mirror of
https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh.git
synced 2024-12-28 12:29:44 +01:00
23687 lines
1.1 MiB
Executable File
23687 lines
1.1 MiB
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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#
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# vim:ts=5:sw=5:expandtab
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# we have a spaces softtab, that ensures readability with other editors too
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# testssl.sh is a program for spotting weak SSL/TLS encryption, ciphers, protocols and some
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# vulnerabilities or features. It may or may be not distributed by your distribution.
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# The upstream versions are available (please leave the links intact):
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#
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# Development version https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh
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# Stable version https://testssl.sh
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# File bugs at GitHub https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues
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#
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# Project lead and initiator: Dirk Wetter, copyleft: 2007-today, contributions so far see CREDITS.md
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# Main contributions from David Cooper
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# Project lead and initiator: Dirk Wetter, copyleft: 2007-today.
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# Main contributions from David Cooper. Further contributors see CREDITS.md .
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#
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# License: GPLv2, see https://opensource.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.php and
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# accompanying license "LICENSE.txt". Redistribution + modification under this
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# license permitted.
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# If you enclose this program or parts of it in your software, it has to be
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# accompanied by the same license (see link). Do not violate the license.
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# If you do not agree to these terms, do not use it in the first place!
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#
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# OpenSSL, which is being used and maybe distributed via one of this projects'
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# web sites, is subject to their licensing: https://www.openssl.org/source/license.txt
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#
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# The client simulation data comes from SSLlabs and is licensed to the 'Qualys SSL Labs
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# Terms of Use' (v2.2), see https://www.ssllabs.com/downloads/Qualys_SSL_Labs_Terms_of_Use.pdf,
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# stating a CC BY 3.0 US license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/
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#
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# Please note: USAGE WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS".
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# USE IT AT your OWN RISK!
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# Seriously! The threat is you run this code on your computer and untrusted input e.g.
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# could be supplied from a server you are querying.
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#
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# HISTORY:
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# Back in 2006 it all started with a few openssl commands...
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# That's because openssl is a such a good swiss army knife (see e.g.
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# https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Command_Line_Utilities) that it was difficult to resist
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# wrapping some shell commands around it, which I used for my pen tests. This is how
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# everything started.
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# Now it has grown up, it has bash socket support for most features, which has been basically
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# replacing more and more functions of OpenSSL and some sockets functions serve as some kind
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# of central functions.
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#
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# WHY BASH?
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# Cross-platform is one of the three main goals of this script. Second: Ease of installation.
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# No compiling, install gems, go to CPAN, use pip etc. Third: Easy to use and to interpret
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# the results.
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# /bin/bash including the builtin sockets fulfill all that. The socket checks in bash may sound
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# cool and unique -- they are -- but probably you can achieve e.g. the same result with my favorite
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# interactive shell: zsh (zmodload zsh/net/socket -- checkout zsh/net/tcp) too! Oh, and btw.
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# ksh93 has socket support too.
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# Also bash is quite powerful if you use it appropriately: It can operate on patterns, process lines
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# and deal perfectly with regular expressions -- without external binaries.
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# /bin/bash though is way more often used within Linux and it's perfect for cross platform support.
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# MacOS X has it and also under Windows the MSYS2 extension or Cygwin as well as Bash on Windows (WSL)
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# has /bin/bash.
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#
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# Q: So what's the difference to www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ or sslcheck.globalsign.com/ ?
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# A: As of now ssllabs only check 1) webservers 2) on standard ports, 3) reachable from the
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# internet. And those examples above 4) are 3rd parties. If these restrictions are all fine
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# with you and you need a management compatible rating -- go ahead and use those.
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#
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# But also if your fine with those restrictions: testssl.sh is meant as a tool in your hand
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# and it's way more flexible. Oh, and did I mention testssl.sh is open source?
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#
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#################### Stop talking, action now ####################
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########### Definition of error codes
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#
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declare -r ERR_BASH=255 # Bash version incorrect
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declare -r ERR_CMDLINE=254 # Cmd line couldn't be parsed
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declare -r ERR_FCREATE=253 # Output file couldn't be created
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declare -r ERR_FNAMEPARSE=252 # Input file couldn't be parsed
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declare -r ERR_NOSUPPORT=251 # Feature requested is not supported
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declare -r ERR_OSSLBIN=250 # Problem with OpenSSL binary
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declare -r ERR_DNSBIN=249 # Problem with DNS lookup binaries
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declare -r ERR_OTHERCLIENT=248 # Other client problem
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declare -r ERR_DNSLOOKUP=247 # Problem with resolving IP addresses or names
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declare -r ERR_CONNECT=246 # Connectivity problem
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declare -r ERR_CLUELESS=245 # Weird state, either though user options or testssl.sh
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declare -r ERR_RESOURCE=244 # Resources testssl.sh needs couldn't be read
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declare -r ERR_CHILD=242 # Child received a signal from master
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declare -r ALLOK=0 # All is fine
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[ -z "${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}" ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Please make sure you're using \"bash\"! Bye...\033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH
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[ $(kill -l | grep -c SIG) -eq 0 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Please make sure you're calling me without leading \"sh\"! Bye...\033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH
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[ ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]} -lt 3 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Minimum requirement is bash 3.2. You have $BASH_VERSION \033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH
