24261 lines
1.2 MiB
Executable File
24261 lines
1.2 MiB
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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#
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# vim:ts=5:sw=5:expandtab
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# we have a spaces softtab, that ensures readability with other editors too
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# testssl.sh is a program for spotting weak SSL/TLS encryption, ciphers, protocols and some
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# vulnerabilities or features. It may or may be not distributed by your distribution.
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# The upstream versions are available (please leave the links intact):
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#
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# Development version https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh
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# Stable version https://testssl.sh
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# File bugs at GitHub https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues
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#
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# Project lead and initiator: Dirk Wetter, copyleft: 2007-today, contributions so far see CREDITS.md
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# Main contributions from David Cooper
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# Project lead and initiator: Dirk Wetter, copyleft: 2007-today.
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# Main contributions from David Cooper. Further contributors see CREDITS.md .
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#
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# License: GPLv2, see https://opensource.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.php and
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# accompanying license "LICENSE.txt". Redistribution + modification under this
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# license permitted.
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# If you enclose this program or parts of it in your software, it has to be
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# accompanied by the same license (see link). Do not violate the license.
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# If you do not agree to these terms, do not use it in the first place!
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#
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# OpenSSL, which is being used and maybe distributed via one of this projects'
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# web sites, is subject to their licensing: https://www.openssl.org/source/license.txt
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#
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# The client simulation data comes from SSLlabs and is licensed to the 'Qualys SSL Labs
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# Terms of Use' (v2.2), see https://www.ssllabs.com/downloads/Qualys_SSL_Labs_Terms_of_Use.pdf,
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# stating a CC BY 3.0 US license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/
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#
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# Please note: USAGE WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS".
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# USE IT AT your OWN RISK!
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# Seriously! The threat is you run this code on your computer and untrusted input e.g.
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# could be supplied from a server you are querying.
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#
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# HISTORY:
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# Back in 2006 it all started with a few openssl commands...
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# That's because openssl is a such a good swiss army knife (see e.g.
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# https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Command_Line_Utilities) that it was difficult to resist
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# wrapping some shell commands around it, which I used for my pen tests. This is how
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# everything started.
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# Now it has grown up, it has bash socket support for most features, which has been basically
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# replacing more and more functions of OpenSSL and some sockets functions serve as some kind
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# of central functions.
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#
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# WHY BASH?
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# Cross-platform is one of the three main goals of this script. Second: Ease of installation.
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# No compiling, install gems, go to CPAN, use pip etc. Third: Easy to use and to interpret
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# the results.
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# /bin/bash including the builtin sockets fulfill all that. The socket checks in bash may sound
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# cool and unique -- they are -- but probably you can achieve e.g. the same result with my favorite
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# interactive shell: zsh (zmodload zsh/net/socket -- checkout zsh/net/tcp) too! Oh, and btw.
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# ksh93 has socket support too.
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# Also bash is quite powerful if you use it appropriately: It can operate on patterns, process lines
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# and deal perfectly with regular expressions -- without external binaries.
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# /bin/bash though is way more often used within Linux and it's perfect for cross platform support.
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# MacOS X has it and also under Windows the MSYS2 extension or Cygwin as well as Bash on Windows (WSL)
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# has /bin/bash.
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#
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# Q: So what's the difference to www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ or sslcheck.globalsign.com/ ?
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# A: As of now ssllabs only check 1) webservers 2) on standard ports, 3) reachable from the
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# internet. And those examples above 4) are 3rd parties. If these restrictions are all fine
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# with you and you need a management compatible rating -- go ahead and use those.
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#
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# But also if your fine with those restrictions: testssl.sh is meant as a tool in your hand
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# and it's way more flexible. Oh, and did I mention testssl.sh is open source?
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#
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#################### Stop talking, action now ####################
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########### Definition of error codes
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#
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declare -r ERR_BASH=255 # Bash version incorrect
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declare -r ERR_CMDLINE=254 # Cmd line couldn't be parsed
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declare -r ERR_FCREATE=253 # Output file couldn't be created
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declare -r ERR_FNAMEPARSE=252 # Input file couldn't be parsed
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declare -r ERR_NOSUPPORT=251 # Feature requested is not supported
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declare -r ERR_OSSLBIN=250 # Problem with OpenSSL binary
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declare -r ERR_DNSBIN=249 # Problem with DNS lookup binaries
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declare -r ERR_OTHERCLIENT=248 # Other client problem
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declare -r ERR_DNSLOOKUP=247 # Problem with resolving IP addresses or names
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declare -r ERR_CONNECT=246 # Connectivity problem
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declare -r ERR_CLUELESS=245 # Weird state, either though user options or testssl.sh
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declare -r ERR_RESOURCE=244 # Resources testssl.sh needs couldn't be read
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declare -r ERR_CHILD=242 # Child received a signal from master
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declare -r ALLOK=0 # All is fine
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[ -z "${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}" ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Please make sure you're using \"bash\"! Bye...\033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH
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[ $(kill -l | grep -c SIG) -eq 0 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Please make sure you're calling me without leading \"sh\"! Bye...\033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH
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[ ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]} -lt 3 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Minimum requirement is bash 3.2. You have $BASH_VERSION \033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH
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[ ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]} -le 3 ] && [ ${BASH_VERSINFO[1]} -le 1 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Minimum requirement is bash 3.2. You have $BASH_VERSION \033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH
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########### Debugging helpers + profiling
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#
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declare -r PS4='|${LINENO}> \011${FUNCNAME[0]:+${FUNCNAME[0]}(): }'
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DEBUGTIME=${DEBUGTIME:-false} # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/5014823/how-to-profile-a-bash-shell-script-slow-startup#20855353
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DEBUG_ALLINONE=${DEBUG_ALLINONE:-false} # true: do debugging in one screen (old behavior for testssl.sh and bash3's default
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# false: needed for performance analysis or useful for just having an extra file
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DEBUG_ALLINONE=${SETX:-false} # SETX as a shortcut for old style debugging, overriding DEBUG_ALLINONE
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if [[ "$SHELLOPTS" =~ xtrace ]]; then
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if "$DEBUGTIME"; then
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# separate debugging, doesn't mess up the screen, $DEBUGTIME determines whether we also do performance analysis
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exec 42>&2 2> >(tee /tmp/testssl-$$.log | sed -u 's/^.*$/now/' | date -f - +%s.%N >/tmp/testssl-$$.time)
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# BASH_XTRACEFD=42
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else
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if ! "$DEBUG_ALLINONE"; then
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exec 42>| /tmp/testssl-$$.log
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BASH_XTRACEFD=42
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fi
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fi
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fi
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########### Traps! Make sure that temporary files are cleaned up after use in ANY case
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#
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trap "cleanup" EXIT
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trap "sig_cleanup" INT QUIT TERM
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trap "child_error" USR1
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########### Internal definitions
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#
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declare -r VERSION="3.2rc3"
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declare -r SWCONTACT="dirk aet testssl dot sh"
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[[ "$VERSION" =~ dev|rc|beta ]] && \
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SWURL="https://testssl.sh/dev/" ||
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SWURL="https://testssl.sh/"
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if git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree &>/dev/null; then
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declare -r GIT_REL="$(git log --format='%h %ci' -1 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1" "$2" "$3 }')"
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declare -r GIT_REL_SHORT="${GIT_REL%% *}"
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declare -r REL_DATE_TIME="${GIT_REL#* }"
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declare -r REL_DATE="${REL_DATE_TIME% *}"
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fi
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declare -r PROG_NAME="$(basename "$0")"
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declare -r RUN_DIR="$(dirname "$0")"
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declare -r SYSTEM="$(uname -s)"
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declare -r SYSTEMREV="$(uname -r)"
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HNAME="$(uname -n)"
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HNAME="${HNAME%%.*}"
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declare CMDLINE
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CMDLINE_PARSED="" # This makes sure we don't let early fatal() write into files when files aren't created yet
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declare -r -a CMDLINE_ARRAY=("$@") # When performing mass testing, the child processes need to be sent the
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declare -a MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE # command line in the form of an array (see #702 and https://mywiki.wooledge.org/BashFAQ/050).
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declare -a SKIP_TESTS=() # This array hold the checks to be skipped
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########### Defining (and presetting) variables which can be changed
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#
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# Following variables make use of $ENV and can also be used like "<VAR>=<value> ./testssl.sh <URI>"
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declare -x OPENSSL
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OPENSSL_TIMEOUT=${OPENSSL_TIMEOUT:-""} # Default connect timeout with openssl before we call the server side unreachable
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CONNECT_TIMEOUT=${CONNECT_TIMEOUT:-""} # Default connect timeout with sockets before we call the server side unreachable
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PHONE_OUT=${PHONE_OUT:-false} # Whether testssl can retrieve CRLs and OCSP
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FAST_SOCKET=${FAST_SOCKET:-false} # EXPERIMENTAL feature to accelerate sockets -- DO NOT USE it for production
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COLOR=${COLOR:-2} # 3: Extra color (ciphers, curves), 2: Full color, 1: B/W only 0: No ESC at all
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COLORBLIND=${COLORBLIND:-false} # if true, swap blue and green in the output
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SHOW_EACH_C=${SHOW_EACH_C:-false} # where individual ciphers are tested show just the positively ones tested
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SHOW_SIGALGO=${SHOW_SIGALGO:-false} # "secret" switch whether testssl.sh shows the signature algorithm for -E / -e
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SNEAKY=${SNEAKY:-false} # is the referer and useragent we leave behind just usual?
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QUIET=${QUIET:-false} # don't output the banner. By doing this you acknowledge usage term appearing in the banner
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SSL_NATIVE=${SSL_NATIVE:-false} # we do per default bash sockets where possible "true": switch back to "openssl native"
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ASSUME_HTTP=${ASSUME_HTTP:-false} # in seldom cases (WAF, old servers, grumpy SSL) service detection fails. "True" enforces HTTP checks
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BASICAUTH=${BASICAUTH:-""} # HTTP basic auth credentials can be set here like user:pass
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REQHEADER=${REQHEADER:-""} # HTTP custom request header can be set here like Header: content. Can be used multiple times.
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BUGS=${BUGS:-""} # -bugs option from openssl, needed for some BIG IP F5
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WARNINGS=${WARNINGS:-""} # can be either off or batch
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DEBUG=${DEBUG:-0} # 1: normal output the files in /tmp/ are kept for further debugging purposes
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# 2: list more what's going on , also lists some errors of connections
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# 3: slight hexdumps + other info,
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# 4: display bytes sent via sockets
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# 5: display bytes received via sockets
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# 6: whole 9 yards
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FAST=${FAST:-false} # preference: show only first cipher, run_allciphers with openssl instead of sockets
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WIDE=${WIDE:-false} # whether to display for some options just ciphers or a table w hexcode/KX,Enc,strength etc.
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MASS_TESTING_MODE=${MASS_TESTING_MODE:-serial} # can be serial or parallel. Subject to change
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LOGFILE="${LOGFILE:-""}" # logfile if used
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JSONFILE="${JSONFILE:-""}" # jsonfile if used
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CSVFILE="${CSVFILE:-""}" # csvfile if used
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HTMLFILE="${HTMLFILE:-""}" # HTML if used
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FNAME=${FNAME:-""} # file name to read commands from
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FNAME_PREFIX=${FNAME_PREFIX:-""} # output filename prefix, see --outprefix
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APPEND=${APPEND:-false} # append to csv/json/html/log file
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OVERWRITE=${OVERWRITE:-false} # overwriting csv/json/html/log file
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[[ -z "$NODNS" ]] && declare NODNS # If unset it does all DNS lookups per default. "min" only for hosts or "none" at all
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NXCONNECT=${NXCONNECT:-invalid.} # For WSL this helps avoiding DNS requests to "invalid." which windows seem to handle delayed
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HAS_IPv6=${HAS_IPv6:-false} # if you have OpenSSL with IPv6 support AND IPv6 networking set it to yes
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ALL_CLIENTS=${ALL_CLIENTS:-false} # do you want to run all client simulation form all clients supplied by SSLlabs?
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OFFENSIVE=${OFFENSIVE:-true} # do you want to include offensive vulnerability tests which may cause blocking by an IDS?
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ADDTL_CA_FILES="${ADDTL_CA_FILES:-""}" # single file with a CA in PEM format or comma separated lists of them
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########### Tuning vars which cannot be set by a cmd line switch. Use instead e.g "HEADER_MAXSLEEP=10 ./testssl.sh <your_args_here>"
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#
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TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="${TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR:-""}" # If you run testssl.sh and it doesn't find it necessary file automagically set TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR
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CA_BUNDLES_PATH="${CA_BUNDLES_PATH:-""}" # You can have your CA stores some place else
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EXPERIMENTAL=${EXPERIMENTAL:-false} # a development hook which allows us to disable code
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PROXY_WAIT=${PROXY_WAIT:-20} # waiting at max 20 seconds for socket reply through proxy
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DNS_VIA_PROXY=${DNS_VIA_PROXY:-false} # do DNS lookups via proxy. --ip=proxy reverses this
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IGN_OCSP_PROXY=${IGN_OCSP_PROXY:-false} # Also when --proxy is supplied it is ignored when testing for revocation via OCSP via --phone-out
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HEADER_MAXSLEEP=${HEADER_MAXSLEEP:-5} # we wait this long before killing the process to retrieve a service banner / http header
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MAX_SOCKET_FAIL=${MAX_SOCKET_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for TCP socket connects are reached we terminate
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MAX_OSSL_FAIL=${MAX_OSSL_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for s_client connects are reached we terminate
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MAX_STARTTLS_FAIL=${MAX_STARTTLS_FAIL:-2} # max number of STARTTLS handshake failures in plaintext phase
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MAX_HEADER_FAIL=${MAX_HEADER_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for HTTP GET are encountered we don't try again to get the header
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MAX_WAITSOCK=${MAX_WAITSOCK:-10} # waiting at max 10 seconds for socket reply. There shouldn't be any reason to change this.
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CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK=${CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK:-5} # for the two CCS payload (each). There shouldn't be any reason to change this.
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HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK=${HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK:-8} # for the heartbleed payload. There shouldn't be any reason to change this.
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STARTTLS_SLEEP=${STARTTLS_SLEEP:-10} # max time wait on a socket for STARTTLS. MySQL has a fixed value of 1 which can't be overwritten (#914)
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FAST_STARTTLS=${FAST_STARTTLS:-true} # at the cost of reliability decrease the handshakes for STARTTLS
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USLEEP_SND=${USLEEP_SND:-0.1} # sleep time for general socket send
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USLEEP_REC=${USLEEP_REC:-0.2} # sleep time for general socket receive
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HSTS_MIN=${HSTS_MIN:-180} # >=180 days is ok for HSTS
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HSTS_MIN=$((HSTS_MIN * 86400)) # correct to seconds
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HPKP_MIN=${HPKP_MIN:-30} # >=30 days should be ok for HPKP_MIN, practical hints?
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HPKP_MIN=$((HPKP_MIN * 86400)) # correct to seconds
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DAYS2WARN1=${DAYS2WARN1:-60} # days to warn before cert expires, threshold 1
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DAYS2WARN2=${DAYS2WARN2:-30} # days to warn before cert expires, threshold 2
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VULN_THRESHLD=${VULN_THRESHLD:-1} # if vulnerabilities to check >$VULN_THRESHLD we DON'T show a separate header line in the output each vuln. check
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UNBRACKTD_IPV6=${UNBRACKTD_IPV6:-false} # some versions of OpenSSL (like Gentoo) don't support [bracketed] IPv6 addresses
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NO_ENGINE=${NO_ENGINE:-false} # if there are problems finding the (external) openssl engine set this to true
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declare -r CLIENT_MIN_FS=5 # number of ciphers needed to run a test for FS
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CAPATH="${CAPATH:-/etc/ssl/certs/}" # Does nothing yet (FC has only a CA bundle per default, ==> openssl version -d)
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SOCAT="${SOCAT:-}" # For now we would need this for STARTTLS injection
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MEASURE_TIME_FILE=${MEASURE_TIME_FILE:-""}
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if [[ -n "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && [[ -z "$MEASURE_TIME" ]]; then
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MEASURE_TIME=true
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else
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MEASURE_TIME=${MEASURE_TIME:-false}
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fi
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DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl" # display OpenSSL ciphername (but both OpenSSL and RFC ciphernames in wide mode)
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declare UA_STD="TLS tester from $SWURL"
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declare -r UA_SNEAKY="Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:94.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94.0"
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SSL_RENEG_ATTEMPTS=${SSL_RENEG_ATTEMPTS:-10} # number of times to check SSL Renegotiation
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SSL_RENEG_WAIT=${SSL_RENEG_WAIT:-0.25} # time between SSL Renegotiation checks
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########### Initialization part, further global vars just being declared here
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#
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LC_COLLATE="" # ensures certain regex patterns work as expected and aren't localized, see setup_lc_collate()
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HAS_LOCALE=false
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SYSTEM2="" # currently only being used for WSL = bash on windows
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PRINTF="" # which external printf to use. Empty presets the internal one, see #1130
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CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE=""
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TLS_DATA_FILE="" # mandatory file for socket-based handshakes
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OPENSSL="" # If you run this from GitHub it's ~/bin/openssl.$(uname).$(uname -m) otherwise /usr/bin/openssl
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OPENSSL2="" # When running from GitHub, this will be openssl version >=1.1.1 (auto determined)
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OPENSSL2_HAS_TLS_1_3=false # If we run with supplied binary AND /usr/bin/openssl supports TLS 1.3 this is set to true
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OPENSSL_LOCATION=""
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IKNOW_FNAME=false
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FIRST_FINDING=true # is this the first finding we are outputting to file?
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JSONHEADER=true # include JSON headers and footers in HTML file, if one is being created
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CSVHEADER=true # same for CSV
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HTMLHEADER=true # same for HTML
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SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=false # kludge for tracking whether we need to close the JSON section object
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GIVE_HINTS=false # give an additional info to findings
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SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false # Some servers have either a ClientHello total size limit or a 128 cipher limit (e.g. old ASAs)
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MULTIPLE_CHECKS=false # need to know whether an MX record or a hostname resolves to multiple IPs to check
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CHILD_MASS_TESTING=${CHILD_MASS_TESTING:-false}
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PARENT_LOGFILE="" # logfile if mass testing and all output sent to a single file
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PARENT_JSONFILE="" # jsonfile if mass testing and all output sent to a single file
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PARENT_CSVFILE="" # csvfile if mass testing and all output sent to a single file
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PARENT_HTMLFILE="" # HTML if mass testing and all output sent to a single file
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TIMEOUT_CMD=""
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HAD_SLEPT=0
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NR_SOCKET_FAIL=0 # Counter for socket failures
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NR_OSSL_FAIL=0 # .. for OpenSSL connects
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NR_STARTTLS_FAIL=0 # .. for STARTTLS failures
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NR_HEADER_FAIL=0 # .. for HTTP_GET
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PROTOS_OFFERED="" # This keeps which protocol is being offered. See has_server_protocol().
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TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="" # This contains the hexcode of a cipher known to be supported by the server with TLS 1.2
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CURVES_OFFERED="" # This keeps which curves have been detected. Just for error handling
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NO_CIPHER_ORDER_LEVEL=5 # This is the finding level to report if the server does not enforce a cipher order for one or more protocol versions.
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KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=false # We need OpenSSL a few times. This variable is an indicator if we can't connect. Eases handling
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DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" # .. as hex string, e.g. 0300 or 0303
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APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="" # Information about the application traffic keys for a TLS 1.3 connection.
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TLS13_ONLY=false # Does the server support TLS 1.3 ONLY?
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OSSL_SHORTCUT=${OSSL_SHORTCUT:-false} # Hack: if during the scan turns out the OpenSSL binary supports TLS 1.3 would be a better choice, this enables it.
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TLS_EXTENSIONS=""
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TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS=""
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CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE=""
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V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH=0
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declare -r NPN_PROTOs="spdy/4a2,spdy/3,spdy/3.1,spdy/2,spdy/1,http/1.1"
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# alpn_protos needs to be space-separated, not comma-separated, including odd ones observed @ facebook and others, old ones like h2-17 omitted as they could not be found
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declare -r ALPN_PROTOs="h2 spdy/3.1 http/1.1 grpc-exp h2-fb spdy/1 spdy/2 spdy/3 stun.turn stun.nat-discovery webrtc c-webrtc ftp"
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TEMPDIR=""
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TMPFILE=""
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ERRFILE=""
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CLIENT_AUTH="none"
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CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST=""
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TLS_TICKETS=false
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NO_SSL_SESSIONID=true
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CERT_COMPRESSION=${CERT_COMPRESSION:-false} # secret flag to set in addition to --devel for certificate compression
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HOSTCERT="" # File with host certificate, without intermediate certificate
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HEADERFILE=""
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HEADERVALUE=""
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HTTP_STATUS_CODE=""
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DH_GROUP_OFFERED=""
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DH_GROUP_LEN_P=0
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KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33" # The extension number for key_share was changed from 40 to 51 in TLSv1.3 draft 23.
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# In order to support draft 23 and later in addition to earlier drafts, need to
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# know which extension number to use. Note that it appears that a single
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# ClientHello cannot advertise both draft 23 and later and earlier drafts.
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# Preset may help to deal with STARTTLS + TLS 1.3 draft 23 and later but not earlier.
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BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER=false # reserved for cases where a ServerHello doesn't contain a cipher offered in the ClientHello
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GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=false
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PATTERN2SHOW=""
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SOCK_REPLY_FILE=""
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NW_STR=""
|
|
LEN_STR=""
|
|
SNI=""
|
|
POODLE="" # keep vulnerability status for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV
|
|
|
|
# Initialize OpenSSL variables (and others)
|
|
OSSL_NAME="" # openssl name, in case of LibreSSL it's LibreSSL
|
|
OSSL_VER="" # openssl version, will be auto-determined
|
|
OSSL_VER_MAJOR=0
|
|
OSSL_VER_MINOR=0
|
|
OSSL_VER_APPENDIX="none"
|
|
CLIENT_PROB_NO=1
|
|
|
|
GOOD_CA_BUNDLE="" # A bundle of CA certificates that can be used to validate the server's certificate
|
|
CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false # Set to true if server sends a certificate list that contains a certificate
|
|
# that does not certify the one immediately preceding it. (See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.2)
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE=""
|
|
HAS_DNS_SANS=false # Whether the certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a DNS name or an application-specific identifier type.
|
|
HAS_DH_BITS=${HAS_DH_BITS:-false} # These are variables which are set by find_openssl_binary()
|
|
HAS_CURVES=false
|
|
OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES=""
|
|
HAS_SSL2=false
|
|
HAS_SSL3=false
|
|
HAS_TLS1=false
|
|
HAS_TLS11=false
|
|
HAS_TLS12=false
|
|
HAS_TLS13=false
|
|
HAS_X448=false
|
|
HAS_X25519=false
|
|
HAS_SIGALGS=false
|
|
HAS_PKUTIL=false
|
|
HAS_PKEY=false
|
|
HAS_NO_SSL2=false
|
|
HAS_NOSERVERNAME=false
|
|
HAS_CIPHERSUITES=false
|
|
HAS_SECLEVEL=false
|
|
HAS_COMP=false
|
|
HAS_NO_COMP=false
|
|
HAS_ALPN=false
|
|
HAS_NPN=false
|
|
HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=false
|
|
HAS_PROXY=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER=false
|
|
HAS_POSTGRES=false
|
|
HAS_MYSQL=false
|
|
HAS_LMTP=false
|
|
HAS_SIEVE=false
|
|
HAS_NNTP=false
|
|
HAS_IRC=false
|
|
HAS_CHACHA20=false
|
|
HAS_AES128_GCM=false
|
|
HAS_AES256_GCM=false
|
|
HAS_ZLIB=false
|
|
HAS_UDS=false
|
|
HAS_UDS2=false
|
|
HAS_ENABLE_PHA=false
|
|
HAS_DIG=false
|
|
HAS_DIG_R=true
|
|
DIG_R="-r"
|
|
HAS_HOST=false
|
|
HAS_DRILL=false
|
|
HAS_NSLOOKUP=false
|
|
HAS_IDN=false
|
|
HAS_IDN2=false
|
|
HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE=false
|
|
HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT=false
|
|
HAS_XXD=false
|
|
|
|
OSSL_CIPHERS_S=""
|
|
PORT=443 # unless otherwise auto-determined, see below
|
|
NODE=""
|
|
NODEIP=""
|
|
rDNS=""
|
|
CORRECT_SPACES="" # Used for IPv6 and proper output formatting
|
|
IPADDRs=""
|
|
IP46ADDRs=""
|
|
LOCAL_A=false # Does the $NODEIP come from /etc/hosts?
|
|
LOCAL_AAAA=false # Does the IPv6 IP come from /etc/hosts?
|
|
XMPP_HOST=""
|
|
PROXYIP="" # $PROXYIP:$PROXPORT is your proxy if --proxy is defined ...
|
|
PROXYPORT="" # ... and openssl has proxy support
|
|
PROXY="" # Once check_proxy() executed it contains $PROXYIP:$PROXPORT
|
|
MTLS="" # mTLS authentication with client certificate and private key
|
|
VULN_COUNT=0
|
|
SERVICE="" # Is the server running an HTTP server, SMTP, POP or IMAP?
|
|
URI=""
|
|
CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2=""
|
|
RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2=""
|
|
STARTTLS_PROTOCOL=""
|
|
OPTIMAL_PROTO="" # Need this for IIS6 (sigh) + OpenSSL 1.0.2, otherwise some handshakes will fail see
|
|
# https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892
|
|
STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO="" # Same for STARTTLS, see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/188
|
|
OPTIMAL_SOCKETS_PROTO="" # Same for tls_sockets(). -- not yet used
|
|
ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS=true # Set to true if all attempts to connect to server using tls_sockets/sslv2_sockets failed
|
|
TLS_TIME="" # To keep the value of TLS server timestamp
|
|
TLS_NOW="" # Similar
|
|
TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=false # Tells TLS functions to measure the TLS difftime or not
|
|
NOW_TIME=""
|
|
HTTP_TIME=""
|
|
HTTP_AGE="" # Age Header, see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Age + RFC 7234
|
|
REQHEADERS=()
|
|
GET_REQ11=""
|
|
START_TIME=0 # time in epoch when the action started
|
|
END_TIME=0 # .. ended
|
|
SCAN_TIME=0 # diff of both: total scan time
|
|
LAST_TIME=0 # only used for performance measurements (MEASURE_TIME=true)
|
|
SERVER_COUNTER=0 # Counter for multiple servers
|
|
|
|
TLS_LOW_BYTE="" # For "secret" development stuff, see -q below
|
|
HEX_CIPHER="" # -- " --
|
|
|
|
GRADE_CAP="" # Keeps track of the current grading cap
|
|
GRADE_CAP_REASONS=() # Keeps track of all the reasons why grades are capped
|
|
GRADE_WARNINGS=() # Keeps track of all the grade warnings
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=100 # Keeps track of the score for category 2 "Key Exchange Strength"
|
|
CIPH_STR_BEST=0 # Keeps track of the best bit size for category 3 "Cipher Strength"
|
|
CIPH_STR_WORST=100000 # Keeps track of the worst bit size for category 3 "Cipher Strength"
|
|
# Intentionally set very high, so it can be set to 0, if necessary
|
|
TRUSTED1ST="" # Contains the `-trusted_first` flag, if this version of openssl supports it
|
|
|
|
########### Global variables for parallel mass testing
|
|
#
|
|
declare -r PARALLEL_SLEEP=1 # Time to sleep after starting each test
|
|
MAX_WAIT_TEST=${MAX_WAIT_TEST:-1200} # Maximum time (in seconds) to wait for a test to complete
|
|
MAX_PARALLEL=${MAX_PARALLEL:-20} # Maximum number of tests to run in parallel
|
|
# This value may be made larger on systems with faster processors
|
|
declare -a -i PARALLEL_TESTING_PID=() # process id for each child test (or 0 to indicate test has already completed)
|
|
declare -a PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE=() # command line for each child test
|
|
declare -i NR_PARALLEL_TESTS=0 # number of parallel tests run
|
|
declare -i NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH=0 # number of parallel tests that have completed and have been processed
|
|
declare FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT=true # true if no output has been added to $JSONFILE yet.
|
|
|
|
|
|
########### Cipher suite information
|
|
#
|
|
declare -i TLS_NR_CIPHERS=0
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_KX=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_AUTH=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_ENC=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED=()
|
|
declare TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS="TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256"
|
|
|
|
|
|
########### Some predefinitions: date, sed (we always use tests for binaries and NOT try to determine
|
|
# capabilities by querying the OS)
|
|
#
|
|
HAS_GNUDATE=false
|
|
HAS_FREEBSDDATE=false
|
|
HAS_OPENBSDDATE=false
|
|
if date -d @735275209 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
if date -r @735275209 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
# It can't do any conversion from a plain date output.
|
|
HAS_OPENBSDDATE=true
|
|
else
|
|
HAS_GNUDATE=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# FreeBSD and OS X date(1) accept "-f inputformat", so do newer OpenBSD versions >~ 6.6.
|
|
date -j -f '%s' 1234567 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
|
|
HAS_FREEBSDDATE=true
|
|
|
|
echo A | sed -E 's/A//' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
|
|
declare -r HAS_SED_E=true || \
|
|
declare -r HAS_SED_E=false
|
|
|
|
########### Terminal definitions
|
|
tty -s && \
|
|
declare -r INTERACTIVE=true || \
|
|
declare -r INTERACTIVE=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z $TERM_WIDTH ]]; then # No batch file and no otherwise predefined TERM_WIDTH
|
|
if ! tput cols &>/dev/null || ! "$INTERACTIVE";then # Prevent tput errors if running non interactive
|
|
export TERM_WIDTH=${COLUMNS:-80}
|
|
else
|
|
export TERM_WIDTH=${COLUMNS:-$(tput cols)} # For custom line wrapping and dashes
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
TERM_CURRPOS=0 # Custom line wrapping needs alter the current horizontal cursor pos
|
|
|
|
|
|
########### Severity functions and globals
|
|
#
|
|
INFO=0
|
|
OK=0
|
|
LOW=1
|
|
MEDIUM=2
|
|
HIGH=3
|
|
CRITICAL=4
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=0
|
|
|
|
set_severity_level() {
|
|
local severity=$1
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$severity" == LOW ]]; then
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=$LOW
|
|
elif [[ "$severity" == MEDIUM ]]; then
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=$MEDIUM
|
|
elif [[ "$severity" == HIGH ]]; then
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=$HIGH
|
|
elif [[ "$severity" == CRITICAL ]]; then
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=$CRITICAL
|
|
else
|
|
# WARN and FATAL will always be logged as the represent scanning problems
|
|
echo "Supported severity levels are LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, CRITICAL!"
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
show_finding() {
|
|
local severity=$1
|
|
|
|
[[ "$severity" == DEBUG ||
|
|
( "$severity" == INFO && $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $INFO ) ||
|
|
( "$severity" == OK && $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $OK ) ||
|
|
( "$severity" == LOW && $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $LOW ) ||
|
|
( "$severity" == MEDIUM && $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $MEDIUM ) ||
|
|
( "$severity" == HIGH && $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $HIGH ) ||
|
|
( "$severity" == CRITICAL && $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $CRITICAL ) ||
|
|
"$severity" == WARN ||
|
|
"$severity" == FATAL ]]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
########### Output functions
|
|
|
|
# For HTML output, replace any HTML reserved characters with the entity name
|
|
html_reserved(){
|
|
local output
|
|
"$do_html" || return 0
|
|
output="${1//&/$'&'amp;}"
|
|
output="${output//</$'&'lt;}"
|
|
output="${output//>/$'&'gt;}"
|
|
output="${output//\"/$'&'quot;}"
|
|
output="${output//\'/$'&'apos;}"
|
|
printf -- "%s" "$output"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
html_out() {
|
|
local outstr="$1"
|
|
|
|
"$do_html" || return 0
|
|
if [[ -n "$HTMLFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$outstr" =~ [[:cntrl:]] ]]; then
|
|
outstr="$(sanitize_fileout "$outstr")"
|
|
fi
|
|
printf -- "%b" "$outstr" >> "$HTMLFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Removes non-printable chars in CSV, JSON, HTML, see #2330
|
|
sanitize_fileout() {
|
|
tr -d '\000-\011\013-\037' <<< "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Removes non-printable chars in terminal output (log files)
|
|
# We need to keep the color ANSI escape code x1b, o33, see #2330
|
|
sanitize_termout() {
|
|
tr -d '\000-\011\013-\032\034-\037' <<< "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This is intentionally the same.
|
|
safe_echo() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; }
|
|
tm_out() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; }
|
|
tmln_out() { printf -- "%b" "$1\n"; }
|
|
|
|
out() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
outln() { printf -- "%b" "$1\n"; html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")\n"; }
|
|
|
|
#TODO: Still no shell injection safe but if just run it from the cmd line: that's fine
|
|
|
|
# Color print functions, see also https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Bash-Prompt-HOWTO/x329.html
|
|
tm_liteblue() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && { "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[0;32m$1" || tm_out "\033[0;34m$1"; } || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # not yet used
|
|
pr_liteblue() { tm_liteblue "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && { "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#008817;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#0000ee;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>"; } || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
tmln_liteblue() { tm_liteblue "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_liteblue() { pr_liteblue "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_blue() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && { "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[1;32m$1" || tm_out "\033[1;34m$1"; } || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # used for head lines of single tests
|
|
pr_blue() { tm_blue "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && { "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#008817;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#5c5cff;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>"; } || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
tmln_blue() { tm_blue "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_blue() { pr_blue "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
# we should be able to use aliases here
|
|
tm_warning() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;35m$1" || tm_underline "$1"; tm_off; } # some local problem: one test cannot be done
|
|
tmln_warning() { tm_warning "$1"; tmln_out; } # litemagenta
|
|
pr_warning() { tm_warning "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#cd00cd;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || { [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }; }
|
|
prln_warning() { pr_warning "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_magenta() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;35m$1" || tm_underline "$1"; tm_off; } # fatal error: quitting because of this!
|
|
tmln_magenta() { tm_magenta "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
# different as warning above?
|
|
pr_magenta() { tm_magenta "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#be32d0;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || { [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }; }
|
|
prln_magenta() { pr_magenta "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_litecyan() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;36m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # not yet used
|
|
tmln_litecyan() { tm_litecyan "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_litecyan() { tm_litecyan "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#168092;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_litecyan() { pr_litecyan "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_cyan() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;36m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # additional hint
|
|
tmln_cyan() { tm_cyan "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_cyan() { tm_cyan "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#0d7ea2;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_cyan() { pr_cyan "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_litegrey() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;37m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # ... https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/600#issuecomment-276129876
|
|
tmln_litegrey() { tm_litegrey "$1"; tmln_out; } # not really usable on a black background, see ..
|
|
prln_litegrey() { pr_litegrey "$1"; outln; }
|
|
pr_litegrey() { tm_litegrey "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#71767a;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
|
|
tm_grey() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;30m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
pr_grey() { tm_grey "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#757575;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
tmln_grey() { tm_grey "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_grey() { pr_grey "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_good() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && { "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[0;34m$1" || tm_out "\033[0;32m$1"; } || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # litegreen (liteblue), This is good
|
|
tmln_svrty_good() { tm_svrty_good "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_svrty_good() { tm_svrty_good "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && { "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#0000ee;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#008817;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>"; } || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_svrty_good() { pr_svrty_good "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_best() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && { "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[1;34m$1" || tm_out "\033[1;32m$1"; } || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # green (blue), This is the best
|
|
tmln_svrty_best() { tm_svrty_best "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_svrty_best() { tm_svrty_best "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && { "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#5c5cff;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#008817;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>"; } || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_svrty_best() { pr_svrty_best "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_low() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;33m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # yellow brown | academic or minor problem
|
|
tmln_svrty_low() { tm_svrty_low "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_svrty_low() { tm_svrty_low "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#a86437;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_svrty_low() { pr_svrty_low "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_medium() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;33m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # brown | it is not a bad problem but you shouldn't do this
|
|
pr_svrty_medium() { tm_svrty_medium "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#c05600;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
tmln_svrty_medium(){ tm_svrty_medium "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_svrty_medium(){ pr_svrty_medium "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_high() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;31m$1" || tm_bold "$1"; tm_off; } # litered
|
|
pr_svrty_high() { tm_svrty_high "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#e52207;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || { [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }; }
|
|
tmln_svrty_high() { tm_svrty_high "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_svrty_high() { pr_svrty_high "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_critical() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;31m$1" || tm_bold "$1"; tm_off; } # red
|
|
pr_svrty_critical() { tm_svrty_critical "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#e52207;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || { [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }; }
|
|
tmln_svrty_critical() { tm_svrty_critical "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_svrty_critical() { pr_svrty_critical "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_deemphasize() { tm_out "$1"; } # hook for a weakened screen output, see #600
|
|
pr_deemphasize() { tm_deemphasize "$1"; html_out "<span style=\"color:#71767a;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>"; }
|
|
tmln_deemphasize() { tm_deemphasize "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_deemphasize() { pr_deemphasize "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
# color=1 functions
|
|
tm_off() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[m"; }
|
|
|
|
tm_bold() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tmln_bold() { tm_bold "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_bold() { tm_bold "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_bold() { pr_bold "$1" ; outln; }
|
|
|
|
NO_ITALICS=false
|
|
if [[ $TERM == screen ]]; then
|
|
NO_ITALICS=true
|
|
elif [[ $SYSTEM == OpenBSD ]]; then
|
|
NO_ITALICS=true
|
|
elif [[ $SYSTEM == FreeBSD ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${SYSTEMREV%\.*} -le 9 ]]; then
|
|
NO_ITALICS=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_italic() { { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && ! "$NO_ITALICS"; } && tm_out "\033[3m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tmln_italic() { tm_italic "$1" ; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_italic() { tm_italic "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<i>$(html_reserved "$1")</i>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_italic() { pr_italic "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_strikethru() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[9m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # ugly!
|
|
tmln_strikethru() { tm_strikethru "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_strikethru() { tm_strikethru "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<strike>$(html_reserved "$1")</strike>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_strikethru() { pr_strikethru "$1" ; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_underline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[4m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tmln_underline() { tm_underline "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_underline() { tm_underline "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_underline() { pr_underline "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_reverse() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[7m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tm_reverse_bold() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[7m\033[1m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
pr_reverse() { tm_reverse "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:white;background-color:black;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
pr_reverse_bold() { tm_reverse_bold "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:white;background-color:black;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
|
|
#pr_headline() { pr_blue "$1"; }
|
|
#https://misc.flogisoft.com/bash/tip_colors_and_formatting
|
|
|
|
#pr_headline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && out "\033[1;30m\033[47m$1" || out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tm_headline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1m\033[4m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tmln_headline() { tm_headline "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_headline() { tm_headline "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"text-decoration:underline;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
pr_headlineln() { pr_headline "$1" ; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_squoted() { tm_out "'$1'"; }
|
|
pr_squoted() { out "'$1'"; }
|
|
tm_dquoted() { tm_out "\"$1\""; }
|
|
pr_dquoted() { out "\"$1\""; }
|
|
|
|
# either files couldn't be found or openssl isn't good enough (which shouldn't happen anymore)
|
|
tm_local_problem() { tm_warning "Local problem: $1"; }
|
|
tmln_local_problem() { tmln_warning "Local problem: $1"; }
|
|
pr_local_problem() { pr_warning "Local problem: $1"; }
|
|
prln_local_problem() { prln_warning "Local problem: $1"; }
|
|
|
|
# general failure
|
|
tm_fixme() { tm_warning "Fixme: $1"; }
|
|
tmln_fixme() { tmln_warning "Fixme: $1"; }
|
|
pr_fixme() { pr_warning "Fixme: $1"; }
|
|
prln_fixme() { prln_warning "Fixme: $1"; }
|
|
|
|
pr_url() { tm_out "$1"; html_out "<a href=\"$1\" style=\"color:black;text-decoration:none;\">$1</a>"; }
|
|
pr_boldurl() { tm_bold "$1"; html_out "<a href=\"$1\" style=\"font-weight:bold;color:black;text-decoration:none;\">$1</a>"; }
|
|
|
|
### color switcher (see e.g. https://linuxtidbits.wordpress.com/2008/08/11/output-color-on-bash-scripts/
|
|
### https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Bash-Prompt-HOWTO/x405.html
|
|
### no output support for HTML!
|
|
set_color_functions() {
|
|
local ncurses_tput=true
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SYSTEM == OpenBSD ]] && [[ "$TERM" =~ xterm-256 ]]; then
|
|
export TERM=xterm
|
|
# OpenBSD can't handle 256 colors (yet) in xterm which might lead to ugly errors
|
|
# like "tput: not enough arguments (3) for capability `AF'". Not our fault but
|
|
# before we get blamed we fix it here.
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Empty all vars if we have COLOR=0 equals no escape code -- these are globals:
|
|
red=""
|
|
green=""
|
|
brown=""
|
|
blue=""
|
|
magenta=""
|
|
cyan=""
|
|
grey=""
|
|
yellow=""
|
|
off=""
|
|
bold=""
|
|
underline=""
|
|
italic=""
|
|
|
|
type -p tput &>/dev/null || return 0 # Hey wait, do we actually have tput / ncurses ?
|
|
tput cols &>/dev/null || return 0 # tput under BSDs and GNUs doesn't work either (TERM undefined?)
|
|
tput sgr0 &>/dev/null || ncurses_tput=false
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
if $ncurses_tput; then
|
|
red=$(tput setaf 1)
|
|
green=$(tput setaf 2)
|
|
brown=$(tput setaf 3)
|
|
blue=$(tput setaf 4)
|
|
magenta=$(tput setaf 5)
|
|
cyan=$(tput setaf 6)
|
|
grey=$(tput setaf 7)
|
|
yellow=$(tput setaf 3; tput bold)
|
|
else # this is a try for old BSD, see terminfo(5)
|
|
red=$(tput AF 1)
|
|
green=$(tput AF 2)
|
|
brown=$(tput AF 3)
|
|
blue=$(tput AF 4)
|
|
magenta=$(tput AF 5)
|
|
cyan=$(tput AF 6)
|
|
grey=$(tput AF 7)
|
|
yellow=$(tput AF 3; tput md)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
if $ncurses_tput; then
|
|
bold=$(tput bold)
|
|
underline=$(tput sgr 0 1 2>/dev/null)
|
|
italic=$(tput sitm) # This doesn't work on FreeBSDi (9,10) and OpenBSD ...
|
|
italic_end=$(tput ritm) # ... and this, too
|
|
off=$(tput sgr0)
|
|
else # this is a try for old BSD, see terminfo(5)
|
|
bold=$(tput md)
|
|
underline=$(tput us)
|
|
italic=$(tput ZH 2>/dev/null) # This doesn't work on FreeBSDi (9,10) and OpenBSD
|
|
italic_end=$(tput ZR 2>/dev/null) # ... probably entry missing in /etc/termcap
|
|
reverse=$(tput mr)
|
|
off=$(tput me)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# FreeBSD 10 understands ESC codes like 'echo -e "\e[3mfoobar\e[23m"', but also no tput for italics
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### START universal helper function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}" == 3 ]]; then
|
|
# older bash can do this only (MacOS X), even SLES 11, see #697
|
|
toupper() { tr 'a-z' 'A-Z' <<< "$1"; }
|
|
tolower() { tr 'A-Z' 'a-z' <<< "$1"; }
|
|
else
|
|
toupper() { echo -n "${1^^}"; }
|
|
tolower() { echo -n "${1,,}"; }
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
get_last_char() {
|
|
echo "${1:~0}" # "${string: -1}" would work too (both also in bash 3.2)
|
|
}
|
|
# Checking for last char. If already a separator supplied, we don't need an additional one
|
|
debugme() {
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && "$@" >&2
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
debugme1() { [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && "$@" >&2; }
|
|
|
|
hex2dec() {
|
|
echo $((16#$1))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# convert decimal number < 256 to hex
|
|
dec02hex() {
|
|
printf "x%02x" "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# convert decimal number between 256 and < 256*256 to hex
|
|
dec04hex() {
|
|
local a=$(printf "%04x" "$1")
|
|
printf "x%02s, x%02s" "${a:0:2}" "${a:2:2}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# trim spaces for BSD and old sed
|
|
count_lines() {
|
|
echo $(wc -l <<< "$1")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count_words() {
|
|
echo $(wc -w <<< "$1")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count_ciphers() {
|
|
echo $(wc -w <<< "${1//:/ }")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count_chars() {
|
|
echo $(wc -c <<< "$1")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newline_to_spaces() {
|
|
tr '\n' ' ' <<< "$1" | sed 's/ $//'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
colon_to_spaces() {
|
|
echo "${1//:/ }"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strip_lf() {
|
|
tr -d '\n' <<< "$1" | tr -d '\r'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strip_spaces() {
|
|
echo "${1// /}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20121022051228/http://codesnippets.joyent.com/posts/show/1816
|
|
strip_leading_space() {
|
|
printf "%s" "${1#"${1%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
|
|
}
|
|
strip_trailing_space() {
|
|
printf "%s" "${1%"${1##*[![:space:]]}"}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
is_number() {
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]] && \
|
|
return 0 || \
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strip_quote() (
|
|
# Note: parens in function definition here force this into a separate
|
|
# shell, preventing extglob from affecting the code outside this function
|
|
shopt -s extglob
|
|
# Remove color codes
|
|
OUT=${1//$'\e['*([0-9;])[a-zA-Z]}
|
|
# Replace quotes
|
|
OUT=${OUT//\"/\'}
|
|
strip_leading_space "$(
|
|
strip_trailing_space "$OUT"
|
|
)"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Converts a string containing PEM encoded data to one line.
|
|
pem_to_one_line() {
|
|
local pem="$1"
|
|
local header="" footer=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$pem" =~ .*-+BEGIN\ [A-Za-z0-9]+-+ ]]; then
|
|
header="$BASH_REMATCH"
|
|
pem="${pem/$header/}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$pem" =~ -+END\ [A-Za-z0-9]+-+.* ]]; then
|
|
footer="$BASH_REMATCH"
|
|
pem="${pem/$footer/}"
|
|
fi
|
|
pem="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$pem")")"
|
|
[[ -n "$header" ]] && pem="$header\\\n$pem"
|
|
[[ -n "$footer" ]] && pem+="\\\n$footer"
|
|
printf -- "%s" "$pem"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
is_ipv4addr() {
|
|
local octet="(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])"
|
|
local ipv4address="$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Check that $1 contains an IPv4 address and nothing else
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ $ipv4address ]] && [[ "$1" == $BASH_REMATCH ]] && \
|
|
return 0 || \
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 4291, Section 2.2
|
|
is_ipv6addr() {
|
|
local ipv6seg="[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}"
|
|
local octet="(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])"
|
|
local ipv4address="$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet"
|
|
local ipv6address
|
|
|
|
ipv6address="($ipv6seg:){7}(:|$ipv6seg)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){6}(:|:$ipv6seg|$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){5}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,2}|:$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){4}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,3}|:($ipv6seg:){0,1}$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){3}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,4}|:($ipv6seg:){0,2}$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){2}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,5}|:($ipv6seg:){0,3}$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){1}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,6}|:($ipv6seg:){0,4}$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|:((:$ipv6seg){1,7}|:($ipv6seg:){0,5}$ipv4address)"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Check that $1 contains an IPv4 address and nothing else
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ $ipv6address ]] && [[ "$1" == $BASH_REMATCH ]] && \
|
|
return 0 || \
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
join_by() {
|
|
# joins an array using a custom delimiter https://web.archive.org/web/20201222183540/https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1527049/how-can-i-join-elements-of-an-array-in-bash/17841619#17841619
|
|
local d=$1
|
|
shift
|
|
local f=$1
|
|
shift
|
|
printf %s "$f" "${@/#/$d}";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### END universal helper function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
###### START ServerHello/OpenSSL/F5 function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
#arg1: TLS 1.2 and below ciphers
|
|
#arg2: TLS 1.3 ciphers
|
|
#arg3: options (e.g., -V)
|
|
actually_supported_osslciphers() {
|
|
local ciphers="$1"
|
|
local tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS"
|
|
local options="$3 "
|
|
|
|
[[ "$2" != ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$2"
|
|
"$HAS_SECLEVEL" && [[ -n "$ciphers" ]] && ciphers="@SECLEVEL=0:$1"
|
|
# With OpenSSL 1.0.2 the only way to exclude SSLv2 ciphers is to use the -tls1 option.
|
|
# However, with newer versions of OpenSSL, the -tls1 option excludes TLSv1.2 ciphers.
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
options="${options//-no_ssl2 /-tls1 }"
|
|
else
|
|
options="${options//-no_ssl2 /}"
|
|
fi
|
|
! "$HAS_TLS1" && options="${options//-tls1 /}"
|
|
if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $options $OSSL_CIPHERS_S -ciphersuites "$tls13_ciphers" "$ciphers" 2>/dev/null || echo ""
|
|
elif [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $options $OSSL_CIPHERS_S "$tls13_ciphers:$ciphers" 2>/dev/null || echo ""
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $options "$ciphers" 2>/dev/null || echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Given a protocol (arg1) and a list of ciphers (arg2) that is formatted as
|
|
# ", xx,xx, xx,xx, xx,xx, xx,xx" remove any TLSv1.3 ciphers if the protocol
|
|
# is less than 04 and remove any TLSv1.2-only ciphers if the protocol is less
|
|
# than 03.
|
|
strip_inconsistent_ciphers() {
|
|
local -i proto=0x$1
|
|
local cipherlist="$2"
|
|
|
|
[[ $proto -lt 4 ]] && cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 13,0[0-9a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
if [[ $proto -lt 3 ]]; then
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,3[b-fB-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,40/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,6[7-9a-dA-D]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,9[c-fC-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,[abAB][0-9a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,[cC][0-5]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 16,[bB][7-9aA]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,2[3-9a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,3[01278a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,[4-9aA][0-9a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC][cC],1[345]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC][cC],[aA][89a-eA-E]/}"
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "$cipherlist"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# retrieve cipher from ServerHello (via openssl)
|
|
get_cipher() {
|
|
local cipher=""
|
|
local server_hello="$(cat -v "$1")"
|
|
# This and two other following instances are not best practice and normally a useless use of "cat", see
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20160711205930/http://porkmail.org/era/unix/award.html#uucaletter
|
|
# However there seem to be cases where the preferred $(< "$1") logic has a problem.
|
|
# Especially with bash 3.2 (Mac OS X) and when on the server side binary chars
|
|
# are returned, see https://stackoverflow.com/questions/7427262/how-to-read-a-file-into-a-variable-in-shell#22607352
|
|
# and https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1292
|
|
# Performance measurements showed no to barely measurable penalty (1s displayed in 9 tries).
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ Cipher\ *:\ ([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+|SSL_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]]; then
|
|
cipher="${BASH_REMATCH##* }"
|
|
elif [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", "(SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?(\/SSLv3)?)", Cipher is "([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]]; then
|
|
cipher="${BASH_REMATCH##* }"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$cipher"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# retrieve protocol from ServerHello (via openssl)
|
|
get_protocol() {
|
|
local protocol=""
|
|
local server_hello="$(cat -v "$1")"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ Protocol\ *:\ (SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?) ]]; then
|
|
protocol="${BASH_REMATCH##* }"
|
|
elif [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", TLSv1.3, Cipher is "TLS_[A-Z0-9_]+ ]]; then
|
|
# Note: When OpenSSL prints "New, <protocol>, Cipher is <cipher>", <cipher> is the
|
|
# negotiated cipher, but <protocol> is not the negotiated protocol. Instead, it is
|
|
# the SSL/TLS protocol that first defined <cipher>. Since the ciphers that were
|
|
# first defined for TLSv1.3 may only be used with TLSv1.3, this line may be used
|
|
# to determine whether TLSv1.3 was negotiated, but if another protocol is specified
|
|
# on this line, then this line does not indicate the actual protocol negotiated. Also,
|
|
# only TLSv1.3 cipher suites have names that begin with TLS_, which provides additional
|
|
# assurance that the above match will only succeed if TLSv1.3 was negotiated.
|
|
protocol="TLSv1.3"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$protocol"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# now some function for the integrated BIGIP F5 Cookie detector (see https://github.com/drwetter/F5-BIGIP-Decoder)
|
|
|
|
f5_hex2ip() {
|
|
debugme echo "$1"
|
|
echo $((16#${1:0:2})).$((16#${1:2:2})).$((16#${1:4:2})).$((16#${1:6:2}))
|
|
}
|
|
f5_hex2ip6() {
|
|
debugme echo "$1"
|
|
echo "[${1:0:4}:${1:4:4}:${1:8:4}:${1:12:4}.${1:16:4}:${1:20:4}:${1:24:4}:${1:28:4}]"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f5_determine_routeddomain() {
|
|
local tmp
|
|
tmp="${1%%o*}"
|
|
echo "${tmp/rd/}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f5_ip_oldstyle() {
|
|
local tmp
|
|
local a b c d
|
|
|
|
tmp="${1/%.*}" # until first dot
|
|
tmp="$(printf "%08x" "$tmp")" # convert the whole thing to hex, now back to ip (reversed notation:
|
|
tmp="$(f5_hex2ip $tmp)" # transform to ip with reversed notation
|
|
IFS="." read -r a b c d <<< "$tmp" # reverse it
|
|
echo $d.$c.$b.$a
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f5_port_decode() {
|
|
local tmp
|
|
|
|
tmp="$(strip_lf "$1")" # remove lf if there is one
|
|
tmp="${tmp/.0000/}" # to be sure remove trailing zeros with a dot
|
|
tmp="${tmp#*.}" # get the port
|
|
tmp="$(printf "%04x" "${tmp}")" # to hex
|
|
if [[ ${#tmp} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
:
|
|
elif [[ ${#tmp} -eq 3 ]]; then # fill it up with leading zeros if needed
|
|
tmp=0${tmp}
|
|
elif [[ ${#tmp} -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
tmp=00${tmp}
|
|
fi
|
|
echo $((16#${tmp:2:2}${tmp:0:2})) # reverse order and convert it from hex to dec
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### END universal helper function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
|
|
###### START scoring function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
# Sets the grade cap to ARG1
|
|
# arg1: A grade to set ("A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "M", or "T")
|
|
# arg2: A reason why (e.g. "Vulnerable to CRIME")
|
|
set_grade_cap() {
|
|
"$do_rating" || return 0
|
|
GRADE_CAP_REASONS+=("Grade capped to $1. $2")
|
|
|
|
# Always set special attributes. These are hard caps, due to name mismatch or cert being invalid
|
|
if [[ "$1" == T || "$1" == M ]]; then
|
|
GRADE_CAP="$1"
|
|
# Only keep track of the lowest grade cap, since a higher grade cap won't do anything (F = lowest, A = highest)
|
|
elif [[ ! "$GRADE_CAP" > "$1" ]]; then
|
|
GRADE_CAP="$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Sets a grade warning, as specified by the grade specification
|
|
# arg1: A warning message
|
|
set_grade_warning() {
|
|
"$do_rating" || return 0
|
|
GRADE_WARNINGS+=("$1")
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Sets the score for Category 2 (Key Exchange Strength)
|
|
# arg1: Short key algorithm ("EC", "DH", "RSA", ...), or "DHE" for ephemeral key size
|
|
# arg2: key size (number of bits)
|
|
set_key_str_score() {
|
|
local type=$1
|
|
local size=$2
|
|
|
|
"$do_rating" || return 0
|
|
|
|
if [[ $type == EC || $type == EdDSA ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $size -lt 110 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 20 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=20
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 123 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 40 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=40
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 163 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 80 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=80
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 225 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 90 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=90
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $size -lt 512 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 20 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=20
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 1024 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 40 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=40
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 2048 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 80 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=80
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 4096 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 90 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=90
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Sets the best and worst bit size key, used to grade Category 3 (Cipher Strength)
|
|
# This function itself doesn't actually set a score; its just in the name to keep it logical (score == rating function)
|
|
# arg1: a bit size
|
|
set_ciph_str_score() {
|
|
local size=$1
|
|
|
|
"$do_rating" || return 0
|
|
|
|
[[ $size -gt $CIPH_STR_BEST ]] && CIPH_STR_BEST=$size
|
|
[[ $size -lt $CIPH_STR_WORST ]] && CIPH_STR_WORST=$size
|
|
|
|
[[ $size -lt 112 || $size == None ]] && set_grade_cap "F" "Using cipher suites weaker than 112 bits"
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### END scoring function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
##################### START output file formatting functions #########################
|
|
#################### START JSON file functions ####################
|
|
|
|
fileout_json_footer() {
|
|
if "$do_json"; then
|
|
if [[ "$SCAN_TIME" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
fileout_json_finding "scanTime" "WARN" "Scan interrupted" "" "" ""
|
|
elif [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -lt $LOW ]] ; then
|
|
# no scan time in --severity=low and above, also needed for Travis, hackish...
|
|
fileout_json_finding "scanTime" "INFO" $SCAN_TIME "" "" ""
|
|
fi
|
|
printf "]\n" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$do_pretty_json"; then
|
|
if [[ "$SCAN_TIME" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo -e " ],\n \"scanTime\" : \"Scan interrupted\"\n}" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e " ],\n \"scanTime\" : ${SCAN_TIME}\n}" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_json_section() {
|
|
case $1 in
|
|
0) echo -e " \"pretest\" : [" ;;
|
|
1) echo -e " \"singleCipher\" : [" ;;
|
|
2) echo -e ",\n \"protocols\" : [" ;;
|
|
3) echo -e ",\n \"grease\" : [" ;;
|
|
4) echo -e ",\n \"ciphers\" : [" ;;
|
|
5) echo -e ",\n \"serverPreferences\" : [" ;;
|
|
6) echo -e ",\n \"fs\" : [" ;;
|
|
7) echo -e ",\n \"serverDefaults\" : [" ;;
|
|
8) echo -e ",\n \"headerResponse\" : [" ;;
|
|
9) echo -e ",\n \"vulnerabilities\" : [" ;;
|
|
10) echo -e ",\n \"cipherTests\" : [" ;;
|
|
11) echo -e ",\n \"browserSimulations\": [" ;;
|
|
12) echo -e ",\n \"rating\" : [" ;;
|
|
*) echo "invalid section" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header() {
|
|
local str=""
|
|
"$2" && str="$(fileout_section_footer false)"
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && FIRST_FINDING=true && (printf "%s%s\n" "$str" "$(fileout_json_section "$1")") >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: whether to end object too
|
|
fileout_section_footer() {
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && FIRST_FINDING=false && printf "\n ]" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && "$1" && echo -e "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter() {
|
|
local parameter="$1"
|
|
local filler="$2"
|
|
local value="$3"
|
|
local not_last="$4"
|
|
local spaces=""
|
|
|
|
"$do_json" && \
|
|
spaces=" " || \
|
|
spaces=" "
|
|
if [[ -n "$value" ]] || [[ "$parameter" == finding ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$value" =~ [[:cntrl:]] ]]; then
|
|
value="$(sanitize_fileout "$value")"
|
|
fi
|
|
printf -- "%b%b%b%b" "$spaces" "\"$parameter\"" "$filler" ": \"$value\"" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
"$not_last" && printf ",\n" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_json_finding() {
|
|
local target
|
|
local finding="$3"
|
|
local cve="$4"
|
|
local cwe="$5"
|
|
local hint="$6"
|
|
|
|
if "$do_json"; then
|
|
"$FIRST_FINDING" || echo -n "," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
echo -e " {" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "id" " " "$1" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "ip" " " "$NODE/$NODEIP" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "port" " " "$PORT" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "severity" " " "$2" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "cve" " " "$cve" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "cwe" " " "$cwe" true
|
|
"$GIVE_HINTS" && fileout_json_print_parameter "hint" " " "$hint" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "finding" " " "$finding" false
|
|
echo -e "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$do_pretty_json"; then
|
|
if [[ "$1" == service ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $SERVER_COUNTER -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
echo " ," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
elif ! "$FIRST_FINDING"; then
|
|
echo -n "," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
target="$NODE"
|
|
$do_mx_all_ips && target="$URI"
|
|
echo -e " {
|
|
\"targetHost\" : \"$target\",
|
|
\"ip\" : \"$NODEIP\",
|
|
\"port\" : \"$PORT\",
|
|
\"rDNS\" : \"$rDNS\",
|
|
\"service\" : \"$finding\"," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
$do_mx_all_ips && echo -e " \"hostname\" : \"$NODE\"," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
("$FIRST_FINDING" && echo -n " {" >> "$JSONFILE") || echo -n ",{" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
echo -e -n "\n" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "id" " " "$1" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "severity" " " "$2" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "cve" " " "$cve" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "cwe" " " "$cwe" true
|
|
"$GIVE_HINTS" && fileout_json_print_parameter "hint" " " "$hint" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "finding" " " "$finding" false
|
|
echo -e -n "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_pretty_json_banner() {
|
|
local target
|
|
|
|
if ! "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
[[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}"
|
|
# NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR is set now --> wrong place
|
|
target="$NODE"
|
|
$do_mx_all_ips && target="$URI"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo -e " \"Invocation\" : \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\",
|
|
\"at\" : \"$HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION\",
|
|
\"version\" : \"$VERSION $GIT_REL_SHORT\",
|
|
\"openssl\" : \"$OSSL_NAME $OSSL_VER from $OSSL_BUILD_DATE\",
|
|
\"startTime\" : \"$START_TIME\",
|
|
\"scanResult\" : ["
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_banner() {
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
# "$do_json" && # here we maybe should add a banner, too
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && FIRST_FINDING=true && (printf "%s\n" "$(fileout_pretty_json_banner)") >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_separator() {
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && echo " ," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
"$do_json" && echo -n "," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_footer() {
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
fileout_json_footer
|
|
fi
|
|
# CSV: no footer
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_insert_warning() {
|
|
# See #815. Make sure we don't mess up the JSON PRETTY format if we complain with a client side warning.
|
|
# This should only be called if an *extra* warning will be printed (previously: 'fileout <extra_warning_ID> "WARN" '
|
|
# arg1: json identifier, arg2: normally "WARN", arg3: finding
|
|
#
|
|
# Also, we have to be careful with any form of mass testing so that a warning won't lead to an invalid JSON
|
|
# file. As any child will do any check as well (to be reconsidered later), we don't need also the parent to issue
|
|
# warnings upfront, see #1169. As a detection we'll use --file/-iL as in the children jobs it'll be removed:
|
|
[[ "$CMDLINE=" =~ --file ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ "$CMDLINE=" =~ -iL ]] && return 0
|
|
# Note we still have the message on screen + in HTML which is not as optimal as it could be
|
|
|
|
if "$do_pretty_json" && "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
echo -e " \"clientProblem${CLIENT_PROB_NO}\" : [" >>"$JSONFILE"
|
|
CLIENT_PROB_NO=$((CLIENT_PROB_NO + 1))
|
|
FIRST_FINDING=true # make sure we don't have a comma here
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$1" "$2" "$3"
|
|
if "$do_pretty_json"; then
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
echo -e "\n ]," >>"$JSONFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e ", " >>"$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
FIRST_FINDING=true
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# args: "id" "fqdn/ip" "port" "severity" "finding" "cve" "cwe" "hint"
|
|
#
|
|
fileout_csv_finding() {
|
|
local finding="$5"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$finding" =~ [[:cntrl:]] ]]; then
|
|
finding="$(sanitize_fileout "$finding")"
|
|
fi
|
|
safe_echo "\"$1\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$2\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$3\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$4\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$finding\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$6\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
if "$GIVE_HINTS"; then
|
|
safe_echo "\"$7\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$8\"\n" >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
safe_echo "\"$7\"\n" >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ID, SEVERITY, FINDING, CVE, CWE, HINT
|
|
fileout() {
|
|
local severity="$2"
|
|
local cve="$4"
|
|
local cwe="$5"
|
|
local hint="$6"
|
|
|
|
if { "$do_pretty_json" && [[ "$1" == service ]]; } || show_finding "$severity"; then
|
|
local finding=$(strip_lf "$(newline_to_spaces "$(strip_quote "$3")")") # additional quotes will mess up screen output
|
|
[[ -e "$JSONFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$JSONFILE" ]] && fileout_json_finding "$1" "$severity" "$finding" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
"$do_csv" && [[ -n "$CSVFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$CSVFILE" ]] && \
|
|
fileout_csv_finding "$1" "$NODE/$NODEIP" "$PORT" "$severity" "$finding" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
"$FIRST_FINDING" && FIRST_FINDING=false
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
json_header() {
|
|
local fname_prefix
|
|
local filename_provided=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PARENT_JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$JSONFILE" ]] && fatal_cmd_line "Can't write to both $PARENT_JSONFILE and $JSONFILE" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
JSONFILE="$PARENT_JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$JSONFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$JSONFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true
|
|
# Similar to HTML: Don't create headers and footers in the following scenarios:
|
|
# * no JSON/CSV output is being created.
|
|
# * mass testing is being performed and each test will have its own file.
|
|
# * this is an individual test within a mass test and all output is being placed in a single file.
|
|
! "$do_json" && ! "$do_pretty_json" && JSONHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && JSONHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && [[ -n "$PARENT_JSONFILE" ]] && JSONHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
|
|
if "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="local-ciphers"
|
|
elif "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
:
|
|
elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}"
|
|
else
|
|
# ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set
|
|
! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}"
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
JSONFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".json)"
|
|
elif [[ -d "$JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
JSONFILE="$JSONFILE/${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".json)"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created
|
|
if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
APPEND=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$APPEND"; then
|
|
JSONHEADER=false
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -s "$JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" || fatal_cmd_line "non-empty \"$JSONFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
cp /dev/null "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$do_json" && echo "[" > "$JSONFILE"
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && echo "{" > "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
csv_header() {
|
|
local fname_prefix
|
|
local filename_provided=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PARENT_CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$CSVFILE" ]] && fatal_cmd_line "Can't write to both $PARENT_CSVFILE and $CSVFILE" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
CSVFILE="$PARENT_CSVFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$CSVFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$CSVFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true
|
|
# CSV similar to JSON
|
|
! "$do_csv" && CSVHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && CSVHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && [[ -n "$PARENT_CSVFILE" ]] && CSVHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
|
|
if "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="local-ciphers"
|
|
elif "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
:
|
|
elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}"
|
|
else
|
|
# ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set
|
|
! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}"
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
CSVFILE="${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".csv)"
|
|
elif [[ -d "$CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
CSVFILE="$CSVFILE/${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".csv)"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created
|
|
if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
APPEND=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$APPEND"; then
|
|
CSVHEADER=false
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -s "$CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" || fatal_cmd_line "non-empty \"$CSVFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
cp /dev/null "$CSVFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
touch "$CSVFILE"
|
|
if "$GIVE_HINTS"; then
|
|
fileout_csv_finding "id" "fqdn/ip" "port" "severity" "finding" "cve" "cwe" "hint"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout_csv_finding "id" "fqdn/ip" "port" "severity" "finding" "cve" "cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
################# END JSON file functions. START HTML functions ####################
|
|
|
|
html_header() {
|
|
local fname_prefix
|
|
local filename_provided=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PARENT_HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$HTMLFILE" ]] && fatal_cmd_line "Can't write to both $PARENT_HTMLFILE and $HTMLFILE" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
HTMLFILE="$PARENT_HTMLFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$HTMLFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$HTMLFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true
|
|
# Don't create HTML headers and footers in the following scenarios:
|
|
# * HTML output is not being created.
|
|
# * mass testing is being performed and each test will have its own HTML file.
|
|
# * this is an individual test within a mass test and all HTML output is being placed in a single file.
|
|
! "$do_html" && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && [[ -n "$PARENT_HTMLFILE" ]] && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
|
|
if "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="local-ciphers"
|
|
elif "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
:
|
|
elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}"
|
|
else
|
|
# ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set
|
|
! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}"
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
HTMLFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".html)"
|
|
elif [[ -d "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
HTMLFILE="$HTMLFILE/$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".html)"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created
|
|
if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
APPEND=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$APPEND"; then
|
|
HTMLHEADER=false
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -s "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" || fatal_cmd_line "non-empty \"$HTMLFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
cp /dev/null "$HTMLFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
html_out "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" ?>\n"
|
|
html_out "<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN\" \"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd\">\n"
|
|
html_out "<!-- This file was created with testssl.sh. https://testssl.sh -->\n"
|
|
html_out "<html xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\">\n"
|
|
html_out "<head>\n"
|
|
html_out "<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"application/xhtml+xml; charset=UTF-8\" />\n"
|
|
html_out "<title>testssl.sh</title>\n"
|
|
html_out "</head>\n"
|
|
html_out "<body>\n"
|
|
html_out "<pre>\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
html_banner() {
|
|
if "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$HTMLHEADER"; then
|
|
html_out "## Scan started as: \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\"\n"
|
|
html_out "## at $HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION\n"
|
|
html_out "## version testssl: $VERSION ${GIT_REL_SHORT} from $REL_DATE\n"
|
|
html_out "## version openssl: \"$OSSL_NAME $OSSL_VER\" from \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\")\n\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
html_footer() {
|
|
if "$HTMLHEADER"; then
|
|
html_out "</pre>\n"
|
|
html_out "</body>\n"
|
|
html_out "</html>\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
################# END HTML file functions ####################
|
|
|
|
prepare_logging() {
|
|
# arg1: for testing mx records name we put a name of logfile in here, otherwise we get strange file names
|
|
local fname_prefix="$1"
|
|
local filename_provided=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PARENT_LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && fatal_cmd_line "Can't write to both $PARENT_LOGFILE and $LOGFILE" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
LOGFILE="$PARENT_LOGFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$LOGFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true
|
|
|
|
# Similar to html_header():
|
|
! "$do_logging" && return 0
|
|
"$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && return 0
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && [[ -n "$PARENT_LOGFILE" ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$fname_prefix" ]] && fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
LOGFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".log)"
|
|
elif [[ -d "$LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
# actually we were instructed to place all files in a DIR instead of the current working dir
|
|
LOGFILE="$LOGFILE/$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".log)"
|
|
else
|
|
: # just for clarity: a log file was specified, no need to do anything else
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$APPEND"; then
|
|
if [[ -s "$LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" || fatal_cmd_line "non-empty \"$LOGFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
cp /dev/null "$LOGFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tmln_out "## Scan started as: \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\"" >>"$LOGFILE"
|
|
tmln_out "## at $HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION" >>"$LOGFILE"
|
|
tmln_out "## version testssl: $VERSION ${GIT_REL_SHORT} from $REL_DATE" >>"$LOGFILE"
|
|
tmln_out "## version openssl: \"$OSSL_VER\" from \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\")\n" >>"$LOGFILE"
|
|
exec > >(tee -a -i "$LOGFILE")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
################### END all file output functions #########################
|
|
|
|
# prints a string of n spaces (n < 80)
|
|
print_n_spaces() {
|
|
local -i n="$1"
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
|
|
out "${spaces:0:n}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# prints out multiple lines in $1, left aligned by spaces in $2
|
|
out_row_aligned() {
|
|
local first=true
|
|
|
|
while read line; do
|
|
"$first" && \
|
|
first=false || \
|
|
out "$2"
|
|
outln "$line"
|
|
done <<< "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# prints text over multiple lines, trying to make no line longer than $max_width.
|
|
# Each line is indented with $spaces.
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width() {
|
|
local text="$1"
|
|
local spaces="$2"
|
|
local -i max_width="$3"
|
|
local -i i len
|
|
local cr=$'\n'
|
|
local line
|
|
local first=true
|
|
|
|
max_width=$max_width-${#spaces}
|
|
len=${#text}
|
|
while true; do
|
|
if [[ $len -lt $max_width ]]; then
|
|
# If the remaining text to print is shorter than $max_width,
|
|
# then just print it.
|
|
i=$len
|
|
else
|
|
# Find the final space character in the text that is less than
|
|
# $max_width characters into the remaining text, and make the
|
|
# text up to that space character the next line to print.
|
|
line="${text:0:max_width}"
|
|
line="${line% *}"
|
|
i="${#line}"
|
|
if [[ $i -eq $max_width ]]; then
|
|
# If there are no space characters in the first $max_width
|
|
# characters of the remaining text, then make the text up
|
|
# to the first space the next line to print. If there are
|
|
# no space characters in the remaining text, make the
|
|
# remaining text the next line to print.
|
|
line="${text#* }"
|
|
i=$len-${#line}
|
|
[[ $i -eq 0 ]] && i=$len
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$first"; then
|
|
tm_out "${cr}${spaces}"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "${text:0:i}"
|
|
[[ $i -eq $len ]] && break
|
|
len=$len-$i-1
|
|
i+=1
|
|
text="${text:i:len}"
|
|
first=false
|
|
[[ $len -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry() {
|
|
local text="$1"
|
|
local spaces="$2"
|
|
local -i max_width="$3"
|
|
local print_function="$4"
|
|
local resp entry prev_entry=" "
|
|
|
|
resp="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$text" "$spaces" "$max_width")"
|
|
while read -d " " entry; do
|
|
if [[ -n "$entry" ]]; then
|
|
$print_function "$entry"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$prev_entry" ]]; then
|
|
outln; out " "
|
|
fi
|
|
out " "
|
|
prev_entry="$entry"
|
|
done <<< "$resp"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
print_fixed_width() {
|
|
local text="$1"
|
|
local -i len width="$2"
|
|
local print_function="$3"
|
|
|
|
len=${#text}
|
|
$print_function "$text"
|
|
print_n_spaces "$((width-len+1))"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# saves $TMPFILE or file supplied in $2 under name "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1".
|
|
# Note: after finishing $TEMPDIR will be removed unless DEBUG >=1
|
|
tmpfile_handle() {
|
|
local savefile="$2"
|
|
[[ -z "$savefile" ]] && savefile=$TMPFILE
|
|
#FIXME: make sure/find out if we do not need $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1" if debug=0. We would save fs access here
|
|
mv $savefile "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1" 2>/dev/null
|
|
[[ $ERRFILE =~ dev.null ]] && return 0 || \
|
|
mv $ERRFILE "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.${1//.txt/}.errorlog" 2>/dev/null
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: line with comment sign, tabs and so on
|
|
filter_input() {
|
|
sed -e 's/#.*$//' -e '/^$/d' <<< "$1" | tr -d '\n' | tr -d '\t' | tr -d '\r'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Dl's any URL (arg1) via HTTP 1.1 GET from port 80, arg2: file to store http body.
|
|
# Proxy is not honored yet (see cmd line switches) -- except when using curl or wget.
|
|
# There the environment variable is used automatically
|
|
# Currently it is being used by check_revocation_crl() only.
|
|
http_get() {
|
|
local proto z
|
|
local node="" query=""
|
|
local dl="$2"
|
|
local useragent="$UA_STD"
|
|
local jsonID="http_get"
|
|
|
|
"$SNEAKY" && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY"
|
|
|
|
if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
curl -s --noproxy '*' -A $''"$useragent"'' -o $dl "$1"
|
|
else
|
|
# for the sake of simplicity assume the proxy is using http
|
|
curl -s -x $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT -A $''"$useragent"'' -o $dl "$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $?
|
|
elif type -p wget &>/dev/null; then
|
|
# wget has no proxy command line. We need to use http_proxy instead. And for the sake of simplicity
|
|
# assume the GET protocol we query is using http -- http_proxy is the $ENV not for the connection TO
|
|
# the proxy, but for the protocol we query THROUGH the proxy
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
wget --no-proxy -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -z "$http_proxy" ]]; then
|
|
http_proxy=http://$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT wget -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1"
|
|
else
|
|
wget -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return $?
|
|
else
|
|
# Worst option: slower and hiccups with chunked transfers. Workaround for the
|
|
# latter is using HTTP/1.0. We do not support https here, yet.
|
|
# First the URL will be split
|
|
IFS=/ read -r proto z node query <<< "$1"
|
|
proto=${proto%:}
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != http ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "protocol $proto not supported yet"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "protocol $proto not supported yet"
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n $PROXY ]]; then
|
|
# PROXYNODE works better than PROXYIP on modern versions of squid. \
|
|
# We don't reuse the code in fd_socket() as there's initial CONNECT which makes problems
|
|
if ! exec 33<> /dev/tcp/${PROXYNODE}/${PROXYPORT}; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT"
|
|
return 6
|
|
else
|
|
printf -- "%b" "GET $proto://$node/$query HTTP/1.0\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nHost: $node\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n" >&33
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
IFS=/ read -r proto z node query <<< "$1"
|
|
exec 33<>/dev/tcp/$node/80
|
|
printf -- "%b" "GET /$query HTTP/1.0\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nHost: $node\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n" >&33
|
|
fi
|
|
# Strip HTTP header. When in Debug Mode we leave the raw data in place
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
cat <&33 >${dl}.raw
|
|
cat ${dl}.raw | sed '1,/^[[:space:]]*$/d' >${dl}
|
|
else
|
|
cat <&33 | sed '1,/^[[:space:]]*$/d' >${dl}
|
|
fi
|
|
exec 33<&-
|
|
exec 33>&-
|
|
[[ -s "$dl" ]] && return 0 || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Outputs the headers when downloading any URL (arg1) via HTTP 1.1 GET from port 80.
|
|
# Only works if curl or wget is available.
|
|
# There the environment variable is used automatically
|
|
# Currently it is being used by check_pwnedkeys() only.
|
|
http_get_header() {
|
|
local proto
|
|
local node="" query=""
|
|
local dl="$2"
|
|
local useragent="$UA_STD"
|
|
local jsonID="http_get_header"
|
|
local headers
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
|
|
"$SNEAKY" && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY"
|
|
|
|
if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
headers="$(curl --head -s --noproxy '*' -A $''"$useragent"'' "$1")"
|
|
else
|
|
# for the sake of simplicity assume the proxy is using http
|
|
headers="$(curl --head -s -x $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT -A $''"$useragent"'' "$1")"
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$headers"
|
|
return $ret
|
|
elif type -p wget &>/dev/null; then
|
|
# wget has no proxy command line. We need to use http_proxy instead. And for the sake of simplicity
|
|
# assume the GET protocol we query is using http -- http_proxy is the $ENV not for the connection TO
|
|
# the proxy, but for the protocol we query THROUGH the proxy
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
headers="$(wget --no-proxy -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -z "$http_proxy" ]]; then
|
|
headers="$(http_proxy=http://$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT wget -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)"
|
|
else
|
|
headers="$(wget -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$headers"
|
|
# wget(1): "8: Server issued an error response.". Happens e.g. when 404 is returned. However also if the call wasn't correct (400)
|
|
# So we assume for now that everything is submitted correctly. We parse the error code too later
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 8 ]] && ret=0 && tm_out "$headers"
|
|
return $ret
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ldap_get() {
|
|
local ldif
|
|
local -i success
|
|
local crl="$1"
|
|
local tmpfile="$2"
|
|
local jsonID="$3"
|
|
|
|
if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then
|
|
# proxy handling?
|
|
ldif="$(curl -s "$crl")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || return 1
|
|
awk '/certificateRevocationList/ { print $2 }' <<< "$ldif" | $OPENSSL base64 -d -A -out "$tmpfile" 2>/dev/null
|
|
[[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] || return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
pr_litecyan " (for LDAP CRL check install \"curl\")"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "LDAP CRL revocation check needs \"curl\""
|
|
return 2
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# checks whether the public key in arg1 appears in the https://pwnedkeys.com/ database.
|
|
# arg1: file containing certificate
|
|
# arg2: public key algorithm
|
|
# arg3 key size
|
|
# Responses are as follows:
|
|
# 0 - not checked
|
|
# 1 - key not found in database
|
|
# 2 - key found in database
|
|
# 7 - network/proxy failure
|
|
check_pwnedkeys() {
|
|
local cert="$1"
|
|
local cert_key_algo="$2"
|
|
local -i cert_keysize="$3"
|
|
local pubkey curve response
|
|
|
|
"$PHONE_OUT" || return 0
|
|
|
|
# https://pwnedkeys.com only keeps records on 1024 bit and larger RSA keys,
|
|
# as well as elliptic-curve keys on the P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves.
|
|
if [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ RSA ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ rsa ]]; then
|
|
[[ $cert_keysize -ge 1024 ]] || return 0
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" == *ecPublicKey ]]; then
|
|
[[ $cert_keysize -eq 256 ]] || [[ $cert_keysize -eq 384 ]] || \
|
|
[[ $cert_keysize -eq 521 ]] || return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pubkey="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
# If it is an elliptic curve key, check that it is P-256, P-384, or P-521.
|
|
if [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" == *ecPublicKey ]]; then
|
|
curve="$($OPENSSL ec -pubin -text <<< "$pubkey" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
curve="${curve#*ASN1 OID: }"
|
|
[[ "$curve" == prime256v1* ]] || [[ "$curve" == secp384r1* ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$curve" == secp521r1* ]] || return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fingerprint="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -outform DER <<< "$pubkey" 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -hex 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
fingerprint="${fingerprint#*= }"
|
|
response="$(http_get_header "https://v1.pwnedkeys.com/$fingerprint")"
|
|
# Handle curl's/wget's connectivity exit codes
|
|
case $? in
|
|
4|5|7) return 7 ;;
|
|
1|2|3|6) return 0 ;;
|
|
# unknown codes we just say "not checked"
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ "$response" =~ "404 Not Found" ]]; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ "200 OK" ]]; then
|
|
return 2
|
|
else
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_revocation_crl() {
|
|
local crl="$1"
|
|
local jsonID="$2"
|
|
local tmpfile=""
|
|
local scheme retcode
|
|
local -i success
|
|
|
|
"$PHONE_OUT" || return 0
|
|
[[ -n "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] || return 0
|
|
scheme="$(tolower "${crl%%://*}")"
|
|
# The code for obtaining CRLs only supports LDAP, HTTP, and HTTPS URLs.
|
|
[[ "$scheme" == http ]] || [[ "$scheme" == https ]] || [[ "$scheme" == ldap ]] || return 0
|
|
tmpfile=$TEMPDIR/${NODE}-${NODEIP}.${crl##*\/} || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
if [[ "$scheme" == ldap ]]; then
|
|
ldap_get "$crl" "$tmpfile" "$jsonID"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
else
|
|
http_get "$crl" "$tmpfile"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ $success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_warning "retrieval of \"$crl\" failed"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "CRL retrieval from $crl failed"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# -crl_download could be more elegant but is supported from 1.0.2 onwards only
|
|
$OPENSSL crl -inform DER -in "$tmpfile" -outform PEM -out "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem" &>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if grep -qe 'BEGIN X509 CRL' "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
mv "$tmpfile" "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "conversion of \"$tmpfile\" failed"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "conversion of CRL to PEM format failed"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem; then
|
|
$OPENSSL verify -crl_check -CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem") -untrusted $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem $HOSTCERT &> "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err"
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL verify -crl_check -CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem") $HOSTCERT &> "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not revoked"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not revoked"
|
|
else
|
|
retcode=$(awk '/error [1-9][0-9]? at [0-9]+ depth lookup:/ { if (!found) {print $2; found=1} }' "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err")
|
|
if [[ "$retcode" == 23 ]]; then # see verify_retcode_helper()
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "revoked"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "revoked"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Certificate revoked"
|
|
else
|
|
retcode="$(verify_retcode_helper "$retcode")"
|
|
out " $retcode"
|
|
retcode="${retcode#(}"
|
|
retcode="${retcode%)}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$retcode"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Issues with certificate $retcode"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
cat "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_revocation_ocsp() {
|
|
local uri="$1"
|
|
local stapled_response="$2"
|
|
local jsonID="$3"
|
|
local tmpfile=""
|
|
local -i success
|
|
local response=""
|
|
local host_header=""
|
|
|
|
"$PHONE_OUT" || [[ -n "$stapled_response" ]] || return 0
|
|
[[ -n "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] || return 0
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]] && ! "$IGN_OCSP_PROXY"; then
|
|
# see #1106 and https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6965
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_warning "revocation not tested as \"openssl ocsp\" doesn't support a proxy"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Revocation not tested as openssl ocsp doesn't support a proxy"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem || return 0
|
|
tmpfile=$TEMPDIR/${NODE}-${NODEIP}.${uri##*\/} || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
if [[ -n "$stapled_response" ]]; then
|
|
hex2binary "$stapled_response" > "$TEMPDIR/stapled_ocsp_response.dd"
|
|
$OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce -respin "$TEMPDIR/stapled_ocsp_response.dd" \
|
|
-issuer $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem -verify_other $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem \
|
|
-CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE") -cert $HOSTCERT -text &> "$tmpfile"
|
|
else
|
|
host_header=${uri##http://}
|
|
host_header=${host_header%%/*}
|
|
if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then
|
|
host_header="-header Host ${host_header}"
|
|
elif [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.0* ]] || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || \
|
|
[[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]]; then
|
|
host_header="-header Host=${host_header}"
|
|
else
|
|
host_header="-header Host ${host_header}"
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce ${host_header} -url "$uri" \
|
|
-issuer $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem -verify_other $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem \
|
|
-CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE") -cert $HOSTCERT -text &> "$tmpfile"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && grep -Fq "Response verify OK" "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
response="$(grep -F "$HOSTCERT: " "$tmpfile")"
|
|
response="${response#$HOSTCERT: }"
|
|
response="${response%\.}"
|
|
if [[ "$response" =~ good ]]; then
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not revoked"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not revoked"
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ revoked ]]; then
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "revoked"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "revoked"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Certificate revoked"
|
|
else
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_warning "error querying OCSP responder"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$response"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
cat "$tmpfile"
|
|
else
|
|
out " ($response)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] || response="empty ocsp response"
|
|
[[ -z "$response" ]] && response="$(awk '/Responder Error:/ { print $3 }' "$tmpfile")"
|
|
[[ -z "$response" ]] && grep -Fq "Response Verify Failure" "$tmpfile" && response="unable to verify response"
|
|
[[ -z "$response" ]] && response="$(awk -F':' '/Code/ { print $NF }' $tmpfile)"
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_warning "error querying OCSP responder"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$response"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
[[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] && cat "$tmpfile" || echo "empty ocsp response"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$response" ]]; then
|
|
out " ($response)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wait_kill(){
|
|
local pid=$1 # pid we wait for or kill
|
|
local maxsleep=$2 # how long we wait before killing
|
|
|
|
HAD_SLEPT=0
|
|
while true; do
|
|
if ! ps $pid >/dev/null ; then
|
|
return 0 # process terminated before didn't reach $maxsleep
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 6 ]] && ps $pid
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
maxsleep=$((maxsleep - 1))
|
|
HAD_SLEPT=$((HAD_SLEPT + 1))
|
|
test $maxsleep -le 0 && break
|
|
done # needs to be killed:
|
|
kill $pid >&2 2>/dev/null
|
|
wait $pid 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p)
|
|
return 3 # means killed
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Convert date formats -- we always use GMT=UTC here
|
|
# argv1: source date string
|
|
# argv2: dest date string
|
|
if "$HAS_GNUDATE"; then # Linux and NetBSD
|
|
parse_date() {
|
|
LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -d "$1" "$2"
|
|
}
|
|
elif "$HAS_FREEBSDDATE"; then # FreeBSD, OS X and newer (~6.6) OpenBSD versions
|
|
parse_date() {
|
|
LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -j -f "$3" "$2" "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
elif "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
# We basically echo it as a conversion as we want it is too difficult. Approach for that would be:
|
|
# printf '%s\n' "$1" | awk '{ printf "%04d%02d%02d\n", $4, $2, (index("JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec",$1)+2)/3}'
|
|
# 4: year, 1: month, 2: day, $3: time (e.g. "Dec 8 10:16:13 2016")
|
|
# This way we could also kind of convert args to epoch but as newer OpenBSDs "date" behave like FreeBSD
|
|
parse_date() {
|
|
local tmp=""
|
|
if [[ $2 == +%s* ]]; then
|
|
echo "${1// GMT}"
|
|
else
|
|
tmp="$(printf '%s\n' "$1" | awk '{ printf "%04d-%02d-%02d %08s\n", $4, (index("JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec",$1)+2)/3, $2, $3 }')"
|
|
echo "${tmp%:*}" # remove seconds, result now is in line with GNU date 2016-12-08 10:16
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
parse_date() {
|
|
LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -j "$2" "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Print $arg1 in binary format. arg1: An ASCII-HEX string
|
|
# The string represented by $arg1 may be binary data (a certificate or public
|
|
# key) or a text string (e.g., ASCII-encoded text).
|
|
hex2binary() {
|
|
local s="$1"
|
|
local -i i len remainder
|
|
|
|
len=${#s}
|
|
[[ $len%2 -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_XXD"; then
|
|
xxd -r -p <<< "$s"
|
|
else
|
|
for (( i=0; i <= len-16 ; i+=16 )); do
|
|
printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}\x${s:$((i+8)):2}\x${s:$((i+10)):2}\x${s:$((i+12)):2}\x${s:$((i+14)):2}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
remainder=$((len-i))
|
|
case $remainder in
|
|
2) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}" ;;
|
|
4) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}" ;;
|
|
6) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}" ;;
|
|
8) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}" ;;
|
|
10) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}\x${s:$((i+8)):2}" ;;
|
|
12) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}\x${s:$((i+8)):2}\x${s:$((i+10)):2}" ;;
|
|
14) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}\x${s:$((i+8)):2}\x${s:$((i+10)):2}\x${s:$((i+12)):2}" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# convert 414243 into ABC
|
|
hex2ascii() {
|
|
hex2binary $1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: text string
|
|
# Output a comma-separated ASCII-HEX string representation of the input string.
|
|
string_to_asciihex() {
|
|
local string="$1"
|
|
local -i i eos
|
|
local output=""
|
|
|
|
eos=${#string}-1
|
|
for (( i=0; i<eos; i++ )); do
|
|
output+="$(printf "%02x," "'${string:i:1}")"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -n "$string" ]] && output+="$(printf "%02x" "'${string:eos:1}")"
|
|
tm_out "$output"
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Adjust options to $OPENSSL s_client based on OpenSSL version and protocol version
|
|
s_client_options() {
|
|
local options=" $1"
|
|
local ciphers="notpresent" tls13_ciphers="notpresent"
|
|
|
|
# Extract the TLSv1.3 ciphers and the non-TLSv1.3 ciphers
|
|
if [[ " $options " =~ \ -cipher\ ]]; then
|
|
ciphers="${options#* -cipher }"
|
|
ciphers="${ciphers%% *}"
|
|
options="${options//-cipher $ciphers/}"
|
|
ciphers="${ciphers##\'}"
|
|
ciphers="${ciphers%%\'}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ " $options " =~ \ -ciphersuites\ ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers="${options#* -ciphersuites }"
|
|
tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers%% *}"
|
|
options="${options//-ciphersuites $tls13_ciphers/}"
|
|
tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers##\'}"
|
|
tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers%%\'}"
|
|
[[ "$tls13_ciphers" == ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Don't include the -servername option for an SSLv2 or SSLv3 ClientHello.
|
|
[[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ " $options " =~ \ -ssl[2|3]\ ]] && options="${options//$SNI/}"
|
|
|
|
# The server_name extension should not be included in the ClientHello unless
|
|
# the -servername option is provided. However, OpenSSL 1.1.1 will include the
|
|
# server_name extension unless the -noservername option is provided. So, if
|
|
# the command line doesn't include -servername and the -noservername option is
|
|
# supported, then add -noservername to the options.
|
|
"$HAS_NOSERVERNAME" && [[ ! " $options " =~ \ -servername\ ]] && options+=" -noservername"
|
|
|
|
# Newer versions of OpenSSL have dropped support for the -no_ssl2 option, so
|
|
# remove any -no_ssl2 option if the option isn't supported. (Since versions of
|
|
# OpenSSL that don't support -no_ssl2 also don't support SSLv2, the option
|
|
# isn't needed for these versions of OpenSSL.)
|
|
! "$HAS_NO_SSL2" && options="${options//-no_ssl2/}"
|
|
|
|
# The -enable_pha option causes the Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be sent.
|
|
# It is only supported by OpenSSL 1.1.1 and newer.
|
|
! "$HAS_ENABLE_PHA" && options="${options//-enable_pha/}"
|
|
|
|
# At least one server will fail under some circumstances if compression methods are offered.
|
|
# So, only offer compression methods if necessary for the test. In OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
|
|
# 1.1.1 compression is only offered if the "-comp" option is provided.
|
|
# OpenSSL 1.0.0, 1.0.1, and 1.0.2 offer compression unless the "-no_comp" option is provided.
|
|
# OpenSSL 0.9.8 does not support either the "-comp" or the "-no_comp" option.
|
|
if [[ " $options " =~ \ -comp\ ]]; then
|
|
# Compression is needed for the test. So, remove "-comp" if it isn't supported, but
|
|
# otherwise make no changes.
|
|
! "$HAS_COMP" && options="${options//-comp/}"
|
|
else
|
|
# Compression is not needed. So, specify "-no_comp" if that option is supported.
|
|
"$HAS_NO_COMP" && options+=" -no_comp"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If $OPENSSL is compiled with TLSv1.3 support and s_client is called without
|
|
# specifying a protocol, but specifying a list of ciphers that doesn't include
|
|
# any TLSv1.3 ciphers, then the command will always fail. So, if $OPENSSL supports
|
|
# TLSv1.3 and a cipher list is provided, but no protocol is specified, then add
|
|
# -no_tls1_3 if no TLSv1.3 ciphers are provided.
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] && \
|
|
[[ "$tls13_ciphers" == notpresent || -z "$tls13_ciphers" ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! " $options " =~ \ -ssl[2|3]\ ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! " $options " =~ \ -tls1\ ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! " $options " =~ \ -tls1_[1|2|3]\ ]]; then
|
|
options+=" -no_tls1_3"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_SECLEVEL"; then
|
|
if [[ "$ciphers" == notpresent ]]; then
|
|
[[ ! " $options " =~ \ -tls1_3\ ]] && ciphers="@SECLEVEL=0:ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers="@SECLEVEL=0:$ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] || [[ "$tls13_ciphers" != notpresent ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
[[ "$ciphers" == notpresent ]] && ciphers=""
|
|
[[ "$tls13_ciphers" == notpresent ]] && tls13_ciphers=""
|
|
[[ -n "$ciphers" ]] && [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]] && ciphers=":$ciphers"
|
|
ciphers="$tls13_ciphers$ciphers"
|
|
options+=" -cipher $ciphers"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] && [[ -n "$ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
options+=" -cipher $ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tls13_ciphers" != notpresent ]] && [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
options+=" -ciphersuites $tls13_ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# In case of mutual TLS authentication is required by the server
|
|
# Note: the PEM certificate file must contain: client certificate and key (not encrypted)
|
|
if [[ -n "$MTLS" ]]; then
|
|
options+=" -cert $MTLS"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# OpenSSL's name for secp256r1 is prime256v1. So whenever we encounter this
|
|
# (e.g. client simulations) we replace it with the name which OpenSSL understands
|
|
# This shouldn't be needed. We have this here as a last resort
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ \ -curves\ ]]; then
|
|
! "$HAS_CURVES" && options="${options// -curves / -groups }"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ secp192r1 ]] && options="${options//secp192r1/prime192v1}"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ secp256r1 ]] && options="${options//secp256r1/prime256v1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$options"
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### check code starts here ######
|
|
|
|
# determines whether the port has an HTTP service running or not (plain TLS, no STARTTLS)
|
|
# arg1 could be the protocol determined as "working". IIS6 needs that.
|
|
#
|
|
service_detection() {
|
|
local -i was_killed
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
# Using sockets is a lot slower than using OpenSSL, and it is
|
|
# not as reliable, but if OpenSSL can't connect to the server,
|
|
# trying with sockets is better than not even trying.
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "" "" false
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
plaintext="$(tm_out "$GET_REQ11" | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
plaintext="${plaintext%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
send_app_data "$plaintext"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
receive_app_data true
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || > "$TMPFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
> "$TMPFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
send_close_notify "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
else
|
|
> "$TMPFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# SNI is not standardized for !HTTPS but fortunately for other protocols s_client doesn't seem to care
|
|
tm_out "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$1 -quiet $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
was_killed=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
head $TMPFILE | grep -aq '^HTTP/' && SERVICE=HTTP
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Ewaq "SMTP|ESMTP|Exim|IdeaSmtpServer|Kerio Connect|Postfix" && SERVICE=SMTP # I know some overlap here
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Ewaq "POP|POP3|Gpop|OK Dovecot" && SERVICE=POP # I know some overlap here
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Ewaqi "IMAP|IMAP4|Cyrus IMAP4IMAP4rev1|IMAP4rev1|Gimap" && SERVICE=IMAP # I know some overlap here
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -aq FTP && SERVICE=FTP
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqi "jabber|xmpp" && SERVICE=XMPP
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqw "Jive News|InterNetNews|NNRP|INN|Kerio Connect|NNTP Service|Kerio MailServer|NNTP server" && SERVICE=NNTP
|
|
# MongoDB port 27017 will respond to a GET request with a mocked HTTP response
|
|
[[ "$SERVICE" == HTTP ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqw "you are trying to access MongoDB over HTTP" && SERVICE=MongoDB
|
|
debugme head -50 $TMPFILE | sed -e '/<HTML>/,$d' -e '/<html>/,$d' -e '/<XML/,$d' -e '/<xml/,$d' -e '/<\?XML/,$d' -e '/<\?xml/,$d' -e '/<\!DOCTYPE/,$d' -e '/<\!doctype/,$d'
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out " Service detected: $CORRECT_SPACES"
|
|
jsonID="service"
|
|
case $SERVICE in
|
|
HTTP)
|
|
out " $SERVICE"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "$SERVICE"
|
|
;;
|
|
IMAP|POP|SMTP|NNTP|MongoDB)
|
|
out " $SERVICE, thus skipping HTTP specific checks"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "$SERVICE, thus skipping HTTP specific checks"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) if [[ ! -z $MTLS ]]; then
|
|
out " not identified, but mTLS authentication is set ==> trying HTTP checks"
|
|
SERVICE=HTTP
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "DEBUG" "Couldn't determine service -- ASSUME_HTTP set"
|
|
elif [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]] && [[ -z $MTLS ]]; then
|
|
out " certificate-based authentication without providing client certificate and private key => skipping all HTTP checks"
|
|
echo "certificate-based authentication without providing client certificate and private key => skipping all HTTP checks" >$TMPFILE
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "certificate-based authentication without providing client certificate and private key => skipping all HTTP checks"
|
|
else
|
|
out " Couldn't determine what's running on port $PORT"
|
|
if "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
SERVICE=HTTP
|
|
out " -- ASSUME_HTTP set though"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "DEBUG" "Couldn't determine service -- ASSUME_HTTP set"
|
|
else
|
|
out ", assuming no HTTP service => skipping all HTTP checks"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "DEBUG" "Couldn't determine service, skipping all HTTP checks"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# 1: counter variable
|
|
# 2: threshold for this variable
|
|
# 3: string for first occurrence of problem
|
|
# 4: string for repeated occurrence of problem
|
|
#
|
|
connectivity_problem() {
|
|
if [[ $1 -lt $2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY" && ! "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
:
|
|
else
|
|
prln_warning " Oops: $3"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $1 -ge $2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$4" =~ openssl\ s_client\ connect ]] ; then
|
|
fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT "Consider increasing MAX_OSSL_FAIL (currently: $2)"
|
|
elif [[ "$4" =~ repeated\ TCP\ connect ]]; then
|
|
fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT "Consider increasing MAX_SOCKET_FAIL (currently: $2)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#problems not handled: chunked
|
|
run_http_header() {
|
|
local header
|
|
local referer useragent
|
|
local url redirect
|
|
local jsonID="HTTP_status_code"
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
|
|
HEADERFILE=$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.http_header.txt
|
|
if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# skip repeating this line if it's 2nd, 3rd,.. try
|
|
outln; pr_headlineln " Testing HTTP header response @ \"$URL_PATH\" "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -ge $MAX_HEADER_FAIL ]]; then
|
|
# signal to caller we have a problem
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " HTTP Status Code "
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && url="/" || url="$1"
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$HEADERFILE 2>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Issue HTTP GET again as it properly finished within $HEADER_MAXSLEEP and didn't hang.
|
|
# Doing it again in the foreground to get an accurate header time
|
|
tm_out "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$HEADERFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
NOW_TIME=$(date "+%s")
|
|
HTTP_TIME=$(awk -F': ' '/^date:/ { print $2 } /^Date:/ { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE)
|
|
HTTP_AGE=$(awk -F': ' '/^[aA][gG][eE]: / { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE)
|
|
HAD_SLEPT=0
|
|
else
|
|
# 1st GET request hung and needed to be killed. Check whether it succeeded anyway:
|
|
if grep -Eiaq "XML|HTML|DOCTYPE|HTTP|Connection" $HEADERFILE; then
|
|
# correct by seconds we slept, HAD_SLEPT comes from wait_kill()
|
|
NOW_TIME=$(($(date "+%s") - HAD_SLEPT))
|
|
HTTP_TIME=$(awk -F': ' '/^date:/ { print $2 } /^Date:/ { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE)
|
|
HTTP_AGE=$(awk -F': ' '/^[aA][gG][eE]: / { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE)
|
|
else
|
|
prln_warning " likely HTTP header requests failed (#lines: $(wc -l $HEADERFILE | awk '{ print $1 }'))"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -lt 1 ]] && outln "Rerun with DEBUG>=1 and inspect $HEADERFILE\n"
|
|
fileout "HTTP_status_code" "WARN" "HTTP header request failed"
|
|
debugme cat $HEADERFILE
|
|
((NR_HEADER_FAIL++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
((NR_HEADER_FAIL++))
|
|
if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -ge $MAX_HEADER_FAIL ]]; then
|
|
# Now, try to give a hint whether it would make sense to try with OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1 instead
|
|
if [[ $CURVES_OFFERED == X448 ]] && ! "$HAS_X448" ; then
|
|
generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X448 curve." "${spaces}OpenSSL 1.1.1 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section."
|
|
elif [[ $CURVES_OFFERED == X25519 ]] && ! "$HAS_X25519" ; then
|
|
generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X25519 curve." "${spaces}OpenSSL 1.1.0 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section."
|
|
elif [[ $CURVES_OFFERED =~ X25519 ]] && [[ $CURVES_OFFERED =~ X448 ]] && ! "$HAS_X25519" && ! "$HAS_X448"; then
|
|
generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X25519/X448 curves." "${spaces}OpenSSL >=1.1.0 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section."
|
|
else
|
|
# we could give more hints but these are the most likely cases
|
|
generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero." "Skipping complete HTTP header section."
|
|
fi
|
|
KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=true
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "HTTP header reply empty. "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "HTTP header reply empty"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Populate vars for HTTP time
|
|
[[ -n "$HTTP_AGE" ]] && HTTP_AGE="$(strip_lf "$HTTP_AGE")"
|
|
[[ -n "$HTTP_TIME" ]] && HTTP_TIME="$(strip_lf "$HTTP_TIME")"
|
|
debugme echo "NOW_TIME: $NOW_TIME | HTTP_AGE: $HTTP_AGE | HTTP_TIME: $HTTP_TIME"
|
|
|
|
# Quit on first empty line to catch 98% of the cases. Next pattern is there because the SEDs tested
|
|
# so far seem not to be fine with header containing x0d x0a (CRLF) which is the usual case.
|
|
# So we also trigger also on any sign on a single line which is not alphanumeric (plus _)
|
|
sed -e '/^$/q' -e '/^[^a-zA-Z_0-9]$/q' $HEADERFILE >$HEADERFILE.tmp
|
|
# Now to be more sure we delete from '<' or '{' maybe with a leading blank until the end
|
|
sed -e '/^ *<.*$/d' -e '/^ *{.*$/d' $HEADERFILE.tmp >$HEADERFILE
|
|
debugme echo -e "---\n $(< $HEADERFILE) \n---"
|
|
|
|
HTTP_STATUS_CODE=$(awk '/^HTTP\// { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE 2>>$ERRFILE)
|
|
msg_thereafter=$(awk -F"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" '/^HTTP\// { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE 2>>$ERRFILE) # dirty trick to use the status code as a
|
|
msg_thereafter=$(strip_lf "$msg_thereafter") # field separator, otherwise we need a loop with awk
|
|
debugme echo "Status/MSG: $HTTP_STATUS_CODE $msg_thereafter"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" ]] && out " $HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter"
|
|
case $HTTP_STATUS_CODE in
|
|
301|302|307|308)
|
|
redirect=$(grep -a '^Location' $HEADERFILE | sed 's/Location: //' | tr -d '\r\n')
|
|
out ", redirecting to \""; pr_url "$redirect"; out "\""
|
|
if [[ $redirect =~ http:// ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high " -- Redirect to insecure URL (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "insecure_redirect" "HIGH" "Redirect to insecure URL: \"$redirect\""
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")"
|
|
;;
|
|
200|204|403|405)
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")"
|
|
;;
|
|
206)
|
|
out " -- WHAT?"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- WHAT?"
|
|
# partial content shouldn't happen
|
|
;;
|
|
400)
|
|
pr_cyan " (Hint: better try another URL)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- better try another URL"
|
|
;;
|
|
401)
|
|
grep -aq "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE && out " "; out "$(strip_lf "$(grep -a "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE)")"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- $(grep -a "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE)"
|
|
;;
|
|
404)
|
|
out " (Hint: supply a path which doesn't give a \"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter\")"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")"
|
|
;;
|
|
"")
|
|
prln_warning "No HTTP status code."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "No HTTP status code"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
pr_warning ". Oh, didn't expect \"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Unexpected $HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter @ \"$URL_PATH\""
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
# we don't call "tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt" as we need the header file in other functions!
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Borrowed from Glenn Jackman, see https://unix.stackexchange.com/users/4667/glenn-jackman
|
|
#
|
|
match_ipv4_httpheader() {
|
|
local octet="(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])"
|
|
local ipv4address="$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet"
|
|
local excluded_header="pagespeed|page-speed|^Content-Security-Policy|^MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices|^X-OWA-Version|^Location|^Server: "
|
|
local your_ip_msg="(check if it's your IP address or e.g. a cluster IP)"
|
|
local headers result
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local jsonID="ipv4_in_header"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-212"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Exclude some headers as they are mistakenly identified as ipv4 address. Issues #158, #323.
|
|
# Also facebook used to have a CSP rule for 127.0.0.1
|
|
headers="$(grep -Evai "$excluded_header" $HEADERFILE)"
|
|
if [[ "$headers" =~ $ipv4address ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " IPv4 address in header "
|
|
while read line; do
|
|
[[ "$line" =~ $ipv4address ]] || continue
|
|
result=$(strip_lf "$line")
|
|
if ! $first; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
your_ip_msg=""
|
|
else
|
|
first=false
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$result"
|
|
outln "\n$spaces$your_ip_msg"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "$result $your_ip_msg" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
done <<< "$headers"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_http_date() {
|
|
local difftime
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
jsonID="HTTP_clock_skew"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] || { [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]] && [[ -z "$MTLS" ]]; }; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " HTTP clock skew "
|
|
if [[ -n "$HTTP_TIME" ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
# We won't normalize the date under an OpenBSD thus no subtraction is feasible
|
|
outln "remote: $HTTP_TIME"
|
|
out "${spaces}local: $(LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date "+%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z")"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_TIME - $(TZ=GMT date "+%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z")"
|
|
else
|
|
# modifying the global from string to a number
|
|
HTTP_TIME="$(parse_date "$HTTP_TIME" "+%s" "%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z" 2>>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
difftime=$((HTTP_TIME + HTTP_AGE - NOW_TIME))
|
|
[[ $difftime != "-"* ]] && [[ $difftime != "0" ]] && difftime="+$difftime"
|
|
# process was killed, so we need to add an error
|
|
[[ $HAD_SLEPT -ne 0 ]] && difftime="$difftime (± 1.5)"
|
|
out "$difftime sec from localtime";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$difftime seconds from localtime"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$HTTP_TIME" ]]; then
|
|
# out " (HTTP header time: $HTTP_TIME)"
|
|
fileout "HTTP_headerTime" "INFO" "$HTTP_TIME"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$HTTP_AGE" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_bold " HTTP Age"
|
|
out " (RFC 7234) $HTTP_AGE"
|
|
fileout "HTTP_headerAge" "INFO" "$HTTP_AGE seconds"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
out "Got no HTTP time, maybe try different URL?";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "Got no HTTP time, maybe try different URL?"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tm_out ", HTTP_TIME + HTTP_AGE in epoch: $HTTP_TIME / $HTTP_AGE"
|
|
outln
|
|
match_ipv4_httpheader "$1"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# HEADERFILE needs to contain the HTTP header (made sure by invoker)
|
|
# arg1: key=word to match
|
|
# arg2: hint for fileout() if double header
|
|
# arg3: indentation, i.e string w spaces
|
|
# arg4: whether we need a CR before "misconfiguration"
|
|
# returns:
|
|
# 0 if header not found
|
|
# 1-n nr of headers found, then in HEADERVALUE the first value from key
|
|
#
|
|
match_httpheader_key() {
|
|
local key="$1"
|
|
local spaces="$3"
|
|
local first=$4
|
|
local -i nr=0
|
|
|
|
nr=$(grep -Eaic "^ *$key:" $HEADERFILE)
|
|
if [[ $nr -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
HEADERVALUE=""
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ $nr -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(grep -Eia "^ *$key:" $HEADERFILE)"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="${HEADERVALUE#*:}" # remove leading part=key to colon
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(strip_lf "$HEADERVALUE")"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(strip_leading_space "$HEADERVALUE")"
|
|
"$first" || out "$spaces"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
"$first" || out "$spaces"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "misconfiguration: "
|
|
pr_italic "$key"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium " ${nr}x"
|
|
outln " -- checking first one only"
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(grep -Fai "$key:" $HEADERFILE | head -1)"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="${HEADERVALUE#*:}"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(strip_lf "$HEADERVALUE")"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(strip_leading_space "$HEADERVALUE")"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && tm_italic "$HEADERVALUE" && tm_out "\n$spaces"
|
|
fileout "${2}_multiple" "MEDIUM" "Multiple $2 headers. Using first header: $HEADERVALUE"
|
|
return $nr
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
includeSubDomains() {
|
|
if grep -aiqw includeSubDomains "$1"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good ", includeSubDomains"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
pr_litecyan ", just this domain"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
preload() {
|
|
if grep -aiqw preload "$1"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good ", preload"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_hsts() {
|
|
local hsts_age_sec
|
|
local hsts_age_days
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local jsonID="HSTS"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Strict Transport Security "
|
|
match_httpheader_key "Strict-Transport-Security" "HSTS" "$spaces" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "$HEADERVALUE" >$TMPFILE
|
|
# strict parsing now as suggested in #2381
|
|
hsts_age_sec="${HEADERVALUE#*=}"
|
|
hsts_age_sec=${hsts_age_sec%%;*}
|
|
if [[ $hsts_age_sec =~ \" ]]; then
|
|
# remove first an last " in $hsts_age_sec (borrowed from strip_trailing_space/strip_leading_space):
|
|
hsts_age_sec=$(printf "%s" "${hsts_age_sec#"${hsts_age_sec%%[!\"]*}"}")
|
|
hsts_age_sec=$(printf "%s" "${hsts_age_sec%"${hsts_age_sec##*[!\"]}"}")
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "hsts_age_sec: $hsts_age_sec"
|
|
if ! is_number "$hsts_age_sec"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "misconfiguration: \'"$hsts_age_sec"\' is not a valid max-age specification"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "MEDIUM" "misconfiguration, specified not a number for max-age"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -n $hsts_age_sec ]]; then
|
|
hsts_age_days=$(( hsts_age_sec / 86400))
|
|
else
|
|
hsts_age_days=-1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $hsts_age_days -eq -1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "misconfiguration: HSTS max-age (recommended > $HSTS_MIN seconds = $((HSTS_MIN/86400)) days ) is required but missing"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "MEDIUM" "misconfiguration, parameter max-age (recommended > $HSTS_MIN seconds = $((HSTS_MIN/86400)) days) missing"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "HSTS max-age is misconfigured"
|
|
elif [[ $hsts_age_sec -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "HSTS max-age is set to 0. HSTS is disabled"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "LOW" "0. HSTS is disabled"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "HSTS is disabled"
|
|
elif [[ $hsts_age_sec -ge $HSTS_MIN ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hsts_age_days days" ; out "=$hsts_age_sec s"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "OK" "$hsts_age_days days (=$hsts_age_sec seconds) > $HSTS_MIN seconds"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$hsts_age_sec s = $hsts_age_days days is too short ( >= $HSTS_MIN seconds recommended)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "MEDIUM" "max-age too short. $hsts_age_days days (=$hsts_age_sec seconds) < $HSTS_MIN seconds"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "HSTS max-age is too short"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if includeSubDomains "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_subdomains" "OK" "includes subdomains"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_subdomains" "INFO" "only for this domain"
|
|
fi
|
|
if preload "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_preload" "OK" "domain IS marked for preloading"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_preload" "INFO" "domain is NOT marked for preloading"
|
|
#FIXME: To be checked against preloading lists,
|
|
# e.g. https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/manager/boot/src/nsSTSPreloadList.inc
|
|
# https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_low "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "not offered"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "HSTS is not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_hpkp() {
|
|
local -i hpkp_age_sec
|
|
local -i hpkp_age_days
|
|
local -i hpkp_nr_keys
|
|
local hpkp_spki hpkp_spki_hostcert
|
|
local -a backup_spki
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local spaces_indented=" "
|
|
local certificate_found=false
|
|
local -i i nrsaved
|
|
local first_hpkp_header
|
|
local spki
|
|
local ca_hashes="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/ca_hashes.txt"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Public Key Pinning "
|
|
grep -aiw '^Public-Key-Pins' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE # TMPFILE includes report-only
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE) -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "Misconfiguration, multiple Public-Key-Pins headers"
|
|
outln ", taking first line"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_error" "MEDIUM" "multiple Public-Key-Pins in header"
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE | head -1)"
|
|
# we only evaluate the keys here, unless they a not present
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
elif [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE) -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
outln "Multiple HPKP headers (Report-Only), taking first line"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_notice" "INFO" "multiple Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only in header"
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE | head -1)"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
elif [[ $(grep -Eaci '^Public-Key-Pins:|^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE) -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
outln "Public-Key-Pins + Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only detected. Continue with first one"
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
elif [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE) -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "Public-Key-Pins-Only detected"
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "INFO" "Only Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# remove leading Public-Key-Pins* and convert it to multiline arg
|
|
sed -e 's/Public-Key-Pins://g' -e s'/Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only://' <<< "$first_hpkp_header" | \
|
|
tr ';' '\n' | sed -e 's/\"//g' -e 's/^ //' >$TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
hpkp_nr_keys=$(grep -ac pin-sha $TMPFILE)
|
|
if [[ $hpkp_nr_keys -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "Only one key pinned (NOT ok), means the site may become unavailable in the future, "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "HIGH" "Only one key pinned"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_nr_keys"
|
|
out " keys, "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "OK" "$hpkp_nr_keys keys pinned in header"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# print key=value pair with awk, then strip non-numbers, to be improved with proper parsing of key-value with awk
|
|
if "$HAS_SED_E"; then
|
|
hpkp_age_sec=$(awk -F= '/max-age/{max_age=$2; print max_age}' $TMPFILE | sed -E 's/[^[:digit:]]//g')
|
|
else
|
|
hpkp_age_sec=$(awk -F= '/max-age/{max_age=$2; print max_age}' $TMPFILE | sed -r 's/[^[:digit:]]//g')
|
|
fi
|
|
hpkp_age_days=$((hpkp_age_sec / 86400))
|
|
if [[ $hpkp_age_sec -ge $HPKP_MIN ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_age_days days" ; out "=$hpkp_age_sec s"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_age" "OK" "HPKP age is set to $hpkp_age_days days ($hpkp_age_sec sec)"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$hpkp_age_sec s = "
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$hpkp_age_days days (< $HPKP_MIN s = $((HPKP_MIN / 86400)) days is not good enough)"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_age" "MEDIUM" "age is set to $hpkp_age_days days ($hpkp_age_sec sec) < $HPKP_MIN s = $((HPKP_MIN / 86400)) days is not good enough."
