PR #1373 changed get_cn_from_cert() to handle certificate subject names that include more than one CN attribute. It did this by converting newline characters to spaces. It seems that this resulted in a space character being added to the end of the string returned by get_cn_from_cert() even in the case that the subject name only included one CN attribute. The presence of the space character in returned value caused compare_server_name_to_cert() to determine that the CN attribute did not contain a DNS name (since DNS names cannot include spaces), and so compare_server_name_to_cert() reports that the server name does not match against the CN in the subject. This may be the reason for the problem noted in #1555.
This commit fixes the above problem and also enhances the matching of the CN in the subject name against the server's name. Currently, compare_server_name_to_cert() assumes that the subject field contains at most one CN attribute. However, as noted in #1373, some certificates include subject names with more than one CN attribute, and RFC 6125 (Section 6.2.2) indicates that the certificate subject name include more than one CN, with each specifying a different DNS name.
So, in addition to fixing the problem with the space character, this commit also enhances the CN matching to work even if the certificate includes more than one CN attribute in the subject name.
In some cases when the Trust finding is printed, there is no space between the results when SNI is used and the results without SNI (which appear in paraenthesis). This commit adds the missing space.
This commit fixes several issues related to Shellcheck issue SC2034: unused variables.
In most cases variables are declared in a function, but are referenced later. The exceptions are:
* SESS_RESUMPTION is declared and values are assigned to it, but it us never used. (Same applies for not_new_reused in sub_seession_resumption().)
* In run_cipherlists(), there is a typo in the declaration of sslv2_tdes_ciphers.
* In get_caa_rr_record(), "hash", "len", and "line" are used but not declared.
This commit adds a function for querying the TXT DNS record, so
that subsequently we'll can build on top of that a function for
checking MTA-STS, see #1073.
Also it modifies a local variable mxs in get_mx_record() which
was declared as mx but mxs was used. (That is pending an backport
to 3.0.)
This commit adds support for EdDSA (Ed25519 and Ed448). In particular:
* It modifies prepare_tls_clienthello() to include Ed25519 and Ed448 in the signature_algorithms extension of the TLS 1.2 and earlier ClientHello (RFC 8422).
* It modifies run_server_defaults() and get_server_certificate() to check whether the server offers EdDSA certificates with TLS 1.3.
* It modifies certificate_info() to handle certificates signed with EdDSA or with EdDSA public keys, even if $OPENSSL does not support pretty printing such keys and signatures.
* It modifies read_sigalg_from_file() to recognize EdDSA signatures even if $OPENSSL does not.
PR #1519 requested that testssl.sh show the signature algorithm that the server uses during the TLS handshake. In TLS 1.3, this appears in the CertificateVerify message. In TLS 1.2 it appears in the ServerKeyExchange message when the chosen cipher suite uses an ephemeral (DH or ECDH) key, except in the case of cipher suites that provide no authentication. This information is not present in TLS 1.1 and earlier, as the hash algorithm to use in these earlier versions of the protocol is hard coded into the specification.
This commit takes a first step towards being able to show the signature algorithm by extending parse_tls_serverhello() to extract the signature algorithm when it is present. Matching the output produced by OpenSSL, it output two separate lines, the "Peer signature type" (RSA, RSA-PSS, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, or Ed448) and the "Peer signing digest" (MD5, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512). This will allow the same function to extract the signature algorithm and digest, whether the handshake was performed using "$OPENSSL s_client" or tls_sockets().
This commit fixes two issues related to $SHOW_SIGALGO.
First, cipher_pref_check() does not show the signature algorithm if any of the ciphers were found using tls_sockets(), since the call to tls_sockets() does not specify that the server's certificate should be extracted.
Second, in run_beast() the call to tls_sockets() indicates that the server's certificate should be extracted if "$SHOW_SIGALGO" is true, even if "$WIDE" is false. While this does not cause any problems, extracting the certificate is a waste of effort if "$WIDE" is false, since the signature algorithm is not shown in that case.
This commit saves more or less time for a detection of the compression.
First it assembles the GET command with all available compressions and send them all.
If the result is negative: we can just tell the finding and return. If it's
positive: We already have identified 1x compression. Then we cycle through the
remaining compressions with single GET requests.
In order to not duplicate code we introduced a helper function sub_breach_helper()
which takes care sending the request and analysis the result.
We treat now failed requests differently: When the first fails we don't
continue anymore.
This commit tries to enummerate through all possible compressions
instead of just raising the arm because of the first one detected.
As far as the performance is concerned there's room for improvements
which subsequent commits will address.
.. see also #1559.
It "mkdirs" the needed etc and bin directories first, then copies
stuff over. It also reduces a few layers.
Also it corrects a mistake in the Readme.md (docker exec --> run)
Thanks for the discussion @Alex131089
The "-sigalgs" option is used in get_server_certificate() to obtain certificates the server uses with TLS 1.3. get_server_certificate() is currently designed to use $OPENSSL, if $OPENSSL supports TLS 1.3.
LibreSSL 3.1.{0,1} has added client support for TLS 1.3, but does not support the "-sigalgs" option. So, this commit determines whether the "-sigalgs" option is supported, and if it isn't, then uses tls_sockets().
When cipher_pref_check() is called in "--ssl-native" mode and the specified protocol is not supported, the message indicating a "local problem" is not properly formatted.
PR #1619 set the grade cap to 'F' is the server has a certificate with an RSA with e=1, however, it did not change the rating in the JSON/CSV output. This commit changes the cert_keySize rating to CRITICAL for an RSA key with e=1, regardless of the size of the modulus. It also uses pr_svrty_critical() to print the exponent in this case.
This commit makes a couple of improvements to set_key_str_score().
It rates (finite-field) DH keys the same as RSA and DSA keys.
Second, in the case of a server that has more than one certificate, the current code sets $KEY_EXCH_SCORE based on the length of the public key in the last certificate that is parsed. This commit changes set_key_str_score() so that $KEY_EXCH_SCORE is set based on the weakest public key.
Note that there is still the issue that the key exchange score does not take into account any ephemeral keys used. However, that needs to be addressed by callling set_key_str_score() from run_fs() and run_logjam(), as certificate_info() cannot provide information about ephemeral keys.
This commit adds additional information to the "Server key size" line for a certificate if the subject public key is RSA, ECDSA, or DH.
For RSA it show the public exponent. For ECDSA, it shows the curve. For DH, it shows the group used, if it is a common prime.
Dirk Wetter
Magnus Larsen
David Cooper
Magnus Larsen
Unit 193