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[ ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]} -le 3 ] && [ ${BASH_VERSINFO[1]} -le 1 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Minimum requirement is bash 3.2. You have $BASH_VERSION \033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH
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########### Debugging helpers + profiling
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#
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declare -r PS4='|${LINENO}> \011${FUNCNAME[0]:+${FUNCNAME[0]}(): }'
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DEBUGTIME=${DEBUGTIME:-false} # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/5014823/how-to-profile-a-bash-shell-script-slow-startup#20855353
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DEBUG_ALLINONE=${DEBUG_ALLINONE:-false} # true: do debugging in one screen (old behavior for testssl.sh and bash3's default
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# false: needed for performance analysis or useful for just having an extra file
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DEBUG_ALLINONE=${SETX:-false} # SETX as a shortcut for old style debugging, overriding DEBUG_ALLINONE
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if [[ "$SHELLOPTS" =~ xtrace ]]; then
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if "$DEBUGTIME"; then
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# separate debugging, doesn't mess up the screen, $DEBUGTIME determines whether we also do performance analysis
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exec 42>&2 2> >(tee /tmp/testssl-$$.log | sed -u 's/^.*$/now/' | date -f - +%s.%N >/tmp/testssl-$$.time)
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# BASH_XTRACEFD=42
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else
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if ! "$DEBUG_ALLINONE"; then
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exec 42>| /tmp/testssl-$$.log
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BASH_XTRACEFD=42
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fi
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fi
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fi
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########### Traps! Make sure that temporary files are cleaned up after use in ANY case
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#
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trap "cleanup" EXIT
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trap "sig_cleanup" INT QUIT TERM
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trap "child_error" USR1
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########### Internal definitions
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#
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declare -r VERSION="3.1dev"
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declare -r SWCONTACT="dirk aet testssl dot sh"
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[[ "$VERSION" =~ dev|rc|beta ]] && \
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SWURL="https://testssl.sh/dev/" ||
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SWURL="https://testssl.sh/"
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if git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree &>/dev/null; then
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declare -r GIT_REL="$(git log --format='%h %ci' -1 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1" "$2" "$3 }')"
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declare -r GIT_REL_SHORT="${GIT_REL%% *}"
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declare -r REL_DATE_TIME="${GIT_REL#* }"
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declare -r REL_DATE="${REL_DATE_TIME% *}"
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fi
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declare -r PROG_NAME="$(basename "$0")"
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declare -r RUN_DIR="$(dirname "$0")"
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declare -r SYSTEM="$(uname -s)"
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declare -r SYSTEMREV="$(uname -r)"
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HNAME="$(uname -n)"
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HNAME="${HNAME%%.*}"
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declare CMDLINE
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CMDLINE_PARSED="" # This makes sure we don't let early fatal() write into files when files aren't created yet
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declare -r -a CMDLINE_ARRAY=("$@") # When performing mass testing, the child processes need to be sent the
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declare -a MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE # command line in the form of an array (see #702 and https://mywiki.wooledge.org/BashFAQ/050).
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declare -a SKIP_TESTS=() # This array hold the checks to be skipped
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########### Defining (and presetting) variables which can be changed
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#
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# Following variables make use of $ENV and can also be used like "<VAR>=<value> ./testssl.sh <URI>"
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declare -x OPENSSL
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OPENSSL_TIMEOUT=${OPENSSL_TIMEOUT:-""} # Default connect timeout with openssl before we call the server side unreachable
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CONNECT_TIMEOUT=${CONNECT_TIMEOUT:-""} # Default connect timeout with sockets before we call the server side unreachable
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PHONE_OUT=${PHONE_OUT:-false} # Whether testssl can retrieve CRLs and OCSP
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FAST_SOCKET=${FAST_SOCKET:-false} # EXPERIMENTAL feature to accelerate sockets -- DO NOT USE it for production
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COLOR=${COLOR:-2} # 3: Extra color (ciphers, curves), 2: Full color, 1: B/W only 0: No ESC at all
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COLORBLIND=${COLORBLIND:-false} # if true, swap blue and green in the output
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SHOW_EACH_C=${SHOW_EACH_C:-false} # where individual ciphers are tested show just the positively ones tested
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SHOW_SIGALGO=${SHOW_SIGALGO:-false} # "secret" switch whether testssl.sh shows the signature algorithm for -E / -e
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SNEAKY=${SNEAKY:-false} # is the referer and useragent we leave behind just usual?
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QUIET=${QUIET:-false} # don't output the banner. By doing this you acknowledge usage term appearing in the banner
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SSL_NATIVE=${SSL_NATIVE:-false} # we do per default bash sockets where possible "true": switch back to "openssl native"
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ASSUME_HTTP=${ASSUME_HTTP:-false} # in seldom cases (WAF, old servers, grumpy SSL) service detection fails. "True" enforces HTTP checks
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BASICAUTH=${BASICAUTH:-""} # HTTP basic auth credentials can be set here like user:pass
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REQHEADER=${REQHEADER:-""} # HTTP custom request header can be set here like Header: content. Can be used multiple times.
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BUGS=${BUGS:-""} # -bugs option from openssl, needed for some BIG IP F5
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WARNINGS=${WARNINGS:-""} # can be either off or batch
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DEBUG=${DEBUG:-0} # 1: normal output the files in /tmp/ are kept for further debugging purposes
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# 2: list more what's going on , also lists some errors of connections
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# 3: slight hexdumps + other info,
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# 4: display bytes sent via sockets
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# 5: display bytes received via sockets
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# 6: whole 9 yards
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FAST=${FAST:-false} # preference: show only first cipher, run_allciphers with openssl instead of sockets
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WIDE=${WIDE:-false} # whether to display for some options just ciphers or a table w hexcode/KX,Enc,strength etc.
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MASS_TESTING_MODE=${MASS_TESTING_MODE:-serial} # can be serial or parallel. Subject to change
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LOGFILE="${LOGFILE:-""}" # logfile if used
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JSONFILE="${JSONFILE:-""}" # jsonfile if used
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CSVFILE="${CSVFILE:-""}" # csvfile if used
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HTMLFILE="${HTMLFILE:-""}" # HTML if used
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FNAME=${FNAME:-""} # file name to read commands from
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FNAME_PREFIX=${FNAME_PREFIX:-""} # output filename prefix, see --outprefix
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APPEND=${APPEND:-false} # append to csv/json/html/log file
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OVERWRITE=${OVERWRITE:-false} # overwriting csv/json/html/log file
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[[ -z "$NODNS" ]] && declare NODNS # If unset it does all DNS lookups per default. "min" only for hosts or "none" at all
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NXCONNECT=${NXCONNECT:-invalid.} # For WSL this helps avoiding DNS requests to "invalid." which windows seem to handle delayed
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HAS_IPv6=${HAS_IPv6:-false} # if you have OpenSSL with IPv6 support AND IPv6 networking set it to yes
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ALL_CLIENTS=${ALL_CLIENTS:-false} # do you want to run all client simulation form all clients supplied by SSLlabs?