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if includeSubDomains "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
fileout "HPKP_subdomains" "INFO" "is valid for subdomains as well"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "HPKP_subdomains" "INFO" "is valid for this domain only"
|
|
fi
|
|
if preload "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
fileout "HPKP_preload" "INFO" "IS marked for browser preloading"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "HPKP_preload" "INFO" "NOT marked for browser preloading"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Get the SPKIs first
|
|
spki=$(tr ';' '\n' < $TMPFILE | tr -d ' ' | tr -d '\"' | awk -F'=' '/pin.*=/ { print $2 }')
|
|
debugme tmln_out "\n$spki"
|
|
|
|
# Look at the host certificate first
|
|
if [[ ! -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then
|
|
get_host_cert || return 1
|
|
# no host certificate
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
hpkp_spki_hostcert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null | grep -v PUBLIC | \
|
|
$OPENSSL base64 -d 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -binary 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL base64 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
hpkp_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -issuer -noout 2>/dev/null |sed 's/^.*CN=//' | sed 's/\/.*$//')"
|
|
|
|
# Get keys/hashes from intermediate certificates
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
# Place the server's certificate in $HOSTCERT and any intermediate
|
|
# certificates that were provided in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
# https://backreference.org/2010/05/09/ocsp-verification-with-openssl/
|
|
awk -v n=-1 "/Certificate chain/ {start=1}
|
|
/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} }
|
|
inc { print > (\"$TEMPDIR/level\" n \".crt\") }
|
|
/---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }" $TMPFILE
|
|
nrsaved=$(count_words "$(echo $TEMPDIR/level?.crt 2>/dev/null)")
|
|
rm $TEMPDIR/level0.crt 2>/dev/null
|
|
|
|
printf ""> "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes"
|
|
if [[ $nrsaved -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
for cert_fname in $TEMPDIR/level?.crt; do
|
|
hpkp_spki_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert_fname" -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null | grep -v PUBLIC | $OPENSSL base64 -d 2>/dev/null |
|
|
$OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -binary 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL enc -base64 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
hpkp_name="$(get_cn_from_cert $cert_fname)"
|
|
hpkp_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $cert_fname -issuer -noout 2>/dev/null |sed 's/^.*CN=//' | sed 's/\/.*$//')"
|
|
[[ -n $hpkp_name ]] || hpkp_name=$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert_fname" -subject -noout 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^subject= //')
|
|
echo "$hpkp_spki_ca $hpkp_name" >> "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# This is where the matching magic starts. First host, intermediate, then root certificate from the supplied stores
|
|
spki_match=false
|
|
has_backup_spki=false
|
|
i=0
|
|
for hpkp_spki in $spki; do
|
|
certificate_found=false
|
|
# compare collected SPKIs against the host certificate
|
|
if [[ "$hpkp_spki_hostcert" == "$hpkp_spki" ]] || [[ "$hpkp_spki_hostcert" == "$hpkp_spki=" ]]; then
|
|
certificate_found=true # We have a match
|
|
spki_match=true
|
|
out "\n$spaces_indented Host cert: "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "OK" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches the host certificate"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tm_out "\n $hpkp_spki | $hpkp_spki_hostcert"
|
|
|
|
# Check for intermediate match
|
|
if ! "$certificate_found"; then
|
|
hpkp_matches=$(grep "$hpkp_spki" $TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes 2>/dev/null)
|
|
if [[ -n $hpkp_matches ]]; then # hpkp_matches + hpkp_spki + '='
|
|
# We have a match
|
|
certificate_found=true
|
|
spki_match=true
|
|
out "\n$spaces_indented Sub CA: "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki"
|
|
ca_cn="$(sed "s/^[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< $"$hpkp_matches" )"
|
|
pr_italic " $ca_cn"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "OK" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Intermediate CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned in the HPKP header"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# we compare now against a precompiled list of SPKIs against the ROOT CAs we have in $ca_hashes
|
|
if ! "$certificate_found"; then
|
|
hpkp_matches=$(grep -h "$hpkp_spki" $ca_hashes 2>/dev/null | sort -u)
|
|
if [[ -n $hpkp_matches ]]; then
|
|
certificate_found=true # root CA found
|
|
spki_match=true
|
|
if [[ $(count_lines "$hpkp_matches") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
# replace by awk
|
|
match_ca=$(sed "s/[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< "$hpkp_matches")
|
|
else
|
|
match_ca=""
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
ca_cn="$(sed "s/^[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< $"$hpkp_matches" )"
|
|
if [[ "$match_ca" == "$hpkp_ca" ]]; then # part of the chain
|
|
out "\n$spaces_indented Root CA: "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki"
|
|
pr_italic " $ca_cn"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Root CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned. (Root CA part of the chain)"
|
|
else # not part of chain
|
|
match_ca=""
|
|
has_backup_spki=true # Root CA outside the chain --> we save it for unmatched
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Root CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned. (Root backup SPKI)"
|
|
backup_spki[i]="$(strip_lf "$hpkp_spki")" # save it for later
|
|
backup_spki_str[i]="$ca_cn" # also the name=CN of the root CA
|
|
i=$((i + 1))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# still no success --> it's probably a backup SPKI
|
|
if ! "$certificate_found"; then
|
|
# Most likely a backup SPKI, unfortunately we can't tell for what it is: host, intermediates
|
|
has_backup_spki=true
|
|
backup_spki[i]="$(strip_lf "$hpkp_spki")" # save it for later
|
|
backup_spki_str[i]="" # no root ca
|
|
i=$((i + 1))
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki doesn't match anything. This is ok for a backup for any certificate"
|
|
# CSV/JSON output here for the sake of simplicity, rest we do en bloc below
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# now print every backup spki out we saved before
|
|
out "\n$spaces_indented Backups: "
|
|
|
|
# for i=0 manually do the same as below as there's other indentation here
|
|
if [[ -n "${backup_spki_str[0]}" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "${backup_spki[0]}"
|
|
#out " Root CA: "
|
|
prln_italic " ${backup_spki_str[0]}"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "${backup_spki[0]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# now for i=1
|
|
for ((i=1; i < ${#backup_spki[@]} ;i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ -n "${backup_spki_str[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
# it's a Root CA outside the chain
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$spaces_indented ${backup_spki[i]}"
|
|
#out " Root CA: "
|
|
prln_italic " ${backup_spki_str[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$spaces_indented ${backup_spki[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ ! -f "$ca_hashes" ]] && "$spki_match"; then
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
prln_warning "Attribution of further hashes couldn't be done as $ca_hashes could not be found"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKImatch" "WARN" "Attribution of further hashes possible as $ca_hashes could not be found"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If all else fails...
|
|
if ! "$spki_match"; then
|
|
"$has_backup_spki" && out "$spaces" # we had a few lines with backup SPKIs already
|
|
prln_svrty_high " No matching key for SPKI found "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKImatch" "HIGH" "None of the SPKI match your host certificate, intermediate CA or known root CAs. Bricked site?"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$has_backup_spki"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high " No backup keys found. Loss/compromise of the currently pinned key(s) will lead to bricked site. "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_backup" "HIGH" "No backup keys found. Loss/compromise of the currently pinned key(s) will lead to bricked site."
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "HPKP" "INFO" "No support for HTTP Public Key Pinning"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
emphasize_stuff_in_headers(){
|
|
local html_brown="<span style=\\\"color:#8a7237;\\\">"
|
|
local html_yellow="<span style=\\\"color:#8a7237;font-weight:bold;\\\">"
|
|
local html_off="<\\/span>"
|
|
|
|
# see https://www.grymoire.com/Unix/Sed.html#uh-3
|
|
# outln "$1" | sed "s/[0-9]*/$brown&${off}/g"
|
|
tmln_out "$1" | sed -e "s/\([0-9]\)/${brown}\1${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Unix/${yellow}Unix${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Debian/${yellow}Debian${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Win32/${yellow}Win32${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Win64/${yellow}Win64${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Ubuntu/${yellow}Ubuntu${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/ubuntu/${yellow}ubuntu${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/buster/${yellow}buster${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/stretch/${yellow}stretch${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/jessie/${yellow}jessie${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/squeeze/${yellow}squeeze${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/wheezy/${yellow}wheezy${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/lenny/${yellow}lenny${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/SUSE/${yellow}SUSE${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Red Hat Enterprise Linux/${yellow}Red Hat Enterprise Linux${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Red Hat/${yellow}Red Hat${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/CentOS/${yellow}CentOS${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Via/${yellow}Via${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Forwarded/${yellow}X-Forwarded${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-TYPO3-Parsetime/${yellow}X-TYPO3-Parsetime${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Liferay-Portal/${yellow}Liferay-Portal${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Cache-Lookup/${yellow}X-Cache-Lookup${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Cache/${yellow}X-Cache${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Squid/${yellow}X-Squid${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Server/${yellow}X-Server${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Varnish/${yellow}X-Varnish${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-OWA-Version/${yellow}X-OWA-Version${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices/${yellow}MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Application-Context/${yellow}X-Application-Context${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Version/${yellow}X-Version${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Powered-By/${yellow}X-Powered-By${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-UA-Compatible/${yellow}X-UA-Compatible${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Link/${yellow}Link${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Rack-Cache/${yellow}X-Rack-Cache${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Runtime/${yellow}X-Runtime${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Pingback/${yellow}X-Pingback${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies/${yellow}X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-AspNet-Version/${yellow}X-AspNet-Version${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/x-note/${yellow}x-note${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/x-global-transaction-id/${yellow}x-global-transaction-id${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Global-Transaction-ID/${yellow}X-Global-Transaction-ID${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Alt-Svc/${yellow}Alt-Svc${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/system-wsgw-management-loopback/${yellow}system-wsgw-management-loopback${off}/g"
|
|
|
|
if "$do_html"; then
|
|
if [[ $COLOR -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
html_out "$(tm_out "$1" | sed -e 's/\&/\&/g' \
|
|
-e 's/</\</g' -e 's/>/\>/g' -e 's/"/\"/g' -e "s/'/\'/g" \
|
|
-e "s/\([0-9]\)/${html_brown}\1${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Unix/${html_yellow}Unix${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Debian/${html_yellow}Debian${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Win32/${html_yellow}Win32${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Win64/${html_yellow}Win64${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Ubuntu/${html_yellow}Ubuntu${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/ubuntu/${html_yellow}ubuntu${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/buster/${html_yellow}buster${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/stretch/${html_yellow}stretch${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/jessie/${html_yellow}jessie${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/squeeze/${html_yellow}squeeze${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/wheezy/${html_yellow}wheezy${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/lenny/${html_yellow}lenny${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/SUSE/${html_yellow}SUSE${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Red Hat Enterprise Linux/${html_yellow}Red Hat Enterprise Linux${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Red Hat/${html_yellow}Red Hat${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/CentOS/${html_yellow}CentOS${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Via/${html_yellow}Via${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Forwarded/${html_yellow}X-Forwarded${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-TYPO3-Parsetime/${yellow}X-TYPO3-Parsetime${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Liferay-Portal/${html_yellow}Liferay-Portal${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Cache-Lookup/${html_yellow}X-Cache-Lookup${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Cache/${html_yellow}X-Cache${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Squid/${html_yellow}X-Squid${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Server/${html_yellow}X-Server${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Varnish/${html_yellow}X-Varnish${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-OWA-Version/${html_yellow}X-OWA-Version${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices/${html_yellow}MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Application-Context/${html_yellow}X-Application-Context${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Version/${html_yellow}X-Version${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Powered-By/${html_yellow}X-Powered-By${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-UA-Compatible/${html_yellow}X-UA-Compatible${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Link/${html_yellow}Link${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Runtime/${html_yellow}X-Runtime${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Rack-Cache/${html_yellow}X-Rack-Cache${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Pingback/${html_yellow}X-Pingback${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies/${html_yellow}X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-AspNet-Version/${html_yellow}X-AspNet-Version${html_off}/g")" \
|
|
-e "s/x-note/${html_yellow}x-note${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Global-Transaction-ID/${html_yellow}X-Global-Transaction-ID${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/x-global-transaction-id/${html_yellow}x-global-transaction-id${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Alt-Svc/${html_yellow}Alt-Svc${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/system-wsgw-management-loopback/${html_yellow}system-wsgw-management-loopback${html_off}/g"
|
|
#FIXME: this is double code. The pattern to emphasize would fit better into
|
|
# one function.
|
|
# Also we need another function like run_other_header as otherwise "Link" "Alt-Svc" will never be found.
|
|
# And: I matches case sensitive only which might not detect all banners. (sed ignorecase is not possible w/ BSD sed)
|
|
else
|
|
html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"
|
|
fi
|
|
html_out "\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_server_banner() {
|
|
local serverbanner
|
|
local jsonID="banner_server"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Server banner "
|
|
grep -ai '^Server' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
serverbanner=$(sed -e 's/^Server: //' -e 's/^server: //' $TMPFILE)
|
|
serverbanner=${serverbanner//$'\r'}
|
|
serverbanner=${serverbanner//$'\n'}
|
|
if [[ -z "$serverbanner" ]]; then
|
|
outln "exists but empty string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "Server banner is empty"
|
|
else
|
|
emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$serverbanner"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$serverbanner"
|
|
if [[ "$serverbanner" == *Microsoft-IIS/6.* ]] && [[ $OSSL_VER == 1.0.2* ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning " It's recommended to run another test w/ OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 !"
|
|
# see https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "WARN" "IIS6_openssl_mismatch: Recommended to rerun this test w/ OpenSSL >= 1.0.1. See https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/
|
|
# https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/245030
|
|
else
|
|
outln "(no \"Server\" line in header, interesting!)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No Server banner line in header, interesting!"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_appl_banner() {
|
|
local line
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local appl_banners=""
|
|
local jsonID="banner_application"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Application banner "
|
|
grep -Eai '^X-Powered-By|^X-AspNet-Version|^X-Version|^Liferay-Portal|^X-TYPO3-Parsetime|^X-OWA-Version^|^MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No application banner found"
|
|
else
|
|
while IFS='' read -r line; do
|
|
line=$(strip_lf "$line")
|
|
if ! $first; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
appl_banners="${appl_banners}, ${line}"
|
|
else
|
|
appl_banners="${line}"
|
|
first=false
|
|
fi
|
|
emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$line"
|
|
done < "$TMPFILE"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$appl_banners"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_rp_banner() {
|
|
local line
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local rp_banners=""
|
|
local jsonID="banner_reverseproxy"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-200"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Reverse Proxy banner "
|
|
grep -Eai '^Via:|^X-Cache|^X-Squid|^X-Varnish:|^X-Server-Name:|^X-Server-Port:|^x-forwarded|^Forwarded' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "--" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
while read line; do
|
|
line=$(strip_lf "$line")
|
|
if $first; then
|
|
first=false
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$line"
|
|
rp_banners="${rp_banners}${line}"
|
|
done < $TMPFILE
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$rp_banners" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: multiline string w cookies
|
|
#
|
|
sub_f5_bigip_check() {
|
|
local allcookies="$1"
|
|
local ip port cookievalue cookiename
|
|
local routed_domain offset
|
|
local savedcookies=""
|
|
local spaces="$2"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-212"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
|
|
# taken from https://github.com/drwetter/F5-BIGIP-Decoder, more details see there
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -e "all cookies: >> $allcookies <<\n"
|
|
while true; do IFS='=' read cookiename cookievalue
|
|
[[ -z "$cookievalue" ]] && break
|
|
cookievalue=${cookievalue/;/}
|
|
debugme echo $cookiename : $cookievalue
|
|
if grep -Eq '[0-9]{9,10}\.[0-9]{3,5}\.0000' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
ip="$(f5_ip_oldstyle "$cookievalue")"
|
|
port="$(f5_port_decode $cookievalue)"
|
|
out "${spaces}F5 cookie (default IPv4 pool member): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is default IPv4 pool member ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif grep -Eq '^rd[0-9]{1,3}o0{20}f{4}[a-f0-9]{8}o[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
routed_domain="$(f5_determine_routeddomain "$cookievalue")"
|
|
offset=$(( 2 + ${#routed_domain} + 1 + 24))
|
|
port="${cookievalue##*o}"
|
|
ip="$(f5_hex2ip "${cookievalue:$offset:8}")"
|
|
out "${spaces}F5 cookie (IPv4 pool in routed domain "; pr_svrty_medium "$routed_domain"; out "): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is IPv4 pool member in routed domain $routed_domain ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif grep -Eq '^vi[a-f0-9]{32}\.[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
ip="$(f5_hex2ip6 ${cookievalue:2:32})"
|
|
port="${cookievalue##*.}"
|
|
port=$(f5_port_decode "$port")
|
|
out "${spaces}F5 cookie (default IPv6 pool member): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is default IPv6 pool member ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif grep -Eq '^rd[0-9]{1,3}o[a-f0-9]{32}o[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
routed_domain="$(f5_determine_routeddomain "$cookievalue")"
|
|
offset=$(( 2 + ${#routed_domain} + 1 ))
|
|
port="${cookievalue##*o}"
|
|
ip="$(f5_hex2ip6 ${cookievalue:$offset:32})"
|
|
out "${spaces}F5 cookie (IPv6 pool in routed domain "; pr_svrty_medium "$routed_domain"; out "): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is IPv6 pool member in routed domain $routed_domain ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif grep -Eq '^!.*=$' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
if [[ "${#cookievalue}" -eq 81 ]] ; then
|
|
savedcookies="${savedcookies} ${cookiename}=${cookievalue:1:79}"
|
|
out "${spaces}Encrypted F5 cookie named "; pr_italic "${cookiename}"; outln " detected"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "INFO" "encrypted F5 cookie named ${cookiename}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$allcookies"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_cookie_flags() { # ARG1: Path
|
|
local -i nr_cookies
|
|
local -i nr_httponly nr_secure
|
|
local negative_word
|
|
local msg302="" msg302_=""
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" =~ 20 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" =~ [301|302] ]]; then
|
|
msg302=" -- maybe better try target URL of 30x"
|
|
msg302_=" (30x detected, better try target URL of 30x)"
|
|
else
|
|
msg302=" -- HTTP status $HTTP_STATUS_CODE signals you maybe missed the web application"
|
|
msg302_=" (maybe missed the application)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Cookie(s) "
|
|
grep -ai '^Set-Cookie' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "(none issued at \"$1\")$msg302"
|
|
fileout "cookie_count" "INFO" "0 at \"$1\"$msg302_"
|
|
else
|
|
nr_cookies=$(count_lines "$(cat $TMPFILE)")
|
|
out "$nr_cookies issued: "
|
|
fileout "cookie_count" "INFO" "$nr_cookies at \"$1\"$msg302_"
|
|
if [[ $nr_cookies -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
negative_word="NONE"
|
|
else
|
|
negative_word="NOT"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_secure=$(grep -iac secure $TMPFILE)
|
|
case $nr_secure in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_medium "$negative_word" ;;
|
|
[123456789]) pr_svrty_good "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies";;
|
|
esac
|
|
out " secure, "
|
|
if [[ $nr_cookies -eq $nr_secure ]]; then
|
|
fileout "cookie_secure" "OK" "All ($nr_cookies) at \"$1\" marked as secure"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "cookie_secure" "INFO" "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies at \"$1\" marked as secure"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_httponly=$(grep -cai httponly $TMPFILE)
|
|
case $nr_httponly in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_medium "$negative_word" ;;
|
|
[123456789]) pr_svrty_good "$nr_httponly/$nr_cookies";;
|
|
esac
|
|
out " HttpOnly"
|
|
if [[ $nr_cookies -eq $nr_httponly ]]; then
|
|
fileout "cookie_httponly" "OK" "All ($nr_cookies) at \"$1\" marked as HttpOnly$msg302_"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "cookie_httponly" "INFO" "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies at \"$1\" marked as HttpOnly$msg302_"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "$msg302"
|
|
allcookies="$(awk '/[Ss][Ee][Tt]-[Cc][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ii][Ee]:/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
sub_f5_bigip_check "$allcookies" "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_security_headers() {
|
|
local header header_output svrty header_and_svrty
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local have_header=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Security headers "
|
|
# X-XSS-Protection is useless and at worst harmful, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20472947
|
|
for header_and_svrty in "X-Frame-Options OK" \
|
|
"X-Content-Type-Options OK" \
|
|
"Content-Security-Policy OK" \
|
|
"X-Content-Security-Policy OK" \
|
|
"X-WebKit-CSP OK" \
|
|
"Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only OK" \
|
|
"Expect-CT OK" \
|
|
"Permissions-Policy OK" \
|
|
"X-XSS-Protection INFO" \
|
|
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin INFO" \
|
|
"Upgrade INFO" \
|
|
"X-Served-By INFO" \
|
|
"Referrer-Policy INFO" \
|
|
"X-UA-Compatible INFO" \
|
|
"Cache-Control INFO" \
|
|
"Pragma INFO"; do
|
|
read header svrty <<< "${header_and_svrty}"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "testing \"$header\" (severity \"$svrty\")"
|
|
match_httpheader_key "$header" "$header" "$spaces" "$first"
|
|
if [[ $? -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
have_header=true
|
|
if "$first"; then
|
|
first=false
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$svrty" in
|
|
OK) pr_svrty_good "$header" ;;
|
|
LOW) pr_svrty_low "$header" ;;
|
|
INFO) out "$header" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# Include $header when determining where to insert line breaks, but print $header
|
|
# separately.
|
|
header_output="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "${header:2}: $HEADERVALUE" "$spaces " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
outln "${header_output#${header:2}}"
|
|
fileout "$header" "$svrty" "$HEADERVALUE"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
#TODO: I am not testing for the correctness or anything stupid yet, e.g. "X-Frame-Options: allowall" or Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|
|
|
|
if ! "$have_header"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "--"
|
|
fileout "security_headers" "MEDIUM" "--"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# #1: string with 2 openssl codes, output is same in NSS/ssllabs terminology
|
|
normalize_ciphercode() {
|
|
if [[ "${1:2:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$(tolower "x${1:7:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
tm_out "$(tolower "x${1:2:2}${1:7:2}${1:12:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prettyprint_local() {
|
|
local arg line
|
|
local hexc hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export
|
|
local re='^[0-9A-Fa-f]+$'
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$1" == 0x* ]] || [[ "$1" == 0X* ]]; then
|
|
fatal_cmd_line "pls supply x<number> instead" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then
|
|
pr_headline " Displaying all $OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS local ciphers ";
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headline " Displaying all local ciphers ";
|
|
# pattern provided; which one?
|
|
[[ $1 =~ $re ]] && \
|
|
pr_headline "matching number pattern \"$1\" " || \
|
|
pr_headline "matching word pattern "\"$1\"" (ignore case) "
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
neat_header
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then
|
|
while read -r hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export ; do
|
|
hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexcode)"
|
|
outln "$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc" "$export")"
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V") # -V doesn't work with openssl < 1.0
|
|
else
|
|
#for arg in $(echo $@ | sed 's/,/ /g'); do
|
|
for arg in ${*//,/ /}; do
|
|
while read -r hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export ; do
|
|
hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexcode)"
|
|
# for numbers we don't do word matching:
|
|
[[ $arg =~ $re ]] && \
|
|
line="$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc" "$export" | grep -ai "$arg")" || \
|
|
line="$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc" "$export" | grep -wai "$arg")"
|
|
[[ -n "$line" ]] && outln "$line"
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V") # -V doesn't work with openssl < 1.0
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Generic function for a rated output, no used yet.
|
|
# arg1: rating from 2 to -4 if available or not
|
|
# arg2: no/yes: decides whether positive or negative logic will be applied and "not" will be printed
|
|
# arg3: jsonID
|
|
#
|
|
rated_output() {
|
|
local jsonID=$3
|
|
local logic=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ $2 == no ]] || [[ $2 == negative ]]; then
|
|
logic="not "
|
|
fi
|
|
case $1 in
|
|
2) pr_svrty_best "${logic}offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "OK" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) pr_svrty_good "${logic}offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "OK" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
0) out "${logic}offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
-1) pr_svrty_low "${logic}offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "LOW" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
-2) pr_svrty_medium "${logic}offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "MEDIUM" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
-3) pr_svrty_high "${logic}offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "HIGH" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
-4) pr_svrty_critical "${logic}offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_warning "FIXME: error around $LINENO, (please report this)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "WARN" "return condition $2 when $1 unclear"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl2rfc() {
|
|
local rfcname=""
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && rfcname="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ "$rfcname" == "-" ]] && rfcname=""
|
|
[[ -n "$rfcname" ]] && tm_out "$rfcname"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rfc2openssl() {
|
|
local ossl_name
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]} ]] && ossl_name="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ "$ossl_name" == "-" ]] && ossl_name=""
|
|
[[ -n "$ossl_name" ]] && tm_out "$ossl_name"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
openssl2hexcode() {
|
|
local hexc=""
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
hexc="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' | awk '/ '"$1"' / { print $1 }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
hexc="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -tls1 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' | awk '/ '"$1"' / { print $1 }')"
|
|
else
|
|
hexc="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' | awk '/ '"$1"' / { print $1 }')"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$hexc" ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_out "$hexc"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rfc2hexcode() {
|
|
local hexc=""
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]} ]] && hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$hexc" ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_out "$hexc"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
show_rfc_style(){
|
|
local rfcname="" hexcode
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
hexcode="$(toupper "$1")"
|
|
case ${#hexcode} in
|
|
3) hexcode="0x00,0x${hexcode:1:2}" ;;
|
|
5) hexcode="0x${hexcode:1:2},0x${hexcode:3:2}" ;;
|
|
7) hexcode="0x${hexcode:1:2},0x${hexcode:3:2},0x${hexcode:5:2}" ;;
|
|
*) return 1 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$hexcode" == ${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]} ]] && rfcname="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ "$rfcname" == "-" ]] && rfcname=""
|
|
[[ -n "$rfcname" ]] && tm_out "$rfcname"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
neat_header(){
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf -- "Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC) KeyExch. Encryption Bits")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && out "$(printf -- " Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)")"
|
|
outln
|
|
out "$(printf -- "%s------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && out "$(printf -- "---------------------------------------")"
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
out "$(printf -- "Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) KeyExch. Encryption Bits")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && out "$(printf -- " Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)")"
|
|
outln
|
|
out "$(printf -- "%s--------------------------------------------------------------------------")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && out "$(printf -- "---------------------------------------------------")"
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hexcode
|
|
# arg2: cipher in openssl notation
|
|
# arg3: keyexchange
|
|
# arg4: encryption (maybe included "export")
|
|
# arg5: "export" if the cipher is an export-quality cipher, empty otherwise.
|
|
# arg6: not a boolean!
|
|
# "true" : if the cipher's "quality" should be highlighted
|
|
# "false": if the line should be printed in light grey
|
|
# "" : if line should be returned as a string
|
|
|
|
neat_list(){
|
|
local hexcode="$1"
|
|
local ossl_cipher="$2" export="$5" tls_cipher=""
|
|
local kx enc strength line what_dh bits
|
|
local -i i len
|
|
local how2show="$6"
|
|
|
|
kx="${3//Kx=/}"
|
|
kx="$(strip_trailing_space "$kx")"
|
|
enc="${4//Enc=/}"
|
|
# In two cases LibreSSL uses very long names for encryption algorithms
|
|
# and doesn't include the number of bits.
|
|
[[ "$enc" == ChaCha20-Poly1305 ]] && enc="CHACHA20(256)"
|
|
[[ "$enc" == GOST-28178-89-CNT ]] && enc="GOST(256)"
|
|
|
|
strength="${enc//\)/}" # retrieve (). first remove trailing ")"
|
|
strength="${strength#*\(}" # exfiltrate (VAL
|
|
enc="${enc%%\(*}"
|
|
|
|
enc="${enc//POLY1305/}" # remove POLY1305
|
|
enc="${enc//\//}" # remove "/"
|
|
|
|
# For rating set bit size but only when cipher is supported by server.
|
|
if [[ $how2show == true ]]; then
|
|
set_ciph_str_score $strength
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ "$export" =~ export ]] && strength="$strength,exp"
|
|
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && tls_cipher="$(show_rfc_style "$hexcode")"
|
|
|
|
# global var SHOW_EACH_C determines whether we display all tested ciphers
|
|
if [[ "$how2show" != true ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
line="$(printf -- " %-7s %-49s %-10s %-12s%-8s" "$hexcode" "$tls_cipher" "$kx" "$enc" "$strength")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && line+="$(printf -- " %-33s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$ossl_cipher")"
|
|
else
|
|
line="$(printf -- " %-7s %-33s %-10s %-12s%-8s" "$hexcode" "$ossl_cipher" "$kx" "$enc" "$strength")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && line+="$(printf -- " %-49s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$tls_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$how2show" ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$line"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_deemphasize "$line"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$kx" =~ " " ]]; then
|
|
what_dh="${kx%% *}"
|
|
bits="${kx##* }"
|
|
else
|
|
what_dh="$kx"
|
|
bits=""
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf -- " %-7s %-49s " "$hexcode" "$tls_cipher")"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$(printf -- " %-7s %-33s " "$hexcode" "$ossl_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
out "$(printf -- " %-7s " "$hexcode")"
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
print_fixed_width "$tls_cipher" 49 pr_cipher_quality
|
|
else
|
|
print_fixed_width "$ossl_cipher" 33 pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$what_dh"
|
|
if [[ -n "$bits" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $what_dh == DH ]] || [[ $what_dh == EDH ]]; then
|
|
pr_dh_quality "$bits" " $bits"
|
|
elif [[ $what_dh == ECDH ]]; then
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" " $bits"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
len=${#kx}
|
|
print_n_spaces "$((10-len))"
|
|
out "$(printf -- " %-12s%-8s " "$enc" "$strength")"
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == rfc ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf -- "%-33s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$ossl_cipher")"
|
|
elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == openssl ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf -- "%-49s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$tls_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == rfc ]]; then
|
|
print_fixed_width "$ossl_cipher" 32 pr_cipher_quality
|
|
elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == openssl ]]; then
|
|
print_fixed_width "$tls_cipher" 48 pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$(printf -- "${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_cipher_match(){
|
|
local hexc n auth ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers s
|
|
local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg
|
|
local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 ciph2 rfc_ciph rfc_ciph2 ossl_supported
|
|
local -a -i index
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0
|
|
local -i num_bundles bundle_size bundle end_of_bundle
|
|
local dhlen has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local cipher proto protos_to_try
|
|
local available
|
|
local -i sclient_success
|
|
local re='^[0-9A-Fa-f]+$'
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
pr_headline " Testing ciphers with "
|
|
if [[ $1 =~ $re ]]; then
|
|
pr_headline "matching number pattern \"$1\" "
|
|
tjolines="$tjolines matching number pattern \"$1\"\n\n"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headline "word pattern "\"$1\"" (ignore case) "
|
|
tjolines="$tjolines word pattern \"$1\" (ignore case)\n\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl"
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "."
|
|
prln_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
neat_header
|
|
#for arg in $(echo $@ | sed 's/,/ /g'); do
|
|
for arg in ${*//, /}; do
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
hexc="$(tolower "$hexc")"
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $arg =~ $re ]]; then
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" | grep -qai "$arg"
|
|
else
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" | grep -qwai "$arg"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && { "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"; }; then # string matches, so we can ssl to it:
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}")"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
sslvers[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && \
|
|
[[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" || ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" || ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexc)"
|
|
# is argument a number?
|
|
if [[ $arg =~ $re ]]; then
|
|
neat_list "$hexc" "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" "${kx[nr_ciphers]}" "${enc[nr_ciphers]}" "${export2[nr_ciphers]}" | grep -qai "$arg"
|
|
else
|
|
neat_list "$hexc" "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" "${kx[nr_ciphers]}" "${enc[nr_ciphers]}" "${export2[nr_ciphers]}" | grep -qwai "$arg"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then # string matches, so we can ssl to it:
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$hexc"
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Test the SSLv2 ciphers, if any.
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "${ciphers_to_test:2}" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ossl_supported[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != "SSLv2" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && "$HAS_TLS12" && protos_to_try+=" -tls1_2"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS11" && protos_to_try+=" -tls1_1"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS1" && protos_to_try+=" -tls1"
|
|
"$HAS_SSL3" && protos_to_try+=" -ssl3"
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_1 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=1
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != "SSLv2" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")"
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
[[ "${kx[i]}" == "Kx=any" ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
"${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C" || continue
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
available=""
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
available="available"
|
|
pr_cyan "available"
|
|
else
|
|
available="not a/v"
|
|
pr_deemphasize "not a/v"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fileout "cipher_${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "INFO" "$(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}") $available"
|
|
done
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
done
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0 # this is a single test for a cipher
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test for all ciphers locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad)
|
|
#
|
|
run_allciphers() {
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers_tested=0 nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0
|
|
local n auth mac hexc sslv2_ciphers="" s
|
|
local -a normalized_hexcode hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg ossl_supported
|
|
local -i i end_of_bundle bundle bundle_size num_bundles
|
|
local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2
|
|
local -i -a index
|
|
local proto protos_to_try
|
|
local dhlen available ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
# get a list of all the cipher suites to test
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
hexc="$(tolower "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")"
|
|
ciph[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
sslvers[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}"
|
|
kx[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=false
|
|
sigalg[i]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[i]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" && [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
ossl_supported[i]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
hexcode[i]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
hexcode[i]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
sslv2_ciphers="$sslv2_ciphers, ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"; then
|
|
nr_ciphers_tested+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
nr_ciphers=$TLS_NR_CIPHERS
|
|
else
|
|
while read -r hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:7:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_ciphers=$nr_ciphers+1
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V")
|
|
nr_ciphers_tested=$nr_ciphers
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers:2}" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing $nr_ciphers_tested ciphers via OpenSSL plus sockets against the server, ordered by encryption strength "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing all $nr_ciphers_tested locally available ciphers against the server, ordered by encryption strength "
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl"
|
|
outln
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "."
|
|
prln_warning " Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
neat_header
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then
|
|
[[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && continue
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && "$HAS_TLS12" && protos_to_try+=" -tls1_2"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS11" && protos_to_try+=" -tls1_1"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS1" && protos_to_try+=" -tls1"
|
|
"$HAS_SSL3" && protos_to_try+=" -ssl3"
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_1 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=1
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ "$proto" != "-no_ssl2" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
[[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && continue
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")"
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
[[ "${kx[i]}" == "Kx=any" ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}" || { "$SHOW_EACH_C" && { "$using_sockets" || "${ossl_supported[i]}"; }; }; then
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
available=""
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if ${ciphers_found[i]}; then
|
|
available="available"
|
|
pr_cyan "$available"
|
|
else
|
|
available="not a/v"
|
|
pr_deemphasize "$available"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fileout "cipher_${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "INFO" "$(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}") $available"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# test for all ciphers per protocol locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad)
|
|
# for the specified protocol, test for all ciphers locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they
|
|
# are good or bad) and list them in order to encryption strength.
|
|
ciphers_by_strength() {
|
|
local proto="$1" proto_hex="$2" proto_text="$3"
|
|
local using_sockets="$4" wide="$5" serverpref_known="$6"
|
|
local ossl_ciphers_proto
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers nr_ossl_ciphers nr_nonossl_ciphers success
|
|
local n sslvers auth mac hexc sslv2_ciphers="" cipher
|
|
local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph rfc_ciph kx enc export2
|
|
local -a hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2
|
|
local -i i bundle end_of_bundle bundle_size num_bundles
|
|
local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 sigalg ossl_supported index
|
|
local dhlen supported_sslv2_ciphers ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test addcmd temp
|
|
local available proto_supported=false
|
|
local id
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local -i quality worst_cipher=8 best_cipher=0 difference_rating=5
|
|
|
|
# for local problem if it happens
|
|
"$wide" || out " "
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! sclient_supported "$proto"; then
|
|
"$wide" && outln
|
|
pr_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support $proto"
|
|
"$wide" && outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
"$wide" && outln "\n - "
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# get a list of all the cipher suites to test
|
|
nr_ciphers=0
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && "$wide" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && \
|
|
[[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" || ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" || ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
hexc="$(tolower "$hexc")"
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if { "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"; }; then
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]] && [[ "$proto" != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" == -tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ ${#hexc} -eq 14 ]] && [[ "$proto" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_ciphers+=", ${hexcode[nr_ciphers]}"
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else # no sockets, openssl!
|
|
# The OpenSSL ciphers function, prior to version 1.1.0, could only understand -ssl2, -ssl3, and -tls1.
|
|
if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then
|
|
ossl_ciphers_proto=""
|
|
elif [[ $proto == -ssl2 ]] || [[ $proto == -ssl3 ]] || \
|
|
[[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.0* ]] || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || \
|
|
[[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]]; then
|
|
ossl_ciphers_proto="$proto"
|
|
else
|
|
ossl_ciphers_proto="-tls1"
|
|
fi
|
|
while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == AEAD-* ]] || continue
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" == -tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-SHA256 ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-SHA384 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-CCM ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-CCM8 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" =~ CHACHA20-POLY1305 ]]; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(normalize_ciphercode "$hexc")"
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "$ossl_ciphers_proto -V")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $proto == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers:2}" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] ; then
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
if [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
proto_supported=true
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
"$wide" && outln
|
|
outln " protocol supported with no cipher "
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
"$wide" && outln "\n - "
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
proto_supported=true
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
"$wide" && outln "\n - "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else # no SSLv2
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers=0
|
|
if sclient_supported "$proto"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
for (( success=0; success==0 ; 1 )); do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
success=1
|
|
if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]] || [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipher" ]]; then
|
|
success=0
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
proto_supported=true
|
|
"$wide" && [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if "$wide" && [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers=0
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
for (( success=0; success==0 ; 1 )); do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
success=1
|
|
if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then
|
|
if "$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
success=0
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
proto_supported=true
|
|
"$wide" && [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if "$wide" && [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$wide" && [[ "${FUNCNAME[1]}" == run_server_preference ]] && "$proto_supported"; then
|
|
if ! "$serverpref_known"; then
|
|
outln " (listed by strength)"
|
|
else
|
|
# Determine the best and worst quality level findings for the supported ciphers
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" != - ]]; then
|
|
get_cipher_quality "${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
get_cipher_quality ${ciph[i]}
|
|
fi
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
[[ $quality -lt $worst_cipher ]] && worst_cipher=$quality
|
|
[[ $quality -gt $best_cipher ]] && best_cipher=$quality
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
# Assign a rating (severity level) based on the difference between the levels
|
|
# of the best and worst supported ciphers.
|
|
if [[ $worst_cipher -ne $best_cipher ]]; then
|
|
case $best_cipher in
|
|
3|5|6|7)
|
|
difference_rating=$worst_cipher
|
|
[[ $difference_rating -gt 5 ]] && difference_rating=5
|
|
;;
|
|
4)
|
|
case $worst_cipher in
|
|
3) difference_rating=4 ;;
|
|
2) difference_rating=2 ;;
|
|
1) difference_rating=1 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
2)
|
|
difference_rating=2
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ $difference_rating -lt $NO_CIPHER_ORDER_LEVEL ]] && NO_CIPHER_ORDER_LEVEL=$difference_rating
|
|
id="cipher_order${proto}"
|
|
case $difference_rating in
|
|
5)
|
|
outln " (no server order, thus listed by strength)"
|
|
fileout "$id" "INFO" "NOT a cipher order configured"
|
|
;;
|
|
4)
|
|
prln_svrty_low " (no server order, thus listed by strength)"
|
|
fileout "$id" "LOW" "NOT a cipher order configured"
|
|
;;
|
|
3)
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " (no server order, thus listed by strength)"
|
|
fileout "$id" "MEDIUM" "NOT a cipher order configured"
|
|
;;
|
|
2)
|
|
prln_svrty_high " (no server order, thus listed by strength)"
|
|
fileout "$id" "HIGH" "NOT a cipher order configured"
|
|
;;
|
|
1)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " (no server order, thus listed by strength)"
|
|
fileout "$id" "CRITICAL" "NOT a cipher order configured"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$wide" && "$proto_supported" || [[ $proto != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
cipher=""
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" != - ]]; then
|
|
cipher+="${rfc_ciph[i]} "
|
|
else
|
|
cipher+="${ciph[i]} "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$wide" && { "${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C"; }; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[i]="$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")"
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
available=""
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
available="available"
|
|
pr_cyan "$available"
|
|
else
|
|
available="not a/v"
|
|
pr_deemphasize "$available"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
id="cipher$proto"
|
|
id+="_${normalized_hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fileout "$id" "$(get_cipher_quality_severity "${ciph[i]}")" "$proto_text $(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}") $available"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $proto != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
# We handled SSLv2 above already
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipher" ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered $proto yes
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered $proto no
|
|
"$wide" && outln " -"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$wide" && [[ -n "$cipher" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
out "$(printf " %-10s " "$proto_text: ")"
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$cipher" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
else
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$cipher" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$cipher" ]] && fileout "supportedciphers_${proto_text//./_}" "INFO" "$cipher"
|
|
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}${proto}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
#FIXME: no error condition
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Test for all ciphers per protocol locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad)
|
|
#
|
|
run_cipher_per_proto() {
|
|
local proto proto_hex proto_text
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing ciphers per protocol via OpenSSL plus sockets against the server, ordered by encryption strength "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing all locally available ciphers per protocol against the server, ordered by encryption strength "
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl"
|
|
outln
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "."
|
|
prln_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
neat_header
|
|
while read proto proto_hex proto_text; do
|
|
pr_underline "$(printf -- "%b" "$proto_text")"
|
|
ciphers_by_strength "$proto" "$proto_hex" "$proto_text" "$using_sockets" "true" "false"
|
|
done <<< "$(tm_out " -ssl2 22 SSLv2\n -ssl3 00 SSLv3\n -tls1 01 TLS 1\n -tls1_1 02 TLS 1.1\n -tls1_2 03 TLS 1.2\n -tls1_3 04 TLS 1.3")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
#FIXME: no error condition
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1 is an ASCII-HEX encoded SSLv3 or TLS ClientHello.
|
|
# arg2: new key_share extension (only present to response to HelloRetryRequest)
|
|
# arg3: cookie extension (if needed for response to HelloRetryRequest)
|
|
#
|
|
# This function may be used to either modify a ClientHello for client simulation
|
|
# or to create a second ClientHello in response to a HelloRetryRequest.
|
|
# If arg2 is present, then this is a response to a HelloRetryRequest, so the
|
|
# function replaces the key_share extension with arg2 and adds the cookie
|
|
# extension, if present.
|
|
# If arg2 is not present, then this is an initial ClientHello for client simulation.
|
|
# In this case, if the provided ClientHello contains a server name extension,
|
|
# then either:
|
|
# 1) replace it with one corresponding to $SNI; or
|
|
# 2) remove it, if $SNI is empty
|
|
modify_clienthello() {
|
|
local tls_handshake_ascii="$1"
|
|
local new_key_share="$2" cookie="$3"
|
|
local -i len offset tls_handshake_ascii_len len_all len_clienthello
|
|
local -i len_extensions len_extension
|
|
local tls_content_type tls_version_reclayer handshake_msg_type tls_clientversion
|
|
local tls_random tls_sid tls_cipher_suites tls_compression_methods
|
|
local tls_extensions="" extension_type len_extensions_hex
|
|
local len_servername hexdump_format_str servername_hexstr
|
|
local len_servername_hex len_sni_listlen len_sni_ext
|
|
local tls_client_hello len_clienthello_hex tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex
|
|
local sni_extension_found=false
|
|
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}
|
|
|
|
tls_content_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}"
|
|
tls_version_reclayer="${tls_handshake_ascii:2:4}"
|
|
len_all=$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:6:4}")
|
|
|
|
handshake_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:10:2}"
|
|
len_clienthello=$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:12:6}")
|
|
tls_clientversion="${tls_handshake_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
tls_random="${tls_handshake_ascii:22:64}"
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:86:2}")+2
|
|
tls_sid="${tls_handshake_ascii:86:$len}"
|
|
offset=86+$len
|
|
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}")+4
|
|
tls_cipher_suites="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}"
|
|
offset=$offset+$len
|
|
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:2}")+2
|
|
tls_compression_methods="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}"
|
|
offset=$offset+$len
|
|
|
|
if [[ $offset -ge $tls_handshake_ascii_len ]]; then
|
|
# No extensions
|
|
tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
len_extensions=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}")
|
|
offset+=4
|
|
for (( 1; offset < tls_handshake_ascii_len; 1 )); do
|
|
extension_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}"
|
|
offset+=4
|
|
len_extension=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}")
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == 0000 ]] && [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then
|
|
# If this is an initial ClientHello, then either remove
|
|
# the SNI extension or replace it with the correct server name.
|
|
sni_extension_found=true
|
|
if [[ -n "$SNI" ]]; then
|
|
servername=${XMPP_HOST:-${NODE}}
|
|
# Create a server name extension that corresponds to $SNI
|
|
len_servername=${#servername}
|
|
hexdump_format_str="$len_servername/1 \"%02x\""
|
|
servername_hexstr=$(printf $servername | hexdump -v -e "${hexdump_format_str}")
|
|
# convert lengths we need to fill in from dec to hex:
|
|
len_servername_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_servername)
|
|
len_sni_listlen=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+3)))
|
|
len_sni_ext=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+5)))
|
|
tls_extensions+="000000${len_sni_ext}00${len_sni_listlen}0000${len_servername_hex}${servername_hexstr}"
|
|
fi
|
|
offset+=$len_extension+4
|
|
elif [[ "$extension_type" != 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR ]] || [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then
|
|
# If this is in response to a HelloRetryRequest, then do
|
|
# not copy over the old key_share extension, but
|
|
# all other extensions should be copied into the new ClientHello.
|
|
offset=$offset-4
|
|
len=$len_extension+8
|
|
tls_extensions+="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}"
|
|
offset+=$len
|
|
else
|
|
# This is the key_share extension, and the modified ClientHello
|
|
# is being created in response to a HelloRetryRequest. Replace
|
|
# the existing key_share extension with the new one.
|
|
tls_extensions+="$new_key_share"
|
|
offset+=$len_extension+4
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
tls_extensions+="$cookie"
|
|
|
|
if ! "$sni_extension_found" && [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
len_extensions=${#tls_extensions}/2
|
|
len_extensions_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extensions)
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_extensions_hex"
|
|
tls_extensions="${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_extensions}"
|
|
|
|
tls_client_hello="${tls_clientversion}${tls_random}${tls_sid}${tls_cipher_suites}${tls_compression_methods}${tls_extensions}"
|
|
len_clienthello=${#tls_client_hello}/2
|
|
len_clienthello_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_clienthello)
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_clienthello_hex"
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii="${handshake_msg_type}00${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_client_hello}"
|
|
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}/2
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $tls_handshake_ascii_len)
|
|
len2twobytes "$tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex"
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii="${tls_content_type}${tls_version_reclayer}${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_handshake_ascii}"
|
|
tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client_simulation_sockets() {
|
|
local -i len i ret=0
|
|
local -i save=0
|
|
local lines clienthello data=""
|
|
local cipher_list_2send=""
|
|
local sock_reply_file2 sock_reply_file3
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii next_packet hello_done=0
|
|
local -i sid_len offset1 offset2
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${1:0:4}" == 1603 ]]; then
|
|
clienthello="$(modify_clienthello "$1")"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${clienthello:10}"
|
|
else
|
|
clienthello="$1"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO=""
|
|
fi
|
|
len=${#clienthello}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
data+=", ${clienthello:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
# same as above. If a CIPHER_SUITES string was provided, then check that it is in the ServerHello
|
|
# this appeared 1st in yassl + MySQL (https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/784) but adds
|
|
# robustness to the implementation
|
|
# see also https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/797
|
|
if [[ "${1:0:4}" == 1603 ]]; then
|
|
# Extract list of cipher suites from SSLv3 or later ClientHello
|
|
sid_len=4*$(hex2dec "${data:174:2}")
|
|
offset1=178+$sid_len
|
|
offset2=182+$sid_len
|
|
len=4*$(hex2dec "${data:offset1:2}${data:offset2:2}")-2
|
|
offset1=186+$sid_len
|
|
code2network "$(tolower "${data:offset1:len}")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format
|
|
else
|
|
# Extract list of cipher suites from SSLv2 ClientHello
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${clienthello:12:2}")
|
|
for (( i=22; i < 22+len; i+=6 )); do
|
|
offset1=$i+2
|
|
offset2=$i+4
|
|
[[ "${clienthello:i:2}" == 00 ]] && cipher_list_2send+=", ${clienthello:offset1:2},${clienthello:offset2:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
code2network "$(tolower "${cipher_list_2send:2}")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format
|
|
fi
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$NW_STR"
|
|
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 6
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nsending client hello... "
|
|
socksend_clienthello "${data}"
|
|
sleep $USLEEP_SND
|
|
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
|
|
# Check if the response is a HelloRetryRequest.
|
|
resend_if_hello_retry_request "$clienthello" "$tls_hello_ascii"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]] || [[ $ret -eq 6 ]]; then
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd
|
|
return $ret
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:1}" != "8" ]]; then
|
|
check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
hello_done=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for(( 1 ; hello_done==1; 1 )); do
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
sock_reply_file2=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.2
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... "
|
|
socksend "" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
|
|
next_packet=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
next_packet="${next_packet%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
if [[ ${#next_packet} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# This shouldn't be necessary. However, it protects against
|
|
# getting into an infinite loop if the server has nothing
|
|
# left to send and check_tls_serverhellodone doesn't
|
|
# correctly catch it.
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
hello_done=0
|
|
else
|
|
tls_hello_ascii+="$next_packet"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
sock_reply_file3=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.3
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file3" #FIXME: we moved that already
|
|
mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
cat "$sock_reply_file3" >> "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
rm "$sock_reply_file3"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
hello_done=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello..."
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6
|
|
echo
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
parse_sslv2_serverhello "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "false"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "Protocol : SSLv2" > "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0200"
|
|
ret=0
|
|
else
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey" "$cipher_list_2send"
|
|
save=$?
|
|
|
|
if [[ $save -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
send_close_notify "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
# see https://secure.wand.net.nz/trac/libprotoident/wiki/SSL
|
|
lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" 2>$ERRFILE)")
|
|
tm_out " ($lines lines returned) "
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# determine the return value for higher level, so that they can tell what the result is
|
|
if [[ $save -eq 1 ]] || [[ $lines -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
ret=1 # NOT available
|
|
else
|
|
ret=0
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_client_simulation() {
|
|
# Runs browser simulations. Browser capabilities gathered from:
|
|
# https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/clients.html on 10 jan 2016
|
|
local names=()
|
|
local short=()
|
|
local protos=()
|
|
local ch_ciphers=()
|
|
local ciphersuites=()
|
|
local tlsvers=()
|
|
local ch_sni=()
|
|
local warning=()
|
|
local handshakebytes=()
|
|
local lowest_protocol=()
|
|
local highest_protocol=()
|
|
local service=()
|
|
local minDhBits=()
|
|
local maxDhBits=()
|
|
local minRsaBits=()
|
|
local maxRsaBits=()
|
|
local minEcdsaBits=()
|
|
local curves=()
|
|
local requiresSha2=()
|
|
local current=()
|
|
local i=0
|
|
local name tls proto cipher temp what_dh bits curve supported_curves
|
|
local has_dh_bits using_sockets=true
|
|
local client_service
|
|
local options
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local jsonID="clientsimulation"
|
|
local client_service=""
|
|
|
|
# source the external file
|
|
. "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/client-simulation.txt" 2>/dev/null
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "couldn't find client simulation data in $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/client-simulation.txt"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != "" ]]; then
|
|
client_service="$SERVICE"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]]; then
|
|
# Can we take the service from STARTTLS?
|
|
client_service=$(toupper "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL%s}") # strip trailing 's' in ftp(s), smtp(s), pop3(s), etc
|
|
elif "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
client_service="HTTP"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "Could not determine the protocol, only simulating generic clients."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headline " Running client simulations "
|
|
[[ "$client_service" == HTTP ]] && pr_headline "($client_service) "
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
pr_headlineln "via sockets "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headline "via openssl "
|
|
prln_warning " -- pls note \"--ssl-native\" will return some false results"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "You shouldn't run this with \"--ssl-native\" as you will get false results"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
debugme echo
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]]; then
|
|
out " Browser Protocol Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) "
|
|
{ "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS"; } && out "Forward Secrecy"
|
|
outln
|
|
out "--------------------------------------------------------------------------"
|
|
else
|
|
out " Browser Protocol Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC) "
|
|
{ "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS"; } && out "Forward Secrecy"
|
|
outln
|
|
out "------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------"
|
|
fi
|
|
{ "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS"; } && out "----------------------"
|
|
outln
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
# We can't use the connectivity checker here as of now the openssl reply is always empty (reason??)
|
|
save_max_ossl_fail=$MAX_OSSL_FAIL
|
|
nr_ossl_fail=$NR_OSSL_FAIL
|
|
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=100
|
|
fi
|
|
for name in "${short[@]}"; do
|
|
if "${current[i]}" || "$ALL_CLIENTS" ; then
|
|
# for ANY we test this service or if the service we determined from STARTTLS matches
|
|
if [[ "${service[i]}" == ANY ]] || [[ "${service[i]}" =~ $client_service ]]; then
|
|
out " $(printf -- "%-29s" "${names[i]}")"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
client_simulation_sockets "${handshakebytes[i]}"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" -lt ${lowest_protocol[i]} ]] || \
|
|
[[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" -gt ${highest_protocol[i]} ]]; then
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE >$ERRFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -n "${curves[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
# "$OPENSSL s_client" will fail if the -curves option includes any unsupported curves.
|
|
supported_curves=""
|
|
for curve in $(colon_to_spaces "${curves[i]}"); do
|
|
# Attention! secp256r1 = prime256v1 and secp192r1 = prime192v1
|
|
# We need to map two curves here as otherwise handshakes will go wrong if "-curves" are supplied
|
|
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/apps/ecparam.c#L221 + ./ssl/t1_lib.c
|
|
[[ "$curve" =~ secp256r1 ]] && curve="${curve//secp256r1/prime256v1}"
|
|
[[ "$curve" =~ secp192r1 ]] && curve="${curve//secp192r1/prime192v1}"
|
|
[[ "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES" =~ \ $curve\ ]] && supported_curves+=":$curve"
|
|
done
|
|
curves[i]=""
|
|
[[ -n "$supported_curves" ]] && curves[i]="-curves ${supported_curves:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
options="$(s_client_options "-cipher ${ch_ciphers[i]} -ciphersuites "\'${ciphersuites[i]}\'" ${curves[i]} ${protos[i]} $STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -connect $NODEIP:$PORT ${ch_sni[i]}")"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS12" || options="${options//-no_tls1_2 /}"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS11" || options="${options//-no_tls1_1 /}"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS1" || options="${options//-no_tls1 /}"
|
|
"$HAS_SSL3" || options="${options//-no_ssl3 /}"
|
|
debugme echo "$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null"
|
|
# If "${protos[i]}" specifies protocols that aren't supported
|
|
# by $OPENSSL, then skip the test.
|
|
if [[ ! "${protos[i]}" =~ -no_ ]] && [[ ! "${protos[i]}" =~ \ ]] && ! sclient_supported "${protos[i]}"; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "${protos[i]} not supported, "
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "${highest_protocol[i]}" == 0x0300 ]]; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "SSLv3 not supported, "
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_TLS1" && [[ "${highest_protocol[i]}" == 0x0301 ]]; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "TLS 1 not supported, "
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_TLS11" && [[ "${highest_protocol[i]}" == 0x0302 ]]; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "TLS 1.1 not supported, "
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_TLS12" && [[ "${highest_protocol[i]}" == 0x0303 ]]; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "TLS 1.2 not supported, "
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ "${highest_protocol[i]}" == 0x0304 ]]; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "TLS 1.3 not supported, "
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
elif [[ -z "$(actually_supported_osslciphers ${ch_ciphers[i]} ${ciphersuites[i]})" ]]; then
|
|
# In some cases $OPENSSL supports the protocol, but none of the ciphers
|
|
# offered by the client being simulated. In that case, issue a "Local problem"
|
|
# rather than having sclient_connect_successful() write "Oops: openssl s_client connect problem".
|
|
pr_local_problem "No supported ciphers, "
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# If an ephemeral DH key was used, check that the number of bits is within range.
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE") # extract line
|
|
what_dh="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
bits="${temp##*, }"
|
|
# formatting
|
|
curve="${temp#*, }"
|
|
if [[ "$curve" == $bits ]]; then
|
|
curve=""
|
|
else
|
|
curve="${curve%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
bits="${bits/bits/}"
|
|
bits="${bits// /}"
|
|
if [[ "$what_dh" == X25519 ]] || [[ "$what_dh" == X448 ]]; then
|
|
curve="$what_dh"
|
|
what_dh="ECDH"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$what_dh" == DH ]]; then
|
|
[[ ${minDhBits[i]} -ne -1 ]] && [[ $bits -lt ${minDhBits[i]} ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
[[ ${maxDhBits[i]} -ne -1 ]] && [[ $bits -gt ${maxDhBits[i]} ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "No connection"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}-${short[i]}" "INFO" "No connection"
|
|
else
|
|
proto=$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)
|
|
# hack:
|
|
[[ "$proto" == TLSv1 ]] && proto="TLSv1.0"
|
|
[[ "$proto" == SSLv3 ]] && proto="SSLv3 "
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == TLSv1.2 ]] && { ! "$using_sockets" || [[ -z "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]]; }; then
|
|
# OpenSSL reports TLS1.2 even if the connection is TLS1.1 or TLS1.0. Need to figure out which one it is...
|
|
for tls in ${tlsvers[i]}; do
|
|
# If the handshake data specifies an unsupported protocol we need to remove it, otherwise the
|
|
# simulation will fail with # 'Oops: openssl s_client connect problem'
|
|
# before/after trying another protocol. We only print a warning it in debug mode
|
|
# as otherwise we would need e.g. handle the curves in a similar fashion -- not
|
|
# to speak about ciphers
|
|
if ! sclient_supported "$tls"; then
|
|
debugme pr_local_problem "$tls not supported, "
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
options="$(s_client_options "$tls -cipher ${ch_ciphers[i]} -ciphersuites "\'${ciphersuites[i]}\'" ${curves[i]} $STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -connect $NODEIP:$PORT ${ch_sni[i]}")"
|
|
debugme echo "$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
case "$tls" in
|
|
"-tls1_2") break ;;
|
|
"-tls1_1") proto="TLSv1.1"
|
|
break ;;
|
|
"-tls1") proto="TLSv1.0"
|
|
break ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* || "$cipher" == SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$cipher")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ "$cipher" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$cipher" != SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$proto "
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
out "$cipher"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_cipher_quality "$cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]]; then
|
|
print_n_spaces "$((34-${#cipher}))"
|
|
else
|
|
print_n_spaces "$((50-${#cipher}))"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$what_dh" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$curve" ]] && curve="($curve)"
|
|
if [[ "$what_dh" == ECDH ]]; then
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$(printf -- "%-12s" "$bits bit $what_dh") $curve"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_dh_quality "$bits" "$(printf -- "%-12s" "$bits bit $what_dh") $curve"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if "$HAS_DH_BITS" || { "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]]; }; then
|
|
out "No FS"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
if [[ -n "${warning[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
out " "
|
|
outln "${warning[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}-${short[i]}" "INFO" "$proto $cipher ${warning[i]}"
|
|
debugme cat $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi # correct service?
|
|
fi #current?
|
|
((i++))
|
|
done
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
# restore from above
|
|
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=$save_max_ossl_fail
|
|
NR_OSSL_FAIL=$nr_ossl_fail
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# generic function whether $1 is supported by s_client.
|
|
sclient_supported() {
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
-ssl2)
|
|
"$HAS_SSL2" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
-ssl3)
|
|
"$HAS_SSL3" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
-tls1)
|
|
"$HAS_TLS1" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
-tls1_1)
|
|
"$HAS_TLS11" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
-tls1_2)
|
|
"$HAS_TLS12" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
-tls1_3)
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
*) if $OPENSSL s_client -connect $NXCONNECT "$1" </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# The protocol check in run_protocols needs to be redone. The using_sockets part there kind of sucks.
|
|
# 1) we need to have a variable where the results are being stored so that every other test doesn't have to do this again
|
|
# --> we have that but certain information like "downgraded" are not being passed. That's not ok for run_protocols()/
|
|
# for all other functions we can use it
|
|
# 2) the code is old and one can do that way better
|
|
# We should do what's available and faster (openssl vs. sockets). Keep in mind that the socket reply for SSLv2 returns the number # of ciphers!
|
|
#
|
|
# arg1: -ssl2|-ssl3|-tls1|-tls1_1|-tls1_2|-tls1_3
|
|
#
|
|
run_prototest_openssl() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local protos proto
|
|
|
|
sclient_supported "$1" || return 7
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
-ssl2) protos="-ssl2" ;;
|
|
-ssl3) protos="-ssl3" ;;
|
|
-tls1) protos="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1 -no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;;
|
|
-tls1_1) protos="-no_tls1_2 -no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;;
|
|
-tls1_2) protos="-no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;;
|
|
-tls1_3) protos="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
#FIXME: we have here HAS_SSL(2|3) and more but we don't use that
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state $protos $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>&1 </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme grep -E "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
if [[ $ret -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if grep -aq "no cipher list" $TMPFILE; then
|
|
ret=5 # <--- important indicator for SSL2 (maybe others, too)
|
|
else
|
|
# try again without $PROXY
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state $protos $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>&1 </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme grep -E "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
grep -aq "no cipher list" $TMPFILE && ret=5 # <--- important indicator for SSL2 (maybe others, too)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
proto=${proto/\./_}
|
|
proto=${proto/v/}
|
|
proto="-$(tolower $proto)"
|
|
[[ "$proto" != $1 ]] && ret=2
|
|
case "$proto" in
|
|
-ssl3) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0300" ;;
|
|
-tls1) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0301" ;;
|
|
-tls1_1) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0302" ;;
|
|
-tls1_2) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0303" ;;
|
|
-tls1_3) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}$1.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
|
|
# 0: offered
|
|
# 1: not offered
|
|
# 2: downgraded
|
|
# 5: protocol ok, but no cipher
|
|
# 7: no local support
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Idempotent function to add SSL/TLS protocols. It should accelerate testing.
|
|
# PROTOS_OFFERED can be e.g. "ssl2:no ssl3:no tls1_2:yes" which means that
|
|
# SSLv2 and SSLv3 was tested but not available, TLS 1.2 was tested and available
|
|
# TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.2 not tested yet
|
|
#
|
|
# arg1: protocol
|
|
# arg2: available (yes) or not (no)
|
|
add_proto_offered() {
|
|
# the ":" is mandatory here (and @ other places), otherwise e.g. tls1 will match tls1_2
|
|
if [[ "$2" == yes ]] && [[ "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $1:no ]]; then
|
|
# In rare cases, a protocol may be marked as not available even though it is
|
|
# (e.g., the connection fails with tls_sockets() but succeeds with $OPENSSL.
|
|
PROTOS_OFFERED="${PROTOS_OFFERED/$1:no/$1:$2}"
|
|
elif [[ ! "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $1: ]]; then
|
|
PROTOS_OFFERED+="${1}:$2 "
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# function which checks whether SSLv2 - TLS 1.2 is being offered, see add_proto_offered()
|
|
# arg1: protocol string or hex code for TLS protocol
|
|
# echos: 0 if proto known being offered, 1: known not being offered, 2: we don't know yet whether proto is being offered
|
|
# return value is always zero
|
|
has_server_protocol() {
|
|
local proto
|
|
local proto_val_pair
|
|
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
04) proto="tls1_3" ;;
|
|
03) proto="tls1_2" ;;
|
|
02) proto="tls1_1" ;;
|
|
01) proto="tls1" ;;
|
|
00) proto="ssl3" ;;
|
|
*) proto="$1" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $proto: ]]; then
|
|
for proto_val_pair in $PROTOS_OFFERED; do
|
|
if [[ $proto_val_pair =~ $proto: ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${proto_val_pair#*:} == yes ]]; then
|
|
echo 0
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
echo 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
# if empty echo 2, hinting to the caller to check at additional cost/connect
|
|
echo 2
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# the protocol check needs to be revamped. It sucks, see above
|
|
run_protocols() {
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local supported_no_ciph1="supported but couldn't detect a cipher (may need debugging)"
|
|
local supported_no_ciph2="supported but couldn't detect a cipher"
|
|
local latest_supported="" # version.major and version.minor of highest version supported by the server
|
|
local detected_version_string latest_supported_string
|
|
local key_share_extn_nr="$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR"
|
|
local lines nr_ciphers_detected
|
|
local tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
local i drafts_offered="" drafts_offered_str="" supported_versions debug_recomm=""
|
|
local tls12_detected_version
|
|
local -i ret=0 ret_val_ssl3 ret_val_tls1 ret_val_tls11 ret_val_tls12=0 ret_val_tls13=0
|
|
local offers_tls13=false
|
|
local jsonID="SSLv2"
|
|
|
|
outln; pr_headline " Testing protocols "
|
|
|
|
if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
using_sockets=false
|
|
prln_underline "via native openssl"
|
|
else
|
|
using_sockets=true
|
|
if [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]]; then
|
|
prln_underline "via sockets "
|
|
else
|
|
prln_underline "via sockets except NPN+ALPN "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -le 1 ]] && debug_recomm=", rerun with DEBUG>=2 or --ssl-native"
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " SSLv2 ";
|
|
if ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets
|
|
case $? in
|
|
6) # couldn't open socket
|
|
prln_fixme "couldn't open socket"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "couldn't be tested, socket problem"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
7) # strange reply, couldn't convert the cipher spec length to a hex number
|
|
pr_cyan "strange v2 reply "
|
|
outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" | head -1
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received a strange SSLv2 reply (rerun with DEBUG>=2)"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) # no sslv2 server hello returned, like in openlitespeed which returns HTTP!
|
|
prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
;;
|
|
0) # reset
|
|
prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "likely not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
3) lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" 2>/dev/null)")
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out " ($lines lines) "
|
|
if [[ "$lines" -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3))
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "SSLv2 is offered"
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq "$nr_ciphers_detected" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "supported but couldn't detect a cipher and vulnerable to CVE-2015-3197 ";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered, no cipher" "CVE-2015-3197" "CWE-310"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok), also VULNERABLE to DROWN attack";
|
|
outln " -- $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "vulnerable with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
debugme tmln_out
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-ssl2"
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) prln_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "SSLv2 is offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
;;
|
|
5) prln_svrty_high "CVE-2015-3197: $supported_no_ciph2";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered, no cipher" "CVE-2015-3197" "CWE-310"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "SSLv2 is offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl2\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " SSLv3 ";
|
|
jsonID="SSLv3"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_ssl3=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
ret_val_ssl3=$?
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-ssl3"
|
|
ret_val_ssl3=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
case $ret_val_ssl3 in
|
|
0) prln_svrty_high "offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_SSL3"; then
|
|
latest_supported="0300"
|
|
latest_supported_string="SSLv3"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "SSLv3 is offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 no
|
|
;;
|
|
2) if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 no
|
|
pr_warning "SSL downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SSL downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) pr_svrty_high "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "SSLv3 is offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with SSLv3"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl3\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1 ";
|
|
jsonID="TLS1"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_tls1=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
ret_val_tls1=$?
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-tls1"
|
|
ret_val_tls1=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
case $ret_val_tls1 in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_low "offered" ; outln " (deprecated)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered (deprecated)"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_TLS1"; then
|
|
latest_supported="0301"
|
|
latest_supported_string="TLSv1.0"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "TLS 1.0 offered"
|
|
;; # nothing wrong with it -- per se
|
|
1) out "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 no
|
|
if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" # neither good nor bad
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2) pr_svrty_medium "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 no
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- downgraded"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered, and downgraded to SSL"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) out "not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 no
|
|
pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "likely not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "TLS 1.0 offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.0"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1.1 ";
|
|
jsonID="TLS1_1"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_tls11=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "02" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
ret_val_tls11=$?
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_1"
|
|
ret_val_tls11=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
case $ret_val_tls11 in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_low "offered" ; outln " (deprecated)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered (deprecated)"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_TLS11"; then
|
|
latest_supported="0302"
|
|
latest_supported_string="TLSv1.1"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "TLS 1.1 offered"
|
|
;; # nothing wrong with it
|
|
1) out "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 no
|
|
if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" # neither good nor bad
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2) out "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 no
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- downgraded"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "TLSv1.1 is not offered, and downgraded to a weaker protocol"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]] && [[ "$latest_supported" == 0301 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports TLSv1.0, but downgraded to SSLv3 (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to SSLv3 rather than TLSv1.0"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -gt 0x0302 ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) out "not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 no
|
|
pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "TLS 1.1 offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.1"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_1\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Now, we are doing a basic/pre test for TLS 1.2 and 1.3 in order not to penalize servers (medium)
|
|
# running TLS 1.3 only when TLS 1.2 is not offered. 0 and 5 are the return codes for
|
|
# TLS 1.3 support (kind of, including deprecated pre-versions of TLS 1.3)
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_tls12=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER"
|
|
ret_val_tls12=$?
|
|
tls12_detected_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_2"
|
|
ret_val_tls12=$?
|
|
tls12_detected_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_tls13=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
# Need to ensure that at most 128 ciphers are included in ClientHello.
|
|
# If the TLSv1.2 test in determine_optimal_sockets_params() was successful,
|
|
# then use the 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers plus the cipher selected in the TLSv1.2 test.
|
|
# If the TLSv1.2 test was not successful, then just use the 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers
|
|
# plus the list of ciphers used in all of the previous tests ($TLS_CIPHER).
|
|
if [[ -n "$TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test="$TLS13_CIPHER, $TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED, 00,ff"
|
|
else
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test="$TLS13_CIPHER,$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$tls13_ciphers_to_test"
|
|
ret_val_tls13=$?
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_3"
|
|
ret_val_tls13=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret_val_tls13 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret_val_tls13 -eq 5 ]]; then
|
|
offers_tls13=true # This variable comes in handy for further if statements below
|
|
fi
|
|
# Done with pretesting TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1.2 ";
|
|
jsonID="TLS1_2"
|
|
case $ret_val_tls12 in
|
|
0) prln_svrty_best "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_TLS12"; then
|
|
latest_supported="0303"
|
|
latest_supported_string="TLSv1.2"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes
|
|
;; # GCM cipher in TLS 1.2: very good!
|
|
1) add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
if "$offers_tls13"; then
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
if "$offers_tls13"; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered" # TLS 1.3, no TLS 1.2 --> no GCM, penalty
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 are not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2) add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "TLS 1.2 is not offered"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol"
|
|
if [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 0300 ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="SSLv3"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$tls12_detected_version-0x0301))"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$tls12_detected_version -lt 0x$latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports $latest_supported_string, but downgraded to $detected_version_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to $detected_version_string rather than $latest_supported_string"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$tls12_detected_version -gt 0x0303 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ ${#tls12_detected_version} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${tls12_detected_version:0:2}.${tls12_detected_version:2:2} (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${tls12_detected_version:0:2}.${tls12_detected_version:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${tls12_detected_version}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${tls12_detected_version}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) out "not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "TLS 1.2 is not offered"
|
|
pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_medium "not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "TLS 1.2 is not offered"
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected, but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.2"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_2\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1.3 ";
|
|
jsonID="TLS1_3"
|
|
case $ret_val_tls13 in
|
|
0) if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_best "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered"
|
|
else
|
|
# If TLS 1.3 is offered, then its support was detected
|
|
# by determine_optimal_sockets_params().
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3_rfc8446) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" 0304 "
|
|
else
|
|
for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12; do
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "$i")) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" 7F$i "
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="28"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
supported_versions=""
|
|
for i in 16 15 14 13 12; do
|
|
[[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]] || supported_versions+=",7f,$i"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$supported_versions" ]] && break
|
|
supported_versions="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3+1))), $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3))) $supported_versions"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "$supported_versions"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || break
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" ${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4} "
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[2-6] ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" ${BASH_REMATCH:8:4} "
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
supported_versions=""
|
|
for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17; do
|
|
[[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]] || supported_versions+=",7f,$i"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]] || supported_versions+=",03,04"
|
|
[[ -z "$supported_versions" ]] && break
|
|
supported_versions="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3+1))), $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3))) $supported_versions"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "$supported_versions"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || break
|
|
if [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00020304 ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" 0304 "
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[7-9A-C] ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" ${BASH_REMATCH:8:4} "
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="$key_share_extn_nr"
|
|
if [[ -n "$drafts_offered" ]]; then
|
|
for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12; do
|
|
if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$drafts_offered_str" ]] && drafts_offered_str+=", "
|
|
drafts_offered_str+="draft $(printf "%d" 0x$i)"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$drafts_offered_str" ]] && drafts_offered_str+=", "
|
|
drafts_offered_str+="final"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "offered (OK)"; outln ": $drafts_offered_str"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered with $drafts_offered_str"
|
|
else
|
|
out "offered (OK)"; outln ": $drafts_offered_str"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered with $drafts_offered_str"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "Unexpected results"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "unexpected results"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
latest_supported="0304"
|
|
latest_supported_string="TLSv1.3"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
;;
|
|
1) pr_svrty_low "not offered"
|
|
if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
;;
|
|
2) if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="SSLv3"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then
|
|
outln "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered + downgraded to weaker protocol"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -lt 0x$latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports $latest_supported_string, but downgraded to $detected_version_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to $detected_version_string rather than $latest_supported_string"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -gt 0x0304 ]]; then
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
;;
|
|
3) out "not offered "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
prln_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.3"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_3\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "PROTOS_OFFERED: $PROTOS_OFFERED"
|
|
if [[ ! "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ yes ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame "You should not proceed as no protocol was detected. If you still really really want to, say \"YES\"" "YES"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# list ciphers (and makes sure you have them locally configured)
|
|
# arg[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list (or anything else)
|
|
# arg[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list
|
|
# arg[3]: protocol (e.g., -ssl2)
|
|
#
|
|
listciphers() {
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
local debugname=""
|
|
local ciphers="$1"
|
|
local tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS"
|
|
local options="$3 "
|
|
|
|
[[ "$2" != ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$2"
|
|
"$HAS_SECLEVEL" && [[ -n "$ciphers" ]] && ciphers="@SECLEVEL=0:$1"
|
|
! "$HAS_TLS1" && options="${options//-tls1 /}"
|
|
if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $options -ciphersuites "$tls13_ciphers" "$ciphers" &>$TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $options "$tls13_ciphers:$ciphers" &>$TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $options "$ciphers" &>$TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme cat $TMPFILE
|
|
debugname="$(sed -e s'/\!/not/g' -e 's/\:/_/g' <<< "$1")"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.${debugname}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# argv[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax
|
|
# argv[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax
|
|
# argv[3]: string on console / HTML or "finding"
|
|
# argv[4]: rating whether ok to offer
|
|
# argv[5]: string to be appended for fileout
|
|
# argv[6]: non-SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets
|
|
# argv[7]: SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets
|
|
# argv[8]: true if using sockets, false if not
|
|
# argv[9]: CVE
|
|
# argv[10]: CWE
|
|
#
|
|
sub_cipherlists() {
|
|
local -i i len sclient_success=1
|
|
local cipherlist sslv2_cipherlist detected_ssl2_ciphers
|
|
local singlespaces
|
|
local proto=""
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local jsonID="cipherlist"
|
|
local using_sockets="${8}"
|
|
local cve="${9}"
|
|
local cwe="${10}"
|
|
|
|
pr_bold "$3 "
|
|
[[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]] && proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
jsonID="${jsonID}_$5"
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || listciphers "$1" "$2" $proto; then
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" || { "$FAST" && listciphers "$1" "$2" -tls1; }; then
|
|
for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
# If $OPENSSL doesn't support TLSv1.3 or if no TLSv1.3
|
|
# ciphers are being tested, then a TLSv1.2 ClientHello
|
|
# was tested in the first iteration.
|
|
! "$HAS_TLS13" && continue
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && continue
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_supported "$proto" || continue
|
|
"$FAST" && continue
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "$1" -ciphersuites "\'$2\'" $BUGS $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $proto") 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
debugme cat $ERRFILE
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
# If $cipherlist doesn't contain any TLSv1.3 ciphers, then there is
|
|
# no reason to try a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
|
|
[[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$6" =~ 13,0 ]] && continue
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" ", $6")"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipherlist" ]] && [[ "$cipherlist" != 00,ff ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipherlist"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol ssl2) ]]; then
|
|
if { [[ -z "$7" ]] || "$FAST"; } && "$HAS_SSL2" && listciphers "$1" "" -ssl2; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -cipher "$1" $BUGS $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
debugme cat $ERRFILE
|
|
elif [[ -n "$7" ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "$7" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_cipherlist="$(strip_spaces "${7//,/}")"
|
|
len=${#sslv2_cipherlist}
|
|
detected_ssl2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len; i+=6 )); do
|
|
[[ "$detected_ssl2_ciphers" =~ x${sslv2_cipherlist:i:6} ]] && sclient_success=0 && break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && $BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER; then
|
|
# If server failed with a known error, raise it to the user.
|
|
if [[ $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL == mysql ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "SERVER_ERROR: test inconclusive due to MySQL Community Edition (yaSSL) bug."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SERVER_ERROR, test inconclusive due to MySQL Community Edition (yaSSL) bug." "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "SERVER_ERROR: test inconclusive."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SERVER_ERROR, test inconclusive." "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
else
|
|
# Otherwise the error means the server doesn't support that cipher list.
|
|
case $4 in
|
|
7) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Strong is excellent to offer
|
|
pr_svrty_best "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
6) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# High is good to offer
|
|
pr_svrty_good "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
# FIXME: we don't penalize the absence of high, but perhaps
|
|
# we should if there is also no strong encryption (next)
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
5) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Neither good nor bad to offer
|
|
out "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
4) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# medium is not that bad
|
|
pr_svrty_low "offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# bad but there is worse
|
|
pr_svrty_high "offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
# need a check for -eq 1 here
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
1) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# the ugly ones
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) # we shouldn't reach this
|
|
pr_warning "?: $4 (please report this)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "return condition $4 unclear" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Not a perfect place here. A new one should be picked in the future
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 && "$1" =~ (^|:)EXPORT(:|$) ]] && set_grade_cap "F" "Export suite offered"
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 && "$1" =~ AEAD ]] && set_grade_cap "B" "No AEAD ciphers offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.${5}.txt
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- $1"
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
singlespaces=$(sed -e 's/ \+/ /g' -e 's/^ //' -e 's/ $//g' -e 's/ //g' <<< "$3")
|
|
if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "No $singlespaces for SSLv2 configured in $OPENSSL"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "No $singlespaces configured in $OPENSSL"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Cipher $3 ($1) not supported by local OpenSSL ($OPENSSL)"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#TODO: work with fixed lists here --> atm ok, as sockets are preferred. If there would be a single function for testing: yes.
|
|
run_cipherlists() {
|
|
local hexc hexcode strength
|
|
local -i i
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local ossl_null_ciphers null_ciphers sslv2_null_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_anon_ciphers anon_ciphers sslv2_anon_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_exp_ciphers exp_ciphers sslv2_exp_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_low_ciphers low_ciphers sslv2_low_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_tdes_ciphers tdes_ciphers sslv2_tdes_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_obsoleted_ciphers obsoleted_ciphers
|
|
local strong_ciphers
|
|
local cwe="CWE-327"
|
|
local cwe2="CWE-310"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing cipher categories "
|
|
outln
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
# conversion 2 byte ciphers via: echo "$@" | sed -e 's/[[:xdigit:]]\{2\},/0x&/g' -e 's/, /\n/g' | while read ci; do grep -wi $ci etc/cipher-mapping.txt; done
|
|
|
|
ossl_null_ciphers='NULL:eNULL'
|
|
null_ciphers="c0,10, c0,06, c0,15, c0,0b, c0,01, c0,3b, c0,3a, c0,39, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,b5, 00,b4, 00,2e, 00,2d, 00,b1, 00,b0, 00,2c, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, 00,82, 00,83, ff,87, 00,ff"
|
|
sslv2_null_ciphers="FF,80,10, 00,00,00"
|
|
|
|
ossl_anon_ciphers='aNULL:ADH'
|
|
anon_ciphers="c0,19, 00,a7, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, c0,47, c0,5b, c0,85, c0,18, 00,a6, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,46, c0,5a, c0,84, c0,16, 00,18, c0,17, 00,1b, 00,1a, 00,19, 00,17, c0,15, 00,ff"
|
|
sslv2_anon_ciphers="FF,80,10"
|
|
|
|
ossl_exp_ciphers='EXPORT:!ADH:!NULL'
|
|
# grep -i EXP etc/cipher-mapping.txt
|
|
exp_ciphers="00,63, 00,62, 00,61, 00,65, 00,64, 00,60, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e, 00,17, 00,03, 00,28, 00,2b, 00,ff"
|
|
sslv2_exp_ciphers="04,00,80, 02,00,80, 00,00,00"
|
|
|
|
ossl_low_ciphers='LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:MD5:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL:!AECDH'
|
|
# grep -Ew '64|56|RC2|RC4|MD5' etc/cipher-mapping.txt | grep -Ev 'Au=None|export'
|
|
low_ciphers="00,04, 00,05, 00,09, 00,0C, 00,0F, 00,12, 00,15, 00,1E, 00,20, 00,22, 00, 23, 00,24, 00,25, 00,66, 00,8A, 00,8E, 00,92, C0,02, C0,07, C0,0C, C0,11, C0,33, FF,00, FE,FE, FF,E1, 00,FF"
|
|
sslv2_low_ciphers="01,00,80, 03,00,80, 05,00,80, 06,00,40, 06,01,40, 07,00,c0, 08,00,80, FF,80,00"
|
|
|
|
ossl_tdes_ciphers='3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH:!MD5'
|
|
# grep -Ew '3DES|IDEA' etc/cipher-mapping.txt | grep -Ev "Au=None|MD5"
|
|
tdes_ciphers="00,07, 00,0A, 00,0D, 00,10, 00,13, 00,16, 00,1F, 00,21, 00,8B, 00,8F, 00,93, C0,03, C0,08, C0,0D, C0,12, C0,1A, C0,1B, C0,1C, C0,34, FE,FF, FF,E0, 00,FF"
|
|
sslv2_tdes_ciphers="07,01,c0"
|
|
|
|
# # Now all AES, CAMELLIA, ARIA and SEED CBC ciphers plus GOST
|
|
ossl_obsoleted_ciphers='HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL:!MD5'
|
|
# grep -Ew "256|128" etc/cipher-mapping.txt | grep -Ev "Au=None|AEAD|RC2|RC4|IDEA|MD5"
|
|
obsoleted_ciphers="00,2F, 00,30, 00,31, 00,32, 00,33, 00,35, 00,36, 00,37, 00,38, 00,39, 00,3C, 00,3D, 00,3E, 00,3F, 00,40, 00,41, 00,42, 00,43, 00,44, 00,45, 00,67, 00,68, 00,69, 00,6A, 00,6B, 00,84, 00,85, 00,86, 00,87, 00,88, 00,8C, 00,8D, 00,90, 00,91, 00,94, 00,95, 00,96, 00,97, 00,98, 00,99, 00,9A, 00,AE, 00,AF, 00,B2, 00,B3, 00,B6, 00,B7, 00,BA, 00,BB, 00,BC, 00,BD, 00,BE, 00,C0, 00,C1, 00,C2, 00,C3, 00,C4, C0,04, C0,05, C0,09, C0,0A, C0,0E, C0,0F, C0,13, C0,14, C0,1D, C0,1E, C0,1F, C0,20, C0,21, C0,22, C0,23, C0,24, C0,25, C0,26, C0,27, C0,28, C0,29, C0,2A, C0,35, C0,36, C0,37, C0,38, C0,3C, C0,3D, C0,3E, C0,3F, C0,40, C0,41, C0,42, C0,43, C0,44, C0,45, C0,48, C0,49, C0,4A, C0,4B, C0,4C, C0,4D, C0,4E, C0,4F, C0,64, C0,65, C0,66, C0,67, C0,68, C0,69, C0,70, C0,71, C0,72, C0,73, C0,74, C0,75, C0,76, C0,77, C0,78, C0,79, C0,94, C0,95, C0,96, C0,97, C0,98, C0,99, C0,9A, C0,9B"
|
|
# Workaround: If we use sockets and in order not to hit 131+1 ciphers we omit the GOST ciphers if SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG is true.
|
|
# This won't be supported by Cisco ACE anyway.
|
|
"$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" || obsoleted_ciphers="${obsoleted_ciphers}, 00,80, 00,81, FF,01, FF,02, FF,03, FF,85"
|
|
obsoleted_ciphers="${obsoleted_ciphers}, 00,FF"
|
|
|
|
ossl_good_ciphers='AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kEECDH:!kEDH:!kDHE:!kDHEPSK:!kECDHEPSK:!aNULL'
|
|
# grep AEAD etc/cipher-mapping.txt | grep -Ev 'Au=None|TLS_ECDHE|TLS_DHE|TLS_PSK_DHE|TLSv1.3'
|
|
good_ciphers="00,9C, 00,9D, 00,A0, 00,A1, 00,A4, 00,A5, 00,A8, 00,A9, 00,AC, 00,AD, C0,2D, C0,2E, C0,31, C0,32, C0,50, C0,51, C0,54, C0,55, C0,58, C0,59, C0,5E, C0,5F, C0,62, C0,63, C0,6A, C0,6B, C0,6E, C0,6F, C0,7A, C0,7B, C0,7E, C0,7F, C0,82, C0,83, C0,88, C0,89, C0,8C, C0,8D, C0,8E, C0,8F, C0,92, C0,93, C0,9C, C0,9D, C0,A0, C0,A1, C0,A4, C0,A5, C0,A8, C0,A9, CC,AB, CC,AE, 00,FF"
|
|
|
|
ossl_strong_ciphers='AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kPSK:!kRSAPSK:!kRSA:!kDH:!kECDH:!aNULL'
|
|
# grep AEAD etc/cipher-mapping.txt | grep -E 'TLS_ECDHE|TLS_DHE|TLS_PSK_DHE|TLSv1.3'
|
|
strong_ciphers="00,9E, 00,9F, 00,A2, 00,A3, 00,AA, 00,AB, 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 16,B7, 16,B8, 16,B9, 16,BA, C0,2B, C0,2C, C0,2F, C0,30, C0,52, C0,53, C0,56, C0,57, C0,5C, C0,5D, C0,60, C0,61, C0,6C, C0,6D, C0,7C, C0,7D, C0,80, C0,81, C0,86, C0,87, C0,8A, C0,8B, C0,90, C0,91, C0,9E, C0,9F, C0,A2, C0,A3, C0,A6, C0,A7, C0,AA, C0,AB, C0,AC, C0,AD, C0,AE, C0,AF, CC,13, CC,14, CC,15, CC,A8, CC,A9, CC,AA, CC,AC, CC,AD, 00,FF"
|
|
|
|
# argv[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax
|
|
# argv[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax
|
|
# argv[3]: string on console / HTML or "finding"
|
|
# argv[4]: rating whether ok to offer
|
|
# argv[5]: string to be appended for fileout
|
|
# argv[6]: non-SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets
|
|
# argv[7]: SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets
|
|
# argv[8]: true if using sockets, false if not
|
|
# argv[9]: CVE
|
|
# argv[10]: CWE
|
|
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_null_ciphers" "" " NULL ciphers (no encryption) " 1 "NULL" "$null_ciphers" "$sslv2_null_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_anon_ciphers" "" " Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication) " 1 "aNULL" "$anon_ciphers" "$sslv2_anon_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_exp_ciphers" "" " Export ciphers (w/o ADH+NULL) " 1 "EXPORT" "$exp_ciphers" "$sslv2_exp_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_low_ciphers" "" " LOW: 64 Bit + DES, RC[2,4], MD5 (w/o export) " 2 "LOW" "$low_ciphers" "$sslv2_low_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_tdes_ciphers" "" " Triple DES Ciphers / IDEA " 3 "3DES_IDEA" "$tdes_ciphers" "$sslv2_tdes_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe2"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_obsoleted_ciphers" "" " Obsoleted CBC ciphers (AES, ARIA etc.) " 4 "OBSOLETED" "$obsoleted_ciphers" "" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe2"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_good_ciphers" "" " Strong encryption (AEAD ciphers) with no FS " 6 "STRONG_NOFS" "$good_ciphers" "" "$using_sockets" "" ""
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_strong_ciphers" 'ALL' " Forward Secrecy strong encryption (AEAD ciphers)" 7 "STRONG_FS" "$strong_ciphers" "" "$using_sockets" "" ""
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pr_sigalg_quality() {
|
|
local sigalg="$1"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$sigalg" =~ MD5 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$sigalg"
|
|
elif [[ "$sigalg" =~ SHA1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "$sigalg"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$sigalg"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The return value is an indicator of the quality of the DH key length in $1:
|
|
# 1 = pr_svrty_critical, 2 = pr_svrty_high, 3 = pr_svrty_medium, 4 = pr_svrty_low
|
|
# 5 = neither good nor bad, 6 = pr_svrty_good, 7 = pr_svrty_best
|
|
pr_dh_quality() {
|
|
local bits="$1"
|
|
local string="$2"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$bits" -le 600 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$string"
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 800 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$string"
|
|
return 2
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 1280 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$string"
|
|
return 3
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -ge 2048 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$string"
|
|
return 6
|
|
else
|
|
out "$string"
|
|
return 5
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# prints out dh group=prime and in round brackets DH bits and labels it accordingly
|
|
# arg1: name of dh group, arg2=bit length
|
|
pr_dh() {
|
|
local -i quality=0
|
|
|
|
pr_italic "$1"
|
|
out " ("
|
|
pr_dh_quality "$2" "$2 bits"
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
out ")"
|
|
return $quality
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality() {
|
|
local bits="$1"
|
|
local string="$2"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$bits" -le 80 ]]; then # has that ever existed?
