is faster than `tls_sockets()`.
With this PR, `cipher_pref_check()` first uses `$OPENSSL s_client` to obtain an ordered list of ciphers. It then makes one call to `tls_sockets()` (or a few calls if proto is TLSv1.2 and `$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG` is `true`) to find if the server supports any ciphers that are not detected by `$OPENSSL s_client`. If not, then it is done. If it finds one, then it throws out the previous results and starts over with `tls_sockets()`. [If proto is TLSv1.2 and `$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG` is `true`, then it doesn't throw out the `$OPENSSL s_client` results. Instead, it continues with `tls_sockets()` to get the full list of supported ciphers, and then uses `tls_sockets()` to order that list.]
The result is that this PR works almost as fast as the current `cipher_pref_check()` if `$OPENSSL s_client` finds all of the supported ciphers, at the cost of a performance penalty when testing servers that support ciphers that would have otherwise been missed using just OpenSSL.
Note that in this PR I removed SSLv2 from the list of protocols tested. This is because https://community.qualys.com/thread/16255 states that "in SSLv2 the client selects the suite to use." It seems that in SSLv2, the client sends a list of ciphers that it supports, the server responds with a list of ciphers that the client and server have in common, and then "the client selects the suite to use." So, showing a cipher order for SSLv2 is a bit misleading.
As noted in #543, this PR does not modify the second part of `cipher_pref_check()`, which deals with NPN protocols.
This PR implements `run_rc4()` in a similar manner to `run_allciphers()` and `run_cipher_per_proto()` (in PR #541). The change doesn't seem to have much of an impact on speed, but when sockets are used it can detect ciphers that aren't locally supported by OpenSSL.
This PR fixes two minor bugs in run_allciphers():
* If `$SSL_NATIVE` or `$FAST` is `true`, then the cipher mapping file will not be used (unless `$OPENSSL ciphers` does not support the `-V` option), so there is no "fallback" to openssl, even if `[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]]`.
* If `$using_sockets` is `false` and `$SHOW_EACH_C` is `true`, then `ossl_supported` should be checked to see if the cipher was tested, not `TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED`.
Dirk Wetter
Steven Danneman
David Cooper
AlGreed
typingArtist