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OFFENSIVE=${OFFENSIVE:-true} # do you want to include offensive vulnerability tests which may cause blocking by an IDS?
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ADDTL_CA_FILES="${ADDTL_CA_FILES:-""}" # single file with a CA in PEM format or comma separated lists of them
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########### Tuning vars which cannot be set by a cmd line switch. Use instead e.g "HEADER_MAXSLEEP=10 ./testssl.sh <your_args_here>"
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#
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TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="${TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR:-""}" # If you run testssl.sh and it doesn't find it necessary file automagically set TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR
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CA_BUNDLES_PATH="${CA_BUNDLES_PATH:-""}" # You can have your CA stores some place else
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EXPERIMENTAL=${EXPERIMENTAL:-false} # a development hook which allows us to disable code
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PROXY_WAIT=${PROXY_WAIT:-20} # waiting at max 20 seconds for socket reply through proxy
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DNS_VIA_PROXY=${DNS_VIA_PROXY:-true} # do DNS lookups via proxy. --ip=proxy reverses this
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IGN_OCSP_PROXY=${IGN_OCSP_PROXY:-false} # Also when --proxy is supplied it is ignored when testing for revocation via OCSP via --phone-out
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HEADER_MAXSLEEP=${HEADER_MAXSLEEP:-5} # we wait this long before killing the process to retrieve a service banner / http header
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MAX_SOCKET_FAIL=${MAX_SOCKET_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for TCP socket connects are reached we terminate
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MAX_OSSL_FAIL=${MAX_OSSL_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for s_client connects are reached we terminate
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MAX_STARTTLS_FAIL=${MAX_STARTTLS_FAIL:-2} # max number of STARTTLS handshake failures in plaintext phase
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MAX_HEADER_FAIL=${MAX_HEADER_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for HTTP GET are encountered we don't try again to get the header
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MAX_WAITSOCK=${MAX_WAITSOCK:-10} # waiting at max 10 seconds for socket reply. There shouldn't be any reason to change this.
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CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK=${CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK:-5} # for the two CCS payload (each). There shouldn't be any reason to change this.
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HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK=${HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK:-8} # for the heartbleed payload. There shouldn't be any reason to change this.
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STARTTLS_SLEEP=${STARTTLS_SLEEP:-10} # max time wait on a socket for STARTTLS. MySQL has a fixed value of 1 which can't be overwritten (#914)
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FAST_STARTTLS=${FAST_STARTTLS:-true} # at the cost of reliability decrease the handshakes for STARTTLS
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USLEEP_SND=${USLEEP_SND:-0.1} # sleep time for general socket send
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USLEEP_REC=${USLEEP_REC:-0.2} # sleep time for general socket receive
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HSTS_MIN=${HSTS_MIN:-180} # >=180 days is ok for HSTS
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HSTS_MIN=$((HSTS_MIN * 86400)) # correct to seconds
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HPKP_MIN=${HPKP_MIN:-30} # >=30 days should be ok for HPKP_MIN, practical hints?
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HPKP_MIN=$((HPKP_MIN * 86400)) # correct to seconds
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DAYS2WARN1=${DAYS2WARN1:-60} # days to warn before cert expires, threshold 1
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DAYS2WARN2=${DAYS2WARN2:-30} # days to warn before cert expires, threshold 2
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VULN_THRESHLD=${VULN_THRESHLD:-1} # if vulnerabilities to check >$VULN_THRESHLD we DON'T show a separate header line in the output each vuln. check
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UNBRACKTD_IPV6=${UNBRACKTD_IPV6:-false} # some versions of OpenSSL (like Gentoo) don't support [bracketed] IPv6 addresses
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NO_ENGINE=${NO_ENGINE:-false} # if there are problems finding the (external) openssl engine set this to true
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declare -r CLIENT_MIN_FS=5 # number of ciphers needed to run a test for FS
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CAPATH="${CAPATH:-/etc/ssl/certs/}" # Does nothing yet (FC has only a CA bundle per default, ==> openssl version -d)
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SOCAT="${SOCAT:-}" # For now we would need this for STARTTLS injection
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MEASURE_TIME_FILE=${MEASURE_TIME_FILE:-""}
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if [[ -n "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && [[ -z "$MEASURE_TIME" ]]; then
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MEASURE_TIME=true
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else
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MEASURE_TIME=${MEASURE_TIME:-false}
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fi
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DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl" # display OpenSSL ciphername (but both OpenSSL and RFC ciphernames in wide mode)
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declare UA_STD="TLS tester from $SWURL"
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declare -r UA_SNEAKY="Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:94.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94.0"
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SSL_RENEG_ATTEMPTS=${SSL_RENEG_ATTEMPTS:-6} # number of times to check SSL Renegotiation
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########### Initialization part, further global vars just being declared here
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#
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LC_COLLATE="" # ensures certain regex patterns work as expected and aren't localized, see setup_lc_collate()
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HAS_LOCALE=false
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SYSTEM2="" # currently only being used for WSL = bash on windows
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PRINTF="" # which external printf to use. Empty presets the internal one, see #1130
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CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE=""
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TLS_DATA_FILE="" # mandatory file for socket-based handshakes
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OPENSSL="" # If you run this from GitHub it's ~/bin/openssl.$(uname).$(uname -m) otherwise /usr/bin/openssl
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OPENSSL2="" # When running from GitHub, this will be openssl version >=1.1.1 (auto determined)
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OPENSSL_LOCATION=""
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IKNOW_FNAME=false
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FIRST_FINDING=true # is this the first finding we are outputting to file?