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$string"
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 108 ]]; then # has that ever existed?
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$string"
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 163 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$string"
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 193 ]]; then # hmm, according to https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography it should ok
|
|
pr_svrty_low "$string" # but openssl removed it https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/299#issuecomment-220905416
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 224 ]]; then
|
|
out "$string"
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -gt 224 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$string"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$string"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pr_ecdh_curve_quality() {
|
|
curve="$1"
|
|
local -i bits=0
|
|
|
|
case "$curve" in
|
|
"sect163k1") bits=163 ;;
|
|
"sect163r1") bits=162 ;;
|
|
"sect163r2") bits=163 ;;
|
|
"sect193r1") bits=193 ;;
|
|
"sect193r2") bits=193 ;;
|
|
"sect233k1") bits=232 ;;
|
|
"sect233r1") bits=233 ;;
|
|
"sect239k1") bits=238 ;;
|
|
"sect283k1") bits=281 ;;
|
|
"sect283r1") bits=282 ;;
|
|
"sect409k1") bits=407 ;;
|
|
"sect409r1") bits=409 ;;
|
|
"sect571k1") bits=570 ;;
|
|
"sect571r1") bits=570 ;;
|
|
"secp160k1") bits=161 ;;
|
|
"secp160r1") bits=161 ;;
|
|
"secp160r2") bits=161 ;;
|
|
"secp192k1") bits=192 ;;
|
|
"prime192v1") bits=192 ;;
|
|
"secp224k1") bits=225 ;;
|
|
"secp224r1") bits=224 ;;
|
|
"secp256k1") bits=256 ;;
|
|
"prime256v1") bits=256 ;;
|
|
"secp384r1") bits=384 ;;
|
|
"secp521r1") bits=521 ;;
|
|
"brainpoolP256r1"*) bits=256 ;;
|
|
"brainpoolP384r1"*) bits=384 ;;
|
|
"brainpoolP512r1"*) bits=512 ;;
|
|
"X25519") bits=253 ;;
|
|
"X448") bits=448 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$curve"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return a value that is an indicator of the quality of the cipher in $1:
|
|
# 0 = $1 is empty
|
|
# 1 = pr_svrty_critical, 2 = pr_svrty_high, 3 = pr_svrty_medium, 4 = pr_svrty_low
|
|
# 5 = neither good nor bad, 6 = pr_svrty_good, 7 = pr_svrty_best
|
|
#
|
|
# Please note this section isn't particular spot on. It needs to be reconsidered/redone
|
|
# SHA1, SSLv3 ciphers are some points which need to be considered.
|
|
# Hint: find out by "grep <pattern> etc/cipher-mapping.txt" but it' might be be easier
|
|
# to look out Enc= and Au= or Mac=
|
|
#
|
|
get_cipher_quality() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local ossl_cipher
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$cipher" != SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
# This must be the OpenSSL name for a cipher or for TLS 1.3 ($TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS)
|
|
# We can ignore them however as the OpenSSL and RFC names currently match
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# We have an OpenSSL name and can't convert it to the RFC name which is rarely
|
|
# the case, see "prepare_arrays()" and "./etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*NULL*|EXP*|ADH*|AECDH*|*anon*)
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
*RC4*|*RC2*|*MD5|*M1)
|
|
return 2
|
|
;;
|
|
AES256-GCM-SHA384|AES128-GCM-SHA256|AES256-CCM*|AES128-CCM*|ARIA256-GCM-SHA384|ARIA128-GCM-SHA256)
|
|
# RSA kx and e.g. GCM isn't certainly the best
|
|
return 6
|
|
;;
|
|
*CBC3*|*3DES*|*IDEA*)
|
|
return 3
|
|
;;
|
|
*DES*)
|
|
return 2
|
|
;;
|
|
PSK-*GCM*|PSK-*CCM*|RSA-PSK-*GCM*|RSA-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305|PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305)
|
|
# PSK kx and e.g. GCM isn't certainly the best
|
|
return 6
|
|
;;
|
|
DH-*GCM*|ECDH-*GCM*)
|
|
# static DH or ECDH kx and GCM isn't certainly the best
|
|
return 6
|
|
;;
|
|
*GCM*|*CCM*|*CHACHA20*)
|
|
return 7
|
|
;; #best ones
|
|
*AES*SHA*|*CAMELLIA*SHA*|*SEED*SHA*|*CBC*|*GOST*)
|
|
return 4
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
return 5
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
ossl_cipher="$cipher"
|
|
cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher="$ossl_cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now we look at the RFC cipher names. The sequence matters - as above.
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*NULL*|*EXP*|*_DES40_*|*anon*)
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
*RC4*|*RC2*|*MD5|*MD5_1)
|
|
return 2
|
|
;;
|
|
*_DES_*)
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" =~ EDE3 ]]; then
|
|
return 3
|
|
fi
|
|
return 2
|
|
;;
|
|
*CBC3*|*3DES*|*IDEA*)
|
|
return 3
|
|
;;
|
|
*CBC*|*GOST*)
|
|
return 4
|
|
;;
|
|
TLS_RSA_*|TLS_DH_*|TLS_ECDH_*|TLS_PSK_WITH_*)
|
|
# RSA, or static DH, ECDH, or PSK kx and e.g. GCM isn't certainly the best
|
|
return 6
|
|
;;
|
|
*GCM*|*CCM*|*CHACHA20*)
|
|
return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
return 5
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Output the severity level associated with the cipher in $1.
|
|
get_cipher_quality_severity() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local -i quality
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
get_cipher_quality "$cipher"
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
case $quality in
|
|
1) tm_out "CRITICAL" ;;
|
|
2) tm_out "HIGH" ;;
|
|
3) tm_out "MEDIUM" ;;
|
|
4) tm_out "LOW" ;;
|
|
5) tm_out "INFO" ;;
|
|
6|7) tm_out "OK" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return $quality
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Print $2 based on the quality of the cipher in $1. If $2 is empty, just print $1.
|
|
# The return value is an indicator of the quality of the cipher in $1:
|
|
# 0 = $1 is empty
|
|
# 1 = pr_svrty_critical, 2 = pr_svrty_high, 3 = pr_svrty_medium, 4 = pr_svrty_low
|
|
# 5 = neither good nor bad, 6 = pr_svrty_good, 7 = pr_svrty_best
|
|
#
|
|
pr_cipher_quality() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local text="$2"
|
|
local -i quality
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ -z "$text" ]] && text="$cipher"
|
|
|
|
get_cipher_quality "$cipher"
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
case $quality in
|
|
1) pr_svrty_critical "$text" ;;
|
|
2) pr_svrty_high "$text" ;;
|
|
3) pr_svrty_medium "$text" ;;
|
|
4) pr_svrty_low "$text" ;;
|
|
5) out "$text" ;;
|
|
6) pr_svrty_good "$text" ;;
|
|
7) pr_svrty_best "$text" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return $quality
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: file with input for grepping the type of ephemeral DH key (DH ECDH)
|
|
read_dhtype_from_file() {
|
|
local temp kx
|
|
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$1") # extract line
|
|
kx="Kx=${temp%%,*}"
|
|
[[ "$kx" == "Kx=X25519" ]] && kx="Kx=ECDH"
|
|
[[ "$kx" == "Kx=X448" ]] && kx="Kx=ECDH"
|
|
tm_out "$kx"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: certificate file
|
|
read_sigalg_from_file() {
|
|
local sig_alg
|
|
|
|
sig_alg="$(strip_leading_space "$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -text -in "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; exit; }')")"
|
|
case "$sig_alg" in
|
|
1.3.101.112|ED25519) tm_out "Ed25519" ;;
|
|
1.3.101.113|ED448) tm_out "Ed448" ;;
|
|
*) tm_out "$sig_alg" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: file with input for grepping the bit length for ECDH/DHE
|
|
# arg2: whether to print warning "old fart" or not (empty: no)
|
|
read_dhbits_from_file() {
|
|
local bits what_dh temp curve=""
|
|
local add=""
|
|
local old_fart=" (your $OPENSSL cannot show DH bits)"
|
|
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$1") # extract line
|
|
what_dh="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
bits="${temp##*, }"
|
|
curve="${temp#*, }"
|
|
if [[ "$curve" == "$bits" ]]; then
|
|
curve=""
|
|
else
|
|
curve="${curve%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
bits="${bits/bits/}"
|
|
bits="${bits// /}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$what_dh" == X25519 ]] || [[ "$what_dh" == X448 ]]; then
|
|
curve="$what_dh"
|
|
what_dh="ECDH"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$2" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$curve" ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo ">$HAS_DH_BITS|$what_dh($curve)|$bits<"
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo ">$HAS_DH_BITS|$what_dh|$bits<"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$what_dh" ]] && HAS_DH_BITS=true # FIX 190
|
|
if [[ -z "$what_dh" ]] && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then
|
|
if [[ "$2" == "string" ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$old_fart"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$2" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "$old_fart"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$2" == quiet ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$bits"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && [[ -n "$bits" ]] && out ", "
|
|
if [[ $what_dh == DH ]] || [[ $what_dh == EDH ]]; then
|
|
add="bit DH"
|
|
[[ -n "$curve" ]] && add+=" ($curve)"
|
|
if [[ "$2" == string ]]; then
|
|
tm_out ", $bits $add"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_dh_quality "$bits" "$bits $add"
|
|
fi
|
|
# https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography, https://www.keylength.com/en/compare/
|
|
elif [[ $what_dh == ECDH ]]; then
|
|
add="bit ECDH"
|
|
[[ -n "$curve" ]] && add+=" ($curve)"
|
|
if [[ "$2" == string ]]; then
|
|
tm_out ", $bits $add"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$bits $add"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: ID or empty. If empty resumption by ticket will be tested, otherwise by ID
|
|
# return: 0: it has resumption, 1:nope, 2: nope (OpenSSL 1.1.1), 6: CLIENT_AUTH --> problem for resumption, 7: can't tell
|
|
#
|
|
# This is basically a short(?) version from Bulletproof SSL and TLS (p386). The version according to that would be e.g.
|
|
# echo | $OPENSSL s_client -connect testssl.sh:443 -servername testssl.sh -no_ssl2 -reconnect 2>&1 | grep -E 'New|Reused'
|
|
# echo | $OPENSSL s_client -connect testssl.sh:443 -servername testssl.sh -no_ssl2 -no_ticket -reconnect 2>&1 | grep -E 'New|Reused|Session-ID'
|
|
#
|
|
# FIXME: actually Ivan's version seems faster. Worth to check and since when -reconnect is a/v
|
|
#
|
|
sub_session_resumption() {
|
|
local ret ret1 ret2
|
|
local tmpfile=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/session_resumption.$NODEIP.XXXXXX)
|
|
local sess_data=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/sub_session_data_resumption.$NODEIP.XXXXXX)
|
|
local -a rw_line
|
|
local protocol="$1"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$2" == ID ]]; then
|
|
local byID=true
|
|
local addcmd="-no_ticket"
|
|
else
|
|
local byID=false
|
|
local addcmd=""
|
|
if ! "$TLS_TICKETS"; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Return 6 if client authentication is required and none PEM file (containing client certificate+private key) is provided
|
|
[[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]] && [[ -z "$MTLS" ]] && return 6
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$HAS_NO_SSL2"; then
|
|
addcmd+=" -no_ssl2"
|
|
else
|
|
protocol=${protocol/\./_}
|
|
protocol=${protocol/v/}
|
|
protocol="-$(tolower $protocol)"
|
|
# In some cases a server will not support session tickets, but will support session resumption
|
|
# by ID. In such a case, it may be more likely to support session resumption with TLSv1.2 than
|
|
# with TLSv1.3. So, if testing a server that does not support session tickets and that supports
|
|
# both TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.2 for session resumption by ID, then use a TLSv1.2 ClientHello. (Note that
|
|
# the line below assumes that if $protocol is -tls1_3, then the server either supports TLSv1.2 or
|
|
# is TLSv1.3-only.
|
|
! "$TLS_TICKETS" && "$byID" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_2") -eq 0 ]] && protocol="-tls1_2"
|
|
addcmd+=" $protocol"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $addcmd -sess_out $sess_data") </dev/null &>$tmpfile
|
|
ret1=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# MacOS and LibreSSL return 1 here, that's why we need to check whether the handshake contains e.g. a certificate
|
|
if [[ ! $(<$tmpfile) =~ -----.*\ CERTIFICATE----- ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "Couldn't connect #1 "
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$byID" && [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && \
|
|
[[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* || $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! -s "$sess_data" ]]; then
|
|
# it seems OpenSSL indicates no Session ID resumption by just not generating output
|
|
debugme echo -n "No session resumption byID (empty file)"
|
|
# If we want to check the presence of session data:
|
|
# [[ ! $(<$sess_data) =~ -----.*\ SSL\ SESSION\ PARAMETERS----- ]]
|
|
ret=2
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $addcmd -sess_in $sess_data") </dev/null >$tmpfile 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
ret2=$?
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo -n "$ret1, $ret2, "
|
|
[[ -s "$sess_data" ]] && echo "not empty" || echo "empty"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret2 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ! $(<$tmpfile) =~ -----.*\ CERTIFICATE----- ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "Couldn't connect #2 "
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# "Reused" indicates session material was reused, "New": not
|
|
if grep -aq "^Reused" "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
new_sid=false
|
|
elif grep -aq "^New" "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
new_sid=true
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -n "Problem with 2nd ServerHello "
|
|
fi
|
|
# Now get the line and compare the numbers "read" and "written" as a second criteria.
|
|
# If the "read" number is bigger: a new session ID was probably used.
|
|
rw_line="$(awk '/^SSL handshake has read/ { print $5" "$(NF-1) }' "$tmpfile" )"
|
|
rw_line=($rw_line)
|
|
if [[ "${rw_line[0]}" -gt "${rw_line[1]}" ]]; then
|
|
new_sid2=true
|
|
else
|
|
new_sid2=false
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "${rw_line[0]}, ${rw_line[1]}"
|
|
|
|
if "$new_sid2" && "$new_sid"; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "No session resumption "
|
|
ret=1
|
|
elif ! "$new_sid2" && ! "$new_sid"; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "Session resumption "
|
|
ret=0
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -n "unclear status: $ret1, $ret2, $new_sid, $new_sid2 -- "
|
|
ret=5
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
"$byID" && echo "byID" || echo "by ticket"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
"$byID" && \
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.byID.log $tmpfile || \
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.byticket.log $tmpfile
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_server_preference() {
|
|
local cipher1="" cipher2="" tls13_cipher1="" tls13_cipher2="" default_proto=""
|
|
local default_cipher="" ciph
|
|
local limitedsense="" supported_sslv2_ciphers
|
|
local proto_ossl proto_txt proto_hex cipherlist i
|
|
local -i ret=0 j sclient_success
|
|
local list_fwd="DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:SEED-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RC4-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-SHA:AES128-SHA:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
|
|
local list_reverse="ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES256-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:RC4-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
|
|
tls_list_fwd="c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f, 00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a, 00,04, 00,05, 00,09, 00,0a, 00,9a, 00,96,
|
|
c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f, 00,ff"
|
|
tls_list_rev="00,2f, 00,35, 00,3c, 00,3d, 13,05, 13,04, 13,03, 13,02, 13,01, 00,9c, 00,9d, 00,33, c0,13, c0,09, 00,39, c0,14, 00,96, 00,9a, 00,0a, 00,09, 00,05, 00,04,
|
|
c0,0a, 00,67, c0,27, c0,23, 00,6b, c0,28, c0,24, 00,9e, c0,2f, c0,2b, cc,aa, cc,a8, cc,a9, 00,9f, c0,30, c0,2c, 00,ff"
|
|
local has_cipher_order=false has_tls13_cipher_order=false
|
|
local addcmd="" addcmd2=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local jsonID="cipher_order" fileout_msg="" fileout_rating="" terminal_msg=""
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing server's cipher preferences "
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
addcmd="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
else
|
|
# the supplied openssl will send an SSLv2 ClientHello if $SNI is empty
|
|
# and the -no_ssl2 isn't provided.
|
|
addcmd="-no_ssl2 $SNI"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Determine negotiated protocol upfront
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
# Send similar list of cipher suites as OpenSSL 1.1.1 does
|
|
tls_sockets "04" \
|
|
"c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f, 00,9a, 00,96,
|
|
00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a,
|
|
c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,02,
|
|
13,03, 13,01, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f, 00,ff" \
|
|
"ephemeralkey"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
elif [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_success=0 # 2: downgraded
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0303) add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] ; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"
|
|
cipher0=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt")
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >"$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"; then
|
|
cipher0=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt")
|
|
debugme tm_out "0 --> $cipher0\n"
|
|
else
|
|
# 2 second try with $OPTIMAL_PROTO especially for intolerant IIS6 servers:
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >"$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"; then
|
|
cipher0=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt")
|
|
debugme tm_out "0 --> $cipher0\n"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "Handshake error!"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && default_proto=$(get_protocol "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt")
|
|
[[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.0 ]] && default_proto="TLSv1"
|
|
# debugme tm_out " --> $default_proto\n"
|
|
|
|
# Some servers don't have a TLS 1.3 cipher order, see #1163
|
|
if [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "13,05, 13,04, 13,03, 13,02, 13,01, 00,ff"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1 && prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 1))"
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
tls13_cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
debugme tm_out "TLS 1.3: --> $tls13_cipher1\n"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 00,ff"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1 && prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 1))"
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
tls13_cipher2=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
debugme tm_out "TLS 1.3: --> $tls13_cipher2\n"
|
|
|
|
[[ $tls13_cipher1 == $tls13_cipher2 ]] && has_tls13_cipher_order=true
|
|
fi
|
|
# Check whether the server has a cipher order for SSLv3 - TLSv1.2
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_2") -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -ne 0 ]] && \
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1") -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Based on testing performed by determine_optimal_sockets_params(), it is believed that
|
|
# this server does not offer SSLv3 - TLSv1.2.
|
|
has_cipher_order="$has_tls13_cipher_order"
|
|
elif [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]]; then
|
|
[[ ! "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" =~ ssl ]] && addcmd2="$SNI"
|
|
[[ "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -tls1_3 ]] && addcmd2+=" $STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
else
|
|
addcmd2="-no_ssl2 $SNI"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo -e "\n Forward: ${list_fwd}"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -cipher $list_fwd $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd2") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if ! sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
list_fwd="$(actually_supported_osslciphers $list_fwd '' '-no_ssl2')"
|
|
pr_warning "no matching cipher in this list found (pls report this): "
|
|
outln "$list_fwd . "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Could not determine server cipher order, no matching cipher in list found (pls report this): $list_fwd"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
# we assume the problem is with testing here but it could be also the server side
|
|
else
|
|
cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) # cipher1 from 1st serverhello
|
|
debugme tm_out "1 --> $cipher1\n"
|
|
|
|
# second client hello with reverse list
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo -e "\n Reverse: ${list_reverse}"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -cipher $list_reverse $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd2") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
# first handshake worked above so no error handling here
|
|
cipher2=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) # cipher2 from 2nd serverhello
|
|
debugme tm_out "2 --> $cipher2\n"
|
|
|
|
[[ $cipher1 == $cipher2 ]] && has_cipher_order=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "has_cipher_order: $has_cipher_order"
|
|
debugme echo "has_tls13_cipher_order: $has_tls13_cipher_order"
|
|
|
|
# restore file from above
|
|
[[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]] || [[ -n "$cipher2" ]]; then
|
|
cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Sanity check: Handshake with no ciphers and one with forward list didn't overlap
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$cipher0" != $cipher1 ]]; then
|
|
limitedsense=" (matching cipher in list missing)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipher1" ]]; then
|
|
ciph="$cipher1"
|
|
else
|
|
ciph="$cipher0"
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "$ciph" == TLS_* || "$ciph" == SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
default_cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$ciph")"
|
|
elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ "$ciph" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$ciph" != SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
default_cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$ciph")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$default_cipher" ]] && default_cipher="$ciph"
|
|
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
neat_header
|
|
while read proto_ossl proto_hex proto_txt; do
|
|
pr_underline "$(printf -- "%b" "$proto_txt")"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto_ossl") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
outln "\n - "
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
# TODO: Also the fact that a protocol is not supported seems not to be saved by cipher_pref_check()
|
|
# (./testssl.sh --wide -p -P -E vs ./testssl.sh --wide -P -E )
|
|
if [[ $proto_ossl == ssl2 ]] || \
|
|
{ [[ $proto_ossl != tls1_3 ]] && ! "$has_cipher_order"; } || \
|
|
{ [[ $proto_ossl == tls1_3 ]] && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; }; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipher2" ]] && [[ $proto_ossl != ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_by_strength "-$proto_ossl" "$proto_hex" "$proto_txt" "$using_sockets" "true" "true"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_by_strength "-$proto_ossl" "$proto_hex" "$proto_txt" "$using_sockets" "true" "false"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
cipher_pref_check "$proto_ossl" "$proto_hex" "$proto_txt" "$using_sockets" "true"
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$(tm_out " ssl2 22 SSLv2\n ssl3 00 SSLv3\n tls1 01 TLSv1\n tls1_1 02 TLSv1.1\n tls1_2 03 TLSv1.2\n tls1_3 04 TLSv1.3\n")"
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Has server cipher order? "
|
|
jsonID="cipher_order"
|
|
case $NO_CIPHER_ORDER_LEVEL in
|
|
5) fileout_rating="INFO" ;;
|
|
4) fileout_rating="LOW" ;;
|
|
3) fileout_rating="MEDIUM" ;;
|
|
2) fileout_rating="HIGH" ;;
|
|
1) fileout_rating="CRITICAL" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then
|
|
terminal_msg="no (TLS 1.3 only)"
|
|
limitedsense=" (limited sense as client will pick)"
|
|
fileout_msg="not a cipher order for TLS 1.3 configured"
|
|
elif ! "$TLS13_ONLY" && [[ -z "$cipher2" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "unable to determine"
|
|
elif ! "$has_cipher_order" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then
|
|
# server used the different ends (ciphers) from the client hello
|
|
terminal_msg="no (NOT ok)"
|
|
[[ "$fileout_rating" == INFO ]] && terminal_msg="no"
|
|
limitedsense=" (limited sense as client will pick)"
|
|
fileout_msg="NOT a cipher order configured"
|
|
elif "$has_cipher_order" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order" && [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $NO_CIPHER_ORDER_LEVEL -eq 5 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "yes (OK)"; out " -- only for < TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server -- TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
else
|
|
# The server does not enforce a cipher order for TLS 1.3 and it
|
|
# accepts some lower quality TLS 1.3 ciphers.
|
|
terminal_msg="only for < TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout_msg="server -- TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif ! "$has_cipher_order" && "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then
|
|
case "$fileout_rating" in
|
|
"INFO")
|
|
out "only for TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "server -- < TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
;;
|
|
"LOW")
|
|
pr_svrty_low "no (NOT ok)"; out " -- only for TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "server -- < TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
;;
|
|
"MEDIUM")
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "no (NOT ok)"; out " -- only for TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "server -- < TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
;;
|
|
"HIGH")
|
|
pr_svrty_high "no (NOT ok)"; out " -- only for TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "server -- < TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
;;
|
|
"CRITICAL")
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "no (NOT ok)"; out " -- only for TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server -- < TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
if "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
out "yes (TLS 1.3 only)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "server (TLS 1.3)"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "yes (OK)"
|
|
out " -- TLS 1.3 and below"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# we don't have TLS 1.3 at all
|
|
pr_svrty_best "yes (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$fileout_msg" ]]; then
|
|
case "$fileout_rating" in
|
|
"INFO") out "$terminal_msg" ;;
|
|
"OK") pr_svrty_good "$terminal_msg" ;;
|
|
"LOW") pr_svrty_low "$terminal_msg" ;;
|
|
"MEDIUM") pr_svrty_medium "$terminal_msg" ;;
|
|
"HIGH") pr_svrty_high "$terminal_msg" ;;
|
|
"CRITICAL") pr_svrty_critical "$terminal_msg" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "$fileout_rating" "$fileout_msg"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher0" != $cipher1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning " -- inconclusive test, matching cipher in list missing"
|
|
outln ", better see above"
|
|
#FIXME: This is ugly but the best we can do before rewrite this section
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$limitedsense"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
# end of run_server_preference()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: true if the list that is returned does not need to be ordered by preference.
|
|
check_tls12_pref() {
|
|
local unordered_list_ok="$1"
|
|
local chacha20_ciphers="" non_chacha20_ciphers=""
|
|
local batchremoved="-CAMELLIA:-IDEA:-KRB5:-PSK:-SRP:-aNULL:-eNULL"
|
|
local batchremoved_success=false
|
|
local tested_cipher="" cipher ciphers_to_test
|
|
local order=""
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers_found_r1=0 nr_ciphers_found_r2=0
|
|
|
|
# Place ChaCha20 ciphers at the end of the list to avoid accidentally
|
|
# triggering the server's PrioritizeChaCha setting.
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$(actually_supported_osslciphers "ALL:$batchremoved" "" "")"
|
|
for cipher in $(colon_to_spaces "$ciphers_to_test"); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher:" || non_chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher:"
|
|
done
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$non_chacha20_ciphers$chacha20_ciphers"
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test%:}"
|
|
|
|
while true; do
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "$ciphers_to_test$tested_cipher" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
order+=" $cipher"
|
|
tested_cipher="$tested_cipher:-$cipher"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found_r1+=1
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
else
|
|
debugme tmln_out "A: $tested_cipher"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
batchremoved="${batchremoved//-/}"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
# no ciphers from "ALL$tested_cipher:$batchremoved" left
|
|
# now we check $batchremoved, and remove the minus signs first:
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "$batchremoved" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then
|
|
batchremoved_success=true # signals that we have some of those ciphers and need to put everything together later on
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
order+=" $cipher"
|
|
batchremoved="$batchremoved:-$cipher"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found_r1+=1
|
|
debugme tmln_out "B1: $batchremoved"
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
else
|
|
debugme tmln_out "B2: $batchremoved"
|
|
break
|
|
# nothing left with batchremoved ciphers, we need to put everything together
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$batchremoved_success" && ! "$unordered_list_ok"; then
|
|
# now we combine the two cipher sets from both while loops
|
|
|
|
# Place ChaCha20 ciphers at the end of the list to avoid accidentally
|
|
# triggering the server's PrioritizeChaCha setting.
|
|
chacha20_ciphers=""; non_chacha20_ciphers=""
|
|
for cipher in $order; do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher " || non_chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher "
|
|
done
|
|
combined_ciphers="$non_chacha20_ciphers$chacha20_ciphers"
|
|
order="" ; tested_cipher=""
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for cipher in $combined_ciphers; do
|
|
[[ ! "$tested_cipher:" =~ :-$cipher: ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$cipher"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
order+=" $cipher"
|
|
tested_cipher="$tested_cipher:-$cipher"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found_r2+=1
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
else
|
|
# This shouldn't happen.
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if "$FAST" && [[ $nr_ciphers_found_r2 -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 14))"
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif ! "$FAST" && [[ $nr_ciphers_found_r2 -ne $nr_ciphers_found_r1 ]]; then
|
|
prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 16))"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$order"
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# At the moment only called from run_server_preference()
|
|
cipher_pref_check() {
|
|
local proto="$1" proto_hex="$2" proto_text="$3"
|
|
local using_sockets="$4"
|
|
local wide="$5" # at the moment always = true
|
|
local tested_cipher cipher order="" rfc_cipher rfc_order
|
|
local -i i nr_ciphers nr_nonossl_ciphers num_bundles bundle_size bundle end_of_bundle success
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers_found
|
|
local hexc ciphers_to_test cipher_list="" chacha20_ciphers non_chacha20_ciphers
|
|
local first_cipher first_chacha_cipher
|
|
local -a normalized_hexcode ciph kx enc export2 sigalg
|
|
local -a rfc_ciph hexcode ciphers_found ciphers_found2
|
|
local -a -i index
|
|
local ciphers_found_with_sockets=false prioritize_chacha=false
|
|
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! sclient_supported "-$proto"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -$proto\"";
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if sclient_supported "-$proto"; then
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_2 ]] && "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" && \
|
|
[[ "$(count_ciphers "$(actually_supported_osslciphers "ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL" "" "")")" -gt 127 ]]; then
|
|
order="$(check_tls12_pref "$wide")"
|
|
[[ "${order:0:1}" == \ ]] && order="${order:1}"
|
|
cipher_list="$order"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$wide" || [[ -z "$order" ]]; then
|
|
# Place ChaCha20 ciphers at the end of the list to avoid accidentally
|
|
# triggering the server's PrioritizeChaCha setting.
|
|
chacha20_ciphers=""; non_chacha20_ciphers=""
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
cipher_list="$(colon_to_spaces "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS")"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$cipher_list" ]]; then
|
|
cipher_list="$(colon_to_spaces "$(actually_supported_osslciphers "ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL" "" "")")"
|
|
fi
|
|
for cipher in $cipher_list; do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher " || non_chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher "
|
|
done
|
|
cipher_list="$non_chacha20_ciphers $chacha20_ciphers"
|
|
|
|
tested_cipher=""; order=""; nr_ciphers_found=0
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for cipher in $cipher_list; do
|
|
[[ ! "$tested_cipher:" =~ :-$cipher: ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$cipher"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if [[ $proto != tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="-cipher ${ciphers_to_test:1}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test="-ciphersuites ${ciphers_to_test:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -"$proto" $BUGS $ciphers_to_test -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break
|
|
order+="$cipher "
|
|
tested_cipher+=":-"$cipher
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
if "$wide"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && continue
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers_found]="$(normalize_ciphercode "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
[[ $proto == tls1_3 ]] && kx[nr_ciphers_found]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers_found]+=" $(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)"
|
|
fi
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers_found]=""
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers_found]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers=0
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=false
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ " $order " =~ \ ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}\ ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
# Only test ciphers that are relevant to the protocol.
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ $proto == tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
elif [[ $proto != tls1_2 ]] || ! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then
|
|
num_bundles=1
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
else
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == ${rfc_ciph[i]} ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
ciphers_found_with_sockets=true
|
|
if [[ $proto != tls1_2 ]] || ! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then
|
|
# Throw out the results found so far and start over using just sockets
|
|
bundle=$num_bundles
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
done
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# If additional ciphers were found using sockets and there is no
|
|
# SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG, then just use sockets to find the cipher order.
|
|
# If there is a SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG, then use sockets to find the cipher
|
|
# order, but starting with the list of ciphers supported by the server.
|
|
if "$ciphers_found_with_sockets"; then
|
|
# Create an array of the ciphers to test with any ChaCha20
|
|
# listed last in order to avoid accidentally triggering the
|
|
# server's PriorizeChaCha setting.
|
|
order=""; nr_ciphers=0; nr_ciphers_found=0
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && continue
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && continue
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ $proto == tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] || [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] || continue
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ $proto == tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == ${rfc_ciph[i]} ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
if "$wide"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == ${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]} ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && continue
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers_found]="$(normalize_ciphercode "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
[[ $proto == tls1_3 ]] && kx[nr_ciphers_found]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers_found]+=" $(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)"
|
|
fi
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers_found]=""
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers_found]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$cipher")"
|
|
# If there is no OpenSSL name for the cipher, then use the RFC name
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
fi
|
|
order+="$cipher "
|
|
done
|
|
elif [[ -n "$order" ]] && [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
rfc_order=""
|
|
while read -d " " cipher; do
|
|
rfc_cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher" ]]; then
|
|
rfc_order+="$rfc_cipher "
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_order+="$cipher "
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$order"
|
|
order="$rfc_order"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the server supports at least one ChaCha20 cipher that is less
|
|
# preferred than a non-ChaCha20 cipher, then check if the server is
|
|
# configured to prioritize ChaCha20 if that cipher is listed first
|
|
# in the ClientHello.
|
|
first_cipher=""; first_chacha_cipher=""
|
|
for cipher in $order; do
|
|
[[ ! "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && first_cipher="$cipher" && break
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$first_cipher" ]]; then
|
|
# Search for first ChaCha20 cipher that comes after $first_cipher in $order.
|
|
for first_chacha_cipher in ${order#*$first_cipher}; do
|
|
[[ "$first_chacha_cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ! "${first_chacha_cipher}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && first_chacha_cipher=""
|
|
if [[ -n "$first_cipher" ]] && [[ -n "$first_chacha_cipher" ]]; then
|
|
# $first_cipher is the first non-ChaCha20 cipher in $order and
|
|
# $first_chacha_cipher is the first ChaCha20 that comes after
|
|
# $first_cipher in $order. Check to see if the server will select
|
|
# $first_chacha_cipher if it appears before $first_cipher in the
|
|
# ClientHello.
|
|
if "$ciphers_found_with_sockets"; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
first_cipher="$(rfc2hexcode "$first_cipher")"
|
|
first_chacha_cipher="$(rfc2hexcode "$first_chacha_cipher")"
|
|
else
|
|
first_cipher="$(openssl2hexcode "$first_cipher")"
|
|
first_chacha_cipher="$(openssl2hexcode "$first_chacha_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
first_cipher="${first_cipher:2:2},${first_cipher:7:2}"
|
|
first_chacha_cipher="${first_chacha_cipher:2:2},${first_chacha_cipher:7:2}"
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "$first_chacha_cipher, $first_cipher, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
cipher="$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && prioritize_chacha=true
|
|
else
|
|
pr_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 5)) "
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
first_cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$first_cipher")"
|
|
first_chacha_cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$first_chacha_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $proto != tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="-cipher $first_chacha_cipher:$first_cipher"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test="-ciphersuites $first_chacha_cipher:$first_cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -"$proto" $BUGS $ciphers_to_test -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
cipher="$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && prioritize_chacha=true
|
|
else
|
|
pr_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 5)) "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$prioritize_chacha"; then
|
|
outln " (server order -- server prioritizes ChaCha ciphers when preferred by clients)"
|
|
fileout "cipher_order-${proto}" "OK" "server -- server prioritizes ChaCha ciphers when preferred by clients"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$order" ]]; then
|
|
outln " (server order)"
|
|
fileout "cipher_order-${proto}" "OK" "server"
|
|
else
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$order" ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered "$proto" yes
|
|
if "$wide"; then
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers_found; i++ )); do
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "true"
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
id="cipher-${proto}_${normalized_hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fileout "$id" "$(get_cipher_quality_severity "${ciph[i]}")" "$proto_text $(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}")"
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
outln
|
|
out "$(printf " %-10s " "$proto_text: ")"
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$order" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
else
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$order" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "cipherorder_${proto_text//./_}" "INFO" "$order"
|
|
[[ -n "$first_cipher" ]] && [[ -n "$first_chacha_cipher" ]] && fileout "prioritize_chacha_${proto_text//./_}" "INFO" "$prioritize_chacha"
|
|
else
|
|
# Order doesn't contain any ciphers, so we can safely unset the protocol and put a dash out
|
|
add_proto_offered "$proto" no
|
|
outln " -"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}-$proto.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1 is OpenSSL s_client parameter or empty
|
|
#
|
|
get_host_cert() {
|
|
local tmpvar=$TEMPDIR/${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt # change later to $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $1") 2>/dev/null </dev/null >$tmpvar
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $tmpvar; then
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' $tmpvar >$HOSTCERT
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "could not retrieve host certificate!"
|
|
fileout "host_certificate_Problem" "WARN" "Could not retrieve host certificate!"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
#tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
#return $((${PIPESTATUS[0]} + ${PIPESTATUS[1]}))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verify_retcode_helper() {
|
|
local ret=0
|
|
local -i retcode=$1
|
|
|
|
case $retcode in
|
|
# codes from ./doc/apps/verify.pod | verify(1ssl)
|
|
44) tm_out "(different CRL scope)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
|
|
26) tm_out "(unsupported certificate purpose)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
|
|
24) tm_out "(certificate unreadable)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
|
|
23) tm_out "(certificate revoked)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
|
|
21) tm_out "(chain incomplete, only 1 cert provided)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
|
|
20) tm_out "(chain incomplete)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
|
|
19) tm_out "(self signed CA in chain)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
|
|
18) tm_out "(self signed)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
|
|
10) tm_out "(expired)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
|
|
9) tm_out "(not yet valid)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
|
|
2) tm_out "(issuer cert missing)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
|
|
*) ret=1 ; tm_out " (unknown, pls report) $1" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: number of certificate if provided >1
|
|
determine_trust() {
|
|
local jsonID="$1"
|
|
local json_postfix="$2"
|
|
local -i i=1
|
|
local -i num_ca_bundles=0
|
|
local bundle_fname=""
|
|
local -a certificate_file verify_retcode trust
|
|
local ok_was=""
|
|
local notok_was=""
|
|
local all_ok=true
|
|
local some_ok=false
|
|
local code
|
|
local ca_bundles=""
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local -i certificates_provided=1+$(grep -ce '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem)
|
|
local addtl_warning
|
|
|
|
# If $json_postfix is not empty, then there is more than one certificate
|
|
# and the output should should be indented by two more spaces.
|
|
[[ -n $json_postfix ]] && spaces=" "
|
|
|
|
case $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR in
|
|
1.0.2|1.1.0|1.1.1|2.[1-9].*|3.*) # 2.x is LibreSSL. 2.1.1 was tested to work, below is not sure
|
|
:
|
|
;;
|
|
*) addtl_warning="Your $OPENSSL <= 1.0.2 might be too unreliable to determine trust"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "$addtl_warning"
|
|
addtl_warning="(${addtl_warning})"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
debugme tmln_out
|
|
|
|
# if you run testssl.sh from a different path /you can set either TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR or CA_BUNDLES_PATH to find the CA BUNDLES
|
|
if [[ -z "$CA_BUNDLES_PATH" ]]; then
|
|
ca_bundles="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/*.pem"
|
|
else
|
|
ca_bundles="$CA_BUNDLES_PATH/*.pem"
|
|
fi
|
|
for bundle_fname in $ca_bundles; do
|
|
certificate_file[i]=$(basename ${bundle_fname//.pem} 2>/dev/null)
|
|
if [[ ! -r $bundle_fname ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "\"$bundle_fname\" cannot be found / not readable"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme printf -- " %-12s" "${certificate_file[i]}"
|
|
# Set SSL_CERT_DIR to /dev/null so that $OPENSSL verify will only use certificates in $bundle_fname
|
|
# in a subshell because that should be valid here only
|
|
(export SSL_CERT_DIR="/dev/null"; export SSL_CERT_FILE="/dev/null"
|
|
if [[ $certificates_provided -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL verify $TRUSTED1ST -purpose sslserver -CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$bundle_fname") -untrusted $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem $HOSTCERT >$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 2>$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL verify $TRUSTED1ST -purpose sslserver -CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$bundle_fname") $HOSTCERT >$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 2>$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2
|
|
fi)
|
|
verify_retcode[i]=$(awk '/error [1-9][0-9]? at [0-9]+ depth lookup:/ { if (!found) {print $2; found=1} }' $TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 $TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2)
|
|
[[ -z "${verify_retcode[i]}" ]] && verify_retcode[i]=0
|
|
if [[ ${verify_retcode[i]} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
trust[i]=true
|
|
some_ok=true
|
|
[[ -z "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] && GOOD_CA_BUNDLE="$bundle_fname"
|
|
debugme tm_svrty_good "Ok "
|
|
debugme tmln_out "${verify_retcode[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
trust[i]=false
|
|
all_ok=false
|
|
debugme tm_svrty_high "not trusted "
|
|
debugme tmln_out "${verify_retcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
((i++))
|
|
done
|
|
num_ca_bundles=$((i - 1))
|
|
debugme tm_out " "
|
|
if "$all_ok"; then
|
|
# all stores ok
|
|
pr_svrty_good "Ok "; pr_warning "$addtl_warning"
|
|
# we did to stdout the warning above already, so we could stay here with OK:
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "passed. $addtl_warning"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "NOT ok"
|
|
if ! "$some_ok"; then
|
|
# ALL failed (we assume with the same issue), we're displaying the reason
|
|
out " "
|
|
code="$(verify_retcode_helper "${verify_retcode[1]}")"
|
|
if [[ "$code" =~ "pls report" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "$code"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$code"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "failed $code. $addtl_warning"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Issues with the chain of trust $code"
|
|
else
|
|
# alt least one ok and other(s) not ==> display the culprit store(s)
|
|
if "$some_ok"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical ":"
|
|
for (( i=1; i<=num_ca_bundles; i++ )); do
|
|
if ${trust[i]}; then
|
|
ok_was="${certificate_file[i]} $ok_was"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_high " ${certificate_file[i]} "
|
|
code="$(verify_retcode_helper "${verify_retcode[i]}")"
|
|
if [[ "$code" =~ "pls report" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "$code"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$code"
|
|
fi
|
|
notok_was="${certificate_file[i]} $code $notok_was"
|
|
if ! [[ ${certificate_file[i]} =~ Java ]]; then
|
|
# Exemption for Java AND rating, as this store doesn't seem to be as complete.
|
|
# We won't penalize this but we still need to raise a red flag. See #1648
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Issues with chain of trust $code"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
outln
|
|
# lf + green ones
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$spaces"
|
|
pr_svrty_good "OK: $ok_was"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "Some certificate trust checks failed -> $notok_was $addtl_warning, OK -> $ok_was"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$addtl_warning" ]] && out "\n$spaces" && pr_warning "$addtl_warning"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
# not handled: Root CA supplied ("contains anchor" in SSLlabs terminology)
|
|
|
|
tls_time() {
|
|
local difftime
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local jsonID="TLS_timestamp"
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS clock skew" ; out "$spaces"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=true # this is a switch whether we want to measure the remote TLS_TIME
|
|
tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER" # try first TLS 1.0 (most frequently used protocol)
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" # TLS 1.2
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "02" "$TLS_CIPHER" # TLS 1.1
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" # SSL 3
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$TLS_TIME" ]]; then # nothing returned a time!
|
|
difftime=$((TLS_TIME - TLS_NOW)) # TLS_NOW has been set in tls_sockets()
|
|
if [[ "${#difftime}" -gt 5 ]]; then
|
|
# openssl >= 1.0.1f fills this field with random values! --> good for possible fingerprint
|
|
out "Random values, no fingerprinting possible "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "random"
|
|
else
|
|
[[ $difftime != "-"* ]] && [[ $difftime != "0" ]] && difftime="+$difftime"
|
|
out "$difftime"; out " sec from localtime";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "off by $difftime seconds from your localtime"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tm_out "$TLS_TIME"
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
outln "SSLv3 through TLS 1.2 didn't return a timestamp"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "None returned by SSLv3 through TLSv1.2"
|
|
fi
|
|
TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=false # reset the switch to save calls to date and friend in tls_sockets()
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# core function determining whether handshake succeeded or not
|
|
# arg1: return value of "openssl s_client connect"
|
|
# arg2: temporary file with the server hello
|
|
# returns 0 if connect was successful, 1 if not
|
|
#
|
|
sclient_connect_successful() {
|
|
local server_hello="$(cat -v "$2")"
|
|
local connect_success=false
|
|
local re='Master-Key: ([^\
|
|
]*)'
|
|
|
|
[[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
if ! "$connect_success" && [[ "$server_hello" =~ $re ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
fi
|
|
! "$connect_success" && [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", "(SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?(\/SSLv3)?)", Cipher is "([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
if "$connect_success"; then
|
|
"$NO_SSL_SESSIONID" && [[ "$server_hello" =~ Session-ID:\ [a-fA-F0-9]{2,64} ]] && NO_SSL_SESSIONID=false
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
# what's left now is: master key empty and Session-ID not empty
|
|
# ==> probably client-based auth with x509 certificate. We handle that at other places
|
|
#
|
|
# For robustness we also detected here network / server connectivity problems:
|
|
# Just need to check whether $TMPFILE=$2 is empty
|
|
if [[ ! -s "$2" ]]; then
|
|
((NR_OSSL_FAIL++))
|
|
connectivity_problem $NR_OSSL_FAIL $MAX_OSSL_FAIL "openssl s_client connect problem" "repeated openssl s_client connect problem, doesn't make sense to continue"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extract_new_tls_extensions() {
|
|
local tls_extensions
|
|
|
|
# this is not beautiful (grep+sed)
|
|
# but maybe we should just get the ids and do a private matching, according to
|
|
# https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
|
|
tls_extensions=$(grep -a 'TLS server extension ' "$1" | \
|
|
sed -e 's/TLS server extension //g' -e 's/\" (id=/\/#/g' \
|
|
-e 's/,.*$/,/g' -e 's/),$/\"/g' \
|
|
-e 's/elliptic curves\/#10/supported_groups\/#10/g')
|
|
tls_extensions=$(echo $tls_extensions) # into one line
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]]; then
|
|
# check to see if any new TLS extensions were returned and add any new ones to TLS_EXTENSIONS
|
|
while read -d "\"" -r line; do
|
|
if [[ $line != "" ]] && [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ "$line" ]]; then
|
|
#FIXME: This is a string of quoted strings, so this seems to determine the output format already. Better e.g. would be an array
|
|
TLS_EXTENSIONS+=" \"${line}\""
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<<$tls_extensions
|
|
[[ "${TLS_EXTENSIONS:0:1}" == " " ]] && TLS_EXTENSIONS="${TLS_EXTENSIONS:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Note that since, at the moment, this function is only called by run_server_defaults()
|
|
# and run_heartbleed(), this function does not look for the status request or NPN
|
|
# extensions. For run_heartbleed(), only the heartbeat extension needs to be detected.
|
|
# For run_server_defaults(), the status request and NPN would already be detected by
|
|
# get_server_certificate(), if they are supported. In the case of the status extension,
|
|
# since including a status request extension in a ClientHello does not work for GOST
|
|
# only servers. In the case of NPN, since a server will not include both the NPN and
|
|
# ALPN extensions in the same ServerHello.
|
|
#
|
|
determine_tls_extensions() {
|
|
local addcmd
|
|
local -i success=1
|
|
local line params="" tls_extensions=""
|
|
local alpn_proto alpn="" alpn_list_len_hex alpn_extn_len_hex
|
|
local -i alpn_list_len alpn_extn_len
|
|
local cbc_cipher_list="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA256:CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA256:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:IDEA-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
local cbc_cipher_list_hex="c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,69, 00,68, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, c0,77, c0,73, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, c0,3d, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,43, c0,45, c0,49, c0,4b, c0,4d, c0,4f, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, 00,67, 00,40, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, c0,76, c0,72, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, c0,3c, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,42, c0,44, c0,48, c0,4a, c0,4c, c0,4e, c0,12, c0,08, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,62, 00,09, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,08, 00,06, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
[[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]] && return 0
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_extensions="00,01,00,01,02, 00,02,00,00, 00,04,00,00, 00,12,00,00, 00,16,00,00, 00,17,00,00"
|
|
if [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then
|
|
for alpn_proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do
|
|
alpn+=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")"
|
|
done
|
|
alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3
|
|
alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len)
|
|
alpn_extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2
|
|
alpn_extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_extn_len)
|
|
tls_extensions+=", 00,10,${alpn_extn_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ encrypt-then-mac ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$cbc_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff" "all" "$tls_extensions"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "all" "$tls_extensions"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $success -eq 2 ]] && success=0
|
|
[[ $success -eq 0 ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
if [[ -r "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ]]; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if "$HAS_ALPN" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then
|
|
params="-alpn \"${ALPN_PROTOs// /,}\"" # we need to replace " " by ","
|
|
elif "$HAS_NPN" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then
|
|
params="-nextprotoneg \"$NPN_PROTOs\""
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]] && [[ -z "$SNI" ]] && "$HAS_NO_SSL2"; then
|
|
addcmd="-no_ssl2"
|
|
else
|
|
addcmd="$SNI"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ encrypt-then-mac ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd $OPTIMAL_PROTO -tlsextdebug $params -cipher $cbc_cipher_list") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd $OPTIMAL_PROTO -tlsextdebug $params") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $success -eq 0 ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Keep it "on file" for debugging purposes
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && safe_echo "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" >"$TEMPDIR/$NODE.$NODEIP.tls_extensions.txt"
|
|
|
|
return $success
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return a list of the certificate compression methods supported (RFC 8879)
|
|
determine_cert_compression() {
|
|
# 1=zlib, 2=brotli, 3=zstd
|
|
local -a supported_compression_methods=("" "false" "false" "false")
|
|
local -i i len nr_compression_methods=3
|
|
local len1 len2 methods_to_test method_found method_nr methods_found=""
|
|
|
|
# Certificate compression is only supported by TLS 1.3.
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 1 ]] && return 1
|
|
while true; do
|
|
methods_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= nr_compression_methods; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${supported_compression_methods[i]}" && methods_to_test+=" ,00,$(printf "%02x" $i)"
|
|
done
|
|
len=$((2*${#methods_to_test}/7))
|
|
# If there are no more compression methods remaining to be tested, then quit.
|
|
[[ $len -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
len1=$(printf "%02x" "$len")
|
|
len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((len+1))")
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,1b, 00,$len2, $len1$methods_to_test"
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
method_found="$(awk '/Certificate Compression Algorithm: / { print $4 $5 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
[[ -z "$method_found" ]] && break
|
|
[[ -z "$methods_found" ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
method_found="${method_found//(//}"
|
|
method_found="${method_found//)/}"
|
|
method_nr="${method_found%%/*}"
|
|
supported_compression_methods[method_nr]=true
|
|
methods_found+=" $method_found"
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$methods_found" ]]; then
|
|
TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS="${methods_found:1}"
|
|
else
|
|
TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS="none"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extract_certificates() {
|
|
local version="$1"
|
|
local savedir
|
|
local -i i success nrsaved=0
|
|
local issuerDN CAsubjectDN previssuerDN
|
|
|
|
# Place the server's certificate in $HOSTCERT and any intermediate
|
|
# certificates that were provided in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
savedir="$PWD"; cd $TEMPDIR
|
|
# https://backreference.org/2010/05/09/ocsp-verification-with-openssl/
|
|
if [[ "$version" == ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
awk -v n=-1 '/Server certificate/ {start=1}
|
|
/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} }
|
|
inc { print > ("level" n ".crt") }
|
|
/---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }' $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
awk -v n=-1 '/Certificate chain/ {start=1}
|
|
/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} }
|
|
inc { print > ("level" n ".crt") }
|
|
/---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }' $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -s level0.crt ]] && nrsaved=$(count_words "$(echo level?.crt 2>/dev/null)")
|
|
if [[ $nrsaved -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
success=1
|
|
else
|
|
success=0
|
|
CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false
|
|
mv level0.crt $HOSTCERT
|
|
if [[ $nrsaved -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
echo "" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
else
|
|
cat level?.crt > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
issuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -issuer 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
issuerDN="${issuerDN:8}"
|
|
previssuerDN="$issuerDN"
|
|
# The second certificate (level1.crt) SHOULD be issued to the CA
|
|
# that issued the server's certificate. But, according to RFC 8446
|
|
# clients SHOULD be prepared to handle cases in which the server
|
|
# does not order the certificates correctly.
|
|
for (( i=1; i < nrsaved; i++ )); do
|
|
CAsubjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "level$i.crt" -noout -subject 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
if [[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" == "$issuerDN" ]]; then
|
|
cp "level$i.crt" $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem
|
|
issuerDN="" # set to empty to prevent further matches
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" != "$previssuerDN" ]] && CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=true
|
|
"$CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM" && [[ -z "$issuerDN" ]] && break
|
|
previssuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "level$i.crt" -noout -issuer 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
previssuerDN="${previssuerDN:8}"
|
|
done
|
|
# This should never happen, but if more than one certificate was
|
|
# provided and none of them belong to the CA that issued the
|
|
# server's certificate, then the extra certificates should just
|
|
# be deleted. There is code elsewhere that assumes that if
|
|
# $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem is non-empty, then
|
|
# $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem is also present.
|
|
[[ -n "$issuerDN" ]] && echo "" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
rm level?.crt
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
cd "$savedir"
|
|
return $success
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extract_stapled_ocsp() {
|
|
local response="$(cat $TMPFILE)"
|
|
local ocsp tmp
|
|
local -i ocsp_len
|
|
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE=""
|
|
if [[ "$response" =~ CertificateStatus ]]; then
|
|
# This is OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1 and the response
|
|
# is TLS 1.2 or earlier.
|
|
ocsp="${response##*CertificateStatus}"
|
|
ocsp="16${ocsp#*16}"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp%%<<<*}"
|
|
ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp:8}"
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ TLS\ server\ extension\ \"status\ request\"\ \(id=5\)\,\ len=0 ]]; then
|
|
# This is not OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1, and the response
|
|
# is TLS 1.2 or earlier.
|
|
ocsp="${response%%OCSP response:*}"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp##*<<<}"
|
|
ocsp="16${ocsp#*16}"
|
|
ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp:8}"
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ TLS\ server\ extension\ \"status\ request\"\ \(id=5\)\,\ len= ]]; then
|
|
# This is OpenSSL 1.1.1 and the response is TLS 1.3.
|
|
ocsp="${response##*TLS server extension \"status request\" (id=5), len=}"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp%%<<<*}"
|
|
tmp="${ocsp%%[!0-9]*}"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp#$tmp}"
|
|
ocsp_len=2*$tmp
|
|
ocsp="$(awk ' { print $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 $11 $12 $13 $14 $15 $16 $17 } ' <<< "$ocsp" | sed 's/-//')"
|
|
ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp:0:ocsp_len}"
|
|
else
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
# Determine whether this is a single OCSP response or a sequence of
|
|
# responses and then extract just the response for the server's
|
|
# certificate.
|
|
if [[ "${ocsp:0:2}" == "01" ]]; then
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${ocsp:8}"
|
|
elif [[ "${ocsp:0:2}" == "02" ]]; then
|
|
ocsp_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:8:6}")
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${ocsp:14:ocsp_len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1 is "<OpenSSL cipher>"
|
|
# arg2 is a list of protocols to try (tls1_2, tls1_1, tls1, ssl3) or empty (if all should be tried)
|
|
get_server_certificate() {
|
|
local protocols_to_try proto
|
|
local success ret
|
|
local npn_params="" line
|
|
local ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (signature) public key
|
|
local -r a_rsa="cc,13, cc,15, c0,30, c0,28, c0,14, 00,9f, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,39, c0,77, 00,c4, 00,88, c0,45, c0,4d, c0,53, c0,61, c0,7d, c0,8b, 16,b7, 16,b9, c0,2f, c0,27, c0,13, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,67, 00,33, c0,76, 00,be, 00,9a, 00,45, c0,44, c0,4c, c0,52, c0,60, c0,7c, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,12, 00,16, 00,15, 00,14, c0,10"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (encryption) public key
|
|
local -r e_rsa="00,b7, c0,99, 00,ad, cc,ae, 00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, 00,95, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,69, c0,6f, c0,7b, c0,93, ff,01, 00,ac, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,b6, 00,96, 00,41, c0,98, 00,07, 00,94, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,68, c0,6e, c0,7a, c0,92, 00,05, 00,04, 00,92, 00,0a, 00,93, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,2e, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, ff,00"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DSA public key
|
|
local -r a_dss="00,a3, 00,6a, 00,38, 00,c3, 00,87, c0,43, c0,57, c0,81, 00,a2, 00,40, 00,32, 00,bd, 00,99, 00,44, c0,42, c0,56, c0,80, 00,66, 00,13, 00,63, 00,12, 00,65, 00,11"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DH public key
|
|
local -r a_dh="00,a5, 00,a1, 00,69, 00,68, 00,37, 00,36, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,86, 00,85, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,55, c0,59, c0,7f, c0,83, 00,a4, 00,a0, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,31, 00,30, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,98, 00,97, 00,43, 00,42, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,54, c0,58, c0,7e, c0,82, 00,10, 00,0d, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDH public key
|
|
local -r a_ecdh="c0,32, c0,2e, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, c0,4b, c0,4f, c0,5f, c0,63, c0,89, c0,8d, c0,31, c0,2d, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, c0,4a, c0,4e, c0,5e, c0,62, c0,88, c0,8c, c0,0c, c0,02, c0,0d, c0,03, c0,0b, c0,01"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDSA public key
|
|
local -r a_ecdsa="cc,14, c0,2c, c0,24, c0,0a, cc,a9, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,73, c0,49, c0,5d, c0,87, 16,b8, 16,ba, c0,2b, c0,23, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,72, c0,48, c0,5c, c0,86, c0,07, c0,08, c0,06"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a GOST public key
|
|
local -r a_gost="00,80, 00,81, 00,82, 00,83"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 1 ]] && return 1
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13" && "$HAS_SIGALGS" && [[ ! "$1" =~ tls1_3_EdDSA ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -tls1_3 -tlsextdebug -status -msg -sigalgs PSS+SHA256:PSS+SHA384:PSS+SHA512:rsa_pss_pss_sha256:rsa_pss_pss_sha384:rsa_pss_pss_sha512") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -tls1_3 -tlsextdebug -status -msg -sigalgs ECDSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA384:ECDSA+SHA512") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || return 1
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304"
|
|
extract_certificates "tls1_3"
|
|
extract_stapled_ocsp
|
|
success=$?
|
|
else
|
|
# For STARTTLS protocols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,16,00,14,08,04,08,05,08,06,04,01,05,01,06,01,02,01,08,09,08,0a,08,0b"
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,0a,00,08,04,03,05,03,06,03,02,03"
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_EdDSA ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,06,00,04,08,07,08,08"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
success=$?
|
|
[[ $success -eq 0 ]] || return 1
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $success -eq 0 ]] && add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $success
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_NPN" && [[ -z "$STARTTLS" ]] && npn_params="-nextprotoneg \"$NPN_PROTOs\""
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$2" ]]; then
|
|
protocols_to_try="$2"
|
|
else
|
|
protocols_to_try="tls1_2 tls1_1 tls1 ssl3"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# throwing 1st every cipher/protocol at the server to know what works
|
|
success=7
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
success=1
|
|
sslv2_sockets "" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
mv $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt $TMPFILE
|
|
success=0
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $success
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1_2/03}"
|
|
protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1_1/02}"
|
|
protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1/01}"
|
|
protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/ssl3/00}"
|
|
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_rsa"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $e_rsa"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aDSS ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_dss"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aDH ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_dh"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aECDH ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_ecdh"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aECDSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_ecdsa"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aGOST ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_gost"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && return 1
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test:2}"
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protocols_to_try; do
|
|
[[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol $proto) ]] && continue
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test, 00,ff" "all" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && success=0 && break
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 2 ]] && success=0 && break
|
|
done # this loop is needed for IIS6 and others which have a handshake size limitations
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then
|
|
# "-status" above doesn't work for GOST only servers, so we do another test without it and see whether that works then:
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test, 00,ff" "all" "00,12,00,00"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && success=0
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 2 ]] && success=0
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then
|
|
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
|
|
prln_warning "Strange, no SSL/TLS protocol seems to be supported (error around line $((LINENO - 6)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 7 # this is ugly, I know
|
|
else
|
|
GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
cp $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
# When "$2" is empty, get_server_certificate() is being called with SNI="".
|
|
# In case the extensions returned by the server differ depending on whether
|
|
# SNI is provided or not, don't collect extensions when SNI="" (unless
|
|
# no DNS name was provided at the command line).
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
# no sockets, openssl
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$1"
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]] && [[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/eRSA/}"
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/aRSA/}"
|
|
for ciph in $(colon_to_spaces $(actually_supported_osslciphers "aRSA")); do
|
|
[[ "$ciph" =~ -RSA- ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$ciph"
|
|
done
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/eRSA/}"
|
|
for ciph in $(colon_to_spaces $(actually_supported_osslciphers "aRSA")); do
|
|
[[ ! "$ciph" =~ -RSA- ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$ciph"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test:1}"
|
|
[[ $(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers "$ciphers_to_test")) -ge 1 ]] || return 1
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protocols_to_try; do
|
|
[[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol $proto) ]] && continue
|
|
sclient_supported "-$proto" || continue
|
|
addcmd=""
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $ciphers_to_test -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -$proto -tlsextdebug $npn_params -status -msg") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
success=0
|
|
break # now we have the certificate
|
|
fi
|
|
done # this loop is needed for IIS6 and others which have a handshake size limitations
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then
|
|
# "-status" above doesn't work for GOST only servers, so we do another test without it and see whether that works then:
|
|
sclient_supported "-$proto" || return 7
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $ciphers_to_test -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -$proto -tlsextdebug") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if ! sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
|
|
prln_warning "Strange, no SSL/TLS protocol seems to be supported (error around line $((LINENO - 6)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 7 # this is ugly, I know
|
|
else
|
|
GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$proto" in
|
|
"tls1_2") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0303" ;;
|
|
"tls1_1") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0302" ;;
|
|
"tls1") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0301" ;;
|
|
"ssl3") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0300" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# When "$2" is empty, get_server_certificate() is being called with SNI="".
|
|
# In case the extensions returned by the server differ depending on whether
|
|
# SNI is provided or not, don't collect extensions when SNI="" (unless
|
|
# no DNS name was provided at the command line).
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
extract_certificates "$proto"
|
|
extract_stapled_ocsp
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $success
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: path to certificate
|
|
# returns CN
|
|
get_cn_from_cert() {
|
|
local subject
|
|
|
|
# attention! openssl 1.0.2 doesn't properly handle online output from certificates from trustwave.com/github.com
|
|
#FIXME: use -nameopt oid for robustness
|
|
|
|
# for e.g. russian sites -esc_msb,utf8 works in an UTF8 terminal -- any way to check platform independent?
|
|
# see x509(1ssl):
|
|
subject="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $1 -noout -subject -nameopt multiline,-align,sname,-esc_msb,utf8,-space_eq 2>>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
echo "$(awk -F'=' '/CN=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$subject" | tr '\n' ' ')"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return 0 if the name provided in arg1 is a wildcard name
|
|
is_wildcard()
|
|
{
|
|
local certname="$1"
|
|
|
|
# If the first label in the DNS name begins "xn--", then assume it is an
|
|
# A-label and not a wildcard name (RFC 6125, Section 6.4.3).
|
|
[[ "${certname:0:4}" == "xn--" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Remove part of name preceding '*' or '.'. If no "*" appears in the
|
|
# left-most label, then it is not a wildcard name (RFC 6125, Section 6.4.3).
|
|
basename="$(echo -n "$certname" | sed 's/^[_a-zA-Z0-9\-]*//')"
|
|
[[ "${basename:0:1}" != "*" ]] && return 1 # not a wildcard name
|
|
|
|
# Check that there are no additional wildcard ('*') characters or any
|
|
# other characters that do not belong in a DNS name.
|
|
[[ -n $(echo -n "${basename:1}" | sed 's/^[_\.a-zA-Z0-9\-]*//') ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return 0 if the name provided in arg2 is a wildcard name and it matches the name provided in arg1.
|
|
wildcard_match()
|
|
{
|
|
local servername="$1"
|
|
local certname="$2"
|
|
local basename
|
|
local -i basename_offset len_certname len_part1 len_basename
|
|
local -i len_servername len_wildcard
|
|
|
|
len_servername=${#servername}
|
|
len_certname=${#certname}
|
|
|
|
# Use rules from RFC 6125 to perform the match.
|
|
|
|
# Assume the "*" in the wildcard needs to be replaced by one or more
|
|
# characters, although RFC 6125 is not clear about that.
|
|
[[ $len_servername -lt $len_certname ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
is_wildcard "$certname"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Comparisons of DNS names are case insensitive, so convert both names to uppercase.
|
|
certname="$(toupper "$certname")"
|
|
servername="$(toupper "$servername")"
|
|
|
|
# Extract part of name that comes after the "*"
|
|
basename="$(echo -n "$certname" | sed 's/^[_A-Z0-9\-]*\*//')"
|
|
len_basename=${#basename}
|
|
len_part1=$len_certname-$len_basename-1
|
|
len_wildcard=$len_servername-$len_certname+1
|
|
basename_offset=$len_servername-$len_basename
|
|
|
|
# Check that initial part of $servername matches initial part of $certname
|
|
# and that final part of $servername matches final part of $certname.
|
|
[[ "${servername:0:len_part1}" != "${certname:0:len_part1}" ]] && return 1
|
|
[[ "${servername:basename_offset:len_basename}" != "$basename" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Check that part of $servername that matches "*" is all part of a single
|
|
# domain label.
|
|
[[ -n $(echo -n "${servername:len_part1:len_wildcard}" | sed 's/^[_A-Z0-9\-]*//') ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Compare the server name provided in arg1 to the CN and SAN in arg2 and return:
|
|
# 0, if server name provided does not match any of the names in the CN or SAN
|
|
# 1, if the server name provided matches a name in the SAN
|
|
# 2, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against a name in the SAN
|
|
# 4, if the server name provided matches the CN
|
|
# 5, if the server name provided matches the CN AND a name in the SAN
|
|
# 6, if the server name provided matches the CN AND is a wildcard match against a name in the SAN
|
|
# 8, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against the CN
|
|
# 9, if the server name provided matches a name in the SAN AND is a wildcard match against the CN
|
|
# 10, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against the CN AND a name in the SAN
|
|
|
|
compare_server_name_to_cert() {
|
|
local cert="$1"
|
|
local servername cns cn dns_sans ip_sans san dercert tag
|
|
local srv_id="" xmppaddr=""
|
|
local -i i len len1 cn_match=0
|
|
local -i subret=0 # no error condition, passing results
|
|
|
|
HAS_DNS_SANS=false
|
|
if [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then
|
|
# RFC 6120, Section 13.7.2.1, states that for XMPP the identity that
|
|
# should appear in the server's certificate is identity that appears
|
|
# in the the 'to' address that the client communicates in the initial
|
|
# stream header.
|
|
servername="$(toupper "$XMPP_HOST")"
|
|
else
|
|
servername="$(toupper "$NODE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check whether any of the DNS names in the certificate match the servername
|
|
dns_sans="$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$cert")"
|
|
while read san; do
|
|
if [[ -n "$san" ]]; then
|
|
HAS_DNS_SANS=true
|
|
[[ $(toupper "$san") == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$dns_sans"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Check whether any of the IP addresses in the certificate match the servername
|
|
ip_sans=$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE | grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" | \
|
|
tr ',' '\n' | grep "IP Address:" | sed -e 's/IP Address://g' -e 's/ //g')
|
|
while read san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ "$san" == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break
|
|
done <<< "$ip_sans"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then
|
|
# For XMPP hosts, in addition to checking for a matching DNS name,
|
|
# should also check for a matching SRV-ID or XmppAddr identifier.
|
|
dercert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
# Look for the beginning of the subjectAltName extension. It
|
|
# will begin with the OID (2.5.29.17 = 0603551D11). After the OID
|
|
# there may be an indication that the extension is critical (0101FF).
|
|
# Finally will be the tag indicating that the value of the extension is
|
|
# encoded as an OCTET STRING (04).
|
|
if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04 ]]; then
|
|
dercert="${dercert##*0603551D110101FF04}"
|
|
else
|
|
dercert="${dercert##*0603551D1104}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Skip over the encoding of the length of the OCTET STRING.
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:0:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
i="${dercert:1:1}"
|
|
i=2*$i+2
|
|
dercert="${dercert:i}"
|
|
else
|
|
dercert="${dercert:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Next byte should be a 30 (SEQUENCE).
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:0:2}" == "30" ]]; then
|
|
# Get the length of the subjectAltName extension and then skip
|
|
# over the encoding of the length.
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:2:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
case "${dercert:3:1}" in
|
|
1) len=2*0x${dercert:4:2}; dercert="${dercert:6}" ;;
|
|
2) len=2*0x${dercert:4:4}; dercert="${dercert:8}" ;;
|
|
3) len=2*0x${dercert:4:6}; dercert="${dercert:10}" ;;
|
|
*) len=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len=2*0x${dercert:2:2}
|
|
dercert="${dercert:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $len -lt ${#dercert} ]]; then
|
|
# loop through all the names and extract the SRV-ID and XmppAddr identifiers
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=len_name )); do
|
|
tag="${dercert:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:i:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
i+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:i:1}" in
|
|
1) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}; i+=2 ;;
|
|
2) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:4}; i+=4 ;;
|
|
3) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:6}; i+=4 ;;
|
|
*) len=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}
|
|
i+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tag" == "A0" ]]; then
|
|
# This is an otherName.
|
|
if [[ $len_name -gt 18 ]] && [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" || \
|
|
"${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070807" ]]; then
|
|
# According to the OID, this is either an SRV-ID or XmppAddr.
|
|
j=$i+20
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == "A0" ]]; then
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
j+=2*0x${dercert:j:1}+1
|
|
else
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" && "${dercert:j:2}" == "0C" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070807" && "${dercert:j:2}" == "16" ]]; then
|
|
# XmppAddr should be encoded as UTF8STRING (0C) and
|
|
# SRV-ID should be encoded IA5STRING (16).
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:j:1}" in
|
|
1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;;
|
|
2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;;
|
|
3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;;
|
|
4) len1=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $len1 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
san="$(hex2binary "${dercert:j:len1}")"
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" ]]; then
|
|
xmppaddr+="$san "
|
|
else
|
|
srv_id+="$san "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$srv_id" ]] && HAS_DNS_SANS=true
|
|
[[ -n "$xmppaddr" ]] && HAS_DNS_SANS=true
|
|
while read -d " " san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ $(toupper "$san") == "_XMPP-SERVER.$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break
|
|
done <<< "$srv_id"
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
while read -d " " san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ $(toupper "$san") == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break
|
|
done <<< "$xmppaddr"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check whether any of the DNS names in the certificate are wildcard names
|
|
# that match the servername
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
while read san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] || continue
|
|
wildcard_match "$servername" "$san"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && subret=2 && break
|
|
done <<< "$dns_sans"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Get every CN from the subject field and compare against the server name.
|
|
cns="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $1 -noout -subject -nameopt multiline,-align,sname,-esc_msb,utf8,-space_eq 2>>$ERRFILE | awk -F'=' '/CN=/ { print $2 }')"
|
|
while read cn; do
|
|
# If the CN contains any characters that are not valid for a DNS name,
|
|
# then assume it does not contain a DNS name.
|
|
[[ -n "${cn//[_\.a-zA-Z0-9*\-]/}" ]] && continue
|
|
|
|
# Check whether the CN matches the servername
|
|
[[ $(toupper "$cn") == "$servername" ]] && cn_match=4 && break
|
|
|
|
# Check whether the CN is a wildcard name that matches the servername
|
|
# NOTE: Don't stop loop on a wildcard match in case there is another CN
|
|
# that is an exact match.
|
|
wildcard_match "$servername" "$cn"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && cn_match=8
|
|
done <<< "$cns"
|
|
subret+=$cn_match
|
|
return $subret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This function determines whether the certificate (arg3) contains "visibility
|
|
# information" (see Section 4.3.3 of
|
|
# https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103500_103599/10352303/01.02.01_60/ts_10352303v010201p.pdf.
|
|
etsi_ets_visibility_info() {
|
|
local jsonID="$1"
|
|
local spaces="$2"
|
|
local cert="$3"
|
|
local cert_txt="$4"
|
|
local dercert tag
|
|
local -a fingerprint=() access_description=()
|
|
local -i i j len len1 len_name nr_visnames=0
|
|
|
|
# If "visibility information" is present, it will appear in the subjectAltName
|
|
# extension (0603551D11) as an otherName with OID 0.4.0.3523.3.1 (060604009B430301).
|
|
# OpenSSL 1.1.1 and earlier displays all names of type otherName as "othername:<unsupported>".
|
|
# As certificates will rarely include a name encoded as an otherName, check the
|
|
# text version of the certificate for "othername:<unsupported>" before calling
|
|
# external functions to obtain the DER encoded certificate.
|
|
if [[ "$cert_txt" =~ X509v3\ Subject\ Alternative\ Name:.*othername:\<unsupported\> ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$cert_txt" =~ X509v3\ Subject\ Alternative\ Name:.*othername:\ 0.4.0.3523.3.1 ]]; then
|
|
dercert="$($OPENSSL x509 -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert" | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04[0-9A-F]*060604009B430301 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D1104[0-9A-F]*060604009B430301 ]]; then
|
|
# Look for the beginning of the subjectAltName extension. It
|
|
# will begin with the OID (2.5.29.17 = 0603551D11). After the OID
|
|
# there may be an indication that the extension is critical (0101FF).
|
|
# Finally will be the tag indicating that the value of the extension is
|
|
# encoded as an OCTET STRING (04).
|
|
if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04 ]]; then
|
|
dercert="${dercert##*0603551D110101FF04}"
|
|
else
|
|
dercert="${dercert##*0603551D1104}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Skip over the encoding of the length of the OCTET STRING.
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:0:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
i="${dercert:1:1}"
|
|
i=2*$i+2
|
|
dercert="${dercert:i}"
|
|
else
|
|
dercert="${dercert:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Next byte should be a 30 (SEQUENCE).
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:0:2}" == 30 ]]; then
|
|
# Get the length of the subjectAltName extension and then skip
|
|
# over the encoding of the length.
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:2:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
case "${dercert:3:1}" in
|
|
1) len=2*0x${dercert:4:2}; dercert="${dercert:6}" ;;
|
|
2) len=2*0x${dercert:4:4}; dercert="${dercert:8}" ;;
|
|
3) len=2*0x${dercert:4:6}; dercert="${dercert:10}" ;;
|
|
*) len=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len=2*0x${dercert:2:2}
|
|
dercert="${dercert:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $len -lt ${#dercert} ]]; then
|
|
# loop through all the names and extract the visibility information
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=len_name )); do
|
|
tag="${dercert:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:i:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
i+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:i:1}" in
|
|
1) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}; i+=2 ;;
|
|
2) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:4}; i+=4 ;;
|
|
3) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:6}; i+=4 ;;
|
|
*) len=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}
|
|
i+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$tag" == A0 ]] || continue
|
|
# This is an otherName.
|
|
[[ $len_name -gt 16 ]] || continue
|
|
[[ "${dercert:i:16}" == 060604009B430301 ]] || continue
|
|
# According to the OID, this is visibility information.
|
|
j=$i+16
|
|
# Skip over the tag (A0) and length for the otherName value.
|
|
[[ "${dercert:j:2}" == A0 ]] || continue
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
j+=2*0x${dercert:j:1}+1
|
|
else
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
# The value for this otherName is encoded as a SEQUENCE (30):
|
|
# VisibilityInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
# fingerprint OCTET STRING (SIZE(10)),
|
|
# accessDescription UTF8String }
|
|
[[ "${dercert:j:2}" == 30 ]] || continue
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:j:1}" in
|
|
1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;;
|
|
2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;;
|
|
3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;;
|
|
4) len1=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $len1 -ne 0 ]] || continue
|
|
# Next is the 10-byte fingerprint, encoded as an OCTET STRING (04)
|
|
[[ "${dercert:j:4}" == 040A ]] || continue
|
|
j+=4
|
|
fingerprint[nr_visnames]="$(hex2binary "${dercert:j:20}")"
|
|
j+=20
|
|
# Finally comes the access description, encoded as a UTF8String (0C).
|
|
[[ "${dercert:j:2}" == 0C ]] || continue
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:j:1}" in
|
|
1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;;
|
|
2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;;
|
|
3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;;
|
|
4) len1=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
access_description[nr_visnames]=""$(hex2binary "${dercert:j:len1}")""
|
|
nr_visnames+=1
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $nr_visnames -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "not present"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not present"
|
|
else
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_visnames; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ $i -ne 0 ]] && out "$spaces"
|
|
outln "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "${fingerprint[i]} / ${access_description[i]}" "$spaces" $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "${fingerprint[i]} / ${access_description[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: arg3 must contain the text output of $HOSTCERT.
|
|
must_staple() {
|
|
local jsonID="cert_mustStapleExtension"
|
|
local json_postfix="$1"
|
|
local provides_stapling="$2"
|
|
local hostcert_txt="$3"
|
|
local cert extn
|
|
local -i extn_len
|
|
local supported=false
|
|
|
|
# Note this function is only looking for status_request (5) and not
|
|
# status_request_v2 (17), since OpenSSL seems to only include status_request (5)
|
|
# in its ClientHello when the "-status" option is used.
|
|
|
|
# OpenSSL 1.1.0 supports pretty-printing the "TLS Feature extension." For any
|
|
# previous versions of OpenSSL, OpenSSL can only show if the extension OID is present.
|
|
if grep -A 1 "TLS Feature:" <<< "$hostcert_txt" | grep -q "status_request"; then
|
|
# FIXME: This will indicate that must staple is supported if the
|
|
# certificate indicates status_request or status_request_v2. This is
|
|
# probably okay, since it seems likely that any TLS Feature extension
|
|
# that includes status_request_v2 will also include status_request.
|
|
supported=true
|
|
elif [[ "$hostcert_txt" =~ '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24:' ]]; then
|
|
cert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$HOSTCERT" -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
extn="${cert##*06082B06010505070118}"
|
|
# Check for critical bit, and skip over it if present.
|
|
[[ "${extn:0:6}" == "0101FF" ]] && extn="${extn:6}"
|
|
# Next is tag and length of extnValue OCTET STRING. Assume it is less than 128 bytes.
|
|
extn="${extn:4}"
|
|
# The TLS Feature is a SEQUENCE of INTEGER. Get the length of the SEQUENCE
|
|
extn_len=2*$(hex2dec "${extn:2:2}")
|
|
# If the extension include the status_request (5), then it supports must staple.
|
|
if [[ "${extn:4:extn_len}" =~ 020105 ]]; then
|
|
supported=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$supported"; then
|
|
if "$provides_stapling"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_good "supported"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "supported"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_high "requires OCSP stapling (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "extension detected but no OCSP stapling provided"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# TODO: This function checks for Certificate Transparency support based on RFC 6962.
|
|
# It will need to be updated to add checks for Certificate Transparency support based on 6962bis.
|
|
# return values are results, no error conditions
|
|
certificate_transparency() {
|
|
local cert_txt="$1"
|
|
local ocsp_response="$2"
|
|
local -i number_of_certificates=$3
|
|
local cipher="$4"
|
|
local sni_used="$5"
|
|
local tls_version="$6"
|
|
local sni=""
|
|
local ciphers=""
|
|
local extra_extns=""
|
|
local -i success
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (signature) public key
|
|
local -r a_rsa="cc,13, cc,15, c0,30, c0,28, c0,14, 00,9f, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,39, c0,77, 00,c4, 00,88, c0,45, c0,4d, c0,53, c0,61, c0,7d, c0,8b, 16,b7, 16,b9, c0,2f, c0,27, c0,13, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,67, 00,33, c0,76, 00,be, 00,9a, 00,45, c0,44, c0,4c, c0,52, c0,60, c0,7c, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,12, 00,16, 00,15, 00,14, c0,10"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (encryption) public key
|
|
local -r e_rsa="00,b7, c0,99, 00,ad, cc,ae, 00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, 00,95, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,69, c0,6f, c0,7b, c0,93, ff,01, 00,ac, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,b6, 00,96, 00,41, c0,98, 00,07, 00,94, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,68, c0,6e, c0,7a, c0,92, 00,05, 00,04, 00,92, 00,0a, 00,93, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,2e, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, ff,00"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DSA public key
|
|
local -r a_dss="00,a3, 00,6a, 00,38, 00,c3, 00,87, c0,43, c0,57, c0,81, 00,a2, 00,40, 00,32, 00,bd, 00,99, 00,44, c0,42, c0,56, c0,80, 00,66, 00,13, 00,63, 00,12, 00,65, 00,11"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DH public key
|
|
local -r a_dh="00,a5, 00,a1, 00,69, 00,68, 00,37, 00,36, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,86, 00,85, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,55, c0,59, c0,7f, c0,83, 00,a4, 00,a0, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,31, 00,30, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,98, 00,97, 00,43, 00,42, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,54, c0,58, c0,7e, c0,82, 00,10, 00,0d, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDH public key
|
|
local -r a_ecdh="c0,32, c0,2e, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, c0,4b, c0,4f, c0,5f, c0,63, c0,89, c0,8d, c0,31, c0,2d, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, c0,4a, c0,4e, c0,5e, c0,62, c0,88, c0,8c, c0,0c, c0,02, c0,0d, c0,03, c0,0b, c0,01"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDSA public key
|
|
local -r a_ecdsa="cc,14, c0,2c, c0,24, c0,0a, cc,a9, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,73, c0,49, c0,5d, c0,87, 16,b8, 16,ba, c0,2b, c0,23, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,72, c0,48, c0,5c, c0,86, c0,07, c0,08, c0,06"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a GOST public key
|
|
local -r a_gost="00,80, 00,81, 00,82, 00,83"
|
|
|
|
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE=""
|
|
|
|
# First check whether signed certificate timestamps (SCT) are included in the
|
|
# server's certificate. If they aren't, check whether the server provided
|
|
# a stapled OCSP response with SCTs. If no SCTs were found in the certificate
|
|
# or OCSP response, check for an SCT TLS extension.
|
|
if [[ "$cert_txt" =~ CT\ Precertificate\ SCTs ]] || [[ "$cert_txt" =~ '1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2' ]]; then
|
|
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE="certificate extension"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ CT\ Certificate\ SCTs ]] || [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ '1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.5' ]]; then
|
|
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE="OCSP extension"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the server only has one certificate, then it is sufficient to check whether
|
|
# determine_tls_extensions() discovered an SCT TLS extension. If the server has more than
|
|
# one certificate, then it is possible that an SCT TLS extension is returned for some
|
|
# certificates, but not for all of them.
|
|
if [[ $number_of_certificates -eq 1 ]] && [[ "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ signed\ certificate\ timestamps ]]; then
|
|
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE="TLS extension"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $number_of_certificates -gt 1 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
if [[ "$tls_version" == 0304 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers=", 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05"
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
|
|
extra_extns=", 00,0d,00,10,00,0e,08,04,08,05,08,06,04,01,05,01,06,01,02,01"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then
|
|
extra_extns=", 00,0d,00,0a,00,08,04,03,05,03,06,03,02,03"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aRSA ]] && ciphers+=", $a_rsa"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ eRSA ]] && ciphers+=", $e_rsa"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aDSS ]] && ciphers+=", $a_dss"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aDH ]] && ciphers+=", $a_dh"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aECDH ]] && ciphers+=", $a_ecdh"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aECDSA ]] && ciphers+=", $a_ecdsa"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aGOST ]] && ciphers+=", $a_gost"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers" ]] && return 1
|
|
ciphers+=", 00,ff"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && sni="$SNI" && SNI=""
|
|
tls_sockets "${tls_version:2:2}" "${ciphers:2}" "all" "00,12,00,00$extra_extns"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
[[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && SNI="$sni"
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 || $success -eq 2 ]] && \
|
|
grep -a 'TLS server extension ' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | \
|
|
grep -aq "signed certificate timestamps"; then
|
|
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE="TLS extension"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]]; then
|
|
# At the moment Certificate Transparency only applies to HTTPS.
|
|
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE="N/A"
|
|
else
|
|
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE="--"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Shortcut for $OPENSSL x509 -noout -in $cert $ossl_command
|
|
# arg1 is the certificate
|
|
# arg2 is -serial | -fingerprint -sha1 | -fingerprint -sha256
|
|
# returns the serial or fingerprint as ASCII
|
|
#
|
|
determine_cert_fingerprint_serial() {
|
|
local cert="$1"
|
|
local ossl_command="$2"
|
|
local result=""
|
|
|
|
result="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout $ossl_command 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert")"
|
|
# remove strings in text output, colon only appear in fingerprints
|
|
result="${result//Fingerprint=}"
|
|
result="${result//serial=}"
|
|
result="${result//:/}"
|
|
result="${result//SHA1 /}"
|
|
result="${result//sha1 /}"
|
|
result="${result//SHA256 /}"
|
|
result="${result//sha256 /}"
|
|
# When the serial number is too large we'll get a 0x0a LF after 70 ASCII chars (see #2010).
|
|
# Thus we clean them here so that it is displayed correctly.
|
|
result="${result/[$'\n\r']/}"
|
|
result="${result//[\\]/}"
|
|
safe_echo "$result"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Returns startdate, enddate, diffseconds, days2expire as CSVs as strings
|
|
# arg1: human readable text string for certificate (openssl x509 -text -noout)
|
|
#
|
|
determine_dates_certificate() {
|
|
local cert_txt="$1"
|
|
local startdate enddate yearnow y m d yearstart clockstart yearend clockend
|
|
local diffseconds=0 days2expire=0
|
|
local -i secsaday=86400
|
|
|
|
startdate="${cert_txt#*Validity*Not Before: }"
|
|
# FreeBSD + OSX can't swallow the leading blank:
|
|
startdate="${startdate%%GMT*}GMT"
|
|
enddate="${cert_txt#*Validity*Not Before: *Not After : }"
|
|
enddate="${enddate%%GMT*}GMT"
|
|
# Now we have a normalized enddate and startdate like "Feb 27 10:03:20 2017 GMT" -- also for OpenBSD
|
|
if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
# Best we want to do under old versions of OpenBSD, first just remove the GMT and keep start/endate for later output
|
|
startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s")"
|
|
enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s")"
|
|
# Now we extract a date block and a time block which we need for later output
|
|
startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")"
|
|
enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")"
|
|
read -r yearstart clockstart <<< "$startdate"
|
|
read -r yearend clockend <<< "$enddate"
|
|
debugme echo "$yearstart, $clockstart"
|
|
debugme echo "$yearend, $clockend"
|
|
y=$(( ${yearend:0:4} - ${yearstart:0:4} ))
|
|
m=$(( ${yearend:5:1} - ${yearstart:5:1} + ${yearend:6:1} - ${yearstart:6:1} ))
|
|
d=$(( ${yearend:8:2} - ${yearstart:8:2} ))
|
|
# We take the year, month, days here as old OpenBSD's date is too difficult for real conversion
|
|
# see comment in parse_date(). In diffseconds then we have the estimated absolute validity period
|
|
diffseconds=$(( d + ((m*30)) + ((y*365)) ))
|
|
diffseconds=$((diffseconds * secsaday))
|
|
# Now we estimate the days left plus length of month/year:
|
|
yearnow="$(date -juz GMT "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M")"
|
|
y=$(( ${yearend:0:4} - ${yearnow:0:4} ))
|
|
m=$(( ${yearend:5:1} - ${yearnow:5:1} + ${yearend:6:1} - ${yearnow:6:1} ))
|
|
d=$(( ${yearend:8:2} - ${yearnow:8:2} ))
|
|
days2expire=$(( d + ((m*30)) + ((y*365)) ))
|
|
else
|
|
startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")"
|
|
enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")"
|
|
days2expire=$(( $(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') - $(LC_ALL=C date "+%s") )) # first in seconds
|
|
days2expire=$((days2expire / secsaday))
|
|
diffseconds=$(( $(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') - $(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') ))
|
|
fi
|
|
safe_echo "$startdate,$enddate,$diffseconds,$days2expire,$yearstart"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
certificate_info() {
|
|
local proto
|
|
local -i certificate_number=$1
|
|
local -i number_of_certificates=$2
|
|
local cert_txt="$3"
|
|
local intermediates="$4"
|
|
local cipher=$5
|
|
local cert_keysize=$6
|
|
local cert_type="$7"
|
|
local ocsp_response_binary="$8"
|
|
local ocsp_response=$9
|
|
local ocsp_response_status=${10}
|
|
local sni_used="${11}"
|
|
local ct="${12}"
|
|
local certificate_list_ordering_problem="${13}"
|
|
local cert_sig_algo cert_sig_hash_algo cert_key_algo cert_spki_info
|
|
local hostcert=""
|
|
local common_primes_file="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/common-primes.txt"
|
|
local -i lineno_matched=0
|
|
local cert_keyusage cert_ext_keyusage short_keyAlgo
|
|
local outok=true
|
|
local days2expire ocsp_uri crl
|
|
local startdate enddate issuer_CN issuer_C issuer_O issuer sans san all_san="" cn
|
|
local issuer_DC issuerfinding cn_nosni=""
|
|
local cert_fingerprint_sha1 cert_fingerprint_sha2 cert_serial cert
|
|
local -a intermediate_certs_txt=()
|
|
local policy_oid
|
|
local spaces=""
|
|
local -i trust_sni=0 trust_nosni=0 diffseconds=0
|
|
local has_dns_sans has_dns_sans_nosni
|
|
local trust_sni_finding
|
|
local -i i certificates_provided=0
|
|
local cn_finding trustfinding trustfinding_nosni
|
|
local cnok="OK"
|
|
local expfinding expok="OK"
|
|
local -i ret=0 tmp=0
|
|
local json_postfix="" # string to place at the end of JSON IDs when there is more than one certificate
|
|
local jsonID="" # string to place at beginning of JSON IDs
|
|
local json_rating json_msg
|
|
local indent=""
|
|
local days2warn2=$DAYS2WARN2
|
|
local days2warn1=$DAYS2WARN1
|
|
local provides_stapling=false
|
|
local caa_node="" all_caa="" caa_property_name="" caa_property_value=""
|
|
local response=""
|
|
local yearstart
|
|
local gt_398=false gt_398warn=false
|
|
local gt_825=false gt_825warn=false
|
|
local -i secsaday=86400
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local badocsp=1
|
|
local len_cert_serial=0
|
|
|
|
if [[ $number_of_certificates -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $certificate_number -eq 1 ]] && outln
|
|
indent=" "
|
|
out "$indent"
|
|
pr_headline "Server Certificate #$certificate_number"
|
|
[[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && pr_underline " (in response to request w/o SNI)"
|
|
outln
|
|
json_postfix=" <hostCert#${certificate_number}>"
|
|
spaces=" "
|
|
else
|
|
spaces=" "
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
GOOD_CA_BUNDLE=""
|
|
cert_sig_algo="$(awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; if (++Match >= 1) exit; }' <<< "$cert_txt")"
|
|
cert_sig_algo="${cert_sig_algo// /}"
|
|
case "$cert_sig_algo" in
|
|
1.3.101.112|ED25519) cert_sig_algo="Ed25519" ;;
|
|
1.3.101.113|ED448) cert_sig_algo="Ed448" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
cert_key_algo="$(awk -F':' '/Public Key Algorithm:/ { print $2; if (++Match >= 1) exit; }' <<< "$cert_txt")"
|
|
cert_key_algo="${cert_key_algo// /}"
|
|
case "$cert_key_algo" in
|
|
1.3.101.112|E[Dd]25519) cert_key_algo="Ed25519"; cert_keysize=253 ;;
|
|
1.3.101.113|E[Dd]448) cert_key_algo="Ed448"; cert_keysize=456 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
out "$indent" ; pr_bold " Signature Algorithm "
|
|
jsonID="cert_signatureAlgorithm"
|
|
case $cert_sig_algo in
|
|
sha1WithRSA|sha1WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "SHA1 with RSA"
|
|
if [[ "$SERVICE" == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
out " -- besides: users will receive a "; pr_svrty_high "strong browser WARNING"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "SHA1 with RSA"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Uses SHA1 algorithm"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha224WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
outln "SHA224 with RSA"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "SHA224 with RSA"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha256WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "SHA256 with RSA"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA256 with RSA"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha384WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "SHA384 with RSA"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA384 with RSA"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha512WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "SHA512 with RSA"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA512 with RSA"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA1)
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "ECDSA with SHA1"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "ECDSA with SHA1"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Uses SHA1 algorithm"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA224)
|
|
outln "ECDSA with SHA224"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "ECDSA with SHA224"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA256)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA256"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA256"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA384)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA384"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA384"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA512)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA512"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA512"
|
|
;;
|
|
dsaWithSHA1)
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "DSA with SHA1"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "DSA with SHA1"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Uses SHA1 algorithm"
|
|
;;
|
|
dsa_with_SHA224)
|
|
outln "DSA with SHA224"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "DSA with SHA224"
|
|
;;
|
|
dsa_with_SHA256)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "DSA with SHA256"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "DSA with SHA256"
|
|
;;
|
|
rsassaPss)
|
|
cert_sig_hash_algo="$(awk '/Signature Algorithm/ { getline; print $0; exit }' <<< "$cert_txt" | sed 's/^.*Hash Algorithm: //')"
|
|
case $cert_sig_hash_algo in
|
|
sha1)
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "RSASSA-PSS with SHA1"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA1"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Uses SHA1 algorithm"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha224)
|
|
outln "RSASSA-PSS with SHA224"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA224"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha256)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA256"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA256"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha384)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA384"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA384"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha512)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA512"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA512"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
out "RSASSA-PSS with $cert_sig_hash_algo"
|
|
prln_warning " (Unknown hash algorithm)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "DEBUG" "RSASSA-PSS with $cert_sig_hash_algo"
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
md2*)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "MD2"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD2"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Supports a insecure signature (MD2)"
|
|
;;
|
|
md4*)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "MD4"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD4"
|
|
;;
|
|
md5*)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "MD5"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD5"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Supports a insecure signature (MD5)"
|
|
;;
|
|
Ed25519|Ed448)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "$cert_sig_algo"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "$cert_sig_algo"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
out "$cert_sig_algo ("
|
|
pr_warning "FIXME: can't tell whether this is good or not"
|
|
outln ")"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "DEBUG" "$cert_sig_algo"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# old, but still interesting: https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/754-Playing-with-the-EFF-SSL-Observatory.html
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server key size "
|
|
jsonID="cert_keySize"
|
|
if [[ -z "$cert_keysize" ]]; then
|
|
outln "(couldn't determine)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "cannot be determined"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
else
|
|
case $cert_key_algo in
|
|
*RSA*|*rsa*) short_keyAlgo="RSA";;
|
|
*ecdsa*|*ecPublicKey) short_keyAlgo="EC";;
|
|
*Ed25519*|*Ed448*) short_keyAlgo="EdDSA";;
|
|
*DSA*|*dsa*) short_keyAlgo="DSA";;
|
|
*GOST*|*gost*) short_keyAlgo="GOST";;
|
|
*dh*|*DH*) short_keyAlgo="DH" ;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "don't know $cert_key_algo "
|
|
((ret++)) ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
out "$short_keyAlgo "
|
|
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492, https://www.keylength.com/en/compare/
|
|
# https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-001-0009-4
|
|
# see https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-4/final
|
|
# Table 2 @ chapter 5.6.1 (~ p66)
|
|
if [[ $cert_key_algo =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ ecPublicKey ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 110 ]]; then # a guess
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="CRITICAL"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 123 ]]; then # a guess
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="HIGH"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 163 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="MEDIUM"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 224 ]]; then
|
|
out "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="INFO"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 533 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="OK"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
else
|
|
out "keysize: $cert_keysize (not expected, FIXME)"
|
|
json_rating="DEBUG"; json_msg=" $short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits (not expected)"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
|
|
set_key_str_score "$short_keyAlgo" "$cert_keysize"
|
|
elif [[ $cert_key_algo =~ RSA ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ rsa ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ dsa ]] || \
|
|
[[ $cert_key_algo =~ dhKeyAgreement ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo == X9.42\ DH ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 512 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$cert_keysize"
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
json_rating="CRITICAL"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 768 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$cert_keysize"
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
json_rating="HIGH"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 1024 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$cert_keysize"
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
json_rating="MEDIUM"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 2048 ]]; then
|
|
out "$cert_keysize bits"
|
|
json_rating="INFO"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 4096 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="OK"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "weird key size: $cert_keysize bits"; out " (could cause compatibility problems)"
|
|
json_rating="WARN"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits (Odd)"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
set_key_str_score "$short_keyAlgo" "$cert_keysize"
|
|
elif [[ $cert_key_algo == Ed* ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$cert_key_algo"
|
|
json_rating="OK"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_key_algo"
|
|
set_key_str_score "$short_keyAlgo" "$cert_keysize"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$cert_key_algo + $cert_keysize bits ("
|
|
pr_warning "FIXME: can't tell whether this is good or not"
|
|
out ")"
|
|
json_rating="WARN"; json_msg="Server keys $cert_keysize bits, unknown public key algorithm $cert_key_algo"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$short_keyAlgo" in
|
|
"RSA") cert_spki_info="${cert_txt##*Subject Public Key Info:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*Public Key Algorithm:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info#*Exponent:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(strip_leading_space "$cert_spki_info")"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info%%[[:space:]]*}"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_spki_info" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $cert_spki_info -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out " (exponent is "; pr_svrty_critical "$cert_spki_info"; out ")"
|
|
json_rating="CRITICAL"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "RSA certificate uses exponent of 1"
|
|
else
|
|
out " (exponent is $cert_spki_info)"
|
|
fi
|
|
json_msg+=" (exponent is $cert_spki_info)"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
"EC") cert_spki_info="${cert_txt##*Subject Public Key Info:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*Public Key Algorithm:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*ASN1 OID: }"
|
|
[[ "$cert_spki_info" =~ NIST\ CURVE:\ ]] && cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*NIST CURVE: }"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info%%[[:space:]]*}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(strip_lf "$(strip_spaces "$cert_spki_info")")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_spki_info" ]]; then
|
|
out " (curve $cert_spki_info)"
|
|
json_msg+=" (curve $cert_spki_info)"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
"DH") if [[ -s "$common_primes_file" ]]; then
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_txt##*Subject Public Key Info:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*Public Key Algorithm:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(awk '/prime:|P:/,/generator:|G:/' <<< "$cert_spki_info" | grep -Ev "prime|P:|generator|G:")"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(strip_spaces "$(colon_to_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$cert_spki_info")")")"
|
|
[[ "${cert_spki_info:0:2}" == 00 ]] && cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info:2}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(toupper "$cert_spki_info")"
|
|
lineno_matched=$(grep -n "$cert_spki_info" "$common_primes_file" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '{ print $1 }')
|
|
if [[ "$lineno_matched" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(awk "NR == $lineno_matched-1" "$common_primes_file" | awk -F'"' '{ print $2 }')"
|
|
out " ($cert_spki_info)"
|
|
json_msg+=" ($cert_spki_info)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "$json_rating" "$json_msg"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server key usage ";
|
|
outok=true
|
|
jsonID="cert_keyUsage"
|
|
cert_keyusage="$(strip_leading_space "$(awk '/X509v3 Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "$cert_txt")")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_keyusage" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$cert_keyusage"
|
|
if [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ RSASig\ || " $cert_type " =~ \ DSA\ || " $cert_type " =~ \ ECDSA\ || " $cert_type " =~ \ EdDSA\ ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Digital\ Signature ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for digital signatures"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for digital signatures: \"$cert_keyusage\""
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ RSAKMK\ ]] && [[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Key\ Encipherment ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for key encipherment"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for key encipherment: \"$cert_keyusage\""
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ DH\ || " $cert_type " =~ \ ECDH\ ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Key\ Agreement ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for key agreement"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for key agreement: \"$cert_keyusage\""
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No server key usage information"
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$outok"; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_keyusage"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server extended key usage ";
|
|
jsonID="cert_extKeyUsage"
|
|
outok=true
|
|
cert_ext_keyusage="$(strip_leading_space "$(awk '/X509v3 Extended Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "$cert_txt")")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_ext_keyusage" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$cert_ext_keyusage"
|
|
if [[ ! "$cert_ext_keyusage" =~ "TLS Web Server Authentication" ]] && [[ ! "$cert_ext_keyusage" =~ "Any Extended Key Usage" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for TLS Web Server Authentication"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for TLS Web Server Authentication: \"$cert_ext_keyusage\""
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No server extended key usage information"
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$outok"; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_ext_keyusage"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
hostcert="$(<$HOSTCERT)"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Serial "
|
|
cert_serial="$(determine_cert_fingerprint_serial "$hostcert" "-serial")"
|
|
fileout "cert_serialNumber${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_serial"
|
|
out "$cert_serial"
|
|
|
|
len_cert_serial=${#cert_serial}
|
|
len_cert_serial=$(( len_cert_serial / 2 ))
|
|
|
|
if [[ $len_cert_serial -gt 20 ]]; then
|
|
# https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.2
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_svrty_low "${spaces}NOT ok: length must not exceed 20 bytes (is: $len_cert_serial bytes)"
|
|
fileout "cert_serialNumberLen${json_postfix}" "LOW" "$len_cert_serial is too long"
|
|
elif [[ $len_cert_serial -lt 8 ]] && [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]]; then
|
|
# We only want this check for browsers as this requirement comes from the CA browser forum,
|
|
# see e.g. https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.8.0.pdf
|
|
prln_svrty_low " NOT ok: length should be >= 64 bits entropy (is: $len_cert_serial bytes)"
|
|
fileout "cert_serialNumberLen${json_postfix}" "LOW" "$len_cert_serial is not enough entropy"
|
|
else
|
|
outln " (OK: length $len_cert_serial)"
|
|
fileout "cert_serialNumberLen${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$len_cert_serial"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Fingerprints "
|
|
cert_fingerprint_sha1="$(determine_cert_fingerprint_serial "$hostcert" "-fingerprint -sha1")"
|
|
outln "SHA1 $cert_fingerprint_sha1"
|
|
fileout "cert_fingerprintSHA1${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${cert_fingerprint_sha1}"
|
|
|
|
cert_fingerprint_sha2="$(determine_cert_fingerprint_serial "$hostcert" "-fingerprint -sha256")"
|
|
fileout "cert_fingerprintSHA256${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${cert_fingerprint_sha2}"
|
|
outln "${spaces}SHA256 ${cert_fingerprint_sha2}"
|
|
|
|
fileout "cert${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$(pem_to_one_line "$hostcert")"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 ]] && \
|
|
CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2" ||
|
|
CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2 $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2"
|
|
[[ -z $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 ]] && \
|
|
[[ $cert_key_algo =~ RSA || $cert_key_algo =~ rsa ]] &&
|
|
RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Common Name (CN) "
|
|
cn_finding="Common Name (CN) : "
|
|
cn="$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cn" ]]; then
|
|
pr_italic "$cn"
|
|
cn_finding="$cn"
|
|
else
|
|
cn="no CN field in subject"
|
|
out "($cn)"
|
|
cn_finding="$cn"
|
|
cnok="INFO"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "cert_commonName${json_postfix}" "$cnok" "$cn_finding"
|
|
cn_finding=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$sni_used" ]]; then
|
|
if grep -qe '-----BEGIN' "$HOSTCERT.nosni"; then
|
|
cn_nosni="$(get_cn_from_cert "$HOSTCERT.nosni")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cn_nosni" ]] && cn_nosni="no CN field in subject"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tm_out "\"$NODE\" | \"$cn\" | \"$cn_nosni\""
|
|
else
|
|
debugme tm_out "\"$NODE\" | \"$cn\""
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$sni_used" ]] || [[ "$(toupper "$cn_nosni")" == "$(toupper "$cn")" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
cn_finding="$cn"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$cn_nosni" ]]; then
|
|
out " (request w/o SNI didn't succeed";
|
|
cn_finding+="request w/o SNI didn't succeed"
|
|
if [[ $cert_sig_algo =~ ecdsa ]]; then
|
|
out ", usual for EC certificates"
|
|
cn_finding+=", usual for EC certificates"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln ")"
|
|
cn_finding+=""
|
|
elif [[ "$cn_nosni" == *"no CN field"* ]]; then
|
|
outln ", (request w/o SNI: $cn_nosni)"
|
|
cn_finding="$cn_nosni"
|
|
else
|
|
out " (CN in response to request w/o SNI: "; pr_italic "$cn_nosni"; outln ")"
|
|
cn_finding="$cn_nosni"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "cert_commonName_wo_SNI${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cn_finding"
|
|
|
|
sans=$(grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" <<< "$cert_txt" | \
|
|
grep -E "DNS:|IP Address:|email:|URI:|DirName:|Registered ID:" | tr ',' '\n' | \
|
|
sed -e 's/ *DNS://g' -e 's/ *IP Address://g' -e 's/ *email://g' -e 's/ *URI://g' -e 's/ *DirName://g' \
|
|
-e 's/ *Registered ID://g' \
|
|
-e 's/ *othername:<unsupported>//g' -e 's/ *X400Name:<unsupported>//g' -e 's/ *EdiPartyName:<unsupported>//g')
|
|
# ^^^ CACert
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " subjectAltName (SAN) "
|
|
jsonID="cert_subjectAltName"
|
|
if [[ -n "$sans" ]]; then
|
|
while read san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && all_san+="$san "
|
|
done <<< "$sans"
|
|
prln_italic "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$all_san" "$indent " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$all_san"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "missing (NOT ok)"; outln " -- Browsers are complaining"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "No SAN, browsers are complaining"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "missing"; outln " -- no SAN is deprecated"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "Providing no SAN is deprecated"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Determine the issuer now as we need them for host certificate warning
|
|
issuer="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -issuer -nameopt multiline,-align,sname,-esc_msb,utf8,-space_eq 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")"
|
|
issuer_CN="$(awk -F'=' '/CN=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")"
|
|
issuer_O="$(awk -F'=' '/O=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")"
|
|
issuer_C="$(awk -F'=' '/ C=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")"
|
|
issuer_DC="$(awk -F'=' '/DC=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Trust (hostname) "
|
|
compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT"
|
|
trust_sni=$?
|
|
|
|
# Find out if the subjectAltName extension is present and contains
|
|
# a DNS name, since Section 6.3 of RFC 6125 says:
|
|
# Security Warning: A client MUST NOT seek a match for a reference
|
|
# identifier of CN-ID if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID,
|
|
# SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types
|
|
# supported by the client.
|
|
has_dns_sans=$HAS_DNS_SANS
|
|
|
|
case $trust_sni in
|
|
0) trustfinding="certificate does not match supplied URI"
|
|
set_grade_cap "M" "Domain name mismatch"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) trustfinding="Ok via SAN" ;;
|
|
2) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard" ;;
|
|
4) if "$has_dns_sans"; then
|
|
trustfinding="via CN, but not SAN"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding="via CN only"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
5) trustfinding="Ok via SAN and CN" ;;
|
|
6) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard and CN"
|
|
;;
|
|
8) if "$has_dns_sans"; then
|
|
trustfinding="via CN wildcard, but not SAN"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding="via CN (wildcard) only"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
9) trustfinding="Ok via CN wildcard and SAN"
|
|
;;
|
|
10) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard and CN wildcard"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if [[ $trust_sni -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$trustfinding"
|
|
trust_sni_finding="HIGH"
|
|
elif [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=308330
|
|
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1245280
|
|
# https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/4981025180483584
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$trustfinding"; out " -- Browsers are complaining"
|
|
trust_sni_finding="HIGH"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$trustfinding"
|
|
trust_sni_finding="MEDIUM"
|
|
# we punish CN matching for non-HTTP as it is deprecated https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818#section-3.1
|
|
! "$has_dns_sans" && out " -- CN only match is deprecated"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$trustfinding"
|
|
trust_sni_finding="OK"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$cn_nosni" ]]; then
|
|
compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT.nosni"
|
|
trust_nosni=$?
|
|
has_dns_sans_nosni=$HAS_DNS_SANS
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# See issue #733.
|
|
if [[ -z "$sni_used" ]]; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=""
|
|
elif [[ $trust_sni -eq $trust_nosni && "$has_dns_sans" == "$has_dns_sans_nosni" ]] || \
|
|
[[ $trust_sni -eq 0 && $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (same w/o SNI)"
|
|
elif [[ $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]]; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: certificate does not match supplied URI)"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (SNI mandatory)"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $trust_nosni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_nosni -eq 8 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]]; then
|
|
case $trust_nosni in
|
|
1) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN)" ;;
|
|
2) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard)" ;;
|
|
4) if "$has_dns_sans_nosni"; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: via CN, but not SAN)"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: via CN only)"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
5) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN and CN)" ;;
|
|
6) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard and CN)" ;;
|
|
8) if "$has_dns_sans_nosni"; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: via CN wildcard, but not SAN)"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: via CN (wildcard) only)"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
9) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via CN wildcard and SAN)" ;;
|
|
10) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard and CN wildcard)" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
elif [[ $trust_sni -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (works w/o SNI)"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (however, works w/o SNI)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$sni_used" ]] || [[ $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]] || [[ $trust_nosni -ne 4 && $trust_nosni -ne 8 ]]; then
|
|
outln "$trustfinding_nosni"
|
|
elif [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$trustfinding_nosni"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "$trustfinding_nosni"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
fileout "cert_trust${json_postfix}" "$trust_sni_finding" "${trustfinding}${trustfinding_nosni}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$trust_sni" =~ ^(2|6|8|9|10)$ ]] || [[ "$trust_nosni" =~ ^(2|6|8|9|10)$ ]]; then
|
|
out "${spaces}"
|
|
pr_svrty_low "wildcard certificate" ; outln " could be problematic, see other hosts at"
|
|
outln "${spaces}https://search.censys.io/search?resource=hosts&virtual_hosts=INCLUDE&q=$cert_fingerprint_sha2"
|
|
fileout "cert_trust${json_postfix}_wildcard" "LOW" "trust is via wildcard"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Chain of trust"; out " "
|
|
jsonID="cert_chain_of_trust"
|
|
# Looks for CA's that have their trust removed by the first part of their Organization Name, add multiple with ^(TrustCor Systems|WoSign) etc.
|
|
if [[ "$issuer_O" =~ ^(TrustCor Systems) ]]; then
|
|
# Shortcut for this special case here. There is a difference between not being in a root store and being removed from a root store.
|
|
pr_italic "$issuer_O"; out " is " ; prln_svrty_critical "actively removed from one or more root stores (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "Issuer removed from one or more root stores ($issuer_O)"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Untrusted certificate chain"
|
|
else
|
|
# Also handles fileout, keep error if happened
|
|
determine_trust "$jsonID" "$json_postfix" || ((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# https://fahrplan.events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/attachments/1777_is-the-SSLiverse-a-safe-place.pdf, see p40+
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " EV cert"; out " (experimental) "
|
|
jsonID="cert_certificatePolicies_EV"
|
|
# only the first one, seldom we have two
|
|
policy_oid=$(awk '/ .Policy: / { print $2 }' <<< "$cert_txt" | awk 'NR < 2')
|
|
if grep -Eq 'Extended Validation|Extended Validated|EV SSL|EV CA' <<< "$issuer" || \
|
|
[[ 2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 2.16.840.1.114412.1.3.0.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 2.16.840.1.114412.2.1 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 2.16.578.1.26.1.3.3 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.17326.10.14.2.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.17326.10.8.12.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.13177.10.1.3.10 == "$policy_oid" ]] ; then
|
|
out "yes "
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "yes"
|
|
else
|
|
out "no "
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "no"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -n "($(newline_to_spaces "$policy_oid"))"
|
|
outln
|
|
#TODO: check browser OIDs:
|
|
# https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/certverifier/ExtendedValidation.cpp
|
|
# https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/chromium/+/master/net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.cc
|
|
# https://certs.opera.com/03/ev-oids.xml
|
|
# see #967
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Validity (UTC) "
|
|
IFS=',' read -r startdate enddate diffseconds days2expire yearstart < <(determine_dates_certificate "$cert_txt")
|
|
|
|
# We adjust the thresholds by %50 for LE certificates, relaxing warnings for those certificates.
|
|
# . instead of \' because it does not break syntax highlighting in vim
|
|
if [[ "$issuer_O" =~ ^Let.s\ Encrypt ]] ; then
|
|
days2warn2=$((days2warn2 / 2))
|
|
days2warn1=$((days2warn1 / 2))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "(diffseconds: $diffseconds)"
|
|
if ! [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend 1 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "expired"
|
|
expfinding="expired"
|
|
expok="CRITICAL"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Certificate expired"
|
|
else
|
|
# low threshold first
|
|
if [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend $((secsaday*days2warn2)) 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
# high threshold
|
|
if [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend $((secsaday*days2warn1)) 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$days2expire >= $days2warn1 days"
|
|
expfinding+="$days2expire >= $days2warn1 days"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "expires < $days2warn1 days ($days2expire)"
|
|
expfinding+="expires < $days2warn1 days ($days2expire)"
|
|
expok="MEDIUM"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_high "expires < $days2warn2 days ($days2expire)"
|
|
expfinding+="expires < $days2warn2 days ($days2expire)"
|
|
expok="HIGH"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln " ($startdate --> $enddate)"
|
|
fileout "cert_expirationStatus${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$expfinding"
|
|
fileout "cert_notBefore${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$startdate" # we assume that the certificate has no start time in the future
|
|
fileout "cert_notAfter${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$enddate" # They are in UTC
|
|
|
|
# Internal certificates or those from appliances often have too high validity periods.
|
|
# We check for ~10 years and >~ 5 years
|
|
if [[ $diffseconds -ge $((secsaday*365*10)) ]]; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
prln_svrty_high ">= 10 years is way too long"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) days"
|
|
elif [[ $diffseconds -ge $((secsaday*365*5)) ]]; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
prln_svrty_medium ">= 5 years is too long"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) days"
|
|
elif [[ $diffseconds -ge $((secsaday*398 + 1)) ]]; then
|
|
# Also "official" certificates issued from september 1st 2020 (1598918400) aren't supposed
|
|
# to be valid longer than 398 days which is 34387200 in epoch seconds
|
|
gt_398=true
|
|
if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
if [[ 20200901 -le ${yearstart//-/} ]]; then
|
|
gt_398warn=true
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') -ge 1598918400 ]]; then
|
|
gt_398warn=true
|
|
fi
|
|
# Now, the verdict, depending on the issuing date
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
if "$gt_398warn" && "$gt_398"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "> 398 days issued after 2020/09/01 is too long"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) > 398 days"
|
|
elif "$gt_398"; then
|
|
outln ">= 398 days certificate life time but issued before 2020/09/01"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) =< 398 days"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $diffseconds -ge $((secsaday*825 + 1)) ]]; then
|
|
# Also "official" certificates issued from March 1st, 2018 (1517353200) aren't supposed
|
|
# to be valid longer than 825 days which is 1517353200 in epoch seconds
|
|
gt_825=true
|
|
if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
if [[ 20180301 -le ${yearstart//-/} ]]; then
|
|
gt_825warn=true
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') -ge 1517353200 ]]; then
|
|
gt_825warn=true
|
|
fi
|
|
# Now, the verdict, depending on the issuing date
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
if "$gt_825warn" && "$gt_825"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "> 825 days issued after 2018/03/01 is too long"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) > 825 days"
|
|
elif "$gt_825"; then
|
|
outln ">= 825 days certificate life time but issued before 2018/03/01"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) =< 825 days"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# All is fine with validity period
|
|
# We ignore for now certificates < 2018/03/01. On the screen we only show debug info
|
|
debugme echo "${spaces}DEBUG: all is fine with total certificate life time"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "OK" "certificate has no extended life time according to browser forum"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " ETS/\"eTLS\""
|
|
out ", visibility info "
|
|
jsonID="cert_eTLS"
|
|
etsi_ets_visibility_info "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "$spaces" "$hostcert" "$cert_txt"
|
|
# *Currently* this is even listed as a vulnerability (CWE-310, CVE-2019-919), see
|
|
# https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9191, https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-9191
|
|
# For now we leave this here. We may want to change that later or add infos to other sections (FS & vulnerability)
|
|
|
|
if "$PHONE_OUT"; then
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " In pwnedkeys.com DB "
|
|
check_pwnedkeys "$HOSTCERT" "$cert_key_algo" "$cert_keysize"
|
|
case "$?" in
|
|
0) outln "not checked"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not checked" ;;
|
|
1) outln "not in database"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not in database" ;;
|
|
2) pr_svrty_critical "NOT ok --"; outln " key appears in database"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "private key is known" ;;
|
|
7) prln_warning "error querying https://v1.pwnedkeys.com"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "WARN" "connection error" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Revocation List "
|
|
jsonID="cert_crlDistributionPoints"
|
|
# ~ get next 50 lines after pattern , strip until Signature Algorithm and retrieve URIs
|
|
crl="$(awk '/X509v3 CRL Distribution/{i=50} i&&i--' <<< "$cert_txt" | awk '/^$|^.*Name.*$|^.*Reasons.*$|^.*CRL Issuer.*$/,/^ [a-zA-Z0-9]+|^ Signature Algorithm:/' | awk -F'URI:' '/URI/ { print $2 }')"
|
|
if [[ -z "$crl" ]] ; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--"
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $(count_lines "$crl") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out "$crl"
|
|
if [[ "$expfinding" != "expired" ]]; then
|
|
check_revocation_crl "$crl" "cert_crlRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
ret=$((ret +$?))
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
else # more than one CRL
|
|
first_crl=true
|
|
while read -r line; do
|
|
if "$first_crl"; then
|
|
first_crl=false
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$line"
|
|
if [[ "$expfinding" != expired ]]; then
|
|
check_revocation_crl "$line" "cert_crlRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
ret=$((ret +$?))
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
done <<< "$crl"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$crl"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP URI "
|
|
jsonID="cert_ocspURL"
|
|
ocsp_uri="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -ocsp_uri 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")"
|
|
if [[ -z "$ocsp_uri" ]]; then
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $(count_lines "$ocsp_uri") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out "$ocsp_uri"
|
|
if [[ "$expfinding" != expired ]]; then
|
|
check_revocation_ocsp "$ocsp_uri" "" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$((ret +$?))
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
first_ocsp=true
|
|
while read -r line; do
|
|
if "$first_ocsp"; then
|
|
first_ocsp=false
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$line"
|
|
if [[ "$expfinding" != expired ]]; then
|
|
check_revocation_ocsp "$line" "" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
ret=$((ret +$?))
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
done <<< "$ocsp_uri"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$ocsp_uri"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ocsp_uri" ]] && [[ -z "$crl" ]]; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
pr_svrty_high "NOT ok --"
|
|
outln " neither CRL nor OCSP URI provided"
|
|
fileout "cert_revocation${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Neither CRL nor OCSP URI provided"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP stapling "
|
|
jsonID="OCSP_stapling"
|
|
if grep -a "OCSP response" <<< "$ocsp_response" | grep -q "no response sent" ; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$ocsp_uri" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "not offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "LOW" "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if grep -a "OCSP Response Status" <<< "$ocsp_response_status" | grep -q successful; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "offered"
|
|
provides_stapling=true
|
|
check_revocation_ocsp "" "$ocsp_response_binary" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
elif [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ Responder\ Error: ]]; then
|
|
response="$(awk '/Responder Error:/ { print $3 }' <<< "$ocsp_response")"
|
|
pr_warning "stapled OCSP response contained an error response from OCSP responder: $response"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "stapled OCSP response contained an error response from OCSP responder: $response"
|
|
else
|
|
if $GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM; then
|
|
pr_warning "(GOST servers make problems here, sorry)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "(The GOST server made a problem here, sorry)"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
else
|
|
out "(response status unknown)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" " not sure what's going on here, '$ocsp_response'"
|
|
debugme grep -a -A20 -B2 "OCSP response" <<< "$ocsp_response"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP must staple extension ";
|
|
must_staple "$json_postfix" "$provides_stapling" "$cert_txt"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " DNS CAA RR"; out " (experimental) "
|
|
jsonID="DNS_CAArecord"
|
|
caa_node="$NODE"
|
|
caa=""
|
|
while [[ -z "$caa" ]] && [[ -n "$caa_node" ]]; do
|
|
caa="$(get_caa_rr_record $caa_node)"
|
|
tmp=${PIPESTATUS[@]}
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo "get_caa_rr_record: $tmp"
|
|
[[ $caa_node =~ '.'$ ]] || caa_node+="."
|
|
caa_node=${caa_node#*.}
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$caa" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "available"; out " - please check for match with \"Issuer\" below"
|
|
if [[ $(count_lines "$caa") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out ": "
|
|
else
|
|
outln; out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
while read caa; do
|
|
if [[ -n "$caa" ]]; then
|
|
all_caa+="$caa, "
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$caa"
|
|
all_caa=${all_caa%, } # strip trailing comma
|
|
pr_italic "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$all_caa" "$indent " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "$all_caa"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$NODNS" ]]; then
|
|
out "(instructed to minimize/skip DNS queries)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "check skipped as instructed"
|
|
elif "$DNS_VIA_PROXY"; then
|
|
out "(instructed to use the proxy for DNS only)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "check skipped as instructed (proxy)"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_low "not offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "LOW" "--"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Transparency ";
|
|
jsonID="certificate_transparency"
|
|
if [[ "$ct" =~ extension ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "yes"; outln " ($ct)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "yes ($ct)"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$ct"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$ct"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificates provided"
|
|
certificates_provided="$(grep -ace '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' <<< "$intermediates")"
|
|
((certificates_provided++)) # plus host certificate
|
|
out " $certificates_provided"
|
|
fileout "certs_countServer${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${certificates_provided}"
|
|
if "$certificate_list_ordering_problem"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_low " (certificate list ordering problem)"
|
|
fileout "certs_list_ordering_problem${json_postfix}" "LOW" "yes"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "certs_list_ordering_problem${json_postfix}" "INFO" "no"
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Issuer "
|
|
jsonID="cert_caIssuers"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$issuer_O" == issuer= ]] || [[ "$issuer_O" == issuer=\ ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" == "$cn" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "self-signed (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "selfsigned"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Self-signed certificate"
|
|
else
|
|
issuerfinding="$issuer_CN"
|
|
pr_italic "$issuer_CN"
|
|
if [[ -z "$issuer_O" ]] && [[ -n "$issuer_DC" ]]; then
|
|
for san in $issuer_DC; do
|
|
if [[ -z "$issuer_O" ]]; then
|
|
issuer_O="${san}"
|
|
else
|
|
issuer_O="${san}.${issuer_O}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$issuer_O" ]]; then
|
|
issuerfinding+=" ("
|
|
out " ("
|
|
issuerfinding+="$issuer_O"
|
|
pr_italic "$issuer_O"
|
|
if [[ -n "$issuer_C" ]]; then
|
|
issuerfinding+=" from "
|
|
out " from "
|
|
issuerfinding+="$issuer_C"
|
|
pr_italic "$issuer_C"
|
|
fi
|
|
issuerfinding+=")"
|
|
out ")"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$issuerfinding"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Now we take care of the intermediate certificates. We basically (should) have them on disk
|
|
# as "intermediatecerts.pem" (which could be split into intermediatecert1.crt, intermediatecert2.crt, ..)
|
|
# However we do this in RAM which is better as it was passed to this function.
|
|
# We should keep in mind though this is somewhat redundant code. We do similar stuff elsewhere,
|
|
# e.g. in extract_certificates() and run_hpkp() but don't keep the certificates
|
|
|
|
# Store all of the text output of the intermediate certificates in an array so that they can
|
|
# be used later (e.g., to check their expiration dates).
|
|
for (( i=1; i < certificates_provided; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$intermediates" =~ \-\-\-\-\-BEGIN\ CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\- ]] || break
|
|
intermediates="${intermediates#*-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----}"
|
|
cert="${intermediates%%-----END CERTIFICATE-----*}"
|
|
intermediates="${intermediates#${cert}-----END CERTIFICATE-----}"
|
|
cert="-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----${cert}-----END CERTIFICATE-----"
|
|
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$(pem_to_one_line "$cert")"
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_fingerprintSHA256 <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$(determine_cert_fingerprint_serial "$cert" "-fingerprint -sha256")"
|
|
|
|
intermediate_certs_txt[i]="$($OPENSSL x509 -text -nameopt utf8 -noout 2>/dev/null <<< "$cert")"
|
|
|
|
# We don't need every value here. For the sake of being consistent here we add the rest
|
|
IFS=',' read -r startdate enddate diffseconds days2expire yearstart < <(determine_dates_certificate "${intermediate_certs_txt[i]}")
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_notBefore <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$startdate"
|
|
|
|
if $first; then
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Intermediate cert validity "
|
|
first=false
|
|
else
|
|
out "$indent$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
out "#${i}: "
|
|
if ! [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend 1 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
cn_finding="expired!"
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$cn_finding"
|
|
expok="CRITICAL"
|
|
elif ! [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend $((secsaday*20)) 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
cn_finding="expires <= 20 days"
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$cn_finding"
|
|
expok="HIGH"
|
|
elif ! [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend $((secsaday*40)) 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
cn_finding="expires <= 40 days"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$cn_finding"
|
|
expok="MEDIUM"
|
|
else
|
|
cn_finding="ok > 40 days"
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$cn_finding"
|
|
expok="OK"
|
|
fi
|
|
out " ($enddate). "
|
|
cn="$(awk -F= '/Subject:.*CN/ { print $NF }' <<< "${intermediate_certs_txt[i]}")"
|
|
issuer_CN="$(awk -F= '/Issuer:.*CN/ { print $NF }' <<< "${intermediate_certs_txt[i]}")"
|
|
pr_italic "$(strip_leading_space "$cn")"; out " <-- "; prln_italic "$(strip_leading_space "$issuer_CN")"
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_notAfter <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$enddate"
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_expiration <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$cn_finding"
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_chain <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cn <-- $issuer_CN"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Courtesy Hanno Böck (see https://github.com/hannob/badocspcert)
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Intermediate Bad OCSP"
|
|
out " (exp.) "
|
|
jsonID="intermediate_cert_badOCSP"
|
|
|
|
for (( i=1; i < certificates_provided; i++ )); do
|
|
cert_ext_keyusage="$(awk '/X509v3 Extended Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "${intermediate_certs_txt[i]}")"
|
|
[[ "$cert_ext_keyusage" =~ OCSP\ Signing ]] && badocsp=0 && break
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $badocsp -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "NOT ok"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "NOT ok is intermediate certificate ${i}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_good "Ok"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "intermediate certificate(s) is/are ok"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_server_defaults() {
|
|
local ciph newhostcert sni
|
|
local match_found
|
|
local sessticket_lifetime_hint="" sessticket_proto="" lifetime unit
|
|
local -i i n
|
|
local -i certs_found=0
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local -a previous_hostcert previous_hostcert_txt previous_hostcert_type
|
|
local -a previous_hostcert_issuer previous_intermediates previous_ordering_problem keysize tested_cipher
|
|
local -a ocsp_response_binary ocsp_response ocsp_response_status sni_used tls_version ct
|
|
local -a ciphers_to_test certificate_type
|
|
local -a -i success
|
|
local cn_nosni cn_sni sans_nosni sans_sni san tls_extensions client_auth_ca
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
# Try each public key type once:
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[1]: cipher suites using certificates with RSA signature public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[2]: cipher suites using certificates with RSA key encipherment public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[3]: cipher suites using certificates with DSA signature public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[4]: cipher suites using certificates with DH key agreement public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[5]: cipher suites using certificates with ECDH key agreement public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[6]: cipher suites using certificates with ECDSA signature public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[7]: cipher suites using certificates with GOST R 34.10 (either 2001 or 94) public keys
|
|
ciphers_to_test[1]="aRSA:eRSA"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[2]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[3]="aDSS:aDH:aECDH:aECDSA:aGOST"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[4]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[5]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[6]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[7]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[8]="tls1_3_RSA"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[9]="tls1_3_ECDSA"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[10]="tls1_3_EdDSA"
|
|
certificate_type[1]="" ; certificate_type[2]=""
|
|
certificate_type[3]=""; certificate_type[4]=""
|
|
certificate_type[5]="" ; certificate_type[6]=""
|
|
certificate_type[7]="" ; certificate_type[8]="RSASig"
|
|
certificate_type[9]="ECDSA" ; certificate_type[10]="EdDSA"
|
|
|
|
for (( n=1; n <= 17 ; n++ )); do
|
|
# Some servers use a different certificate if the ClientHello
|
|
# specifies TLSv1.1 and doesn't include a server name extension.
|
|
# So, for each public key type for which a certificate was found,
|
|
# try again, but only with TLSv1.1 and without SNI.
|
|
if [[ $n -ne 1 ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]=""
|
|
elif [[ $n -ge 11 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]=""
|
|
[[ ${success[n-10]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -ne 1 ]] && \
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="${ciphers_to_test[n-10]}" && certificate_type[n]="${certificate_type[n-10]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $n -ge 11 ]]; then
|
|
sni="$SNI"
|
|
SNI=""
|
|
get_server_certificate "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" "tls1_1"
|
|
success[n]=$?
|
|
SNI="$sni"
|
|
else
|
|
get_server_certificate "${ciphers_to_test[n]}"
|
|
success[n]=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${success[n]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then
|
|
[[ $n -ge 11 ]] && [[ ! -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]] && cp $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.get_server_certificate.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then
|
|
sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket life/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE)
|
|
sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $n -le 7 ]]; then
|
|
ciph="$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if [[ "$ciph" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$ciph" != SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
ciph="$(openssl2rfc "$ciph")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DHE_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_CECPQ1_RSA_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="RSASig"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aRSA/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aRSA"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == SSL_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_GOST*_RSA_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="RSAKMK"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/eRSA/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="eRSA"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DHE_DSS_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="DSA"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aDSS/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aDSS"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DH_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="DH"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aDH/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aDH"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDH_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="ECDH"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aECDH/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aECDH"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_CECPQ1_ECDSA_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="ECDSA"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aECDSA/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aECDSA"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_GOST* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="GOST"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aGOST/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aGOST"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# check whether the host's certificate has been seen before
|
|
match_found=false
|
|
i=1
|
|
newhostcert=$(cat $HOSTCERT)
|
|
while [[ $i -le $certs_found ]]; do
|
|
if [[ "$newhostcert" == "${previous_hostcert[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
match_found=true
|
|
break;
|
|
fi
|
|
i=$((i + 1))
|
|
done
|
|
if ! "$match_found" && [[ $n -ge 11 ]] && [[ $certs_found -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# A new certificate was found using TLSv1.1 without SNI.
|
|
# Check to see if the new certificate should be displayed.
|
|
# It should be displayed if it is either a match for the
|
|
# $NODE being tested or if it has the same subject
|
|
# (CN and SAN) as other certificates for this host.
|
|
compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && success[n]=0 || success[n]=1
|
|
|
|
if [[ ${success[n]} -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
cn_nosni="$(toupper "$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)")"
|
|
sans_nosni="$(toupper "$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$HOSTCERT")")"
|
|
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert[1]}" > $HOSTCERT
|
|
cn_sni="$(toupper "$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)")"
|
|
|
|
# FIXME: Not sure what the matching rule should be. At
|
|
# the moment, the no SNI certificate is considered a
|
|
# match if the CNs are the same and the SANs (if
|
|
# present) contain at least one DNS name in common.
|
|
if [[ "$cn_nosni" == "$cn_sni" ]]; then
|
|
sans_sni="$(toupper "$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$HOSTCERT")")"
|
|
if [[ "$sans_nosni" == "$sans_sni" ]]; then
|
|
success[n]=0
|
|
else
|
|
while read -r san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ " $sans_sni " =~ \ $san\ ]] && success[n]=0 && break
|
|
done <<< "$sans_nosni"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# If the certificate found for TLSv1.1 w/o SNI appears to
|
|
# be for a different host, then set match_found to true so
|
|
# that the new certificate will not be included in the output.
|
|
[[ ${success[n]} -ne 0 ]] && match_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$match_found"; then
|
|
certs_found=$(( certs_found + 1))
|
|
tested_cipher[certs_found]=${ciphers_to_test[n]}
|
|
keysize[certs_found]=$(awk '/Server public key/ { print $(NF-1) }' $TMPFILE)
|
|
# If an OCSP response was sent, then get the full
|
|
# response so that certificate_info() can determine
|
|
# whether it includes a certificate transparency extension.
|
|
ocsp_response_binary[certs_found]="$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE"
|
|
if grep -a "OCSP response:" $TMPFILE | grep -q "no response sent"; then
|
|
ocsp_response[certs_found]="$(grep -a "OCSP response" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
else
|
|
ocsp_response[certs_found]="$(awk -v n=2 '/OCSP response:/ {start=1; inc=2} /======================================/ { if (start) {inc--} } inc' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
ocsp_response_status[certs_found]=$(grep -a "OCSP Response Status" $TMPFILE)
|
|
previous_hostcert[certs_found]=$newhostcert
|
|
previous_hostcert_txt[certs_found]="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$newhostcert")"
|
|
previous_intermediates[certs_found]=$(cat $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem)
|
|
previous_hostcert_issuer[certs_found]=""
|
|
[[ -n "${previous_intermediates[certs_found]}" ]] && [[ -r $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem ]] && \
|
|
previous_hostcert_issuer[certs_found]=$(cat $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem)
|
|
previous_ordering_problem[certs_found]=$CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM
|
|
[[ $n -ge 11 ]] && sni_used[certs_found]="" || sni_used[certs_found]="$SNI"
|
|
tls_version[certs_found]="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
previous_hostcert_type[certs_found]=" ${certificate_type[n]}"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert[certs_found]}" > $TEMPDIR/host_certificate_$certs_found.pem
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert_txt[certs_found]}" > $TEMPDIR/host_certificate_$certs_found.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
previous_hostcert_type[i]+=" ${certificate_type[n]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
determine_tls_extensions
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.determine_tls_extensions.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then
|
|
sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket lifetime/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE)
|
|
sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS=""
|
|
"$using_sockets" && determine_cert_compression
|
|
[[ -n "$TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS" ]] && [[ "$TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS" != "none" ]] && \
|
|
extract_new_tls_extensions "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.determine_cert_compression.txt"
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && ! "$TLS13_ONLY" && [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" || "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -tls1_3 ]] ; then
|
|
# If a session ticket were sent in response to a TLSv1.3 ClientHello, then a session ticket
|
|
# would have been found by get_server_certificate(). So, try again with a TLSv1.2 ClientHello.
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -no_tls1_3 -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket lifetime/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE)
|
|
sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]] && TLS_TICKETS=false || TLS_TICKETS=true
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "# certificates found $certs_found"
|
|
# Now that all of the server's certificates have been found, determine for
|
|
# each certificate whether certificate transparency information is provided.
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= certs_found; i++ )); do
|
|
certificate_transparency "${previous_hostcert_txt[i]}" "${ocsp_response[i]}" "$certs_found" "${tested_cipher[i]}" "${sni_used[i]}" "${tls_version[i]}"
|
|
ct[i]="$CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE"
|
|
# If certificate_transparency() called tls_sockets() and found a "signed certificate timestamps" extension,
|
|
# then add it to $TLS_EXTENSIONS, since it may not have been found by determine_tls_extensions().
|
|
[[ $certs_found -gt 1 ]] && [[ "${ct[i]}" == TLS\ extension ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing server defaults (Server Hello) "
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS extensions (standard) "
|
|
if [[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]]; then
|
|
outln "(none)"
|
|
fileout "TLS_extensions" "INFO" "(none)"
|
|
else
|
|
#FIXME: we rather want to have the chance to print each ext in italics or another format.
|
|
# Atm is a string of quoted strings -- that needs to be fixed at the root then
|
|
# out_row_aligned_max_width() places line breaks at space characters.
|
|
# So, in order to prevent the text for an extension from being broken
|
|
# across lines, temporarily replace space characters within the text
|
|
# of an extension with "}", and then convert the "}" back to space in
|
|
# the output of out_row_aligned_max_width().
|
|
tls_extensions="${TLS_EXTENSIONS// /{}"
|
|
tls_extensions="${tls_extensions//\"{\"/\" \"}"
|
|
tls_extensions="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$tls_extensions" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
tls_extensions="${tls_extensions//{/ }"
|
|
outln "$tls_extensions"
|
|
fileout "TLS_extensions" "INFO" "$TLS_EXTENSIONS"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Session Ticket RFC 5077 hint "
|
|
jsonID="TLS_session_ticket"
|
|
if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then
|
|
outln "no -- no lifetime advertised"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "no -- no lifetime advertised"
|
|
# it MAY be given a hint of the lifetime of the ticket, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-5.6 .
|
|
# Sometimes it just does not -- but it then may also support TLS session tickets reuse
|
|
else
|
|
lifetime=$(grep -a lifetime <<< "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" | sed 's/[A-Za-z:() ]//g')
|
|
unit=$(grep -a lifetime <<< "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" | sed -e 's/^.*'"$lifetime"'//' -e 's/[ ()]//g')
|
|
out "$lifetime $unit"
|
|
if [[ $((3600 * 24)) -lt $lifetime ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_low " but: FS requires session ticket keys to be rotated < daily !"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "valid for $lifetime $unit (>daily)"
|
|
else
|
|
outln ", session tickets keys seems to be rotated < daily"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "valid for $lifetime $unit only (<daily)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " SSL Session ID support "
|
|
jsonID="SSL_sessionID_support"
|
|
if "$NO_SSL_SESSIONID"; then
|
|
outln "no"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "no"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "yes"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "yes"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Session Resumption "
|
|
jsonID="sessionresumption_ticket"
|
|
sub_session_resumption "$sessticket_proto"
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) out "Tickets: yes, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) out "Tickets no, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) pr_warning "Ticket resumption test failed, pls report / "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, pls report"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
6) pr_warning "Client Auth: Ticket resumption test not supported / "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check couldn't be performed because of client authentication"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) pr_warning "Connect problem: Ticket resumption test not possible / "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed because of connect problem"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
jsonID="sessionresumption_ID"
|
|
if "$NO_SSL_SESSIONID"; then
|
|
outln "ID: no"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No Session ID, no resumption"
|
|
else
|
|
sub_session_resumption "$sessticket_proto" ID
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) outln "ID: yes"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
1|2) outln "ID: no"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) prln_warning "ID resumption test failed, pls report"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, pls report"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
6) prln_warning "Client Auth: ID resumption test not supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check couldn't be performed because of client authentication"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) prln_warning "ID resumption test failed"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed because of connect problem"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tls_time
|
|
|
|
jsonID="cert_compression"
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
# At the moment support for certificate compression can only be
|
|
# tested using tls_sockets().
|
|
:
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
jsonID="certificate_compression"
|
|
pr_bold " Certificate Compression "
|
|
outln "$TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "N/A"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
jsonID="clientAuth"
|
|
pr_bold " Client Authentication "
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == unknown ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -enable_pha\""
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$CLIENT_AUTH"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$CLIENT_AUTH"
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == optional ]] || [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]]; then
|
|
jsonID="clientAuth_CA_list"
|
|
pr_bold " CA List for Client Auth "
|
|
out_row_aligned "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST" " "
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST" == empty ]] || [[ $(count_lines "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST"
|
|
else
|
|
i=1
|
|
while read client_auth_ca; do
|
|
fileout "$jsonID #$i" "INFO" "$client_auth_ca"
|
|
i+=1
|
|
done <<< "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ $certs_found -ne 0 ]] && [[ ! -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]]; then
|
|
# no cipher suites specified here. We just want the default vhost subject
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
sni="$SNI" ; SNI=""
|
|
mv $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.save
|
|
# Send same list of cipher suites as OpenSSL 1.1.1 sends (but with
|
|
# all 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers offered.
|
|
tls_sockets "04" \
|
|
"c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f,
|
|
00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a,
|
|
c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,02,
|
|
13,03, 13,01, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f,
|
|
00,ff" \
|
|
"all+"
|
|
success[0]=$?
|
|
if [[ ${success[0]} -eq 0 ]] || [[ ${success[0]} -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -s $HOSTCERT ]]; then
|
|
mv $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
else
|
|
# The connection was successful, but the certificate could
|
|
# not be obtained (probably because the connection was TLS 1.3
|
|
# and $OPENSSL does not support the key exchange group that was
|
|
# selected). So, try again using OpenSSL (which will not use a TLS 1.3
|
|
# ClientHello).
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $OPTIMAL_PROTO") 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null | \
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' >$HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
>$HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
fi
|
|
mv $HOSTCERT.save $HOSTCERT
|
|
SNI="$sni"
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $OPTIMAL_PROTO") 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null | \
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' >$HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $certs_found -eq 0 ]] && [[ -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
generic_nonfatal "Client problem, shouldn't happen: Host certificate found but we can't continue with \"server defaults\"."
|
|
elif [[ $certs_found -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
if $TLS13_ONLY; then
|
|
generic_nonfatal "Client problem: We need openssl supporting TLS 1.3. We can't continue with \"server defaults\" as we cannot retrieve the certificate. "
|
|
else
|
|
generic_nonfatal "Client problem: No server certificate could be retrieved. Thus we can't continue with \"server defaults\"."
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && [[ -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]] && $OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT.nosni -text -noout 2>>$ERRFILE > $HOSTCERT.nosni.txt
|
|
|
|
fileout "cert_numbers" "INFO" "$certs_found"
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= certs_found; i++ )); do
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert[i]}" > $HOSTCERT
|
|
echo "${previous_intermediates[i]}" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert_issuer[i]}" > $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem
|
|
certificate_info "$i" "$certs_found" "${previous_hostcert_txt[i]}" "${previous_intermediates[i]}" \
|
|
"${tested_cipher[i]}" "${keysize[i]}" "${previous_hostcert_type[i]}" \
|
|
"${ocsp_response_binary[i]}" "${ocsp_response[i]}" \
|
|
"${ocsp_response_status[i]}" "${sni_used[i]}" "${ct[i]}" \
|
|
"${previous_ordering_problem[i]}"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ((ret++))
|
|
done
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
get_session_ticket_lifetime_from_serverhello() {
|
|
awk '/session ticket.*lifetime/ { print $(NF-1) "$1" }'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
get_san_dns_from_cert() {
|
|
echo "$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$1" -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE | \
|
|
grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "DNS:" | \
|
|
sed -e 's/DNS://g' -e 's/ //g')"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_fs() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success
|
|
local fs_offered=false ecdhe_offered=false ffdhe_offered=false
|
|
local fs_tls13_offered=false fs_tls12_offered=false
|
|
local protos_to_try proto hexc dash fs_cipher sslvers auth mac export curve dhlen
|
|
local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph rfc_ciph kx enc ciphers_found sigalg ossl_supported
|
|
# generated from 'kEECDH:kEDH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!DES:!3DES:!RC4' with openssl 1.0.2i and openssl 1.1.0
|
|
local fs_cipher_list="DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8:DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8:DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
|
|
local fs_hex_cipher_list="" ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test
|
|
local ecdhe_cipher_list="" tls13_cipher_list="" ecdhe_cipher_list_hex="" ffdhe_cipher_list_hex=""
|
|
local curves_hex=("00,01" "00,02" "00,03" "00,04" "00,05" "00,06" "00,07" "00,08" "00,09" "00,0a" "00,0b" "00,0c" "00,0d" "00,0e" "00,0f" "00,10" "00,11" "00,12" "00,13" "00,14" "00,15" "00,16" "00,17" "00,18" "00,19" "00,1a" "00,1b" "00,1c" "00,1d" "00,1e" "00,1f" "00,20" "00,21")
|
|
local -a curves_ossl=("sect163k1" "sect163r1" "sect163r2" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "sect233k1" "sect233r1" "sect239k1" "sect283k1" "sect283r1" "sect409k1" "sect409r1" "sect571k1" "sect571r1" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "prime192v1" "secp224k1" "secp224r1" "secp256k1" "prime256v1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448" "brainpoolP256r1tls13" "brainpoolP384r1tls13" "brainpoolP512r1tls13")
|
|
local -a curves_ossl_output=("K-163" "sect163r1" "B-163" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "K-233" "B-233" "sect239k1" "K-283" "B-283" "K-409" "B-409" "K-571" "B-571" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "P-192" "secp224k1" "P-224" "secp256k1" "P-256" "P-384" "P-521" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448" "brainpoolP256r1tls13" "brainpoolP384r1tls13" "brainpoolP512r1tls13")
|
|
local -ai curves_bits=(163 162 163 193 193 232 233 238 281 282 407 409 570 570 161 161 161 192 192 225 224 256 256 384 521 256 384 512 253 448 256 384 512)
|
|
# Many curves have been deprecated, and RFC 8446, Appendix B.3.1.4, states
|
|
# that these curves MUST NOT be offered in a TLS 1.3 ClientHello.
|
|
local -a curves_deprecated=("true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "false" "false" "false" "true" "true" "true" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false")
|
|
local -a ffdhe_groups_hex=("01,00" "01,01" "01,02" "01,03" "01,04")
|
|
local -a ffdhe_groups_output=("ffdhe2048" "ffdhe3072" "ffdhe4096" "ffdhe6144" "ffdhe8192")
|
|
local -a supported_curve
|
|
local -a sigalgs_hex=("01,01" "01,02" "01,03" "02,01" "02,02" "02,03" "03,01" "03,02" "03,03" "04,01" "04,02" "04,03" "04,20" "05,01" "05,02" "05,03" "05,20" "06,01" "06,02" "06,03" "06,20" "07,08" "08,04" "08,05" "08,06" "08,07" "08,08" "08,09" "08,0a" "08,0b" "08,1a" "08,1b" "08,1c")
|
|
local -a sigalgs_strings=("RSA+MD5" "DSA+MD5" "ECDSA+MD5" "RSA+SHA1" "DSA+SHA1" "ECDSA+SHA1" "RSA+SHA224" "DSA+SHA224" "ECDSA+SHA224" "RSA+SHA256" "DSA+SHA256" "ECDSA+SHA256" "RSA+SHA256" "RSA+SHA384" "DSA+SHA384" "ECDSA+SHA384" "RSA+SHA384" "RSA+SHA512" "DSA+SHA512" "ECDSA+SHA512" "RSA+SHA512" "SM2+SM3" "RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA256" "RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA384" "RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA512" "Ed25519" "Ed448" "RSA-PSS-PSS+SHA256" "RSA-PSS-PSS+SHA384" "RSA-PSS-PSS+SHA512" "ECDSA-BRAINPOOL+SHA256" "ECDSA-BRAINPOOL+SHA384" "ECDSA-BRAINPOOL+SHA512")
|
|
local -a tls13_supported_sigalgs=("false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false")
|
|
local -a tls12_supported_sigalgs=("false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false" "false")
|
|
local rsa_cipher="" ecdsa_cipher="" dss_cipher=""
|
|
local sigalgs_to_test tls12_supported_sigalg_list="" tls13_supported_sigalg_list=""
|
|
local -i nr_supported_ciphers=0 nr_curves=0 nr_ossl_curves=0 i j low high
|
|
local fs_ciphers curves_offered="" curves_to_test temp
|
|
local curves_option="" curves_list1="" curves_list2=""
|
|
local len1 len2 curve_found sigalg_found
|
|
local key_bitstring quality_str
|
|
local -i len_dh_p quality
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local jsonID="FS"
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headline " Testing robust forward secrecy (FS)"; prln_underline " -- omitting Null Authentication/Encryption, 3DES, RC4 "
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl"
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" && "$WIDE"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "."
|
|
pr_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
fs_cipher="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if [[ "$fs_cipher" == "TLS_DHE_"* || "$fs_cipher" == "TLS_ECDHE_"* || "${hexc:2:2}" == "13" ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "$fs_cipher" =~ NULL ]] && [[ ! "$fs_cipher" =~ DES ]] && [[ ! "$fs_cipher" =~ RC4 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "$fs_cipher" =~ PSK ]] && { "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"; }; then
|
|
fs_hex_cipher_list+=", ${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
ciph[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_supported_ciphers]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_supported_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"
|
|
hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$using_sockets" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && "$WIDE" && ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]=false
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
while read -r hexc dash ciph[nr_supported_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_supported_ciphers] auth enc[nr_supported_ciphers] mac export; do
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_supported_ciphers]=false
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
sigalg[nr_supported_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers+=1
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers "$fs_cipher_list" "ALL" "-V")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# All TLSv1.3 cipher suites offer robust FS.
|
|
sclient_success=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "${fs_hex_cipher_list:2}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
# Sometimes a TLS 1.3 ClientHello will fail, but a TLS 1.2 ClientHello will succeed. See #2131.
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${fs_hex_cipher_list:2}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers
|
|
debugme echo $(actually_supported_osslciphers $fs_cipher_list "ALL")
|
|
if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -le "$CLIENT_MIN_FS" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_local_problem "You only have $nr_supported_ciphers FS ciphers on the client side "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "tests skipped as you only have $nr_supported_ciphers FS ciphers on the client site. ($CLIENT_MIN_FS are required)"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# By default, OpenSSL 1.1.1 and above only include a few curves in the ClientHello, so in order
|
|
# to test all curves, the -curves option must be added. In addition, OpenSSL limits the number of
|
|
# curves that can be specified to 28. So, if more than 28 curves are supported, then the curves must
|
|
# be tested in batches.
|
|
curves_list1="$(strip_trailing_space "$(strip_leading_space "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES")")"
|
|
curves_list1="${curves_list1// / }"
|
|
if [[ "$(count_words "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES")" -gt 28 ]]; then
|
|
# Place the first 28 supported curves in curves_list1 and the remainder in curves_list2.
|
|
curves_list2="${curves_list1#* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * }"
|
|
curves_list1="${curves_list1%$curves_list2}"
|
|
curves_list1="$(strip_trailing_space "$curves_list1")"
|
|
curves_list2="${curves_list2// /:}"
|
|
fi
|
|
curves_list1="${curves_list1// /:}"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher $fs_cipher_list -ciphersuites ALL $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(grep -ac "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" $TMPFILE) -eq 0 ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
# Sometimes a TLS 1.3 ClientHello will fail, but a TLS 1.2 ClientHello will succeed. See #2131.
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
curves_option="-curves $curves_list1"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher $fs_cipher_list $curves_option $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(grep -ac "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" $TMPFILE) -eq 0 ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ -n "$curves_list2" ]]; then
|
|
curves_option="-curves $curves_list2"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher $fs_cipher_list $curves_option $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(grep -ac "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" $TMPFILE) -eq 0 ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " No ciphers supporting Forward Secrecy (FS) offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "No ciphers supporting Forward Secrecy offered"
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "Forward Secrecy (FS) is not supported"
|
|
else
|
|
outln
|
|
fs_offered=true
|
|
fs_ciphers=""
|
|
pr_svrty_good " FS is offered (OK) "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered"
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
outln ", ciphers follow (client/browser support is important here) \n"
|
|
neat_header
|
|
else
|
|
out " "
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -no_tls1_3"
|
|
! "$using_sockets" && [[ -z "$curves_option" ]] && protos_to_try+=" curves1-no_tls1_3"
|
|
! "$using_sockets" && [[ -z "$curves_option" ]] && [[ -n "$curves_list2" ]] && protos_to_try+=" curves2-no_tls1_3"
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2"
|
|
! "$using_sockets" && [[ -z "$curves_option" ]] && protos_to_try+=" curves1-no_ssl2"
|
|
! "$using_sockets" && [[ -z "$curves_option" ]] && [[ -n "$curves_list2" ]] && protos_to_try+=" curves2-no_ssl2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
# If ECDHE ciphers were already found, then no need to try
|
|
# again with a different "-curves" option.
|
|
[[ "$proto" =~ curves1 ]] && "$ecdhe_offered" && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" =~ curves2 ]] && "$ecdhe_offered" && break
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
[[ "$proto" == -no_ssl2 ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" =~ -no_tls1_3 ]] && [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
else
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$proto" =~ curves1 ]]; then
|
|
curves_option="-curves $curves_list1"
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" =~ curves2 ]]; then
|
|
curves_option="-curves $curves_list2"
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-${proto#*-} -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $curves_option $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break
|
|
fs_cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$fs_cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$fs_cipher" == "${ciph[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_supported_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$fs_cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$fs_cipher" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$fs_cipher" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
fs_tls13_offered=true
|
|
"$WIDE" && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
elif [[ "$fs_cipher" == ECDHE-* ]]; then
|
|
ecdhe_offered=true
|
|
! "$fs_tls12_offered" && [[ "$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")" == TLSv1.2 ]] && fs_tls12_offered=true
|
|
else
|
|
! "$fs_tls12_offered" && [[ "$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")" == TLSv1.2 ]] && fs_tls12_offered=true
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for proto in 04 03; do
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" == "04" ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")"
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
fs_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$fs_cipher" == "${rfc_ciph[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_supported_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "${kx[i]}" == Kx=any ]]; then
|
|
fs_tls13_offered=true
|
|
"$WIDE" && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && fs_tls12_offered=true
|
|
elif ! "$fs_tls12_offered" && [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "$(get_protocol "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")" == TLSv1.2 ]]; then
|
|
fs_tls12_offered=true
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ! "$SHOW_EACH_C" && continue
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl && "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]] || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "-" ]]; then
|
|
fs_cipher="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
fs_cipher="${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fs_ciphers+="$fs_cipher "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == ECDHE-* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${ciph[i]}" == AEAD-* ]] || { "$using_sockets" && [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == TLS_ECDHE_* ]]; }; then
|
|
ecdhe_offered=true
|
|
ecdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
tls13_cipher_list+=":$fs_cipher"
|
|
else
|
|
ecdhe_cipher_list+=":$fs_cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == "DHE-"* ]] || { "$using_sockets" && [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "TLS_DHE_"* ]]; }; then
|
|
ffdhe_offered=true
|
|
ffdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
elif [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
ffdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
neat_list "$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
pr_cipher_quality "${rfc_ciph[i]}" "available"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_deemphasize "not a/v"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if ! "$WIDE"; then
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$fs_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
else
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$fs_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo $fs_offered
|
|
"$WIDE" || outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ciphers" "INFO" "$fs_ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# find out what elliptic curves are supported.
|
|
if "$ecdhe_offered"; then
|
|
for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_curves]=false
|
|
supported_curve[nr_curves]=false
|
|
[[ "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES" =~ \ $curve\ ]] && ossl_supported[nr_curves]=true && nr_ossl_curves+=1
|
|
nr_curves+=1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# OpenSSL limits the number of curves that can be specified in the
|
|
# "-curves" option to 28. So, break the list in two if there are more
|
|
# than 28 curves supported by OpenSSL.
|
|
for j in 1 2; do
|
|
if [[ $j -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_curves -le 28 ]]; then
|
|
low=0; high=$nr_curves
|
|
else
|
|
low=0; high=$nr_curves/2
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_curves -le 28 ]]; then
|
|
continue # all curves tested in first round
|
|
else
|
|
low=$nr_curves/2; high=$nr_curves
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
if "$fs_tls13_offered"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -no_tls1_3"
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_tls1_3"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
while true; do
|
|
curves_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=low; i < high; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" || ! "${curves_deprecated[i]}" || [[ "$proto" == "-no_tls1_3" ]]; then
|
|
"${ossl_supported[i]}" && ! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=":${curves_ossl[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ecdhe_cipher_list:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_cipher_list:1}\'" -curves "${curves_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE")
|
|
curve_found="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
if [[ "$curve_found" == ECDH ]]; then
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ ! "$proto" == "-no_tls1_3" ]] && [[ "$curve_found" == brainpoolP[235][581][642]r1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")" == TLSv1.3 ]] && curve_found+="tls13"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=low; i < high; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${supported_curve[i]}"; then
|
|
[[ "${curves_ossl_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "${curves_ossl[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $high ]] && break
|
|
supported_curve[i]=true
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$ecdhe_offered" && "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="03"
|
|
"$fs_tls13_offered" && protos_to_try="04 03"
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
ecdhe_cipher_list_hex="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "03" "$ecdhe_cipher_list_hex")"
|
|
[[ -z "$ecdhe_cipher_list_hex" ]] && continue
|
|
fi
|
|
while true; do
|
|
curves_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${curves_deprecated[i]}" || [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=", ${curves_hex[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
len1=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7))")
|
|
len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7+2))")
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ecdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" "00, 0a, 00, $len2, 00, $len1, ${curves_to_test:2}"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
curve_found="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
if [[ "$curve_found" == "ECDH" ]]; then
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${supported_curve[i]}" && [[ "${curves_ossl_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_curves ]] && break
|
|
supported_curve[i]=true
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$ecdhe_offered"; then
|
|
low=1000
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${supported_curve[i]}"; then
|
|
curves_offered+="${curves_ossl[i]} "
|
|
[[ ${curves_bits[i]} -lt $low ]] && low=${curves_bits[i]}
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$curves_offered" ]]; then
|
|
"$WIDE" && outln
|
|
pr_bold " Elliptic curves offered: "
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$curves_offered" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_ecdh_curve_quality
|
|
outln
|
|
# severity ratings based on quality specified by
|
|
# pr_ecdh_quality() for shortest curve offered.
|
|
if [[ "$low" -le 163 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "MEDIUM" "$curves_offered"
|
|
elif [[ "$low" -le 193 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "LOW" "$curves_offered"
|
|
elif [[ "$low" -le 224 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "INFO" "$curves_offered"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "OK" "$curves_offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
CURVES_OFFERED="$curves_offered"
|
|
CURVES_OFFERED=$(strip_trailing_space "$CURVES_OFFERED")
|
|
# Keep it "on file" for debugging purposes
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && safe_echo "$CURVES_OFFERED" >"$TEMPDIR/$NODE.$NODEIP.curves_offered.txt"
|
|
|
|
# find out what groups are supported.
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && { "$fs_tls13_offered" || "$ffdhe_offered"; }; then
|
|
nr_curves=0
|
|
for curve in "${ffdhe_groups_output[@]}"; do
|
|
supported_curve[nr_curves]=false
|
|
[[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ $curve ]] && supported_curve[nr_curves]=true
|
|
nr_curves+=1
|
|
done
|
|
protos_to_try=""
|
|
"$fs_tls13_offered" && protos_to_try="04"
|
|
if "$ffdhe_offered"; then
|
|
if "$fs_tls13_offered"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="04 03"
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="03"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
curve_found=""
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
while true; do
|
|
curves_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=", ${ffdhe_groups_hex[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
len1=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7))")
|
|
len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7+2))")
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ffdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" "00, 0a, 00, $len2, 00, $len1, ${curves_to_test:2}"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == "03" ]] && [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]] && [[ "$curve_found" =~ ffdhe ]]; then
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC7919/$curve_found"
|
|
DH_GROUP_LEN_P="${curve_found#ffdhe}"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ! "$curve_found" =~ ffdhe ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${supported_curve[i]}" && [[ "${ffdhe_groups_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_curves ]] && break
|
|
supported_curve[i]=true
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
curves_offered=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
"${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_offered+="${ffdhe_groups_output[i]} "
|
|
done
|
|
curves_offered="$(strip_trailing_space "$curves_offered")"
|
|
if "$ffdhe_offered" && [[ -z "$curves_offered" ]] && [[ -z "$curve_found" ]]; then
|
|
# Some servers will fail if the supported_groups extension is present.
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${ffdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$curves_offered" ]] && [[ -n "$curve_found" ]]; then
|
|
# The server is not using one of the groups from RFC 7919.
|
|
if [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
# this global will get the name of the group either here or in run_logjam()
|
|
key_bitstring="$(awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt)"
|
|
get_common_prime "$jsonID" "$key_bitstring" ""
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) curves_offered="$DH_GROUP_OFFERED"
|
|
len_dh_p=$DH_GROUP_LEN_P ;;
|
|
2) pr_bold " DH or FF group offered : "
|
|
prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility."
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
curves_offered="$DH_GROUP_OFFERED"
|
|
len_dh_p=$DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$curves_offered" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ! "$curves_offered" =~ ffdhe ]] || [[ ! "$curves_offered" =~ \ ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " DH group offered: "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_bold " Finite field group: "
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$curves_offered" =~ ffdhe ]]; then
|
|
# ok not to display them in italics:
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$curves_offered"
|
|
quality=6
|
|
else
|
|
pr_dh "$curves_offered" "$len_dh_p"
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$quality" in
|
|
1) quality_str="CRITICAL" ;;
|
|
2) quality_str="HIGH" ;;
|
|
3) quality_str="MEDIUM" ;;
|
|
4) quality_str="LOW" ;;
|
|
5) quality_str="INFO" ;;
|
|
6|7) quality_str="OK" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ "$curves_offered" =~ Unknown ]]; then
|
|
fileout "DH_groups" "$quality_str" "$curves_offered ($len_dh_p bits)"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "DH_groups" "$quality_str" "$curves_offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
protos_to_try=""
|
|
"$fs_tls13_offered" && protos_to_try="04-01 04-02"
|
|
# For TLS 1.2, find a supported cipher suite corresponding to each of the key types (RSA, ECDSA, DSS).
|
|
# Need to try each key type separately, otherwise not all supported signature algorithms will be found.
|
|
if "$fs_tls12_offered"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && continue
|
|
if [[ -z "$rsa_cipher" ]] && { [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == TLS_DHE_RSA* ]] ||
|
|
[[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == TLS_ECDHE_RSA* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == DHE-RSA-* ]] ||
|
|
[[ "${ciph[i]}" == ECDHE-RSA-* ]]; }; then
|
|
rsa_cipher="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$ecdsa_cipher" ]] && { [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == ECDHE-ECDSA-* ]]; }; then
|
|
ecdsa_cipher="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$dss_cipher" ]] && { [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == TLS_DHE_DSS* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == DHE-DSS-* ]]; }; then
|
|
dss_cipher="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -n "$rsa_cipher" ]] && protos_to_try+=" 03-rsa-$rsa_cipher"
|
|
[[ -n "$ecdsa_cipher" ]] && protos_to_try+=" 03-ecdsa-$ecdsa_cipher"
|
|
[[ -n "$dss_cipher" ]] && protos_to_try+=" 03-dss-$dss_cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
while true; do
|
|
i=0
|
|
sigalgs_to_test=""
|
|
# A few servers get confused if the signature_algorithms extension contains too many entries. So:
|
|
# * For TLS 1.3, break the list into two and test each half separately.
|
|
# * For TLS 1.2, generally limit the signature_algorithms extension to algorithms that are consistent with the key type.
|
|
for hexc in "${sigalgs_hex[@]}"; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == 04* ]]; then
|
|
if ! "${tls13_supported_sigalgs[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "${proto##*-}" == 01 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $i -le 16 ]] && sigalgs_to_test+=", $hexc"
|
|
else
|
|
[[ $i -gt 16 ]] && sigalgs_to_test+=", $hexc"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif ! "${tls12_supported_sigalgs[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "$proto" =~ rsa ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:3:2}" == 01 ]] || [[ "${hexc:0:2}" == 08 ]]; then
|
|
sigalgs_to_test+=", $hexc"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" =~ dss ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:3:2}" == 02 ]] && sigalgs_to_test+=", $hexc"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:3:2}" == 03 ]] || [[ "${hexc:0:2}" == 08 ]]; then
|
|
sigalgs_to_test+=", $hexc"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
i+=1
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$sigalgs_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
len1=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#sigalgs_to_test}/7))")
|
|
len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#sigalgs_to_test}/7+2))")
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == 04* ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "${proto%%-*}" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,0d, 00,$len2, 00,$len1, ${sigalgs_to_test:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "${proto%%-*}" "${proto##*-}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" "00,0d, 00,$len2, 00,$len1, ${sigalgs_to_test:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || break
|
|
sigalg_found="$(awk -F ': ' '/^Peer signing digest/ { print $2 } ' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
[[ -n "$sigalg_found" ]] && sigalg_found="+$sigalg_found"
|
|
sigalg_found="$(awk -F ': ' '/^Peer signature type/ { print $2 } ' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")$sigalg_found"
|
|
i=0
|
|
for hexc in "${sigalgs_hex[@]}"; do
|
|
[[ "${sigalgs_strings[i]}" == $sigalg_found ]] && break
|
|
i+=1
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "${sigalgs_hex[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == 04* ]]; then
|
|
"${tls13_supported_sigalgs[i]}" && break
|
|
tls13_supported_sigalgs[i]=true
|
|
tls13_supported_sigalg_list+=" $sigalg_found"
|
|
else
|
|
"${tls12_supported_sigalgs[i]}" && break
|
|
tls12_supported_sigalgs[i]=true
|
|
tls12_supported_sigalg_list+=" $sigalg_found"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
tls12_supported_sigalg_list="${tls12_supported_sigalg_list:1}"
|
|
tls13_supported_sigalg_list="${tls13_supported_sigalg_list:1}"
|
|
if "$fs_tls12_offered"; then
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1.2 sig_algs offered: "
|
|
if [[ -z "$(sed -e 's/[A-Za-z\-]*+SHA1//g' -e 's/[A-Za-z\-]*+MD5//g' -e 's/ //g' <<< "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list")" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list " " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_TLS12_sig_algs" "CRITICAL" "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list"
|
|
else
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list " " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_sigalg_quality
|
|
outln
|
|
if [[ "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list" =~ MD5 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_TLS12_sig_algs" "HIGH" "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list" =~ SHA1 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_TLS12_sig_algs" "LOW" "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_TLS12_sig_algs" "INFO" "$tls12_supported_sigalg_list"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$fs_tls13_offered"; then
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1.3 sig_algs offered: "
|
|
# If only SHA1 and MD5 signature algorithms are supported, this is a critical finding.
|
|
# If SHA1 and/or MD5 are supported, but stronger algorithms are also supported, the
|
|
# severity is less.
|
|
if [[ -z "$(sed -e 's/[A-Za-z\-]*+SHA1//g' -e 's/[A-Za-z\-]*+MD5//g' -e 's/ //g' <<< "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list")" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list " " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_TLS13_sig_algs" "CRITICAL" "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list"
|
|
else
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list " " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_sigalg_quality
|
|
outln
|
|
if [[ "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list" =~ MD5 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_TLS13_sig_algs" "HIGH" "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list" =~ SHA1 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_TLS13_sig_algs" "LOW" "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_TLS13_sig_algs" "INFO" "$tls13_supported_sigalg_list"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# good source for configuration and bugs: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
|
|
# good start to read: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Attacks_against_TLS.2FSSL
|
|
|
|
|
|
npn_pre(){
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it"
|
|
fileout "NPN" "WARN" "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$HAS_NPN"; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support NPN/SPDY";
|
|
fileout "NPN" "WARN" "not tested $OPENSSL doesn't support NPN/SPDY"
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
alpn_pre(){
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it"
|
|
fileout "ALPN" "WARN" "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$HAS_ALPN" && "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support ALPN/HTTP2";
|
|
fileout "ALPN" "WARN" "not tested as $OPENSSL does not support it"
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# modern browsers do not support it anymore but we should still test it at least for fingerprinting the server side
|
|
# Thus we don't label any support for NPN as good.
|
|
# FAST mode skips this test
|
|
run_npn() {
|
|
local tmpstr
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local jsonID="NPN"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0
|
|
"$FAST" && return 0
|
|
pr_bold " NPN/SPDY "
|
|
if ! npn_pre; then
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-connect $NODEIP:$PORT $BUGS $SNI -nextprotoneg "$NPN_PROTOs"") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1
|
|
tmpstr="$(grep -a '^Protocols' $TMPFILE | sed 's/Protocols.*: //')"
|
|
if [[ -z "$tmpstr" ]] || [[ "$tmpstr" == " " ]]; then
|
|
outln "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
# now comes a strange thing: "Protocols advertised by server:" is empty but connection succeeded
|
|
if [[ "$tmpstr" =~ [h2|spdy|http] ]]; then
|
|
out "$tmpstr"
|
|
outln " (advertised)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered with $tmpstr (advertised)"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_cyan "please check manually, server response was ambiguous ..."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "please check manually, server response was ambiguous ..."
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# btw: nmap can do that too https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/tls-nextprotoneg.html
|
|
# nmap --script=tls-nextprotoneg #NODE -p $PORT is your friend if your openssl doesn't want to test this
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_alpn() {
|
|
local tmpstr alpn_extn len
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local has_alpn_proto=false
|
|
local alpn_finding=""
|
|
local jsonID="ALPN"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0
|
|
pr_bold " ALPN/HTTP2 "
|
|
if ! alpn_pre; then
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
for proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do
|
|
# for some reason OpenSSL doesn't list the advertised protocols, so instead try common protocols
|
|
if "$HAS_ALPN"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-connect $NODEIP:$PORT $BUGS $SNI -alpn $proto") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
alpn_extn="$(printf "%02x" ${#proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$proto")"
|
|
len="$(printf "%04x" $((${#proto}+1)))"
|
|
alpn_extn="${len:0:2},${len:2:2},$alpn_extn"
|
|
len="$(printf "%04x" $((${#proto}+3)))"
|
|
alpn_extn="00,10,${len:0:2},${len:2:2},$alpn_extn"
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "all+" "$alpn_extn"
|
|
if [[ -r "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ]]; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
echo "" > $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpstr="$(awk -F':' '/^ALPN protocol*:/ { print $2 }' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if [[ "$tmpstr" == *"$proto" ]]; then
|
|
if ! $has_alpn_proto; then
|
|
has_alpn_proto=true
|
|
else
|
|
out ", "
|
|
fi
|
|
# only h2 is what browser need to use HTTP/2.0 and brings a security,privacy and performance benefit
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == "h2" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$proto"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_HTTP2" "OK" "$proto"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$proto"
|
|
alpn_finding+="$proto"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if $has_alpn_proto; then
|
|
outln " (offered)"
|
|
# if h2 is not the only protocol:
|
|
[[ -n "$alpn_finding" ]] && fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$alpn_finding"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: send string
|
|
# arg2: success string: an egrep pattern
|
|
# arg3: number of loops we should read from the buffer (optional, otherwise STARTTLS_SLEEP)
|
|
starttls_io() {
|
|
local nr_waits=$STARTTLS_SLEEP
|
|
local buffer=""
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$3" ]] && waitsleep=$3
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && echo "FIXME $((LINENO))"
|
|
|
|
# If there's a sending part it's IO. Postgres sends via socket and replies via
|
|
# strings "S". So there's no I part of IO ;-)
|
|
if [[ -n "$1" ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -en "C: $1"
|
|
echo -en "$1" >&5
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$2" == JUSTSEND ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -e "\n (only sent)\n"
|
|
dd of=/dev/null bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# This seems a bit dangerous but works. No blockings yet. "if=nonblock" doesn't work on BSDs
|
|
buffer="$(dd bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
|
|
for ((i=1; i < nr_waits; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && echo -en "\nS: " && echo $buffer
|
|
if [[ "$buffer" =~ $2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo " ---> reply matched \"$2\""
|
|
# the fd sometimes still seem to contain chars which confuses the following TLS handshake, trying to empty:
|
|
# dd of=/dev/null bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
# no match yet, more reading from fd helps.
|
|
buffer+=$(dd bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null)
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Line-based send with newline characters appended (arg2 empty)
|
|
# arg2: debug_string -- what we had in the caller previously
|
|
starttls_just_send(){
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "C: $1\r\n"
|
|
# We need cat here, otherwise the appended ELHO after STARTTLS will be in the next packet
|
|
printf "%b" "$1\r\n" | cat >&5
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo " > succeeded: $2"
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo " > failed: $2 ($ret)"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: (optional): wait time
|
|
starttls_just_read(){
|
|
local waitsleep=$STARTTLS_SLEEP
|
|
[[ -n "$1" ]] && waitsleep=$1
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo "=== just read banner ==="
|
|
cat <&5 &
|
|
else
|
|
dd of=/dev/null count=8 <&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
fi
|
|
wait_kill $! $waitsleep
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_full_read(){
|
|
local cont_pattern="$1"
|
|
local end_pattern="$2"
|
|
local starttls_regex="$3" # optional: pattern we search for in the server's response
|
|
local debug_str="$4" # optional
|
|
local starttls_read_data=()
|
|
local one_line=""
|
|
local ret=0
|
|
local ret_found=0
|
|
local debugpad=" > found: "
|
|
local oldIFS="$IFS"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== reading banner ... ==="
|
|
if [[ -n "$starttls_regex" ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "=== we'll have to search for \"$starttls_regex\" pattern ==="
|
|
# pre-set an error if we won't find the ~regex
|
|
ret_found=3
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
IFS=''
|
|
# Now read handshake line by line and act on the args supplied.
|
|
# Exit the subshell if timeout has been hit (-t $STARTTLS_SLEEP)
|
|
while read -r -t $STARTTLS_SLEEP one_line; ret=$?; (exit $ret); do
|
|
debugme tmln_out "S: ${one_line}"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 5 ]]; then
|
|
echo "end_pattern/cont_pattern: ${end_pattern} / ${cont_pattern}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$starttls_regex" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${one_line} =~ $starttls_regex ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_out "${debugpad} ${one_line} "
|
|
# We don't exit here as the buffer is not empty. So we continue reading but save the status:
|
|
ret_found=0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
starttls_read_data+=("${one_line}")
|
|
if [[ ${one_line} =~ ${end_pattern} ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_out "${debugpad} ${one_line} "
|
|
IFS="${oldIFS}"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! ${one_line} =~ ${cont_pattern} ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "=== full read syntax error, expected regex pattern ${cont_pattern} (cont) or ${end_pattern} (end) ==="
|
|
IFS="${oldIFS}"
|
|
ret_found=2
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done <&5
|
|
if [[ $ret_found -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Print the debug statement we previously had in the caller function
|
|
[[ -n "$debug_str" ]] && debugme echo " >> $debug_str"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $ret -ge 128 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "=== timeout reading ==="
|
|
ret_found=$ret
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
IFS="${oldIFS}"
|
|
return $ret_found
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_ftp_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local reSTARTTLS='^ AUTH'
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting ftp STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send 'FEAT' "sent FEAT" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^(211-| )' '^211 ' "${reSTARTTLS}" "received server features and checked STARTTLS availability" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send 'AUTH TLS' "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^234-' '^234 ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished ftp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# argv1: empty: SMTP, "lmtp" : LMTP
|
|
# argv2: payload for STARTTLS injection test
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_smtp_dialog() {
|
|
local greet_str="EHLO testssl.sh"
|
|
local proto="smtp"
|
|
local reSTARTTLS='^250[ -]STARTTLS'
|
|
local starttls="STARTTLS"
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
|
|
"$SNEAKY" && greet_str="EHLO google.com"
|
|
[[ -n "$2" ]] && starttls="$starttls\r\n$2" # this adds a payload if supplied
|
|
if [[ "$1" == lmtp ]]; then
|
|
proto="lmtp"
|
|
greet_str="LHLO testssl.sh"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting $proto STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
|
|
starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$greet_str" "sent $greet_str" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^250-' '^250 ' "${reSTARTTLS}" "received server capabilities and checked STARTTLS availability" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$starttls" "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished $proto STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# argv1: payload for STARTTLS injection test
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_pop3_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local starttls="STLS"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$1" ]] && starttls="$starttls\r\n$1" # this adds a payload if supplied
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting pop3 STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\+OK' '^\+OK' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$starttls" "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\+OK' '^\+OK' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished pop3 STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# argv1: payload for STARTTLS injection test
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_imap_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local reSTARTTLS='^\* CAPABILITY(( .*)? IMAP4rev1( .*)? STARTTLS(.*)?|( .*)? STARTTLS( .*)? IMAP4rev1(.*)?)$'
|
|
local starttls="a002 STARTTLS"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$1" ]] && starttls="$starttls\r\n$1" # this adds a payload if supplied
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting imap STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^\* OK ' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send 'a001 CAPABILITY' "sent CAPABILITY" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^a001 OK ' "${reSTARTTLS}" "received server capabilities and checked STARTTLS availability" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$starttls" "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^a002 OK ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished imap STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# argv1: payload for STARTTLS injection test
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_sieve_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local starttls="STARTTLS"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$1" ]] && starttls="$starttls\r\n$1" # this adds a payload if supplied
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting sieve STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '^"' '^OK ' '"STARTTLS"' "received server capabilities and checked STARTTLS availability" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$starttls" "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^OK ' '^OK ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished sieve STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_xmpp_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting xmpp STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
[[ -z $XMPP_HOST ]] && XMPP_HOST="$NODE"
|
|
|
|
namespace="jabber:client"
|
|
[[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" == xmpp-server ]] && namespace="jabber:server"
|
|
|
|
starttls_io "<stream:stream xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' xmlns='"$namespace"' to='"$XMPP_HOST"' version='1.0'>" 'starttls(.*)features' 1 &&
|
|
starttls_io "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>" '<proceed' 1
|
|
# starttls_io "<stream:stream xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' xmlns='"$namespace"' to='"$XMPP_HOST"' version='1.0'>" 'JUSTSEND' 2
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished xmpp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_nntp_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting nntp STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '$^' '^20[01] ' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send 'STARTTLS' "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '$^' '^382 ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished nntp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_postgres_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local debugpad=" > "
|
|
local starttls_init=", x00, x00 ,x00 ,x08 ,x04 ,xD2 ,x16 ,x2F"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting postgres STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
socksend "${starttls_init}" 0 && debugme echo "${debugpad}initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_io "" S 1 && debugme echo "${debugpad}received ack (=\"S\") for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished postgres STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# RFC 2251, 2830, RFC 4511
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_ldap_dialog() {
|
|
local debugpad=" > "
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local msg_lenstr=""
|
|
local -i msg_len=0
|
|
local buffer="" buffsize=""
|
|
local result_code="00"
|
|
local starttls_init=",
|
|
x30, x1d, x02, x01, # LDAP extendedReq
|
|
x01, # messageID: 1
|
|
x77, x18, x80, x16, x31, x2e, x33, x2e, x36, x2e, # ProtocolOP: extendedReq
|
|
x31, x2e, x34, x2e, x31, x2e, x31, x34, x36, x36, x2e, x32, x30, x30, x33, x37" # OID for STATRTTLS = "1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting LDAP STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
socksend "${starttls_init}" 0 && debugme echo "${debugpad}initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
buffer=$(sockread_fast 256)
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && safe_echo "$debugpad $buffer\n"
|
|
|
|
# We have two different scenarios: AD and OpenLDAP. And maybe more we don't more of yet.
|
|
# OpenLDAP-like reply is
|
|
# 30 0c 02 01 01 78 07 0a 01 00 04 00 04 00
|
|
# ^^ buffsize ^^ LDAP result code (0 -> success)
|
|
#
|
|
# see https://git.openldap.org/openldap/openldap/-/blob/master/include/ldap.h
|
|
# return values in https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2251#page-45 and e.g.
|
|
|
|
# AD-like is
|
|
# error: 30 84 00 00 00 7d 02 01 01 78 84 00 00 00 74 0a 01 34 04 00 04 55 30 30 [.. LdapErr, string, OID.. ]
|
|
# success 30 84 00 00 00 28 02 01 01 78 84 00 00 00 1F 0A 01 00 04 00 04 00 8A 16 [ .. OID .. ]
|
|
# ^^ buffsize ^^ LDAP result code (0 -> success)
|
|
|
|
# We assume that AD servers probably all have x84. It was deducted from a number of hosts.
|
|
# It maybe needs to be amended for other implementations.
|
|
# Basically using ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse() in apps/s_client.c of openssl would be
|
|
# more robust but it is kind of hard to understand.
|
|
#
|
|
# Bottom line: We'll look at the 9th or the 17th byte when retrieving the result code
|
|
# depending what the buffsize is.
|
|
|
|
buffsize="${buffer:2:2}"
|
|
|
|
case $buffsize in
|
|
0C) result_code="${buffer:18:2}" ;;
|
|
84) result_code="${buffer:34:2}" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && safe_echo "$debugpad buffsize: $buffsize / LDAP result code: $result_code \n"
|
|
|
|
case $result_code in
|
|
00) ret=0 ;;
|
|
# success
|
|
01) ret=1 ;;
|
|
# OpenLDAP: operationsError
|
|
02) ret=2
|
|
# OpenLDAP: protocolError (text msg: "unsupported extended operation") e.g. when STARTTLS not supported
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
msg_lenstr=$(hex2dec ${buffer:26:02})
|
|
msg_len=$((2 * msg_lenstr))
|
|
safe_echo "$debugpad $(hex2binary "${buffer:28:$msg_len}")"
|
|
fi ;;
|
|
34) # This (52 in dec) seems to be the error code for AD when there's no STARTTLS
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && safe_echo " seems AD server with no STARTTLS\n"
|
|
ret=52 ;;
|
|
*) [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && safe_echo "$debugpad $(hex2dec "${buffer:28:2}")"
|
|
ret=127 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished LDAP STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_mysql_dialog() {
|
|
local debugpad=" > "
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local starttls_init="
|
|
, x20, x00, x00, x01, # payload_length, sequence_id
|
|
x85, xae, xff, x00, # capability flags, CLIENT_SSL always set
|
|
x00, x00, x00, x01, # max-packet size
|
|
x21, # character set
|
|
x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, # string[23] reserved (all [0])
|
|
x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00,
|
|
x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting mysql STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
socksend "${starttls_init}" 0 && debugme echo "${debugpad}initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_just_read 1 "read succeeded"
|
|
# 1 is the timeout value which only MySQL needs. Note, there seems no response whether STARTTLS
|
|
# succeeded. We could try harder, see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/apps/s_client.c
|
|
# but atm this seems sufficient as later we will fail if there's no STARTTLS.
|
|
# BUT: there seem to be cases when the handshake fails (8S01Bad handshake --> 30 38 53 30 31 42 61 64 20 68 61 6e 64 73 68 61 6b 65).
|
|
# also there's a banner in the reply "<version><somebytes>mysql_native_password"
|
|
# TODO: We could detect if the server supports STARTTLS via the "Server Capabilities"
|
|
# bit field, but we'd need to parse the binary stream, with greater precision than regex.
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished mysql STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_telnet_dialog() {
|
|
local debugpad=" > "
|
|
local tnres=""
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local msg1="
|
|
, xff, xfb, x2e"
|
|
local msg2="
|
|
, xff, xfa, x2e, x01, xff, xf0
|
|
"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting telnet STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
socksend "${msg1}" 0 && debugme echo "${debugpad}initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
socksend "${msg2}" 1 &&
|
|
tnres=$(sockread_fast 20) && debugme echo "read succeeded"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 6 ]] && safe_echo "$debugpad $tnres\n"
|
|
# check for START_TLS and FOLLOWS
|
|
if [[ ${tnres:10:2} == 2E ]] && [[ ${tnres:12:2} == 01 ]]; then
|
|
ret=0
|
|
else
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished telnet STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: fd for socket -- which we don't use yes as it is a hassle (not clear whether it works under every bash version)
|
|
# arg2: optional: for STARTTLS additional command to be injected
|
|
# returns 6 if opening the socket caused a problem, 1 if STARTTLS handshake failed, 0: all ok
|
|
#
|
|
fd_socket() {
|
|
local fd="$1"
|
|
local payload="$2"
|
|
local proyxline=""
|
|
local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # sockets do not need the square brackets we have of IPv6 addresses
|
|
# we just need do it here, that's all!
|
|
if [[ -t 5 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket because of a tty conflict"
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
# PROXYNODE works better than PROXYIP on modern versions of squid
|
|
if ! exec 5<> /dev/tcp/${PROXYNODE}/${PROXYPORT}; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT"
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$DNS_VIA_PROXY"; then
|
|
printf -- "%b" "CONNECT $NODE:$PORT HTTP/1.0\n\n" >&5
|
|
else
|
|
printf -- "%b" "CONNECT $nodeip:$PORT HTTP/1.0\n\n" >&5
|
|
fi
|
|
while true; do
|
|
read -t $PROXY_WAIT -r proyxline <&5
|
|
if [[ $? -ge 128 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "Proxy timed out. Unable to CONNECT via proxy. "
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
return 6
|
|
elif [[ "${proyxline%/*}" == HTTP ]]; then
|
|
proyxline=${proyxline#* }
|
|
if [[ "${proyxline%% *}" != 200 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "Unable to CONNECT via proxy. "
|
|
[[ "$PORT" != 443 ]] && prln_warning "Check whether your proxy supports port $PORT and the underlying protocol."
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$proyxline" == $'\r' ]] || [[ -z "$proyxline" ]] ; then
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
# For the following execs: 2>/dev/null would remove a potential error message, but disables debugging.
|
|
# First we check whether a socket connect timeout was specified. We exec the connect in a subshell,
|
|
# then we'll see whether we can connect. If not we take the emergency exit. If we're still alive we'll
|
|
# proceed with the "usual case", see below.
|
|
elif [[ -n "$CONNECT_TIMEOUT" ]]; then
|
|
if ! $TIMEOUT_CMD $CONNECT_TIMEOUT bash -c "exec 5<>/dev/tcp/$nodeip/$PORT"; then
|
|
((NR_SOCKET_FAIL++))
|
|
connectivity_problem $NR_SOCKET_FAIL $MAX_SOCKET_FAIL "TCP connect problem" "repeated TCP connect problems (connect timeout), giving up"
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "Unable to open a socket to $NODEIP:$PORT. "
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Now comes the usual case
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]] && ! exec 5<>/dev/tcp/$nodeip/$PORT; then
|
|
((NR_SOCKET_FAIL++))
|
|
connectivity_problem $NR_SOCKET_FAIL $MAX_SOCKET_FAIL "TCP connect problem" "repeated TCP connect problems, giving up"
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "Unable to open a socket to $NODEIP:$PORT. "
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]]; then
|
|
case "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" in # port
|
|
ftp|ftps) # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4217, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc959
|
|
starttls_ftp_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
smtp|smtps) # SMTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc{2033,3207,5321}
|
|
starttls_smtp_dialog "" "$payload"
|
|
;;
|
|
lmtp|lmtps) # LMTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc{2033,3207,5321}
|
|
starttls_smtp_dialog lmtp
|
|
;;
|
|
pop3|pop3s) # POP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595
|
|
starttls_pop3_dialog "$payload"
|
|
;;
|
|
nntp|nntps) # NNTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4642
|
|
starttls_nntp_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
imap|imaps) # IMAP, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3501
|
|
starttls_imap_dialog "$payload"
|
|
;;
|
|
sieve) # MANAGESIEVE, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5804
|
|
starttls_sieve_dialog "$payload"
|
|
;;
|
|
irc|ircs) # IRC, https://ircv3.net/specs/extensions/tls-3.1.html, https://ircv3.net/specs/core/capability-negotiation.html
|
|
fatal "FIXME: IRC+STARTTLS not yet supported" $ERR_NOSUPPORT
|
|
;;
|
|
ldap|ldaps) # LDAP, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2830#section-2.1, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4511
|
|
# https://ldap.com/ldapv3-wire-protocol-reference-extended/
|
|
#fatal "FIXME: LDAP+STARTTLS over sockets not supported yet (try \"--ssl-native\")" $ERR_NOSUPPORT
|
|
starttls_ldap_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
acap|acaps) # ACAP = Application Configuration Access Protocol, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595
|
|
fatal "ACAP Easteregg: not implemented -- probably never will" $ERR_NOSUPPORT
|
|
;;
|
|
xmpp|xmpps|xmpp-server) # XMPP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6120
|
|
starttls_xmpp_dialog
|
|
# IM observatory: https://xmpp.net , XMPP server directory: https://xmpp.net/directory.php
|
|
;;
|
|
postgres) # Postgres SQL, see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/devel/protocol-message-formats.html
|
|
starttls_postgres_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
mysql) # MySQL, see https://dev.mysql.com/doc/internals/en/x-protocol-lifecycle-lifecycle.html#x-protocol-lifecycle-tls-extension
|
|
starttls_mysql_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
telnet) # captured from a tn3270 negotiation against z/VM 7.2. Also, see OpenSSL apps/s_client.c for the handling of PROTO_TELNET
|
|
starttls_telnet_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
*) # we need to throw an error here -- otherwise testssl.sh treats the STARTTLS protocol as plain SSL/TLS which leads to FP
|
|
fatal "FIXME: STARTTLS protocol $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL is not supported yet" $ERR_NOSUPPORT
|
|
esac
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
case $ret in
|
|
0) return 0 ;;
|
|
3) fatal "No STARTTLS found in handshake" $ERR_CONNECT ;;
|
|
*) if [[ $ret -eq 2 ]] && [[ -n "$payload" ]]; then
|
|
# We don't want this handling for STARTTLS injection
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
((NR_STARTTLS_FAIL++))
|
|
# This are mostly timeouts here (code >=128). We give the client a chance to try again later. For cases
|
|
# where we have no STARTTLS in the server banner however - ret code=3 - we don't need to try again
|
|
connectivity_problem $NR_STARTTLS_FAIL $MAX_STARTTLS_FAIL "STARTTLS handshake failed (code: $ret)" "repeated STARTTLS problems, giving up ($ret)"
|
|
return 6 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
# Plain socket ok, yes or no?
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && return 0
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: socket fd but atm we use 5 anyway, see comment for fd_socket()
|
|
#
|
|
close_socket(){
|
|
local fd="$1"
|
|
|
|
exec 5<&-
|
|
exec 5>&-
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
send_close_notify() {
|
|
local detected_tlsversion="$1"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "sending close_notify..."
|
|
if [[ $detected_tlsversion == 0300 ]]; then
|
|
socksend ",x15, x03, x00, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0
|
|
else
|
|
socksend ",x15, x03, x01, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Format string properly for socket
|
|
# ARG1: any commented sequence of two bytes hex, separated by commas. It can contain comments, new lines, tabs and white spaces
|
|
# NW_STR holds the global with the string prepared for printf, like '\x16\x03\x03\'
|
|
code2network() {
|
|
NW_STR=$(sed -e 's/,/\\\x/g' <<< "$1" | sed -e 's/# .*$//g' -e 's/ //g' -e '/^$/d' | tr -d '\n' | tr -d '\t')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# sockets inspired by https://blog.chris007.de/using-bash-for-network-socket-operation/
|
|
# ARG1: hexbytes separated by commas, with a leading comma
|
|
# ARG2: seconds to sleep
|
|
socksend_clienthello() {
|
|
local data=""
|
|
|
|
code2network "$1"
|
|
data="$NW_STR"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]] && echo && echo "\"$data\""
|
|
if [[ -z "$PRINTF" ]] ;then
|
|
# We could also use "dd ibs=1M obs=1M" here but is seems to be at max 3% slower
|
|
printf -- "$data" | cat >&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
else
|
|
$PRINTF -- "$data" 2>/dev/null >&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
fi
|
|
sleep $USLEEP_SND
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ARG1: hexbytes -- preceded by x -- separated by commas, with a leading comma
|
|
# ARG2: seconds to sleep
|
|
socksend() {
|
|
local data line
|
|
|
|
# read line per line and strip comments (bash internal func can't handle multiline statements
|
|
data="$(while read line; do
|
|
printf "${line%%\#*}"
|
|
done <<< "$1" )"
|
|
data="${data// /}" # strip ' '
|
|
data="${data//,/\\}" # s&r , by \
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo && echo "\"$data\""
|
|
if [[ -z "$PRINTF" ]] ;then
|
|
printf -- "$data" | cat >&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
else
|
|
$PRINTF -- "$data" 2>/dev/null >&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
fi
|
|
sleep $2
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Reads from socket. Uses SOCK_REPLY_FILE global to save socket reply
|
|
# Not blocking, polling
|
|
# ARG1: blocksize for reading
|
|
#
|
|
sockread() {
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && maxsleep=$MAX_WAITSOCK || maxsleep=$2
|
|
SOCK_REPLY_FILE=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7
|
|
dd bs=$1 of=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
wait_kill $! $maxsleep
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Reads from socket. Utilises a pipe. Output is ASCII.
|
|
# Faster as previous, blocks however when socket stream is empty
|
|
# ARG1: blocksize for reading
|
|
#
|
|
sockread_fast() {
|
|
dd bs=$1 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len2twobytes() {
|
|
local len_arg1=${#1}
|
|
[[ $len_arg1 -le 2 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "00, %02s \n" "$1")
|
|
[[ $len_arg1 -eq 3 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "0%s, %02s \n" "${1:0:1}" "${1:1:2}")
|
|
[[ $len_arg1 -eq 4 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "%02s, %02s \n" "${1:0:2}" "${1:2:2}")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_pub_key_size() {
|
|
local pubkey pubkeybits
|
|
local -i i len1 len
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_PKEY" || return 1
|
|
|
|
# OpenSSL displays the number of bits for RSA and ECC
|
|
pubkeybits=$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub 2>>$ERRFILE)
|
|
if [[ "$pubkeybits" =~ E[Dd]25519 ]]; then
|
|
echo "Server public key is 253 bit" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ "$pubkeybits" =~ E[Dd]448 ]]; then
|
|
echo "Server public key is 456 bit" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
pubkeybits=$(awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }' <<< "$pubkeybits")
|
|
if [[ -n $pubkeybits ]]; then
|
|
# remainder e.g. "256 bit)"
|
|
pubkeybits="${pubkeybits//\)/}"
|
|
echo "Server public key is $pubkeybits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
# This extracts the public key for DSA, DH, and GOST
|
|
pubkey=$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')
|
|
[[ -z "$pubkey" ]] && return 1
|
|
# Skip over tag and length of subjectPublicKeyInfo
|
|
i=2
|
|
len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
i+=2
|
|
else
|
|
len1=$((len1-0x80))
|
|
i+=$((2*len1+2))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Skip over algorithm field
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
i+=$((2*len1))
|
|
else
|
|
case $len1 in
|
|
129) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" ;;
|
|
130) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
131) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
132) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
i+=$((2+2*len))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Next is the public key BIT STRING. Skip over tag, length, and number of unused bits.