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JSONHEADER=true # include JSON headers and footers in HTML file, if one is being created
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CSVHEADER=true # same for CSV
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HTMLHEADER=true # same for HTML
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SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=false # kludge for tracking whether we need to close the JSON section object
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GIVE_HINTS=false # give an additional info to findings
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SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false # Some servers have either a ClientHello total size limit or a 128 cipher limit (e.g. old ASAs)
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MULTIPLE_CHECKS=false # need to know whether an MX record or a hostname resolves to multiple IPs to check
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CHILD_MASS_TESTING=${CHILD_MASS_TESTING:-false}
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PARENT_LOGFILE="" # logfile if mass testing and all output sent to a single file
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PARENT_JSONFILE="" # jsonfile if mass testing and all output sent to a single file
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PARENT_CSVFILE="" # csvfile if mass testing and all output sent to a single file
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PARENT_HTMLFILE="" # HTML if mass testing and all output sent to a single file
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TIMEOUT_CMD=""
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HAD_SLEPT=0
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NR_SOCKET_FAIL=0 # Counter for socket failures
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NR_OSSL_FAIL=0 # .. for OpenSSL connects
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NR_STARTTLS_FAIL=0 # .. for STARTTLS failures
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NR_HEADER_FAIL=0 # .. for HTTP_GET
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PROTOS_OFFERED="" # This keeps which protocol is being offered. See has_server_protocol().
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TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="" # This contains the hexcode of a cipher known to be supported by the server with TLS 1.2
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CURVES_OFFERED="" # This keeps which curves have been detected. Just for error handling
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KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=false # We need OpenSSL a few times. This variable is an indicator if we can't connect. Eases handling
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DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" # .. as hex string, e.g. 0300 or 0303
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APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="" # Information about the application traffic keys for a TLS 1.3 connection.
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TLS13_ONLY=false # Does the server support TLS 1.3 ONLY?
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OSSL_SHORTCUT=${OSSL_SHORTCUT:-false} # Hack: if during the scan turns out the OpenSSL binary supports TLS 1.3 would be a better choice, this enables it.
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TLS_EXTENSIONS=""
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V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH=0
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declare -r NPN_PROTOs="spdy/4a2,spdy/3,spdy/3.1,spdy/2,spdy/1,http/1.1"
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# alpn_protos needs to be space-separated, not comma-separated, including odd ones observed @ facebook and others, old ones like h2-17 omitted as they could not be found
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declare -r ALPN_PROTOs="h2 spdy/3.1 http/1.1 grpc-exp h2-fb spdy/1 spdy/2 spdy/3 stun.turn stun.nat-discovery webrtc c-webrtc ftp"
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TEMPDIR=""
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TMPFILE=""
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ERRFILE=""
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CLIENT_AUTH="none"
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CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST=""
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TLS_TICKETS=false
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NO_SSL_SESSIONID=true
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CERT_COMPRESSION=${CERT_COMPRESSION:-false} # secret flag to set in addition to --devel for certificate compression
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HOSTCERT="" # File with host certificate, without intermediate certificate
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HEADERFILE=""
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HEADERVALUE=""
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HTTP_STATUS_CODE=""
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DH_GROUP_OFFERED=""
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DH_GROUP_LEN_P=0
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KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33" # The extension number for key_share was changed from 40 to 51 in TLSv1.3 draft 23.
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# In order to support draft 23 and later in addition to earlier drafts, need to
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# know which extension number to use. Note that it appears that a single
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# ClientHello cannot advertise both draft 23 and later and earlier drafts.
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# Preset may help to deal with STARTTLS + TLS 1.3 draft 23 and later but not earlier.
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BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER=false # reserved for cases where a ServerHello doesn't contain a cipher offered in the ClientHello
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GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=false
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PATTERN2SHOW=""
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SOCK_REPLY_FILE=""
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NW_STR=""
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LEN_STR=""
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SNI=""
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POODLE="" # keep vulnerability status for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV
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# Initialize OpenSSL variables (and others)
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OSSL_NAME="" # openssl name, in case of LibreSSL it's LibreSSL
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OSSL_VER="" # openssl version, will be auto-determined
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|
OSSL_VER_MAJOR=0
|
|
OSSL_VER_MINOR=0
|
|
OSSL_VER_APPENDIX="none"
|
|
CLIENT_PROB_NO=1
|
|
|
|
GOOD_CA_BUNDLE="" # A bundle of CA certificates that can be used to validate the server's certificate
|
|
CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false # Set to true if server sends a certificate list that contains a certificate
|
|
# that does not certify the one immediately preceding it. (See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.2)
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE=""
|
|
HAS_DNS_SANS=false # Whether the certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a DNS name or an application-specific identifier type.