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
i+=4
|
|
else
|
|
len1=$((len1-0x80))
|
|
i+=$((2*len1+4))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now get the length of the public key
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
len=$len1
|
|
else
|
|
case $len1 in
|
|
129) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" ;;
|
|
130) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
131) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
132) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
len=$((8*len)) # convert from bytes to bits
|
|
pubkeybits="$(printf "%d" $len)"
|
|
echo "Server public key is $pubkeybits bit" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Extract the DH ephemeral key from the ServerKeyExchange message
|
|
get_dh_ephemeralkey() {
|
|
local tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="$1"
|
|
local -i tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len offset
|
|
local dh_p dh_g dh_y dh_param len1 key_bitstring
|
|
local -i i dh_p_len dh_g_len dh_y_len dh_param_len
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_PKEY" || return 1
|
|
|
|
tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=${#tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii}
|
|
dh_p_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:4}")
|
|
offset=4+$dh_p_len
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Subtract any leading 0 bytes
|
|
for (( i=4; i < offset; i+=2 )); do
|
|
[[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break
|
|
dh_p_len=$dh_p_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_p_len}"
|
|
|
|
dh_g_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
i=4+$offset
|
|
offset+=4+$dh_g_len
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# Subtract any leading 0 bytes
|
|
for (( 1; i < offset; i+=2 )); do
|
|
[[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break
|
|
dh_g_len=$dh_g_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_g="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_g_len}"
|
|
|
|
dh_y_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
i=4+$offset
|
|
offset+=4+$dh_y_len
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# Subtract any leading 0 bytes
|
|
for (( 1; i < offset; i+=2 )); do
|
|
[[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break
|
|
dh_y_len=$dh_y_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_y="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_y_len}"
|
|
|
|
# The following code assumes that all lengths can be encoded using at most 2 bytes,
|
|
# which just means that the encoded length of the public key must be less than
|
|
# 65,536 bytes. If the length is anywhere close to that, it is almost certainly an
|
|
# encoding error.
|
|
if [[ $dh_p_len+$dh_g_len+$dh_y_len -ge 131000 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# make ASN.1 INTEGER of p, g, and Y
|
|
[[ "0x${dh_p:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_p_len+=2 && dh_p="00$dh_p"
|
|
if [[ $dh_p_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_p_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_p_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_p_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_p_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p="02${len1}$dh_p"
|
|
|
|
[[ "0x${dh_g:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_g_len+=2 && dh_g="00$dh_g"
|
|
if [[ $dh_g_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_g_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_g_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_g_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_g_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_g="02${len1}$dh_g"
|
|
|
|
[[ "0x${dh_y:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_y_len+=2 && dh_y="00$dh_y"
|
|
if [[ $dh_y_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_y_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_y="02${len1}$dh_y"
|
|
|
|
# Make a SEQUENCE of p and g
|
|
dh_param_len=${#dh_p}+${#dh_g}
|
|
if [[ $dh_param_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_param_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_param="30${len1}${dh_p}${dh_g}"
|
|
|
|
# Make a SEQUENCE of the parameters SEQUENCE and the OID
|
|
dh_param_len=22+${#dh_param}
|
|
if [[ $dh_param_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_param_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_param="30${len1}06092A864886F70D010301${dh_param}"
|
|
|
|
# Encapsulate public key, y, in a BIT STRING
|
|
dh_y_len=${#dh_y}+2
|
|
if [[ $dh_y_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_y_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_y="03${len1}00$dh_y"
|
|
|
|
# Create the public key SEQUENCE
|
|
i=${#dh_param}+${#dh_y}
|
|
if [[ $i -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((i/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $i -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((i/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((i/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
key_bitstring="30${len1}${dh_param}${dh_y}"
|
|
key_bitstring="$(hex2binary "$key_bitstring" | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -inform DER 2> $ERRFILE)"
|
|
[[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_out "$key_bitstring"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: name of file with socket reply
|
|
# arg2: true if entire server hello should be parsed
|
|
# return values: 0=no SSLv2 (reset)
|
|
# 1=no SSLv2 (plaintext reply like it happens with OLS webservers)
|
|
# 3=SSLv2 supported (in $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd is reply for further processing
|
|
# --> there could be checked whether ciphers e.g have been returned at all (or anything else)
|
|
# 4=looks like an STARTTLS 5xx message
|
|
# 6=socket couldn't be opened
|
|
# 7=strange reply we can't deal with
|
|
parse_sslv2_serverhello() {
|
|
local ret v2_hello_ascii v2_hello_initbyte v2_hello_length
|
|
local v2_hello_handshake v2_cert_type v2_hello_cert_length
|
|
local v2_hello_cipherspec_length
|
|
local -i certificate_len nr_ciphers_detected offset i
|
|
local ret=3
|
|
local parse_complete="false"
|
|
# SSLv2 server hello: in hex representation, see below
|
|
# byte 1+2: length of server hello 0123
|
|
# 3: 04=Handshake message, server hello 45
|
|
# 4: session id hit or not (boolean: 00=false, this 67
|
|
# is the normal case)
|
|
# 5: certificate type, 01 = x509 89
|
|
# 6+7 version (00 02 = SSLv2) 10-13
|
|
# 8+9 certificate length 14-17
|
|
# 10+11 cipher spec length 17-20
|
|
# 12+13 connection id length
|
|
# [certificate length] ==> certificate
|
|
# [cipher spec length] ==> ciphers GOOD: HERE ARE ALL CIPHERS ALREADY!
|
|
|
|
# Note: recent SSL/TLS stacks reply with a TLS alert on a SSLv2 client hello.
|
|
# The TLS error message is different and could be used for fingerprinting.
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$2" == "true" ]]; then
|
|
parse_complete=true
|
|
fi
|
|
"$parse_complete" && echo "======================================" > $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
v2_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' $1)
|
|
v2_hello_ascii="${v2_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$v2_hello_ascii"
|
|
if [[ -z "$v2_hello_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
ret=0 # 1 line without any blanks: no server hello received
|
|
debugme echo "(SSLv2) ServerHello empty"
|
|
else
|
|
# now scrape two bytes out of the reply per byte
|
|
v2_hello_initbyte="${v2_hello_ascii:0:1}" # normally this belongs to the next, should be 8!
|
|
v2_hello_length="${v2_hello_ascii:1:3}" # + 0x8000 see above
|
|
v2_hello_handshake="${v2_hello_ascii:4:2}"
|
|
v2_cert_type="${v2_hello_ascii:8:2}"
|
|
v2_hello_cert_length="${v2_hello_ascii:14:4}"
|
|
v2_hello_cipherspec_length="${v2_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
|
|
V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH=$(printf "%d\n" "0x$v2_hello_cipherspec_length" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=7
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${v2_hello_ascii:0:2}" == "35" ]] && "$do_starttls"; then
|
|
# this could be a 500/5xx for some weird reason where the STARTTLS handshake failed
|
|
debugme echo "$(hex2ascii "$v2_hello_ascii")"
|
|
ret=4
|
|
elif [[ "${v2_hello_ascii:0:4}" == "1503" ]]; then
|
|
# Cloudflare does this, OpenSSL 1.1.1 and picoTLS. With different alert messages
|
|
# Just in case somebody's interested in the exact error, we deliver it ;-)
|
|
debugme echo -n ">TLS< alert message discovered: ${v2_hello_ascii} "
|
|
case "${v2_hello_ascii:10:2}" in
|
|
01) debugme echo "(01/warning: 0x"${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"/$(tls_alert "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;;
|
|
02) debugme echo "(02/fatal: 0x"${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"/$(tls_alert "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;;
|
|
*) debugme echo "("${v2_hello_ascii:10:2}" : "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
ret=0
|
|
elif [[ $v2_hello_initbyte != "8" ]] || [[ $v2_hello_handshake != "04" ]]; then
|
|
ret=1
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo "no correct (SSLv2) ServerHello"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 server init byte: 0x0$v2_hello_initbyte"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 hello handshake : 0x$v2_hello_handshake"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo "SSLv2 server hello length: 0x0$v2_hello_length"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 certificate type: 0x$v2_cert_type"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 certificate length: 0x$v2_hello_cert_length"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 cipher spec length: 0x$v2_hello_cipherspec_length"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$parse_complete" && [[ $((2*$(hex2dec "$v2_hello_length"))) -ne $((${#v2_hello_ascii}-4)) ]]; then
|
|
ret=7
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$parse_complete" || return $ret
|
|
|
|
# not sure why we need this
|
|
rm -f $HOSTCERT
|
|
> $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "$v2_hello_cert_length")
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$v2_cert_type" == "01" ]] && [[ "$v2_hello_cert_length" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
hex2binary "${v2_hello_ascii:26:certificate_len}" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -out $HOSTCERT 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
get_pub_key_size
|
|
echo "======================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Output list of supported ciphers
|
|
offset=$((certificate_len+26))
|
|
nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3))
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers_detected; i++ )); do
|
|
echo "Supported cipher: x$(tolower "${v2_hello_ascii:offset:6}")" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
offset=$((offset+6))
|
|
done
|
|
echo "======================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: text
|
|
hmac() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local key="$2" text="$3" output
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]]; then
|
|
output="$(hex2binary "$text" | $OPENSSL mac -macopt digest:"${hash_fn/-/}" -macopt hexkey:"$key" HMAC 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_lf "$output")"
|
|
else
|
|
output="$(hex2binary "$text" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -mac HMAC -macopt hexkey:"$key" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
tm_out "${output#*= }"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: transcript
|
|
# Compute the HMAC of the hash of the transcript
|
|
hmac-transcript() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local key="$2" transcript="$3" output
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]]; then
|
|
output="$(hex2binary "$transcript" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -binary 2>/dev/null | \
|
|
$OPENSSL mac -macopt digest:"${hash_fn/-/}" -macopt hexkey:"$key" HMAC 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
tm_out "$(toupper "$(strip_lf "$output")")"
|
|
else
|
|
output="$(hex2binary "$transcript" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -binary 2>/dev/null | \
|
|
$OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -mac HMAC -macopt hexkey:"$key" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
tm_out "$(toupper "${output#*= }")"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: pseudorandom key (PRK)
|
|
# arg2: info
|
|
# arg3: length of output keying material in octets
|
|
# See RFC 5869, Section 2.3
|
|
hkdf-expand() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local prk="$2" info="$3" output=""
|
|
local -i out_len="$4"
|
|
local -i i n hash_len ret
|
|
local counter
|
|
local ti tim1 # T(i) and T(i-1)
|
|
|
|
case "$hash_fn" in
|
|
"-sha256") hash_len=32 ;;
|
|
"-sha384") hash_len=48 ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
n=$out_len/$hash_len
|
|
[[ $((out_len%hash_len)) -ne 0 ]] && n+=1
|
|
|
|
tim1=""
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= n; i++ )); do
|
|
counter="$(printf "%02X\n" $i)"
|
|
ti="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$prk" "$tim1$info$counter")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
output+="$ti"
|
|
tim1="$ti"
|
|
done
|
|
out_len=$((2*out_len))
|
|
tm_out "${output:0:out_len}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: secret
|
|
# arg3: label
|
|
# arg4: context
|
|
# arg5: length
|
|
# See RFC 8446, Section 7.1
|
|
hkdf-expand-label() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local secret="$2" label="$3"
|
|
local context="$4"
|
|
local -i length="$5"
|
|
local hkdflabel hkdflabel_label hkdflabel_context
|
|
local hkdflabel_length
|
|
local -i len
|
|
|
|
hkdflabel_length="$(printf "%04X\n" "$length")"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
# "544c5320312e332c20" = "TLS 1.3, "
|
|
hkdflabel_label="544c5320312e332c20$label"
|
|
else
|
|
# "746c73313320" = "tls13 "
|
|
hkdflabel_label="746c73313320$label"
|
|
fi
|
|
len=${#hkdflabel_label}/2
|
|
hkdflabel_label="$(printf "%02X\n" "$len")$hkdflabel_label"
|
|
len=${#context}/2
|
|
hkdflabel_context="$(printf "%02X\n" "$len")$context"
|
|
hkdflabel="$hkdflabel_length$hkdflabel_label$hkdflabel_context"
|
|
|
|
hkdf-expand "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$hkdflabel" "$length"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: secret
|
|
# arg3: label
|
|
# arg4: ASCII-HEX of messages
|
|
# See RFC 8446, Section 7.1
|
|
derive-secret() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local secret="$2" label="$3" messages="$4"
|
|
local hash_messages
|
|
local -i hash_len retcode
|
|
|
|
case "$hash_fn" in
|
|
"-sha256") hash_len=32 ;;
|
|
"-sha384") hash_len=48 ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
hash_messages="$(hex2binary "$messages" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
hash_messages="${hash_messages#*= }"
|
|
hkdf-expand-label "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$label" "$hash_messages" "$hash_len"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: secret
|
|
# arg3: purpose ("key" or "iv")
|
|
# arg4: length of the key
|
|
# See RFC 8446, Section 7.3
|
|
derive-traffic-key() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local secret="$2" purpose="$3"
|
|
local -i key_length="$4"
|
|
local key
|
|
|
|
key="$(hkdf-expand-label "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$purpose" "" "$key_length")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
tm_out "$key"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
#arg2: First ClientHello, if response was a HelloRetryRequest
|
|
#arg3: HelloRetryRequest, if one was sent
|
|
#arg4: Final (or only) ClientHello
|
|
#arg5: ServerHello
|
|
create-initial-transcript() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local clienthello1="$2" hrr="$3" clienthello2="$4" serverhello="$5"
|
|
local hash_clienthello1 msg_transcript
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$hrr" ]] && [[ "${serverhello:8:4}" == 7F12 ]]; then
|
|
msg_transcript="$clienthello1$hrr$clienthello2$serverhello"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$hrr" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
hash_len=32
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
hash_len=48
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
hash_clienthello1="$(hex2binary "$clienthello1" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
hash_clienthello1="${hash_clienthello1#*= }"
|
|
msg_transcript="FE0000$(printf "%02x" $((${#hash_clienthello1}/2)))$hash_clienthello1$hrr$clienthello2$serverhello"
|
|
else
|
|
msg_transcript="$clienthello2$serverhello"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$msg_transcript"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
#arg2: file containing cipher name, public key, and private key
|
|
derive-handshake-secret() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local tmpfile="$2"
|
|
local -i retcode
|
|
local hash_fn
|
|
local pub_file priv_file tmpfile
|
|
local early_secret derived_secret shared_secret handshake_secret
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_PKUTIL" || return 1
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pub_file="$(mktemp "$TEMPDIR/pubkey.XXXXXX")" || return 7
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' \
|
|
"$tmpfile" > "$pub_file"
|
|
[[ ! -s "$pub_file" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
priv_file="$(mktemp "$TEMPDIR/privkey.XXXXXX")" || return 7
|
|
if grep -qe "-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS" "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS/,/-----END EC PRIVATE KEY/ { print $0 }' \
|
|
"$tmpfile" > "$priv_file"
|
|
else
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY/,/-----END PRIVATE KEY/ { print $0 }' \
|
|
"$tmpfile" > "$priv_file"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ! -s "$priv_file" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# early_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "000...000" "000...000")"
|
|
case "$hash_fn" in
|
|
"-sha256") early_secret="33ad0a1c607ec03b09e6cd9893680ce210adf300aa1f2660e1b22e10f170f92a"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
# "6465726976656420736563726574" = "derived secret"
|
|
# derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "6465726976656420736563726574" "")"
|
|
derived_secret="c1c0c36bf8fb1d1afa949fbd360e71af69a6244a4c2eaef5bbbb6442a7277d2c"
|
|
else
|
|
# "64657269766564" = "derived"
|
|
# derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "64657269766564" "")"
|
|
derived_secret="6f2615a108c702c5678f54fc9dbab69716c076189c48250cebeac3576c3611ba"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
"-sha384") early_secret="7ee8206f5570023e6dc7519eb1073bc4e791ad37b5c382aa10ba18e2357e716971f9362f2c2fe2a76bfd78dfec4ea9b5"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
# "6465726976656420736563726574" = "derived secret"
|
|
# derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "6465726976656420736563726574" "")"
|
|
derived_secret="54c80fa05ee9e0532ce3db8ddeca37a0365683bcd3b27bdc88d2b9fdc115ca4ebc8edc1f0b72a6a0861e803fc34761ef"
|
|
else
|
|
# "64657269766564" = "derived"
|
|
# derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "64657269766564" "")"
|
|
derived_secret="1591dac5cbbf0330a4a84de9c753330e92d01f0a88214b4464972fd668049e93e52f2b16fad922fdc0584478428f282b"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
shared_secret="$($OPENSSL pkeyutl -derive -inkey "$priv_file" -peerkey "$pub_file" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
rm "$pub_file" "$priv_file"
|
|
|
|
# For draft 18 use $early_secret rather than $derived_secret.
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4}" == "7F12" ]]; then
|
|
handshake_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "${shared_secret%%[!0-9A-F]*}")"
|
|
else
|
|
handshake_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$derived_secret" "${shared_secret%%[!0-9A-F]*}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$handshake_secret"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: handshake secret
|
|
# arg3: transcript
|
|
# arg4: "client" or "server"
|
|
derive-handshake-traffic-keys() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" handshake_secret="$2" transcript="$3"
|
|
local sender="$4"
|
|
local hash_fn
|
|
local -i hash_len key_len
|
|
local handshake_traffic_secret label key iv finished="0000"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
hash_len=32
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
hash_len=48
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *AES_128* ]]; then
|
|
key_len=16
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *AES_256* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == *CHACHA20_POLY1305* ]]; then
|
|
key_len=32
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$sender" == server ]]; then
|
|
# "7365727665722068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574" = "server handshake traffic secret"
|
|
label="7365727665722068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574"
|
|
else
|
|
# "636c69656e742068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574" = "client handshake traffic secret"
|
|
label="636c69656e742068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$sender" == server ]]; then
|
|
# "732068732074726166666963" = "s hs traffic"
|
|
label="732068732074726166666963"
|
|
else
|
|
# "632068732074726166666963" = "c hs traffic"
|
|
label="632068732074726166666963"
|
|
fi
|
|
handshake_traffic_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$handshake_secret" "$label" "$transcript")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
# "6b6579" = "key"
|
|
key="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$handshake_traffic_secret" "6b6579" "$key_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
# "6976" = "iv"
|
|
iv="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$handshake_traffic_secret" "6976" "12")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] || [[ "$sender" == client ]]; then
|
|
# "66696e6973686564" = "finished"
|
|
finished="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$handshake_traffic_secret" "66696e6973686564" "$hash_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$key $iv $finished"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
#arg2: handshake secret
|
|
derive-master-secret() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local handshake_secret="$2"
|
|
local -i retcode
|
|
local hash_fn
|
|
local derived_secret zeros master_secret
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
zeros="0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
zeros="000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4}" == 7F12 ]]; then
|
|
derived_secret="$handshake_secret"
|
|
elif [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$handshake_secret" "6465726976656420736563726574" "")"
|
|
else
|
|
derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$handshake_secret" "64657269766564" "")"
|
|
fi
|
|
master_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$derived_secret" "$zeros")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$master_secret"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: master secret
|
|
# arg3: transcript
|
|
# arg4: "client" or "server"
|
|
derive-application-traffic-keys() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" master_secret="$2" transcript="$3"
|
|
local sender="$4"
|
|
local hash_fn
|
|
local -i key_len
|
|
local application_traffic_secret_0 label key iv
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *AES_128* ]]; then
|
|
key_len=16
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *AES_256* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == *CHACHA20_POLY1305* ]]; then
|
|
key_len=32
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$sender" == server ]]; then
|
|
# "736572766572206170706c69636174696f6e207472616666696320736563726574" = "server application traffic secret"
|
|
label="736572766572206170706c69636174696f6e207472616666696320736563726574"
|
|
else
|
|
# "636c69656e74206170706c69636174696f6e207472616666696320736563726574" = "client application traffic secret"
|
|
label="636c69656e74206170706c69636174696f6e207472616666696320736563726574"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$sender" == server ]]; then
|
|
# "732061702074726166666963" = "s hs traffic"
|
|
label="732061702074726166666963"
|
|
else
|
|
# "632061702074726166666963" = "c hs traffic"
|
|
label="632061702074726166666963"
|
|
fi
|
|
application_traffic_secret_0="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$master_secret" "$label" "$transcript")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
# "6b6579" = "key"
|
|
key="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$application_traffic_secret_0" "6b6579" "$key_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
# "6976" = "iv"
|
|
iv="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$application_traffic_secret_0" "6976" "12")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_out "$key $iv"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Section 2.1
|
|
chacha20_Qround() {
|
|
local -i a="0x$1"
|
|
local -i b="0x$2"
|
|
local -i c="0x$3"
|
|
local -i d="0x$4"
|
|
local -i x y
|
|
|
|
a=$(((a+b) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
d=$((d^a))
|
|
# rotate d left 16 bits
|
|
x=$((d & 0xffff0000))
|
|
x=$((x >> 16))
|
|
y=$((d & 0x0000ffff))
|
|
y=$((y << 16))
|
|
d=$((x | y))
|
|
|
|
c=$(((c+d) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
b=$((b^c))
|
|
# rotate b left 12 bits
|
|
x=$((b & 0xfff00000))
|
|
x=$((x >> 20))
|
|
y=$((b & 0x000fffff))
|
|
y=$((y << 12))
|
|
b=$((x | y))
|
|
|
|
a=$(((a+b) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
d=$((d^a))
|
|
# rotate d left 8 bits
|
|
x=$((d & 0xff000000))
|
|
x=$((x >> 24))
|
|
y=$((d & 0x00ffffff))
|
|
y=$((y << 8))
|
|
d=$((x | y))
|
|
|
|
c=$(((c+d) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
b=$((b^c))
|
|
# rotate b left 7 bits
|
|
x=$((b & 0xfe000000))
|
|
x=$((x >> 25))
|
|
y=$((b & 0x01ffffff))
|
|
y=$((y << 7))
|
|
b=$((x | y))
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$(printf "%X" $a) $(printf "%X" $b) $(printf "%X" $c) $(printf "%X" $d)"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Section 2.3.1
|
|
chacha20_inner_block() {
|
|
local s0="$1" s1="$2" s2="$3" s3="$4"
|
|
local s4="$5" s5="$6" s6="$7" s7="$8"
|
|
local s8="$9" s9="${10}" s10="${11}" s11="${12}"
|
|
local s12="${13}" s13="${14}" s14="${15}" s15="${16}"
|
|
local res
|
|
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s0" "$s4" "$s8" "$s12")"
|
|
read -r s0 s4 s8 s12 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s1" "$s5" "$s9" "$s13")"
|
|
read -r s1 s5 s9 s13 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s2" "$s6" "$s10" "$s14")"
|
|
read -r s2 s6 s10 s14 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s3" "$s7" "$s11" "$s15")"
|
|
read -r s3 s7 s11 s15 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s0" "$s5" "$s10" "$s15")"
|
|
read -r s0 s5 s10 s15 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s1" "$s6" "$s11" "$s12")"
|
|
read -r s1 s6 s11 s12 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s2" "$s7" "$s8" "$s13")"
|
|
read -r s2 s7 s8 s13 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s3" "$s4" "$s9" "$s14")"
|
|
read -r s3 s4 s9 s14 <<< "$res"
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$s0 $s1 $s2 $s3 $s4 $s5 $s6 $s7 $s8 $s9 $s10 $s11 $s12 $s13 $s14 $s15"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Sections 2.3 and 2.3.1
|
|
chacha20_block() {
|
|
local key="$1"
|
|
local counter="$2"
|
|
local nonce="$3"
|
|
local s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15
|
|
local ws0 ws1 ws2 ws3 ws4 ws5 ws6 ws7 ws8 ws9 ws10 ws11 ws12 ws13 ws14 ws15
|
|
local working_state
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
# create the state variable
|
|
s0="61707865"; s1="3320646e"; s2="79622d32"; s3="6b206574"
|
|
s4="${key:6:2}${key:4:2}${key:2:2}${key:0:2}"
|
|
s5="${key:14:2}${key:12:2}${key:10:2}${key:8:2}"
|
|
s6="${key:22:2}${key:20:2}${key:18:2}${key:16:2}"
|
|
s7="${key:30:2}${key:28:2}${key:26:2}${key:24:2}"
|
|
s8="${key:38:2}${key:36:2}${key:34:2}${key:32:2}"
|
|
s9="${key:46:2}${key:44:2}${key:42:2}${key:40:2}"
|
|
s10="${key:54:2}${key:52:2}${key:50:2}${key:48:2}"
|
|
s11="${key:62:2}${key:60:2}${key:58:2}${key:56:2}"
|
|
s12="$counter"
|
|
s13="${nonce:6:2}${nonce:4:2}${nonce:2:2}${nonce:0:2}"
|
|
s14="${nonce:14:2}${nonce:12:2}${nonce:10:2}${nonce:8:2}"
|
|
s15="${nonce:22:2}${nonce:20:2}${nonce:18:2}${nonce:16:2}"
|
|
|
|
# Initialize working_state to state
|
|
working_state="$s0 $s1 $s2 $s3 $s4 $s5 $s6 $s7 $s8 $s9 $s10 $s11 $s12 $s13 $s14 $s15"
|
|
|
|
# compute the 20 rounds (10 calls to inner block function, each of which
|
|
# performs 8 quarter rounds).
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i < 10; i++ )); do
|
|
working_state="$(chacha20_inner_block $working_state)"
|
|
done
|
|
read -r ws0 ws1 ws2 ws3 ws4 ws5 ws6 ws7 ws8 ws9 ws10 ws11 ws12 ws13 ws14 ws15 <<< "$working_state"
|
|
|
|
# Add working state to state
|
|
s0="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s0+0x$ws0) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s1="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s1+0x$ws1) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s2="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s2+0x$ws2) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s3="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s3+0x$ws3) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s4="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s4+0x$ws4) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s5="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s5+0x$ws5) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s6="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s6+0x$ws6) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s7="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s7+0x$ws7) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s8="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s8+0x$ws8) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s9="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s9+0x$ws9) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s10="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s10+0x$ws10) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s11="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s11+0x$ws11) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s12="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s12+0x$ws12) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s13="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s13+0x$ws13) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s14="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s14+0x$ws14) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s15="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s15+0x$ws15) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
|
|
# serialize the state
|
|
s0="${s0:6:2}${s0:4:2}${s0:2:2}${s0:0:2}"
|
|
s1="${s1:6:2}${s1:4:2}${s1:2:2}${s1:0:2}"
|
|
s2="${s2:6:2}${s2:4:2}${s2:2:2}${s2:0:2}"
|
|
s3="${s3:6:2}${s3:4:2}${s3:2:2}${s3:0:2}"
|
|
s4="${s4:6:2}${s4:4:2}${s4:2:2}${s4:0:2}"
|
|
s5="${s5:6:2}${s5:4:2}${s5:2:2}${s5:0:2}"
|
|
s6="${s6:6:2}${s6:4:2}${s6:2:2}${s6:0:2}"
|
|
s7="${s7:6:2}${s7:4:2}${s7:2:2}${s7:0:2}"
|
|
s8="${s8:6:2}${s8:4:2}${s8:2:2}${s8:0:2}"
|
|
s9="${s9:6:2}${s9:4:2}${s9:2:2}${s9:0:2}"
|
|
s10="${s10:6:2}${s10:4:2}${s10:2:2}${s10:0:2}"
|
|
s11="${s11:6:2}${s11:4:2}${s11:2:2}${s11:0:2}"
|
|
s12="${s12:6:2}${s12:4:2}${s12:2:2}${s12:0:2}"
|
|
s13="${s13:6:2}${s13:4:2}${s13:2:2}${s13:0:2}"
|
|
s14="${s14:6:2}${s14:4:2}${s14:2:2}${s14:0:2}"
|
|
s15="${s15:6:2}${s15:4:2}${s15:2:2}${s15:0:2}"
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$s0$s1$s2$s3$s4$s5$s6$s7$s8$s9$s10$s11$s12$s13$s14$s15"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Section 2.4
|
|
chacha20() {
|
|
local key="$1"
|
|
local -i counter=1
|
|
local nonce="$2"
|
|
local ciphertext="$3"
|
|
local -i i ciphertext_len num_blocks mod_check
|
|
local -i i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8 i9 i10 i11 i12 i13 i14 i15 i16
|
|
local keystream plaintext=""
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_CHACHA20"; then
|
|
plaintext="$(hex2binary "$ciphertext" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -chacha20 -K "$key" -iv "01000000$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext}
|
|
num_blocks=$ciphertext_len/128
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < num_blocks; i++)); do
|
|
i1=$((128*i)); i2=$((i1+8)); i3=$((i1+16)); i4=$((i1+24)); i5=$((i1+32)); i6=$((i1+40)); i7=$((i1+48)); i8=$((i1+56))
|
|
i9=$((i1+64)); i10=$((i1+72)); i11=$((i1+80)); i12=$((i1+88)); i13=$((i1+96)); i14=$((i1+104)); i15=$((i1+112)); i16=$((i1+120))
|
|
keystream="$(chacha20_block "$key" "$(printf "%08X" $counter)" "$nonce")"
|
|
plaintext+="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i1:8} ^ 0x${keystream:0:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i2:8} ^ 0x${keystream:8:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i3:8} ^ 0x${keystream:16:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i4:8} ^ 0x${keystream:24:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i5:8} ^ 0x${keystream:32:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i6:8} ^ 0x${keystream:40:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i7:8} ^ 0x${keystream:48:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i8:8} ^ 0x${keystream:56:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i9:8} ^ 0x${keystream:64:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i10:8} ^ 0x${keystream:72:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i11:8} ^ 0x${keystream:80:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i12:8} ^ 0x${keystream:88:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i13:8} ^ 0x${keystream:96:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i14:8} ^ 0x${keystream:104:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i15:8} ^ 0x${keystream:112:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i16:8} ^ 0x${keystream:120:8}))")"
|
|
counter+=1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
mod_check=$ciphertext_len%128
|
|
if [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
keystream="$(chacha20_block "$key" "$(printf "%08X" $counter)" "$nonce")"
|
|
i1=$((128*num_blocks))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < mod_check; i+=2 )); do
|
|
plaintext+="$(printf "%02X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:2} ^ 0x${keystream:i:2}))")"
|
|
i1+=2
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Implement U8to32 from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna/blob/master/poly1305-donna-32.h
|
|
# Used to decode value encoded as 32-bit little-endian integer
|
|
u8to32() {
|
|
local p="$1"
|
|
|
|
tm_out "0x${p:6:2}${p:4:2}${p:2:2}${p:0:2}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Implement U32to8 from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna/blob/master/poly1305-donna-32.h
|
|
# Used to encode value as 32-bit little-endian integer
|
|
u32to8() {
|
|
local -i v="$1"
|
|
local p
|
|
|
|
v=$((v & 0xffffffff))
|
|
p="$(printf "%08X" $v)"
|
|
tm_out "${p:6:2}${p:4:2}${p:2:2}${p:0:2}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Used to encode value as 64-bit little-endian integer
|
|
u64to8() {
|
|
local -i v="$1"
|
|
local p
|
|
|
|
p="$(printf "%016X" "$v")"
|
|
tm_out "${p:14:2}${p:12:2}${p:10:2}${p:8:2}${p:6:2}${p:4:2}${p:2:2}${p:0:2}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: 32-byte key
|
|
# arg2: message to be authenticated
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Section 2.5
|
|
# Implementation based on https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
|
|
poly1305_mac() {
|
|
local key="$1" nonce="$2" ciphertext="$3" aad="$4"
|
|
local mac_key msg
|
|
local -i ciphertext_len aad_len
|
|
local -i bytes
|
|
local -i r0 r1 r2 r3 r4
|
|
local -i h0=0 h1=0 h2=0 h3=0 h4=0
|
|
local -i pad0 pad1 pad2 pad3
|
|
local -i s1 s2 s3 s4
|
|
local -i d0 d1 d2 d3 d4
|
|
local -i g0 g1 g2 g3 g4
|
|
local -i i c f blocksize hibit
|
|
local padding="00000000000000000000000000000000"
|
|
|
|
# poly1305_key_gen - RFC 8439, Section 2.6
|
|
# The MAC key is actually just the first 64 characters (32 bytes) of the
|
|
# output of the chacha20_block function. However, there is no need to
|
|
# truncate the key, since the code below will ignore all but the first
|
|
# 64 characters.
|
|
mac_key="$(chacha20_block "$key" "00000000" "$nonce")"
|
|
|
|
# Construct message to be authenticated. RFC 8439, Section 2.8
|
|
msg="$aad"
|
|
aad_len=$((${#aad}/2))
|
|
bytes=$(( aad_len % 16 ))
|
|
[[ $bytes -ne 0 ]] && msg+="${padding:0:$((2*(16-bytes)))}"
|
|
msg+="$ciphertext"
|
|
ciphertext_len=$((${#ciphertext}/2))
|
|
bytes=$(( ciphertext_len % 16 ))
|
|
[[ $bytes -ne 0 ]] && msg+="${padding:0:$((2*(16-bytes)))}"
|
|
msg+="$(u64to8 $aad_len)$(u64to8 $ciphertext_len)"
|
|
bytes="${#msg}"
|
|
|
|
# poly1305_init
|
|
r0=$(( $(u8to32 "${mac_key:0:8}") & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
r1=$(( ($(u8to32 "${mac_key:6:8}") >> 2) & 0x3ffff03 ))
|
|
r2=$(( ($(u8to32 "${mac_key:12:8}") >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff ))
|
|
r3=$(( ($(u8to32 "${mac_key:18:8}") >> 6) & 0x3f03fff ))
|
|
r4=$(( ($(u8to32 "${mac_key:24:8}") >> 8) & 0x00fffff ))
|
|
|
|
s1=$((r1*5))
|
|
s2=$((r2*5))
|
|
s3=$((r3*5))
|
|
s4=$((r4*5))
|
|
|
|
pad0=$(u8to32 "${mac_key:32:8}")
|
|
pad1=$(u8to32 "${mac_key:40:8}")
|
|
pad2=$(u8to32 "${mac_key:48:8}")
|
|
pad3=$(u8to32 "${mac_key:56:8}")
|
|
|
|
# poly1305_update
|
|
for (( 1 ; bytes > 0; bytes=bytes-blocksize )); do
|
|
if [[ $bytes -ge 32 ]]; then
|
|
blocksize=32
|
|
hibit=0x1000000
|
|
else
|
|
blocksize=$bytes
|
|
hibit=0
|
|
msg+="01${padding:0:$((30-bytes))}"
|
|
fi
|
|
h0+=$(( $(u8to32 "${msg:0:8}") & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h1+=$(( ($(u8to32 "${msg:6:8}") >> 2) & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h2+=$(( ($(u8to32 "${msg:12:8}") >> 4) & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h3+=$(( ($(u8to32 "${msg:18:8}") >> 6) & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h4+=$(( (($(u8to32 "${msg:24:8}") >> 8) & 0xffffff) | hibit ))
|
|
|
|
d0=$(( h0*r0 + h1*s4 + h2*s3 + h3*s2 + h4*s1 ))
|
|
d1=$(( h0*r1 + h1*r0 + h2*s4 + h3*s3 + h4*s2 ))
|
|
d2=$(( h0*r2 + h1*r1 + h2*r0 + h3*s4 + h4*s3 ))
|
|
d3=$(( h0*r3 + h1*r2 + h2*r1 + h3*r0 + h4*s4 ))
|
|
d4=$(( h0*r4 + h1*r3 + h2*r2 + h3*r1 + h4*r0 ))
|
|
|
|
c=$(( (d0 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h0=$(( d0 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
d1+=$c; c=$(( (d1 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h1=$(( d1 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
d2+=$c; c=$(( (d2 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h2=$(( d2 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
d3+=$c; c=$(( (d3 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h3=$(( d3 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
d4+=$c; c=$(( (d4 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h4=$(( d4 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h0+=$((c*5)); c=$(( (h0 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h0=$(( h0 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h1+=$c
|
|
|
|
msg="${msg:32}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# poly1305_finish
|
|
c=$(( (h0 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h1=$(( h1 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h2+=$c; c=$(( (h2 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h2=$(( h2 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h3+=$c; c=$(( (h3 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h3=$(( h3 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h4+=$c; c=$(( (h4 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h4=$(( h4 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h0+=$((c*5)); c=$(( (h0 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h0=$(( h0 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h1+=$c
|
|
|
|
g0=$((h0+5)); c=$(( (g0 >> 26) & 0x3f )); g0=$(( g0 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
g1=$((h1+c)); c=$(( (g1 >> 26) & 0x3f )); g1=$(( g1 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
g2=$((h2+c)); c=$(( (g2 >> 26) & 0x3f )); g2=$(( g2 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
g3=$((h3+c)); c=$(( (g3 >> 26) & 0x3f )); g3=$(( g3 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
g4=$((h4+c-0x4000000))
|
|
|
|
if [[ $((g4 & 0x8000000000000000)) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
h0=$g0; h1=$g1; h2=$g2; h3=$g3; h4=$g4
|
|
fi
|
|
h0=$(( ( h0 | (h1 << 26)) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
h1=$(( ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20)) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
h2=$(( ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
h3=$(( ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8)) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
|
|
f=$(( h0+pad0 )); h0=$f
|
|
f=$(( h1+pad1+(f>>32) )); h1=$f
|
|
f=$(( h2+pad2+(f>>32) )); h2=$f
|
|
f=$(( h3+pad3+(f>>32) )); h3=$f
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$(u32to8 $h0)$(u32to8 $h1)$(u32to8 $h2)$(u32to8 $h3)"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: key
|
|
# arg2: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg3: ciphertext
|
|
# arg4: additional authenticated data
|
|
# arg5: expected tag
|
|
# arg6: true if authentication tag should be checked. false otherwise.
|
|
chacha20_aead_decrypt() {
|
|
local key="$1" nonce="$2" ciphertext="$3" aad="$4" expected_tag="$(toupper "$5")"
|
|
local compute_tag="$6"
|
|
local plaintext computed_tag
|
|
|
|
plaintext="$(chacha20 "$key" "$nonce" "$ciphertext")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
computed_tag="$(poly1305_mac "$key" "$nonce" "$ciphertext" "$aad")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
[[ "$computed_tag" == $expected_tag ]] || return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: key
|
|
# arg2: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg3: plaintext
|
|
# arg4: additional authenticated data
|
|
chacha20_aead_encrypt() {
|
|
local key="$1" nonce="$2" plaintext="$3" aad="$4"
|
|
local ciphertext computed_tag
|
|
|
|
ciphertext="$(chacha20 "$key" "$nonce" "$plaintext")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
computed_tag="$(poly1305_mac "$key" "$nonce" "$ciphertext" "$aad")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$ciphertext $computed_tag"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: nonce (must be 96 bits)
|
|
# arg2: number of blocks needed for plaintext/ciphertext
|
|
# Generate the sequence of counter blocks, which are to be encrypted and then
|
|
# XORed with either the plaintext or the ciphertext.
|
|
# See Section 6.1, Section 6.2, and Appendix A.3 of NIST SP 800-38C and
|
|
# Section 5.3 of RFC 5116.
|
|
generate-ccm-counter-blocks() {
|
|
local ctr="02${1}000000" ctr_msb blocks=""
|
|
local -i i ctr_lsb n="$2"
|
|
|
|
ctr_msb="${ctr:0:24}"
|
|
ctr_lsb=0x${ctr:24:8}
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i <= n; i+=1 )); do
|
|
blocks+="${ctr_msb}$(printf "%08X" "$ctr_lsb")"
|
|
ctr_lsb+=1
|
|
done
|
|
hex2binary "$blocks"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: an OpenSSL ecb cipher (e.g., -aes-128-ecb)
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: iv (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: additional authenticated data
|
|
# arg5: plaintext
|
|
# arg6: tag length (must be 16 or 32)
|
|
# Compute the CCM authentication tag
|
|
ccm-compute-tag() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" iv="$3" aad="$4" plaintext="$5"
|
|
local -i tag_len="$6"
|
|
local b tag
|
|
local -i i aad_len plaintext_len final_block_len nr_blocks
|
|
local padding_bytes="00000000000000000000000000000000"
|
|
|
|
aad_len=$((${#aad}/2))
|
|
plaintext_len=$((${#plaintext}/2))
|
|
|
|
# Apply the formatting function to create b=B0B1B2... as in
|
|
# Appendix A.2 of NIST SP 800-38C.
|
|
|
|
# The first block consists of the flags, nonce, and length of plaintext
|
|
# See Section 5.3 of RFC 5116 for value of q.
|
|
if [[ $aad_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $tag_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
b="5A${iv}$(printf "%06X" $plaintext_len)"
|
|
else
|
|
b="7A${iv}$(printf "%06X" $plaintext_len)"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $tag_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
b="1A${iv}$(printf "%06X" $plaintext_len)"
|
|
else
|
|
b="3A${iv}$(printf "%06X" $plaintext_len)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Next comes any additional authenticated data
|
|
if [[ $aad_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $aad_len -lt 0xFF00 ]]; then
|
|
b+="$(printf "%04X" $aad_len)$aad"
|
|
final_block_len=$(( (aad_len+2) % 16 ))
|
|
elif [[ $aad_len -lt 0x100000000 ]]; then
|
|
b+="FFFE$(printf "%08X" $aad_len)$aad"
|
|
final_block_len=$(( (aad_len+6) % 16 ))
|
|
else
|
|
# AES-CCM supports lengths up to 2^64, but there doesn't
|
|
# seem to be any reason to try to support such lengths.
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
# Add padding to complete block
|
|
[[ $final_block_len -ne 0 ]] && b+="${padding_bytes:0:$((2*(16-final_block_len)))}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Finally add the plaintext and any padding needed to complete block
|
|
b+="$plaintext"
|
|
final_block_len=$((plaintext_len % 16))
|
|
[[ $final_block_len -ne 0 ]] && b+="${padding_bytes:0:$((2*(16-final_block_len)))}"
|
|
|
|
# Compute the authentication tag as described in
|
|
# Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of NIST SP 800-38C.
|
|
nr_blocks=$((${#b}/32))
|
|
tag="${b:0:32}"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_blocks; i++ )); do
|
|
# XOR current block with previous block and then encrypt
|
|
[[ $i -ne 0 ]] &&
|
|
tag="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${b:0:8} ^ 0x${tag:0:8}))" "$((0x${b:8:8} ^ 0x${tag:8:8}))" "$((0x${b:16:8} ^ 0x${tag:16:8}))" "$((0x${b:24:8} ^ 0x${tag:24:8}))")"
|
|
|
|
tag="$(hex2binary "$tag" | $OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
b="${b:32}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
tm_out "${tag:0:tag_len}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: AES-CCM TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: ciphertext
|
|
# arg5: additional authenticated data
|
|
# arg6: expected tag (must be 16 or 32 characters)
|
|
# arg7: true if authentication tag should be checked. false otherwise.
|
|
# See Section 6.2 of NIST SP 800-38C
|
|
ccm-decrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" nonce="$3" ciphertext="$4" aad="$5" enciphered_expected_tag="$6"
|
|
local compute_tag="$7"
|
|
local plaintext="" expected_tag computed_tag
|
|
local -i i i1 i2 i3 i4 tag_len
|
|
local -i ciphertext_len n mod_check
|
|
local s s0
|
|
|
|
[[ ${#nonce} -ne 24 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*AES_128*) cipher="-aes-128-ecb" ;;
|
|
*AES_256*) cipher="-aes-256-ecb" ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext}
|
|
n=$((ciphertext_len/32))
|
|
mod_check=$((ciphertext_len%32))
|
|
[[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n+=1
|
|
|
|
# generate keystream
|
|
s="$(generate-ccm-counter-blocks "$nonce" "$n" | $OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
|
|
# The first 16-bytes of the keystream ($s) are used to decrypt the
|
|
# authentication tag and the remaining bytes are used to decrypt the
|
|
# ciphertext.
|
|
s0="${s:0:32}"
|
|
s="${s:32}"
|
|
|
|
# XOR the ciphertext with the keystream ($s). For efficiency, work in blocks
|
|
# of 16 bytes at a time (but with each XOR operation working on 32 bits.
|
|
[[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n=$((n-1))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < n; i++ )); do
|
|
i1=$((32*i)); i2=$((i1+8)); i3=$((i1+16)); i4=$((i1+24))
|
|
plaintext+="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:8} ^ 0x${s:i1:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i2:8} ^ 0x${s:i2:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i3:8} ^ 0x${s:i3:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i4:8} ^ 0x${s:i4:8}))")"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# If the length of the ciphertext is not an even multiple of 16 bytes, then handle the final incomplete block.
|
|
if [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
i1=$((32*n))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < mod_check; i+=2 )); do
|
|
plaintext+="$(printf "%02X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:2} ^ 0x${s:i1:2}))")"
|
|
i1+=2
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
tag_len=${#enciphered_expected_tag}
|
|
|
|
# Decrypt the authentication tag that was provided with the message
|
|
if [[ $tag_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
expected_tag="$(printf "%08X%08X" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:0:8} ^ 0x${s0:0:8}))" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:8:8} ^ 0x${s0:8:8}))")"
|
|
elif [[ $tag_len -eq 32 ]]; then
|
|
expected_tag="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:0:8} ^ 0x${s0:0:8}))" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:8:8} ^ 0x${s0:8:8}))" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:16:8} ^ 0x${s0:16:8}))" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:24:8} ^ 0x${s0:24:8}))")"
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# obtain the actual authentication tag for the decrypted message
|
|
computed_tag="$(ccm-compute-tag "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$aad" "$plaintext" "$tag_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$compute_tag" || [[ "$computed_tag" == $expected_tag ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: AES-CCM TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: plaintext
|
|
# arg5: additional authenticated data
|
|
# See Section 6.1 of NIST SP 800-38C
|
|
ccm-encrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" nonce="$3" plaintext="$4" aad="$5"
|
|
local -i tag_len
|
|
local ossl_cipher="-aes-128-ecb"
|
|
local ciphertext="" tag encrypted_tag
|
|
local -i i i1 i2 i3 i4
|
|
local -i plaintext_len n mod_check
|
|
local s s0
|
|
|
|
[[ ${#nonce} -ne 24 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) tag_len=32 ;;
|
|
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) tag_len=16 ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# compute the authentication tag
|
|
tag="$(ccm-compute-tag "$ossl_cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$aad" "$plaintext" "$tag_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
plaintext_len=${#plaintext}
|
|
n=$((plaintext_len/32))
|
|
mod_check=$((plaintext_len%32))
|
|
[[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n+=1
|
|
|
|
# generate keystream
|
|
s="$(generate-ccm-counter-blocks "$nonce" "$n" | $OPENSSL enc "$ossl_cipher" -K "$key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
|
|
# encrypt the authentication tag using the first 16 bytes of the keystrem ($s)
|
|
if [[ $tag_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
encrypted_tag="$(printf "%08X%08X" "$((0x${tag:0:8} ^ 0x${s:0:8}))" "$((0x${tag:8:8} ^ 0x${s:8:8}))")"
|
|
elif [[ $tag_len -eq 32 ]]; then
|
|
encrypted_tag="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${tag:0:8} ^ 0x${s:0:8}))" "$((0x${tag:8:8} ^ 0x${s:8:8}))" "$((0x${tag:16:8} ^ 0x${s:16:8}))" "$((0x${tag:24:8} ^ 0x${s:24:8}))")"
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# XOR the plaintext with the keystream ($s). For efficiency, work in blocks
|
|
# of 16 bytes at a time (but with each XOR operation working on 32 bits.
|
|
s="${s:32}"
|
|
[[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n=$((n-1))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < n; i++ )); do
|
|
i1=$((32*i)); i2=$((i1+8)); i3=$((i1+16)); i4=$((i1+24))
|
|
ciphertext+="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${plaintext:i1:8} ^ 0x${s:i1:8}))" "$((0x${plaintext:i2:8} ^ 0x${s:i2:8}))" "$((0x${plaintext:i3:8} ^ 0x${s:i3:8}))" "$((0x${plaintext:i4:8} ^ 0x${s:i4:8}))")"
|
|
done
|
|
# If the length of the plaintext is not an even multiple of 16 bytes, then handle the final incomplete block.
|
|
if [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
i1=$((32*n))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < mod_check; i+=2 )); do
|
|
ciphertext+="$(printf "%02X" "$((0x${plaintext:i1:2} ^ 0x${s:i1:2}))")"
|
|
i1+=2
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$ciphertext$encrypted_tag"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This function is based on gcm_mult in https://github.com/mko-x/SharedAES-GCM
|
|
# args 1-16: HL from gcm_ctx
|
|
# args 17-32: HH from gcm_ctx
|
|
# args 33-48: x - the input vector
|
|
gcm_mult() {
|
|
local -a gcm_ctx_hl=( "$1" "$2" "$3" "$4" "$5" "$6" "$7" "$8" "$9" "${10}" "${11}" "${12}" "${13}" "${14}" "${15}" "${16}" )
|
|
local -a gcm_ctx_hh=( "${17}" "${18}" "${19}" "${20}" "${21}" "${22}" "${23}" "${24}" "${25}" "${26}" "${27}" "${28}" "${29}" "${30}" "${31}" "${32}" )
|
|
local -a x=( "${33}" "${34}" "${35}" "${36}" "${37}" "${38}" "${39}" "${40}" "${41}" "${42}" "${43}" "${44}" "${45}" "${46}" "${47}" "${48}" )
|
|
local output
|
|
local -i i lo hi rem zh zl
|
|
local -r -a -i last4=(0x0000 0x1c20 0x3840 0x2460 0x7080 0x6ca0 0x48c0 0x54e0 0xe100 0xfd20 0xd940 0xc560 0x9180 0x8da0 0xa9c0 0xb5e0)
|
|
|
|
lo=$((0x${x[15]} & 0x0F))
|
|
hi=$((0x${x[15]} >> 4))
|
|
zh=0x${gcm_ctx_hh[$lo]}
|
|
zl=0x${gcm_ctx_hl[$lo]}
|
|
|
|
for (( i=15; i >=0; i=i-1 )); do
|
|
lo=$((0x${x[i]} & 0x0F))
|
|
hi=$((0x${x[i]} >> 4))
|
|
if [[ $i -ne 15 ]]; then
|
|
rem=$((zl & 0x0F))
|
|
zl=$(((zl >> 4) & 0x0fffffffffffffff))
|
|
zl=$(((zh << 60) | zl))
|
|
zh=$(((zh >> 4) & 0x0fffffffffffffff))
|
|
zh=$((zh^(last4[rem] << 48)))
|
|
zh=$((zh^0x${gcm_ctx_hh[$lo]}))
|
|
zl=$((zl^0x${gcm_ctx_hl[$lo]}))
|
|
fi
|
|
rem=$((zl & 0x0F))
|
|
zl=$(((zl >> 4) & 0x0fffffffffffffff))
|
|
zl=$(((zh << 60) | zl))
|
|
zh=$(((zh >> 4) & 0x0fffffffffffffff))
|
|
zh=$((zh^(last4[rem] << 48)))
|
|
zh=$((zh^0x${gcm_ctx_hh[$hi]}))
|
|
zl=$((zl^0x${gcm_ctx_hl[$hi]}))
|
|
done
|
|
output="$(printf "%016X" $zh)$(printf "%016X" $zl)"
|
|
tm_out "${output:0:2} ${output:2:2} ${output:4:2} ${output:6:2} ${output:8:2} ${output:10:2} ${output:12:2} ${output:14:2} ${output:16:2} ${output:18:2} ${output:20:2} ${output:22:2} ${output:24:2} ${output:26:2} ${output:28:2} ${output:30:2}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: nonce (must be 96 bits)
|
|
# arg2: number of blocks needed for plaintext/ciphertext
|
|
# Generate the sequence of counter blocks, which are to be encrypted and then
|
|
# XORed with either the plaintext or the ciphertext. The first block that is
|
|
# encrypted is used in computing the authentication tag.
|
|
generate_gcm_ctr() {
|
|
local -i nr_blocks="$1"
|
|
local nonce="$2"
|
|
local -i i
|
|
local ctr=""
|
|
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= nr_blocks; i++ )); do
|
|
ctr+="${nonce}$(printf "%08X" "$i")"
|
|
done
|
|
hex2binary "$ctr"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: an OpenSSL ecb cipher (e.g., -aes-128-ecb)
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: ciphertext
|
|
# arg5: aad
|
|
# arg6: mode
|
|
# arg7: true if authentication tag should be computed. false otherwise.
|
|
# This function is based on gcm_setkey, gcm_start, gcm_update, and gcm_finish
|
|
# in https://github.com/mko-x/SharedAES-GCM
|
|
gcm() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" aes_key="$2" nonce="$3" input="$4" aad="$5" mode="$6"
|
|
local compute_tag="$7"
|
|
local -a -i gcm_ctx_hl=(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0)
|
|
local -a -i gcm_ctx_hh=(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0)
|
|
local -a -i tag
|
|
local -a gcm_ctx_buf=("00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" )
|
|
local -i i j hi lo vl vh t length
|
|
local h hl="" hh="" buf ectr base_ectr tmp
|
|
local -i input_len="$((${#input}/2))" aad_len="$((${#aad}/2))" use_len
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
# gcm_setkey - populate HL and HH from gcm_ctx
|
|
h+=$(printf "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"| \
|
|
$OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$aes_key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')
|
|
hi=0x${h:0:8}
|
|
lo=0x${h:8:8}
|
|
vh=$(((hi << 32) | lo))
|
|
|
|
hi=0x${h:16:8}
|
|
lo=0x${h:24:8}
|
|
vl=$(((hi << 32) | lo))
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx_hl[8]=$vl
|
|
gcm_ctx_hh[8]=$vh
|
|
gcm_ctx_hh[0]=0
|
|
gcm_ctx_hl[0]=0
|
|
|
|
for (( i=4; i > 0; i=i>>1 )); do
|
|
t=$(((vl & 1) * 0xe1000000))
|
|
vl=$(((vl >> 1) & 0x7fffffffffffffff))
|
|
vl=$(((vh << 63) | vl))
|
|
vh=$(((vh >> 1) & 0x7fffffffffffffff))
|
|
vh=$((vh ^ (t << 32)))
|
|
gcm_ctx_hl[i]=$vl
|
|
gcm_ctx_hh[i]=$vh
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for (( i=2; i < 16; i=i<<1 )); do
|
|
vh=${gcm_ctx_hh[i]}
|
|
vl=${gcm_ctx_hl[i]}
|
|
for (( j=1; j < i; j++ )); do
|
|
gcm_ctx_hh[$((i+j))]=$((vh ^ gcm_ctx_hh[j]))
|
|
gcm_ctx_hl[$((i+j))]=$((vl ^ gcm_ctx_hl[j]))
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# place HL and HH in strings so that can be passed to gcm_mult
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
hl+="$(printf "%016X" ${gcm_ctx_hl[i]}) "
|
|
hh+="$(printf "%016X" ${gcm_ctx_hh[i]}) "
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Feed any additional authenticated data into the computation for the authentication tag.
|
|
for (( i=0; i < aad_len; i+=use_len )); do
|
|
[[ $((aad_len-i)) -lt 16 ]] && use_len=$((aad_len-i)) || use_len=16
|
|
for (( j=0; j < use_len; j++ )); do
|
|
gcm_ctx_buf[j]="$(printf "%02X" $((0x${gcm_ctx_buf[j]} ^ 0x${aad:$((2*i+2*j)):2})))"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
buf="$(gcm_mult $hl $hh ${gcm_ctx_buf[0]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[1]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[2]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[3]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[4]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[5]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[6]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[7]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[8]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[9]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[10]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[11]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[12]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[13]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[14]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[15]})"
|
|
read -r gcm_ctx_buf[0] gcm_ctx_buf[1] gcm_ctx_buf[2] gcm_ctx_buf[3] gcm_ctx_buf[4] gcm_ctx_buf[5] gcm_ctx_buf[6] gcm_ctx_buf[7] gcm_ctx_buf[8] gcm_ctx_buf[9] gcm_ctx_buf[10] gcm_ctx_buf[11] gcm_ctx_buf[12] gcm_ctx_buf[13] gcm_ctx_buf[14] gcm_ctx_buf[15] <<< "$buf"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
j=$((1 + input_len/16))
|
|
[[ $((input_len%16)) -ne 0 ]] && j+=1
|
|
ectr="$(generate_gcm_ctr "$j" "$nonce" | $OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$aes_key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
base_ectr="${ectr:0:32}"
|
|
ectr="${ectr:32}"
|
|
|
|
# gcm_update
|
|
# Encrypt or decrypt the input and feed the ciphertext into the computation for the authentication tag.
|
|
for (( length=input_len; length > 0; length=length-use_len )); do
|
|
[[ $length -lt 16 ]] && use_len=$length || use_len=16
|
|
|
|
if [[ $use_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
tmp="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${ectr:0:8} ^ 0x${input:0:8}))" "$((0x${ectr:8:8} ^ 0x${input:8:8}))" "$((0x${ectr:16:8} ^ 0x${input:16:8}))" "$((0x${ectr:24:8} ^ 0x${input:24:8}))")"
|
|
else
|
|
tmp=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < use_len; i++ )); do
|
|
tmp+="$(printf "%02X" $((0x${ectr:$((2*i)):2} ^ 0x${input:$((2*i)):2})))"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
output+="$tmp"
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
[[ $mode == decrypt ]] && tmp="${input:0:32}"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < use_len; i++ )); do
|
|
gcm_ctx_buf[i]="$(printf "%02X" $((0x${gcm_ctx_buf[i]} ^ 0x${tmp:$((2*i)):2})))"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
ectr="${ectr:32}"
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
tmp="$(gcm_mult $hl $hh ${gcm_ctx_buf[0]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[1]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[2]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[3]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[4]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[5]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[6]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[7]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[8]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[9]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[10]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[11]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[12]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[13]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[14]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[15]})"
|
|
read -r gcm_ctx_buf[0] gcm_ctx_buf[1] gcm_ctx_buf[2] gcm_ctx_buf[3] gcm_ctx_buf[4] gcm_ctx_buf[5] gcm_ctx_buf[6] gcm_ctx_buf[7] gcm_ctx_buf[8] gcm_ctx_buf[9] gcm_ctx_buf[10] gcm_ctx_buf[11] gcm_ctx_buf[12] gcm_ctx_buf[13] gcm_ctx_buf[14] gcm_ctx_buf[15] <<< "$tmp"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
input="${input:$((2*use_len))}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
# gcm_finish - feed the lengths of the ciphertext and additional authenticated data
|
|
# into the computation for the authentication tag.
|
|
input_len=$((8*input_len))
|
|
aad_len=$((8*aad_len))
|
|
output+=" "
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
tag[i]=0x${base_ectr:$((2*i)):2}
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $input_len -ne 0 ]] || [[ $aad_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
buf="$(printf "%016X" $aad_len)$(printf "%016X" $input_len)"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
gcm_ctx_buf[i]="$(printf "%02X" $((0x${gcm_ctx_buf[i]} ^ 0x${buf:$((2*i)):2})))"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
buf="$(gcm_mult $hl $hh ${gcm_ctx_buf[0]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[1]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[2]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[3]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[4]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[5]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[6]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[7]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[8]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[9]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[10]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[11]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[12]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[13]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[14]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[15]})"
|
|
read -r gcm_ctx_buf[0] gcm_ctx_buf[1] gcm_ctx_buf[2] gcm_ctx_buf[3] gcm_ctx_buf[4] gcm_ctx_buf[5] gcm_ctx_buf[6] gcm_ctx_buf[7] gcm_ctx_buf[8] gcm_ctx_buf[9] gcm_ctx_buf[10] gcm_ctx_buf[11] gcm_ctx_buf[12] gcm_ctx_buf[13] gcm_ctx_buf[14] gcm_ctx_buf[15] <<< "$buf"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
tag[i]=$((tag[i] ^ 0x${gcm_ctx_buf[i]}))
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
output+="$(printf "%02X" ${tag[i]})"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$output"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: AES-GCM TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: ciphertext
|
|
# arg5: aad
|
|
# arg6: expected tag
|
|
# arg7: true if authentication tag should be checked. false otherwise.
|
|
gcm-decrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" nonce="$3" ciphertext="$4" aad="$5" expected_tag="$(toupper "$6")"
|
|
local compute_tag="$7"
|
|
local plaintext computed_tag tmp
|
|
|
|
[[ ${#nonce} -ne 24 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ]] && "$HAS_AES128_GCM" && ! "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
plaintext="$(hex2binary "$ciphertext" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -aes-128-gcm -K "$key" -iv "$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ]] && "$HAS_AES256_GCM" && ! "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
plaintext="$(hex2binary "$ciphertext" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -aes-256-gcm -K "$key" -iv "$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*AES_128*) cipher="-aes-128-ecb" ;;
|
|
*AES_256*) cipher="-aes-256-ecb" ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
tmp="$(gcm "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$ciphertext" "$aad" "decrypt" "$compute_tag")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
computed_tag="${tmp##* }"
|
|
plaintext="${tmp% $computed_tag}"
|
|
|
|
if ! "$compute_tag" || [[ "$computed_tag" == $expected_tag ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: AES-GCM TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: plaintext
|
|
# arg5: aad
|
|
# See Section 7.2 of SP 800-38D
|
|
gcm-encrypt() {
|
|
local cipher
|
|
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
*AES_128*) cipher="-aes-128-ecb" ;;
|
|
*AES_256*) cipher="-aes-256-ecb" ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ ${#3} -ne 24 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$(gcm "$cipher" "$2" "$3" "$4" "$5" "encrypt" true)"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: ciphertext
|
|
# arg5: additional authenticated data
|
|
sym-decrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local key="$2" nonce="$3"
|
|
local ciphertext="$4"
|
|
local additional_data="$5"
|
|
local plaintext
|
|
local -i ciphertext_len tag_len
|
|
local compute_tag=false
|
|
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*CCM_8*)
|
|
tag_len=16 ;;
|
|
*CCM*|*GCM*|*CHACHA20_POLY1305*)
|
|
tag_len=32 ;;
|
|
*)
|
|
return 7 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# The final $tag_len characters of the ciphertext are the authentication tag
|
|
ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext}
|
|
[[ $ciphertext_len -lt $tag_len ]] && return 7
|
|
ciphertext_len=$((ciphertext_len-tag_len))
|
|
|
|
# In general there is no need to verify that the authentication tag is correct
|
|
# when decrypting, and performing the check is time consuming when the
|
|
# computations are performed in Bash. If the ciphertext is very long (e.g.,
|
|
# some application data), then trying to compute the authentication tag is
|
|
# too time consuming even for debug mode.
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && [[ $ciphertext_len -le 1024 ]] && compute_tag=true
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20_POLY1305 ]]; then
|
|
plaintext="$(chacha20_aead_decrypt "$key" "$nonce" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" "$additional_data" "${ciphertext:ciphertext_len:tag_len}" "$compute_tag")"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" =~ CCM ]]; then
|
|
plaintext=$(ccm-decrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" "$additional_data" "${ciphertext:ciphertext_len:tag_len}" "$compute_tag")
|
|
else # GCM
|
|
plaintext=$(gcm-decrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" "$additional_data" "${ciphertext:ciphertext_len:tag_len}" "$compute_tag")
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: plaintext
|
|
# arg5: additional authenticated data
|
|
sym-encrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" nonce="$3" plaintext="$4" additional_data="$5"
|
|
local ciphertext=""
|
|
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" =~ CCM ]]; then
|
|
ciphertext=$(ccm-encrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$plaintext" "$additional_data")
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" =~ GCM ]]; then
|
|
ciphertext=$(gcm-encrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$plaintext" "$additional_data")
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20_POLY1305 ]]; then
|
|
ciphertext="$(chacha20_aead_encrypt "$key" "$nonce" "$plaintext" "$additional_data")"
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_spaces "$ciphertext")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: iv
|
|
# arg2: sequence number
|
|
get-nonce() {
|
|
local iv="$1"
|
|
local -i seq_num="$2"
|
|
local -i len lsb
|
|
local msb nonce
|
|
|
|
len=${#iv}
|
|
[[ $len -lt 8 ]] && return 7
|
|
i=$len-8
|
|
msb="${iv:0:i}"
|
|
lsb="0x${iv:i:8}"
|
|
nonce="${msb}$(printf "%08X" "$((lsb ^ seq_num))")"
|
|
tm_out "$nonce"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return:
|
|
# 0 if arg1 contains the entire server response.
|
|
# 1 if arg1 does not contain the entire server response.
|
|
# 2 if the response is malformed.
|
|
# 3 if (a) the response version is TLSv1.3;
|
|
# (b) arg1 contains the entire ServerHello (and appears to contain the entire response);
|
|
# (c) the entire response is supposed to be parsed; and
|
|
# (d) the key and IV have not been provided to decrypt the response.
|
|
# arg1: ASCII-HEX encoded reply
|
|
# arg2: whether to process the full request ("all") or just the basic request plus the ephemeral key if any ("ephemeralkey").
|
|
# arg3: TLS cipher for decrypting TLSv1.3 response
|
|
# arg4: handshake secret
|
|
# arg5: message transcript (up through ServerHello)
|
|
check_tls_serverhellodone() {
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii="$1"
|
|
local process_full="$2"
|
|
local cipher="$3"
|
|
local handshake_secret="$4"
|
|
local msg_transcript="$5"
|
|
local tls_handshake_ascii="" tls_alert_ascii=""
|
|
local -i i tls_hello_ascii_len tls_handshake_ascii_len tls_alert_ascii_len
|
|
local -i msg_len remaining tls_serverhello_ascii_len sid_len
|
|
local -i j offset tls_extensions_len extension_len
|
|
local tls_content_type tls_protocol tls_msg_type extension_type
|
|
local tls_err_level
|
|
local hash_fn handshake_traffic_keys key="" iv="" finished_key=""
|
|
local post_finished_msg=""
|
|
local -i seq_num=0 plaintext_len
|
|
local plaintext decrypted_response="" additional_data
|
|
local include_headers=true
|
|
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$handshake_secret" ]]; then
|
|
handshake_traffic_keys="$(derive-handshake-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$handshake_secret" "$msg_transcript" "server")"
|
|
read -r key iv finished_key <<< "$handshake_traffic_keys"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$tls_hello_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
return 0 # no server hello received
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii}
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_hello_ascii_len; i+=msg_len )); do
|
|
remaining=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $remaining -lt 10 ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
tls_content_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
case "$tls_content_type" in
|
|
14|15|16|17) ;;
|
|
*) return 2 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
i+=2
|
|
tls_protocol="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
[[ -z "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol"
|
|
[[ "${tls_protocol:0:2}" != 03 ]] && return 2
|
|
i+=4
|
|
additional_data="$tls_content_type$tls_protocol${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}")
|
|
i+=4
|
|
remaining=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $msg_len -gt $remaining ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_content_type" == 16 ]]; then
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii+="${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}
|
|
decrypted_response+="$tls_content_type$tls_protocol$(printf "%04X" $((msg_len/2)))${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
# the ServerHello MUST be the first handshake message
|
|
[[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge 2 ]] && [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}" != 02 ]] && return 2
|
|
if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge 12 ]]; then
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="${tls_handshake_ascii:8:4}"
|
|
|
|
# In TLSv1.3 (starting with draft 22), the version field specifies TLSv1.2, but
|
|
# there is a supported_versions extension that specifies the actual version. So,
|
|
# if the version field specifies TLSv1.2, then check to see if there is a
|
|
# supported_versions extension.
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:76:2}")
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -gt 76+$sid_len ]]; then
|
|
# ServerHello contains extensions, so check for supported_versions extension
|
|
offset=84+$sid_len
|
|
tls_extensions_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
[[ $tls_extensions_len -ne $tls_serverhello_ascii_len-$sid_len-80 ]] && return 2
|
|
for (( j=0; j<tls_extensions_len; j+=8+extension_len )); do
|
|
[[ $tls_extensions_len-$j -lt 8 ]] && return 2
|
|
offset=88+$sid_len+$j
|
|
extension_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
offset=92+$sid_len+$j
|
|
extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
[[ $extension_len -gt $tls_extensions_len-$j-8 ]] && return 2
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == 002B ]]; then # supported_versions
|
|
[[ $extension_len -ne 4 ]] && return 2
|
|
offset=96+$sid_len+$j
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# A version of {0x7F, xx} represents an implementation of a draft version of TLS 1.3
|
|
if [[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]]; then
|
|
[[ 0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=0304
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -ge 0x0304 ]] && [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge $tls_serverhello_ascii_len+8 ]]; then
|
|
tm_out ""
|
|
return 0 # The entire ServerHello message has been received (and the rest isn't needed)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_content_type" == 15 ]]; then # TLS ALERT
|
|
tls_alert_ascii+="${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
decrypted_response+="$tls_content_type$tls_protocol$(printf "%04X" $((msg_len/2)))${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_content_type" == 17 ]] && [[ -n "$key" ]]; then # encrypted data
|
|
# The header information was added to additional data in TLSv1.3 draft 25.
|
|
"$include_headers" || additional_data=""
|
|
nonce="$(get-nonce "$iv" "$seq_num")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 2
|
|
plaintext="$(sym-decrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" "$additional_data")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 2
|
|
seq_num+=1
|
|
|
|
# Remove zeros from end of plaintext, if any
|
|
plaintext_len=${#plaintext}-2
|
|
while [[ "${plaintext:plaintext_len:2}" == 00 ]]; do
|
|
plaintext_len=$plaintext_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
tls_content_type="${plaintext:plaintext_len:2}"
|
|
decrypted_response+="${tls_content_type}0301$(printf "%04X" $((plaintext_len/2)))${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}"
|
|
case "$tls_content_type" in
|
|
15) tls_alert_ascii+="${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}" ;;
|
|
16) tls_handshake_ascii+="${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}"
|
|
# Data after the Finished message is encrypted under a different key.
|
|
if [[ "${plaintext:0:2}" == 14 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "$process_full" == all+ ]] && post_finished_msg="${tls_hello_ascii:$((i+msg_len))}"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) return 2 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# If there is a fatal alert, then we are done.
|
|
tls_alert_ascii_len=${#tls_alert_ascii}
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_alert_ascii_len; i+=4 )); do
|
|
remaining=$tls_alert_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $remaining -lt 4 ]] && return 1
|
|
tls_err_level=${tls_alert_ascii:i:2} # 1: warning, 2: fatal
|
|
[[ $tls_err_level == 02 ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" && tm_out "" && return 0
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# If there is a serverHelloDone or Finished, then we are done.
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_handshake_ascii_len; i+=msg_len )); do
|
|
remaining=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $remaining -lt 8 ]] && return 1
|
|
tls_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:6}")
|
|
i+=6
|
|
remaining=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $msg_len -gt $remaining ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# The ServerHello has already been added to $msg_transcript,
|
|
# but all other handshake messages need to be added.
|
|
if [[ -n "$key" ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" != 02 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 14 ]]; then
|
|
# Check the Finished message
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
[[ $msg_len -eq 64 ]] || return 2
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
[[ $msg_len -eq 96 ]] || return 2
|
|
else
|
|
return 2
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}" != $(hmac-transcript "$hash_fn" "$finished_key" "$msg_transcript") ]] && \
|
|
return 2
|
|
fi
|
|
msg_transcript+="$tls_msg_type${tls_handshake_ascii:$((i-6)):6}${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# For SSLv3 - TLS1.2 look for a ServerHelloDone message.
|
|
# For TLS 1.3 look for a Finished message.
|
|
[[ $tls_msg_type == 0E ]] && tm_out "" && return 0
|
|
[[ $tls_msg_type == 14 ]] && tm_out "$msg_transcript $decrypted_response $post_finished_msg" && return 0
|
|
done
|
|
# If the response is TLSv1.3 and the full response is to be processed, but the
|
|
# key and IV have not been provided to decrypt the response, then return 3 if
|
|
# the entire ServerHello has been received.
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0304 ]] && [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && \
|
|
[[ -z "$handshake_secret" ]] && [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
return 3
|
|
fi
|
|
# If we haven't encountered a fatal alert or a server hello done,
|
|
# then there must be more data to retrieve.
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: tls alert error/warning code
|
|
# returns: description
|
|
tls_alert() {
|
|
local tls_alert_text=""
|
|
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
00) tls_alert_text="close notify" ;;
|
|
0A) tls_alert_text="unexpected message" ;;
|
|
14) tls_alert_text="bad record mac" ;;
|
|
15) tls_alert_text="decryption failed" ;;
|
|
16) tls_alert_text="record overflow" ;;
|
|
1E) tls_alert_text="decompression failure" ;;
|
|
28) tls_alert_text="handshake failure" ;;
|
|
29) tls_alert_text="no certificate RESERVED" ;;
|
|
2A) tls_alert_text="bad certificate" ;;
|
|
2B) tls_alert_text="unsupported certificate" ;;
|
|
2C) tls_alert_text="certificate revoked" ;;
|
|
2D) tls_alert_text="certificate expired" ;;
|
|
2E) tls_alert_text="certificate unknown" ;;
|
|
2F) tls_alert_text="illegal parameter" ;;
|
|
30) tls_alert_text="unknown ca" ;;
|
|
31) tls_alert_text="access denied" ;;
|
|
32) tls_alert_text="decode error" ;;
|
|
33) tls_alert_text="decrypt error" ;;
|
|
3C) tls_alert_text="export restriction RESERVED" ;;
|
|
46) tls_alert_text="protocol version" ;;
|
|
47) tls_alert_text="insufficient security" ;;
|
|
50) tls_alert_text="internal error" ;;
|
|
56) tls_alert_text="inappropriate fallback" ;;
|
|
5A) tls_alert_text="user canceled" ;;
|
|
64) tls_alert_text="no renegotiation" ;;
|
|
6D) tls_alert_text="missing extension" ;;
|
|
6E) tls_alert_text="unsupported extension" ;;
|
|
6F) tls_alert_text="certificate unobtainable" ;;
|
|
70) tls_alert_text="unrecognized name" ;;
|
|
71) tls_alert_text="bad certificate status response" ;;
|
|
72) tls_alert_text="bad certificate hash value" ;;
|
|
73) tls_alert_text="unknown psk identity" ;;
|
|
74) tls_alert_text="certificate required" ;;
|
|
78) tls_alert_text="no application protocol" ;;
|
|
*) tls_alert_text="$(hex2dec "$1")";;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo "$tls_alert_text"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: ASCII-HEX encoded reply
|
|
# arg2: (optional): "all" or "all+" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages)
|
|
# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any)
|
|
# arg3: (optional): CIPHER_SUITES string (lowercase, and in the format output by code2network())
|
|
# If present, parse_tls_serverhello() will check that the cipher in the ServerHello appears in
|
|
# the CIPHER_SUITES string.
|
|
parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii="$1"
|
|
local process_full="$2"
|
|
local cipherlist="$3"
|
|
local tls_handshake_ascii="" tls_alert_ascii=""
|
|
local -i tls_hello_ascii_len tls_handshake_ascii_len tls_alert_ascii_len msg_len
|
|
local tls_serverhello_ascii="" tls_certificate_ascii=""
|
|
local tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="" tls_certificate_status_ascii=""
|
|
local tls_encryptedextensions_ascii="" tls_revised_certificate_msg=""
|
|
local -i tls_serverhello_ascii_len=0 tls_certificate_ascii_len=0
|
|
local -i tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=0 tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=0
|
|
local -i tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=0
|
|
local added_encrypted_extensions=false
|
|
local tls_alert_descrip tls_sid_len_hex issuerDN subjectDN CAissuerDN CAsubjectDN
|
|
local -i tls_sid_len offset extns_offset nr_certs=0
|
|
local tls_msg_type tls_content_type tls_protocol tls_protocol2 tls_hello_time
|
|
local tls_err_level tls_err_descr_no tls_cipher_suite rfc_cipher_suite tls_compression_method
|
|
local tls_extensions="" extension_type named_curve_str="" named_curve_oid
|
|
local cert_compression_method="" cert_compression_method_str=""
|
|
local -i i j extension_len extn_len tls_extensions_len ocsp_response_len=0 ocsp_response_list_len ocsp_resp_offset
|
|
local -i certificate_list_len certificate_len cipherlist_len
|
|
local -i curve_type named_curve
|
|
local -i dh_bits=0 msb mask
|
|
local hostcert_issuer=""
|
|
local len1 len2 len3 key_bitstring="" pem_certificate
|
|
local dh_p dh_param ephemeral_param rfc7919_param
|
|
local -i dh_p_len dh_param_len
|
|
local peering_signing_digest=0 peer_signature_type=0
|
|
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=""
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && echo > $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo $tls_hello_ascii # one line without any blanks
|
|
|
|
# Client messages, including handshake messages, are carried by the record layer.
|
|
# First, extract the handshake and alert messages.
|
|
# see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_record
|
|
# byte 0: content type: 0x14=CCS, 0x15=TLS alert x16=Handshake, 0x17 Application, 0x18=HB
|
|
# byte 1+2: TLS version word, major is 03, minor 00=SSL3, 01=TLS1 02=TLS1.1 03=TLS 1.2
|
|
# byte 3+4: fragment length
|
|
# bytes 5...: message fragment
|
|
tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii}
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "TLS message fragments:"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_hello_ascii_len; i+=msg_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len-$i -lt 10 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
# The entire server response should have been retrieved.
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
# This could just be a result of the server's response being
|
|
# split across two or more packets.
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_content_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
tls_protocol="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
i+=4
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}")
|
|
i+=4
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo " protocol (rec. layer): 0x$tls_protocol"
|
|
echo -n " tls_content_type: 0x$tls_content_type"
|
|
case $tls_content_type in
|
|
14) tmln_out " (change cipher spec)" ;;
|
|
15) tmln_out " (alert)" ;;
|
|
16) tmln_out " (handshake)" ;;
|
|
17) tmln_out " (application data)" ;;
|
|
*) tmln_out ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo " msg_len: $((msg_len/2))"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$do_starttls" ; then
|
|
if [[ $tls_content_type == 35 ]] || [[ $tls_content_type == 34 ]]; then
|
|
# STARTTLS handshake failed and server replied plaintext with a 5xx or 4xx
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && printf "%s\n" "400/500: $(hex2ascii "$tls_hello_ascii" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 4
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_hello_ascii" =~ 6130303220 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && printf "%s\n" "probably IMAP plaintext reply \"$(hex2ascii "${tls_hello_ascii:0:32}" 2>/dev/null)\""
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 3
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $tls_content_type != 14 ]] && [[ $tls_content_type != 15 ]] && \
|
|
[[ $tls_content_type != 16 ]] && [[ $tls_content_type != 17 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Content type other than alert, handshake, change cipher spec, or application data detected."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "${tls_protocol:0:2}" != 03 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Protocol record_version.major is not 03."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=$tls_protocol
|
|
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-$i ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 7
|
|
else
|
|
# This could just be a result of the server's response being split
|
|
# across two or more packets. Just grab the part that is available.
|
|
msg_len=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$tls_content_type" in
|
|
15) tls_alert_ascii="$tls_alert_ascii${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" ;;
|
|
16) tls_handshake_ascii="$tls_handshake_ascii${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Now check the alert messages.
|
|
tls_alert_ascii_len=${#tls_alert_ascii}
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ $tls_alert_ascii_len%4 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $tls_alert_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "CONNECTED(00000003)" > $TMPFILE
|
|
debugme echo "TLS alert messages:"
|
|
for (( i=0; i+3 < tls_alert_ascii_len; i+=4 )); do
|
|
tls_err_level=${tls_alert_ascii:i:2} # 1: warning, 2: fatal
|
|
j=$i+2
|
|
tls_err_descr_no=${tls_alert_ascii:j:2}
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tm_out " tls_err_descr_no: 0x${tls_err_descr_no} / = $(hex2dec ${tls_err_descr_no})"
|
|
tls_alert_descrip="$(tls_alert "$tls_err_descr_no")"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out " ($tls_alert_descrip)"
|
|
tm_out " tls_err_level: ${tls_err_level}"
|
|
fi
|
|
case $tls_err_level in
|
|
01) echo -n "warning " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
debugme tmln_out " (warning)" ;;
|
|
02) echo -n "fatal " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
debugme tmln_out " (fatal)" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo "alert $tls_alert_descrip" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_err_level" != 01 ]] && [[ "$tls_err_level" != 02 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Unexpected AlertLevel (0x$tls_err_level)."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_err_level" == 02 ]]; then
|
|
# Fatal alert
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now extract just the server hello, certificate, certificate status,
|
|
# and server key exchange handshake messages.
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "TLS handshake messages:"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_handshake_ascii_len; i+=msg_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i -lt 8 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
# The entire server response should have been retrieved.
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
# This could just be a result of the server's response being
|
|
# split across two or more packets.
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:6}")
|
|
i+=6
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tm_out " handshake type: 0x${tls_msg_type}"
|
|
case $tls_msg_type in
|
|
00) tmln_out " (hello_request)" ;;
|
|
01) tmln_out " (client_hello)" ;;
|
|
02) tmln_out " (server_hello)" ;;
|
|
03) tmln_out " (hello_verify_request)" ;;
|
|
04) tmln_out " (new_session_ticket)" ;;
|
|
05) tmln_out " (end_of_early_data)" ;;
|
|
06) tmln_out " (hello_retry_request)" ;;
|
|
08) tmln_out " (encrypted_extensions)" ;;
|
|
0B) tmln_out " (certificate)" ;;
|
|
0C) tmln_out " (server_key_exchange)" ;;
|
|
0D) tmln_out " (certificate_request)" ;;
|
|
0E) tmln_out " (server_hello_done)" ;;
|
|
0F) tmln_out " (certificate_verify)" ;;
|
|
10) tmln_out " (client_key_exchange)" ;;
|
|
14) tmln_out " (finished)" ;;
|
|
15) tmln_out " (certificate_url)" ;;
|
|
16) tmln_out " (certificate_status)" ;;
|
|
17) tmln_out " (supplemental_data)" ;;
|
|
18) tmln_out " (key_update)" ;;
|
|
19) tmln_out " (compressed_certificate)" ;;
|
|
FE) tmln_out " (message_hash)" ;;
|
|
*) tmln_out ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo " msg_len: $((msg_len/2))"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
# This could just be a result of the server's response being
|
|
# split across two or more packets. Just grab the part that
|
|
# is available.
|
|
msg_len=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 02 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_serverhello_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one ServerHello handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 04 ]]; then
|
|
parse_tls13_new_session_ticket "${APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO%% *}" "${tls_handshake_ascii:$((i-8)):$((msg_len+8))}"
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 08 ]]; then
|
|
# Add excrypted extensions (now decrypted) to end of extensions in ServerHello
|
|
tls_encryptedextensions_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -lt 2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained a malformed encrypted extensions message"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0B ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one Certificate handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all || "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0C ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one ServerKeyExchange handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0F ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained malformed certificate_verify message."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# Extract just the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm from the CertificateVerify message.
|
|
peering_signing_digest="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
peer_signature_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:$((i+2)):2}"
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 16 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_status_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one certificate_status handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_certificate_status_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 19 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one Certificate handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
cert_compression_method="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
case $cert_compression_method in
|
|
0001) cert_compression_method_str="ZLIB" ;;
|
|
0002) cert_compression_method_str="Brotli" ;;
|
|
0003) cert_compression_method_str="Zstandard" ;;
|
|
*) cert_compression_method_str="unrecognized" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out " Certificate Compression Algorithm: $cert_compression_method ($cert_compression_method_str)"
|
|
offset=$((i+4))
|
|
tmln_out " Uncompressed certificate length: $(printf "%d" 0x${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:6})"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"compress_certificate\" (id=27), len=0\n"
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && "$HAS_ZLIB" && [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:4}" == 0001 ]]; then
|
|
offset=$((i+4))
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii_len=2*0x${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:6}
|
|
offset=$((i+16))
|
|
len1=$((msg_len-16))
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii="$(hex2binary "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:len1}" | $OPENSSL zlib -d 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii="${tls_certificate_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
if [[ ${#tls_certificate_ascii} -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Length of uncompressed certificates did not match specified length."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "(TLS) ServerHello empty, TCP connection closed"
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="closed TCP connection "
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1 # no server hello received
|
|
elif [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt 76 ]]; then
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="reply malformed"
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}" != 02 ]]; then
|
|
# the ServerHello MUST be the first handshake message
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="reply contained no ServerHello"
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "The first handshake protocol message is not a ServerHello."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $tls_alert_ascii_len -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "CONNECTED(00000003)" > $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
echo "CONNECTED(00000003)" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# First parse the server hello handshake message
|
|
# byte 0+1: 03, TLS version word see byte 1+2
|
|
# byte 2-5: TLS timestamp for OpenSSL <1.01f
|
|
# byte 6-33: random, 28 bytes
|
|
# byte 34: session id length
|
|
# byte 35+36+sid-len: cipher suite!
|
|
# byte 37+sid-len: compression method: 00: none, 01: deflate, 64: LZS
|
|
# byte 38+39+sid-len: extension length
|
|
tls_protocol2="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:4}"
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol2"
|
|
[[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304"
|
|
if [[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" != 03 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "server_version.major in ServerHello is not 03."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
tls_hello_time="${tls_serverhello_ascii:4:8}"
|
|
[[ "$TLS_DIFFTIME_SET" || "$DEBUG" ]] && TLS_TIME=$(hex2dec "$tls_hello_time")
|
|
tls_sid_len_hex="${tls_serverhello_ascii:68:2}"
|
|
tls_sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "$tls_sid_len_hex")
|
|
offset=$((tls_sid_len+70))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt 76+$tls_sid_len ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
offset=68
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tls_cipher_suite="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
offset=$((tls_sid_len+74))
|
|
tls_compression_method="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}"
|
|
extns_offset=$((tls_sid_len+76))
|
|
else
|
|
extns_offset=72
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -gt $extns_offset ]] && \
|
|
[[ "$process_full" =~ all || "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 || \
|
|
( "$process_full" == ephemeralkey && "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -gt "0x03" ) ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt $extns_offset+4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_extensions_len=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}")*2
|
|
if [[ $tls_extensions_len -ne $tls_serverhello_ascii_len-$extns_offset-4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_extensions_len; i+=8+extension_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_extensions_len-$i -lt 8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+i+4))
|
|
extension_type="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+i+8))
|
|
extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -gt $tls_extensions_len-$i-8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
|
|
case $extension_type in
|
|
0000) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server name\" (id=0), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0001) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"max fragment length\" (id=1), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0002) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client certificate URL\" (id=2), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0003) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"trusted CA keys\" (id=3, len=$extension_len\n)" ;;
|
|
0004) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"truncated HMAC\" (id=4), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0005) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"status request\" (id=5), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -gt 0 ]] && [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
# In TLSv1.3 the status_request extension contains the CertificateStatus message, unlike
|
|
# TLSv1.2 and below where CertificateStatus appears in its own handshake message. So, if
|
|
# the status_request extension is not empty, extract the value and place it in
|
|
# $tls_certificate_status_ascii.
|
|
tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=$extension_len
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
tls_certificate_status_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:tls_certificate_status_ascii_len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0006) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"user mapping\" (id=6), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0007) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client authz\" (id=7), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0008) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server authz\" (id=8), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0009) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cert type\" (id=9), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000A) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"supported_groups\" (id=10), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported groups extension."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -n "Supported groups: " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt $len1+4 ]] || [[ $len1 -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported groups extension."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((offset+4))
|
|
for (( j=0; j < len1; j+=4 )); do
|
|
[[ $j -ne 0 ]] && echo -n ", " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
case "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}" in
|
|
"0017") echo -n "secp256r1" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0018") echo -n "secp384r1" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0019") echo -n "secp521r1" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"001D") echo -n "X25519" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"001E") echo -n "X448" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0100") echo -n "ffdhe2048" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0101") echo -n "ffdhe3072" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0102") echo -n "ffdhe4096" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0103") echo -n "ffdhe6144" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0104") echo -n "ffdhe8192" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
*) echo -n "unknown (${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4})" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
offset=$((offset+4))
|
|
done
|
|
echo "" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
000B) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"EC point formats\" (id=11), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000C) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"SRP\" (id=12), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000D) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"signature algorithms\" (id=13), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000E) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"use SRTP\" (id=14), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000F) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"heartbeat\" (id=15), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0010) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"application layer protocol negotiation\" (id=16), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -n "ALPN protocol: " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
j=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -ne $j+4 ]] || [[ $j -lt 2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((offset+4))
|
|
j=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -ne $j+6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((offset+2))
|
|
hex2binary "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:j}" >> "$TMPFILE"
|
|
echo "" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0011) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"certificate status version 2\" (id=17), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0012) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"signed certificate timestamps\" (id=18), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0013) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client certificate type\" (id=19), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0014) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server certificate type\" (id=20), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0015) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"TLS padding\" (id=21), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0016) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"encrypt-then-mac\" (id=22), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0017) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"extended master secret\" (id=23), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0018) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"token binding\" (id=24), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0019) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cached info\" (id=25), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0023) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"session ticket\" (id=35), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0028|0033)
|
|
# The key share extension was renumbered from 40 to 51 in TLSv1.3 draft 23 since a few
|
|
# implementations have been using 40 for the extended_random extension. Since the
|
|
# server's version may not yet have been determined, assume that both values represent the
|
|
# key share extension.
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == "00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" ]]; then
|
|
tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"key share\""
|
|
else
|
|
tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"unrecognized extension\""
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == 0028 ]]; then
|
|
tls_extensions+=" (id=40), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_extensions+=" (id=51), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed key share extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
named_curve=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+16+i))
|
|
msg_len=2*"$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")"
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -ne $extension_len-8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed key share extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
case $named_curve in
|
|
21) dh_bits=224 ; named_curve_str="P-224" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040021" ;;
|
|
23) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="P-256" ; named_curve_oid="06082a8648ce3d030107" ;;
|
|
24) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="P-384" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040022" ;;
|
|
25) dh_bits=521 ; named_curve_str="P-521" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040023" ;;
|
|
29) dh_bits=253 ; named_curve_str="X25519" ;;
|
|
30) dh_bits=448 ; named_curve_str="X448" ;;
|
|
31) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP256r1tls13" ; named_curve_oid="06092B2403030208010107" ;;
|
|
32) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP384r1tls13" ; named_curve_oid="06092B240303020801010B" ;;
|
|
33) dh_bits=512 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP512r1tls13" ; named_curve_oid="06092B240303020801010D" ;;
|
|
256) dh_bits=2048 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe2048" ;;
|
|
257) dh_bits=3072 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe3072" ;;
|
|
258) dh_bits=4096 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe4096" ;;
|
|
259) dh_bits=6144 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe6144" ;;
|
|
260) dh_bits=8192 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe8192" ;;
|
|
*) named_curve_str="" ; named_curve_oid="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+20+i))
|
|
if ! "$HAS_PKEY"; then
|
|
# The key can't be extracted without the pkey utility.
|
|
key_bitstring=""
|
|
elif [[ $named_curve -eq 29 ]]; then
|
|
key_bitstring="302a300506032b656e032100${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
elif [[ $named_curve -eq 30 ]]; then
|
|
key_bitstring="3042300506032b656f033900${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
elif [[ $named_curve -lt 256 ]] && [[ -n "$named_curve_oid" ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((msg_len/2+1)))"
|
|
[[ "0x${len1}" -ge "0x80" ]] && len1="81${len1}"
|
|
key_bitstring="03${len1}00${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
len2="$(printf "%02x" $((${#named_curve_oid}/2+9)))"
|
|
len3="$(printf "%02x" $((${#named_curve_oid}/2+${#key_bitstring}/2+11)))"
|
|
[[ "0x${len3}" -ge "0x80" ]] && len3="81${len3}"
|
|
key_bitstring="30${len3}30${len2}06072a8648ce3d0201${named_curve_oid}${key_bitstring}"
|
|
elif [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]] && [[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ "BEGIN" ]]; then
|
|
dh_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubout -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
|
|
# First is the length of the public-key SEQUENCE, and it is always encoded in four bytes (3082xxxx)
|
|
# Next is the length of the parameters SEQUENCE, and it is also always encoded in four bytes (3082xxxx)
|
|
dh_param_len=8+2*"$(hex2dec "${dh_param:12:4}")"
|
|
dh_param="${dh_param:8:dh_param_len}"
|
|
if [[ "0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}" -ge 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
key_bitstring="00${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
msg_len+=2
|
|
else
|
|
key_bitstring="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
len1="$(printf "%04x" $((msg_len/2)))"
|
|
key_bitstring="0282${len1}$key_bitstring"
|
|
len1="$(printf "%04x" $((${#key_bitstring}/2+1)))"
|
|
key_bitstring="${dh_param}0382${len1}00$key_bitstring"
|
|
len1="$(printf "%04x" $((${#key_bitstring}/2)))"
|
|
key_bitstring="3082${len1}$key_bitstring"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then
|
|
key_bitstring="$(hex2binary "$key_bitstring" | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -inform DER 2>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
if [[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$named_curve_str" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support $named_curve_str"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_warning "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support named curve $named_curve"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0029) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"pre-shared key\" (id=41), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002A) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"early data\" (id=42), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002B) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"supported versions\" (id=43), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -ne 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported versions extension."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
tls_protocol2="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol2"
|
|
[[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304"
|
|
;;
|
|
002C) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cookie\" (id=44), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002D) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"psk key exchange modes\" (id=45), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002E) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"ticket early data info\" (id=46), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002F) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"certificate authorities\" (id=47), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0030) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"oid filters\" (id=48), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0031) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"post handshake auth\" (id=49), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
3374) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"next protocol\" (id=13172), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
local -i protocol_len
|
|
echo -n "Protocols advertised by server: " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
for (( j=0; j<extension_len; j+=protocol_len+2 )); do
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt $j+2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed next protocol extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
protocol_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt $j+$protocol_len+2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed next protocol extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((offset+2))
|
|
hex2binary "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:protocol_len}" >> "$TMPFILE"
|
|
offset=$((offset+protocol_len))
|
|
[[ $j+$protocol_len+2 -lt $extension_len ]] && echo -n ", " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
done
|
|
echo "" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
FF01) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"renegotiation info\" (id=65281), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
*) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"unrecognized extension\" (id=$(printf "%d\n\n" "0x$extension_type")), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# After processing all of the extensions in the ServerHello message,
|
|
# if it has been determined that the response is TLSv1.3 and the
|
|
# response was decrypted, then modify $tls_serverhello_ascii by adding
|
|
# the extensions from the EncryptedExtensions and Certificate messages
|
|
# and then process them.
|
|
if ! "$added_encrypted_extensions" && [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0304" ]] && \
|
|
[[ $((i+8+extension_len)) -eq $tls_extensions_len ]]; then
|
|
# Note that the encrypted extensions have been added so that
|
|
# the aren't added a second time.
|
|
added_encrypted_extensions=true
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len+=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len-4
|
|
tls_extensions_len+=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len-4
|
|
tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len/2-2
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+4))
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:extns_offset}$(printf "%04X" $((0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}+tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len)))${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset}${tls_encryptedextensions_ascii:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
# In TLS 1.3, the Certificate message begins with a zero length certificate_request_context.
|
|
# In addition, certificate_list is now a list of (certificate, extension) pairs rather than
|
|
# just certificates. So, extract the extensions and add them to $tls_serverhello_ascii and
|
|
# create a new $tls_certificate_ascii that only contains a list of certificates.
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${tls_certificate_ascii:0:2}" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -lt 8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
certificate_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
if [[ $certificate_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len-8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( j=8; j < tls_certificate_ascii_len; j+=extn_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$j -lt 6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:j:6}")
|
|
if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$j-6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
len1=$certificate_len+6
|
|
tls_revised_certificate_msg+="${tls_certificate_ascii:j:len1}"
|
|
j+=$len1
|
|
extn_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:j:4}")
|
|
j+=4
|
|
# TODO: Should only the extensions associated with the EE certificate be added to $tls_serverhello_ascii?
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len+=$extn_len
|
|
tls_extensions_len+=$extn_len
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+4))
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:extns_offset}$(printf "%04X" $(( 0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}+extn_len/2)) )${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset}${tls_certificate_ascii:j:extn_len}"
|
|
done
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii_len=${#tls_revised_certificate_msg}+6
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii="$(printf "%06X" $(( tls_certificate_ascii_len/2-3)) )$tls_revised_certificate_msg"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]] && [[ $tls_sid_len -gt 0 ]] && NO_SSL_SESSIONID=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0300" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Protocol : SSLv3" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
echo "Protocol : TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${tls_cipher_suite:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${tls_cipher_suite:0:4}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${tls_cipher_suite:0:2},0x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')"
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${tls_cipher_suite:0:2},0x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')"
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "Cipher : $rfc_cipher_suite" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: DH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X25519" ]] || [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X448" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then
|
|
echo "$key_bitstring" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ "BEGIN" ]] && \
|
|
echo "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
case $tls_compression_method in
|
|
00) echo "Compression: NONE" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
01) echo "Compression: zlib compression" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
40) echo "Compression: LZS compression" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
*) echo "Compression: unrecognized compression method" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_compression_method" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Certificate Compression Algorithm: $cert_compression_method ($cert_compression_method_str)" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]] && echo -e "$tls_extensions" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo "TLS server hello message:"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
echo " tls_protocol: 0x$tls_protocol2"
|
|
[[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]] && echo " tls_sid_len: 0x$tls_sid_len_hex / = $((tls_sid_len/2))"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " tls_hello_time: 0x$tls_hello_time "
|
|
parse_date "$TLS_TIME" "+%Y-%m-%d %r" "%s" # in debugging mode we don't mind the cycles and don't use TLS_DIFFTIME_SET
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -n " tls_cipher_suite: 0x$tls_cipher_suite"
|
|
if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher_suite" ]]; then
|
|
echo " ($rfc_cipher_suite)"
|
|
else
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]]; then
|
|
echo " dh_bits: DH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X25519" ]] || [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X448" ]]; then
|
|
echo " dh_bits: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
else
|
|
echo " dh_bits: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " tls_compression_method: 0x$tls_compression_method "
|
|
case $tls_compression_method in
|
|
00) echo "(NONE)" ;;
|
|
01) echo "(zlib compression)" ;;
|
|
40) echo "(LZS compression)" ;;
|
|
*) echo "(unrecognized compression method)" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " tls_extensions: "
|
|
newline_to_spaces "$(grep -a 'TLS server extension ' $TMPFILE | \
|
|
sed -e 's/TLS server extension //g' -e 's/\" (id=/\/#/g' \
|
|
-e 's/,.*$/,/g' -e 's/),$/\"/g' \
|
|
-e 's/elliptic curves\/#10/supported_groups\/#10/g')"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ supported_groups ]]; then
|
|
echo " Supported Groups: $(grep "Supported groups:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/Supported groups: //')"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ application\ layer\ protocol\ negotiation ]]; then
|
|
echo " ALPN protocol: $(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ next\ protocol ]]; then
|
|
echo " NPN protocols: $(grep "Protocols advertised by server:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/Protocols advertised by server: //')"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If a CIPHER_SUITES string was provided, then check that $tls_cipher_suite is in the string.
|
|
# this appeared in yassl + MySQL (https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/784) but adds robustness
|
|
# to the implementation
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipherlist" ]]; then
|
|
tls_cipher_suite="$(tolower "$tls_cipher_suite")"
|
|
tls_cipher_suite="${tls_cipher_suite:0:2}\\x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2}"
|
|
cipherlist_len=${#cipherlist}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < cipherlist_len; i+=8 )); do
|
|
# At the right hand side we need the quotes here!
|
|
[[ "${cipherlist:i:6}" == "$tls_cipher_suite" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $cipherlist_len ]]; then
|
|
BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER=true
|
|
debugme echo "The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the ClientHello included a supported_versions extension, then check that the
|
|
# $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION appeared in the list offered in the ClientHello.
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:0:2}" == 01 ]]; then
|
|
# get position of cipher lists (just after session id)
|
|
offset=78+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:76:2}")
|
|
# get position of compression methods
|
|
offset+=4+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}")
|
|
# get position of extensions
|
|
extns_offset=$offset+6+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:2}")
|
|
len1=${#TLS_CLIENT_HELLO}
|
|
for (( i=extns_offset; i < len1; i+=8+extension_len )); do
|
|
extension_type="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:i:4}"
|
|
offset=4+$i
|
|
extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == 002b ]]; then
|
|
offset+=6
|
|
tls_protocol2="$(tolower "$tls_protocol2")"
|
|
for (( j=0; j < extension_len-2; j+=4 )); do
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}" == $tls_protocol2 ]] && break
|
|
offset+=4
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $j -eq $extension_len-2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "The ServerHello specifies a version that wasn't offered in the ClientHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now parse the Certificate message.