|
|
HAS_DH_BITS=${HAS_DH_BITS:-false} # These are variables which are set by find_openssl_binary()
|
|
HAS_CURVES=false
|
|
OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES=""
|
|
HAS_SSL2=false
|
|
HAS_SSL3=false
|
|
HAS_TLS13=false
|
|
HAS_X448=false
|
|
HAS_X25519=false
|
|
HAS_SIGALGS=false
|
|
HAS_PKUTIL=false
|
|
HAS_PKEY=false
|
|
HAS_NO_SSL2=false
|
|
HAS_NOSERVERNAME=false
|
|
HAS_CIPHERSUITES=false
|
|
HAS_SECLEVEL=false
|
|
HAS_COMP=false
|
|
HAS_NO_COMP=false
|
|
HAS_ALPN=false
|
|
HAS_NPN=false
|
|
HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=false
|
|
HAS_PROXY=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER=false
|
|
HAS_POSTGRES=false
|
|
HAS_MYSQL=false
|
|
HAS_LMTP=false
|
|
HAS_SIEVE=false
|
|
HAS_NNTP=false
|
|
HAS_IRC=false
|
|
HAS_CHACHA20=false
|
|
HAS_AES128_GCM=false
|
|
HAS_AES256_GCM=false
|
|
HAS_ZLIB=false
|
|
HAS_UDS=false
|
|
HAS_UDS2=false
|
|
HAS_ENABLE_PHA=false
|
|
HAS_DIG=false
|
|
HAS_DIG_R=true
|
|
DIG_R="-r"
|
|
HAS_HOST=false
|
|
HAS_DRILL=false
|
|
HAS_NSLOOKUP=false
|
|
HAS_IDN=false
|
|
HAS_IDN2=false
|
|
HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE=false
|
|
HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT=false
|
|
HAS_XXD=false
|
|
|
|
OSSL_CIPHERS_S=""
|
|
PORT=443 # unless otherwise auto-determined, see below
|
|
NODE=""
|
|
NODEIP=""
|
|
rDNS=""
|
|
CORRECT_SPACES="" # Used for IPv6 and proper output formatting
|
|
IPADDRs=""
|
|
IP46ADDRs=""
|
|
LOCAL_A=false # Does the $NODEIP come from /etc/hosts?
|
|
LOCAL_AAAA=false # Does the IPv6 IP come from /etc/hosts?
|
|
XMPP_HOST=""
|
|
PROXYIP="" # $PROXYIP:$PROXPORT is your proxy if --proxy is defined ...
|
|
PROXYPORT="" # ... and openssl has proxy support
|
|
PROXY="" # Once check_proxy() executed it contains $PROXYIP:$PROXPORT
|
|
VULN_COUNT=0
|
|
SERVICE="" # Is the server running an HTTP server, SMTP, POP or IMAP?
|
|
URI=""
|
|
CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2=""
|
|
RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2=""
|
|
STARTTLS_PROTOCOL=""
|
|
OPTIMAL_PROTO="" # Need this for IIS6 (sigh) + OpenSSL 1.0.2, otherwise some handshakes will fail see
|
|
# https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892
|
|
STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO="" # Same for STARTTLS, see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/188
|
|
OPTIMAL_SOCKETS_PROTO="" # Same for tls_sockets(). -- not yet used
|
|
ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS=true # Set to true if all attempts to connect to server using tls_sockets/sslv2_sockets failed
|
|
TLS_TIME="" # To keep the value of TLS server timestamp
|
|
TLS_NOW="" # Similar
|
|
TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=false # Tells TLS functions to measure the TLS difftime or not
|
|
NOW_TIME=""
|
|
HTTP_TIME=""
|
|
HTTP_AGE="" # Age Header, see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Age + RFC 7234
|
|
REQHEADERS=()
|
|
GET_REQ11=""
|
|
START_TIME=0 # time in epoch when the action started
|
|
END_TIME=0 # .. ended
|
|
SCAN_TIME=0 # diff of both: total scan time
|
|
LAST_TIME=0 # only used for performance measurements (MEASURE_TIME=true)
|
|
SERVER_COUNTER=0 # Counter for multiple servers
|
|
|
|
TLS_LOW_BYTE="" # For "secret" development stuff, see -q below
|
|
HEX_CIPHER="" # -- " --
|
|
|
|
GRADE_CAP="" # Keeps track of the current grading cap
|
|
GRADE_CAP_REASONS=() # Keeps track of all the reasons why grades are capped
|
|
GRADE_WARNINGS=() # Keeps track of all the grade warnings
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=100 # Keeps track of the score for category 2 "Key Exchange Strength"
|
|
CIPH_STR_BEST=0 # Keeps track of the best bit size for category 3 "Cipher Strength"
|
|
CIPH_STR_WORST=100000 # Keeps track of the worst bit size for category 3 "Cipher Strength"
|
|
# Intentionally set very high, so it can be set to 0, if necessary
|
|
TRUSTED1ST="" # Contains the `-trusted_first` flag, if this version of openssl supports it
|
|
|
|
########### Global variables for parallel mass testing
|
|
#
|
|
declare -r PARALLEL_SLEEP=1 # Time to sleep after starting each test
|
|
MAX_WAIT_TEST=${MAX_WAIT_TEST:-1200} # Maximum time (in seconds) to wait for a test to complete
|
|
MAX_PARALLEL=${MAX_PARALLEL:-20} # Maximum number of tests to run in parallel
|
|
# This value may be made larger on systems with faster processors
|
|
declare -a -i PARALLEL_TESTING_PID=() # process id for each child test (or 0 to indicate test has already completed)
|
|
declare -a PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE=() # command line for each child test
|
|
declare -i NR_PARALLEL_TESTS=0 # number of parallel tests run
|
|
declare -i NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH=0 # number of parallel tests that have completed and have been processed
|
|
declare FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT=true # true if no output has been added to $JSONFILE yet.
|
|
|
|
|
|
########### Cipher suite information
|
|
#
|
|
declare -i TLS_NR_CIPHERS=0
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_KX=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_AUTH=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_ENC=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT=()
|
|
declare TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED=()
|
|
declare TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS="TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256"
|
|
|
|
|
|
########### Some predefinitions: date, sed (we always use tests for binaries and NOT try to determine
|
|
# capabilities by querying the OS)
|
|
#
|
|
HAS_GNUDATE=false
|
|
HAS_FREEBSDDATE=false
|
|
HAS_OPENBSDDATE=false
|
|
if date -d @735275209 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
if date -r @735275209 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
# It can't do any conversion from a plain date output.
|
|
HAS_OPENBSDDATE=true
|
|
else
|
|
HAS_GNUDATE=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# FreeBSD and OS X date(1) accept "-f inputformat", so do newer OpenBSD versions >~ 6.6.