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
# not sure why we need this
|
|
[[ -e "$HOSTCERT" ]] && rm "$HOSTCERT"
|
|
[[ -e "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem" ]] && > "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# The first certificate is the server's certificate. If there are anything
|
|
# subsequent certificates, they are intermediate certificates.
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -lt 12 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
certificate_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:0:6}")
|
|
if [[ $certificate_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len-6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Place server's certificate in $HOSTCERT
|
|
certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:6:6}")
|
|
if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-12 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
hex2binary "${tls_certificate_ascii:12:certificate_len}" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -out "$HOSTCERT" 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
get_pub_key_size
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "---" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "Certificate chain" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
subjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -subject 2>>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
issuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -issuer 2>>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
echo " $nr_certs s:${subjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo " i:${issuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
cat "$HOSTCERT" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
echo "" > "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem"
|
|
# Place any additional certificates in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false
|
|
CAissuerDN="$issuerDN"
|
|
for (( i=12+certificate_len; i<tls_certificate_ascii_len; i+=certificate_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$i -lt 6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:i:6}")
|
|
i+=6
|
|
if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$i ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pem_certificate="$(hex2binary "${tls_certificate_ascii:i:certificate_len}" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM 2>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_certs+=1
|
|
CAsubjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -subject 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$pem_certificate")"
|
|
# Check that this certificate certifies the one immediately preceding it.
|
|
[[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" != "${CAissuerDN:8}" ]] && CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=true
|
|
CAissuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -issuer 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$pem_certificate")"
|
|
echo " $nr_certs s:${CAsubjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo " i:${CAissuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "$pem_certificate" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "$pem_certificate" >> "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem"
|
|
if [[ -z "$hostcert_issuer" ]] && [[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" == "${issuerDN:8}" ]]; then
|
|
# The issuer's certificate is needed if there is a stapled OCSP response,
|
|
# and it may be needed if check_revocation_ocsp() will later be called
|
|
# with the OCSP URI in the server's certificate.
|
|
hostcert_issuer="$TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem"
|
|
echo "$pem_certificate" > "$hostcert_issuer"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
echo "---" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "Server certificate" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "subject=${subjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "issuer=${issuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "---" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now parse the certificate status message
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -lt 8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:0:2}" == "01" ]]; then
|
|
# This is a certificate status message of type "ocsp"
|
|
ocsp_response_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
if [[ $ocsp_response_len -ne $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len-8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
ocsp_resp_offset=8
|
|
elif [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:0:2}" == "02" ]]; then
|
|
# This is a list of OCSP responses, but only the first one is needed
|
|
# since the first one corresponds to the server's certificate.
|
|
ocsp_response_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
if [[ $ocsp_response_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len-8 ]] || [[ $ocsp_response_list_len -lt 6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
ocsp_response_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:8:6}")
|
|
if [[ $ocsp_response_len -gt $ocsp_response_list_len-6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
ocsp_resp_offset=14
|
|
fi
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE=""
|
|
if [[ $ocsp_response_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${tls_certificate_status_ascii:ocsp_resp_offset:ocsp_response_len}"
|
|
echo "OCSP response:" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ -n "$hostcert_issuer" ]]; then
|
|
hex2binary "$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce -CAfile $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem -issuer $hostcert_issuer -cert $HOSTCERT -respin /dev/stdin -resp_text >> $TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
else
|
|
hex2binary "$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL ocsp -respin /dev/stdin -resp_text >> $TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
echo "OCSP response: no response sent" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now parse the server key exchange message
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_ECDHE_ ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_ECDH_anon ]] || \
|
|
[[ $rfc_cipher_suite == ECDHE* ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == AECDH* ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt 6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
curve_type=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:2}")
|
|
if [[ $curve_type -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
# named_curve - the curve is identified by a 2-byte number
|
|
named_curve=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:2:4}")
|
|
# https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8
|
|
case $named_curve in
|
|
1) dh_bits=163 ; named_curve_str="K-163" ;;
|
|
2) dh_bits=162 ; named_curve_str="sect163r1" ;;
|
|
3) dh_bits=163 ; named_curve_str="B-163" ;;
|
|
4) dh_bits=193 ; named_curve_str="sect193r1" ;;
|
|
5) dh_bits=193 ; named_curve_str="sect193r2" ;;
|
|
6) dh_bits=232 ; named_curve_str="K-233" ;;
|
|
7) dh_bits=233 ; named_curve_str="B-233" ;;
|
|
8) dh_bits=238 ; named_curve_str="sect239k1" ;;
|
|
9) dh_bits=281 ; named_curve_str="K-283" ;;
|
|
10) dh_bits=282 ; named_curve_str="B-283" ;;
|
|
11) dh_bits=407 ; named_curve_str="K-409" ;;
|
|
12) dh_bits=409 ; named_curve_str="B-409" ;;
|
|
13) dh_bits=570 ; named_curve_str="K-571" ;;
|
|
14) dh_bits=570 ; named_curve_str="B-571" ;;
|
|
15) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160k1" ;;
|
|
16) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160r1" ;;
|
|
17) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160r2" ;;
|
|
18) dh_bits=192 ; named_curve_str="secp192k1" ;;
|
|
19) dh_bits=192 ; named_curve_str="P-192" ;;
|
|
20) dh_bits=225 ; named_curve_str="secp224k1" ;;
|
|
21) dh_bits=224 ; named_curve_str="P-224" ;;
|
|
22) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="secp256k1" ;;
|
|
23) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="P-256" ;;
|
|
24) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="P-384" ;;
|
|
25) dh_bits=521 ; named_curve_str="P-521" ;;
|
|
26) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP256r1" ;;
|
|
27) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP384r1" ;;
|
|
28) dh_bits=512 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP512r1" ;;
|
|
29) dh_bits=253 ; named_curve_str="X25519" ;;
|
|
30) dh_bits=448 ; named_curve_str="X448" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then
|
|
# Skip over the public key to get to the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
# This is TLS 1.2-only, as this field does not appear in earlier versions.
|
|
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:6:2}")
|
|
offset=$((len1+8))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ge $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
|
# The SignatureAndHashAlgorithm won't be present in an anonymous
|
|
# key exchange.
|
|
peering_signing_digest="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:2}"
|
|
peer_signature_type="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:$((offset+2)):2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && [[ $named_curve -ne 29 ]] && [[ $named_curve -ne 30 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_DHE_ ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_DH_anon ]] || \
|
|
[[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "DHE-"* ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "EDH-"* ]] || \
|
|
[[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "EXP1024-DHE-"* ]]; then
|
|
# For DH ephemeral keys the first field is p, and the length of
|
|
# p is the same as the length of the public key.
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:4}")
|
|
offset=4+$dh_p_len
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Subtract any leading 0 bytes
|
|
for (( i=4; i < offset; i+=2 )); do
|
|
[[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break
|
|
dh_p_len=$dh_p_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_p_len}"
|
|
|
|
dh_bits=4*$dh_p_len
|
|
msb=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}")
|
|
for (( mask=128; msb < mask; mask/=2 )); do
|
|
dh_bits=$dh_bits-1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
key_bitstring="$(get_dh_ephemeralkey "$tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && echo "$key_bitstring" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
# Check to see whether the ephemeral public key uses one of the groups from
|
|
# RFC 7919 for parameters
|
|
case $dh_bits in
|
|
2048) named_curve=256; named_curve_str=" ffdhe2048," ;;
|
|
3072) named_curve=257; named_curve_str=" ffdhe3072," ;;
|
|
4096) named_curve=258; named_curve_str=" ffdhe4096," ;;
|
|
6144) named_curve=259; named_curve_str=" ffdhe6144," ;;
|
|
8192) named_curve=260; named_curve_str=" ffdhe8192," ;;
|
|
*) named_curve=0; named_curve_str="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && named_curve=0 && named_curve_str=""
|
|
if "$HAS_PKEY" && [[ $named_curve -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ BEGIN ]]; then
|
|
ephemeral_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$key_bitstring")"
|
|
# OpenSSL 3.0.0 outputs the group name rather than the actual parameter values for some named groups.
|
|
if [[ "$ephemeral_param" =~ GROUP: ]]; then
|
|
ephemeral_param="${ephemeral_param#*GROUP: }"
|
|
rfc7919_param="${named_curve_str# }"
|
|
rfc7919_param="${rfc7919_param%,}"
|
|
[[ "$ephemeral_param" =~ $rfc7919_param ]] || named_curve_str=""
|
|
else
|
|
ephemeral_param="$(grep -EA 1000 "prime:|P:" <<< "$ephemeral_param")"
|
|
rfc7919_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" | grep -EA 1000 "prime:|P:")"
|
|
[[ "$ephemeral_param" != "$rfc7919_param" ]] && named_curve_str=""
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits"
|
|
[[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo "Server Temp Key: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then
|
|
# Skip over the public key (P, G, Y) to get to the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
# This is TLS 1.2-only, as this field does not appear in earlier versions.
|
|
offset=$((dh_p_len+4))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
offset+=$((len1+4))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
offset+=$((len1+4))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ge $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
|
# The SignatureAndHashAlgorithm won't be present in an anonymous
|
|
# key exchange.
|
|
peering_signing_digest="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:2}"
|
|
peer_signature_type="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:$((offset+2)):2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -eq 8 ]] && \
|
|
[[ 0x$peer_signature_type -ge 4 ]] && [[ 0x$peer_signature_type -le 11 ]] || \
|
|
[[ 0x$peer_signature_type -ge 26 ]] && [[ 0x$peer_signature_type -le 28 ]]; then
|
|
case $peer_signature_type in
|
|
04) peering_signing_digest="SHA256"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS-RSAE" ;;
|
|
05) peering_signing_digest="SHA384"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS-RSAE" ;;
|
|
06) peering_signing_digest="SHA512"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS-RSAE" ;;
|
|
07) peering_signing_digest=""; peer_signature_type="Ed25519" ;;
|
|
08) peering_signing_digest=""; peer_signature_type="Ed448" ;;
|
|
09) peering_signing_digest="SHA256"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS-PSS" ;;
|
|
0A) peering_signing_digest="SHA384"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS-PSS" ;;
|
|
0B) peering_signing_digest="SHA512"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS-PSS" ;;
|
|
1A) peering_signing_digest="SHA256"; peer_signature_type="ECDSA-BRAINPOOL" ;;
|
|
1B) peering_signing_digest="SHA384"; peer_signature_type="ECDSA-BRAINPOOL" ;;
|
|
1C) peering_signing_digest="SHA512"; peer_signature_type="ECDSA-BRAINPOOL" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ -n "$peering_signing_digest" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest"
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type\n"
|
|
elif [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -ge 1 ]] && [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -le 6 ]] && \
|
|
[[ 0x$peer_signature_type -ge 1 ]] && [[ 0x$peer_signature_type -le 3 ]]; then
|
|
case $peering_signing_digest in
|
|
01) peering_signing_digest="MD5" ;;
|
|
02) peering_signing_digest="SHA1" ;;
|
|
03) peering_signing_digest="SHA224" ;;
|
|
04) peering_signing_digest="SHA256" ;;
|
|
05) peering_signing_digest="SHA384" ;;
|
|
06) peering_signing_digest="SHA512" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
case $peer_signature_type in
|
|
01) peer_signature_type="RSA" ;;
|
|
02) peer_signature_type="DSA" ;;
|
|
03) peer_signature_type="ECDSA" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo "Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest"
|
|
echo "Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
|
|
TLS_SERVER_HELLO="02$(printf "%06x" $(( tls_serverhello_ascii_len/2)) )${tls_serverhello_ascii}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ASCII-HEX encoded session ticket
|
|
parse_tls13_new_session_ticket() {
|
|
local tls_version="$1"
|
|
local new_session_ticket="$2"
|
|
local -i len ticket_lifetime ticket_age_add min_len remainder
|
|
local ticket_nonce ticket extensions
|
|
local has_nonce=true
|
|
|
|
[[ "${new_session_ticket:0:2}" == 04 ]] || return 7
|
|
# Prior to draft 21 the NewSessionTicket did not include a ticket_nonce.
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -le 20 ]] && has_nonce=false
|
|
|
|
# Set min_len to the minimum length that a session ticket can be.
|
|
min_len=28
|
|
"$has_nonce" || min_len=$((min_len-2))
|
|
|
|
remainder=$((2*0x${new_session_ticket:2:6}))
|
|
[[ $remainder -ge $min_len ]] || return 7
|
|
[[ ${#new_session_ticket} -ge $((remainder + 8)) ]] || return 7
|
|
|
|
ticket_lifetime=0x${new_session_ticket:8:8}
|
|
ticket_age_add=0x${new_session_ticket:16:8}
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:24}"
|
|
remainder=$((remainder-16))
|
|
|
|
if "$has_nonce"; then
|
|
len=$((2*0x${new_session_ticket:0:2}))
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:2}"
|
|
[[ $remainder -ge $((len + 12)) ]] || return 7
|
|
ticket_nonce="${new_session_ticket:0:len}"
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:len}"
|
|
remainder=$((remainder-len-2))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
len=$((2*0x${new_session_ticket:0:4}))
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:4}"
|
|
[[ $remainder -ge $((len + 8)) ]] || return 7
|
|
ticket="${new_session_ticket:0:len}"
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:len}"
|
|
remainder=$((remainder-len-4))
|
|
|
|
len=$((2*0x${new_session_ticket:0:4}))
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:4}"
|
|
[[ $remainder -eq $((len + 4)) ]] || return 7
|
|
extensions="${new_session_ticket:0:len}"
|
|
|
|
echo " TLS session ticket lifetime hint: $ticket_lifetime (seconds)" > $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt $TMPFILE
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#arg1 (optional): list of ciphers suites or empty
|
|
#arg2 (optional): "true" if full server response should be parsed.
|
|
# return: 6: couldn't open socket, 3(!): sslv2 handshake succeeded, 0=no SSLv2
|
|
# 1,4,6,7: see return value of parse_sslv2_serverhello()
|
|
sslv2_sockets() {
|
|
local ret
|
|
local cipher_suites="$1"
|
|
local client_hello len_client_hello
|
|
local len_ciph_suites
|
|
local server_hello sock_reply_file2 foo
|
|
local -i len_ciph_suites_byte response_len server_hello_len
|
|
local parse_complete=false
|
|
|
|
# this could be empty so we use '=='
|
|
if [[ "$2" == true ]]; then
|
|
parse_complete=true
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$cipher_suites" ]]; then
|
|
cipher_suites="
|
|
05,00,80, # 1st cipher 9 cipher specs, only classical V2 ciphers are used here, see FIXME below
|
|
03,00,80, # 2nd there are v3 in v2!!! : https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101#appendix-E
|
|
01,00,80, # 3rd Cipher specifications introduced in version 3.0 can be included in version 2.0 client hello messages using
|
|
07,00,c0, # 4th the syntax below. [..] # V2CipherSpec (see Version 3.0 name) = { 0x00, CipherSuite }; !!!!
|
|
08,00,80, # 5th
|
|
06,00,40, # 6th
|
|
04,00,80, # 7th
|
|
02,00,80, # 8th
|
|
06,01,40, # 9
|
|
07,01,c0, # 10
|
|
FF,80,00, # 11
|
|
FF,80,10, # 12
|
|
00,00,00" # 13
|
|
# FIXME: also SSLv3 ciphers, see
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20170310142840/http://max.euston.net/d/tip_sslciphers.html
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
code2network "$cipher_suites" # convert CIPHER_SUITES
|
|
cipher_suites="$NW_STR" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next
|
|
len_ciph_suites_byte=${#cipher_suites}
|
|
|
|
len_ciph_suites_byte+=2
|
|
len_ciph_suites=$(printf "%02x\n" $(( len_ciph_suites_byte / 4 )))
|
|
len_client_hello=$(printf "%02x\n" $((0x$len_ciph_suites + 0x19)))
|
|
|
|
client_hello="
|
|
,80,$len_client_hello # length
|
|
,01 # Client Hello
|
|
,00,02 # SSLv2
|
|
,00,$len_ciph_suites # cipher spec length
|
|
,00,00 # session ID length
|
|
,00,10 # challenge length
|
|
,$cipher_suites
|
|
,29,22,be,b3,5a,01,8b,04,fe,5f,80,03,a0,13,eb,c4" # Challenge
|
|
# https://idea.popcount.org/2012-06-16-dissecting-ssl-handshake/ (client)
|
|
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 6
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend_clienthello "$client_hello"
|
|
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
if "$parse_complete"; then
|
|
if [[ -s "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
server_hello=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
server_hello_len=$((2 + $(hex2dec "${server_hello:1:3}") ))
|
|
foo="$(wc -c "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")"
|
|
response_len="${foo% *}"
|
|
for (( 1; response_len < server_hello_len; 1 )); do
|
|
sock_reply_file2=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.2
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... "
|
|
socksend "" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
|
|
[[ ! -s "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ]] && break
|
|
cat "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" >> "$sock_reply_file2"
|
|
mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
foo="$(wc -c "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")"
|
|
response_len="${foo% *}"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello... "
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -6
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
parse_sslv2_serverhello "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$parse_complete"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: supported groups extension
|
|
# arg2: "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages)
|
|
# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any)
|
|
# Given the supported groups extension, create a key_share extension that includes a key share for
|
|
# each group listed in the supported groups extension.
|
|
generate_key_share_extension() {
|
|
local supported_groups
|
|
local -i i len supported_groups_len group
|
|
local extn_len list_len
|
|
local key_share key_shares=""
|
|
local -i nr_key_shares=0
|
|
|
|
supported_groups="${1//\\x/}"
|
|
[[ "${supported_groups:0:4}" != "000a" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
supported_groups_len=${#supported_groups}
|
|
[[ $supported_groups_len -lt 16 ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:4:4}")
|
|
[[ $len+8 -ne $supported_groups_len ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:8:4}")
|
|
[[ $len+12 -ne $supported_groups_len ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
for (( i=12; i<supported_groups_len; i+=4 )); do
|
|
group=$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:i:4}")
|
|
# If the Supported groups extensions lists more than one group,
|
|
# then don't include the larger key shares in the extension.
|
|
[[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -gt 256 ]] && continue
|
|
|
|
# Versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 cannot perform operations
|
|
# with X25519 keys, so don't include the X25519 key share
|
|
# if the server's response needs to be decrypted and an
|
|
# older version of OpenSSL is being used.
|
|
[[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -eq 29 ]] && [[ "$2" == all ]] && ! "$HAS_X25519" && continue
|
|
|
|
# Versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1 cannot perform operations
|
|
# with X448 keys, so don't include the X448 key share
|
|
# if the server's response needs to be decrypted and an
|
|
# older version of OpenSSL is being used.
|
|
[[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -eq 30 ]] && [[ "$2" == all ]] && ! "$HAS_X448" && continue
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: The public keys could be extracted from the private keys
|
|
# (TLS13_KEY_SHARES) using $OPENSSL, but only OpenSSL 1.1.0 and newer can
|
|
# extract the public key from an X25519 private key, and only
|
|
# OpenSSL 1.1.1 can extract the public key from an X448 private key.
|
|
key_share="${TLS13_PUBLIC_KEY_SHARES[group]}"
|
|
if [[ ${#key_share} -gt 4 ]]; then
|
|
key_shares+=",$key_share"
|
|
nr_key_shares+=1
|
|
# Don't include more than two keys, so that the extension isn't too large.
|
|
[[ $nr_key_shares -ge 2 ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$key_shares" ]] && tm_out "" && return 0
|
|
|
|
len=${#key_shares}/3
|
|
list_len="$(printf "%04x" "$len")"
|
|
len+=2
|
|
extn_len="$(printf "%04x" "$len")"
|
|
tm_out "00,$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR,${extn_len:0:2},${extn_len:2:2},${list_len:0:2},${list_len:2:2}$key_shares"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ARG1: TLS version low byte (00: SSLv3, 01: TLS 1.0, 02: TLS 1.1, 03: TLS 1.2)
|
|
# ARG2: CIPHER_SUITES string (lowercase, and in the format output by code2network())
|
|
# ARG3: "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages)
|
|
# "all+" - same as "all", but do not offer any curves with TLSv1.3 that are not supported by
|
|
# $OPENSSL, since response MUST be decrypted.
|
|
# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any)
|
|
# ARG4: (optional) additional request extensions
|
|
# ARG5: (optional): "true" if ClientHello should advertise compression methods other than "NULL"
|
|
# ARG6: (optional): "false" if prepare_tls_clienthello() should not open a new socket
|
|
#
|
|
prepare_tls_clienthello() {
|
|
local tls_low_byte="$1" tls_legacy_version="$1"
|
|
local process_full="$3"
|
|
local new_socket=true
|
|
local tls_word_reclayer="03, 01" # the first TLS version number is the record layer and always 0301
|
|
# -- except: SSLv3 and second ClientHello after HelloRetryRequest
|
|
local servername_hexstr len_servername len_servername_hex
|
|
local hexdump_format_str part1 part2
|
|
local all_extensions=""
|
|
local -i i j len_ciph_suites_byte len_extension len_padding_extension len_all len_session_id
|
|
local len_sni_listlen len_sni_ext len_extension_hex len_padding_extension_hex
|
|
local cipher_suites len_ciph_suites len_ciph_suites_word
|
|
local len_client_hello_word len_all_word
|
|
local ecc_cipher_suite_found=false
|
|
local extension_signature_algorithms extension_heartbeat session_id
|
|
local extension_session_ticket extension_next_protocol
|
|
local extension_supported_groups="" extension_supported_point_formats=""
|
|
local extensions_key_share="" extn_type supported_groups_c2n="" extn_psk_mode=""
|
|
local extra_extensions extra_extensions_list="" extension_supported_versions=""
|
|
local offer_compression=false compression_methods
|
|
local padding_bytes="\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00"
|
|
|
|
# TLSv1.3 ClientHello messages MUST specify only the NULL compression method.
|
|
[[ "$5" == true ]] && [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -le "0x03" ]] && offer_compression=true
|
|
[[ "$6" == false ]] && new_socket=false
|
|
|
|
cipher_suites="$2" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next
|
|
len_ciph_suites_byte=${#cipher_suites}
|
|
len_ciph_suites_byte+=2
|
|
|
|
# we have additional 2 chars \x in each 2 byte string and 2 byte ciphers, so we need to divide by 4:
|
|
len_ciph_suites=$(printf "%02x\n" $(( len_ciph_suites_byte / 4 )))
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_ciph_suites"
|
|
len_ciph_suites_word="$LEN_STR"
|
|
#[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_ciph_suites_word
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
# Add extensions
|
|
|
|
# Check to see if any ECC cipher suites are included in cipher_suites
|
|
# (not needed for TLSv1.3)
|
|
if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len_ciph_suites_byte; i+=8 )); do
|
|
j=$i+4
|
|
part1="0x${cipher_suites:$i:2}"
|
|
part2="0x${cipher_suites:$j:2}"
|
|
if [[ "$part1" == 0xc0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$part2" -ge 0x01 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x19 ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x23 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x3b ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x48 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x4f ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x5c ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x63 ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x70 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x79 ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x86 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x8d ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x9a ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x9b ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0xac ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0xaf ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$part1" == 0xcc ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$part2" == 0xa8 ]] || [[ "$part2" == 0xa9 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$part2" == 0xac ]] || [[ "$part2" == 0x13 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$part2" == 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$SNI" ]]; then
|
|
#formatted example for SNI
|
|
#00 00 # extension server_name
|
|
#00 1a # length = the following +2 = server_name length + 5
|
|
#00 18 # server_name list_length = server_name length +3
|
|
#00 # server_name type (hostname)
|
|
#00 15 # server_name length
|
|
#66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 66 66 66 target.mydomain1.tld # server_name target
|
|
servername=${XMPP_HOST:-${NODE}}
|
|
len_servername=${#servername}
|
|
hexdump_format_str="$len_servername/1 \"%02x,\""
|
|
servername_hexstr=$(printf $servername | hexdump -v -e "${hexdump_format_str}" | sed 's/,$//')
|
|
# convert lengths we need to fill in from dec to hex:
|
|
len_servername_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_servername)
|
|
len_sni_listlen=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+3)))
|
|
len_sni_ext=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+5)))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -le 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
extension_signature_algorithms="
|
|
00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 5246 and RFC 8422
|
|
00, 30, 00,2e, # lengths
|
|
06,01, 06,02, 06,03, 05,01, 05,02, 05,03, 04,01, 04,02, 04,03,
|
|
03,01, 03,02, 03,03, 02,01, 02,02, 02,03,
|
|
08,04, 08,05, 08,06, 08,07, 08,08, 08,09, 08,0a, 08,0b"
|
|
else
|
|
extension_signature_algorithms="
|
|
00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 8446
|
|
00, 22, 00, 20, # lengths
|
|
04,03, 05,03, 06,03, 08,04, 08,05, 08,06,
|
|
04,01, 05,01, 06,01, 08,09, 08,0a, 08,0b,
|
|
08,07, 08,08, 02,01, 02,03"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
extension_heartbeat="
|
|
00, 0f, 00, 01, 01"
|
|
|
|
extension_session_ticket="
|
|
00, 23, 00, 00"
|
|
|
|
extension_next_protocol="
|
|
33, 74, 00, 00"
|
|
|
|
extn_psk_mode="
|
|
00, 2d, 00, 02, 01, 01"
|
|
|
|
if "$ecc_cipher_suite_found"; then
|
|
# Supported Groups Extension
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492
|
|
00, 42, 00, 40, # lengths
|
|
00, 0e, 00, 0d, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b,
|
|
00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08,
|
|
00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13,
|
|
00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11, 01, 00, 01, 01"
|
|
elif [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
# Supported Groups Extension
|
|
if [[ ! "$process_full" =~ all ]] || { "$HAS_X25519" && "$HAS_X448"; }; then
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,16, 00,14, # lengths
|
|
00,1d, 00,17, 00,1e, 00,18, 00,19, 00,1f, 00,20, 00,21,
|
|
01,00, 01,01"
|
|
# OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1 does not support X448, so list it as the least
|
|
# preferred option if the response needs to be decrypted, and do not
|
|
# list it at all if the response MUST be decrypted.
|
|
elif "$HAS_X25519" && [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]]; then
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,14, 00,12, # lengths
|
|
00,1d, 00,17, 00,18, 00,19, 00,1f, 00,20, 00,21,
|
|
01,00, 01,01"
|
|
elif "$HAS_X25519"; then
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,16, 00,14, # lengths
|
|
00,1d, 00,17, 00,18, 00,19, 00,1f, 00,20, 00,21,
|
|
01,00, 01,01, 00,1e"
|
|
# OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 does not support either X25519 or X448,
|
|
# so list them as the least referred options if the response
|
|
# needs to be decrypted, and do not list them at all if the
|
|
# response MUST be decrypted.
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]]; then
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,12, 00,10, # lengths
|
|
00,17, 00,18, 00,19, 00,1f, 00,20, 00,21,
|
|
01,00, 01,01"
|
|
else
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,16, 00,14, # lengths
|
|
00,17, 00,18, 00,19, 00,1f, 00,20, 00,21,
|
|
01,00, 01,01, 00,1d, 00,1e"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
code2network "$extension_supported_groups"
|
|
supported_groups_c2n="$NW_STR"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$ecc_cipher_suite_found" || [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
# Supported Point Formats Extension.
|
|
extension_supported_point_formats="
|
|
00, 0b, # Type: Supported Point Formats , see RFC 4492
|
|
00, 02, # len
|
|
01, 00"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Each extension should appear in the ClientHello at most once. So,
|
|
# find out what extensions were provided as an argument and only use
|
|
# the provided values for those extensions.
|
|
extra_extensions="$(tolower "$4")"
|
|
code2network "$extra_extensions"
|
|
len_all=${#NW_STR}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len_all; i+=16+4*0x$len_extension_hex )); do
|
|
part2=$i+4
|
|
extn_type="${NW_STR:i:2}${NW_STR:part2:2}"
|
|
extra_extensions_list+=" $extn_type "
|
|
j=$i+8
|
|
part2=$j+4
|
|
len_extension_hex="${NW_STR:j:2}${NW_STR:part2:2}"
|
|
if [[ "$extn_type" == "000a" ]] && [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
j=14+4*0x$len_extension_hex
|
|
supported_groups_c2n="${NW_STR:i:j}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
extensions_key_share="$(generate_key_share_extension "$supported_groups_c2n" "$process_full")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0000\ ]]; then
|
|
all_extensions="
|
|
00, 00 # extension server_name
|
|
,00, $len_sni_ext # length SNI EXT
|
|
,00, $len_sni_listlen # server_name list_length
|
|
,00 # server_name type (hostname)
|
|
,00, $len_servername_hex # server_name length. We assume len(hostname) < FF - 9
|
|
,$servername_hexstr" # server_name target
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -ge 0x04 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 002b\ ]]; then
|
|
# Add supported_versions extension listing all TLS/SSL versions
|
|
# from the one specified in $tls_low_byte to SSLv3.
|
|
for (( i=0x$tls_low_byte; i >=0; i=i-1 )); do
|
|
if [[ 0x$i -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
# FIXME: The ClientHello currently advertises support for various
|
|
# draft versions of TLSv1.3. Eventually it should only advertise
|
|
# support for the final version (0304).
|
|
if [[ "$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" == 33 ]]; then
|
|
extension_supported_versions+=", 03, 04, 7f, 1c, 7f, 1b, 7f, 1a, 7f, 19, 7f, 18, 7f, 17"
|
|
else
|
|
extension_supported_versions+=", 7f, 16, 7f, 15, 7f, 14, 7f, 13, 7f, 12"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
extension_supported_versions+=", 03, $(printf "%02x" $i)"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
# FIXME: Adjust the lengths ("+15" and "+14") when the draft versions of TLSv1.3 are removed.
|
|
if [[ "$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" == 33 ]]; then
|
|
all_extensions+="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+15))), $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+14)))$extension_supported_versions"
|
|
else
|
|
all_extensions+="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+11))), $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+10)))$extension_supported_versions"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# There does not seem to be any reason to include this extension. However, it appears that
|
|
# OpenSSL, Firefox, and Chrome include it in TLS 1.3 ClientHello messages, and there is at
|
|
# least one server that will fail the connection if it is absent
|
|
# (see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/990).
|
|
if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -ge 0x04 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 002d\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extn_psk_mode"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0023\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_session_ticket"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the ClientHello will include the ALPN extension, then don't include the NPN extension.
|
|
if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 3374\ ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0010\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_next_protocol"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# RFC 5246 says that clients MUST NOT offer the signature algorithms
|
|
# extension if they are offering TLS versions prior to 1.2.
|
|
if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -ge 0x03 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 000d\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_signature_algorithms"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$extension_supported_groups" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 000a\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_supported_groups"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$extensions_key_share" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extensions_key_share"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$extension_supported_point_formats" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 000b\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_supported_point_formats"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -ge 0x04 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 001b\ ]]; then
|
|
# If the response needs to be decrypted, then indicate support
|
|
# for ZLIB certificate compression if $OPENSSL can decompress
|
|
# the result. If the response does not need to be decrypted,
|
|
# then indicate support for all certificate compression methods,
|
|
# as the response does not need to be decompressed.
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_ZLIB"; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="00,1b,00,03,02,00,01"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="00,1b,00,07,06,00,01,00,02,00,03"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$extra_extensions" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extra_extensions"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Make sure that a non-empty extension goes last (either heartbeat or padding).
|
|
# See PR #792 and https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg19720.html.
|
|
if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 000f\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_heartbeat"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
code2network "$all_extensions" # convert extensions
|
|
all_extensions="$NW_STR" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next
|
|
len_extension=${#all_extensions}
|
|
len_extension+=2
|
|
len_extension=$len_extension/4
|
|
len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension)
|
|
|
|
# If the length of the Client Hello would be between 256 and 511 bytes,
|
|
# then add a padding extension (see RFC 7685)
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + 0x2b + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2))
|
|
"$offer_compression" && len_all+=2
|
|
[[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]] && len_all+=32 # TLSv1.3 ClientHello includes a 32-byte session id
|
|
if [[ $len_all -ge 256 ]] && [[ $len_all -le 511 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0015\ ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $len_all -ge 508 ]]; then
|
|
len_padding_extension=1 # Final extension cannot be empty: see PR #792
|
|
else
|
|
len_padding_extension=$((508 - len_all))
|
|
fi
|
|
len_padding_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_padding_extension)
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_padding_extension_hex"
|
|
all_extensions+="\\x00\\x15\\x${LEN_STR:0:2}\\x${LEN_STR:4:2}${padding_bytes:0:$((4*len_padding_extension))}"
|
|
len_extension=$len_extension+$len_padding_extension+0x4
|
|
len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension)
|
|
elif [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0015\ ]] && [[ $((len_all%256)) -eq 10 || $((len_all%256)) -eq 14 ]]; then
|
|
# Some servers fail if the length of the ClientHello is 522, 778, 1034, 1290, ... bytes.
|
|
# A few servers also fail if the length is 526, 782, 1038, 1294, ... bytes.
|
|
# So, if the ClientHello would be one of these length, add a 5-byte padding extension.
|
|
all_extensions+="\\x00\\x15\\x00\\x01\\x00"
|
|
len_extension+=5
|
|
len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension)
|
|
fi
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_extension_hex"
|
|
all_extensions="
|
|
,$LEN_STR # first the len of all extensions.
|
|
,$all_extensions"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
# TLSv1.3 calls for sending a random 32-byte session id in middlebox compatibility mode.
|
|
session_id="20,44,b8,92,56,af,74,52,9e,d8,cf,52,14,c8,af,d8,34,0b,e7,7f,eb,86,01,84,50,5d,e4,a1,6a,09,3b,bf,6e"
|
|
len_session_id=32
|
|
else
|
|
session_id="00"
|
|
len_session_id=0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# RFC 3546 doesn't specify SSLv3 to have SNI, openssl just ignores the switch if supplied
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x27))
|
|
else
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x27 + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2))
|
|
fi
|
|
"$offer_compression" && len_all+=2
|
|
len2twobytes $(printf "%02x\n" $len_all)
|
|
len_client_hello_word="$LEN_STR"
|
|
#[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_client_hello_word
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x2b))
|
|
else
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x2b + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2))
|
|
fi
|
|
"$offer_compression" && len_all+=2
|
|
len2twobytes $(printf "%02x\n" $len_all)
|
|
len_all_word="$LEN_STR"
|
|
#[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_all_word
|
|
|
|
# if we have SSLv3, the first occurrence of TLS protocol -- record layer -- is SSLv3, otherwise TLS 1.0,
|
|
# except in the case of a second ClientHello in TLS 1.3, in which case it is TLS 1.2.
|
|
[[ $tls_low_byte == "00" ]] && tls_word_reclayer="03, 00"
|
|
|
|
[[ 0x$tls_legacy_version -ge 0x04 ]] && tls_legacy_version="03"
|
|
|
|
if "$offer_compression"; then
|
|
# See https://www.iana.org/assignments/comp-meth-ids/comp-meth-ids.xhtml#comp-meth-ids-2
|
|
compression_methods="03,01,40,00" # Offer NULL, DEFLATE, and LZS compression
|
|
else
|
|
compression_methods="01,00" # Only offer NULL compression (0x00)
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="
|
|
# TLS header ( 5 bytes)
|
|
,16, $tls_word_reclayer # TLS Version: in wireshark this is always 01 for TLS 1.0-1.2
|
|
,$len_all_word # Length <---
|
|
# Handshake header:
|
|
,01 # Type (x01 for ClientHello)
|
|
,00, $len_client_hello_word # Length ClientHello
|
|
,03, $tls_legacy_version # TLS version ClientHello
|
|
,54, 51, 1e, 7a # Unix time since see www.moserware.com/2009/06/first-few-milliseconds-of-https.html
|
|
,de, ad, be, ef # Random 28 bytes
|
|
,31, 33, 07, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00
|
|
,cf, bd, 39, 04, cc, 16, 0b, 85
|
|
,03, 90, 9f, 77, 04, 33, d4, de
|
|
,$session_id
|
|
,$len_ciph_suites_word # Cipher suites length
|
|
,$cipher_suites
|
|
,$compression_methods"
|
|
|
|
if "$new_socket"; then
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend_clienthello "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO$all_extensions" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="$(tolower "$NW_STR")"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x0\\/\\x00\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x1\\/\\x01\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x2\\/\\x02\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x3\\/\\x03\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x4\\/\\x04\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x5\\/\\x05\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x6\\/\\x06\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x7\\/\\x07\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x8\\/\\x08\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x9\\/\\x09\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xa\\/\\x0a\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xb\\/\\x0b\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xc\\/\\x0c\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xd\\/\\x0d\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xe\\/\\x0e\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xf\\/\\x0f\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x/}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:10}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: The original ClientHello
|
|
# arg2: The server's response
|
|
# Return 0 if the response is not a HelloRetryRequest.
|
|
# Return 1 if the response is a malformed HelloRetryRequest or if a new ClientHello cannot be sent.
|
|
# Return 2 if the response is a HelloRetryRequest, and sending a new ClientHello succeeded.
|
|
# Return 6 if the response is a HelloRetryRequest, and sending a new ClientHello failed.
|
|
resend_if_hello_retry_request() {
|
|
local original_clienthello="$1"
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii="$2"
|
|
local msg_type server_version cipher_suite rfc_cipher_suite
|
|
local key_share="" new_key_share="" cookie="" second_clienthello data=""
|
|
local -i i j msg_len tls_hello_ascii_len sid_len
|
|
local -i extns_offset hrr_extns_len len_extn
|
|
local extn_type
|
|
local sha256_hrr="CF21AD74E59A6111BE1D8C021E65B891C2A211167ABB8C5E079E09E2C8A8339C"
|
|
|
|
tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii}
|
|
# A HelloRetryRequest is at least 13 bytes long
|
|
[[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 26 ]] && return 0
|
|
# A HelloRetryRequest is a handshake message (16) with a major record version of 03.
|
|
[[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" != 1603 ]] && return 0
|
|
msg_type="${tls_hello_ascii:10:2}"
|
|
if [[ "$msg_type" == 02 ]]; then
|
|
# A HRR is a ServerHello with a Random value equal to the
|
|
# SHA-256 hash of "HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
[[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 76 ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ "${tls_hello_ascii:22:64}" != $sha256_hrr ]] && return 0
|
|
elif [[ "$msg_type" != 06 ]]; then
|
|
# The handshake type for hello_retry_request in draft versions was 06.
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# This appears to be a HelloRetryRequest message.
|
|
debugme echo "reading hello retry request... "
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6
|
|
echo
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$tls_hello_ascii" # one line without any blanks
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check the length of the handshake message
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:6:4}")
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-10 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# The HelloRetryRequest message may be followed by something
|
|
# else (e.g., a change cipher spec message). Ignore anything
|
|
# that follows.
|
|
tls_hello_ascii_len=$msg_len+10
|
|
|
|
# Check the length of the HelloRetryRequest message.
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:12:6}")
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -ne $tls_hello_ascii_len-18 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$msg_type" == 06 ]]; then
|
|
server_version="${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
if [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f13 ]]; then
|
|
# Starting with TLSv1.3 draft 19, a HelloRetryRequest is at least 15 bytes long
|
|
[[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 30 ]] && return 0
|
|
cipher_suite="${tls_hello_ascii:22:2},${tls_hello_ascii:24:2}"
|
|
extns_offset=26
|
|
else
|
|
extns_offset=22
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:86:2}")
|
|
i=88+$sid_len
|
|
j=90+$sid_len
|
|
cipher_suite="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2},${tls_hello_ascii:j:2}"
|
|
extns_offset=94+$sid_len
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check the length of the extensions.
|
|
hrr_extns_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:extns_offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ $hrr_extns_len -ne $tls_hello_ascii_len-$extns_offset-4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Parse HelloRetryRequest extensions
|
|
for (( i=extns_offset+4; i < tls_hello_ascii_len; i+=8+len_extn )); do
|
|
extn_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
j=$i+4
|
|
len_extn=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}")
|
|
j+=4
|
|
if [[ $len_extn -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-$j ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$extn_type" == 002C ]]; then
|
|
# If the HRR includes a cookie extension, then it needs to be
|
|
# included in the next ClientHello.
|
|
j=8+$len_extn
|
|
cookie="${tls_hello_ascii:i:j}"
|
|
elif [[ "$extn_type" == 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR ]]; then
|
|
# If the HRR includes a key_share extension, then it specifies the
|
|
# group to be used in the next ClientHello. So, create a key_share
|
|
# extension that specifies this group.
|
|
if [[ $len_extn -ne 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed key share extension in HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
key_share="${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}"
|
|
new_key_share="$(generate_key_share_extension "000a00040002$key_share" "ephemeralkey")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
[[ -z "$new_key_share" ]] && return 1
|
|
new_key_share="${new_key_share//,/}"
|
|
elif [[ "$extn_type" == 002B ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $len_extn -ne 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed supported versions extension in HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
server_version="${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo "TLS message fragments:"
|
|
echo " tls_protocol (reclyr): 0x${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}"
|
|
echo " tls_content_type: 0x16 (handshake)"
|
|
echo " msg_len: $(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:6:4}")"
|
|
echo
|
|
echo "TLS handshake message:"
|
|
echo -n " handshake type: 0x$msg_type "
|
|
case "$msg_type" in
|
|
02) echo "(hello_retry_request formatted as server_hello)" ;;
|
|
06) echo "(hello_retry_request)" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo " msg_len: $(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:12:6}")"
|
|
echo
|
|
echo "TLS hello retry request message:"
|
|
echo " server version: $server_version"
|
|
if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f13 ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " cipher suite: $cipher_suite"
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${cipher_suite:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${cipher_suite:3:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${cipher_suite:0:2}${cipher_suite:3:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${cipher_suite:0:2},0x${cipher_suite:3:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')"
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${cipher_suite:0:2},0x${cipher_suite:3:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher_suite" ]]; then
|
|
echo " ($rfc_cipher_suite)"
|
|
else
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$key_share" ]] && echo " key share: 0x$key_share"
|
|
[[ -n "$cookie" ]] && echo " cookie: $cookie"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Starting with TLSv1.3 draft 24, the second ClientHello should specify a record layer version of 0x0303
|
|
if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f18 ]]; then
|
|
original_clienthello="160303${original_clienthello:6}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f16 ]]; then
|
|
# Send a dummy change cipher spec for middlebox compatibility.
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending dummy change cipher spec... "
|
|
socksend ", x14, x03, x03 ,x00, x01, x01" 0
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending second client hello... "
|
|
second_clienthello="$(modify_clienthello "$original_clienthello" "$new_key_share" "$cookie")"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${second_clienthello:10}"
|
|
msg_len=${#second_clienthello}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < msg_len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
data+=", ${second_clienthello:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend_clienthello "$data" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
return 2
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS version low byte
|
|
# (00: SSLv3, 01: TLS 1.0, 02: TLS 1.1, 03: TLS 1.2)
|
|
# arg2: (optional) list of cipher suites
|
|
# arg3: (optional): "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages)
|
|
# "all+" - same as "all", but do not offer any curves with TLSv1.3 that are not supported by
|
|
# $OPENSSL, since response MUST be decrypted.
|
|
# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any)
|
|
# arg4: (optional) additional request extensions
|
|
# arg5: (optional) "true" if ClientHello should advertise compression methods other than "NULL"
|
|
# arg6: (optional) "false" if the connection should not be closed before the function returns.
|
|
# return: 0: successful connect | 1: protocol or cipher not available | 2: as (0) but downgraded
|
|
# 6: couldn't open socket | 7: couldn't open temp file
|
|
tls_sockets() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local -i save=0
|
|
local lines
|
|
local tls_low_byte
|
|
local cipher_list_2send
|
|
local sock_reply_file2 sock_reply_file3
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii next_packet post_finished_msg=""
|
|
local clienthello1 original_clienthello hrr=""
|
|
local process_full="$3" offer_compression=false skip=false
|
|
local close_connection=true include_headers=true
|
|
local -i i len msg_len tag_len hello_done=0 seq_num=0
|
|
local cipher="" tls_version handshake_secret="" res
|
|
local initial_msg_transcript msg_transcript finished_msg aad="" data="" plaintext
|
|
local handshake_traffic_keys key iv finished_key
|
|
local master_secret master_traffic_keys
|
|
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO=""
|
|
[[ "$5" == true ]] && offer_compression=true
|
|
[[ "$6" == false ]] && close_connection=false
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]] && [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_new_session_ticket.txt" ]]; then
|
|
rm "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_new_session_ticket.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_low_byte="$1"
|
|
if [[ -n "$2" ]]; then # use supplied string in arg2 if there is one
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$2"
|
|
else # otherwise use std ciphers then
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$TLS12_CIPHER"
|
|
else
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
code2network "$(tolower "$cipher_list_2send")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$NW_STR"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending client hello... "
|
|
prepare_tls_clienthello "$tls_low_byte" "$cipher_list_2send" "$process_full" "$4" "$offer_compression"
|
|
ret=$? # 6 means opening socket didn't succeed, e.g. timeout
|
|
|
|
# if sending didn't succeed we don't bother
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
clienthello1="$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO"
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
"$TLS_DIFFTIME_SET" && TLS_NOW=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s")
|
|
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%140303000101}"
|
|
|
|
# Check if the response is a HelloRetryRequest.
|
|
original_clienthello="160301$(printf "%04x" "${#clienthello1}")$clienthello1"
|
|
resend_if_hello_retry_request "$original_clienthello" "$tls_hello_ascii"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
hrr="${tls_hello_ascii:10}"
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]] || [[ $ret -eq 6 ]]; then
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd
|
|
return $ret
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# The server's response may span more than one packet. If only the
|
|
# first part of the response needs to be processed, this isn't an
|
|
# issue. However, if the entire response needs to be processed or
|
|
# if the ephemeral key is needed (which comes last for TLS 1.2 and
|
|
# below), then we need to check if response appears to be complete,
|
|
# and if it isn't then try to get another packet from the server.
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then
|
|
hello_done=1; skip=true
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( 1 ; hello_done==1; 1 )); do
|
|
if ! "$skip"; then
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
sock_reply_file2=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... "
|
|
socksend "" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
|
|
next_packet=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
next_packet="${next_packet%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ${#next_packet} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# This shouldn't be necessary. However, it protects against
|
|
# getting into an infinite loop if the server has nothing
|
|
# left to send and check_tls_serverhellodone doesn't
|
|
# correctly catch it.
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
hello_done=0
|
|
else
|
|
tls_hello_ascii+="$next_packet"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
sock_reply_file3=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file3"
|
|
mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
cat "$sock_reply_file3" >> "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
rm "$sock_reply_file3"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
skip=false
|
|
if [[ $hello_done -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
res="$(check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "$process_full" "$cipher" "$handshake_secret" "$initial_msg_transcript")"
|
|
hello_done=$?
|
|
if [[ "$hello_done" -eq 0 ]] && [[ -n "$res" ]]; then
|
|
read -r msg_transcript tls_hello_ascii post_finished_msg <<< "$res"
|
|
if [[ -n "$post_finished_msg" ]]; then
|
|
# Determine TLS version
|
|
tls_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then
|
|
tls_version="${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4}"
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[0-9A-F] ]]; then
|
|
tls_version="${BASH_REMATCH:8:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
|
|
# Compute application traffic keys and IVs.
|
|
master_secret="$(derive-master-secret "$cipher" "$handshake_secret")"
|
|
master_traffic_keys="$(derive-application-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$master_secret" "$msg_transcript" client)"
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="$master_traffic_keys 0"
|
|
master_traffic_keys="$(derive-application-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$master_secret" "$msg_transcript" server)"
|
|
read -r key iv finished_key <<< "$master_traffic_keys"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
len=${#post_finished_msg}
|
|
[[ $len -ge 10 ]] || break
|
|
[[ "${post_finished_msg:0:5}" == 17030 ]] || break
|
|
msg_len=$((2*0x${post_finished_msg:6:4}))
|
|
[[ $len -ge $((msg_len+10)) ]] || break
|
|
aad="${post_finished_msg:0:10}"
|
|
"$include_headers" || aad=""
|
|
plaintext="$(sym-decrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$(get-nonce "$iv" "$seq_num")" "${post_finished_msg:10:msg_len}" "$aad")"
|
|
|
|
# Remove zeros from end of plaintext, if any
|
|
len=${#plaintext}-2
|
|
while [[ "${plaintext:len:2}" == 00 ]]; do
|
|
len=$((len-2))
|
|
done
|
|
tls_hello_ascii+="${plaintext:len:2}0301$(printf "%04X" $((len/2)))${plaintext:0:len}"
|
|
post_finished_msg="${post_finished_msg:$((msg_len+10))}"
|
|
seq_num+=1
|
|
done
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="$tls_version $cipher $master_traffic_keys $seq_num $APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO"
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="$(toupper "$tls_hello_ascii")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$hello_done" -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
hello_done=1; skip=true
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello..."
|
|
parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
if [[ "$ret" -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$ret" -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
if [[ -n "$hrr" ]]; then
|
|
initial_msg_transcript="$(create-initial-transcript "$cipher" "$clienthello1" "$hrr" "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO" "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO")"
|
|
else
|
|
initial_msg_transcript="$(create-initial-transcript "$cipher" "" "" "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO" "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO")"
|
|
fi
|
|
handshake_secret="$(derive-handshake-secret "$cipher" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && hello_done=2
|
|
else
|
|
hello_done=2
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello..."
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6
|
|
echo
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "$process_full" "$cipher_list_2send"
|
|
save=$?
|
|
if "$close_connection" && [[ $save == 0 ]]; then
|
|
send_close_notify "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
# see https://secure.wand.net.nz/trac/libprotoident/wiki/SSL
|
|
lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" 2>$ERRFILE)")
|
|
tm_out " ($lines lines returned) "
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$close_connection" && [[ $save == 0 ]] && \
|
|
[[ -n "$handshake_secret" ]] && [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]]; then
|
|
tls_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then
|
|
tls_version="${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4}"
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[0-9A-F] ]]; then
|
|
tls_version="${BASH_REMATCH:8:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
|
|
handshake_traffic_keys="$(derive-handshake-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$handshake_secret" "$initial_msg_transcript" "client")"
|
|
read -r key iv finished_key <<< "$handshake_traffic_keys"
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
finished_msg="14000020$(hmac-transcript "-sha256" "$finished_key" "$msg_transcript")"
|
|
else
|
|
finished_msg="14000030$(hmac-transcript "-sha384" "$finished_key" "$msg_transcript")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CCM_8 ]] && tag_len=8 || tag_len=16
|
|
aad="170303$(printf "%04X" "$(( ${#finished_msg}/2 + tag_len + 1 ))")"
|
|
if "$include_headers"; then
|
|
# The header information was added to additional data in TLSv1.3 draft 25.
|
|
finished_msg="$(sym-encrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$(get-nonce "$iv" 0)" "${finished_msg}16" "$aad")"
|
|
else
|
|
finished_msg="$(sym-encrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$(get-nonce "$iv" 0)" "${finished_msg}16" "")"
|
|
fi
|
|
finished_msg="$aad$finished_msg"
|
|
|
|
len=${#finished_msg}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
data+=", ${finished_msg:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nsending finished..."
|
|
socksend_clienthello "${data}"
|
|
sleep $USLEEP_SND
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO" ]]; then
|
|
# Compute application traffic keys and IVs.
|
|
master_secret="$(derive-master-secret "$cipher" "$handshake_secret")"
|
|
master_traffic_keys="$(derive-application-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$master_secret" "$msg_transcript" server)"
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="$tls_version $cipher $master_traffic_keys 0 "
|
|
master_traffic_keys="$(derive-application-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$master_secret" "$msg_transcript" client)"
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO+="$master_traffic_keys 0"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Some servers send new session tickets as soon as the handshake is complete.
|
|
receive_app_data
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ -s $TMPFILE ]] && echo -n "Unexpected response: " && cat "$TMPFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] &&[[ "$process_full" == all+ ]] && [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_new_session_ticket.txt" ]]; then
|
|
echo -en "\nTicket: " && cat "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_new_session_ticket.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# determine the return value for higher level, so that they can tell what the result is
|
|
if [[ $save -eq 1 ]] || [[ $lines -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
ret=1 # NOT available
|
|
elif [[ $save -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
# only for IMAP currently 'a002 NO Starttls'
|
|
ret=3
|
|
elif [[ $save -eq 8 ]]; then
|
|
# odd return, we just pass this from parse_tls_serverhello() back
|
|
ret=8
|
|
elif [[ $save -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
# STARTTLS problem passing back
|
|
ret=4
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ 03$tls_low_byte -eq $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION ]]; then
|
|
ret=0 # protocol available, TLS version returned equal to the one send
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -n "protocol send: 0x03$tls_low_byte, returned: 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
ret=2 # protocol NOT available, server downgraded to $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo "stuck on sending: $ret"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$close_connection" && close_socket 5
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Send application data over a TLS 1.3 channel that has already been created.
|
|
send_app_data() {
|
|
local plaintext="$1"
|
|
local tls_version cipher client_key client_iv server_key server_iv
|
|
local aad res data
|
|
local -i i client_seq server_seq tag_len len
|
|
local include_headers=true
|
|
|
|
read -r tls_version cipher server_key server_iv server_seq client_key client_iv client_seq <<< "$APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO"
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CCM_8 ]] && tag_len=8 || tag_len=16
|
|
|
|
aad="170303$(printf "%04X" "$(( ${#plaintext}/2 + tag_len + 1 ))")"
|
|
if "$include_headers"; then
|
|
res="$(sym-encrypt "$cipher" "$client_key" "$(get-nonce "$client_iv" $client_seq)" "${plaintext}17" "$aad")"
|
|
else
|
|
res="$(sym-encrypt "$cipher" "$client_key" "$(get-nonce "$client_iv" $client_seq)" "${plaintext}17" "")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || return 1
|
|
client_seq+=1
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="$tls_version $cipher $server_key $server_iv $server_seq $client_key $client_iv $client_seq"
|
|
|
|
res="$aad$res"
|
|
len=${#res}
|
|
data=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
data+=",x${res:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
socksend "$data" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Receive application data from a TLS 1.3 channel that has already been created.
|
|
# arg1: true if only the first block of application data should be decrypted.
|
|
# This can save a lot of time if the server sends a lot a data (e.g., a
|
|
# big home page), but only the first part of the data is needed. However,
|
|
# no further data may be received over this connection as the message
|
|
# sequence number will not be correct.
|
|
receive_app_data() {
|
|
local plaintext=""
|
|
local tls_version cipher client_key client_iv server_key server_iv
|
|
local aad ciphertext="" res="" data
|
|
local -i client_seq server_seq len msg_len
|
|
local include_headers=true
|
|
local first_block_only=false
|
|
|
|
[[ "$1" == true ]] && first_block_only=true
|
|
|
|
read -r tls_version cipher server_key server_iv server_seq client_key client_iv client_seq <<< "$APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO"
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
|
|
sleep $USLEEP_REC
|
|
while true; do
|
|
len=${#ciphertext}
|
|
if [[ $len -ge 10 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${ciphertext:0:5}" == 17030 ]] || break
|
|
msg_len=$((2*0x${ciphertext:6:4}))
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $len -lt 10 ]] || [[ $len -lt $((msg_len+10)) ]]; then
|
|
if "$FAST_SOCKET"; then
|
|
res="$(sockread_fast 32768)"
|
|
else
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
res="$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
res="${res%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
[[ -z "$res" ]] && break
|
|
ciphertext+="$res"
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
"$include_headers" && aad="${ciphertext:0:10}" || aad=""
|
|
data="$(sym-decrypt "$cipher" "$server_key" "$(get-nonce "$server_iv" "$server_seq")" "${ciphertext:10:msg_len}" "$aad")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || return 1
|
|
|
|
len=${#data}-2
|
|
while [[ "${data:len:2}" == 00 ]]; do
|
|
len=$((len-2))
|
|
done
|
|
content_type="${data:len:2}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$content_type" == 16 ]] && [[ "${data:0:2}" == 04 ]]; then
|
|
# This is a new_session_ticket
|
|
parse_tls13_new_session_ticket "$tls_version" "${data:0:len}"
|
|
elif [[ "$content_type" == 17 ]]; then
|
|
# This really is application data.
|
|
plaintext+="${data:0:len}"
|
|
"$first_block_only" && break
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphertext=${ciphertext:$((msg_len+10))}
|
|
server_seq+=1
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphertext" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="$tls_version $cipher $server_key $server_iv $server_seq $client_key $client_iv $client_seq"
|
|
hex2binary "$plaintext" > "$TMPFILE"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
####### Vulnerabilities follow #######
|
|
# General overview which browser "supports" which vulnerability:
|
|
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Web_browsers
|
|
|
|
# mainly adapted from https://gist.github.com/takeshixx/10107280
|
|
#
|
|
run_heartbleed(){
|
|
local tls_hexcode
|
|
local heartbleed_payload
|
|
local -i n lines_returned
|
|
local append=""
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii=""
|
|
local jsonID="heartbleed"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-0160"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-119"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for heartbleed vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " Heartbleed"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]] && determine_tls_extensions
|
|
if [[ ! "${TLS_EXTENSIONS}" =~ heartbeat ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no heartbeat extension"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no heartbeat extension" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x01"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x02"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x03"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x00"
|
|
else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in
|
|
*1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03" ; add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
*1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02" ; add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01" ; add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00" ; add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode"
|
|
|
|
heartbleed_payload=", x18, $tls_hexcode, x00, x03, x01, x40, x00"
|
|
tls_sockets "${tls_hexcode:6:2}" "" "ephemeralkey" "" "" "false"
|
|
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && tmln_out "\nsending payload with TLS version $tls_hexcode:"
|
|
socksend "$heartbleed_payload" 1
|
|
sockread 16384 $HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
append=", timed out"
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$append"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $append" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
# server reply should be (>=SSLv3): 18030x in case of a heartBEAT reply -- which we take as a positive result
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
debugme echo "tls_content_type: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}"
|
|
debugme echo "tls_protocol: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}"
|
|
|
|
lines_returned=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -ve '16/1 "%02x " " \n"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")")
|
|
debugme echo "lines HB reply: $lines_returned"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out "\nheartbleed reply: "
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20
|
|
[[ $lines_returned -gt 20 ]] && tmln_out "[...]"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $lines_returned -gt 1 ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" == 1803 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ ftp ]]; then
|
|
# check possibility of weird vsftpd reply, see #426, despite "1803" seems very unlikely...
|
|
if grep -q '500 OOPS' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ; then
|
|
append=", successful weeded out vsftpd false positive"
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$append"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $append" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out "likely "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -lt 3 ]] && tm_out ", use debug >=3 to confirm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to Heartbleed"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# helper function
|
|
ok_ids(){
|
|
prln_svrty_best "\n ok -- something reset our ccs packets"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
|
|
# mainly adapted from Ramon de C Valle's C code from https://gist.github.com/rcvalle/71f4b027d61a78c42607
|
|
#FIXME: At a certain point ccs needs to be changed and make use of code2network using a file, then tls_sockets
|
|
#
|
|
run_ccs_injection(){
|
|
local tls_hexcode ccs_message client_hello byte6
|
|
local -i retval ret=0
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii=""
|
|
local jsonID="CCS"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-0224"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CCS injection vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " CCS"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x01"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x02"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x03"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x00"
|
|
else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in
|
|
*1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03" ; add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
*1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02" ; add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01" ; add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00" ; add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode"
|
|
|
|
ccs_message=", x14, $tls_hexcode ,x00, x01, x01"
|
|
|
|
client_hello="
|
|
# TLS header (5 bytes)
|
|
,x16, # content type (x16 for handshake)
|
|
x03, x01, # TLS version in record layer is always TLS 1.0 (except SSLv3)
|
|
x00, x93, # length
|
|
# Handshake header
|
|
x01, # type (x01 for ClientHello)
|
|
x00, x00, x8f, # length
|
|
$tls_hexcode, # TLS version
|
|
# Random (32 byte)
|
|
x53, x43, x5b, x90, x9d, x9b, x72, x0b,
|
|
xbc, x0c, xbc, x2b, x92, xa8, x48, x97,
|
|
xcf, xbd, x39, x04, xcc, x16, x0b, x85,
|
|
x03, x90, x9f, x77, x04, x33, xd4, xde,
|
|
x00, # session ID length
|
|
x00, x68, # cipher suites length
|
|
# Cipher suites (51 suites)
|
|
xc0, x13, xc0, x12, xc0, x11, xc0, x10,
|
|
xc0, x0f, xc0, x0e, xc0, x0d, xc0, x0c,
|
|
xc0, x0b, xc0, x0a, xc0, x09, xc0, x08,
|
|
xc0, x07, xc0, x06, xc0, x05, xc0, x04,
|
|
xc0, x03, xc0, x02, xc0, x01, x00, x39,
|
|
x00, x38, x00, x37, x00, x36, x00, x35, x00, x34,
|
|
x00, x33, x00, x32, x00, x31, x00, x30,
|
|
x00, x2f, x00, x16, x00, x15, x00, x14,
|
|
x00, x13, x00, x12, x00, x11, x00, x10,
|
|
x00, x0f, x00, x0e, x00, x0d, x00, x0c,
|
|
x00, x0b, x00, x0a, x00, x09, x00, x08,
|
|
x00, x07, x00, x06, x00, x05, x00, x04,
|
|
x00, x03, x00, x02, x00, x01, x01, x00"
|
|
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 1
|
|
|
|
# we now make a standard handshake ...
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend "$client_hello" 1
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello... "
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20
|
|
tmln_out "[...]"
|
|
tm_out "\nsending payload #1 with TLS version $tls_hexcode: "
|
|
fi
|
|
rm "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
# ... and then send the change cipher spec message
|
|
socksend "$ccs_message" 1 || ok_ids
|
|
sockread 4096 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out "\n1st reply: "
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
tm_out "sending payload #2 with TLS version $tls_hexcode: "
|
|
fi
|
|
rm "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
|
|
socksend "$ccs_message" 2 || ok_ids
|
|
sockread 4096 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
retval=$?
|
|
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
byte6="${tls_hello_ascii:12:2}"
|
|
debugme echo "tls_content_type: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2} | tls_protocol: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4} | byte6: $byte6"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out "\n2nd reply: "
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# in general, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Alert_protocol
|
|
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2
|
|
#
|
|
# not ok for CCSI: 15 | 0301 | 00 02 | 02 15
|
|
# ALERT | TLS 1.0 | Length=2 | Decryption failed (21)
|
|
#
|
|
# ok: nothing: ==> RST
|
|
#
|
|
# 0A: Unexpected message
|
|
# 28: Handshake failure
|
|
if [[ -z "${tls_hello_ascii:0:12}" ]]; then
|
|
# empty reply
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
if [[ $retval -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable (timed out)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" == "1503" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ! "${tls_hello_ascii:5:2}" =~ [03|02|01|00] ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "test failed "
|
|
out "no proper TLS reply (debug info: protocol sent: 1503${tls_hexcode#x03, x}, reply: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:14}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around line $LINENO, debug info (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
elif [[ "$byte6" == "15" ]]; then
|
|
# decryption failed received
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to CCS injection"
|
|
elif [[ "$byte6" == "0A" ]] || [[ "$byte6" == "28" ]]; then
|
|
# Unexpected message / Handshake failure received
|
|
pr_warning "likely "
|
|
out "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
out " - alert description type: $byte6"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "probably not vulnerable but received 0x${byte6} instead of 0x15" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
elif [[ "$byte6" == "14" ]]; then
|
|
# bad_record_mac -- this is not "not vulnerable"
|
|
out "likely "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
out ", suspicious \"bad_record_mac\" ($byte6)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "likely VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
# other errors, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2
|
|
out "likely "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
out ", suspicious error code \"$byte6\" returned. Please report"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "likely VULNERABLE with $byte6" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL == "mysql" ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:14:12}" == "233038533031" ]]; then
|
|
# MySQL community edition (yaSSL) returns a MySQL error instead of a TLS Alert
|
|
# Error: #08S01 Bad handshake
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
out ", looks like MySQL community edition (yaSSL)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable (MySQL community edition (yaSSL) detected)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ "$byte6" == [0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:2:2}" != "03" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "test failed"
|
|
out ", probably read buffer too small (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, probably read buffer too small (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "test failed "
|
|
out "around line $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:12},$byte6)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around line $LINENO, debug info (${tls_hello_ascii:0:12},$byte6)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub_session_ticket_tls() {
|
|
local tls_proto="$1"
|
|
local sessticket_tls=""
|
|
#FIXME: we likely have done this already before (either @ run_server_defaults() or at least the output
|
|
# from a previous handshake) --> would save 1x connect. We have TLS_TICKET but not yet the ticket itself #FIXME
|
|
#ATTENTION: we DO NOT use SNI here as we assume ticketbleed is a vulnerability of the TLS stack. If we'd do SNI here, we'd also need
|
|
# it in the ClientHello of run_ticketbleed() otherwise the ticket will be different and the whole thing won't work!
|
|
#
|
|
sessticket_tls="$($OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$BUGS $tls_proto $PROXY $SNI -connect $NODEIP:$PORT") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE | awk '/TLS session ticket:/,/^$/' | awk '!/TLS session ticket/')"
|
|
sessticket_tls="$(sed -e 's/^.* - /x/g' -e 's/ .*$//g' <<< "$sessticket_tls" | tr '\n' ',')"
|
|
sed -e 's/ /,x/g' -e 's/-/,x/g' <<< "$sessticket_tls"
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# see https://blog.filippo.io/finding-ticketbleed/ | https://filippo.io/ticketbleed/
|
|
run_ticketbleed() {
|
|
local tls_hexcode tls_proto=""
|
|
local session_tckt_tls=""
|
|
local -i len_ch=300 # fixed len of prepared clienthello below
|
|
local sid="x00,x0B,xAD,xC0,xDE,x00," # some arbitrary bytes
|
|
local len_sid="$(( ${#sid} / 4))"
|
|
local xlen_sid="$(dec02hex $len_sid)"
|
|
local -i len_tckt_tls=0 nr_sid_detected=0
|
|
local xlen_tckt_tls="" xlen_handshake_record_layer="" xlen_handshake_ssl_layer=""
|
|
local -i len_handshake_record_layer=0
|
|
local i
|
|
local -a memory sid_detected
|
|
local early_exit=true
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local jsonID="ticketbleed"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2016-9244"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-200"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Ticketbleed vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " Ticketbleed"; out " ($cve), experiment. "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$SERVICE" != HTTP ]] && [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]]; then
|
|
outln "(applicable only for HTTPS)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not applicable, not HTTP" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# highly unlikely that it is NOT supported. We may loose time here but it's more solid
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]] && determine_tls_extensions
|
|
if [[ ! "${TLS_EXTENSIONS}" =~ "session ticket" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no session ticket extension"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "no session ticket extension" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x01"; tls_proto="-tls1"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x02"; tls_proto="-tls1_1"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x03"; tls_proto="-tls1_2"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x00"; tls_proto="-ssl3"
|
|
else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && tls_proto="-no_tls1_3"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $tls_proto -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in
|
|
*1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03"; tls_proto="-tls1_2" ; add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
*1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02"; tls_proto="-tls1_1" ; add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01"; tls_proto="-tls1" ; add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00"; tls_proto="-ssl3" ; add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode"
|
|
|
|
session_tckt_tls="$(sub_session_ticket_tls "$tls_proto")"
|
|
if [[ "$session_tckt_tls" == "," ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no session tickets"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
debugme echo " session ticket TLS \"$session_tckt_tls\""
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
len_tckt_tls=${#session_tckt_tls}
|
|
len_tckt_tls=$(( len_tckt_tls / 4))
|
|
xlen_tckt_tls="$(dec02hex $len_tckt_tls)"
|
|
len_handshake_record_layer="$(( len_sid + len_ch + len_tckt_tls ))"
|
|
xlen_handshake_record_layer="$(dec04hex "$len_handshake_record_layer")"
|
|
len_handshake_ssl_layer="$(( len_handshake_record_layer + 4 ))"
|
|
xlen_handshake_ssl_layer="$(dec04hex "$len_handshake_ssl_layer")"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
echo "len_tckt_tls (hex): $len_tckt_tls ($xlen_tckt_tls)"
|
|
echo "sid: $sid"
|
|
echo "len_sid (hex) $len_sid ($xlen_sid)"
|
|
echo "len_handshake_record_layer: $len_handshake_record_layer ($xlen_handshake_record_layer)"
|
|
echo "len_handshake_ssl_layer: $len_handshake_ssl_layer ($xlen_handshake_ssl_layer)"
|
|
echo "session_tckt_tls: $session_tckt_tls"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
client_hello="
|
|
# TLS header (5 bytes)
|
|
,x16, # Content type (x16 for handshake)
|
|
x03,x01, # TLS version record layer
|
|
# Length Secure Socket Layer follows:
|
|
$xlen_handshake_ssl_layer,
|
|
# Handshake header
|
|
x01, # Type (x01 for ClientHello)
|
|
# Length of ClientHello follows:
|
|
x00, $xlen_handshake_record_layer,
|
|
$tls_hexcode, # TLS Version
|
|
# Random (32 byte) Unix time etc, see www.moserware.com/2009/06/first-few-milliseconds-of-https.html
|
|
xee, xee, x5b, x90, x9d, x9b, x72, x0b,
|
|
xbc, x0c, xbc, x2b, x92, xa8, x48, x97,
|
|
xcf, xbd, x39, x04, xcc, x16, x0b, x85,
|
|
x03, x90, x9f, x77, x04, x33, xff, xff,
|
|
$xlen_sid, # Session ID length
|
|
$sid
|
|
x00, x6a, # Cipher suites length 106
|
|
# 53 Cipher suites
|
|
xc0,x14, xc0,x13, xc0,x0a, xc0,x21,
|
|
x00,x39, x00,x38, x00,x88, x00,x87,
|
|
xc0,x0f, xc0,x05, x00,x35, x00,x84,
|
|
xc0,x12, xc0,x08, xc0,x1c, xc0,x1b,
|
|
x00,x16, x00,x13, xc0,x0d, xc0,x03,
|
|
x00,x0a, xc0,x13, xc0,x09, xc0,x1f,
|
|
xc0,x1e, x00,x33, x00,x32, x00,x9a,
|
|
x00,x99, x00,x45, x00,x44, xc0,x0e,
|
|
xc0,x04, x00,x2f, x00,x96, x00,x41,
|
|
xc0,x11, xc0,x07, xc0,x0c, xc0,x02,
|
|
x00,x05, x00,x04, x00,x15, x00,x12,
|
|
xc0,x30, xc0,x2f, x00,x9d, x00,x9c,
|
|
x00,x3d, x00,x3c, x00,x9f, x00,x9e,
|
|
x00,xff,
|
|
x01, # Compression methods length
|
|
x00, # Compression method (x00 for NULL)
|
|
x01,x5b, # Extensions length ####### 10b + x14 + x3c
|
|
# Extension Padding
|
|
x00,x15,
|
|
# length:
|
|
x00,x38,
|
|
x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00,
|
|
x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00,
|
|
x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00,
|
|
# Extension: ec_point_formats
|
|
x00,x0b,
|
|
# length:
|
|
x00,x04,
|
|
# data:
|
|
x03,x00, x01,x02,
|
|
# Extension: elliptic_curves
|
|
x00,x0a,
|
|
# length
|
|
x00,x34,
|
|
x00,x32,
|
|
# data:
|
|
x00,x0e, x00,x0d, x00,x19, x00,x0b, x00,x0c,
|
|
x00,x18, x00,x09, x00,x0a, x00,x16,
|
|
x00,x17, x00,x08, x00,x06, x00,x07,
|
|
x00,x14, x00,x15, x00,x04, x00,x05,
|
|
x00,x12, x00,x13, x00,x01, x00,x02,
|
|
x00,x03, x00,x0f, x00,x10, x00,x11,
|
|
# Extension: Signature Algorithms
|
|
x00,x0d,
|
|
# length:
|
|
x00,x10,
|
|
# data:
|
|
x00,x0e ,x04,x01, x05,x01 ,x02,x01, x04,x03, x05,x03,
|
|
x02,x03, x02,x02,
|
|
# Extension: SessionTicket TLS
|
|
x00, x23,
|
|
# length of SessionTicket TLS
|
|
x00, $xlen_tckt_tls,
|
|
# data, Session Ticket
|
|
$session_tckt_tls # here we have the comma already
|
|
# Extension: Heartbeat
|
|
x00, x0f, x00, x01, x01"
|
|
|
|
# we do 3 client hellos, then see whether different memory is returned
|
|
for i in 1 2 3; do
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 6
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend "$client_hello" 0
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello (ticketbleed reply)... "
|
|
if "$FAST_SOCKET"; then
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(sockread_fast 32768)
|
|
else
|
|
sockread 32768 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$tls_hello_ascii"
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
echo "============================="
|
|
echo "$tls_hello_ascii"
|
|
echo "============================="
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" == 15 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "TLS Alert ${tls_hello_ascii:10:4} (TLS version: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}) -- "
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
break
|
|
elif [[ -z "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
out ", reply empty"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
break
|
|
elif [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" == 16 ]]; then
|
|
early_exit=false
|
|
debugme echo -n "Handshake (TLS version: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}), "
|
|
if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:10:6}" == 020000 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "ServerHello -- "
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -n "Message type: ${tls_hello_ascii:10:6} -- "
|
|
fi
|
|
sid_input=$(sed -e 's/x//g' -e 's/,//g' <<< "$sid")
|
|
sid_detected[i]="${tls_hello_ascii:88:32}"
|
|
memory[i]="${tls_hello_ascii:$((88+ len_sid*2)):$((32 - len_sid*2))}"
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo
|
|
echo "TLS version, record layer: ${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
echo "Session ID: ${sid_detected[i]}"
|
|
echo "memory: ${memory[i]}"
|
|
echo -n "$sid_input in SID: " ;
|
|
[[ "${sid_detected[i]}" =~ $sid_input ]] && echo "yes" || echo "no"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo $tls_hello_ascii >$TEMPDIR/${FUNCNAME[0]}.tls_hello_ascii${i}.txt
|
|
else
|
|
ret=1
|
|
pr_warning "test failed"
|
|
out " around line $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}, ${tls_hello_ascii:2:10})"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}, ${tls_hello_ascii:2:10})" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if ! "$early_exit"; then
|
|
# here we test the replies if a TLS server hello was received >1x
|
|
for i in 1 2 3 ; do
|
|
if [[ "${sid_detected[i]}" =~ $sid_input ]]; then
|
|
# was our faked TLS SID returned?
|
|
nr_sid_detected+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $nr_sid_detected -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${memory[1]} != ${memory[2]} ]] && [[ ${memory[2]} != ${memory[3]} ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to Ticketbleed"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
out ", session IDs were returned but potential memory fragments do not differ"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, returned potential memory fragments do not differ" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo
|
|
pr_warning "test failed, non reproducible results!"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "test failed, non reproducible results!"
|
|
out " Please run again w \"--debug=2\" (# of faked TLS SIDs detected: $nr_sid_detected)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, non reproducible results. $nr_sid_detected TLS Session IDs $nr_sid_detected, ${sid_detected[1]},${sid_detected[2]},${sid_detected[3]}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Overview @ http://www.exploresecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/custom/SSL_manual_cheatsheet.html
|
|
#
|
|
run_renego() {
|
|
local legacycmd="" proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
local sec_renego sec_client_renego
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID=""
|
|
local ssl_reneg_attempts=$SSL_RENEG_ATTEMPTS
|
|
local ssl_reneg_wait=$SSL_RENEG_WAIT
|
|
local pid watcher
|
|
local tmp_result loop_reneg
|
|
# In cases where there's no default host configured we need SNI here as openssl then would return otherwise an error and the test will fail
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && [[ -z "$proto" ]] && proto="-no_tls1_3"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Renegotiation vulnerabilities " && outln
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) "
|
|
jsonID="secure_renego"
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
# https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2018/02/08/tlsv1.3/
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
# first fingerprint for the Line "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" or "Secure Renegotiation IS "
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 2>&1 </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
grep -iaq "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" $TMPFILE
|
|
sec_renego=$? # 0= Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
|
|
# grep -iaq "Secure Renegotiation IS supported"
|
|
#FIXME: didn't occur to me yet but why not also to check on "Secure Renegotiation IS supported"
|
|
case $sec_renego in
|
|
0) prln_svrty_critical "Not supported / VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_warning "Secure renegotiation is not supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) prln_svrty_best "supported (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "supported" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_renego"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "FIXME (bug) $sec_renego" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
prln_warning "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# FIXME: Basically this can be done with sockets and we might have that information already
|
|
# see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.4: 'The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info"
|
|
# extension, or the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV signaling cipher suite value in the ClientHello. [..]
|
|
# When a ServerHello is received, the client MUST check if it includes the "renegotiation_info" extension:
|
|
# If the extension is not present, the server does not support secure renegotiation'
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation "
|
|
jsonID="secure_client_renego"
|
|
cve="CVE-2011-1473"
|
|
# see: https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks
|
|
# https://blog.ivanristic.com/2009/12/testing-for-ssl-renegotiation.html -- head/get doesn't seem to be needed though
|
|
# https://archive.fo/20130415224936/http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/
|
|
# https://vincent.bernat.ch/en/blog/2011-ssl-dos-mitigation
|
|
case "$OSSL_VER" in
|
|
0.9.8*) # we need this for Mac OSX unfortunately
|
|
case "$OSSL_VER_APPENDIX" in
|
|
[a-l])
|
|
prln_local_problem " Your $OPENSSL cannot test this secure renegotiation vulnerability"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "your $OPENSSL cannot test this secure renegotiation vulnerability" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
[m-z])
|
|
;; # all ok
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
1.0.1*|1.0.2*)
|
|
legacycmd="-legacy_renegotiation"
|
|
;;
|
|
0.9.9*|1.0*|1.1*)
|
|
;; # all ok
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]] && [[ -z "$MTLS" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "not having provided client certificate and private key file, the client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not having provided client certificate and private key file, the client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
|
|
sec_client_renego=1
|
|
else
|
|
# We will need $ERRFILE for mitigation detection
|
|
if [[ $ERRFILE =~ dev.null ]]; then
|
|
ERRFILE=$TEMPDIR/errorfile.txt || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
# cleanup previous run if any (multiple IP)
|
|
rm -f $ERRFILE
|
|
restore_errfile=1
|
|
else
|
|
restore_errfile=0
|
|
fi
|
|
# We need up to two tries here, as some LiteSpeed servers don't answer on "R" and block. Thus first try in the background
|
|
# msg enables us to look deeper into it while debugging
|
|
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS $legacycmd $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "likely not vulnerable (OK)"; outln ", timed out" # it hung
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "likely not vulnerable (timed out)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
sec_client_renego=1
|
|
else
|
|
# second try in the foreground as we are sure now it won't hang
|
|
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
sec_client_renego=$?
|
|
# 0 means client is renegotiating & doesn't return an error --> vuln!
|
|
# 1 means client tried to renegotiating but the server side errored then. You still see RENEGOTIATING in the output
|
|
if tail -5 $TMPFILE| grep -qa '^closed'; then
|
|
# Exemption from above: server closed the connection but return value was zero
|
|
# See https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1725 and referenced issue @haproxy
|
|
sec_client_renego=1
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$sec_client_renego" in
|
|
0) # We try again if server is HTTP. This could be either a node.js server or something else.
|
|
# Mitigations (default values) for:
|
|
# - node.js allows 3x R and then blocks. So then 4x should be tested.
|
|
# - F5 BIG-IP ADS allows 5x R and then blocks. So then 6x should be tested.
|
|
# - Stormshield allows 9x and then blocks. So then 10x should be tested.
|
|
# This way we save a couple seconds as we weeded out the ones which are more robust
|
|
# Amount of times tested before breaking is set in SSL_RENEG_ATTEMPTS.
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", potential DoS threat"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, potential DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
# Clear the log to not get the content of previous run before the execution of the new one.
|
|
echo -n > $TMPFILE
|
|
#RENEGOTIATING wait loop watchdog file
|
|
touch $TEMPDIR/allowed_to_loop
|
|
# If we dont wait for the session to be established on slow server, we will try to re-negotiate
|
|
# too early losing all the attempts before the session establishment as OpenSSL will not buffer them
|
|
# (only the first will be till the establishement of the session).
|
|
(j=0; while [[ $(grep -ac '^SSL-Session:' $TMPFILE) -ne 1 ]] && [[ $j -lt 30 ]]; do sleep $ssl_reneg_wait; ((j++)); done; \
|
|
for ((i=0; i < ssl_reneg_attempts; i++ )); do sleep $ssl_reneg_wait; echo R; k=0; \
|
|
while [[ $(grep -ac '^RENEGOTIATING' $ERRFILE) -ne $((i+3)) ]] && [[ -f $TEMPDIR/allowed_to_loop ]] \
|
|
&& [[ $(tail -n1 $ERRFILE |grep -acE '^(RENEGOTIATING|depth|verify|notAfter)') -eq 1 ]] \
|
|
&& [[ $k -lt 120 ]]; \
|
|
do sleep $ssl_reneg_wait; ((k++)); if (tail -5 $TMPFILE| grep -qa '^closed'); then sleep 1; break; fi; done; \
|
|
done) | \
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE &
|
|
pid=$!
|
|
( sleep $((ssl_reneg_attempts*3)) && kill $pid && touch $TEMPDIR/was_killed ) >&2 2>/dev/null &
|
|
watcher=$!
|
|
# Trick to get the return value of the openssl command, output redirection and a timeout.
|
|
# Yes, some target hang/block after some tries.
|
|
wait $pid
|
|
tmp_result=$?
|
|
pkill -HUP -P $watcher
|
|
wait $watcher
|
|
rm -f $TEMPDIR/allowed_to_loop
|
|
# If we are here, we have done two successful renegotiation (-2) and do the loop
|
|
loop_reneg=$(($(grep -ac '^RENEGOTIATING' $ERRFILE)-2))
|
|
# As above, some servers close the connection and return value is zero
|
|
if (tail -5 $TMPFILE| grep -qa '^closed'); then
|
|
tmp_result=1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -f $TEMPDIR/was_killed ]]; then
|
|
tmp_result=2
|
|
rm -f $TEMPDIR/was_killed
|
|
fi
|
|
case $tmp_result in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", DoS threat ($ssl_reneg_attempts attempts)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " -- mitigated (disconnect after $loop_reneg/$ssl_reneg_attempts attempts)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, mitigated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
2) pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"; \
|
|
outln " -- mitigated ($loop_reneg successful reneg within ${ssl_reneg_attempts} in $((${ssl_reneg_attempts}*3))s(timeout))"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, mitigated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_client_renego ($ssl_reneg_attempts tries)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "FIXME (bug $ssl_reneg_attempts tries) $sec_client_renego" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
1)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_client_renego"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "FIXME (bug) $sec_client_renego - Please report" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
#pr_bold " Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation " # pre-RFC 5746, CVE-2009-3555
|
|
#jsonID="insecure_client_renego"
|
|
#
|
|
# https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#y2009. It can only be tested with OpenSSL <=0.9.8k
|
|
# Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation is missing ==> sockets. When we complete the handshake ;-)
|
|
if [[ $restore_errfile -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
ERRFILE="/dev/null"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_crime() {
|
|
local -i ret=0 sclient_success
|
|
local addcmd=""
|
|
local cve="CVE-2012-4929"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
|
|
# In a nutshell: don't offer TLS/SPDY compression. This tests for CRIME Vulnerability on HTTPS only,
|
|
# not SPDY or ALPN (yet). Please note that it is an attack where you need client side control, so in
|
|
# regular situations this # means anyway "game over", with or without CRIME.
|
|
#
|
|
# https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2012/09/14/crime-information-leakage-attack-against-ssltls
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CRIME vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " CRIME, TLS " ; out "($cve) "
|
|
jsonID="CRIME_TLS"
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no compression in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$HAS_ZLIB"; then
|
|
if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks zlib support"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "CRIME, TLS: Not tested. $OPENSSL lacks zlib support" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "" "" "true"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$OSSL_VER" == 0.9.8* ]] && addcmd="-no_ssl2"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]] && addcmd+=" -no_tls1_3"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -comp $addcmd $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null &>$TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed, couldn't connect" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
elif grep -a Compression $TMPFILE | grep -aq NONE >/dev/null; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]]; then
|
|
out " (not using HTTP anyway)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable (not using HTTP anyway)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]] || [[ ! -z "$MTLS" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE but not using HTTP: probably no exploit known"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, but not using HTTP. Probably no exploit known" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
# not clear whether a protocol != HTTP offers the ability to repeatedly modify the input
|
|
# which is done e.g. via javascript in the context of HTTP
|
|
fi
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "Vulnerable to CRIME"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
# this needs to be re-done i order to remove the redundant check for spdy
|
|
|
|
# weed out starttls, spdy-crime is a web thingy
|
|
# if [[ "x$STARTTLS" != "x" ]]; then
|
|
# echo
|
|
# return $ret
|
|
# fi
|
|
|
|
# weed out non-webports, spdy-crime is a web thingy. there's a catch thoug, you see it?
|
|
# case $PORT in
|
|
# 25|465|587|80|110|143|993|995|21)
|
|
# echo
|
|
# return $ret
|
|
# esac
|
|
|
|
# if "$HAS_NPN"; then
|
|
# $OPENSSL s_client -host $NODE -port $PORT -nextprotoneg $NPN_PROTOs $SNI </dev/null 2>/dev/null >$TMPFILE
|
|
# if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# echo
|
|
# pr_bold "CRIME Vulnerability, SPDY " ; outln "($cve): "
|
|
|
|
# STR=$(grep Compression $TMPFILE )
|
|
# if echo $STR | grep -q NONE >/dev/null; then
|
|
# pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
# ret=$((ret + 0))
|
|
# else
|
|
# pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
# ret=$((ret + 1))
|
|
# fi
|
|
# fi
|
|
# fi
|
|
# [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] tmln_out "$STR"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# As the name says. It expects as arg1 a GET command string. It returns 1
|
|
# when GET command was stalled or killed (which is no not always used)
|
|
# and echos "warn_*". It return 0 when everything went ok and echos the
|
|
# compression if any.
|
|
sub_breach_helper() {
|
|
local get_command="$1"
|
|
local detected_compression=""
|
|
local -i was_killed=0
|
|
|
|
safe_echo "$get_command" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 1>$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
was_killed=$? # !=0 when it was killed
|
|
detected_compression=$(grep -ia ^Content-Encoding: $TMPFILE)
|
|
detected_compression="$(strip_lf "$detected_compression")"
|
|
detected_compression="${detected_compression#*:}"
|
|
detected_compression="$(strip_spaces "$detected_compression")"
|
|
if [[ ! -s $TMPFILE ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $was_killed -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "warn_stalled"
|
|
else
|
|
echo "warn_killed"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ -z $detected_compression ]]; then
|
|
echo "no_compression"
|
|
else
|
|
echo "$detected_compression"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# BREACH is a HTTP-level compression & an attack which works against any cipher suite and is agnostic to the
|
|
# version of TLS/SSL, more: http://www.breachattack.com/ . External referrers are the important thing here!
|
|
# Mitigation: see https://community.qualys.com/message/20360
|
|
# Any URL can be vulnerable. Here only the given URL is tested. See also $when_makesense
|
|
#
|
|
run_breach() {
|
|
local header
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local referer useragent
|
|
local url="$1"
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local disclaimer=""
|
|
local when_makesense=" Can be ignored for static pages or if no secrets in the page"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2013-3587"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint="" c=""
|
|
local jsonID="BREACH"
|
|
local compressions="gzip deflate compress br"
|
|
local has_compression=()
|
|
local detected_compression=""
|
|
local get_command=""
|
|
|
|
[[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for BREACH (HTTP compression) vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " BREACH"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]] && [[ -z "$MTLS" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "not having provided client certificate and private key file, the client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not having provided client certificate and private key file, the client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$url" ]] && url="/"
|
|
disclaimer=" - only supplied \"$url\" tested"
|
|
|
|
referer="https://google.com/"
|
|
[[ "$NODE" =~ google ]] && referer="https://yandex.ru/" # otherwise we have a false positive for google.com
|
|
useragent="$UA_STD"
|
|
$SNEAKY && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY"
|
|
|
|
# Assemble the GET command with all available compressions and send them all, initially.
|
|
# If the result is negative: we can just tell the finding and return. If it's
|
|
# positive: We already have identified 1x compression
|
|
get_command="GET $url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nReferer: $referer\r\nConnection: Close\r\nAccept-encoding: ${compressions// /,}\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n"
|
|
detected_compression=$(sub_breach_helper "$get_command")
|
|
case "$detected_compression" in
|
|
warn_stalled)
|
|
prln_warning "First request failed (HTTP header request stalled and was terminated)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as first HTTP request stalled and was terminated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
warn_failed)
|
|
prln_warning "First request failed (HTTP header request was empty)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as first HTTP response was empty" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
no_compression)
|
|
pr_svrty_good "no gzip/deflate/compress/br HTTP compression (OK) "
|
|
outln "$disclaimer"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no gzip/deflate/compress/br HTTP compression $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=0
|
|
;;
|
|
*) # Now assemble the remaining compressions in $compressions and loop through them
|
|
has_compression+=("$detected_compression:yes")
|
|
compressions="${compressions//$detected_compression/}"
|
|
for c in $compressions; do
|
|
get_command="GET $url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nReferer: $referer\r\nConnection: Close\r\nAccept-encoding: ${c}\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n"
|
|
detected_compression=$(sub_breach_helper "$get_command")
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# This failure unlikely here. The initial request must have succeeded and this one then
|
|
# failed but we'd rather treat this correctly (e.d. IDS which triggers later). Not also
|
|
# we exit on the first stalled request. So if the first one with all compressions failed,
|
|
# we don't get here. It seems very unlikely the first failed and subsequent will succeed.
|
|
has_compression+=("$c:$compressions")
|
|
elif [[ "$detected_compression" =~ no_compression ]]; then
|
|
has_compression+=("$c:no")
|
|
debugme echo "has_compression: $c: no"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$detected_compression" ]]; then
|
|
has_compression+=("$c:yes")
|
|
debugme echo "has_compression: $c: yes"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_fixme "strange reply around line $((LINENO)) from sub_breach_helper()"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Final verdict (if not happened preemptively before). We reuse $detected_compression here
|
|
detected_compression=""
|
|
if [[ ${has_compression[@]} =~ warn ]]; then
|
|
# warn_empty / warn_stalled
|
|
if [[ ${has_compression[@]} =~ warn_empty ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "At least 1/4 checks failed (HTTP header request was empty, debug: ${has_compression[@]}"
|
|
out ", debug: ${has_compression[@]})"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP response was empty, debug: ${has_compression[@]}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else # warn_stalled
|
|
pr_warning "At least 1/4 checks failed (HTTP header request stalled and was terminated"
|
|
out ", debug: ${has_compression[@]})"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP request stalled and was terminated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
for c in ${has_compression[@]}; do
|
|
if [[ $c =~ yes ]]; then
|
|
detected_compression+="${c%:*} "
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
detected_compression="$(strip_trailing_space "$detected_compression")"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "potentially NOT ok, \"$detected_compression\" HTTP compression detected."
|
|
outln "$disclaimer"
|
|
outln "${spaces}${when_makesense}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "potentially VULNERABLE, $detected_compression HTTP compression detected $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme outln "${spaces}has_compression: ${has_compression[@]}"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# SWEET32 (https://sweet32.info/). Birthday attacks on 64-bit block ciphers.
|
|
# In a nutshell: don't use 3DES ciphers anymore (DES, RC2 and IDEA too).
|
|
# Please note as opposed to RC4 (stream cipher) RC2 is a block cipher.
|
|
#
|
|
run_sweet32() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success=1
|
|
local sweet32_ciphers="IDEA-CBC-SHA:IDEA-CBC-MD5:RC2-CBC-MD5:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DES-CFB-M1:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
local sweet32_ciphers_hex="00,07, 00,21, 00,25, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, 00,1e, 00,22, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
local ssl2_sweet32_ciphers='RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:IDEA-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC3-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CFB-M1'
|
|
local ssl2_sweet32_ciphers_hex='03,00,80, 04,00,80, 05,00,80, 06,00,40, 06,01,40, 07,00,C0, 07,01,C0, FF,80,00'
|
|
local nr_cipher_minimal=21
|
|
local proto
|
|
local cve="CVE-2016-2183 CVE-2016-6329"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-327"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local -i nr_sweet32_ciphers=0 nr_supported_ciphers=0 nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers=0 nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers=0
|
|
local ssl2_sweet=false
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local tls1_1_vulnerable=false
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SWEET32 (Birthday Attacks on 64-bit Block Ciphers) " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " SWEET32"; out " (${cve// /, }) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
# Unfortunately there's no restriction using TLS 1.2 with $sweet32_ciphers
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", TLS 1.3 doesn't offer such ciphers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing).
|
|
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here.
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for proto in 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${sweet32_ciphers_hex}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "$ssl2_sweet32_ciphers_hex"
|
|
case $? in
|
|
3) ssl2_sweet=true
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes ;;
|
|
0) ;; # ssl2_sweet=false
|
|
1|4|6|7) debugme "${FUNCNAME[0]}: test problem we don't handle here"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
nr_sweet32_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $sweet32_ciphers)
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $sweet32_ciphers))
|
|
debugme echo "$nr_sweet32_ciphers / $nr_supported_ciphers"
|
|
|
|
nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers)
|
|
nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers))
|
|
debugme echo "$nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers / $nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $(( nr_supported_ciphers + nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers )) -le $nr_cipher_minimal ]]; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "Only ${nr_supported_ciphers}+${nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers} \"SWEET32 ciphers\" found in your $OPENSSL."
|
|
outln " Test skipped"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "Not tested, lack of local support ($((nr_supported_ciphers + nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) ciphers only)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do
|
|
[[ $nr_supported_ciphers -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_supported "$proto" || continue
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $proto -cipher $sweet32_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
[[ $proto == -tls1_1 && $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && tls1_1_vulnerable=true
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
if [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -ssl2 -cipher $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ssl2_sweet=true
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
debugme tm_warning "Can't test with SSLv2 here as $OPENSSL lacks support"
|
|
# we omit adding a string for DEBUG==0 here as using sockets is the default and the following elif statement becomes ugly
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && "$ssl2_sweet" ; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers for SSLv2 and above"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers for SSLv2 and above" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
"$tls1_1_vulnerable" && set_grade_cap "C" "Uses 64 bit block ciphers with TLS 1.1 (vulnerable to SWEET32)"
|
|
elif [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
"$tls1_1_vulnerable" && set_grade_cap "C" "Uses 64 bit block ciphers with TLS 1.1 (vulnerable to SWEET32)"
|
|
elif "$ssl2_sweet"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers with SSLv2 only"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers with SSLv2 only" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)";
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 38 ]]; then
|
|
# Likely only PSK/KRB5 ciphers are missing: display discrepancy but no warning
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers) local ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers) local ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "not vulnerable but ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) local ciphers only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "not vulnerable but ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers) local ciphers only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption, in a nutshell: don't use CBC Ciphers in SSLv3
|
|
run_ssl_poodle() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success=0
|
|
local cbc_ciphers="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:AES256-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA:ADH-SEED-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:AES128-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:IDEA-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
local cbc_ciphers_hex="c0,14, c0,0a, c0,22, c0,21, c0,20, 00,91, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,19, 00,3a, 00,89, c0,0f, c0,05, 00,35, c0,36, 00,84, 00,95, 00,8d, c0,13, c0,09, c0,1f, c0,1e, c0,1d, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,18, 00,34, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,0e, c0,04, 00,2f, c0,35, 00,90, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, 00,94, 00,8c, 00,21, 00,25, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,1e, 00,22, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local -i nr_cbc_ciphers=0
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-3566"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local jsonID="POODLE_SSL"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SSLv3 POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " POODLE, SSL"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY" || [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
# one condition should normally suffice but we don't know when run_poddle() was called
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no SSLv3 support"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSLv3" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK and KRB5 ciphers are typically missing).
|
|
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "$cbc_ciphers_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
else
|
|
if ! "$HAS_SSL3"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support SSLv3"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_cbc_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $cbc_ciphers)
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $cbc_ciphers))
|
|
# SNI not needed as SSLv3 has none:
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-ssl3 $STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $cbc_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -eq 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
POODLE=0
|
|
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; out ", uses SSLv3+CBC (check TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mitigation below)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, uses SSLv3+CBC" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "Vulnerable to POODLE"
|
|
else
|
|
POODLE=1
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)";
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 83 ]]; then
|
|
# Likely only KRB and PSK cipher are missing: display discrepancy but no warning
|
|
out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# for appliance which use padding, no fallback needed
|
|
run_tls_poodle() {
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-8730"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local jsonID="POODLE_TLS"
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " POODLE, TLS"; out " ($cve), experimental "
|
|
#FIXME
|
|
prln_warning "#FIXME"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not yet implemented #FIXME" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
# set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to POODLE TLS"
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#FIXME: fileout needs to be patched according to new scheme. Postponed as otherwise merge fails ??
|
|
#
|
|
# This isn't a vulnerability check per se, but checks for the existence of
|
|
# the countermeasure to protect against protocol downgrade attacks.
|
|
#
|
|
run_tls_fallback_scsv() {
|
|
local -i ret=0 debug_level hsp
|
|
local high_proto="" low_proto=""
|
|
local p high_proto_str protos_to_try
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local jsonID="fallback_SCSV"
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV Protection " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV"; out " (RFC 7507) "
|
|
|
|
# First check we have support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in our local OpenSSL
|
|
if ! "$HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV" && ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL lacks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# First determine the highest protocol that the server supports (not including TLSv1.3).
|
|
if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "No fallback possible, SSLv2 is the only protocol"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "SSLv2 is the only protocol"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
for p in tls1_2 tls1_1 tls1 ssl3; do
|
|
hsp=$(has_server_protocol "$p")
|
|
[[ $hsp -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
if [[ $hsp -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
high_proto="$p"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! sclient_supported "-$p"; then
|
|
"$using_sockets"|| continue
|
|
case "$p" in
|
|
"tls1_2") tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"tls1_1") tls_sockets "02" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"tls1") tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"ssl3") tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
high_proto="$p"
|
|
add_proto_offered "$p" yes
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered "$p" no
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-$p $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
high_proto="$p"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
case "$high_proto" in
|
|
"tls1_2")
|
|
high_proto_str="TLS 1.2"
|
|
protos_to_try="tls1_1 tls1 ssl3" ;;
|
|
"tls1_1")
|
|
high_proto_str="TLS 1.1"
|
|
protos_to_try="tls1 ssl3" ;;
|
|
"tls1")
|
|
high_proto_str="TLS 1"
|
|
protos_to_try="ssl3" ;;
|
|
"ssl3")
|
|
prln_svrty_high "No fallback possible, SSLv3 is the only protocol"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "only SSLv3 supported"
|
|
return 0
|
|
;;
|
|
# TODO: Need to recheck possible scenarios when $high_proto can't be found if
|
|
# not using sockets and $OPENSSL doesn't support TLS 1, TLS 1.1, etc.
|
|
*) hsp=$(has_server_protocol tls1_3)
|
|
if [[ $hsp -eq 0 ]] && { "$HAS_TLS12" || "$using_sockets"; }; then
|
|
# If the server supports TLS 1.3, and does not support TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1,
|
|
# then assume it does not support SSLv3, even if SSLv3 cannot be tested.
|
|
pr_svrty_good "No fallback possible (OK)"; outln ", TLS 1.3 is the only protocol"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "only TLS 1.3 supported"
|
|
elif [[ $hsp -eq 1 ]] && \
|
|
{ [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]] || "$HAS_SSL3"; }; then
|
|
# TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, TLS 1, and SSLv3 are all not supported.
|
|
# This may be an SSLv2-only server, if $OPENSSL does not support SSLv2.
|
|
prln_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed. (couldn't connect)"
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ $hsp -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
# If the server does not support TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1, and
|
|
# support for SSLv3 cannot be tested, then treat it as HIGH severity, since
|
|
# it is very likely that SSLv3 is the only supported protocol.
|
|
pr_svrty_high "NOT ok, no fallback possible"; outln ", TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.1 and 1.0 not supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.1, 1.0 not supported"
|
|
else
|
|
# TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 are not supported, but can't tell whether TLS 1.3 is supported.
|
|
# This could be a TLS 1.3 only server, an SSLv3 only server (if SSLv3 support cannot be tested),
|
|
# or a server that does not support SSLv3 or any TLS protocol. So, don't report a severity,
|
|
# since this could either be good or bad.
|
|
outln "No fallback possible, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 not supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 not supported"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Next find a second protocol that the server supports.
|
|
for p in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
hsp=$(has_server_protocol "$p")
|
|
[[ $hsp -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
if [[ $hsp -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
low_proto="$p"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! sclient_supported "-$p"; then
|
|
"$using_sockets" || continue
|
|
case "$p" in
|
|
"tls1_1") tls_sockets "02" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"tls1") tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"ssl3") tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
low_proto="$p"
|
|
add_proto_offered "$p" yes
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered "$p" no
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-$p $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
low_proto="$p"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$low_proto" ]]; then
|
|
case "$high_proto" in
|
|
tls1_2)
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! "$HAS_TLS11" && [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) -eq 2 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support TLS 1.1"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support TLS 1.1"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_svrty_good "No fallback possible (OK)"; outln ", no protocol below $high_proto_str offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
tls1_1)
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! "$HAS_TLS1" && [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support TLS 1"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support TLS 1"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "No fallback possible, no protocol below $high_proto_str offered (OK)"
|
|
;;
|
|
tls1)
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support SSLv3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support SSLv3"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "No fallback possible, no protocol below $high_proto_str offered (OK)"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "no protocol below $high_proto_str offered"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! sclient_supported "-$low_proto"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Can't test: $OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -$low_proto\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Can't test: $OPENSSL doesn't support 's_client -$low_proto'"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$low_proto" in
|
|
"tls1_1")
|
|
p="-no_tls1_2" ;;
|
|
"tls1")
|
|
p="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1" ;;
|
|
"ssl3")
|
|
p="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1 -no_tls1" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && p+=" -no_tls1_3"
|
|
debugme echo "Simulating fallback from $high_proto to $low_proto"
|
|
|
|
# ...and do the test (we need to parse the error here!)
|
|
if "$HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV" && sclient_supported "-$low_proto"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $p -fallback_scsv") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
else
|
|
# Need to ensure that $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt contains the results of the
|
|
# most recent calls to tls_sockets even if tls_sockets is not successful. Setting $DEBUG to
|
|
# a non-zero value ensures this. Setting it to 1 prevents any extra information from being
|
|
# displayed.
|
|
debug_level="$DEBUG"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -eq 0 ]] && DEBUG=1
|
|
> "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
|
|
# tls_sockets() needs to parse the full response since the following code is
|
|
# looking for "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" when the TLS connection is successful. It
|
|
# may be possible to speed up this code by having the following code check
|
|
# the return value from tls_sockets() to determine whether the connection was
|
|
# successful rather than looking for "BEGIN CERTIFICATE".
|
|
case "$low_proto" in
|
|
"tls1_1")
|
|
tls_sockets "02" "56,00, $TLS_CIPHER" "all" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"tls1")
|
|
tls_sockets "01" "56,00, $TLS_CIPHER" "all" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"ssl3")
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "56,00, $TLS_CIPHER" "all" "" "true" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
mv "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" "$TMPFILE"
|
|
DEBUG=$debug_level
|
|
fi
|
|
if grep -q "CONNECTED(00" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
if grep -qa 'BEGIN CERTIFICATE' "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
if [[ -z "$POODLE" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "Rerun including POODLE SSL check. "
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "NOT supported. Pls rerun with POODLE SSL check"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
elif [[ "$POODLE" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported and vulnerable to POODLE SSL"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "NOT supported and vulnerable to POODLE SSL"
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "Vulnerable to POODLE"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "NOT supported"
|
|
fi
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Does not support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV"
|
|
|
|
elif grep -qa "alert inappropriate fallback" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "Downgrade attack prevention supported (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "supported"
|
|
elif grep -qa "alert handshake failure" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "Probably OK. "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "Probably oK"
|
|
# see RFC 7507, https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/121
|
|
# other case reported by Nicolas was F5 and at customer of mine: the same
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "But received non-RFC-compliant \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "received non-RFC-compliant \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\""
|
|
elif grep -qa "ssl handshake failure" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "some unexpected \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "some unexpected \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\" (likely: warning)"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "Check failed, unexpected result "
|
|
out ", run $PROG_NAME -Z --debug=1 and look at $TEMPDIR/*tls_fallback_scsv.txt"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed, unexpected result, run $PROG_NAME -Z --debug=1 and look at $TEMPDIR/*tls_fallback_scsv.txt"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed. (couldn't connect)"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Factoring RSA Export Keys: don't use EXPORT RSA ciphers, see https://freakattack.com/
|
|
run_freak() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success=0
|
|
local -i i nr_supported_ciphers=0 len
|
|
# with correct build it should list these 9 ciphers (plus the two latter as SSLv2 ciphers):
|
|
local exportrsa_cipher_list="EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP1024-RC4-SHA:EXP1024-RC4-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC4-MD5"
|
|
local exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex="00,62, 00,61, 00,64, 00,60, 00,14, 00,0E, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03"
|
|
local exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex="04,00,80, 02,00,80, 00,00,00"
|
|
local detected_ssl2_ciphers
|
|
local addtl_warning="" hexc
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2015-0204"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="FREAK"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for FREAK attack " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " FREAK"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", TLS 1.3 only server"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_words "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex")+$(count_words "$exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex")
|
|
else
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportrsa_cipher_list))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case $nr_supported_ciphers in
|
|
0) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't have any EXPORT RSA ciphers configured"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not tested. $OPENSSL doesn't have any EXPORT RSA ciphers configured" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
;;
|
|
1|2|3)
|
|
addtl_warning=" ($magenta""tested only with $nr_supported_ciphers out of 9 ciphers only!$off)" ;;
|
|
4|5|6|7)
|
|
addtl_warning=" (tested with $nr_supported_ciphers/9 ciphers)" ;;
|
|
8|9|10|11)
|
|
addtl_warning="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
|
|
# TLS handshake failed with ciphers above. Now we check SSLv2 -- unless we know it's not available
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "$exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex="$(strip_spaces "${exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex//,/}")"
|
|
len=${#exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex}
|
|
detected_ssl2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len; i+=6 )); do
|
|
[[ "$detected_ssl2_ciphers" =~ x${exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex:i:6} ]] && sclient_success=0 && break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportrsa_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -no_ssl2") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
debugme grep -Ea "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportrsa_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; out ", uses EXPORT RSA ciphers"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE, uses EXPORT RSA ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$addtl_warning"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for hexc in ${exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex//, / } ${exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex//, / }; do
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 5 ]]; then
|
|
hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2},0x${hexc:6:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$hexc" == ${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]} ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && tm_out "$hexc " || tm_out "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} "
|
|
done
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
else
|
|
actually_supported_osslciphers $exportrsa_cipher_list
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ARGs see below
|
|
# Sets the global DH_GROUP_OFFERED, start value: "", after this function:
|
|
# DH_GROUP_OFFERED=""
|
|
# DH_GROUP_OFFERED="<name of group>"
|
|
# return: 1: common primes file problem, 2: no pkey support, 0: went w/o error
|
|
get_common_prime() {
|
|
local jsonID2="$1"
|
|
local key_bitstring="$2"
|
|
local spaces="$3"
|
|
local pubkey dh_p=""
|
|
local -i subret=0
|
|
local common_primes_file="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/common-primes.txt"
|
|
local -i lineno_matched=0
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_PKEY" || return 2
|
|
pubkey="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$key_bitstring")"
|
|
if [[ "$pubkey" =~ GROUP: ]]; then
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED="${pubkey#*GROUP: }"
|
|
case "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" in
|
|
modp_1536) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 5" ;;
|
|
modp_2048) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 14" ;;
|
|
modp_3072) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 15" ;;
|
|
modp_4096) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 16" ;;
|
|
modp_6144) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 17" ;;
|
|
modp_8192) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 18" ;;
|
|
dh_1024_160) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/1024-bit DSA group with 160-bit prime order subgroup" ;;
|
|
dh_2048_224) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/2048-bit DSA group with 224-bit prime order subgroup" ;;
|
|
dh_2048_256) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/2048-bit DSA group with 256-bit prime order subgroup" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
pubkey="$(awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }' <<< "$pubkey")"
|
|
DH_GROUP_LEN_P="${pubkey%% bit*}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p="$(awk '/prime:|P:/,/generator:|G:/' <<< "$pubkey" | grep -Ev "prime|P:|generator|G:")"
|
|
dh_p="$(strip_spaces "$(colon_to_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$dh_p")")")"
|
|
[[ "${dh_p:0:2}" == "00" ]] && dh_p="${dh_p:2}"
|
|
DH_GROUP_LEN_P="$((4*${#dh_p}))"
|
|
debugme tmln_out "len(dh_p): $DH_GROUP_LEN_P | dh_p: $dh_p"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -gt 1 ]] && echo "$dh_p" > $TEMPDIR/dh_p.txt
|
|
if [[ ! -s "$common_primes_file" ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "couldn't read common primes file $common_primes_file"
|
|
out "${spaces}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "WARN" "couldn't read common primes file $common_primes_file"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
dh_p="$(toupper "$dh_p")"
|
|
# In the previous line of the match is basically the hint we want to echo
|
|
# the most elegant thing to get the previous line [ awk '/regex/ { print x }; { x=$0 }' ] doesn't work with gawk
|
|
lineno_matched=$(grep -n "$dh_p" "$common_primes_file" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '{ print $1 }')
|
|
if [[ "$lineno_matched" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED="$(awk "NR == $lineno_matched-1" "$common_primes_file" | awk -F'"' '{ print $2 }')"
|
|
#subret=1 # vulnerable: common prime
|
|
else
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED="Unknown DH group"
|
|
:
|
|
#subret=0 # not vulnerable: no known common prime
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# helper function for run_logjam see below
|
|
#
|
|
out_common_prime() {
|
|
local jsonID2="$1"
|
|
local cve="$2"
|
|
local cwe="$3"
|
|
|
|
[[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" == ffdhe* ]] && [[ ! "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ \ ]] && DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC7919/$DH_GROUP_OFFERED"
|
|
if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ ffdhe ]] && [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ \ ]]; then
|
|
out "common primes detected: "; pr_italic "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
# Now (below) size matters -- i.e. the bit size. As this is about a known prime we label it more strict.
|
|
# This needs maybe needs another thought as it could appear inconsistent with run_fs and elsewhere.
|
|
# for now we label the bit size similar in the screen, but distinguish the leading text for logjam before
|
|
elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 800 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " common prime: "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "CRITICAL" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1024 ]]; then
|
|
# really? Here we assume that 1024-bit common prime for nation states are worth and possible to precompute (TBC)
|
|
# otherwise 1024 are just medium
|
|
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " common prime: "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "HIGH" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1536 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "common prime: "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "LOW" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
else
|
|
out "common prime with $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits detected: "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# see https://weakdh.org/logjam.html
|
|
run_logjam() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success=0
|
|
local exportdh_cipher_list="EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
local exportdh_cipher_list_hex="00,63, 00,65, 00,14, 00,11"
|
|
local all_dh_ciphers="cc,15, 00,b3, 00,91, c0,97, 00,a3, 00,9f, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,39, 00,38, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,88, 00,87, 00,a7, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, 00,ab, cc,ad, c0,a7, c0,43, c0,45, c0,47, c0,53, c0,57, c0,5b, c0,67, c0,6d, c0,7d, c0,81, c0,85, c0,91, 00,a2, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,aa, c0,a6, 00,67, 00,40, 00,33, 00,32, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,45, 00,44, 00,a6, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, 00,b2, 00,90, c0,96, c0,42, c0,44, c0,46, c0,52, c0,56, c0,5a, c0,66, c0,6c, c0,7c, c0,80, c0,84, c0,90, 00,66, 00,18, 00,8e, 00,16, 00,13, 00,1b, 00,8f, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,1a, 00,65, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,17, 00,b5, 00,b4, 00,2d" # 93 ciphers
|
|
local -i i nr_supported_ciphers=0 server_key_exchange_len=0 ephemeral_pub_len=0
|
|
local addtl_warning="" hexc
|
|
local -i ret=0 subret=0
|
|
local server_key_exchange key_bitstring=""
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local vuln_exportdh_ciphers=false
|
|
local openssl_no_expdhciphers=false
|
|
local str=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2015-4000"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="LOGJAM"
|
|
local jsonID2="${jsonID}-common_primes"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for LOGJAM vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " LOGJAM"; out " ($cve), experimental "
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# Also as the openssl binary distributed has everything we need measurements show that
|
|
# there's no impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportdh_cipher_list))
|
|
debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers
|
|
case $nr_supported_ciphers in
|
|
0) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't have any DH EXPORT ciphers configured"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not tested. $OPENSSL doesn't support any DH EXPORT ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
openssl_no_expdhciphers=true
|
|
;;
|
|
1|2|3) addtl_warning=" ($magenta""tested w/ $nr_supported_ciphers/4 ciphers only!$off)" ;;
|
|
4) ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# test for DH export ciphers first
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$exportdh_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && vuln_exportdh_ciphers=true
|
|
elif [[ $nr_supported_ciphers -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportdh_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && vuln_exportdh_ciphers=true
|
|
debugme grep -Ea "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for hexc in ${exportdh_cipher_list_hex//, / }; do
|
|
hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2}"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$hexc" == ${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]} ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && tm_out "$hexc " || tm_out "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} "
|
|
done
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
else
|
|
echo $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportdh_cipher_list)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Try all ciphers that use an ephemeral DH key. If successful, check whether the key uses a weak prime.
|
|
if [[ -n "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ Unknown ]]; then
|
|
subret=0 # no common DH key detected
|
|
else
|
|
subret=1 # known prime/DH key
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$all_dh_ciphers, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
key_bitstring="$(awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# FIXME: determine # of ciphers supported, 48 only are the shipped binaries
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher kEDH -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && grep -q ServerKeyExchange $TMPFILE; then
|
|
# Example: '<<< TLS 1.0 Handshake [length 010b], ServerKeyExchange'
|
|
# get line with ServerKeyExchange, cut from the beginning to "length ". cut from the end to ']'
|
|
str="$(awk '/<<< TLS 1.[0-2].*ServerKeyExchange$/' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if [[ -z "$str" ]] ; then
|
|
str="$(awk '/<<< SSL [2-3].*ServerKeyExchange$/' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
str="${str#<*length }"
|
|
str="${str%]*}"
|
|
server_key_exchange_len=$(hex2dec "$str")
|
|
server_key_exchange_len=2+$server_key_exchange_len/16
|
|
server_key_exchange="$(grep -A $server_key_exchange_len ServerKeyExchange $TMPFILE | tail -n +2)"
|
|
server_key_exchange="$(toupper "$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$server_key_exchange")")")"
|
|
server_key_exchange="${server_key_exchange%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
server_key_exchange_len=${#server_key_exchange}
|
|
[[ $server_key_exchange_len -gt 8 ]] && [[ "${server_key_exchange:0:2}" == "0C" ]] && ephemeral_pub_len=$(hex2dec "${server_key_exchange:2:6}")
|
|
[[ $ephemeral_pub_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $ephemeral_pub_len -le $server_key_exchange_len ]] && key_bitstring="$(get_dh_ephemeralkey "${server_key_exchange:8}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
get_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$key_bitstring" "$spaces"
|
|
ret=$? # no common primes file would be ret=1 --> we should treat that some place else before
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ Unknown ]]; then
|
|
subret=0 # no common DH key detected
|
|
else
|
|
subret=1 # known prime/DH key
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
subret=3
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now if we have DH export ciphers we print them out first
|
|
if "$vuln_exportdh_ciphers"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " uses DH EXPORT ciphers"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, uses DH EXPORT ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
out ", no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2"
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out "\n${spaces}"
|
|
out_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
out " no common primes detected"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "--" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out "FIXME 1"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
if ! "$openssl_no_expdhciphers"; then
|
|
outln ","
|
|
out "${spaces}but no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK):"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
out ", no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "no DH key with <= TLS 1.2" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK):"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
# we issue a special warning if there's no common prime but the bit length is too low
|
|
if [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1024 ]]; then
|
|
out "\n${spaces}But: "
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
case $? in
|
|
1) fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe" ;;
|
|
2) fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe";;
|
|
3) fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe";;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
out ", no common prime detected"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "--" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "partly not vulnerable:"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -gt 0 ]] && set_key_str_score "DHE" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption, more @ https://drownattack.com/
|
|
run_drown() {
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers_detected ret=0
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local cert_fingerprint_sha2=""
|
|
local cve="CVE-2016-0800 CVE-2016-0703"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="DROWN"
|
|
local censys_host_url="https://search.censys.io/search?resource=hosts&virtual_hosts=INCLUDE"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing for DROWN vulnerability "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
# if we want to use OPENSSL: check for < openssl 1.0.2g, openssl 1.0.1s if native openssl
|
|
pr_bold " DROWN"; out " (${cve// /, }) "
|
|
|
|
# Any fingerprint that is placed in $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is also added to
|
|
# to $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2, so if $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is not empty, but
|
|
# $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is empty, then the server doesn't have an RSA certificate.
|
|
if [[ -z "$CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2" ]]; then
|
|
get_host_cert "-cipher aRSA -no_ssl2"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && cert_fingerprint_sha2="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -in $HOSTCERT -fingerprint -sha256 2>>$ERRFILE | sed -e 's/^.*Fingerprint=//' -e 's/://g' )"
|
|
else
|
|
cert_fingerprint_sha2="$RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2"
|
|
cert_fingerprint_sha2=${cert_fingerprint_sha2/SHA256 /}
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
censys_host_url="$censys_host_url&q=$cert_fingerprint_sha2"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets
|
|
else
|
|
[[ aaa == bbb ]] # provoke return code=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case $? in
|
|
7) # strange reply, couldn't convert the cipher spec length to a hex number
|
|
pr_fixme "strange v2 reply "
|
|
outln " (rerun with DEBUG >=2)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" | head -1
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received a strange SSLv2 reply (rerun with DEBUG>=2)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
3) # vulnerable, [[ -n "$cert_fingerprint_sha2" ]] test is not needed as we should have RSA certificate here
|
|
lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" 2>/dev/null)")
|
|
debugme tm_out " ($lines lines) "
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
if [[ "$lines" -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3))
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq "$nr_ciphers_detected" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "CVE-2015-3197: SSLv2 supported but couldn't detect a cipher (NOT ok)";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "SSLv2 offered, but could not detect a cipher. Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see $censys_host_url" "$cve CVE-2015-3197" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok), SSLv2 offered with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE, SSLv2 offered with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers. Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see $censys_host_url" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to DROWN"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "$spaces Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see:"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
pr_url "$censys_host_url"
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable on this host and port (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable on this host and port" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_fingerprint_sha2" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$spaces make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services, see"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
pr_url "$censys_host_url"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_hint" "INFO" "Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services, see $censys_host_url" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$spaces no RSA certificate, thus certificate can't be used with SSLv2 elsewhere"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_hint" "INFO" "no RSA certificate, can't be used with SSLv2 elsewhere" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS: don't use CBC Ciphers in SSLv3 TLSv1.0
|
|
run_beast(){
|
|
local hexc dash cbc_cipher sslvers auth mac
|
|
local -a ciph hexcode normalized_hexcode kx enc export2
|
|
local proto proto_hex
|
|
local -i i subret nr_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0
|
|
local detected_cbc_ciphers="" ciphers_to_test
|
|
local higher_proto_supported=""
|
|
local vuln_beast=false
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local cr=$'\n'
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local continued=false
|
|
local cbc_cipher_list="EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:IDEA-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:ADH-SEED-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
|
|
local cbc_ciphers_hex="00,06, 00,07, 00,08, 00,09, 00,0A, 00,0B, 00,0C, 00,0D, 00,0E, 00,0F, 00,10, 00,11, 00,12, 00,13, 00,14, 00,15, 00,16, 00,19, 00,1A, 00,1B, 00,1E, 00,1F, 00,21, 00,22, 00,23, 00,25, 00,26, 00,27, 00,29, 00,2A, 00,2F, 00,30, 00,31, 00,32, 00,33, 00,34, 00,35, 00,36, 00,37, 00,38, 00,39, 00,3A, 00,41, 00,42, 00,43, 00,44, 00,45, 00,46, 00,61, 00,62, 00,63, 00,84, 00,85, 00,86, 00,87, 00,88, 00,89, 00,8B, 00,8C, 00,8D, 00,8F, 00,90, 00,91, 00,93, 00,94, 00,95, 00,96, 00,97, 00,98, 00,99, 00,9A, 00,9B, 00,AE, 00,AF, 00,B2, 00,B3, 00,B6, 00,B7, C0,03, C0,04, C0,05, C0,08, C0,09, C0,0A, C0,0D, C0,0E, C0,0F, C0,12, C0,13, C0,14, C0,17, C0,18, C0,19, C0,1A, C0,1B, C0,1C, C0,1D, C0,1E, C0,1F, C0,21, C0,22, C0,34, C0,35, C0,36, C0,37, C0,38, C0,64, C0,65, C0,66, C0,67, C0,68, C0,69, C0,70, C0,71, C0,94, C0,95, C0,96, C0,97, C0,98, C0,99, C0,9A, C0,9B, FE,FE, FE,FF, FF,E0, FF,E1"
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2011-3389"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-20"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="BEAST"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing for BEAST vulnerability "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " BEAST"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY" || [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 && $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no SSL3 or TLS1"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
# If $OPENSSL does not support TLS 1, then it probably does not support
|
|
# SSL 3 either. To work with an $OPENSSL that did support SSL 3, but not
|
|
# TLS 1, it would be necessary to make some changes this function.
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! "$HAS_TLS1"; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client tls1\"."
|
|
outln " Test skipped"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# $cbc_ciphers_hex has 126 ciphers, we omitted SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA bc the trailing 00,ff below will pose
|
|
# a problem for ACE loadbalancers otherwise. So in case we know this is not true, we'll re-add it
|
|
! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" && "$using_sockets" && cbc_ciphers_hex="$cbc_ciphers_hex, C0,20"
|
|
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]] && [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ CBC ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && "$WIDE" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && \
|
|
[[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=ECDH || ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=DH || ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
# no sockets, openssl
|
|
while read hexc dash ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
if [[ ":${cbc_cipher_list}:" =~ :${ciph[nr_ciphers]}: ]]; then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-tls1 -V")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# first determine whether it's mitigated by higher protocols
|
|
for proto in tls1_1 tls1_2; do
|
|
subret=$(has_server_protocol "$proto")
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
case $proto in
|
|
tls1_1) higher_proto_supported+=" TLSv1.1" ;;
|
|
tls1_2) higher_proto_supported+=" TLSv1.2" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_supported "-$proto" || continue
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state -"${proto}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
higher_proto_supported+=" $(get_protocol $TMPFILE)"
|
|
add_proto_offered "$proto" yes
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for proto in ssl3 tls1; do
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! sclient_supported "-$proto"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -$proto\""
|
|
continued=true
|
|
out " "
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
subret=$(has_server_protocol "$proto")
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_success=0
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
elif sclient_supported "-$proto"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-"$proto" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then # protocol supported?
|
|
if "$continued"; then # second round: we hit TLS1
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL3" || "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" ; outln ", no SSL3 or TLS1"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_good "no TLS1 (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
else # protocol not succeeded but it's the first time
|
|
continued=true
|
|
continue # protocol not supported, so we do not need to check each cipher with that protocol
|
|
fi
|
|
fi # protocol succeeded
|
|
add_proto_offered "$proto" yes
|
|
|
|
# now we test in one shot with the precompiled ciphers
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
case "$proto" in
|
|
"ssl3") proto_hex="00" ;;
|
|
"tls1") proto_hex="01" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "$cbc_ciphers_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || continue
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-"$proto" -cipher "$cbc_cipher_list" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || continue
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers=""
|
|
for ((i=0; i<nr_ciphers; i++)); do
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
done
|
|
while true; do
|
|
sclient_supported "-$proto" || break
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && "${ossl_supported[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" -"${proto}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break
|
|
cbc_cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cbc_cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cbc_cipher" == "${ciph[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == - ]]; then
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers+="${ciph[i]} "
|
|
else
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers+="${rfc_ciph[i]} "
|
|
fi
|
|
vuln_beast=true
|
|
if "$WIDE" && [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
done
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break
|
|
cbc_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cbc_cipher" == "${rfc_ciph[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl && "${ciph[i]}" != - ]] || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == - ]]; then
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers+="${ciph[i]} "
|
|
else
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers+="${rfc_ciph[i]} "
|
|
fi
|
|
vuln_beast=true
|
|
if "$WIDE" && [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH || ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$WIDE" && [[ -n "$detected_cbc_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
out "\n "; pr_underline "$(toupper $proto):\n";
|
|
if "$first"; then
|
|
neat_header
|
|
fi
|
|
first=false
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
neat_list "$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "available"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "available"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_deemphasize "not a/v"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$WIDE"; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$detected_cbc_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_CBC_$(toupper $proto)" "MEDIUM" "$detected_cbc_ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
! "$first" && out "$spaces"
|
|
out "$(toupper $proto): "
|
|
[[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]] && \
|
|
pr_svrty_low "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$detected_cbc_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)" || \
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$detected_cbc_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
outln
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers="" # empty for next round
|
|
first=false
|
|
else
|
|
[[ $proto == tls1 ]] && ! $first && echo -n "$spaces "
|
|
prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto) (OK)"
|
|
first=false
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if ! "$vuln_beast" ; then
|
|
prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto) (OK)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_CBC_$(toupper $proto)" "OK" "No CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done # for proto in ssl3 tls1
|
|
|
|
if "$vuln_beast"; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]]; then
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
outln; out " "
|
|
# NOT ok seems too harsh for me if we have TLS >1.0
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"
|
|
outln " -- but also supports higher protocols (possible mitigation) $higher_proto_supported"
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"
|
|
outln " -- but also supports higher protocols $higher_proto_supported (likely mitigated)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "VULNERABLE -- but also supports higher protocols $higher_proto_supported (likely mitigated)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE"
|
|
outln " -- and no higher protocols as mitigation supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE -- and no higher protocols as mitigation supported" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "Vulnerable to BEAST"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
"$first" && ! "$vuln_beast" && prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers found for any protocol (OK)"
|
|
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This is a quick test for Winshock, MS14-066, a vulnerability in the TLS stack of Microsoft which leads to RCE.
|
|
# This vulnerability affected all SChannel services -- most notably RDP (port 3398 normally). See
|
|
# https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2992611/ms14-066-vulnerability-in-schannel-could-allow-remote-code-execution-n
|
|
# and http://www.securitysift.com/exploiting-ms14-066-cve-2014-6321-aka-winshock for "exploiting"/crashing lsass.exe.
|
|
# What we do here is giving a strong hint.
|
|
#
|
|
# First we check whether TLS 1.3 is available. Then with the fix MS introduced came additional ciphers
|
|
# TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|
|
# = DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 AES256-GCM-SHA384 AES128-GCM-SHA256.
|
|
# We also check for the absence of ciphers which came in way later (ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 / ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384), or
|
|
# more ciphers like ARIA, CCM, CAMELLIA and CHACHAPOLY. (Those ciphers could also be retrieved from our array TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]
|
|
# and using TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]. We may want to # do that later. We check for all this in sockets only to avoid overhead.)
|
|
# Then we check for absence of elliptical curves and TLS extensions.
|
|
# That all should minimize false # positives because of middle boxes, proxies and later Windows versions.
|
|
# The last straw then is to check for webserver banners (http.sys, IIS/8.0 and IIS/8.5).
|
|
#
|
|
run_winshock() {
|
|
local wsfixed_ciphers='00,9F, 00,9D, 00,9E, 00,9C'
|
|
local aria_ciphers='C0,3D,C0,3F,C0,41,C0,43,C0,45,C0,47,C0,49,C0,4B,C0,4D,C0,4F,C0,51,C0,53,C0,55,C0,57,C0,59,C0,5B,C0,5D,C0,5F,C0,61,C0,63,C0,65,C0,67,C0,69,C0,6B,C0,6D,C0,6F,C0,71,C0,3C,C0,3E,C0,40,C0,42,C0,44,C0,46,C0,48,C0,4A,C0,4C,C0,4E,C0,50,C0,52,C0,54,C0,56,C0,58,C0,5A,C0,5C,C0,5E,C0,60,C0,62,C0,64,C0,66,C0,68,C0,6A,C0,6C,C0,6E,C0,70'
|
|
local camellia_ciphers='C0,9B,C0,99,C0,97,C0,95,C0,77,C0,73,00,C4,00,C3,00,C2,00,C1,00,88,00,87,00,86,00,85,00,C5,00,89,C0,79,C0,75,00,C0,00,84,C0,7B,C0,7D,C0,7F,C0,81,C0,83,C0,85,C0,87,C0,89,C0,8B,C0,8D,C0,8F,C0,91,C0,93,C0,76,C0,72,00,BE,00,BD,00,BC,00,BB,00,45,00,44,00,43,00,42,00,BF,00,46,C0,78,C0,74,00,BA,00,41,C0,9A,C0,98,C0,96,C0,94,C0,7A,C0,7C,C0,7E,C0,80,C0,82,C0,84,C0,86,C0,88,C0,8A,C0,8C,C0,8E,C0,90,C0,92'
|
|
local chacha_ccm_ciphers='CC,14,CC,13,CC,15,CC,A9,CC,A8,CC,AA,C0,AF,C0,AD,C0,A3,C0,9F,CC,AE,CC,AD,CC,AC,C0,AB,C0,A7,C0,A1,C0,9D,CC,AB,C0,A9,C0,A5,16,B7,16,B8,13,04,13,05,C0,AE,C0,AC,C0,A2,C0,9E,C0,AA,C0,A6,C0,A0,C0,9C,C0,A8,C0,A4'
|
|
# TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 / TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 / ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
|
|
# came in Server 2016, see https://notsomany.com/2016/08/26/achieve-a-on-sslabs-iis-8-5-windows-2012-r2/
|
|
# https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/cipher-suites-in-schannel
|
|
local more_excluded_ciphers='C0,2F, C0,30'
|
|
# These are the three NIST curves allowed only. Keep in mind prime256v1=secp256r1 and MS labels them as P256, P384 and P521
|
|
local allowed_curves="prime256v1 secp384r1 secp521r1"
|
|
local curve="" tls_ext=""
|
|
local -i sclient_success=0
|
|
local server_banner=""
|
|
local check_patches=" - check patches locally to confirm"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-6321"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-94"
|
|
local jsonID="winshock"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing for winshock vulnerability "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Winshock"; out " ($cve), experimental "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -eq 0 ]] ; then
|
|
# There's no MS server supporting TLS 1.3. Winshock was way back in time
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
debugme echo " - TLS 1.3 found"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable " "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now we check whether any CAMELLIA, ARIA, CCM or CHACHA cipher is available.
|
|
# We do this in two shots in order to stay below the 128 cipher limit
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${aria_ciphers},${chacha_ccm_ciphers}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" ; outln " - ARIA, CHACHA or CCM ciphers found"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable " "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${camellia_ciphers},${more_excluded_ciphers}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - CAMELLIA or ECDHE_RSA GCM ciphers found"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable " "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now we need to check the fixed ciphers
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${wsfixed_ciphers}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
# has rollup ciphers
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - GCM rollup ciphers found"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ $sclient_success -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "check failed, connect problem"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, connect problem" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Basic idea: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_TLS_implementations#Supported_elliptic_curves
|
|
# [[ -z "$CURVES_OFFERED" ]] && sub_check_curves
|
|
if [[ -n "$CURVES_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
# Check whether there are any additional curves besides $allowed_curves
|
|
for curve in $CURVES_OFFERED; do
|
|
if ! [[ $allowed_curves =~ $curve ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - curve $curve detected"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - curve $curve detected" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
#FIXME: The catch is that when a user didn't invoke run_fs() before, this wasn't processed + CURVES_OFFERED
|
|
# is empty. So we could call it like above but need to move curves detection into a separate function
|
|
# (~ sub_check_curves) which is some work. But also for the sake of clean code this needs to be done.
|
|
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]] && determine_tls_extensions
|
|
# Basis of the following https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_TLS_implementations#Extensions
|
|
# Our standard: https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
|
|
|
|
# According to Wikipedia above these are the ones which can be detected unders version of Windows
|
|
# Secure Renegotiation, Server Name Indication, Certificate Status Request, Supplemental Data, Extended Master Secret, ALPN
|
|
# supplemental_data(23) (RFC 4680) seems to have been overwritten by extended master secret(23) RFC 7627
|
|
# local -a allowed_tls_ext=("server name" "status_request" "extended master secret" "application layer protocol negotiation")
|
|
# Instead we rather focus on the ones which according to that source weren't available
|
|
# Encrypt-then-MAC, Maximum Fragment Length, Keying Material Exporter, TLS Fallback SCSV, ClientHello Padding
|
|
# Padding is client side. Don't know what they mean by the fallback SCSV. That is not an extension
|
|
local -a forbidden_tls_ext=("encrypt-then-mac" "max fragment length")
|
|
# Open whether ec_point_formats, supported_groups(=elliptic_curves), heartbeat are supported under windows <=2012
|
|
# key_share and supported_versions are extensions which came with TLS 1.3. We checked the protocol before.
|
|
if [[ -n "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]]; then
|
|
# Check whether there are any TLS extension which should not be available under <= Windows 2012 R2
|
|
for tls_ext in $TLS_EXTENSIONS; do
|
|
# We use the whole array, got to be careful when the array becomes bigger (unintended match)
|
|
if [[ ${forbidden_tls_ext[@]} =~ $tls_ext ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - TLS extension $tls_ext detected"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - TLS extension $tls_ext detected" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# More would be possible if we look @ the following:
|
|
# See also https://github.com/cisco/joy/blob/master/fingerprinting/resources/fingerprint_db.json.gz
|
|
# https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/Presentation/2019_017_001_539902.pdf
|
|
# https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisco/joy/master/doc/using-joy-fingerprinting-00.pdf
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Now the solid determination more or less done. What's left now is to detect the service
|
|
# and perform an educated guess.
|
|
|
|
# Next we weed out is whether we run HTTP or RDP (on standard port).
|
|
# Using the experimental flag we can test it also on other ports / services
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ $PORT != 3389 ]] && ! "$EXPERIMENTAL"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - no HTTP or RDP"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - no HTTP or RDP" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ $PORT == 3389 ]]; then
|
|
# We take a security guess here (better safe than sorry) for RDP as we don't have a banner
|
|
out "probably "; pr_svrty_critical "vulnerable (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "probably vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now we have potentially vulnerable HTTP servers left where we grab the server banner.
|
|
# First choice for that is the HTTP header # file which we retrieved in a default run.
|
|
# From the service detection we also should have a header though as a fall back.
|
|
if [[ -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
server_banner="$(grep -Eai '^Server:' $HEADERFILE)"
|
|
elif [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.service_detection.txt" ]]; then
|
|
server_banner="$(grep -Eai '^Server:' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.service_detection.txt")"
|
|
elif "$EXPERIMENTAL"; then
|
|
# If testing e.g. an SMTP server
|
|
:
|
|
else
|
|
# We can't use run_http_header here as it messes up the screen. We could automatically
|
|
# run it when --winshock is requested though but this should suffice here.
|
|
prln_warning "check failed, rerun with cmd line option --header "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, connect problem" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-IIS\/8.5 ]]; then
|
|
# Windows 2012 R2 is less likely than Windows 2012
|
|
out "probably "; pr_svrty_critical "vulnerable (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "probably vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
elif [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-IIS\/8.0 ]]; then
|
|
out "likely "; pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "likely vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
elif [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-HTTPAPI\/2.0 ]]; then
|
|
# This is http.sys. It may or may not indicate a 2012 server. IIS is not yet configured though.
|
|
# So we have a peek on port 80
|
|
http_get $NODE "$TEMPDIR/$NODE.$NODEIP.http-header.txt"
|
|
server_banner="$(grep -Eai '^Server:' $TEMPDIR/$NODE.$NODEIP.http-header.txt)"
|
|
if [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-IIS\/8.5 ]]; then
|
|
out "probably "; pr_svrty_critical "vulnerable (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "probably vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
elif [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-IIS\/8.0 ]]; then
|
|
out "likely "; pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "likely vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
else
|
|
out "likely "; prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$EXPERIMENTAL"; then
|
|
out "seems "; pr_svrty_critical "vulnerable (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "seems vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln " - doesn't seem to be IIS 8.x"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - doesn't seem to be IIS 8.x" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20200324101422/http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html
|
|
# Paper: https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2013.42
|
|
# in a nutshell: don't offer CBC suites (again). MAC as a fix for padding oracles is not enough. Best: TLS v1.2+ AES GCM
|
|
run_lucky13() {
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local cbc_ciphers="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA256:ADH-AES256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA256:ADH-AES128-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ADH-SEED-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:IDEA-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
cbc_ciphers_hex1="c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, c0,22, c0,21, c0,20, 00,b7, 00,b3, 00,91, c0,9b, c0,99, c0,97, 00,af, c0,95, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,69, 00,68, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, c0,77, c0,73, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,19, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, c0,38, c0,36, 00,84, 00,95, 00,8d, c0,3d, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,43, c0,45, c0,47, c0,49, c0,4b, c0,4d, c0,4f, c0,65, c0,67, c0,69, c0,71, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, c0,1f, c0,1e, c0,1d, 00,67, 00,40, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, c0,76, c0,72, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,18, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba"
|
|
cbc_ciphers_hex2="c0,37, c0,35, 00,b6, 00,b2, 00,90, 00,96, 00,41, c0,9a, c0,98, c0,96, 00,ae, c0,94, 00,07, 00,94, 00,8c, 00,21, 00,25, c0,3c, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,42, c0,44, c0,46, c0,48, c0,4a, c0,4c, c0,4e, c0,64, c0,66, c0,68, c0,70, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, 00,1e, 00,22, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local -i nr_supported_ciphers=0 sclient_success
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2013-0169"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="LUCKY13"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing for LUCKY13 vulnerability "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " LUCKY13"; out " ($cve), experimental "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no CBC ciphers in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing).
|
|
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${cbc_ciphers_hex1}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${cbc_ciphers_hex2}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
nr_cbc_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $cbc_ciphers)
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $cbc_ciphers))
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -no_ssl2 -cipher $cbc_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -eq 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
out "potentially "
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS. Check patches"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "potentially vulnerable, uses TLS CBC ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
# the CBC padding which led to timing differences during MAC processing has been solved in openssl (https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20130205.txt)
|
|
# and other software. However we can't tell with reasonable effort from the outside. Thus we still issue a warning and label it experimental
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)";
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 133 ]]; then
|
|
# Likely only PSK/KRB5 ciphers are missing: display discrepancy but no warning
|
|
out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7465 REQUIRES that TLS clients and servers NEVER negotiate the use of RC4 cipher suites!
|
|
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#RC4_attacks
|
|
# https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html
|
|
#
|
|
run_rc4() {
|
|
local -i rc4_offered=0
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0
|
|
local n auth mac hexc sslv2_ciphers_hex="" sslv2_ciphers_ossl="" s
|
|
local -a normalized_hexcode hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg ossl_supported
|
|
local -i i
|
|
local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2
|
|
local -i -a index
|
|
local dhlen available="" ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers proto
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" rc4_detected=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2013-2566 CVE-2015-2808"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="RC4"
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Checking for vulnerable RC4 Ciphers "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " RC4"; out " (${cve// /, }) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no RC4 support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Get a list of all the cipher suites to test. #FIXME: This is rather ineffective as RC4 ciphers won't change.
|
|
# We should instead build a fixed list here like @ other functions
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ RC4 ]] && { "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"; }; then
|
|
hexc="$(tolower "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
sslvers[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && "$WIDE" && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" &&
|
|
[[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" || ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" || ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
sslv2_ciphers_hex+=", ${hexcode[nr_ciphers]}"
|
|
sslv2_ciphers_ossl+=":${ciph[nr_ciphers]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" =~ RC4 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:7:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}")"
|
|
sslv2_ciphers_ossl+=":${ciph[nr_ciphers]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' '' '-V')
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "$sslv2_ciphers_hex" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers_hex:2}" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
rc4_offered=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_SSL2" && [[ -n "$sslv2_ciphers_ossl" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -cipher "${sslv2_ciphers_ossl:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
rc4_offered=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ossl_supported[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != SSLv2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
sclient_supported "$proto" || continue
|
|
fi
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ossl_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ossl_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
rc4_offered=1
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if "$WIDE" && [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" || ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" || ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -qe '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
|
|
# If you use RC4 with newer protocols, you are punished harder
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_1 ]]; then
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "RC4 ciphers offered on TLS 1.1"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != SSLv2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_nonossl_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_nonossl_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
rc4_offered=1
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if "$WIDE" && [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" || ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" || ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $rc4_offered -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
"$WIDE" || pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok): "
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
neat_header
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ! "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
continue # no successful connect AND not verbose displaying each cipher
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "available"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_deemphasize "not a/v"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl && "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]] || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "-" ]]; then
|
|
rc4_detected+="${ciph[i]} "
|
|
else
|
|
rc4_detected+="${rfc_ciph[i]} "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
! "$WIDE" && pr_svrty_high "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$rc4_detected" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
outln
|
|
"$WIDE" && out " " && prln_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, Detected ciphers: $rc4_detected" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "RC4 ciphers offered"
|
|
elif [[ $nr_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "No RC4 Ciphers configured in $OPENSSL"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "RC4 ciphers not supported by local OpenSSL ($OPENSSL)"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_good "no RC4 ciphers detected (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_youknowwho() {
|
|
local cve="CVE-2013-2566"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
# NOT FIXME as there's no code: https://web.archive.org/web/20191008002003/http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/index.html
|
|
# Paper and presentation: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/paper/alFardan
|
|
# https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/12/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in/
|
|
return 0
|
|
# in a nutshell: don't use RC4, really not!
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_tls_truncation() {
|
|
# https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/workshop-program/presentation/smyth
|
|
# https://secure-resumption.com/tlsauth.pdf
|
|
#FIXME: difficult to test, is there any test available: pls let me know
|
|
:
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# see https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/
|
|
#
|
|
run_starttls_injection() {
|
|
local uds=""
|
|
local openssl_bin=""
|
|
local -i socat_pid
|
|
local -i openssl_pid
|
|
local vuln=false
|
|
local cve="CVE-2011-0411 CVE-2021-38084 CVE-2021-33515 CVE-2020-15955 CVE-2021-37844 CVE-2021-37845 CVE-2021-37846 CVE-2020-29548 CVE-2020-15955 CVE-2020-29547"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-74"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="starttls_injection"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Checking for STARTTLS injection "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " STARTTLS injection" ; out " (CVE-2011-0411, exp.) "
|
|
|
|
# We'll do a soft fail here, also no warning, as I do not expect everybody to have socat installed
|
|
if [[ -z "$SOCAT" ]]; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Need socat for this" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
outln "Need socat for this check"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$HAS_UDS2" ]] && [[ -z "$HAS_UDS" ]]; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Need OpenSSL with Unix-domain socket s_client support for this check" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
outln "Need an OpenSSL with Unix-domain socket s_client support for this check"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case $SERVICE in
|
|
smtp) fd_socket 5 "EHLO google.com"
|
|
;;
|
|
pop3) fd_socket 5 "CAPA"
|
|
;;
|
|
imap) five_random=$(tr -dc '[:upper:]' < /dev/urandom | dd bs=5 count=1 2>/dev/null)
|
|
fd_socket 5 "$five_random NOOP"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) outln "STARTTLS injection test doesn't work for $SERVICE, yet"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "STARTTLS injection test doesn't work for $SERVICE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
uds="$TEMPDIR/uds"
|
|
$SOCAT FD:5 UNIX-LISTEN:$uds &
|
|
socat_pid=$!
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_UDS"; then
|
|
openssl_bin="$OPENSSL"
|
|
elif "$HAS_UDS2"; then
|
|
openssl_bin="$OPENSSL2"
|
|
fi
|
|
# normally the interesting fallback we grep later for is in fd2 but we'll catch also stdout here
|
|
$openssl_bin s_client -unix $uds >$TMPFILE 2>&1 &
|
|
openssl_pid=$!
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && tail $TMPFILE
|
|
#FIXME: is the pattern sufficient for SMTP / POP / IMAP?
|
|
case $SERVICE in
|
|
# Mind all ' ' here!
|
|
smtp) grep -Eqa '^250-|^503 ' $TMPFILE && vuln=true ;;
|
|
pop3) grep -Eqa '^USER|^PIPELINING|^\+OK ' $TMPFILE && vuln=true ;;
|
|
imap) grep -Eqa ' OK NOOP ' $TMPFILE && vuln=true ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if "$vuln"; then
|
|
out "likely "
|
|
prln_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
kill $socat_pid 2>/dev/null
|
|
kill $openssl_pid 2>/dev/null
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test for various server implementation errors that aren't tested for elsewhere.
|
|
# Inspired by RFC 8701.
|
|
run_grease() {
|
|
local -i success
|
|
local bug_found=false
|
|
local normal_hello_ok=false
|
|
local cipher_list proto selected_cipher selected_cipher_hex="" extn rnd_bytes
|
|
local alpn_proto alpn alpn_list_len_hex extn_len_hex
|
|
local selected_alpn_protocol grease_selected_alpn_protocol
|
|
local ciph list temp curve_found
|
|
local -i i j rnd alpn_list_len extn_len debug_level=""
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
# Note: The following values were taken from RFC 8701.
|
|
# These arrays may need to be updated if the values change in the final version of this document.
|
|
local -a -r grease_cipher_suites=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" )
|
|
local -a -r grease_supported_groups=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" )
|
|
local -a -r grease_extn_values=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" )
|
|
local -r ecdhe_ciphers="cc,14, cc,13, c0,30, c0,2c, c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, c0,9b, cc,a9, cc,a8, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,77, c0,73, c0,19, cc,ac, c0,38, c0,36, c0,49, c0,4d, c0,5d, c0,61, c0,71, c0,87, c0,8b, c0,2f, c0,2b, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,76, c0,72, c0,18, c0,37, c0,35, c0,9a, c0,48, c0,4c, c0,5c, c0,60, c0,70, c0,86, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,07, c0,16, c0,33, c0,12, c0,08, c0,17, c0,34, c0,10, c0,06, c0,15, c0,3b, c0,3a, c0,39"
|
|
local jsonID="GREASE"
|
|
|
|
outln; pr_headline " Testing for server implementation bugs "; outln "\n"
|
|
|
|
# Many of the following checks work by modifying the "basic" call to
|
|
# tls_sockets() and assuming the tested-for bug is present if the
|
|
# connection fails. However, this only works if the connection succeeds
|
|
# with the "basic" call. So, keep trying different "basic" calls until
|
|
# one is found that succeeds.
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 5; i++ )); do
|
|
case $i in
|
|
0) proto="03" ; cipher_list="$TLS12_CIPHER" ;;
|
|
2) proto="02" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;;
|
|
3) proto="01" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;;
|
|
4) proto="00" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
selected_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$selected_cipher" == "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" ]] && selected_cipher_hex="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
elif "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -tls1 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL'| awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')"
|
|
else
|
|
selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL'| awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$selected_cipher_hex" ]]; then
|
|
normal_hello_ok=true
|
|
selected_cipher_hex="${selected_cipher_hex:2:2},${selected_cipher_hex:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
proto="03"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Test for yaSSL bug - server only looks at second byte of each cipher
|
|
# suite listed in ClientHello (see issue #793). First check to see if
|
|
# server ignores the ciphers in the ClientHello entirely, then check to
|
|
# see if server only looks at second byte of each offered cipher.
|
|
|
|
# Send a list of non-existent ciphers where the second byte does not match
|
|
# any existing cipher.
|
|
|
|
# Need to ensure that $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt contains the results of the
|
|
# most recent calls to tls_sockets even if tls_sockets is not successful. Setting $DEBUG to
|
|
# a non-zero value ensures this. Setting it to 1 prevents any extra information from being
|
|
# displayed.
|
|
debug_level="$DEBUG"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -eq 0 ]] && DEBUG=1
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with non-existent ciphers."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "de,d0, de,d1, d3,d2, de,d3, 00,ff"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
elif grep -q "The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server responded with a ServerHello rather than an alert even though it doesn't support any of the client-offered cipher suites."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server responded with a ServerHello rather than an alert even though it doesn't support any of the client-offered cipher suites."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
else
|
|
# Send a list of non-existent ciphers such that for each cipher that
|
|
# is defined, there is one in the list that matches in the second byte
|
|
# (but make sure list contains at more 127 ciphers).
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with non-existent ciphers, but that match existing ciphers in second byte."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "de,01, de,02, de,03, de,04, de,05, de,06, de,07, de,08, de,09, de,0a, de,0b, de,0c, de,0d, de,0e, de,0f, de,10, de,11, de,12, de,13, de,14, de,15, de,16, de,17, de,18, de,19, de,1a, de,1b, de,23, de,24, de,25, de,26, de,27, de,28, de,29, de,2a, de,2b, de,2c, de,2d, de,2e, de,2f, de,30, de,31, de,32, de,33, de,34, de,35, de,36, de,37, de,38, de,39, de,3a, de,3b, de,3c, de,3d, de,3e, de,3f, de,40, de,41, de,42, de,43, de,44, de,45, de,46, de,60, de,61, de,62, de,63, de,64, de,65, de,66, de,67, de,68, de,69, de,6a, de,6b, de,6c, de,6d, de,72, de,73, de,74, de,75, de,76, de,77, de,78, de,79, de,84, de,85, de,86, de,87, de,88, de,89, de,96, de,97, de,98, de,99, de,9a, de,9b, de,9c, de,9d, de,9e, de,9f, de,a0, de,a1, de,a2, de,a3, de,a4, de,a5, de,a6, de,a7, de,ba, de,bb, de,bc, de,bd, de,be, de,bf, de,c0, de,c1, de,c2, de,c3, de,c4, de,c5, 00,ff"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
elif grep -q " The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server only compares against second byte in each cipher suite in ClientHello."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server only compares against second byte in each cipher suite in ClientHello."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
DEBUG="$debug_level"
|
|
|
|
# Check that server ignores unrecognized extensions
|
|
# see RFC 8701
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
# Try multiple different randomly-generated GREASE extensions,
|
|
# but make final test use zero-length extension value, just to
|
|
# be sure that works before testing server with a zero-length
|
|
# extension as the final extension.
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= 5; i++ )); do
|
|
# Create a random extension using one of the GREASE values.
|
|
rnd=$RANDOM%${#grease_extn_values[@]}
|
|
extn="${grease_extn_values[rnd]}"
|
|
if [[ $i -eq 5 ]]; then
|
|
extn_len=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Not sure what a good upper bound is here, but a key_share
|
|
# extension with an ffdhe8192 would be over 1024 bytes.
|
|
extn_len=$RANDOM%1024
|
|
fi
|
|
extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len)
|
|
extn+=",${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2}"
|
|
for (( j=0; j <= extn_len-2; j+=2 )); do
|
|
rnd_bytes="$(printf "%04x" $RANDOM)"
|
|
extn+=",${rnd_bytes:0:2},${rnd_bytes:2:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $j -lt $extn_len ]]; then
|
|
rnd_bytes="$(printf "%04x" $RANDOM)"
|
|
extn+=",${rnd_bytes:0:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo -en "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized extension"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -n ": $extn"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" "$extn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an unrecognized extension."
|
|
outln " extension used in failed test: $extn"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains an unrecognized extension: $extn"
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
else
|
|
# Check for inability to handle empty last extension (see PR #792 and
|
|
# https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg19720.html).
|
|
# (Since this test also uses an unrecognized extension, only run this
|
|
# test if the previous test passed, and use the final extension value
|
|
# from that test to ensure that the only difference is the location
|
|
# of the extension.)
|
|
|
|
# The "extra extensions" parameter needs to include the padding and
|
|
# heartbeat extensions, since otherwise prepare_tls_clienthello()
|
|
# will add these extensions to the end of the ClientHello.
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with empty last extension."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" "
|
|
00,0f, 00,01, 01,
|
|
00,15, 00,56,
|
|
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
|
|
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
|
|
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
|
|
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
|
|
$extn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if last extension in ClientHello is empty."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if last extension in ClientHello is empty."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check for SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG.
|
|
# Send a ClientHello with 129 cipher suites (including 0x00,0xff) to see
|
|
# if adding a 129th cipher to the list causes a failure.
|
|
#TODO: we need to clarify whether the mit is hit at 128 or 129 ciphers.
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with 129 cipher suites."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "00,27, $cipher_list"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello includes more than 128 cipher suites."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello includes more than 128 cipher suites."
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=true
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check for ClientHello size bug. According to RFC 7586 "at least one TLS
|
|
# implementation is known to hang the connection when [a] ClientHello
|
|
# record [with a length between 256 and 511 bytes] is received."
|
|
# If the length of the host name is more than 75 bytes (which would make
|
|
# $SNI more than 87 bytes), then the ClientHello would be more than 511
|
|
# bytes if the server_name extension were included. Removing the SNI
|
|
# extension, however, may not be an option, since the server may reject the
|
|
# connection attempt for that reason.
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" != 00 ]] && [[ ${#SNI} -le 87 ]]; then
|
|
# Normally prepare_tls_clienthello() will add a padding extension with a length
|
|
# that will make the ClientHello be 512 bytes in length. Providing an "extra
|
|
# extensions" parameter with a short padding extension prevents that.
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with length between 256 and 511 bytes."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" "00,15,00,01,00"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello is between 256 and 511 bytes in length."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello is between 256 and 511 bytes in length."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check that server ignores unrecognized cipher suite values
|
|
# see RFC 8701
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok"; then
|
|
list=""
|
|
for ciph in "${grease_cipher_suites[@]}"; do
|
|
list+=", $ciph"
|
|
done
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized cipher suite values."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${list:2}, $selected_cipher_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains unrecognized cipher suite values."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains unrecognized cipher suite values."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check that servers that support ECDHE cipher suites ignore
|
|
# unrecognized named group values.
|
|
# see RFC 8701
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
# Send a ClientHello that lists all of the ECDHE cipher suites
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$ecdhe_ciphers, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
# Send the same ClientHello as before but with an unrecognized
|
|
# named group value added. Make the unrecognized value the first
|
|
# one in the list replacing one of the values in the original list,
|
|
# but don't replace the value that was selected by the server.
|
|
rnd=$RANDOM%${#grease_supported_groups[@]}
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
curve_found="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
if [[ "$curve_found" == "ECDH" ]]; then
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$curve_found" == "B-571" ]]; then
|
|
extn="
|
|
00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492
|
|
00, 3e, 00, 3c, # lengths
|
|
${grease_supported_groups[rnd]}, 00, 0e, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b,
|
|
00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08,
|
|
00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13,
|
|
00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11"
|
|
else
|
|
extn="
|
|
00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492
|
|
00, 3e, 00, 3c, # lengths
|
|
${grease_supported_groups[rnd]}, 00, 0d, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b,
|
|
00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08,
|
|
00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13,
|
|
00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized named group value in supported_groups extension."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$ecdhe_ciphers, 00,ff" "" "$extn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains a supported_groups extension with an unrecognized named group value (${grease_supported_groups[rnd]})."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains a supported_groups extension with an unrecognized named group value (${grease_supported_groups[rnd]})."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check that servers that support the ALPN extension ignore
|
|
# unrecognized ALPN values.
|
|
# see RFC 8701
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]] && [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
for alpn_proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do
|
|
alpn+=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")"
|
|
done
|
|
alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3
|
|
alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len)
|
|
extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2
|
|
extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len)
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "all" "00,10,${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
else
|
|
selected_alpn_protocol="$(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')"
|
|
# If using a "normal" ALPN extension worked, then add an unrecognized
|
|
# ALPN value to the beginning of the extension and try again.
|
|
alpn_proto="ZZ" # "ZZ" = "{0x5A,0x5A}"
|
|
alpn=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")$alpn"
|
|
alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3
|
|
alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len)
|
|
extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2
|
|
extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len)
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized ALPN value in application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "all" "00,10,${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension with an unrecognized ALPN value."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension with an unrecognized ALPN value."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
else
|
|
grease_selected_alpn_protocol="$(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')"
|
|
if [[ -z "$grease_selected_alpn_protocol" ]] && [[ -n "$selected_alpn_protocol" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server did not ignore unrecognized ALPN value in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server did not ignore unrecognized ALPN value in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
elif [[ "$grease_selected_alpn_protocol" == $alpn_proto ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server selected GREASE ALPN value ($alpn_proto) in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server selected GREASE ALPN value ($alpn_proto) in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers ignore
|
|
# an unrecognized named group value along with a corresponding
|
|
# unrecognized key share
|
|
# see https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22322.html
|
|
# and https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22319.html
|
|
|
|
# TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers ignore unrecognized
|
|
# values in the supported_versions extension.
|
|
# see https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22319.html
|
|
|
|
# TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers don't require the
|
|
# psk_key_exchange_modes extension to be present in the ClientHello.
|
|
|
|
if ! "$bug_found"; then
|
|
outln " No bugs found."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "No bugs found."
|
|
#return 0
|
|
else
|
|
#return 1
|
|
:
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
#FIXME: No client side error cases where we want to return 1?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# If the server supports any non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport,
|
|
# check if the server is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) attacks.
|
|
# See "Return Of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)" by Hanno Böck,
|
|
# Juraj Somorovsky, and Craig Young (https://robotattack.org).
|
|
#
|
|
run_robot() {
|
|
local tls_hexcode="03"
|
|
# A list of all non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport
|
|
local cipherlist="00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,7b, ff,00, ff,01, ff,02, ff,03, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,7a, 00,05, 00,04, 00,0a, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01"
|
|
# A list of all non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport and that use AES in either GCM or CBC mode.
|
|
local aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist="00,9d, 00,9c, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,3c, 00,2f"
|
|
local padded_pms encrypted_pms cke_prefix client_key_exchange rnd_pad
|
|
local rnd_pms="aa112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899"
|
|
local rnd_padding_bytes="abcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcd"
|
|
local change_cipher_spec finished resp
|
|
local -a response
|
|
local -i i subret len iteration testnum pubkeybytes
|
|
local pubkeybits
|
|
local vulnerable=false send_ccs_finished=true
|
|
local -i start_time end_time robottimeout=$MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
local cve="CVE-2017-17382 CVE-2017-17427 CVE-2017-17428 CVE-2017-13098 CVE-2017-1000385 CVE-2017-13099 CVE-2016-6883 CVE-2012-5081 CVE-2017-6168"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-203"
|
|
local jsonID="ROBOT"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " ROBOT "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$HAS_PKUTIL" ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkeyutl utility."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkeyutl utility." "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_PKEY"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility." "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="03"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="02"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="01"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="00"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Some hosts are only vulnerable with GCM. First send a list of
|
|
# ciphers that use AES in GCM or CBC mode, with the GCM ciphers
|
|
# listed first, and then try all ciphers that use RSA key transport
|
|
# if there is no connection on the first try.
|
|
tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist, 00,ff"
|
|
subret=$?
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] || [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
cipherlist="$aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist"
|
|
tls_hexcode="${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$tls_hexcode" != "03" ]]; then
|
|
cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$tls_hexcode" ", $cipherlist")"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$cipherlist, 00,ff"
|
|
subret=$?
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$tls_hexcode" ", $cipherlist")"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}"
|
|
elif [[ $subret -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_best "Server does not support any cipher suites that use RSA key transport"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no RSA key transport cipher" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Run the tests in two iterations. In iteration 0, send 5 different client
|
|
# key exchange (CKE) messages followed by change cipher spec (CCS) and
|
|
# Finished messages, and check whether the server provided the same
|
|
# response in each case. If the server didn't provide the same response
|
|
# for all five messages in iteration 0, then it is vulnerable. Otherwise
|
|
# try a second time (iteration 1) with the same CKE messages, but without
|
|
# sending the CCS or Finished messages.
|
|
# Iterations 0 and 1 are run with a short timeout waiting for the server
|
|
# to respond to the CKE message. If the server was found to be potentially
|
|
# vulnerable in iteration 0 or 1 and testssl.sh timed out waiting for a
|
|
# response in some cases, then retry the test using a longer timeout value.
|
|
for (( iteration=0; iteration < 3; iteration++ )); do
|
|
if [[ $iteration -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
# If the server was found to be vulnerable in iteration 0, then
|
|
# there's no need to try the alternative message flow.
|
|
"$vulnerable" && continue
|
|
send_ccs_finished=false
|
|
elif [[ $iteration -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
# The tests are being rerun, so reset the vulnerable flag.
|
|
vulnerable=false
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( testnum=0; testnum < 5; testnum++ )); do
|
|
response[testnum]="untested"
|
|
done
|
|
for (( testnum=0; testnum < 5; testnum++ )); do
|
|
tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$cipherlist, 00,ff" "all" "" "" "false"
|
|
|
|
# Create the padded premaster secret to encrypt. The padding should be
|
|
# of the form "00 02 <random> 00 <TLS version> <premaster secret>."
|
|
# However, for each test except testnum=0 the padding will be
|
|
# made incorrect in some way, as specified below.
|
|
|
|
# Determine the length of the public key and create the <random> bytes.
|
|
# <random> should be a length that makes total length of $padded_pms
|
|
# the same as the length of the public key. <random> should contain no 00 bytes.
|
|
pubkeybits="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | \
|
|
$OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub 2>>$ERRFILE | awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }')"
|
|
pubkeybits="${pubkeybits%%bit*}"
|
|
pubkeybytes=$pubkeybits/8
|
|
[[ $((pubkeybits%8)) -ne 0 ]] && pubkeybytes+=1
|
|
rnd_pad="${rnd_padding_bytes:0:$((2*(pubkeybytes-51)))}"
|
|
for (( len=$((${#rnd_pad}/2)); len < pubkeybytes-52; len+=2 )); do
|
|
rnd_pad+="abcd"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $len -eq $pubkeybytes-52 ]] && rnd_pad+="ab"
|
|
|
|
case "$testnum" in
|
|
# correct padding
|
|
0) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}00${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}${rnd_pms}" ;;
|
|
# wrong first two bytes
|
|
1) padded_pms="4117${rnd_pad}00${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}${rnd_pms}" ;;
|
|
# 0x00 on a wrong position
|
|
2) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}11${rnd_pms}0011" ;;
|
|
# no 0x00 in the middle
|
|
3) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}111111${rnd_pms}" ;;
|
|
# wrong version number (according to Klima / Pokorny / Rosa paper)
|
|
4) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}000202${rnd_pms}" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Encrypt the padded premaster secret using the server's public key.
|
|
encrypted_pms="$(hex2binary "$padded_pms" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL pkeyutl -encrypt -certin -inkey $HOSTCERT -pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:none 2>/dev/null | \
|
|
hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02x"')"
|
|
if [[ -z "$encrypted_pms" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0300" ]]; then
|
|
socksend ",x15, x03, x00, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0
|
|
else
|
|
socksend ",x15, x03, x01, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0
|
|
fi
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
prln_fixme "Conversion of public key failed around line $((LINENO - 9))"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Conversion of public key failed around line $((LINENO - 10)) "
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Create the client key exchange message.
|
|
len=${#encrypted_pms}/2
|
|
cke_prefix="16${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}$(printf "%04x" $((len+6)))10$(printf "%06x" $((len+2)))$(printf "%04x" $len)"
|
|
encrypted_pms="$cke_prefix$encrypted_pms"
|
|
len=${#encrypted_pms}
|
|
client_key_exchange=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
client_key_exchange+=", x${encrypted_pms:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# The contents of change cipher spec are fixed.
|
|
change_cipher_spec=", x14, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}, x00, x01, x01"
|
|
|
|
# Send an arbitrary Finished message.
|
|
finished=", x16, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}
|
|
, x00, x40, x6e, x49, x65, x68, x00, x46, x79, xfd, x5a, x57, xdc
|
|
, x3e, xef, xb2, xd2, xac, xe0, x8c, x54, x2d, x5f, x00, x87, xdb
|
|
, xb6, xe3, x77, x2c, x9d, x88, x27, x38, x98, x7d, xcd, x7e, xac
|
|
, xdd, x5d, x72, xbe, x24, x0d, x20, x36, x14, x0e, x94, x51, xde
|
|
, xa0, xb6, xc7, x56, x28, xd8, xa1, xcb, x24, xb9, x03, xd0, x7c, x50"
|
|
|
|
if "$send_ccs_finished"; then
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending client key exchange, change cipher spec, finished... "
|
|
socksend "$client_key_exchange$change_cipher_spec$finished" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending client key exchange... "
|
|
socksend "$client_key_exchange" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "reading server error response..."
|
|
start_time=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s")
|
|
sockread 32768 $robottimeout
|
|
subret=$?
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
end_time=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s")
|
|
resp=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02x"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
response[testnum]="${resp%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
# The first time a response is received to a client key
|
|
# exchange message, measure the amount of time it took to
|
|
# receive a response and set the timeout value for future
|
|
# tests to 2 seconds longer than it took to receive a response.
|
|
[[ $iteration -ne 2 ]] && [[ $robottimeout -eq $MAX_WAITSOCK ]] && \
|
|
[[ $((end_time-start_time)) -lt $((MAX_WAITSOCK-2)) ]] && \
|
|
robottimeout=$((end_time-start_time+2))
|
|
else
|
|
response[testnum]="Timeout waiting for alert"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nresponse[$testnum] = ${response[testnum]}"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && parse_tls_serverhello "${response[testnum]}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
|
|
# Don't continue testing if it has already been determined that
|
|
# tests need to be rerun with a longer timeout.
|
|
if [[ $iteration -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= testnum; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${response[i]}" != "${response[$((i-1))]}" ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${response[i]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" || \
|
|
"${response[$((i-1))]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]]; then
|
|
vulnerable=true
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
"$vulnerable" && break
|
|
fi
|
|
# Don't continue testing if it has already been determined that the server is
|
|
# strongly vulnerable.
|
|
if [[ $testnum -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${response[1]}" != "${response[2]}" ]] && break
|
|
elif [[ $testnum -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${response[2]}" != "${response[3]}" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "${response[0]}" != "${response[1]}" ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
# If the server provided the same error message for all tests, then this
|
|
# is an indication that the server is not vulnerable.
|
|
if [[ "${response[0]}" != "${response[1]}" ]] || [[ "${response[1]}" != "${response[2]}" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[2]}" != "${response[3]}" ]] || [[ "${response[3]}" != "${response[4]}" ]]; then
|
|
vulnerable=true
|
|
|
|
# If the test was run with a short timeout and was found to be
|
|
# potentially vulnerable due to some tests timing out, then
|
|
# verify the results by rerunning with a longer timeout.
|
|
if [[ $robottimeout -eq $MAX_WAITSOCK ]]; then
|
|
break
|
|
elif [[ "${response[0]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[1]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[2]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[3]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[4]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]]; then
|
|
robottimeout=10
|
|
else
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
! "$vulnerable" && [[ $iteration -eq 1 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$vulnerable"; then
|
|
if [[ "${response[1]}" == "${response[2]}" ]] && [[ "${response[2]}" == "${response[3]}" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln " - weakly vulnerable as the attack would take too long"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, but the attack would take too long" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to ROBOT"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
old_fart() {
|
|
out "Get precompiled bins or compile "
|
|
pr_url "https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl"
|
|
outln "."
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "old_fart" "WARN" "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is an old fart... . It doesn\'t make much sense to proceed. Get precompiled bins or compile https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl ."
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is an old fart... . It doesn't make much sense to proceed." $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# try very hard to determine the install path to get ahold of the mapping file and the CA bundles
|
|
# TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR can be supplied via environment so that the cipher mapping and CA bundles can be found
|
|
# www.carbonwind.net/TLS_Cipher_Suites_Project/tls_ssl_cipher_suites_simple_table_all.htm
|
|
get_install_dir() {
|
|
[[ -z "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" ]] && TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -r "$RUN_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]]; then
|
|
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$RUN_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -z "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" ]] && TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$RUN_DIR" # probably TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -r "$RUN_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$RUN_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# we haven't found the cipher file yet...
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p readlink &>/dev/null ; then
|
|
readlink -f ls &>/dev/null && \
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(readlink -f "$(basename "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" || \
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(readlink "$(basename "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")"
|
|
# not sure whether Darwin has -f
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# still no cipher mapping file:
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p realpath &>/dev/null ; then
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(realpath "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")"
|
|
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# still no cipher mapping file (and realpath is not present):
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p readlink &>/dev/null ; then
|
|
readlink -f ls &>/dev/null && \
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" || \
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(readlink "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")"
|
|
# not sure whether Darwin has -f
|
|
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl-only"
|
|
debugme echo "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE"
|
|
prln_warning "\nATTENTION: No cipher mapping file found!"
|
|
outln "Please note from 2.9 on $PROG_NAME needs files in \"\$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/\" to function correctly."
|
|
outln
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame "Type \"yes\" to ignore this warning and proceed at your own risk" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
TLS_DATA_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/tls_data.txt"
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$TLS_DATA_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "\nATTENTION: No TLS data file found -- needed for socket-based handshakes"
|
|
outln "Please note from 2.9 on $PROG_NAME needs files in \"\$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/\" to function correctly."
|
|
outln
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame "Type \"yes\" to ignore this warning and proceed at your own risk" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
else
|
|
: # see #705, in a nutshell: not portable to initialize a global array inside a function. Thus it'll be done in main part below
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_openssl_suffix() {
|
|
local naming_ext="$(uname).$(uname -m)"
|
|
local uname_arch="$(uname -m)"
|
|
local myarch_suffix=""
|
|
|
|
[[ $uname_arch =~ 64 ]] && myarch_suffix=64 || myarch_suffix=32
|
|
if [[ -f "$1/openssl" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl" ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$1/openssl"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ -f "$1/openssl.$naming_ext" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl.$naming_ext" ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$1/openssl.$naming_ext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ -f "$1/openssl.$uname_arch" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl.$uname_arch" ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$1/openssl.$uname_arch"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ -f "$1/openssl$myarch_suffix" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl$myarch_suffix" ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$1/openssl$myarch_suffix"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
find_openssl_binary() {
|
|
local s_client_has=$TEMPDIR/s_client_has.txt
|
|
local s_client_has2=$TEMPDIR/s_client_has2.txt
|
|
local s_client_starttls_has=$TEMPDIR/s_client_starttls_has.txt
|
|
local s_client_starttls_has2=$TEMPDIR/s_client_starttls_has2
|
|
local openssl_location cwd=""
|
|
local ossl_wo_dev_info
|
|
local curve
|
|
local -a curves_ossl=("sect163k1" "sect163r1" "sect163r2" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "sect233k1" "sect233r1" "sect239k1" "sect283k1" "sect283r1" "sect409k1" "sect409r1" "sect571k1" "sect571r1" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "prime192v1" "secp224k1" "secp224r1" "secp256k1" "prime256v1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448" "brainpoolP256r1tls13" "brainpoolP384r1tls13" "brainpoolP512r1tls13" "ffdhe2048" "ffdhe3072" "ffdhe4096" "ffdhe6144" "ffdhe8192")
|
|
|
|
# 0. check environment variable whether it's executable
|
|
if [[ -n "$OPENSSL" ]] && [[ ! -x "$OPENSSL" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "\ncannot find specified (\$OPENSSL=$OPENSSL) binary."
|
|
tmln_out " Looking some place else ..."
|
|
elif [[ -x "$OPENSSL" ]]; then
|
|
: # 1. all ok supplied $OPENSSL was found and has executable bit set -- testrun comes below
|
|
elif [[ -e "/mnt/c/Windows/System32/bash.exe" ]] && test_openssl_suffix "$(dirname "$(type -p openssl)")"; then
|
|
# 2. otherwise, only if on Bash on Windows, use system binaries only.
|
|
SYSTEM2="WSL"
|
|
# Workaround for delayed responses of Windows DNS when using "invalid.", see #1738, #1812.
|
|
[[ $NXCONNECT == invalid. ]] && NXCONNECT=127.0.0.1:0
|
|
elif test_openssl_suffix "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR"; then
|
|
: # 3. otherwise try openssl in path of testssl.sh
|
|
elif test_openssl_suffix "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/bin"; then
|
|
: # 4. otherwise here, this is supposed to be the standard --platform independent path in the future!!!
|
|
elif test_openssl_suffix "$(dirname "$(type -p openssl)")"; then
|
|
: # 5. we tried hard and failed, so now we use the system binaries
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ ! -x "$OPENSSL" ]] && fatal "cannot exec or find any openssl binary" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
|
|
# The former detection only was flawed, because when the system supplied openssl.cnf file
|
|
# couldn't be parsed by our openssl it bailed out here with a misleading error, see #1982.
|
|
# Now we try with another version of the config file and if it still fails we bail out.
|
|
if ! $OPENSSL version -d >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf"
|
|
if ! $OPENSSL version -d >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
|
|
fatal "cannot exec or find any openssl binary" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
else
|
|
debugme1 echo "We provide our own openssl.cnf file as the one from your system cannot be used"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20150815130800/http://openssl.org/news/openssl-notes.html
|
|
OSSL_NAME=$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
OSSL_VER=$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null | awk -F' ' '{ print $2 }')
|
|
OSSL_VER_MAJOR="${OSSL_VER%%\.*}"
|
|
ossl_wo_dev_info="${OSSL_VER%%-*}"
|
|
OSSL_VER_MINOR="${ossl_wo_dev_info#$OSSL_VER_MAJOR\.}"
|
|
OSSL_VER_MINOR="${OSSL_VER_MINOR%%[a-zA-Z]*}"
|
|
OSSL_VER_APPENDIX="${OSSL_VER#$OSSL_VER_MAJOR\.$OSSL_VER_MINOR}"
|
|
OSSL_VER_PLATFORM=$($OPENSSL version -p 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^platform: //')
|
|
OSSL_BUILD_DATE=$($OPENSSL version -a 2>/dev/null | grep '^built' | sed -e 's/built on//' -e 's/: ... //' -e 's/: //' -e 's/ UTC//' -e 's/ +0000//' -e 's/.000000000//')
|
|
|
|
# see #190, reverting logic: unless otherwise proved openssl has no dh bits
|
|
case "$OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR" in
|
|
1.0.2|1.1.0|1.1.1|3.*) HAS_DH_BITS=true ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then
|
|
[[ ${OSSL_VER//./} -ge 210 ]] && HAS_DH_BITS=true
|
|
if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "LibreSSL in native ssl mode is not a good choice for testing INSECURE features!"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
initialize_engine
|
|
|
|
openssl_location="$(type -p $OPENSSL)"
|
|
[[ -n "$GIT_REL" ]] && \
|
|
cwd="$PWD" || \
|
|
cwd="$RUN_DIR"
|
|
if [[ "$openssl_location" == ${PWD}/bin ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL_LOCATION="\$PWD/bin/$(basename "$openssl_location")"
|
|
elif [[ "$openssl_location" =~ $cwd ]] && [[ "$cwd" != '.' ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL_LOCATION="${openssl_location%%$cwd}"
|
|
else
|
|
OPENSSL_LOCATION="$openssl_location"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
OSSL_CIPHERS_S=""
|
|
HAS_SSL2=false
|
|
HAS_SSL3=false
|
|
HAS_TLS1=false
|
|
HAS_TLS11=false
|
|
HAS_TLS12=false
|
|
HAS_TLS13=false
|
|
HAS_X448=false
|
|
HAS_X25519=false
|
|
HAS_SIGALGS=false
|
|
HAS_NO_SSL2=false
|
|
HAS_NOSERVERNAME=false
|
|
HAS_CIPHERSUITES=false
|
|
HAS_SECLEVEL=false
|
|
HAS_COMP=false
|
|
HAS_NO_COMP=false
|
|
HAS_CURVES=false
|
|
OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES=""
|
|
HAS_PKEY=false
|
|
HAS_PKUTIL=false
|
|
HAS_ALPN=false
|
|
HAS_NPN=false
|
|
HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=false
|
|
HAS_PROXY=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER2=false
|
|
HAS_POSTGRES=false
|
|
HAS_MYSQL=false
|
|
HAS_LMTP=false
|
|
HAS_SIEVE=false
|
|
HAS_NNTP=false
|
|
HAS_IRC=false
|
|
HAS_CHACHA20=false
|
|
HAS_AES128_GCM=false
|
|
HAS_AES256_GCM=false
|
|
HAS_ZLIB=false
|
|
HAS_UDS=false
|
|
HAS_UDS2=false
|
|
TRUSTED1ST=""
|
|
HAS_ENABLE_PHA=false
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers -s 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || OSSL_CIPHERS_S="-s"
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -ssl2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_SSL2=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -ssl3 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_SSL3=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -tls1 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_TLS1=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -tls1_1 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_TLS11=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -tls1_2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_TLS12=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -tls1_3 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_TLS13=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -no_ssl2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_NO_SSL2=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL genpkey -algorithm X448 2>&1 | grep -aq "not found" || HAS_X448=true
|
|
$OPENSSL genpkey -algorithm X25519 2>&1 | grep -aq "not found" || HAS_X25519=true
|
|
$OPENSSL pkey -help 2>&1 | grep -q Error || HAS_PKEY=true
|
|
$OPENSSL pkeyutl 2>&1 | grep -q Error || HAS_PKUTIL=true
|
|
|
|
# Below and at other occurrences we do a little trick using "$NXCONNECT" to avoid plain and
|
|
# link level DNS lookups. See issue #1418 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6761#section-6.4
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -tls1_3 -sigalgs PSS+SHA256:PSS+SHA384 -connect $NXCONNECT </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_SIGALGS=true
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -noservername </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_NOSERVERNAME=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -ciphersuites </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_CIPHERSUITES=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers @SECLEVEL=0:ALL > /dev/null 2> /dev/null && HAS_SECLEVEL=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -comp </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_COMP=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -no_comp </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_NO_COMP=true
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS=$(count_ciphers "$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' 'ALL')")
|
|
|
|
# The following statement works with OpenSSL 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0 and LibreSSL 3.4
|
|
if $OPENSSL s_client -curves </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then
|
|
# This is e.g. for LibreSSL (tested with version 3.4.1): WSL users will get "127.0.0.1:0" here,
|
|
# all other "invalid.:0". We need a port here, in any case!
|
|
# The $OPENSSL connect call deliberately fails: when the curve isn't available with
|
|
# "getaddrinfo: Name or service not known", newer LibreSSL with "Failed to set groups".
|
|
for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -groups $curve -connect ${NXCONNECT%:*}:0 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -Eiaq "Error with command|unknown option|Failed to set groups"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES+=" $curve "
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
HAS_CURVES=true
|
|
for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do
|
|
# Same as above, we just don't need a port for invalid.
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -curves $curve -connect $NXCONNECT </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -Eiaq "Error with command|unknown option"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES+=" $curve "
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# For the following we feel safe enough to query the s_client help functions.
|
|
# That was not good enough for the previous lookups
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -help 2>$s_client_has
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -starttls foo </dev/null 2>$s_client_starttls_has
|
|
|
|
grep -qe '-proxy' $s_client_has && HAS_PROXY=true
|
|
grep -qwe '-alpn' $s_client_has && HAS_ALPN=true
|
|
grep -qwe '-nextprotoneg' $s_client_has && HAS_NPN=true
|
|
|
|
grep -qwe '-fallback_scsv' $s_client_has && HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=true
|
|
|
|
# the output from 1.0.2 and 1.1.1/3.0.x is quite different
|
|
grep -q 'xmpp' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_XMPP=true
|
|
grep -Eq 'xmpp-server|xmpp\[-server\]' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_XMPP_SERVER=true
|
|
|
|
grep -q 'postgres' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_POSTGRES=true
|
|
grep -q 'mysql' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_MYSQL=true
|
|
grep -q 'lmtp' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_LMTP=true
|
|
grep -q 'sieve' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_SIEVE=true
|
|
grep -q 'nntp' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_NNTP=true
|
|
grep -q 'irc' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_IRC=true
|
|
|
|
grep -q 'Unix-domain socket' $s_client_has && HAS_UDS=true
|
|
|
|
grep -qe '-enable_pha' $s_client_has && HAS_ENABLE_PHA=true
|
|
|
|
# Now check whether the standard $OPENSSL has Unix-domain socket and xmpp-server support. If
|
|
# not check /usr/bin/openssl -- if available. This is more a kludge which we shouldn't use for
|
|
# every openssl feature. At some point we need to decide which with openssl version we go.
|
|
# We also check, whether there's /usr/bin/openssl which has TLS 1.3
|
|
OPENSSL2=/usr/bin/openssl
|
|
if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ ! $OSSL_VER =~ 1.1.1 ]] && [[ ! $OSSL_VER_MAJOR =~ 3 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -x $OPENSSL2 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL2 s_client -help 2>$s_client_has2
|
|
$OPENSSL2 s_client -starttls foo 2>$s_client_starttls_has2
|
|
grep -q 'Unix-domain socket' $s_client_has2 && HAS_UDS2=true
|
|
grep -q 'xmpp-server' $s_client_starttls_has2 && HAS_XMPP_SERVER2=true
|
|
# Likely we don't need the following second check here, see 6 lines above
|
|
if grep -wq 'tls1_3' $s_client_has2 && [[ $OPENSSL != /usr/bin/openssl ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL2_HAS_TLS_1_3=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -chacha20 -K 12345678901234567890123456789012 -iv 01000000123456789012345678901234 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_CHACHA20=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -aes-128-gcm -K 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef -iv 0123456789abcdef01234567 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_AES128_GCM=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -aes-256-gcm -K 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef -iv 0123456789abcdef01234567 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_AES256_GCM=true
|
|
|
|
[[ "$(echo -e "\x78\x9C\xAB\xCA\xC9\x4C\xE2\x02\x00\x06\x20\x01\xBC" | $OPENSSL zlib -d 2>/dev/null)" == zlib ]] && HAS_ZLIB=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL verify -trusted_first </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -q '^usage' || TRUSTED1ST="-trusted_first"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$CONNECT_TIMEOUT" ]] || [[ -n "$OPENSSL_TIMEOUT" ]]; then
|
|
# We don't set a general timeout as we might not have "timeout" installed and we only
|
|
# do what is instructed. Thus we check first what the command line params were,
|
|
# then we proceed
|
|
if type -p timeout >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
# There are different versions of "timeout". Check whether --preserve-status is supported
|
|
if timeout --help 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'preserve-status'; then
|
|
TIMEOUT_CMD="timeout --preserve-status"
|
|
else
|
|
TIMEOUT_CMD="timeout"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
TIMEOUT_CMD=""
|
|
outln
|
|
fatal "You specified a connect or openssl timeout but the binary \"timeout\" couldn't be found " $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
if [[ -n $OPENSSL_TIMEOUT ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$TIMEOUT_CMD $OPENSSL_TIMEOUT $OPENSSL"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
find_socat() {
|
|
local result""
|
|
|
|
result=$(type -p socat)
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -x $result ]] && $result -V 2>&1 | grep -iaq 'socat version' ; then
|
|
SOCAT=$result
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
check4openssl_oldfarts() {
|
|
case "$OSSL_VER" in
|
|
0.9.7*|0.9.6*|0.9.5*)
|
|
# 0.9.5a was latest in 0.9.5 an released 2000/4/1, that'll NOT suffice for this test
|
|
old_fart ;;
|
|
0.9.8)
|
|
case $OSSL_VER_APPENDIX in
|
|
a|b|c|d|e) old_fart;; # no SNI!
|
|
# other than that we leave this for MacOSX and FreeBSD but it's a pain and likely gives false negatives/positives
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then ## mm: Patch for libressl
|
|
prln_warning " Your \"$OPENSSL\" is way too old (<version 1.0) !"
|
|
case $SYSTEM in
|
|
*BSD|Darwin)
|
|
out " Please use binary provided in \$INSTALLDIR/bin/ or from ports/brew or compile from "
|
|
pr_url "github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl"; outln "."
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "too_old_openssl" "WARN" "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is way too old. Please use binary provided in \$INSTALLDIR/bin/ or from ports/brew or compile from github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl ." ;;
|
|
*) out " Update openssl binaries or compile from "
|
|
pr_url "https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl"; outln "."
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "too_old_openssl" "WARN" "Update openssl binaries or compile from https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl .";;
|
|
esac
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to accept false negatives or positives" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# FreeBSD needs to have /dev/fd mounted. This is a friendly hint, see #258
|
|
check_bsd_mount() {
|
|
if [[ "$(uname)" == FreeBSD ]]; then
|
|
if ! mount | grep -q "^devfs"; then
|
|
outln "you seem to run $PROG_NAME= in a jail. Hopefully you're did \"mount -t fdescfs fdesc /dev/fd\""
|
|
elif mount | grep '/dev/fd' | grep -q fdescfs; then
|
|
:
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "You need to mount fdescfs on FreeBSD: \"mount -t fdescfs fdesc /dev/fd\"" $ERR_OTHERCLIENT
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# It's important to avoid certain locales as the impact bash's pattern matching, see #1860
|
|
# and comment in #2100
|
|
#
|
|
setup_lc_collate() {
|
|
local l=""
|
|
local msg='locale(1) support for any of "C, POSIX, C.UTF-8, en_US.UTF-8, en_GB.UTF-8" missing'
|
|
local found=false
|
|
|
|
type -p locale &> /dev/null && HAS_LOCALE=true
|
|
if ! "$HAS_LOCALE"; then
|
|
# likely docker container or any other minimal environment. This should work(tm)
|
|
LC_COLLATE=C
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for l in C POSIX C.UTF-8 en_US.UTF-8 en_GB.UTF-8; do
|
|
locale -a | grep -q $l
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && continue
|
|
export LC_COLLATE=$l
|
|
found=true
|
|
break
|
|
done
|
|
if ! "$found"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$msg\n"
|
|
# we can't use fileout yet as it messes up JSON output, see #2103
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This sets the PRINTF command for writing into TCP sockets. It is needed because
|
|
# The shell builtin printf flushes the write buffer at every \n, ("\x0a") which
|
|
# in turn means a new TCP fragment. That causes a slight performance penalty and
|
|
# some F5s to hiccup, see #1113. Unfortunately this can be used only with GNU's
|
|
# and OpenBSD's /usr/bin/printf -- FreeBSD + OS X can't do this. Thus here we need
|
|
# to pipe through dd or cat, see socksend() and socksend_clienthello(). An empty
|
|
# $PRINTF signals the bash internal printf which then uses cat as a stdout buffer.
|
|
# A better solution needs to follow.
|
|
#
|
|
choose_printf() {
|
|
local p ptf
|
|
|
|
ptf="$(type -aP printf)"
|
|
if [[ -n "$ptf" ]]; then
|
|
for p in $ptf; do
|
|
if $p "\xc0\x14\xc0\xff\xee" | hexdump -C | grep -q 'c0 14 c0 ff ee'; then
|
|
PRINTF=$p
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if type -t printf >/dev/null; then
|
|
PRINTF=""
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fatal "Neither external printf nor shell internal found. " $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
help() {
|
|
cat << EOF
|
|
|
|
"$PROG_NAME [options] <URI>" or "$PROG_NAME <options>"
|
|
|
|
"$PROG_NAME <option>", where <option> is mostly standalone and one of:
|
|
|
|
--help what you're looking at
|
|
-b, --banner displays banner + version of $PROG_NAME
|
|
-v, --version same as previous
|
|
-V, --local [pattern] pretty print all local ciphers (of openssl only). If search pattern supplied: it is an
|
|
an ignore case word pattern of cipher hexcode or any other string in its name, kx or bits
|
|
|
|
"$PROG_NAME [options] <URI>", where <URI> is:
|
|
|
|
<URI> host|host:port|URL|URL:port port 443 is default, URL can only contain HTTPS as a protocol
|
|
|
|
and [options] is/are:
|
|
|
|
-t, --starttls <protocol> Does a run against a STARTTLS enabled service which is one of ftp, smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap,
|
|
sieve, xmpp, xmpp-server, telnet, ldap, nntp, postgres, mysql
|
|
--xmpphost <to_domain> For STARTTLS xmpp or xmpp-server checks it supplies the domainname (like SNI)
|
|
--mx <domain/host> Tests MX records from high to low priority (STARTTLS, port 25)
|
|
--file/-iL <fname> Mass testing option: Reads one testssl.sh command line per line from <fname>.
|
|
Can be combined with --serial or --parallel. Implicitly turns on "--warnings batch".
|
|
Text format 1: Comments via # allowed, EOF signals end of <fname>
|
|
Text format 2: nmap output in greppable format (-oG), 1 port per line allowed
|
|
--mode <serial|parallel> Mass testing to be done serial (default) or parallel (--parallel is shortcut for the latter)
|
|
--warnings <batch|off> "batch" doesn't continue when a testing error is encountered, off continues and skips warnings
|
|
--connect-timeout <seconds> useful to avoid hangers. Max <seconds> to wait for the TCP socket connect to return
|
|
--openssl-timeout <seconds> useful to avoid hangers. Max <seconds> to wait before openssl connect will be terminated
|
|
|
|
single check as <options> ("$PROG_NAME URI" does everything except -E and -g):
|
|
-e, --each-cipher checks each local cipher remotely
|
|
-E, --cipher-per-proto checks those per protocol
|
|
-s, --std, --categories tests standard cipher categories by strength
|
|
-f, --fs, --nsa checks forward secrecy settings
|
|
-p, --protocols checks TLS/SSL protocols (including SPDY/HTTP2)
|
|
-g, --grease tests several server implementation bugs like GREASE and size limitations
|
|
-S, --server-defaults displays the server's default picks and certificate info
|
|
-P, --server-preference displays the server's picks: protocol+cipher
|
|
-x, --single-cipher <pattern> tests matched <pattern> of ciphers
|
|
(if <pattern> not a number: word match)
|
|
-c, --client-simulation test client simulations, see which client negotiates with cipher and protocol
|
|
-h, --header, --headers tests HSTS, HPKP, server/app banner, security headers, cookie, reverse proxy, IPv4 address
|
|
|
|
-U, --vulnerable tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities (if applicable)
|
|
-H, --heartbleed tests for Heartbleed vulnerability
|
|
-I, --ccs, --ccs-injection tests for CCS injection vulnerability
|
|
-T, --ticketbleed tests for Ticketbleed vulnerability in BigIP loadbalancers
|
|
--BB, --robot tests for Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) vulnerability
|
|
--SI, --starttls-injection tests for STARTTLS injection issues
|
|
-R, --renegotiation tests for renegotiation vulnerabilities
|
|
-C, --compression, --crime tests for CRIME vulnerability (TLS compression issue)
|
|
-B, --breach tests for BREACH vulnerability (HTTP compression issue)
|
|
-O, --poodle tests for POODLE (SSL) vulnerability
|
|
-Z, --tls-fallback checks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mitigation
|
|
-W, --sweet32 tests 64 bit block ciphers (3DES, RC2 and IDEA): SWEET32 vulnerability
|
|
-A, --beast tests for BEAST vulnerability
|
|
-L, --lucky13 tests for LUCKY13
|
|
-WS, --winshock tests for winshock vulnerability
|
|
-F, --freak tests for FREAK vulnerability
|
|
-J, --logjam tests for LOGJAM vulnerability
|
|
-D, --drown tests for DROWN vulnerability
|
|
-4, --rc4, --appelbaum which RC4 ciphers are being offered?
|
|
|
|
tuning / connect options (most also can be preset via environment variables):
|
|
-9, --full includes tests for implementation bugs and cipher per protocol (could disappear)
|
|
--bugs enables the "-bugs" option of s_client, needed e.g. for some buggy F5s
|
|
--assume-http if protocol check fails it assumes HTTP protocol and enforces HTTP checks
|
|
--ssl-native use OpenSSL where sockets are normally used. Faster but inaccurate, avoid it if possible
|
|
--openssl <PATH> use this openssl binary (default: look in \$PATH, \$RUN_DIR of $PROG_NAME)
|
|
--proxy <host:port|auto> (experimental) proxy connects via <host:port>, auto: values from \$env (\$http(s)_proxy)
|
|
-6 also use IPv6. Works only with supporting OpenSSL version and IPv6 connectivity
|
|
--ip <ip> a) tests the supplied <ip> v4 or v6 address instead of resolving host(s) in URI
|
|
b) "one" means: just test the first DNS returns (useful for multiple IPs)
|
|
c) "proxy" means: dns resolution via proxy. Needed when host has no DNS.
|
|
-n, --nodns <min|none> if "none": do not try any DNS lookups, "min" queries A, AAAA and MX records
|
|
--sneaky leave less traces in target logs: user agent, referer
|
|
--user-agent <user agent> set a custom user agent instead of the standard user agent
|
|
--ids-friendly skips a few vulnerability checks which may cause IDSs to block the scanning IP
|
|
--phone-out allow to contact external servers for CRL download and querying OCSP responder
|
|
--add-ca <CA files|CA dir> path to <CAdir> with *.pem or a comma separated list of CA files to include in trust check
|
|
--mtls <CLIENT CERT file> path to <CLIENT CERT> file in PEM format containing unencrypted certificate key (beta)
|
|
--basicauth <user:pass> provide HTTP basic auth information
|
|
--reqheader <header> add custom http request headers
|
|
|
|
output options (can also be preset via environment variables):
|
|
--quiet don't output the banner. By doing this you acknowledge usage terms normally appearing in the banner
|
|
--wide wide output for tests like RC4, BEAST. FS also with hexcode, kx, strength, RFC name
|
|
--show-each for wide outputs: display all ciphers tested -- not only succeeded ones
|
|
--mapping <openssl| openssl: use the OpenSSL cipher suite name as the primary name cipher suite name form (default)
|
|
iana|rfc -> use the IANA/(RFC) cipher suite name as the primary name cipher suite name form
|
|
no-openssl| -> don't display the OpenSSL cipher suite name, display IANA/(RFC) names only
|
|
no-iana|no-rfc> -> don't display the IANA/(RFC) cipher suite name, display OpenSSL names only
|
|
--color <0|1|2|3> 0: no escape or other codes, 1: b/w escape codes, 2: color (default), 3: extra color (color all ciphers)
|
|
--colorblind swap green and blue in the output
|
|
--debug <0-6> 1: screen output normal but keeps debug output in /tmp/. 2-6: see "grep -A 5 '^DEBUG=' testssl.sh"
|
|
--disable-rating Explicitly disables the rating output
|
|
|
|
file output options (can also be preset via environment variables)
|
|
--log, --logging logs stdout to '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.log' in current working directory (cwd)
|
|
--logfile|-oL <logfile> logs stdout to 'dir/\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.log'. If 'logfile' is a dir or to a specified 'logfile'
|
|
--json additional output of findings to flat JSON file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.json' in cwd
|
|
--jsonfile|-oj <jsonfile> additional output to the specified flat JSON file or directory, similar to --logfile
|
|
--json-pretty additional JSON structured output of findings to a file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.json' in cwd
|
|
--jsonfile-pretty|-oJ <jsonfile> additional JSON structured output to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile
|
|
--csv additional output of findings to CSV file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.csv' in cwd or directory
|
|
--csvfile|-oC <csvfile> additional output as CSV to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile
|
|
--html additional output as HTML to file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.html'
|
|
--htmlfile|-oH <htmlfile> additional output as HTML to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile
|
|
--out(f,F)ile|-oa/-oA <fname> log to a LOG,JSON,CSV,HTML file (see nmap). -oA/-oa: pretty/flat JSON.
|
|
"auto" uses '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}'. If fname if a dir uses 'dir/\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}'
|
|
--hints additional hints to findings
|
|
--severity <severity> severities with lower level will be filtered for CSV+JSON, possible values <LOW|MEDIUM|HIGH|CRITICAL>
|
|
--append if (non-empty) <logfile>, <csvfile>, <jsonfile> or <htmlfile> exists, append to file. Omits any header
|
|
--overwrite if <logfile>, <csvfile>, <jsonfile> or <htmlfile> exists it overwrites it without any warning
|
|
--outprefix <fname_prefix> before '\${NODE}.' above prepend <fname_prefix>
|
|
|
|
|
|
Options requiring a value can also be called with '=' e.g. testssl.sh -t=smtp --wide --openssl=/usr/bin/openssl <URI>.
|
|
<URI> always needs to be the last parameter.
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
# Set HTMLHEADER and JSONHEADER to false so that the cleanup() function won't
|
|
# try to write footers to the HTML and JSON files.
|
|
HTMLHEADER=false
|
|
JSONHEADER=false
|
|
#' Fix syntax highlight on sublime
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && kill -s USR1 $PPID
|
|
exit $1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
maketempf() {
|
|
TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/testssl.XXXXXX 2>/dev/null)
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# For e.g. devices where we can't write to /tmp we chose $PWD but we can't
|
|
# allow every char as we haven't quoted all strings depending on it, see #1445
|
|
if [[ $PWD =~ [^A-Za-z0-9\.,/_-] ]]; then
|
|
fatal "\$PWD contains illegal chars: \"$BASH_REMATCH\"" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
fi
|
|
TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d "$PWD/testssl.XXXXXX") || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
fi
|
|
ls "$TEMPDIR/" 2>/dev/null || fatal "temporary directory needed not readable" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
TMPFILE=$TEMPDIR/tempfile.txt
|
|
touch $TMPFILE 2>/dev/null || fatal "temporary directory needed not writeable" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ERRFILE="/dev/null"
|
|
else
|
|
ERRFILE=$TEMPDIR/errorfile.txt || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
fi
|
|
HOSTCERT=$TEMPDIR/host_certificate.pem
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prepare_debug() {
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
cat >$TEMPDIR/environment.txt << EOF
|
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_REL: $GIT_REL
|
|
|
|
PID: $$
|
|
commandline: "$CMDLINE"
|
|
bash version: ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}.${BASH_VERSINFO[1]}.${BASH_VERSINFO[2]}
|
|
status: ${BASH_VERSINFO[4]}
|
|
machine: ${BASH_VERSINFO[5]}
|
|
operating system: $SYSTEM $SYSTEMREV
|
|
os constraint: $SYSTEM2
|
|
shellopts: $SHELLOPTS
|
|
printf: $PRINTF
|
|
NO_ITALICS: $NO_ITALICS
|
|
|
|
$($OPENSSL version -a 2>/dev/null)
|
|
OSSL_VER_MAJOR: $OSSL_VER_MAJOR
|
|
OSSL_VER_MINOR: $OSSL_VER_MINOR
|
|
OSSL_VER_APPENDIX: $OSSL_VER_APPENDIX
|
|
OSSL_BUILD_DATE: $OSSL_BUILD_DATE
|
|
OSSL_VER_PLATFORM: $OSSL_VER_PLATFORM
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS: $OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF: $OPENSSL_CONF
|
|
HAS_CURVES: $HAS_CURVES
|
|
OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES: $OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES
|
|
|
|
HAS_IPv6: $HAS_IPv6
|
|
HAS_SSL2: $HAS_SSL2
|
|
HAS_SSL3: $HAS_SSL3
|
|
HAS_TLS1: $HAS_TLS1
|
|
HAS_TLS11: $HAS_TLS11
|
|
HAS_TLS12: $HAS_TLS12
|
|
HAS_TLS13: $HAS_TLS13
|
|
HAS_X448: $HAS_X448
|
|
HAS_X25519: $HAS_X25519
|
|
HAS_SIGALGS: $HAS_SIGALGS
|
|
HAS_NO_SSL2: $HAS_NO_SSL2
|
|
HAS_SPDY: $HAS_SPDY
|
|
HAS_ALPN: $HAS_ALPN
|
|
HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV: $HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV
|
|
HAS_COMP: $HAS_COMP
|
|
HAS_NO_COMP: $HAS_NO_COMP
|
|
HAS_CIPHERSUITES: $HAS_CIPHERSUITES
|
|
HAS_SECLEVEL: $HAS_SECLEVEL
|
|
HAS_PKEY: $HAS_PKEY
|
|
HAS_PKUTIL: $HAS_PKUTIL
|
|
HAS_PROXY: $HAS_PROXY
|
|
HAS_XMPP: $HAS_XMPP
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER: $HAS_XMPP_SERVER
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER2: $HAS_XMPP_SERVER2
|
|
HAS_POSTGRES: $HAS_POSTGRES
|
|
HAS_MYSQL: $HAS_MYSQL
|
|
HAS_LMTP: $HAS_LMTP
|
|
HAS_SIEVE: $HAS_SIEVE
|
|
HAS_NNTP: $HAS_NNTP
|
|
HAS_IRC: $HAS_IRC
|
|
HAS_UDS: $HAS_UDS
|
|
HAS_UDS2: $HAS_UDS2
|
|
HAS_ENABLE_PHA: $HAS_ENABLE_PHA
|
|
|
|
HAS_DIG: $HAS_DIG
|
|
HAS_HOST: $HAS_HOST
|
|
HAS_DRILL: $HAS_DRILL
|
|
HAS_NSLOOKUP: $HAS_NSLOOKUP
|
|
HAS_IDN: $HAS_IDN
|
|
HAS_IDN2: $HAS_IDN2
|
|
HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE: $HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE
|
|
HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT: $HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT
|
|
HAS_DIG_R: $HAS_DIG_R
|
|
HAS_XXD: $HAS_XXD
|
|
|
|
PATH: $PATH
|
|
PROG_NAME: $PROG_NAME
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR: $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR
|
|
RUN_DIR: $RUN_DIR
|
|
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE: $CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE
|
|
|
|
CAPATH: $CAPATH
|
|
COLOR: $COLOR
|
|
COLORBLIND: $COLORBLIND
|
|
TERM_WIDTH: $TERM_WIDTH
|
|
INTERACTIVE: $INTERACTIVE
|
|
HAS_GNUDATE: $HAS_GNUDATE
|
|
HAS_FREEBSDDATE: $HAS_FREEBSDDATE
|
|
HAS_OPENBSDDATE: $HAS_OPENBSDDATE
|
|
HAS_SED_E: $HAS_SED_E
|
|
HAS_LOCALE: $HAS_LOCALE
|
|
|
|
SHOW_EACH_C: $SHOW_EACH_C
|
|
SSL_NATIVE: $SSL_NATIVE
|
|
ASSUME_HTTP $ASSUME_HTTP
|
|
BASICAUTH: $BASICAUTH
|
|
REQHEADER: $REQHEADER
|
|
SNEAKY: $SNEAKY
|
|
OFFENSIVE: $OFFENSIVE
|
|
PHONE_OUT: $PHONE_OUT
|
|
|
|
DEBUG: $DEBUG
|
|
|
|
HSTS_MIN: $HSTS_MIN
|
|
HPKP_MIN: $HPKP_MIN
|
|
CLIENT_MIN_FS: $CLIENT_MIN_FS
|
|
DAYS2WARN1: $DAYS2WARN1
|
|
DAYS2WARN2: $DAYS2WARN2
|
|
|
|
HEADER_MAXSLEEP: $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
MAX_WAITSOCK: $MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK: $HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK: $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
USLEEP_SND $USLEEP_SND
|
|
USLEEP_REC $USLEEP_REC
|
|
|
|
SOCAT: $SOCAT
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
type -p locale &>/dev/null && locale >>$TEMPDIR/environment.txt || echo "locale doesn't exist" >>$TEMPDIR/environment.txt
|
|
actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' 'ALL' "-V" &>$TEMPDIR/all_local_ciphers.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
# see also $TEMPDIR/s_client_has.txt from find_openssl_binary
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
prepare_arrays() {
|
|
local hexc mac ossl_ciph
|
|
local ossl_supported_tls="" ossl_supported_sslv2=""
|
|
local -i i=0
|
|
|
|
if [[ -e "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$HAS_SSL2" && ossl_supported_sslv2="$($OPENSSL ciphers -ssl2 -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 2>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
ossl_supported_tls="$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-no_ssl2 -V")"
|
|
TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS=""
|
|
while read hexc n TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i] TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i] TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i] TLS_CIPHER_KX[i] TLS_CIPHER_AUTH[i] TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i] mac TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]; do
|
|
TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]="$hexc"
|
|
TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=false
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
# >= SSLv3 ciphers
|
|
if [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ ":${ossl_supported_tls}:" =~ :${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}: ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true
|
|
else
|
|
ossl_ciph="$(awk '/'"$hexc"'/ { print $3 }' <<< "$ossl_supported_tls")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$ossl_ciph" ]]; then
|
|
TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true
|
|
[[ "$ossl_ciph" != ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]="$ossl_ciph"
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS+=":$ossl_ciph"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ ":${ossl_supported_sslv2}:" =~ :${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}: ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$ossl_supported_sslv2" =~ $hexc ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true
|
|
fi
|
|
i+=1
|
|
done < "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
TLS_NR_CIPHERS=i
|
|
TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS="${TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS:1}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
mybanner() {
|
|
local bb1 bb2 bb3
|
|
|
|
"$QUIET" && return
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && return
|
|
OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS=$(count_ciphers "$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL')")
|
|
bb1=$(cat <<EOF
|
|
|
|
###########################################################
|
|
$PROG_NAME $VERSION from
|
|
EOF
|
|
)
|
|
bb2=$(cat <<EOF
|
|
|
|
This program is free software. Distribution and
|
|
modification under GPLv2 permitted.
|
|
USAGE w/o ANY WARRANTY. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK!
|
|
|
|
Please file bugs @
|
|
EOF
|
|
)
|
|
bb3=$(cat <<EOF
|
|
|
|
###########################################################
|
|
EOF
|
|
)
|
|
pr_bold "$bb1 "
|
|
pr_boldurl "$SWURL"; outln
|
|
if [[ -n "$GIT_REL" ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " ("
|
|
pr_litegrey "$GIT_REL"
|
|
prln_bold ")"
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold "$bb2 "
|
|
pr_boldurl "https://testssl.sh/bugs/"; outln
|
|
pr_bold "$bb3"
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
outln " Using \"$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null)\" [~$OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS ciphers]"
|
|
out " on $HNAME:"
|
|
outln "$OPENSSL_LOCATION"
|
|
outln " (built: \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\", platform: \"$OSSL_VER_PLATFORM\")\n"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
calc_scantime() {
|
|
END_TIME=$(date +%s)
|
|
SCAN_TIME=$(( END_TIME - START_TIME ))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup() {
|
|
# If parallel mass testing is being performed, then the child tests need
|
|
# to be killed before $TEMPDIR is deleted. Otherwise, error messages
|
|
# will be created if testssl.sh is stopped before all testing is complete.
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && [[ $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS -gt 0 ]] && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do
|
|
if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ne 0 ]] && \
|
|
ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then
|
|
kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null
|
|
wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p)
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "stopped"
|
|
else
|
|
# If a test had already completed, but its output wasn't yet processed,
|
|
# then process it now.
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed"
|
|
fi
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
tm_underline "DEBUG (level $DEBUG): see files in $TEMPDIR"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
else
|
|
[[ -d "$TEMPDIR" ]] && rm -rf "$TEMPDIR";
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
# No shorthand expression to avoid errors when $CMDLINE_PARSED haven't been filled yet.
|
|
if [[ $CMDLINE_PARSED == true ]]; then
|
|
"$SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED" && fileout_section_footer true
|
|
html_footer
|
|
fileout_footer
|
|
fi
|
|
# debugging off, see above
|
|
grep -q xtrace <<< "$SHELLOPTS" && ! "$DEBUG_ALLINONE" && exec 2>&42 42>&-
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# see https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/57940/trap-int-term-exit-really-necessary
|
|
sig_cleanup() {
|
|
trap '' EXIT
|
|
cleanup
|
|
exit 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
child_error() {
|
|
cleanup
|
|
exit $ERR_CHILD
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Program terminates prematurely, with error code
|
|
# arg1: string to print / to write to file
|
|
# arg2: global error code, see ERR_* above
|
|
# arg3: an optional hint (string)
|
|
#
|
|
fatal() {
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1" >&2
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
if [[ -n "$3" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$3" >&2
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && outln "$3" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
# Make sure we don't try to write into files when not created yet.
|
|
# No shorthand expression to avoid errors when $CMDLINE_PARSED haven't been filled yet.
|
|
[[ $CMDLINE_PARSED == true ]] && fileout "scanProblem" "FATAL" "${1//\\n/ }" # See issue #2049.
|
|
exit $2
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Program terminates as a result of an error in the command line.
|
|
# arg1: string to print / to write to file
|
|
# arg2: global error code, see ERR_* above
|
|
# arg3: an optional hint (string)
|
|
#
|
|
fatal_cmd_line() {
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1" >&2
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
if [[ -n "$3" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$3" >&2
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && outln "$3" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
# Make sure we don't try to write into files when not created yet.
|
|
# No shorthand expression to avoid errors when $CMDLINE_PARSED haven't been filled yet.
|
|
HTMLHEADER=false
|
|
JSONHEADER=false
|
|
[[ $CMDLINE_PARSED == true ]] && fileout "scanProblem" "FATAL" "$1"
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && kill -s USR1 $PPID
|
|
exit $2
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This OTOH doesn't exit but puts a fatal error to the screen but continues with the next
|
|
# IP/hostname. It should only be used if a single IP/Hostname in a scan is not reachable.
|
|
# arg1: string to print / to write to file
|
|
#
|
|
ip_fatal() {
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1, proceeding with next IP (if any)" >&2
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1, proceeding with next IP (if any)" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "scanProblem" "FATAL" "$1, proceeding with next IP (if any)"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This generic function outputs an error onto the screen and handles logging.
|
|
# arg1: string to print / to write to file, arg2 (optional): additional hint to write
|
|
#
|
|
generic_nonfatal() {
|
|
prln_magenta "$1" >&2
|
|
[[ -n $2 ]] && outln "$2"
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "$1" >>$LOGFILE && [[ -n $2 ]] && outln "$2" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "scanProblem" "WARN" "$1"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
initialize_engine(){
|
|
# for now only GOST engine
|
|
grep -q '^# testssl config file' "$OPENSSL_CONF" 2>/dev/null && \
|
|
return 0 # We have been here already
|
|
if "$NO_ENGINE"; then
|
|
# Avoid potential conflicts also -- manual hook, see #1117
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF=''
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif $OPENSSL engine gost -v 2>&1 | grep -Eq 'invalid command|no such engine'; then
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln && pr_warning "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"; outln
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "engine_problem" "WARN" "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF=''
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif ! $OPENSSL engine gost -vvvv -t -c 2>/dev/null >/dev/null; then
|
|
# check for openssl 1.1.1 config -- not this may not be reliable. We only use this
|
|
# to suppress the warning (confuses users), see #1119
|
|
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b524b808a1d1ba204dbdcbb42de4e3bddb3472ac
|
|
if ! grep -q 'using the .include directive' /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf; then
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln && pr_warning "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"; outln
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "engine_problem" "WARN" "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"
|
|
# Avoid clashes of OpenSSL 1.1.1 config file with our openssl 1.0.2. This is for Debian 10
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF=''
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
# we have engine support. But we want to check whether an external OPENSSL_CONF was supplied.
|
|
# $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf is an internal presetting, see #1982
|
|
if [[ -n "$OPENSSL_CONF" ]] && [[ "$OPENSSL_CONF" != "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "For now I am providing the config file to have GOST support"
|
|
else
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF=$TEMPDIR/gost.conf
|
|
# see https://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-users@openssl.org/msg65395.html
|
|
cat >$OPENSSL_CONF << EOF
|
|
# testssl config file for openssl
|
|
|
|
openssl_conf = openssl_def
|
|
|
|
[ openssl_def ]
|
|
engines = engine_section
|
|
|
|
[ engine_section ]
|
|
gost = gost_section
|
|
|
|
[ gost_section ]
|
|
engine_id = gost
|
|
default_algorithms = ALL
|
|
CRYPT_PARAMS = id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: text to display before "-->"
|
|
# arg2: arg needed to accept to continue
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame() {
|
|
local a
|
|
|
|
[[ "$WARNINGS" == off ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ "$WARNINGS" == batch ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_warning "$1 --> "
|
|
read a
|
|
if [[ "$2" == "$(toupper "$2")" ]]; then
|
|
# all uppercase requested
|
|
if [[ "$a" == "$2" ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$2" == "$(tolower "$a")" ]]; then
|
|
# we normalize the word to continue
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: URI
|
|
parse_hn_port() {
|
|
local tmp_port
|
|
local node_tmp=""
|
|
|
|
NODE="$1"
|
|
NODE="${NODE/https\:\/\//}" # strip "https"
|
|
NODE="${NODE%%/*}" # strip trailing urlpath
|
|
NODE="${NODE%%.}" # strip trailing "." if supplied
|
|
if grep -q ':$' <<< "$NODE"; then
|
|
if grep -wq http <<< "$NODE"; then
|
|
fatal "\"http\" is not what you meant probably" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "\"$1\" is not a valid URI" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Was an IPv6 address supplied like [AA:BB:CC::]:port ?
|
|
if grep -q ']' <<< "$NODE"; then
|
|
tmp_port=$(printf "$NODE" | sed 's/\[.*\]//' | sed 's/://')
|
|
# determine v6 port, supposed it was supplied additionally
|
|
if [[ -n "$tmp_port" ]]; then
|
|
PORT=$tmp_port
|
|
NODE=$(sed "s/:$PORT//" <<< "$NODE")
|
|
fi
|
|
NODE=$(sed -e 's/\[//' -e 's/\]//' <<< "$NODE")
|
|
else
|
|
# determine v4 port, supposed it was supplied additionally
|
|
grep -q ':' <<< "$NODE" && \
|
|
PORT=$(sed 's/^.*\://' <<< "$NODE") && NODE=$(sed 's/\:.*$//' <<< "$NODE")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# We check for non-ASCII chars now. If there are some we'll try to convert it if IDN/IDN2 is installed
|
|
# If not, we'll continue. Hoping later that dig can use it. If not the error handler will tell
|
|
# Honestly we don't care whether it's IDN2008 or IDN2003 or Emoji domains as long as it works.
|
|
# So we try to resolve anything supplied. If it can't our resolver error handler takes care
|
|
if [[ "$NODE" == *[![:ascii:]]* ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_IDN2" && ! "$HAS_IDN"; then
|
|
prln_warning " URI contains non-ASCII characters and libidn/libidn2 not available."
|
|
outln " Trying to feed the resolver without converted \"$NODE\" ...\n"
|
|
#ToDo: fileout is missing
|
|
node_tmp="$NODE"
|
|
elif "$HAS_IDN2"; then
|
|
node_tmp="$(idn2 "$NODE" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_IDN" && [[ -z "$node_tmp" ]]; then
|
|
node_tmp="$(idn "$NODE" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$node_tmp" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning " URI contains non-ASCII characters and IDN conversion failed."
|
|
outln " Trying to feed the resolver without converted \"$NODE\" ...\n"
|
|
#ToDo: fileout is missing
|
|
node_tmp="$NODE"
|
|
fi
|
|
NODE="$node_tmp"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo $NODE:$PORT
|
|
if [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then
|
|
# XMPP host is set, force SNI to be that
|
|
SNI="-servername $XMPP_HOST"
|
|
else
|
|
SNI="-servername $NODE"
|
|
fi
|
|
URL_PATH=$(sed 's/https:\/\///' <<< "$1" | sed 's/'"${NODE}"'//' | sed 's/.*'"${PORT}"'//') # remove protocol and node part and port
|
|
URL_PATH=$(sed 's/\/\//\//g' <<< "$URL_PATH") # we rather want // -> /
|
|
URL_PATH=${URL_PATH%%.} # strip trailing "." so that it is not interpreted as URL
|
|
[[ -z "$URL_PATH" ]] && URL_PATH="/"
|
|
debugme echo "URL_PATH: $URL_PATH"
|
|
return 0 # NODE, URL_PATH, PORT is set now
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# args: string containing ip addresses
|
|
filter_ip6_address() {
|
|
local a
|
|
|
|
for a in "$@"; do
|
|
if ! is_ipv6addr "$a"; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_SED_E"; then
|
|
sed -E 's/^abcdeABCDEFf0123456789:]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d' -e '/^;;/d'
|
|
else
|
|
sed -r 's/[^abcdefABCDEF0123456789:]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d' -e '/^;;/d'
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
filter_ip4_address() {
|
|
local a
|
|
|
|
for a in "$@"; do
|
|
if ! is_ipv4addr "$a"; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_SED_E"; then
|
|
sed -E 's/[^[:digit:].]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d'
|
|
else
|
|
sed -r 's/[^[:digit:].]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d'
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# For security testing sometimes we have local entries. Getent is BS under Linux for localhost: No network, no resolution
|
|
# arg1 is the entry we want to look up in the host file
|
|
get_local_aaaa() {
|
|
local ip6=""
|
|
local etchosts="/etc/hosts /c/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && echo "" && return 1
|
|
# Also multiple records should work fine
|
|
ip6=$(grep -wih "$1" $etchosts 2>/dev/null | grep ':' | grep -Ev '^#|\.local' | grep -Ei "[[:space:]]$1" | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
if is_ipv6addr "$ip6"; then
|
|
echo "$ip6"
|
|
else
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
get_local_a() {
|
|
local ip4=""
|
|
local etchosts="/etc/hosts /c/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts"
|
|
|
|
ip4=$(grep -wih "$1" $etchosts 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev ':|^#|\.local' | grep -Ei "[[:space:]]$1" | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$ip4"; then
|
|
echo "$ip4"
|
|
else
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Does a hard exit if no lookup binary is provided
|
|
# Checks for IDN capabilities also
|
|
#
|
|
check_resolver_bins() {
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
type -p dig &> /dev/null && HAS_DIG=true
|
|
type -p host &> /dev/null && HAS_HOST=true
|
|
type -p drill &> /dev/null && HAS_DRILL=true
|
|
type -p nslookup &> /dev/null && HAS_NSLOOKUP=true
|
|
type -p avahi-resolve &>/dev/null && HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE=true
|
|
type -p idn &>/dev/null && HAS_IDN=true
|
|
type -p idn2 &>/dev/null && HAS_IDN2=true
|
|
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DIG" && ! "$HAS_HOST" && ! "$HAS_DRILL" && ! "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
fatal "Neither \"dig\", \"host\", \"drill\" nor \"nslookup\" is present" $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
# Old dig versions don't have an option to ignore $HOME/.digrc
|
|
if ! dig -h | grep -qEe '-r.*~/.digrc'; then
|
|
HAS_DIG_R=false
|
|
DIG_R=""
|
|
fi
|
|
if dig -h | grep -Eq idnout; then
|
|
HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: a host name. Returned will be 0-n IPv4 addresses
|
|
# watch out: $1 can also be a cname! --> all checked
|
|
get_a_record() {
|
|
local ip4=""
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
[[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && return 0 # if no DNS lookup was instructed, leave here
|
|
if [[ "$1" == localhost ]]; then
|
|
# This is a bit ugly but prevents from doing DNS lookups which could fail
|
|
echo 127.0.0.1
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$1"; then
|
|
# This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachable DNS
|
|
echo $1
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(avahi-resolve -4 -n "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(dig $DIG_R @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 +short -t a +notcp "$1" 2>/dev/null | sed '/^;;/d'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(drill @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/,/AUTHORITY SECTION/ { print $NF }' | awk '/^[0-9]/'))
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "Local hostname given but neither 'avahi-resolve', 'dig' nor 'drill' is available." $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$ip4" ]] && debugme echo ".local IP address requested but mDNS resolution (IPv4) failed"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(dig +search $DIG_R +short +timeout=2 +tries=2 $noidnout -t a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1 }'))
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(host -t a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/address/ { print $NF }'))
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(drill a "$1" | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/,/AUTHORITY SECTION/ { print $NF }' | awk '/^[0-9]/'))
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(strip_lf "$(nslookup -querytype=a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^Name/ { getline; print $NF }')"))
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
echo "$ip4"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: a host name. Returned will be 0-n IPv6 addresses
|
|
# watch out: $1 can also be a cname! --> all checked
|
|
get_aaaa_record() {
|
|
local ip6=""
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
[[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && return 0 # if no DNS lookup was instructed, leave here
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
if is_ipv6addr "$1"; then
|
|
# This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachable DNS
|
|
echo "$1"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif is_ipv4addr "$1"; then
|
|
# we need also this here as get_aaaa_record is always called after get_a_record and we want to handle this at a low level
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(avahi-resolve -6 -n "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(dig $DIG_R @ff02::fb -p 5353 -t aaaa +short +notcp "$NODE" 2>/dev/null))
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(drill @ff02::fb -p 5353 "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/,/AUTHORITY SECTION/ { print $NF }' | awk '/^[0-9]/'))
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "Local hostname given but neither 'avahi-resolve', 'dig' nor 'drill' is available." $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$ip6" ]] && debugme echo ".local IP address requested but mDNS resolution (IPv6) failed"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(dig +search $DIG_R +short +timeout=2 +tries=2 $noidnout -t aaaa "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1 }'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(host -t aaaa "$1" | awk '/address/ { print $NF }'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(drill aaaa "$1" | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/,/AUTHORITY SECTION/ { print $NF }' | awk '/^[0-9]/'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=aaaa "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/'"^${a}"'.*AAAA/ { print $NF }')"))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
echo "$ip6"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# RFC6844: DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record
|
|
# arg1: domain to check for
|
|
get_caa_rr_record() {
|
|
local raw_caa=""
|
|
local hash len line
|
|
local -i len_caa_property
|
|
local caa_property_name
|
|
local caa_property_value
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local all_caa=""
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$NODNS" ]] && return 2 # if minimum DNS lookup was instructed, leave here
|
|
|
|
# if there's a type257 record there are two output formats here, mostly depending on age of distribution
|
|
# roughly that's the difference between text and binary format
|
|
# 1) 'google.com has CAA record 0 issue "symantec.com"'
|
|
# 2) 'google.com has TYPE257 record \# 19 0005697373756573796D616E7465632E636F6D'
|
|
# for dig +short the output always starts with '0 issue [..]' or '\# 19 [..]' so we normalize thereto to keep caa_flag, caa_property
|
|
# caa_property then has key/value pairs, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-3
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF=""
|
|
if "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(dig $DIG_R +search +short +timeout=3 +tries=3 $noidnout type257 "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1" "$2" "$3 }')"
|
|
# empty if no CAA record
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(drill $1 type257 | awk '/'"^${1}"'.*CAA/ { print $5,$6,$7 }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(host -t type257 $1)"
|
|
if grep -Ewvq "has no CAA|has no TYPE257" <<< "$raw_caa"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(sed -e 's/^.*has CAA record //' -e 's/^.*has TYPE257 record //' <<< "$raw_caa")"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=type257 $1 | grep -w rdata_257)")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$raw_caa" ]]; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(sed 's/^.*rdata_257 = //' <<< "$raw_caa")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
# No dig, drill, host, or nslookup --> complaint was elsewhere already
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
debugme echo $raw_caa
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$raw_caa" =~ \#\ [0-9][0-9] ]]; then
|
|
# for posteo we get this binary format returned e.g. for old dig versions:
|
|
# \# 19 0005697373756567656F74727573742E636F6D
|
|
# \# 23 0009697373756577696C6467656F74727573742E636F6D
|
|
# \# 34 0005696F6465666D61696C746F3A686F73746D617374657240706F73 74656F2E6465
|
|
# # len caaflag <more_see_below> @ p o s t e o . d e
|
|
while read hash len line ;do
|
|
if [[ "${line:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then # probably the caa flag, always 00, so we don't keep this
|
|
len_caa_property=$(printf "%0d" "$((10#${line:2:2}))") # get len and do type casting, for posteo we have 05 or 09 here as a string
|
|
len_caa_property=$((len_caa_property*2)) # =>word! Now get name from 4th and value from 4th+len position...
|
|
line="${line/ /}" # especially with iodefs there's a blank in the string which we just skip
|
|
caa_property_name="$(hex2ascii ${line:4:$len_caa_property})"
|
|
caa_property_value="$(hex2ascii "${line:$((4+len_caa_property)):100}")"
|
|
# echo "${caa_property_name}=${caa_property_value}"
|
|
all_caa+="${caa_property_name}=${caa_property_value}\n"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "please report unknown CAA RR $line with flag @ $NODE"
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$raw_caa"
|
|
sort <<< "$(safe_echo "$all_caa")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif grep -q '"' <<< "$raw_caa"; then
|
|
raw_caa=${raw_caa//\"/} # strip all ". Now we should have flag, name, value
|
|
#caa_property_name="$(awk '{ print $2 }' <<< "$raw_caa")"
|
|
#caa_property_value="$(awk '{ print $3 }' <<< "$raw_caa")"
|
|
safe_echo "$(sort <<< "$(awk '{ print $2"="$3 }' <<< "$raw_caa")")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
# no caa record
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# to do:
|
|
# 4: check whether $1 is a CNAME and take this
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: domain to check for. Returned will be the MX record as a string
|
|
get_mx_record() {
|
|
local mx=""
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
# we need the last two columns here
|
|
if "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
mx="$(host -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/is handled by/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
mx="$(dig $DIG_R +search +short $noidnout -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1" "$2 }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
mx="$(drill mx $1 | awk '/IN[ \t]MX[ \t]+/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
mx="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/mail exchanger/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')")"
|
|
else
|
|
# shouldn't reach this, as we checked in the top
|
|
fatal "No dig, host, drill or nslookup" $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf"
|
|
echo "$mx"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: domain / hostname. Returned will be the TXT record as a string which can be multilined
|
|
# (one entry per line), for e.g. non-MTA-STS records.
|
|
# Is supposed to be used by MTA STS in the future like get_txt_record _mta-sts.DOMAIN.TLD
|
|
get_txt_record() {
|
|
local record=""
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
# we need the last two columns here and strip any remaining double quotes later
|
|
if "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
record="$(host -t TXT "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F\" '/descriptive text/ { print $(NF-1) }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
record="$(dig $DIG_R +search +short $noidnout -t TXT "$1" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
record="$(drill txt $1 | awk -F\" '/^[a-z0-9].*TXT/ { print $(NF-1) }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
record="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F= '/text/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')")"
|
|
else
|
|
# shouldn't reach this, as we checked in the top
|
|
fatal "No dig, host, drill or nslookup" $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf"
|
|
echo "${record//\"/}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# set IPADDRs and IP46ADDRs
|
|
#
|
|
determine_ip_addresses() {
|
|
local ip4=""
|
|
local ip6=""
|
|
|
|
ip4="$(get_a_record "$NODE")"
|
|
ip6="$(get_aaaa_record "$NODE")"
|
|
IP46ADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4 $ip6")
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$CMDLINE_IP" ]]; then
|
|
# command line has supplied an IP address or "one"
|
|
if [[ "$CMDLINE_IP" == one ]]; then
|
|
# use first IPv6 or IPv4 address
|
|
if "$HAS_IPv6" && [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="$(head -1 <<< "$ip6")"
|
|
else
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="$(head -1 <<< "$ip4")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
NODEIP="$CMDLINE_IP"
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$NODEIP"; then
|
|
ip4="$NODEIP"
|
|
elif is_ipv6addr "$NODEIP"; then
|
|
ip6="$NODEIP"
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "couldn't identify supplied \"CMDLINE_IP\"" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
fi
|
|
elif is_ipv4addr "$NODE"; then
|
|
ip4="$NODE" # only an IPv4 address was supplied as an argument, no hostname
|
|
SNI="" # override Server Name Indication as we test the IP only
|
|
else
|
|
ip4=$(get_local_a "$NODE") # is there a local host entry?