|
|
date -j -f '%s' 1234567 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
|
|
HAS_FREEBSDDATE=true
|
|
|
|
echo A | sed -E 's/A//' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
|
|
declare -r HAS_SED_E=true || \
|
|
declare -r HAS_SED_E=false
|
|
|
|
########### Terminal definitions
|
|
tty -s && \
|
|
declare -r INTERACTIVE=true || \
|
|
declare -r INTERACTIVE=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z $TERM_WIDTH ]]; then # No batch file and no otherwise predefined TERM_WIDTH
|
|
if ! tput cols &>/dev/null || ! "$INTERACTIVE";then # Prevent tput errors if running non interactive
|
|
export TERM_WIDTH=${COLUMNS:-80}
|
|
else
|
|
export TERM_WIDTH=${COLUMNS:-$(tput cols)} # For custom line wrapping and dashes
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
TERM_CURRPOS=0 # Custom line wrapping needs alter the current horizontal cursor pos
|
|
|
|
|
|
########### Severity functions and globals
|
|
#
|
|
INFO=0
|
|
OK=0
|
|
LOW=1
|
|
MEDIUM=2
|
|
HIGH=3
|
|
CRITICAL=4
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=0
|
|
|
|
set_severity_level() {
|
|
local severity=$1
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$severity" == LOW ]]; then
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=$LOW
|
|
elif [[ "$severity" == MEDIUM ]]; then
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=$MEDIUM
|
|
elif [[ "$severity" == HIGH ]]; then
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=$HIGH
|
|
elif [[ "$severity" == CRITICAL ]]; then
|
|
SEVERITY_LEVEL=$CRITICAL
|
|
else
|
|
# WARN and FATAL will always be logged as the represent scanning problems
|
|
echo "Supported severity levels are LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, CRITICAL!"
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
show_finding() {
|
|
local severity=$1
|
|
|
|
[[ "$severity" == DEBUG ]] ||
|
|
( [[ "$severity" == INFO ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $INFO ]] ) ||
|
|
( [[ "$severity" == OK ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $OK ]] ) ||
|
|
( [[ "$severity" == LOW ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $LOW ]] ) ||
|
|
( [[ "$severity" == MEDIUM ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $MEDIUM ]] ) ||
|
|
( [[ "$severity" == HIGH ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $HIGH ]] ) ||
|
|
( [[ "$severity" == CRITICAL ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $CRITICAL ]] ) ||
|
|
[[ "$severity" == WARN ]] ||
|
|
[[ "$severity" == FATAL ]]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
########### Output functions
|
|
|
|
# For HTML output, replace any HTML reserved characters with the entity name
|
|
html_reserved(){
|
|
local output
|
|
"$do_html" || return 0
|
|
#sed -e 's/\&/\&/g' -e 's/</\</g' -e 's/>/\>/g' -e 's/"/\"/g' -e "s/'/\'/g" <<< "$1"
|
|
output="${1//&/&}"
|
|
output="${output//</<}"
|
|
output="${output//>/>}"
|
|
output="${output//\"/"}"
|
|
output="${output//\'/'}"
|
|
printf -- "%s" "$output"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
html_out() {
|
|
"$do_html" || return 0
|
|
[[ -n "$HTMLFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$HTMLFILE" ]] && printf -- "%b" "$1" >> "$HTMLFILE"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This is intentionally the same.
|
|
safe_echo() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; }
|
|
tm_out() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; }
|
|
tmln_out() { printf -- "%b" "$1\n"; }
|
|
|
|
out() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
outln() { printf -- "%b" "$1\n"; html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")\n"; }
|
|
|
|
#TODO: Still no shell injection safe but if just run it from the cmd line: that's fine
|
|
|
|
# Color print functions, see also https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Bash-Prompt-HOWTO/x329.html
|
|
tm_liteblue() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[0;32m$1" || tm_out "\033[0;34m$1" ) || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # not yet used
|
|
pr_liteblue() { tm_liteblue "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#008817;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#0000ee;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" ) || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
tmln_liteblue() { tm_liteblue "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_liteblue() { pr_liteblue "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_blue() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[1;32m$1" || tm_out "\033[1;34m$1" ) || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # used for head lines of single tests
|
|
pr_blue() { tm_blue "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#008817;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#5c5cff;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" ) || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
tmln_blue() { tm_blue "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_blue() { pr_blue "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
# we should be able to use aliases here
|
|
tm_warning() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;35m$1" || tm_underline "$1"; tm_off; } # some local problem: one test cannot be done
|
|
tmln_warning() { tm_warning "$1"; tmln_out; } # litemagenta
|
|
pr_warning() { tm_warning "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#cd00cd;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || ( [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" ); }
|
|
prln_warning() { pr_warning "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_magenta() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;35m$1" || tm_underline "$1"; tm_off; } # fatal error: quitting because of this!
|
|
tmln_magenta() { tm_magenta "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
# different as warning above?
|
|
pr_magenta() { tm_magenta "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#be32d0;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || ( [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" ); }
|
|
prln_magenta() { pr_magenta "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_litecyan() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;36m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # not yet used
|
|
tmln_litecyan() { tm_litecyan "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_litecyan() { tm_litecyan "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#168092;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_litecyan() { pr_litecyan "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_cyan() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;36m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # additional hint
|
|
tmln_cyan() { tm_cyan "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_cyan() { tm_cyan "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#0d7ea2;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_cyan() { pr_cyan "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_litegrey() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;37m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # ... https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/600#issuecomment-276129876
|
|
tmln_litegrey() { tm_litegrey "$1"; tmln_out; } # not really usable on a black background, see ..