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]]; then # empty: no (LOCAL_A is predefined as false)
|
|
ip4=$(get_a_record "$NODE")
|
|
else
|
|
LOCAL_A=true # we have the ip4 from local host entry and need to signal this to testssl
|
|
fi
|
|
# same now for ipv6
|
|
ip6=$(get_local_aaaa "$NODE")
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
ip6=$(get_aaaa_record "$NODE")
|
|
else
|
|
LOCAL_AAAA=true # we have a local ipv6 entry and need to signal this to testssl
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# IPv6 only address
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_IPv6"; then
|
|
IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip6")
|
|
IP46ADDRs="$IPADDRs" # IP46ADDRs are the ones to display, IPADDRs the ones to test
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if "$HAS_IPv6" && [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
if is_ipv6addr "$CMDLINE_IP"; then
|
|
IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip6")
|
|
else
|
|
IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4 $ip6")
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4")
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$IPADDRs" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
fatal "Only IPv6 address(es) for \"$NODE\" available, maybe add \"-6\" to $0" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "No IPv4/IPv6 address(es) for \"$NODE\" available" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0 # IPADDR and IP46ADDR is set now
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
determine_rdns() {
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local nodeip="" rdns="" line=""
|
|
|
|
[[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && rDNS="(instructed to skip DNS queries)" && return 0 # No DNS lookups at all
|
|
[[ "$NODNS" == min ]] && rDNS="(instructed to minimize DNS queries)" && return 0 # PTR records were not asked for
|
|
local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # for DNS we do not need the square brackets of IPv6 addresses
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(avahi-resolve -a $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }')
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(dig $DIG_R -x $nodeip @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 +notcp +noall +answer +short | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
# 1+2 should suffice. It's a compromise for if e.g. network is down but we have a docker/localhost server
|
|
rDNS=$(dig $DIG_R -x $nodeip +timeout=1 +tries=2 +noall +answer +short | awk '{ print $1 }') # +short returns also CNAME, e.g. openssl.org
|
|
elif "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(host -t PTR $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '/pointer/ { print $NF }')
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(drill -x ptr $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/ { getline; print $NF }')
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=PTR $nodeip 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'canonical name =' | grep 'name = ' | awk '{ print $NF }' | sed 's/\.$//')")
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
# First, rDNS can contain multilines due to multiple PTR DNS records, though this is not recommended.
|
|
# So we use a loop to check for each FQDN returned. There we remove chars which under weird
|
|
# circumstances (see #1506) can show up here. The blacklist is taken from RFC 1912 ("Allowable characters in a
|
|
# label for a host name are only ASCII, letters, digits, and the `-' character")
|
|
while read -r line; do
|
|
line="$(tr -dc '[a-zA-Z0-9-_.]' <<< "$line")"
|
|
[[ -z "$rdns" ]] && rdns="$line" || rdns="$rdns $line"
|
|
done <<< "$rDNS"
|
|
rDNS="$rdns"
|
|
[[ -z "$rDNS" ]] && rDNS="--"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# We need to get the IP address of the proxy so we can use it in fd_socket
|
|
#
|
|
check_proxy() {
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_PROXY"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL is too old to support the \"-proxy\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$PROXY" == auto ]]; then
|
|
# Get $ENV https_proxy is the one we care about for connects
|
|
PROXY="${https_proxy#*\/\/}"
|
|
# Fallback:
|
|
[[ -z "$PROXY" ]] && PROXY="${http_proxy#*\/\/}"
|
|
[[ -z "$PROXY" ]] && fatal "you specified \"--proxy=auto\" but \"\$http(s)_proxy\" is empty" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
# strip off http/https part if supplied:
|
|
PROXY="${PROXY/http\:\/\//}"
|
|
PROXY="${PROXY/https\:\/\//}" # this shouldn't be needed
|
|
PROXYNODE="${PROXY%:*}"
|
|
PROXYPORT="${PROXY#*:}"
|
|
is_number "$PROXYPORT" || fatal "Proxy port cannot be determined from \"$PROXY\"" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
|
|
#if is_ipv4addr "$PROXYNODE" || is_ipv6addr "$PROXYNODE" ; then
|
|
# IPv6 via openssl -proxy: that doesn't work. Sockets does
|
|
#FIXME: finish this with LibreSSL which supports an IPv6 proxy
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$PROXYNODE"; then
|
|
PROXYIP="$PROXYNODE"
|
|
else
|
|
PROXYIP="$(get_a_record "$PROXYNODE" 2>/dev/null | grep -v alias | sed 's/^.*address //')"
|
|
[[ -z "$PROXYIP" ]] && fatal "Proxy IP cannot be determined from \"$PROXYNODE\"" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
PROXY="-proxy $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Given the ASCII-HEX of a DER-encoded distinguished name, return the string
|
|
# representation of the name.
|
|
print_dn() {
|
|
local dn="$1"
|
|
local cert name
|
|
local -i len
|
|
|
|
# Use $OPENSSL to print the DN by creating a certificate containing the DN
|
|
# as the issuer and then having $OPENSSL print the issuer field in the
|
|
# resulting certificate.
|
|
|
|
# Create the to-be-signed portion of the certificate: version || serialNumber || signature || issuer || validity || subject || subjectPublicKeyInfo
|
|
# with the DN to be printed being the issuer.
|
|
cert="A003020102020100300A06082A8648CE3D040302${dn}301E170D3139303830353038333030305A170D3139303830353038333030305A30003019301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107030200FF"
|
|
|
|
# Make a SEQUENCE of the to-be-signed portion of the certificate.
|
|
len=$((${#cert}/2))
|
|
if [[ $len -lt 128 ]]; then
|
|
cert="30$(printf "%02x" $len)$cert"
|
|
elif [[ $len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
cert="3081$(printf "%02x" $len)$cert"
|
|
else
|
|
cert="3082$(printf "%04x" $len)$cert"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Append a signature algorithm and signature value to the end of the
|
|
# to-be-signed portion of the certificate and then make a SEQUENCE of
|
|
# the result.
|
|
cert+="300A06082A8648CE3D040302030200FF"
|
|
len=$((${#cert}/2))
|
|
if [[ $len -lt 128 ]]; then
|
|
cert="30$(printf "%02x" $len)$cert"
|
|
elif [[ $len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
cert="3081$(printf "%02x" $len)$cert"
|
|
else
|
|
cert="3082$(printf "%04x" $len)$cert"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Use the LDAP String Representation of Distinguished Names (RFC 2253),
|
|
# The current specification is in RFC 4514.
|
|
name="$(hex2binary "$cert" | $OPENSSL x509 -issuer -noout -inform DER -nameopt RFC2253 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
name="${name#issuer=}"
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_leading_space "$name")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Given the OpenSSL output of a response from a TLS server (with the -msg option)
|
|
# in which the response includes a CertificateRequest message, return the list of
|
|
# distinguished names that are in the CA list.
|
|
extract_calist() {
|
|
local response="$1"
|
|
local is_tls12=false is_tls13=false
|
|
local certreq calist="" certtypes sigalgs dn
|
|
local calist_string=""
|
|
local -i len type
|
|
|
|
# Determine whether this is a TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 response, since the information
|
|
# is encoded in a different place for TLS 1.3 and the CertificateRequest message
|
|
# differs between TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.1 and earlier.
|
|
if [[ "$response" =~ \<\<\<\ TLS\ 1.3[\,]?\ Handshake\ \[length\ [0-9a-fA-F]*\]\,\ CertificateRequest ]]; then
|
|
is_tls13=true
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ \<\<\<\ TLS\ 1.2[\,]?\ Handshake\ \[length\ [0-9a-fA-F]*\]\,\ CertificateRequest ]]; then
|
|
is_tls12=true
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Extract just the CertificateRequest message as an ASCII-HEX string.
|
|
certreq="${response##*CertificateRequest}"
|
|
certreq="0d${certreq#*0d}"
|
|
certreq="${certreq%%<<<*}"
|
|
certreq="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$certreq")")"
|
|
certreq="${certreq:8}"
|
|
|
|
# Get the list of DNs from the CertificateRequest message.
|
|
if "$is_tls13"; then
|
|
# struct {
|
|
# opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
|
|
# Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
# } CertificateRequest;
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:2}")
|
|
certreq="${certreq:$((len+2))}"
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:4}")
|
|
certreq="${certreq:4}"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
[[ -z "$certreq" ]] && break
|
|
type=$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:4}")
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:4:4}")
|
|
if [[ $type -eq 47 ]]; then
|
|
# This is the certificate_authorities extension
|
|
calist="${certreq:8:len}"
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${calist:0:4}")
|
|
calist="${calist:4:len}"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
certreq="${certreq:$((len+8))}"
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
# struct {
|
|
# ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
# SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
# supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; - only present in TLS 1.2
|
|
# DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
# } CertificateRequest;
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:2}")
|
|
certtypes="${certreq:2:len}"
|
|
certreq="${certreq:$((len+2))}"
|
|
if "$is_tls12"; then
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:4}")
|
|
sigalgs="${certreq:4:len}"
|
|
certreq="${certreq:$((len+4))}"
|
|
fi
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:4}")
|
|
calist="${certreq:4:len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Convert each DN to a string.
|
|
while true; do
|
|
[[ -z "$calist" ]] && break
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${calist:0:4}")
|
|
dn="${calist:4:len}"
|
|
calist_string+="$(print_dn "$dn")\n"
|
|
calist="${calist:$((len+4))}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$calist_string" ]] && calist_string="empty"
|
|
tm_out "$calist_string"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This is only being called from determine_optimal_proto() in order to check whether we have a server with
|
|
# client authentication, a server with no SSL session ID switched off -- and as the name indicates a protocol.
|
|
# ARG1 is the openssl s_client connect return value. (Darwin or LibreSSL may return 1 here)
|
|
# ARG2 is the server hello file name
|
|
#
|
|
sclient_auth() {
|
|
local server_hello="$(cat -v "$2")"
|
|
local re='Master-Key: ([^\
|
|
]*)'
|
|
local connect_success=false
|
|
|
|
[[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
|
|
! "$connect_success" && [[ "$server_hello" =~ $re ]] && \
|
|
[[ -n "${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
! "$connect_success" && \
|
|
[[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)\,\ (SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?(\/SSLv3)?)\,\ Cipher\ is\ ([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]] && \
|
|
connect_success=true
|
|
|
|
if "$connect_success"; then
|
|
[[ "$server_hello" =~ Session-ID:\ [a-fA-F0-9]{2,64} ]] && NO_SSL_SESSIONID=false
|
|
# we needed to set this for later
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ \<\<\<\ (SSL\ [23]|TLS\ 1)(\.[0-3])?[\,]?\ Handshake\ \[length\ [0-9a-fA-F]*\]\,\ CertificateRequest ]]; then
|
|
# CertificateRequest message in -msg
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH="required"
|
|
[[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && CLIENT_AUTH="optional"
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST="$(extract_calist "$server_hello")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && return 0
|
|
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ \-\-\-BEGIN\ CERTIFICATE\-\-\-.*\-\-\-END\ CERTIFICATE\-\-\- ]]; then
|
|
# This should be already set but just to be sure
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH="none"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Determine the best parameters to use with tls_sockets():
|
|
# For TLSv1.3, determine what extension number to use for the key_share extension.
|
|
# For TLSv1.2, determine what cipher list to send, since there are more than 128
|
|
# TLSv1.2 ciphers and some servers fail if the ClientHello contains too many ciphers.
|
|
# If both TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.2 ClientHello messages result in failed connection attempts,
|
|
# then try to determine whether:
|
|
# (1) This is an SSLv2-only server
|
|
# (2) This server supports some protocol in SSLv3 - TLSv1.1, but cannot handle version negotiation.
|
|
# (3) This is not a TLS/SSL enabled server.
|
|
# This information can be used by determine_optimal_proto() to help distinguish between a server
|
|
# that is not TLS/SSL enabled and one that is not compatible with the version of OpenSSL being used.
|
|
determine_optimal_sockets_params() {
|
|
local -i ret1=1 ret2=1 ret3=1
|
|
local i proto cipher_offered
|
|
local all_failed=true
|
|
|
|
# If a STARTTLS protocol is specified and $SSL_NATIVE is true, then skip this test, since
|
|
# $SSL_NATIVE may have been set to true as a result of tls_sockets() not supporting the STARTTLS
|
|
# protocol.
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]] && "$SSL_NATIVE" && return 0
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: The following code is only needed as long as draft versions of TLSv1.3 prior to draft 23
|
|
# are supported. It is used to determine whether a draft 23 or pre-draft 23 ClientHello should be
|
|
# sent.
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "00, 2b, 00, 0f, 0e, 03,04, 7f,1c, 7f,1b, 7f,1a, 7f,19, 7f,18, 7f,17"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
else
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="28"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "00, 2b, 00, 0b, 0a, 7f,16, 7f,15, 7f,14, 7f,13, 7f,12"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$all_failed"; then
|
|
# Determine which version of TLS 1.3 was offered. For drafts 18-21 the
|
|
# version appears in the ProtocolVersion field of the ServerHello. For
|
|
# drafts 22-28 and the final TLS 1.3 the ProtocolVersion field contains
|
|
# 0303 and the actual version appears in the supported_versions extension.
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2}") yes
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00020304 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3_rfc8446 yes
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[2-9A-C] ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "${BASH_REMATCH:10:2}") yes
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Need to determine which set of ciphers is best to use with
|
|
# a TLSv1.2 ClientHello since there are far more than 128 ciphers
|
|
# that can be used.
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER"
|
|
ret1=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret1 -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0303) add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Try again with a different, less common, set of cipher suites
|
|
# see #807 and #806. If using these cipher suites results in a
|
|
# successful connection, then change $TLS12_CIPHER to these
|
|
# cipher suites so that later tests will use this list of cipher
|
|
# suites.
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY"
|
|
ret2=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret2 -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret2 -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ $ret1 -ne 2 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Try a third time with cipher suites not in $TLS12_CIPHER or
|
|
# $TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY. If using these cipher suites results in a
|
|
# successful connection, then change $TLS12_CIPHER to these
|
|
# cipher suites so that later tests will use this list of cipher
|
|
# suites.
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]] && [[ $ret2 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER_3RD_TRY"
|
|
ret3=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret3 -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_3RD_TRY"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret3 -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ $ret1 -ne 2 ]] && [[ $ret2 -ne 2 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_3RD_TRY"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret2 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret3 -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
cipher_offered="$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if [[ "$cipher_offered" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher_offered" == SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
cipher_offered="$(rfc2hexcode "$cipher_offered")"
|
|
else
|
|
cipher_offered="$(openssl2hexcode "$cipher_offered")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ${#cipher_offered} -eq 9 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="${cipher_offered:2:2},${cipher_offered:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$all_failed"; then
|
|
# One of the following must be true:
|
|
# * This is not a TLS/SSL enabled server.
|
|
# * The server only supports SSLv2
|
|
# * The server does not handle version negotiation correctly.
|
|
for proto in 01 00 02; do
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true"
|
|
ret1=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
case $proto in
|
|
02) add_proto_offered tls1_1 no ;;
|
|
01) add_proto_offered tls1 no ;;
|
|
00) add_proto_offered ssl3 no ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret1 -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
OPTIMAL_SOCKETS_PROTO="$proto"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$all_failed"; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets
|
|
[[ $? -eq 3 ]] && all_failed=false && add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
fi
|
|
ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS="$all_failed"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This function determines (STARTTLS_)OPTIMAL_PROTO. It is basically a workaround function as under certain
|
|
# circumstances a ClientHello without specifying a protocol will fail.
|
|
# Circumstances observed so far: 1.) IIS 6 and openssl 1.0.2 as opposed to 1.0.1 2.) starttls + dovecot imap.
|
|
# Independent on the server side it seems reasonable to to know upfront which protocol always works
|
|
#
|
|
# arg1: if empty: no STARTTLS, else: STARTTLS protocol
|
|
# The first try in the loop is empty as we prefer not to specify always a protocol if we can get along w/o it
|
|
#
|
|
determine_optimal_proto() {
|
|
local all_failed=true
|
|
local tmp=""
|
|
local proto optimal_proto
|
|
local jsonID="optimal_proto"
|
|
|
|
"$do_tls_sockets" && return 0
|
|
|
|
>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ -n "$1" ]]; then
|
|
# STARTTLS workaround needed see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/188 -- kind of odd
|
|
for STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO in -tls1_2 -tls1 -ssl3 -tls1_1 -tls1_3 -ssl2; do
|
|
sclient_supported "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" || continue
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" $PROXY -msg $STARTTLS $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
if sclient_auth $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
add_proto_offered "${STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO/-/}" yes
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
"$all_failed" && STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
optimal_proto="$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
debugme echo "STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO: $STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
else
|
|
# No STARTTLS
|
|
for proto in '' -tls1_2 -tls1 -tls1_3 -ssl3 -tls1_1 -ssl2; do
|
|
[[ -z "$proto" ]] || sclient_supported "$proto" || continue
|
|
# Only send $GET_REQ11 in case of a non-empty $URL_PATH, as it
|
|
# is not needed otherwise. Also, sending $GET_REQ11 may cause
|
|
# problems if the server being tested is not an HTTPS server,
|
|
# and $URL_PATH should be empty for non-HTTPS servers.
|
|
# With TLS 1.3 it is only possible to test for client authentication
|
|
# if $OPENSSL supports post-handshake authentication. So, don't send try
|
|
# to send $GET_REQ11 after a TLS 1.3 ClientHello to a TLS 1.3 server if
|
|
# $ENABLE_PHA is false.
|
|
if [[ -z "$URL_PATH" ]] || [[ "$URL_PATH" == / ]] || \
|
|
{ "$HAS_TLS13" && ! "$HAS_ENABLE_PHA" && [[ -z "$proto" || "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -ne 1 ]]; }; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
else
|
|
safe_echo "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI -ign_eof -enable_pha") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Issue HTTP GET again as it properly finished within $HEADER_MAXSLEEP and didn't hang.
|
|
# Doing it again in the foreground to get an accurate return code.
|
|
safe_echo "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI -ign_eof -enable_pha") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
else
|
|
# Issuing HTTP GET caused $OPENSSL to hang, so just try to determine
|
|
# protocol support without also trying to collect information about
|
|
# client authentication.
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if sclient_auth $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
# we use the successful handshake at least to get one valid protocol supported -- it saves us time later
|
|
if [[ -z "$proto" ]]; then
|
|
# convert to openssl terminology
|
|
tmp=$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)
|
|
tmp=${tmp/\./_}
|
|
tmp=${tmp/v/}
|
|
tmp="$(tolower $tmp)"
|
|
add_proto_offered "${tmp}" yes
|
|
debugme echo "one proto determined: $tmp"
|
|
OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered "${proto/-/}" yes
|
|
OPTIMAL_PROTO="$proto"
|
|
fi
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
# If a $URL_PATH is specified and a TLS 1.3 server is being
|
|
# tested using an $OPENSSL that supports TLS 1.3 but not
|
|
# post-handshake authentication, then test for client
|
|
# authentication using a protocol version earlier than
|
|
# TLS 1.3 (unless the server only is TLS 1.3-only).
|
|
if [[ "$tmp" == tls1_3 ]] && [[ -n "$URL_PATH" ]] && [[ "$URL_PATH" != / ]] && ! "$HAS_ENABLE_PHA"; then
|
|
if [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -eq 0 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1")" -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
safe_echo "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI -ign_eof -no_tls1_3") >$TEMPDIR/client_auth_test.txt 2>>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
# If the HTTP properly finished within $HEADER_MAXSLEEP and didn't hang, then
|
|
# do it again in the foreground to get an accurate return code. If it did hang,
|
|
# there is no way to test for client authentication, so don't try.
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
safe_echo "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI -ign_eof -no_tls1_3") >$TEMPDIR/client_auth_test.txt 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
sclient_auth $? $TEMPDIR/client_auth_test.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == none ]]; then
|
|
# This is a TLS 1.3-only server and $OPENSSL does not support -enable_pha, so it is not
|
|
# possible to test for client authentication.
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH="unknown"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
"$all_failed" && OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
optimal_proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "OPTIMAL_PROTO: $OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$optimal_proto" != -ssl2 ]] && ! "$all_failed" && grep -q '^Server Temp Key' $TMPFILE && HAS_DH_BITS=true # FIX #190
|
|
if [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -ne 0 ]] &&
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1")" -ne 0 ]] &&
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
TLS13_ONLY=true
|
|
elif [[ -z "$TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED" ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" == TLSv1.2 ]]; then
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)"
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="$(openssl2hexcode "$TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED")"
|
|
[[ ${#TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED} -eq 9 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="${TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED:2:2},${TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED:7:2}" || TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED=""
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$optimal_proto" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_magenta "$NODEIP:$PORT appears to only support SSLv2."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODEIP:$PORT appears to only support SSLv2."
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept false negatives or positives" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
elif "$all_failed" && ! "$ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS"; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_magenta " $NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY. You better use --openssl=<path_to_openssl_supporting_TLS_1.3>"
|
|
if ! "$OSSL_SHORTCUT" || [[ ! -x /usr/bin/openssl ]] || /usr/bin/openssl s_client -tls1_3 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY, but $OPENSSL does not support TLS 1.3"
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed with $OPENSSL and accept all scan problems" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=10
|
|
else
|
|
# dirty hack but an idea for the future to be implemented upfront: Now we know, we'll better off
|
|
# with the OS supplied openssl binary. We need to initialize variables / arrays again though.
|
|
# And the service detection can't be made up for now
|
|
outln ", \n proceeding with /usr/bin/openssl"
|
|
OPENSSL=/usr/bin/openssl
|
|
find_openssl_binary
|
|
prepare_arrays
|
|
fi
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -ne 0 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -ne 0 ]] &&
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1")" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_magenta " $NODE:$PORT appears to support SSLv3 ONLY. You better use --openssl=<path_to_openssl_supporting_SSL_3>"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODE:$PORT appears to support SSLv3 ONLY, but $OPENSSL does not support SSLv3."
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept all scan problems" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=10
|
|
else
|
|
prln_bold " Your OpenSSL cannot connect to $NODEIP:$PORT"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Your OpenSSL cannot connect to $NODEIP:$PORT."
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " The results might look ok but they could be nonsense. Really proceed ? (\"yes\" to continue)" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$all_failed"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
if "$HAS_IPv6"; then
|
|
pr_bold " Your $OPENSSL is not IPv6 aware, or $NODEIP:$PORT "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Your $OPENSSL is not IPv6 aware, or $NODEIP:$PORT doesn't seem to be a TLS/SSL enabled server."
|
|
else
|
|
pr_bold " $NODEIP:$PORT "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODEIP:$PORT doesn't seem to be a TLS/SSL enabled server."
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
prln_bold "doesn't seem to be a TLS/SSL enabled server";
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " The results might look ok but they could be nonsense. Really proceed ? (\"yes\" to continue)" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
elif ! "$all_failed" && "$ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS" && ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
# For some reason connecting with tls_sockets/sslv2_sockets didn't work, but connecting
|
|
# with $OPENSSL s_client did.
|
|
# FIXME: Should we include some sort of "please report" note here?
|
|
prln_magenta " Testing with $NODE:$PORT only worked using $OPENSSL."
|
|
prln_magenta " Test results may be somewhat better if the --ssl-native option is used."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Testing with $NODE:$PORT only worked using $OPENSSL."
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept false negatives or positives" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1 (optional): ftp smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap, sieve, xmpp, xmpp-server, telnet, ldap, postgres, mysql, irc, nntp (maybe with trailing s)
|
|
#
|
|
determine_service() {
|
|
local ua
|
|
local protocol
|
|
local basicauth_header=""
|
|
local reqheader=""
|
|
|
|
# Check if we can connect to $NODEIP:$PORT. Attention: This ALWAYS uses sockets. Thus timeouts for --ssl-=native do not apply
|
|
if ! fd_socket 5; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
fatal "You're sure $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT allows tunneling here? Can't connect to \"$NODEIP:$PORT\"" $ERR_CONNECT
|
|
else
|
|
if "$MULTIPLE_CHECKS"; then
|
|
ip_fatal "Couldn't connect to $NODEIP:$PORT"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "Can't connect to \"$NODEIP:$PORT\"\nMake sure a firewall is not between you and your scanning target!" $ERR_CONNECT
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then
|
|
# no STARTTLS.
|
|
determine_optimal_sockets_params
|
|
$SNEAKY && \
|
|
ua="$UA_SNEAKY" || \
|
|
ua="$UA_STD"
|
|
if [[ -n "$BASICAUTH" ]]; then
|
|
basicauth_header="Authorization: Basic $(safe_echo "$BASICAUTH" | $OPENSSL base64 2>/dev/null)\r\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$REQHEADERS" ]]; then
|
|
reqheader="$(join_by "\r\n" "${REQHEADERS[@]}")\r\n" #Add all required custom http headers to one string with newlines
|
|
fi
|
|
GET_REQ11="GET $URL_PATH HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $ua\r\n${basicauth_header}${reqheader}Accept-Encoding: identity\r\nAccept: */*\r\nConnection: Close\r\n\r\n"
|
|
determine_optimal_proto
|
|
# returns always 0:
|
|
service_detection $OPTIMAL_PROTO
|
|
else # STARTTLS
|
|
if [[ "$1" == postgres ]] || [[ "$1" == sieve ]]; then
|
|
protocol="$1"
|
|
else
|
|
protocol=${1%s} # strip trailing 's' in ftp(s), smtp(s), pop3(s), etc
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$protocol" in
|
|
ftp|smtp|lmtp|pop3|imap|sieve|xmpp|xmpp-server|telnet|ldap|postgres|mysql|nntp)
|
|
STARTTLS="-starttls $protocol"
|
|
if [[ "$protocol" == xmpp ]] || [[ "$protocol" == xmpp-server ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_XMPP"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-xmpphost\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
STARTTLS="$STARTTLS -xmpphost $XMPP_HOST" # small hack -- instead of changing calls all over the place
|
|
# see https://xmpp.org/rfcs/rfc3920.html
|
|
else
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$NODE"; then
|
|
# XMPP needs a jabber domainname
|
|
if [[ -n "$rDNS" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning " IP address doesn't work for XMPP, trying PTR record $rDNS"
|
|
# remove trailing .
|
|
NODE=${rDNS%%.}
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "No DNS supplied and no PTR record available which I can try for XMPP" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_XMPP"; then
|
|
# small hack -- instead of changing calls all over the place
|
|
STARTTLS="$STARTTLS -xmpphost $NODE"
|
|
else
|
|
# If the XMPP name cannot be provided using -xmpphost,
|
|
# then it needs to be provided to the -connect option
|
|
NODEIP="$NODE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$protocol" == xmpp-server ]] && ! "$HAS_XMPP_SERVER"; then
|
|
#FIXME: make use of HAS_XMPP_SERVER2
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls xmpp-server\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == postgres ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports postgres.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_POSTGRES"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls postgres\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == mysql ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports mysql.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_MYSQL"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls mysql\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == lmtp ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports lmtp.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_LMTP"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls lmtp\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == sieve ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports sieve.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_SIEVE"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls sieve\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == nntp ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports lmtp.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_NNTP"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls nntp\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
determine_optimal_sockets_params
|
|
determine_optimal_proto "$1"
|
|
|
|
out " Service set:$CORRECT_SPACES STARTTLS via "
|
|
out "$(toupper "$protocol")"
|
|
[[ "$protocol" == mysql ]] && out " (experimental)"
|
|
fileout "service" "INFO" "$protocol"
|
|
[[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]] && out " (XMPP domain=\'$XMPP_HOST\')"
|
|
outln
|
|
;;
|
|
*) outln
|
|
fatal "momentarily only ftp, smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap, sieve, xmpp, xmpp-server, telnet, ldap, nntp, postgres and mysql allowed" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# It comes handy later also for STARTTLS injection to define this global. When we do banner grabbing
|
|
# or replace service_detection() we might not need that anymore
|
|
SERVICE=$protocol
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0 # OPTIMAL_PROTO, GET_REQ*/HEAD_REQ* is set now
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Sets SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG to true or false, depending on whether we hit the 128 cipher limit.
|
|
# Return value is 0 unless we have a problem executing
|
|
#
|
|
determine_sizelimitbug() {
|
|
# overflow_cipher must be some cipher that does not appear in TLS12_CIPHER.
|
|
local overflow_cipher='C0,86'
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers
|
|
|
|
# For STARTTLS protocols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
|
|
# Fixme: find out whether we can't skip this in general for STARTTLS
|
|
[[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
# Only with TLS 1.2 offered at the server side it is possible to hit this bug, in practice. Thus
|
|
# we assume if TLS 1.2 is not supported, the server has no cipher size limit bug. It still may,
|
|
# theoretically, but in a regular check with testssl.sh we won't hit this limit with lower protocols.
|
|
# Upon calling this function we already know whether TLS 1.2 is supported. If TLS 1.2 is supported, we
|
|
# send 129 ciphers (including 00FF) and check whether it works.
|
|
|
|
if [[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol 03) ]]; then
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers="$(tr ' ' '\n' <<< "${overflow_cipher}, $TLS12_CIPHER" | sed -e '/^$/d' | wc -l)"
|
|
if [[ $nr_ciphers -ne 129 ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "FIXME line $LINENO, ${FUNCNAME[0]} sending $nr_ciphers ciphers rather than 129."
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo "${FUNCNAME[0]} sending $nr_ciphers ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets 03 "${overflow_cipher}, ${TLS12_CIPHER}"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false
|
|
else
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=true
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG: $SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then
|
|
out " Pre-test: "
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "128 cipher limit bug"
|
|
fileout "pre_128cipher" "MEDIUM" "128 cipher limit bug"
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln " Pre-test: No 128 cipher limit bug"
|
|
fileout "pre_128cipher" "INFO" "No 128 cipher limit bug"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
display_rdns_etc() {
|
|
local ip further_ip_addrs=""
|
|
local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # for displaying IPv6 addresses we don't need []
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
out " Via Proxy: $CORRECT_SPACES"
|
|
outln "$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT "
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $(count_words "$IP46ADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
out " Further IP addresses: $CORRECT_SPACES"
|
|
for ip in $IP46ADDRs; do
|
|
if [[ "$ip" == "$NODEIP" ]] || [[ "[$ip]" == "$NODEIP" ]]; then
|
|
continue
|
|
else
|
|
further_ip_addrs+="$ip "
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
outln "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$further_ip_addrs" " $CORRECT_SPACES" $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$LOCAL_A"; then
|
|
outln " A record via: $CORRECT_SPACES /etc/hosts "
|
|
elif "$LOCAL_AAAA"; then
|
|
outln " AAAA record via: $CORRECT_SPACES /etc/hosts "
|
|
elif [[ -n "$CMDLINE_IP" ]]; then
|
|
if is_ipv6addr $"$CMDLINE_IP"; then
|
|
outln " AAAA record via: $CORRECT_SPACES supplied IP \"$CMDLINE_IP\""
|
|
else
|
|
outln " A record via: $CORRECT_SPACES supplied IP \"$CMDLINE_IP\""
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$rDNS" =~ instructed ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf " %-23s " "rDNS ($nodeip):")"
|
|
out "$rDNS"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$rDNS" ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf " %-23s " "rDNS ($nodeip):")"
|
|
out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$rDNS" " $CORRECT_SPACES" $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
datebanner() {
|
|
local scan_time_f=""
|
|
local node_banner=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]] && "$DNS_VIA_PROXY"; then
|
|
node_banner="$NODE:$PORT"
|
|
else
|
|
node_banner="$NODEIP:$PORT ($NODE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ Done ]] ; then
|
|
scan_time_f="$(printf "%04ss" "$SCAN_TIME")" # 4 digits because of windows
|
|
pr_reverse "$1 $(date +%F) $(date +%T) [$scan_time_f] -->> $node_banner <<--"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_reverse "$1 $(date +%F) $(date +%T) -->> $node_banner <<--"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ Start ]] && display_rdns_etc
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# one line with char $1 over screen width $2
|
|
draw_line() {
|
|
out "$(printf -- "$1"'%.s' $(eval "echo {1.."$(($2))"}"))"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_mx_all_ips() {
|
|
local mxs mx
|
|
local mxport
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local word=""
|
|
|
|
STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="smtp"
|
|
# test first higher priority servers
|
|
mxs=$(get_mx_record "$1" | sort -n | sed -e 's/^.* //' -e 's/\.$//' | tr '\n' ' ')
|
|
if [[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]]; then
|
|
word="as instructed one" # with highest priority
|
|
mxs=${mxs%% *}
|
|
else
|
|
word="the only"
|
|
fi
|
|
mxport=${2:-25}
|
|
if [[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] || [[ -n "$PARENT_LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
prepare_logging
|
|
else
|
|
prepare_logging "${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$mxs" ]] && [[ "$mxs" != ' ' ]]; then
|
|
[[ $(count_words "$mxs") -gt 1 ]] && MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true
|
|
if "$MULTIPLE_CHECKS"; then
|
|
pr_bold "Testing all MX records (on port $mxport): "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_bold "Testing $word MX record (on port $mxport): "
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "$mxs"
|
|
[[ $mxport == 465 ]] && STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="" # no starttls for tcp 465, all other ports are starttls
|
|
for mx in $mxs; do
|
|
draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3))
|
|
outln
|
|
parse_hn_port "$mx:$mxport"
|
|
determine_ip_addresses || continue
|
|
if [[ $(count_words "$IPADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then # we have more than one ipv4 address to check
|
|
MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true
|
|
pr_bold "Testing all IPv4 addresses (port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs"
|
|
for ip in $IPADDRs; do
|
|
NODEIP="$ip"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
NODEIP="$IPADDRs"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
done
|
|
draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3))
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_bold "Done testing all MX records (on port $mxport): "; outln "$mxs"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_bold " $1 has no MX records(s)"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# If run_mass_testing() is being used, then create the command line
|
|
# for the test based on the global command line (all elements of the
|
|
# command line provided to the parent, except the --file/-iL option) and the
|
|
# specific command line options for the test to be run. Each argument
|
|
# in the command line needs to be a separate element in an array in order
|
|
# to deal with word splitting within file names (see #702).
|
|
#
|
|
# If run_mass_testing_parallel() is being used, then in addition to the above,
|
|
# modify global command line for child tests so that if all (JSON, CSV, HTML)
|
|
# output is to go into a single file, each child will have its output placed in
|
|
# a separate, named file, so that the separate files can be concatenated
|
|
# together once they are complete to create the single file.
|
|
#
|
|
# If run_mass_testing() is being used, then "$1" is "serial". If
|
|
# run_mass_testing_parallel() is being used, then "$1" is "parallel XXXXXXXX"
|
|
# where XXXXXXXX is the number of the test being run.
|
|
#
|
|
create_mass_testing_cmdline() {
|
|
local testing_type="$1"
|
|
local cmd test_number
|
|
local outfile_arg
|
|
local -i nr_cmds=0 i=0
|
|
local skip_next=false
|
|
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE=()
|
|
[[ "$testing_type" =~ parallel ]] && read -r testing_type test_number <<< "$testing_type"
|
|
|
|
# Start by adding the elements from the global command line to the command line for the
|
|
# test. If run_mass_testing_parallel(), then modify the command line so that, when
|
|
# required, each child process sends its test results to a separate file. If a cmd
|
|
# uses '=' for supplying a value we just skip next parameter (we don't use 'parse_opt_equal_sign' here)
|
|
debugme echo "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}"
|
|
for cmd in "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}"; do
|
|
"$skip_next" && skip_next=false && i+=1 && continue
|
|
if [[ "$cmd" =~ --file ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -iL ]]; then
|
|
# Don't include the "--file[=...] or -iL argument in the child's command
|
|
# line, but do include "--warnings=batch".
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--warnings=batch"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
# next is the file itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --file ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -iL ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif [[ "$testing_type" == serial ]]; then
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER" && [[ "$cmd" =~ --jsonfile-pretty || "$cmd" =~ -oJ ]]; then
|
|
>"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
# next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile-pretty ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oJ ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$JSONHEADER" && [[ "$cmd" =~ --jsonfile || "$cmd" =~ -oj ]]; then
|
|
>"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
# next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oj ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$CSVHEADER" && [[ "$cmd" =~ --csvfile || "$cmd" =~ -oC ]]; then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$outfile_arg"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --csvfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oC ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$HTMLHEADER" && [[ "$cmd" =~ --htmlfile || "$cmd" =~ -oH ]]; then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$outfile_arg"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --htmlfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oH ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif [[ "$cmd" =~ --logfile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oL ]]; then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--logfile-parent=$outfile_arg"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --logfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oL ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$JSONHEADER" && [[ "$cmd" =~ --outFile || "$cmd" =~ -oA ]]; then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
>"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$outfile_arg.csv"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$outfile_arg.html"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --outFile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oA ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$JSONHEADER" && [[ "$cmd" =~ --outfile || "$cmd" =~ -oa ]]; then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
>"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$outfile_arg.csv"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$outfile_arg.html"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --outfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oa ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
else
|
|
case "$cmd" in
|
|
--jsonfile|--jsonfile=*|-oj|-oj=*)
|
|
# If <jsonfile> is a file, then have provide a different
|
|
# file name to each child process. If <jsonfile> is a
|
|
# directory, then just pass it on to the child processes.
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json"
|
|
# next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oj ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--jsonfile-pretty|--jsonfile-pretty=*|-oJ|-oJ=*)
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json"
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile-pretty ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oJ ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--csvfile|--csvfile=*|-oC|-oC=*)
|
|
if "$CSVHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv"
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --csvfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oC ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--htmlfile|--htmlfile=*|-oH|-oH=*)
|
|
if "$HTMLHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html"
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --htmlfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oH ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--logfile|--logfile=*|-oL|-oL=*)
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--logfile-parent=$outfile_arg"
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --logfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oL ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--outfile|--outfile=*|-oa|-oa=*)
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --outfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oa ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--outFile|--outFile=*|-oA|-oA=*)
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --outFile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oA ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
i+=1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Now add the command line arguments for the specific test to the command line.
|
|
# Skip the first argument sent to this function, since it specifies the type of testing being performed.
|
|
shift
|
|
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$1"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
shift
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
ports2starttls() {
|
|
local tcp_port=$1
|
|
local ret=0
|
|
|
|
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_TCP_and_UDP_port_numbers
|
|
case $tcp_port in
|
|
21) echo "-t ftp " ;;
|
|
23) echo "-t telnet " ;;
|
|
119|433) echo "-t nntp " ;; # to come
|
|
25|587) echo "-t smtp " ;;
|
|
110) echo "-t pop3 " ;;
|
|
143) echo "-t imap " ;;
|
|
389) echo "-t ldap ";;
|
|
3306) echo "-t mysql " ;;
|
|
5222) echo "-t xmpp " ;; # domain of jabber server maybe needed
|
|
5432) echo "-t postgres " ;;
|
|
4190) echo "-t sieve " ;;
|
|
563) ;; # NNTPS
|
|
636) ;; # LDAP
|
|
1443|8443|443|981) ;; # HTTPS
|
|
465) ;; # HTTPS | SMTP
|
|
631) ;; # CUPS
|
|
853) ;; # DNS over TLS
|
|
995|993) ;; # POP3|IMAP
|
|
3389) ;; # RDP
|
|
*) ret=1 ;; # we don't know this ports so we rather do not scan it
|
|
esac
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nmap_to_plain_file() {
|
|
local target_fname=""
|
|
local oneline=""
|
|
local ip hostdontcare round_brackets ports_specs starttls
|
|
local tmp port host_spec protocol ssl_hint dontcare dontcare1
|
|
#FIXME: IPv6 is missing here
|
|
|
|
# Ok, since we are here we are sure to have an nmap file. To avoid questions we make sure it's the right format too
|
|
if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ ( -oG )(.*) ]] || [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ ( -oA )(.*) ]] ; then
|
|
# yes, greppable
|
|
if [[ $(grep -c Status "$FNAME") -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $(grep -c '/open/' "$FNAME") -eq 0 ]] && \
|
|
fatal "Nmap file $FNAME should contain at least one open port" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "strange, nmap grepable misses \"Status\"" -1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "Nmap file $FNAME is not in grep(p)able format (-oG filename.g(n)map)" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
fi
|
|
# create ${FNAME%.*}.txt in $TEMPDIR
|
|
target_fname="${FNAME%.*}.txt"
|
|
target_fname="${target_fname##*\/}" # strip path (Unix)
|
|
target_fname="${target_fname##*\\}" # strip path (Dos)
|
|
target_fname="$TEMPDIR/$target_fname"
|
|
> "${target_fname}" || fatal "Cannot create \"${target_fname}\"" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
|
|
# Line x: "Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Status: Up"
|
|
# Line x+1: "Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Ports: 443/open/tcp//https///"
|
|
# (or): Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Ports: 22/open/tcp//ssh//<banner>/, 25/open/tcp//smtp//<banner>/, 443/open/tcp//ssl|http//<banner>
|
|
while read -r hostdontcare ip round_brackets tmp ports_specs; do
|
|
[[ "$ports_specs" =~ "Status: " ]] && continue # we don't need this
|
|
[[ "$ports_specs" =~ '/open/tcp/' ]] || continue # no open tcp at all for this IP --> move
|
|
host_spec="$ip"
|
|
fqdn="${round_brackets/\(/}"
|
|
fqdn="${fqdn/\)/}"
|
|
if [[ -n "$fqdn" ]]; then
|
|
tmp="$(get_a_record "$fqdn")"
|
|
debugme echo "$tmp \?= $ip"
|
|
if [[ "$tmp" == "$ip" ]]; then
|
|
host_spec="$fqdn"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
while read -r oneline; do
|
|
# 25/open/tcp//smtp//<banner>/,
|
|
[[ "$oneline" =~ '/open/tcp/' ]] || continue # no open tcp for this port on this IP --> move on
|
|
IFS=/ read -r port dontcare protocol ssl_hint dontcare1 <<< "$oneline"
|
|
if [[ "$ssl_hint" =~ ^(ssl|https) ]] || [[ "$dontcare1" =~ ^(ssl|https) ]]; then
|
|
echo "${host_spec}:${port}" >>"$target_fname"
|
|
else
|
|
starttls="$(ports2starttls $port)"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 1 ]] && continue # nmap got a port but we don't know how to speak to
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo "${starttls}$host_spec:$port"
|
|
echo "${starttls}${host_spec}:${port}" >>"$target_fname"
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(tr ',' '\n' <<< "$ports_specs")
|
|
done < "$FNAME"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo
|
|
|
|
[[ -s "$target_fname" ]] || \
|
|
fatal "Couldn't find any open port in $FNAME" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
export FNAME=$target_fname
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_mass_testing() {
|
|
local cmdline=""
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local gnmapadd=""
|
|
local saved_fname="$FNAME"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$FNAME" ]] && "$IKNOW_FNAME"; then
|
|
fatal "Can't read file \"$FNAME\"" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ (Nmap [4-8])(.*)( scan initiated )(.*) ]]; then
|
|
gnmapadd="grep(p)able nmap "
|
|
nmap_to_plain_file
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_reverse "====== Running in file batch mode with ${gnmapadd}file=\"$saved_fname\" ======"; outln "\n"
|
|
while read -r cmdline; do
|
|
cmdline="$(filter_input "$cmdline")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cmdline" ]] && continue
|
|
[[ "$cmdline" == EOF ]] && break
|
|
# Create the command line for the child in the form of an array (see #702)
|
|
create_mass_testing_cmdline "serial" $cmdline
|
|
draw_line "=" $((TERM_WIDTH / 2)); outln;
|
|
outln "$(create_cmd_line_string "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}")"
|
|
# we call ourselves here. $do_mass_testing is the parent, $CHILD_MASS_TESTING... you figured
|
|
if [[ -z "$(type -p "$0")" ]]; then
|
|
CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$RUN_DIR/$PROG_NAME" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}"
|
|
else
|
|
CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER" && [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" ]]; then
|
|
# Need to ensure that a separator is only added if the test
|
|
# produced some JSON output.
|
|
"$first" || fileout_separator # this is needed for appended output, see #687
|
|
first=false
|
|
cat "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
FIRST_FINDING=false
|
|
fi
|
|
done < "${FNAME}"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This function is called when it has been determined that the next child
|
|
# process has completed or it has been stopped. If the child process completed,
|
|
# then this process prints the child process's output to the terminal and, if
|
|
# appropriate, adds any JSON, CSV, and HTML output it has created to the
|
|
# appropriate file. If the child process was stopped, then a message indicating
|
|
# that is printed, but the incomplete results are not used.
|
|
#
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result() {
|
|
draw_line "=" $((TERM_WIDTH / 2)); outln;
|
|
outln "${PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]}"
|
|
if [[ "$1" == completed ]]; then
|
|
cat "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).log"
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER" && [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).json" ]]; then
|
|
# Need to ensure that a separator is only added if the test
|
|
# produced some JSON output.
|
|
"$FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT" || fileout_separator # this is needed for appended output, see #687
|
|
FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT=false
|
|
FIRST_FINDING=false
|
|
cat "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).json" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$CSVHEADER" && cat "$TEMPDIR/csvfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).csv" >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
"$HTMLHEADER" && cat "$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).html" >> "$HTMLFILE"
|
|
elif [[ "$1" == "stopped" ]]; then
|
|
outln "\nTest was stopped before it completed.\n"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "\nTest timed out before it completed.\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#FIXME: not called/tested yet
|
|
run_mass_testing_parallel() {
|
|
local cmdline=""
|
|
local -i i nr_active_tests=0
|
|
local -a -i start_time=()
|
|
local -i curr_time wait_time
|
|
local gnmapadd=""
|
|
local saved_fname="$FNAME"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$FNAME" ]] && $IKNOW_FNAME; then
|
|
fatal "Can't read file \"$FNAME\"" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ (Nmap [4-8])(.*)( scan initiated )(.*) ]]; then
|
|
gnmapadd="grep(p)able nmap "
|
|
nmap_to_plain_file
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_reverse "====== Running in file batch mode with ${gnmapadd}file=\"$saved_fname\" ======"; outln "\n"
|
|
while read -r cmdline; do
|
|
cmdline="$(filter_input "$cmdline")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cmdline" ]] && continue
|
|
[[ "$cmdline" == "EOF" ]] && break
|
|
# Create the command line for the child in the form of an array (see #702)
|
|
create_mass_testing_cmdline "parallel $(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS)" $cmdline
|
|
|
|
# fileout() won't include the "service" information in the JSON file for the child process
|
|
# if the JSON file doesn't already exist.
|
|
"$JSONHEADER" && >"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).json"
|
|
PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]="$(create_cmd_line_string "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}")"
|
|
if [[ -z "$(type -p "$0")" ]]; then
|
|
CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$RUN_DIR/$PROG_NAME" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}" > "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).log" 2>&1 &
|
|
else
|
|
CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}" > "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).log" 2>&1 &
|
|
fi
|
|
PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]=$!
|
|
start_time[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]=$(date +%s)
|
|
if "$INTERACTIVE"; then
|
|
echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
echo -n "Started test #$NR_PARALLEL_TESTS" 1>&2
|
|
[[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]] && \
|
|
echo -n " (waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish)" 1>&2
|
|
fi
|
|
NR_PARALLEL_TESTS+=1
|
|
nr_active_tests+=1
|
|
sleep $PARALLEL_SLEEP
|
|
# Get the results of any completed tests
|
|
while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do
|
|
if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
elif ! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1
|
|
else
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $nr_active_tests -ge $MAX_PARALLEL ]]; then
|
|
curr_time=$(date +%s)
|
|
while true; do
|
|
# Check to see if any test completed
|
|
for (( i=NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH; i < NR_PARALLEL_TESTS; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]} -ne 0 ]] && \
|
|
! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]} >/dev/null ; then
|
|
PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]=0
|
|
nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $nr_active_tests -lt $MAX_PARALLEL ]] && break
|
|
if [[ $curr_time-${start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]]; then
|
|
# No test completed in the allocated time, so the first one to
|
|
# start will be killed.
|
|
kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null
|
|
wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p)
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "timeout"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
# Wake up to increment the counter every second (so that the counter
|
|
# appears to users as if it is operating smoothly), but check the
|
|
# status of the $MAX_PARALLEL active processes less often, since the
|
|
# ps command is expensive.
|
|
for (( i=0; i <= $((MAX_PARALLEL/5)); i++ )); do
|
|
wait_time=$((curr_time-start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]))
|
|
[[ $wait_time -gt $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && wait_time=$MAX_WAIT_TEST
|
|
if "$INTERACTIVE"; then
|
|
echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
echo -n "Waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish" 1>&2
|
|
if [[ $((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) -le 60 ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " ($((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) seconds to timeout)" 1>&2
|
|
else
|
|
echo -n " ($wait_time seconds)" 1>&2
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $wait_time -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && break
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
curr_time=$(date +%s)
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
done < "$FNAME"
|
|
|
|
# Wait for remaining tests to finish
|
|
curr_time=$(date +%s)
|
|
while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do
|
|
if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -eq 0 ]] || \
|
|
! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
elif [[ $curr_time-${start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]]; then
|
|
kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null
|
|
wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p)
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "timeout"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
else
|
|
# Here it is okay to check process status every second, since the
|
|
# status of only one process is being checked.
|
|
if "$INTERACTIVE"; then
|
|
echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
wait_time=$((curr_time-start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]))
|
|
[[ $wait_time -gt $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && wait_time=$MAX_WAIT_TEST
|
|
echo -n "Waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish" 1>&2
|
|
if [[ $((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) -le 60 ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " ($((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) seconds to timeout)" 1>&2
|
|
else
|
|
echo -n " ($wait_time seconds)" 1>&2
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
curr_time=$(date +%s)
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_rating() {
|
|
local pre_cap_grade final_grade
|
|
local -i c1_score c2_score c3_score c1_wscore c2_wscore c3_wscore final_score
|
|
local -i c1_worst c1_best
|
|
local -i c3_worst c3_best c3_worst_cb c3_best_cb
|
|
local old_ifs=$IFS sorted_reasons sorted_warnings
|
|
local -i reason_nr=0 warning_nr=0
|
|
|
|
outln "\n";
|
|
pr_headlineln " Rating (experimental) "
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]] && set_grade_cap "T" "Encryption via STARTTLS is not mandatory (opportunistic)."
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Rating specs"; out " (not complete) "; outln "SSL Labs's 'SSL Server Rating Guide' (version 2009q from 2020-01-30)"
|
|
pr_bold " Specification documentation "; pr_url "https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-Server-Rating-Guide"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "rating_spec" "INFO" "SSL Labs's 'SSL Server Rating Guide' (version 2009q from 2020-01-30)"
|
|
fileout "rating_doc" "INFO" "https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-Server-Rating-Guide"
|
|
|
|
# No point in calculating a score, if a cap of "F", "T", or "M" has been set
|
|
if [[ $GRADE_CAP == F || $GRADE_CAP == T || $GRADE_CAP == M ]]; then
|
|
# Sort the reasons
|
|
IFS=$'\n' sorted_reasons=($(sort -ru <<<"${GRADE_CAP_REASONS[*]}"))
|
|
IFS=$'\n' sorted_warnings=($(sort -u <<<"${GRADE_WARNINGS[*]}"))
|
|
IFS=$old_ifs
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Protocol Support"; out " (weighted) "; outln "0 (0)"
|
|
pr_bold " Key Exchange"; out " (weighted) "; outln "0 (0)"
|
|
pr_bold " Cipher Strength"; out " (weighted) "; outln "0 (0)"
|
|
pr_bold " Final Score "; outln "0"
|
|
pr_bold " Overall Grade "; prln_svrty_critical "$GRADE_CAP"
|
|
|
|
fileout "protocol_support_score" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "protocol_support_score_weighted" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "key_exchange_score" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "key_exchange_score_weighted" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "cipher_strength_score" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "cipher_strength_score_weighted" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "final_score" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "CRITICAL" "$GRADE_CAP"
|
|
else
|
|
## Category 1
|
|
# get best score, by searching for the best protocol, until a hit occurs
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 || $(has_server_protocol "tls1_2") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_best=100
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_best=95
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_best=90
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_best=80
|
|
# If the best protocol offered is SSLv3, cap to F. It is easier done here
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "SSLv3 is the best protocol offered"
|
|
else # SSLv2 gives 0 points
|
|
c1_best=0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# get worst score, by searching for the worst protocol, until a hit occurs
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_worst=0
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_worst=80
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_worst=90
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_worst=95
|
|
else # TLS1.2 and TLS1.3 both give 100 points
|
|
c1_worst=100
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
c1_score=$(( (c1_best+c1_worst)/2 )) # Gets the category score
|
|
c1_wscore=$((c1_score*30/100)) # Gets the weighted score for category (30%)
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Protocol Support "; out "(weighted) "; outln "$c1_score ($c1_wscore)"
|
|
fileout "protocol_support_score" "INFO" "$c1_score"
|
|
fileout "protocol_support_score_weighted" "INFO" "$c1_wscore"
|
|
|
|
## Category 2
|
|
if [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -le 40 ]]; then
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Using an insecure public key and/or ephemeral key"
|
|
elif [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -le 80 ]]; then
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "Using a weak public key and/or ephemeral key"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
c2_score=$KEY_EXCH_SCORE
|
|
c2_wscore=$((c2_score*30/100))
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Key Exchange "; out " (weighted) "; outln "$c2_score ($c2_wscore)"
|
|
fileout "key_exchange_score" "INFO" "$c2_score"
|
|
fileout "key_exchange_score_weighted" "INFO" "$c2_wscore"
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Category 3
|
|
# Get the cipher bits sizes for the best cipher, and the worst cipher
|
|
c3_best_cb=$CIPH_STR_BEST
|
|
c3_worst_cb=$CIPH_STR_WORST
|
|
|
|
# Determine score for the best key
|
|
if [[ $c3_best_cb -ge 256 ]]; then
|
|
c3_best=100
|
|
elif [[ $c3_best_cb -ge 128 ]]; then
|
|
c3_best=80
|
|
elif [[ $c3_best_cb -ge 0 ]]; then
|
|
c3_best=20
|
|
else
|
|
c3_best=0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Determine the score for the worst key
|
|
if [[ $c3_worst_cb -gt 0 && $c3_worst_cb -lt 128 ]]; then
|
|
c3_worst=20
|
|
elif [[ $c3_worst_cb -ge 128 && $c3_worst_cb -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
c3_worst=80
|
|
elif [[ $c3_worst_cb -ge 256 ]]; then
|
|
c3_worst=100
|
|
else
|
|
c3_worst=0
|
|
fi
|
|
c3_score=$(( (c3_best+c3_worst)/2 )) # Gets the category score
|
|
c3_wscore=$((c3_score*40/100)) # Gets the weighted score for category (40%)
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Cipher Strength "; out " (weighted) "; outln "$c3_score ($c3_wscore)"
|
|
fileout "cipher_strength_score" "INFO" "$c3_score"
|
|
fileout "cipher_strength_score_weighted" "INFO" "$c3_wscore"
|
|
|
|
## Calculate final score and grade
|
|
|
|
# Sort the reasons
|
|
IFS=$'\n' sorted_reasons=($(sort -ru <<<"${GRADE_CAP_REASONS[*]}"))
|
|
IFS=$'\n' sorted_warnings=($(sort -u <<<"${GRADE_WARNINGS[*]}"))
|
|
IFS=$old_ifs
|
|
|
|
# If any category resulted in a score of 0, push final grade to 0
|
|
if [[ $c1_score -eq 0 || $c2_score -eq 0 || $c3_score -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
final_score=0
|
|
else
|
|
final_score=$((c1_wscore+c2_wscore+c3_wscore))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Final Score "; outln $final_score
|
|
fileout "final_score" "INFO" "$final_score"
|
|
|
|
# Calculate the pre-cap grade
|
|
if [[ $final_score -ge 80 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="A"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -ge 65 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="B"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -ge 50 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="C"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -ge 35 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="D"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -ge 20 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="E"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -lt 20 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="F"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the calculated grade is bigger than the grade cap, then set grade as the cap
|
|
if [[ -n "$GRADE_CAP" && ! $pre_cap_grade > $GRADE_CAP ]]; then
|
|
final_grade=$GRADE_CAP
|
|
# For "exceptional" config, an "A+" is awarded, or "A-" for slightly less "exceptional"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$GRADE_CAP" && $pre_cap_grade == A ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${#GRADE_WARNINGS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
final_grade="A+"
|
|
else
|
|
final_grade="A-"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
final_grade=$pre_cap_grade
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Overall Grade "
|
|
case "$final_grade" in
|
|
A*) prln_svrty_best $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "OK" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
B) prln_svrty_medium $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "MEDIUM" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
C) prln_svrty_medium $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "MEDIUM" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
D) prln_svrty_high $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "HIGH" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
E) prln_svrty_high $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "HIGH" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
F) prln_svrty_critical $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "CRITICAL" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Pretty print - again, it's just nicer to read
|
|
for reason in "${sorted_reasons[@]}"; do
|
|
if [[ $reason_nr -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " Grade cap reasons "; outln "$reason"
|
|
else
|
|
outln " $reason"
|
|
fi
|
|
((reason_nr++))
|
|
fileout "grade_cap_reason_${reason_nr}" "INFO" "$reason"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for warning in "${sorted_warnings[@]}"; do
|
|
if [[ $warning_nr -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " Grade warning "; prln_svrty_medium "$warning"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " $warning"
|
|
fi
|
|
((warning_nr++))
|
|
fileout "grade_cap_warning_${warning_nr}" "INFO" "$warning"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Checks whether rating can be done or not.
|
|
# Rating needs a mix of certificate and vulnerabilities checks, in order to give out proper grades.
|
|
# This function disables rating, if not all required checks are enabled
|
|
# Returns "0" if rating is enabled, and "1" if rating is disabled
|
|
set_rating_state() {
|
|
local gbl
|
|
local -i nr_enabled=0
|
|
|
|
# All of these should be enabled
|
|
for gbl in do_protocols do_cipherlists do_fs do_server_defaults do_header \
|
|
do_heartbleed do_ccs_injection do_ticketbleed do_robot do_renego \
|
|
do_crime do_ssl_poodle do_tls_fallback_scsv do_drown do_beast \
|
|
do_rc4 do_logjam; do
|
|
"${!gbl}" && ((nr_enabled++))
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# ... at least one of these has to be set
|
|
[[ "$do_allciphers" || "$do_cipher_per_proto" ]] && ((nr_enabled++))
|
|
|
|
# ... else we can't do rating
|
|
if [[ $nr_enabled -lt 18 ]]; then
|
|
do_rating=false
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This initializes boolean global do_* variables. They keep track of what to do
|
|
# -- as the name insinuates
|
|
initialize_globals() {
|
|
do_allciphers=false
|
|
do_vulnerabilities=false
|
|
do_beast=false
|
|
do_lucky13=false
|
|
do_breach=false
|
|
do_ccs_injection=false
|
|
do_ticketbleed=false
|
|
do_robot=false
|
|
do_cipher_per_proto=false
|
|
do_crime=false
|
|
do_freak=false
|
|
do_logjam=false
|
|
do_drown=false
|
|
do_header=false
|
|
do_heartbleed=false
|
|
do_mx_all_ips=false
|
|
do_mass_testing=false
|
|
do_logging=false
|
|
do_json=false
|
|
do_pretty_json=false
|
|
do_csv=false
|
|
do_html=false
|
|
do_fs=false
|
|
do_protocols=false
|
|
do_rc4=false
|
|
do_starttls_injection=false
|
|
do_winshock=false
|
|
do_grease=false
|
|
do_renego=false
|
|
do_cipherlists=false
|
|
do_server_defaults=false
|
|
do_server_preference=false
|
|
do_ssl_poodle=false
|
|
do_sweet32=false
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=false
|
|
do_cipher_match=false
|
|
do_tls_sockets=false
|
|
do_client_simulation=false
|
|
do_display_only=false
|
|
do_starttls=false
|
|
do_rating=false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Set default scanning options for the boolean global do_* variables.
|
|
set_scanning_defaults() {
|
|
do_allciphers=false
|
|
do_vulnerabilities=true
|
|
do_beast=true
|
|
do_lucky13=true
|
|
do_breach=true
|
|
do_heartbleed="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_ccs_injection="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_ticketbleed="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_robot="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_crime=true
|
|
do_freak=true
|
|
do_logjam=true
|
|
do_drown=true
|
|
do_ssl_poodle=true
|
|
do_sweet32=true
|
|
do_header=true
|
|
do_fs=true
|
|
do_rc4=true
|
|
do_starttls_injection=true
|
|
do_winshock=true
|
|
do_protocols=true
|
|
do_renego=true
|
|
do_cipherlists=true
|
|
do_server_defaults=true
|
|
do_server_preference=true
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=true
|
|
do_client_simulation=true
|
|
if "$OFFENSIVE"; then
|
|
VULN_COUNT=17
|
|
else
|
|
VULN_COUNT=13
|
|
fi
|
|
do_rating=true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# returns number of $do variables set = number of run_funcs() to perform
|
|
count_do_variables() {
|
|
local gbl
|
|
local -i true_nr=0
|
|
|
|
for gbl in do_allciphers do_vulnerabilities do_beast do_lucky13 do_breach do_ccs_injection do_ticketbleed do_cipher_per_proto do_crime \
|
|
do_freak do_logjam do_drown do_header do_heartbleed do_mx_all_ips do_fs do_protocols do_rc4 do_starttls_injection do_grease do_robot do_renego \
|
|
do_cipherlists do_server_defaults do_server_preference do_ssl_poodle do_tls_fallback_scsv do_winshock \
|
|
do_sweet32 do_client_simulation do_cipher_match do_tls_sockets do_mass_testing do_display_only do_rating; do
|
|
"${!gbl}" && ((true_nr++))
|
|
done
|
|
return $true_nr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
debug_globals() {
|
|
local gbl
|
|
|
|
for gbl in do_allciphers do_vulnerabilities do_beast do_lucky13 do_breach do_ccs_injection do_ticketbleed do_cipher_per_proto do_crime \
|
|
do_freak do_logjam do_drown do_header do_heartbleed do_mx_all_ips do_fs do_protocols do_rc4 do_starttls_injection do_grease do_robot do_renego \
|
|
do_cipherlists do_server_defaults do_server_preference do_ssl_poodle do_tls_fallback_scsv do_winshock \
|
|
do_sweet32 do_client_simulation do_cipher_match do_tls_sockets do_mass_testing do_display_only do_rating; do
|
|
printf "%-22s = %s\n" $gbl "${!gbl}"
|
|
done
|
|
# ${!var} is an indirect expansion, see https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html_node/Shell-Parameter-Expansion.html
|
|
# Example: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/8515411/what-is-indirect-expansion-what-does-var-mean#8515492
|
|
printf "%-22s : %s\n" URI: "$URI"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This is determining the tests which should be skipped by --no-* or --disable-* a a cmdline arg.
|
|
# It achieves that by setting the do_<variables> according to the global array $SKIP_TESTS
|
|
#
|
|
set_skip_tests() {
|
|
local t
|
|
|
|
for t in ${SKIP_TESTS[@]} ; do
|
|
t="do_${t}"
|
|
# declare won't do it here --> local scope
|
|
eval "$t"=false
|
|
debugme printf '%s\n' "set $t: ${!t}"
|
|
done
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: either switch+value (=) or switch
|
|
# arg2: value (if no = provided)
|
|
parse_opt_equal_sign() {
|
|
if [[ "$1" == *=* ]]; then
|
|
echo ${1#*=}
|
|
return 1 # = means we don't need to shift args!
|
|
else
|
|
echo "$2"
|
|
return 0 # we need to shift
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Create the command line string for printing purposes
|
|
# See https://stackoverflow.com/questions/10835933/preserve-quotes-in-bash-arguments
|
|
create_cmd_line_string() {
|
|
local arg
|
|
local -a allargs=()
|
|
local chars='[ !"#$&()*,;<>?\^`{|}]'
|
|
|
|
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|
if [[ $1 == *\'* ]]; then
|
|
arg=\""$1"\"
|
|
elif [[ $1 == *$chars* ]]; then
|
|
arg="'$1'"
|
|
else
|
|
arg="$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
allargs+=("$arg") # ${allargs[@]} is to be used only for printing
|
|
shift
|
|
done
|
|
printf '%s\n' "${allargs[*]}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_base_requirements() {
|
|
local binary=''
|
|
local whitelist=' hexdump grep awk sed '
|
|
|
|
for binary in 'hexdump' 'dd' 'grep' 'awk' 'tr' 'sed' 'wc' 'date' 'cat' 'ps' 'kill' 'head' 'tail' 'dirname'; do
|
|
if ! type -p "${binary}" &> /dev/null; then
|
|
fatal "You need to install ${binary} for this program to work" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ${whitelist} =~ \ ${binary}\ ]] && continue
|
|
"${binary}" --help 2>&1 | grep -iq busybox
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
fatal "${binary} is from busybox. Please install a regular binary" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
# testssl.sh works without xxd, but using xxd is faster. The following checks that the xxd
|
|
# binary is available and (just to be safe) that "xxd -r -p" works as expected.
|
|
if type -p xxd &> /dev/null && [[ "$(xxd -r -p <<< "30313233343536373839" 2>/dev/null)" == 0123456789 ]]; then
|
|
HAS_XXD=true
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parse_cmd_line() {
|
|
local outfile_arg=""
|
|
local cipher_mapping
|
|
local -i subret=0
|
|
|
|
CMDLINE="$(create_cmd_line_string "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}")"
|
|
CMDLINE_PARSED=false
|
|
|
|
case $1 in
|
|
--help|"")
|
|
help 0
|
|
;;
|
|
-b|--banner|-v|--version)
|
|
maketempf
|
|
get_install_dir
|
|
find_openssl_binary
|
|
prepare_debug
|
|
mybanner
|
|
exit $ALLOK
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# set all do_* globals to false
|
|
initialize_globals
|
|
|
|
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|
case $1 in
|
|
--help|-b|--banner|-v|--version)
|
|
fatal_cmd_line "$1 is a standalone command line option" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
;;
|
|
--mx)
|
|
do_mx_all_ips=true
|
|
PORT=25
|
|
;;
|
|
--mx465) # doesn't work with major ISPs
|
|
do_mx_all_ips=true
|
|
PORT=465
|
|
;;
|
|
--mx587) # doesn't work with major ISPs
|
|
do_mx_all_ips=true
|
|
PORT=587
|
|
;;
|
|
--ip|--ip=*)
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
if [[ "$CMDLINE_IP" == proxy ]]; then
|
|
DNS_VIA_PROXY=true
|
|
unset CMDLINE_IP
|
|
fi
|
|
# normalize any IPv6 address
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="${CMDLINE_IP//[/}" # fix vim syntax highlighting "]
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="${CMDLINE_IP//]/}"
|
|
;;
|
|
-n|--nodns|-n=*|--nodns=*)
|
|
NODNS="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
if [[ "$NODNS" != none ]] && [[ "$NODNS" != min ]]; then
|
|
fatal_cmd_line "Value for nodns switch can be either \"min\" or \"none\"" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
-V|-V=*|--local|--local=*) # attention, this could have a value or not!
|
|
do_display_only=true
|
|
PATTERN2SHOW="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
subret=$?
|
|
if [[ "$PATTERN2SHOW" == -* ]]; then
|
|
unset PATTERN2SHOW # we hit the next command ==> not our value
|
|
else # it was ours, point to next arg
|
|
[[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
-x|-x=*|--single[-_]cipher|--single[-_]cipher=*)
|
|
do_cipher_match=true
|
|
single_cipher=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
-t|-t=*|--starttls|--starttls=*)
|
|
do_starttls=true
|
|
STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL in
|
|
ftp|smtp|lmtp|pop3|imap|sieve|xmpp|xmpp-server|telnet|ldap|irc|nntp|postgres|mysql) ;;
|
|
ftps|smtps|lmtps|pop3s|imaps|xmpps|telnets|ldaps|ircs|nntps|mysqls) ;;
|
|
*) tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized STARTTLS protocol \"$1\", see help" 1>&2
|
|
help 1 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--xmpphost|--xmpphost=*)
|
|
XMPP_HOST=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
-e|--each-cipher)
|
|
do_allciphers=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-E|--cipher-per-proto|--cipher_per_proto)
|
|
do_cipher_per_proto=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-p|--protocols)
|
|
do_protocols=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-s|--std|--standard|--categories)
|
|
# --standard is deprecated
|
|
do_cipherlists=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-S|--server[-_]defaults)
|
|
do_server_defaults=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-P|--server[_-]preference|--preference)
|
|
do_server_preference=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-h|--header|--headers)
|
|
do_header=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-c|--client-simulation)
|
|
do_client_simulation=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-U|--vulnerable|--vulnerabilities)
|
|
# Lookahead function: If the order of the cmdline is '-U --ids-friendly'
|
|
# then we need to make sure we catch --ids-friendly. Normally we do not,
|
|
# see #1717. The following statement makes sure. In the do-while + case-esac
|
|
# loop it will be execute again, but it does not hurt
|
|
if [[ "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}" =~ --ids-friendly ]]; then
|
|
OFFENSIVE=false
|
|
fi
|
|
do_vulnerabilities=true
|
|
do_heartbleed="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_ccs_injection="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_ticketbleed="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_robot="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_renego=true
|
|
do_crime=true
|
|
do_breach=true
|
|
do_ssl_poodle=true
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=true
|
|
do_sweet32=true
|
|
do_freak=true
|
|
do_drown=true
|
|
do_logjam=true
|
|
do_beast=true
|
|
do_lucky13=true
|
|
do_winshock=true
|
|
do_rc4=true
|
|
do_starttls_injection=true
|
|
if "$OFFENSIVE"; then
|
|
VULN_COUNT=17
|
|
else
|
|
VULN_COUNT=13
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--ids-friendly)
|
|
OFFENSIVE=false
|
|
;;
|
|
-H|--heartbleed)
|
|
do_heartbleed=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-I|--ccs|--ccs[-_]injection)
|
|
do_ccs_injection=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-T|--ticketbleed)
|
|
do_ticketbleed=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-BB|--BB|--robot)
|
|
do_robot=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-R|--renegotiation)
|
|
do_renego=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-C|--compression|--crime)
|
|
do_crime=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-B|--breach)
|
|
do_breach=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-O|--poodle)
|
|
do_ssl_poodle=true
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-Z|--tls[_-]fallback|tls[_-]fallback[_-]scs)
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-W|--sweet32)
|
|
do_sweet32=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-F|--freak)
|
|
do_freak=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-D|--drown)
|
|
do_drown=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-J|--logjam)
|
|
do_logjam=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-A|--beast)
|
|
do_beast=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-L|--lucky13)
|
|
do_lucky13=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-WS|--winshock)
|
|
do_winshock=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-4|--rc4|--appelbaum)
|
|
do_rc4=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-SI|--SI|--starttls[-_]injection)
|
|
do_starttls_injection=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-f|--fs|--nsa|--forward-secrecy)
|
|
do_fs=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-g|--grease)
|
|
do_grease=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--disable-rating|--no-rating)
|
|
SKIP_TESTS+=("rating")
|
|
# TODO: a generic thing would be --disable-* / --no-* ,
|
|
# catch $1 and add it to the array ( #1502 )
|
|
;;
|
|
-9|--full)
|
|
set_scanning_defaults
|
|
do_allciphers=false
|
|
do_grease=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--add-ca|--add-CA|--add-ca=*|--add-CA=*)
|
|
ADDTL_CA_FILES="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--devel) echo -e "\nthis is a development feature and may disappear at any time"
|
|
# arg1: SSL/TLS protocol (SSLv2=22)
|
|
# arg2: list of cipher suites / hostname/ip
|
|
# arg3: hostname/ip
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 04 "13,02, 13,01" google.com --> TLS 1.3
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 03 "cc, 13, c0, 13" google.de --> TLS 1.2, old CHACHA/POLY
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 03 "cc,a8, cc,a9, cc,aa, cc,ab, cc,ac" blog.cloudflare.com --> new CHACHA/POLY
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 01 yandex.ru --> TLS 1.0
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 00 <host which supports SSLv3>
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 22 <host which still supports SSLv2>
|
|
HEX_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER"
|
|
TLS_LOW_BYTE="$2"
|
|
if [[ $# -eq 4 ]]; then # protocol AND ciphers specified
|
|
HEX_CIPHER="$3"
|
|
shift
|
|
fi
|
|
shift
|
|
do_tls_sockets=true
|
|
outln "\nTLS_LOW_BYTE, HEX_CIPHER: \"${TLS_LOW_BYTE}\", \"${HEX_CIPHER}\""
|
|
;;
|
|
--wide)
|
|
WIDE=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--assuming[_-]http|--assume[-_]http)
|
|
ASSUME_HTTP=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--sneaky)
|
|
SNEAKY=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--user-agent|--user-agent=*)
|
|
UA_STD="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
-q|--quiet)
|
|
QUIET=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--file|--file=*|-iL|-iL=*)
|
|
# no shift here as otherwise URI is empty and it bails out
|
|
FNAME="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
IKNOW_FNAME=true
|
|
WARNINGS="batch" # set this implicitly!
|
|
do_mass_testing=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--mode|--mode=*)
|
|
MASS_TESTING_MODE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case "$MASS_TESTING_MODE" in
|
|
serial|parallel) ;;
|
|
*) tmln_magenta "\nmass testing mode can be either \"serial\" or \"parallel\"" 1>&2
|
|
help 1
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--serial)
|
|
MASS_TESTING_MODE=serial
|
|
;;
|
|
--parallel)
|
|
MASS_TESTING_MODE=parallel
|
|
;;
|
|
--warnings|--warnings=*)
|
|
WARNINGS=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case "$WARNINGS" in
|
|
batch|off) ;;
|
|
*) tmln_magenta "\nwarnings can be either \"batch\", or \"off\"" 1>&2
|
|
help 1
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--show[-_]each)
|
|
SHOW_EACH_C=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--fast)
|
|
FAST=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--bugs)
|
|
BUGS="-bugs"
|
|
;;
|
|
--debug|--debug=*)
|
|
DEBUG=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case $DEBUG in
|
|
[0-6]) ;;
|
|
*) tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized debug value \"$1\", must be between 0..6" 1>&2
|
|
help 1
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--color|--color=*)
|
|
COLOR="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case $COLOR in
|
|
[0-3]) ;;
|
|
*) COLOR=2
|
|
tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized color: \"$1\", must be between 0..3" 1>&2
|
|
help 1
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--colorblind)
|
|
COLORBLIND=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--log|--logging)
|
|
"$do_logging" && fatal_cmd_line "two --log* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;; # DEFINITION of LOGFILE if no arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port()
|
|
# following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location
|
|
--logfile|--logfile=*|-oL|-oL=*)
|
|
"$do_logging" && fatal_cmd_line "two --log* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
LOGFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--logfile-parent|--logfile-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_LOGFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--json)
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && fatal_cmd_line "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_json" && fatal_cmd_line "--json and --jsonfile are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
if [[ "$2" =~ \.(json|JSON)$ ]]; then
|
|
fatal_cmd_line "No file name allowed after \"--json\" (use \"--jsonfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
do_json=true
|
|
;; # DEFINITION of JSONFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port()
|
|
# following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location
|
|
--jsonfile|--jsonfile=*|-oj|-oj=*)
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && fatal_cmd_line "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_json" && fatal_cmd_line "--json and --jsonfile are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--jsonfile-parent|--jsonfile-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--json-pretty)
|
|
"$do_json" && fatal_cmd_line "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && fatal_cmd_line "--json-pretty and --jsonfile-pretty are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
if [[ "$2" =~ \.(json|JSON)$ ]]; then
|
|
fatal_cmd_line "No file name allowed after \"--json\" (use \"--jsonfile-pretty\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
do_pretty_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--jsonfile-pretty|--jsonfile-pretty=*|-oJ|-oJ=*)
|
|
"$do_json" && fatal_cmd_line "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && fatal_cmd_line "--json-pretty and --jsonfile-pretty are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_pretty_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--jsonfile-pretty-parent|--jsonfile-pretty-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_pretty_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--severity|--severity=*)
|
|
set_severity_level "$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--hints)
|
|
GIVE_HINTS=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--csv)
|
|
"$do_csv" && fatal_cmd_line "two --csv* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
if [[ "$2" =~ \.(csv|CSV)$ ]]; then
|
|
fatal_cmd_line "No file name allowed after \"--csv\" (use \"--csvfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
;; # DEFINITION of CSVFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port()
|
|
# following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location
|
|
--csvfile|--csvfile=*|-oC|-oC=*)
|
|
"$do_csv" && fatal_cmd_line "two --csv* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
CSVFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--csvfile-parent|--csvfile-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_CSVFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--html)
|
|
"$do_html" && fatal_cmd_line "two --html* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
if [[ "$2" =~ \.(htm|html|HTM|HTML)$ ]]; then
|
|
fatal_cmd_line "No file name allowed after \"--html\" (use \"--htmlfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
;; # DEFINITION of HTMLFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port()
|
|
# following does the same but additionally we can specify a file location
|
|
--htmlfile|--htmlfile=*|-oH|-oH=*)
|
|
"$do_html" && fatal_cmd_line "two --html* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
HTMLFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--htmlfile-parent|--htmlfile-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_HTMLFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--outfile|--outfile=*|-oa|-oa=*)
|
|
{ "$do_html" || "$do_json" || "$do_pretty_json" || "$do_csv" || "$do_logging"; } && fatal_cmd_line "check your arguments four multiple file output options" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
if [[ "$outfile_arg" != "auto" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -d "$outfile_arg" ]]; then
|
|
HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
CSVFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
JSONFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
LOGFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
else
|
|
HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg.html"
|
|
CSVFILE="$outfile_arg.csv"
|
|
JSONFILE="$outfile_arg.json"
|
|
LOGFILE="$outfile_arg.log"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
do_json=true
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--outFile|--outFile=*|-oA|-oA=*)
|
|
{ "$do_html" || "$do_json" || "$do_pretty_json" || "$do_csv" || "$do_logging"; } && fatal_cmd_line "check your arguments four multiple file output options" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
if [[ "$outfile_arg" != "auto" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -d "$outfile_arg" ]]; then
|
|
HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
CSVFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
JSONFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
LOGFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
else
|
|
HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg.html"
|
|
CSVFILE="$outfile_arg.csv"
|
|
JSONFILE="$outfile_arg.json"
|
|
LOGFILE="$outfile_arg.log"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
do_pretty_json=true
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--overwrite)
|
|
"$APPEND" && fatal_cmd_line "using --overwrite and --append is contradicting" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
OVERWRITE=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--append)
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" && fatal_cmd_line "using --append and --overwrite is contradicting" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
APPEND=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--outprefix)
|
|
FNAME_PREFIX="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
shift
|
|
case "$(get_last_char "$FNAME_PREFIX")" in
|
|
'.') ;;
|
|
'-') ;;
|
|
'_') ;;
|
|
*) FNAME_PREFIX="${FNAME_PREFIX}-" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--openssl|--openssl=*)
|
|
OPENSSL="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--openssl-timeout|--openssl-timeout=*)
|
|
OPENSSL_TIMEOUT="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--mtls|--mtls=*)
|
|
MTLS="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--connect-timeout|--connect-timeout=*)
|
|
CONNECT_TIMEOUT="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--mapping|--mapping=*)
|
|
cipher_mapping="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case "$cipher_mapping" in
|
|
no-openssl) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="rfc-only" ;;
|
|
no-rfc|no-iana) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl-only" ;;
|
|
openssl) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl" ;;
|
|
rfc|iana) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="rfc" ;;
|
|
*) tmln_warning "\nmapping can only be \"no-openssl\", \"no-iana\"(\"no-rfc\"), \"openssl\" or \"iana\"(\"rfc\")" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--proxy|--proxy=*)
|
|
PROXY="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--phone-out)
|
|
PHONE_OUT=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-6) # doesn't work automagically. My versions have -DOPENSSL_USE_IPV6, CentOS/RHEL/FC do not
|
|
HAS_IPv6=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--has[-_]dhbits|--has[_-]dh[-_]bits)
|
|
# Should work automagically. Helper switch for CentOS,RHEL+FC w openssl server temp key backport (version 1.0.1), see #190
|
|
HAS_DH_BITS=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--ssl_native|--ssl-native)
|
|
SSL_NATIVE=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--basicauth|--basicauth=*)
|
|
BASICAUTH="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--reqheader|--reqheader=*)
|
|
REQHEADER="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
REQHEADERS+=("$REQHEADER")
|
|
;;
|
|
(--) shift
|
|
break
|
|
;;
|
|
(-*) tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
;;
|
|
(*) break
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
shift
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Show usage if no further options were specified
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]] && [[ -z "$FNAME" ]] && ! "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
fatal_cmd_line "URI missing" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
else
|
|
# What is left here should be the URI.
|
|
URI="$1"
|
|
[[ -n "$2" ]] && fatal_cmd_line "URI comes last" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now spot some incompatibilities in cmdlines
|
|
[[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]] && [[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && fatal_cmd_line "\"--ip=one\" and \"--nodns=none\" don't work together" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
[[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]] && ( is_ipv4addr "$URI" || is_ipv6addr "$URI" ) && fatal_cmd_line "\"--ip=one\" plus supplying an IP address doesn't work" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_mx_all_ips" && [[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && fatal_cmd_line "\"--mx\" and \"--nodns=none\" don't work together" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
|
|
if [[ -d $ADDTL_CA_FILES ]]; then
|
|
ADDTL_CA_FILES="$ADDTL_CA_FILES/*.pem"
|
|
else
|
|
ADDTL_CA_FILES="${ADDTL_CA_FILES//,/ }"
|
|
fi
|
|
for fname in $ADDTL_CA_FILES; do
|
|
[[ -s "$fname" ]] || fatal_cmd_line "CA file \"$fname\" does not exist" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
grep -q 'BEGIN CERTIFICATE' "$fname" || fatal_cmd_line "\"$fname\" is not CA file in PEM format" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Check if mTLS has been selected, and if the correct client auth PEM file has been provided by user
|
|
if [[ ! -z "$MTLS" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -f $MTLS ]]; then
|
|
grep -q 'BEGIN CERTIFICATE' "$MTLS" || fatal_cmd_line "\"$MTLS\" is not a client certificate file in PEM format" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
grep -q 'BEGIN PRIVATE KEY\|BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY' "$MTLS" || fatal_cmd_line "\"$MTLS\" the not encrypted private key is missing in the specified PEM file" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
MTLS=$MTLS
|
|
else
|
|
[[ -s "$MTLS" ]] || fatal_cmd_line "the specified client certificate file \"$MTLS\" does not exist" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$FAST" && pr_warning "\n'--fast' can have some undesired side effects thus it is not recommended to use anymore\n"
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && pr_warning "\nusage of '--ssl-native' is not recommended as it will return incomplete and may even return incorrect results\n"
|
|
|
|
if "$do_starttls_injection" && [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ smtp ]]; then
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
count_do_variables
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && set_scanning_defaults
|
|
set_skip_tests
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && debug_globals
|
|
|
|
# Unless explicit disabled, check if rating can be enabled
|
|
# Should be called after set_scanning_defaults
|
|
! "$do_rating" && set_rating_state
|
|
|
|
CMDLINE_PARSED=true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# connect call from openssl needs ipv6 in square brackets
|
|
nodeip_to_proper_ip6() {
|
|
local len_nodeip=0
|
|
|
|
if is_ipv6addr $NODEIP; then
|
|
${UNBRACKTD_IPV6} || NODEIP="[$NODEIP]"
|
|
len_nodeip=${#NODEIP}
|
|
CORRECT_SPACES="$(printf -- " "'%.s' $(eval "echo {1.."$((len_nodeip - 17))"}"))"
|
|
# IPv6 addresses are longer, this variable takes care that "further IP" and "Service" is properly aligned
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
reset_hostdepended_vars() {
|
|
NR_SOCKET_FAIL=0
|
|
NR_OSSL_FAIL=0
|
|
NR_STARTTLS_FAIL=0
|
|
NR_HEADER_FAIL=0
|
|
TLS_EXTENSIONS=""
|
|
TLS13_CERT_COMPRESS_METHODS=""
|
|
CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_SOURCE=""
|
|
PROTOS_OFFERED=""
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED=""
|
|
CURVES_OFFERED=""
|
|
NO_CIPHER_ORDER_LEVEL=5
|
|
KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=false
|
|
TLS13_ONLY=false
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH="none"
|
|
NO_SSL_SESSIONID=true
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED=""
|
|
DH_GROUP_LEN_P=0
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33"
|
|
BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER=false
|
|
GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=false
|
|
OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS=true
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false
|
|
SERVICE=""
|
|
CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2=""
|
|
RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2=""
|
|
TLS_TIME=""
|
|
GRADE_CAP=""
|
|
GRADE_CAP_REASONS=()
|
|
GRADE_WARNINGS=()
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=100
|
|
CIPH_STR_BEST=0
|
|
CIPH_STR_WORST=100000
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Rough estimate, in the future we maybe want to make use of nano secs (%N). Note this
|
|
# is for performance debugging purposes (MEASURE_TIME=yes), eye candy is not important.
|
|
#
|
|
stopwatch() {
|
|
local new_delta
|
|
local column=$((COLUMNS - 0)) # for future adjustments
|
|
|
|
"$MEASURE_TIME" || return
|
|
new_delta=$(( $(date +%s) - LAST_TIME ))
|
|
printf "%${column}s" "$1: $new_delta"
|
|
[[ -e "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && echo "$1 : $new_delta " >> "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE"
|
|
LAST_TIME=$(( new_delta + LAST_TIME ))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1(optional): "init" --> just initializing. Or: STARTTLS protocol
|
|
lets_roll() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local section_number=0
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$1" == init ]]; then
|
|
# called once upfront to be able to measure preparation time b4 everything starts
|
|
START_TIME=$(date +%s)
|
|
LAST_TIME=$START_TIME
|
|
[[ -n "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && >"$MEASURE_TIME_FILE"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
stopwatch initialized
|
|
|
|
nodeip_to_proper_ip6
|
|
reset_hostdepended_vars
|
|
determine_rdns # Returns always zero or has already exited if fatal error occurred
|
|
stopwatch determine_rdns
|
|
|
|
((SERVER_COUNTER++))
|
|
datebanner " Start"
|
|
determine_service "$1" # STARTTLS service? Other will be determined here too. Returns 0 if test connect was ok or has already exited if fatal error occurred
|
|
# determine_service() can return 1, it indicates that this IP cannot be reached but there are more IPs to check
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] ; then
|
|
# "secret" devel options --devel:
|
|
if "$do_tls_sockets"; then
|
|
if [[ "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" == 22 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "" "true"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" == 04 ]]; then
|
|
if "$CERT_COMPRESSION"; then
|
|
# See PR #1279
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -eq 3 ]] && tmln_out "including TLS extension certificate compression"
|
|
tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "all+" "00,1b, 00,03, 02, 00,01"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "all"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
echo $?
|
|
exit $ALLOK;
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$do_cipher_match"; then
|
|
# we will have an invalid JSON with no if statement
|
|
((section_number++))
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number false
|
|
run_cipher_match ${single_cipher}
|
|
stopwatch run_cipher_match
|
|
else
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number false && ((section_number++))
|
|
determine_sizelimitbug
|
|
fileout_section_footer false
|
|
|
|
((section_number++))
|
|
# all top level functions now following have the prefix "run_"
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number false && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_protocols" && {
|
|
run_protocols; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_protocols;
|
|
run_npn; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_npn;
|
|
run_alpn; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_alpn;
|
|
}
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_grease" && { run_grease; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_grease; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_cipherlists" && { run_cipherlists; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_cipherlists; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_server_preference" && { run_server_preference; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_server_preference; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_fs" && { run_fs; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_fs; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_server_defaults" && { run_server_defaults; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_server_defaults; }
|
|
|
|
if "$do_header"; then
|
|
#TODO: refactor this into functions
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_http_date "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_hsts "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_hpkp "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_server_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_appl_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_cookie_flags "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_security_headers "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_rp_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
stopwatch do_header
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
((section_number++))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# vulnerabilities
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -gt $VULN_THRESHLD ]] || "$do_vulnerabilities"; then
|
|
outln; pr_headlineln " Testing vulnerabilities "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
|
|
"$do_heartbleed" && { run_heartbleed; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_heartbleed; }
|
|
"$do_ccs_injection" && { run_ccs_injection; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ccs_injection; }
|
|
"$do_ticketbleed" && { run_ticketbleed; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ticketbleed; }
|
|
"$do_robot" && { run_robot; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_robot; }
|
|
"$do_renego" && { run_renego; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_renego; }
|
|
"$do_crime" && { run_crime; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_crime; }
|
|
"$do_breach" && { run_breach "$URL_PATH" ; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_breach; }
|
|
"$do_ssl_poodle" && { run_ssl_poodle; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ssl_poodle; }
|
|
"$do_tls_fallback_scsv" && { run_tls_fallback_scsv; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_tls_fallback_scsv; }
|
|
"$do_sweet32" && { run_sweet32; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_sweet32; }
|
|
"$do_freak" && { run_freak; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_freak; }
|
|
"$do_drown" && { run_drown ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_drown; }
|
|
"$do_logjam" && { run_logjam; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_logjam; }
|
|
"$do_beast" && { run_beast; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_beast; }
|
|
"$do_lucky13" && { run_lucky13; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_lucky13; }
|
|
"$do_winshock" && { run_winshock; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_winshock; }
|
|
"$do_rc4" && { run_rc4; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_rc4; }
|
|
"$do_starttls_injection" && { run_starttls_injection; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_starttls_injection; }
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_allciphers" && { run_allciphers; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_allciphers; }
|
|
"$do_cipher_per_proto" && { run_cipher_per_proto; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_cipher_per_proto; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_client_simulation" && { run_client_simulation; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_client_simulation; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_rating" && { run_rating; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_rating; }
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout_section_footer true
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
calc_scantime
|
|
datebanner " Done"
|
|
|
|
"$MEASURE_TIME" && printf "$1: %${COLUMNS}s\n" "$SCAN_TIME"
|
|
[[ -e "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && echo "Total : $SCAN_TIME " >> "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE"
|
|
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
################# main #################
|
|
|
|
|
|
RET=0 # this is a global as we can have a function main(), see #705. Should we toss then all local $ret?
|
|
ip=""
|
|
stopwatch start
|
|
|
|
lets_roll init
|
|
initialize_globals
|
|
check_base_requirements # needs to come after $do_html is defined
|
|
parse_cmd_line "$@"
|
|
# CMDLINE_PARSED has been set now. Don't put a function immediately after this which calls fatal().
|
|
# Rather put it after csv_header below.
|
|
# html_header() needs to be called early! Otherwise if html_out() is called before html_header() and the
|
|
# command line contains --htmlfile <htmlfile> or --html, it'll make problems with html output, see #692.
|
|
# json_header and csv_header could be called later but for context reasons we'll leave it here
|
|
html_header
|
|
json_header
|
|
csv_header
|
|
get_install_dir
|
|
# see #705, we need to source TLS_DATA_FILE here instead of in get_install_dir(), see #705
|
|
[[ -r "$TLS_DATA_FILE" ]] && . "$TLS_DATA_FILE"
|
|
set_color_functions
|
|
maketempf
|
|
find_openssl_binary
|
|
find_socat
|
|
choose_printf
|
|
check_resolver_bins
|
|
prepare_debug ; stopwatch parse
|
|
prepare_arrays ; stopwatch prepare_arrays
|
|
mybanner
|
|
check_proxy
|
|
check4openssl_oldfarts
|
|
check_bsd_mount
|
|
setup_lc_collate
|
|
|
|
if "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
prettyprint_local "$PATTERN2SHOW"
|
|
exit $?
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout_banner
|
|
|
|
if "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
prepare_logging
|
|
if [[ "$MASS_TESTING_MODE" == parallel ]]; then
|
|
run_mass_testing_parallel
|
|
else
|
|
run_mass_testing
|
|
fi
|
|
exit $?
|
|
fi
|
|
html_banner
|
|
|
|
#TODO: there shouldn't be the need for a special case for --mx, only the ip addresses we would need upfront and the do-parser
|
|
if "$do_mx_all_ips"; then
|
|
#FIXME: do we need this really here?
|
|
count_do_variables # if we have just 1x "do_*" --> we do a standard run -- otherwise just the one specified
|
|
[[ $? -eq 1 ]] && set_scanning_defaults
|
|
run_mx_all_ips "${URI}" $PORT # we should reduce run_mx_all_ips to what's necessary as below we have similar code
|
|
exit $?
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}" # NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDRs and IP46ADDR is set now
|
|
prepare_logging
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]] && $DNS_VIA_PROXY; then
|
|
NODEIP="$NODE"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
RET=$?
|
|
else
|
|
determine_ip_addresses
|
|
if [[ $(count_words "$IPADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then # we have more than one ipv4 address to check
|
|
MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true
|
|
pr_bold "Testing all IPv4 addresses (port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs"
|
|
for ip in $IPADDRs; do
|
|
draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3))
|
|
outln
|
|
NODEIP="$ip"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
RET=$((RET + $?)) # RET value per IP address
|
|
done
|
|
draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3))
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_bold "Done testing now all IP addresses (on port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs"
|
|
else # Just 1x ip4v to check, applies also if CMDLINE_IP was supplied
|
|
NODEIP="$IPADDRs"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
RET=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
exit $RET
|