|
|
prln_litegrey() { pr_litegrey "$1"; outln; }
|
|
pr_litegrey() { tm_litegrey "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#71767a;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
|
|
tm_grey() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;30m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
pr_grey() { tm_grey "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#757575;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
tmln_grey() { tm_grey "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_grey() { pr_grey "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_good() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[0;34m$1" || tm_out "\033[0;32m$1" ) || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # litegreen (liteblue), This is good
|
|
tmln_svrty_good() { tm_svrty_good "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_svrty_good() { tm_svrty_good "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#0000ee;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#008817;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" ) || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_svrty_good() { pr_svrty_good "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_best() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[1;34m$1" || tm_out "\033[1;32m$1" ) || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # green (blue), This is the best
|
|
tmln_svrty_best() { tm_svrty_best "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_svrty_best() { tm_svrty_best "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#5c5cff;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#008817;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" ) || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_svrty_best() { pr_svrty_best "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_low() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;33m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # yellow brown | academic or minor problem
|
|
tmln_svrty_low() { tm_svrty_low "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_svrty_low() { tm_svrty_low "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#a86437;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_svrty_low() { pr_svrty_low "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_medium() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;33m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # brown | it is not a bad problem but you shouldn't do this
|
|
pr_svrty_medium() { tm_svrty_medium "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#c05600;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
tmln_svrty_medium(){ tm_svrty_medium "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_svrty_medium(){ pr_svrty_medium "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_high() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;31m$1" || tm_bold "$1"; tm_off; } # litered
|
|
pr_svrty_high() { tm_svrty_high "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#e52207;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || ( [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" ); }
|
|
tmln_svrty_high() { tm_svrty_high "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_svrty_high() { pr_svrty_high "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_svrty_critical() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;31m$1" || tm_bold "$1"; tm_off; } # red
|
|
pr_svrty_critical() { tm_svrty_critical "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#e52207;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || ( [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" ); }
|
|
tmln_svrty_critical() { tm_svrty_critical "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_svrty_critical() { pr_svrty_critical "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_deemphasize() { tm_out "$1"; } # hook for a weakened screen output, see #600
|
|
pr_deemphasize() { tm_deemphasize "$1"; html_out "<span style=\"color:#71767a;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>"; }
|
|
tmln_deemphasize() { tm_deemphasize "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
prln_deemphasize() { pr_deemphasize "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
# color=1 functions
|
|
tm_off() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[m"; }
|
|
|
|
tm_bold() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tmln_bold() { tm_bold "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_bold() { tm_bold "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_bold() { pr_bold "$1" ; outln; }
|
|
|
|
NO_ITALICS=false
|
|
if [[ $TERM == screen ]]; then
|
|
NO_ITALICS=true
|
|
elif [[ $SYSTEM == OpenBSD ]]; then
|
|
NO_ITALICS=true
|
|
elif [[ $SYSTEM == FreeBSD ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${SYSTEMREV%\.*} -le 9 ]]; then
|
|
NO_ITALICS=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_italic() { ( [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && ! "$NO_ITALICS" ) && tm_out "\033[3m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tmln_italic() { tm_italic "$1" ; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_italic() { tm_italic "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<i>$(html_reserved "$1")</i>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_italic() { pr_italic "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_strikethru() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[9m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # ugly!
|
|
tmln_strikethru() { tm_strikethru "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_strikethru() { tm_strikethru "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<strike>$(html_reserved "$1")</strike>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_strikethru() { pr_strikethru "$1" ; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_underline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[4m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tmln_underline() { tm_underline "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_underline() { tm_underline "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
prln_underline() { pr_underline "$1"; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_reverse() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[7m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tm_reverse_bold() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[7m\033[1m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
pr_reverse() { tm_reverse "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:white;background-color:black;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
pr_reverse_bold() { tm_reverse_bold "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:white;background-color:black;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
|
|
#pr_headline() { pr_blue "$1"; }
|
|
#https://misc.flogisoft.com/bash/tip_colors_and_formatting
|
|
|
|
#pr_headline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && out "\033[1;30m\033[47m$1" || out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tm_headline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1m\033[4m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; }
|
|
tmln_headline() { tm_headline "$1"; tmln_out; }
|
|
pr_headline() { tm_headline "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"text-decoration:underline;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; }
|
|
pr_headlineln() { pr_headline "$1" ; outln; }
|
|
|
|
tm_squoted() { tm_out "'$1'"; }
|
|
pr_squoted() { out "'$1'"; }
|
|
tm_dquoted() { tm_out "\"$1\""; }
|
|
pr_dquoted() { out "\"$1\""; }
|
|
|
|
# either files couldn't be found or openssl isn't good enough (which shouldn't happen anymore)
|
|
tm_local_problem() { tm_warning "Local problem: $1"; }
|
|
tmln_local_problem() { tmln_warning "Local problem: $1"; }
|
|
pr_local_problem() { pr_warning "Local problem: $1"; }
|
|
prln_local_problem() { prln_warning "Local problem: $1"; }
|
|
|
|
# general failure
|
|
tm_fixme() { tm_warning "Fixme: $1"; }
|
|
tmln_fixme() { tmln_warning "Fixme: $1"; }
|
|
pr_fixme() { pr_warning "Fixme: $1"; }
|
|
prln_fixme() { prln_warning "Fixme: $1"; }
|
|
|
|
pr_url() { tm_out "$1"; html_out "<a href=\"$1\" style=\"color:black;text-decoration:none;\">$1</a>"; }
|
|
pr_boldurl() { tm_bold "$1"; html_out "<a href=\"$1\" style=\"font-weight:bold;color:black;text-decoration:none;\">$1</a>"; }
|
|
|
|
### color switcher (see e.g. https://linuxtidbits.wordpress.com/2008/08/11/output-color-on-bash-scripts/
|
|
### https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Bash-Prompt-HOWTO/x405.html
|
|
### no output support for HTML!
|
|
set_color_functions() {
|
|
local ncurses_tput=true
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SYSTEM == OpenBSD ]] && [[ "$TERM" =~ xterm-256 ]]; then
|
|
export TERM=xterm
|
|
# OpenBSD can't handle 256 colors (yet) in xterm which might lead to ugly errors
|
|
# like "tput: not enough arguments (3) for capability `AF'". Not our fault but
|
|
# before we get blamed we fix it here.
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Empty all vars if we have COLOR=0 equals no escape code -- these are globals:
|
|
red=""
|
|
green=""
|
|
brown=""
|
|
blue=""
|
|
magenta=""
|
|
cyan=""
|
|
grey=""
|
|
yellow=""
|
|
off=""
|
|
bold=""
|
|
underline=""
|
|
italic=""
|
|
|
|
type -p tput &>/dev/null || return 0 # Hey wait, do we actually have tput / ncurses ?
|
|
tput cols &>/dev/null || return 0 # tput under BSDs and GNUs doesn't work either (TERM undefined?)
|
|
tput sgr0 &>/dev/null || ncurses_tput=false
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
if $ncurses_tput; then
|
|
red=$(tput setaf 1)
|
|
green=$(tput setaf 2)
|
|
brown=$(tput setaf 3)
|
|
blue=$(tput setaf 4)
|
|
magenta=$(tput setaf 5)
|
|
cyan=$(tput setaf 6)
|
|
grey=$(tput setaf 7)
|
|
yellow=$(tput setaf 3; tput bold)
|
|
else # this is a try for old BSD, see terminfo(5)
|
|
red=$(tput AF 1)
|
|
green=$(tput AF 2)
|
|
brown=$(tput AF 3)
|
|
blue=$(tput AF 4)
|
|
magenta=$(tput AF 5)
|
|
cyan=$(tput AF 6)
|
|
grey=$(tput AF 7)
|
|
yellow=$(tput AF 3; tput md)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
if $ncurses_tput; then
|
|
bold=$(tput bold)
|
|
underline=$(tput sgr 0 1 2>/dev/null)
|
|
italic=$(tput sitm) # This doesn't work on FreeBSDi (9,10) and OpenBSD ...
|
|
italic_end=$(tput ritm) # ... and this, too
|
|
off=$(tput sgr0)
|
|
else # this is a try for old BSD, see terminfo(5)
|
|
bold=$(tput md)
|
|
underline=$(tput us)
|
|
italic=$(tput ZH 2>/dev/null) # This doesn't work on FreeBSDi (9,10) and OpenBSD
|
|
italic_end=$(tput ZR 2>/dev/null) # ... probably entry missing in /etc/termcap
|
|
reverse=$(tput mr)
|
|
off=$(tput me)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# FreeBSD 10 understands ESC codes like 'echo -e "\e[3mfoobar\e[23m"', but also no tput for italics
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### START universal helper function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}" == 3 ]]; then
|
|
# older bash can do this only (MacOS X), even SLES 11, see #697
|
|
toupper() { tr 'a-z' 'A-Z' <<< "$1"; }
|
|
tolower() { tr 'A-Z' 'a-z' <<< "$1"; }
|
|
else
|
|
toupper() { echo -n "${1^^}"; }
|
|
tolower() { echo -n "${1,,}"; }
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
get_last_char() {
|
|
echo "${1:~0}" # "${string: -1}" would work too (both also in bash 3.2)
|
|
}
|
|
# Checking for last char. If already a separator supplied, we don't need an additional one
|
|
debugme() {
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && "$@" >&2
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
debugme1() { [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && "$@" >&2; }
|
|
|
|
hex2dec() {
|
|
echo $((16#$1))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# convert decimal number < 256 to hex
|
|
dec02hex() {
|
|
printf "x%02x" "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# convert decimal number between 256 and < 256*256 to hex
|
|
dec04hex() {
|
|
local a=$(printf "%04x" "$1")
|
|
printf "x%02s, x%02s" "${a:0:2}" "${a:2:2}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# trim spaces for BSD and old sed
|
|
count_lines() {
|
|
echo $(wc -l <<< "$1")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count_words() {
|
|
echo $(wc -w <<< "$1")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count_ciphers() {
|
|
echo $(wc -w <<< "${1//:/ }")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count_chars() {
|
|
echo $(wc -c <<< "$1")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newline_to_spaces() {
|
|
tr '\n' ' ' <<< "$1" | sed 's/ $//'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
colon_to_spaces() {
|
|
echo "${1//:/ }"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strip_lf() {
|
|
tr -d '\n' <<< "$1" | tr -d '\r'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strip_spaces() {
|
|
echo "${1// /}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20121022051228/http://codesnippets.joyent.com/posts/show/1816
|
|
strip_leading_space() {
|
|
printf "%s" "${1#"${1%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
|
|
}
|
|
strip_trailing_space() {
|
|
printf "%s" "${1%"${1##*[![:space:]]}"}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
is_number() {
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]] && \
|
|
return 0 || \
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strip_quote() (
|
|
# Note: parens in function definition here force this into a separate
|
|
# shell, preventing extglob from affecting the code outside this function
|
|
shopt -s extglob
|
|
# Remove color codes
|
|
OUT=${1//$'\e['*([0-9;])[a-zA-Z]}
|
|
# Replace quotes
|
|
OUT=${OUT//\"/\'}
|
|
strip_leading_space "$(
|
|
strip_trailing_space "$OUT"
|
|
)"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
is_ipv4addr() {
|
|
local octet="(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])"
|
|
local ipv4address="$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Check that $1 contains an IPv4 address and nothing else
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ $ipv4address ]] && [[ "$1" == $BASH_REMATCH ]] && \
|
|
return 0 || \
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 4291, Section 2.2
|
|
is_ipv6addr() {
|
|
local ipv6seg="[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}"
|
|
local octet="(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])"
|
|
local ipv4address="$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet"
|
|
local ipv6address
|
|
|
|
ipv6address="($ipv6seg:){7}(:|$ipv6seg)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){6}(:|:$ipv6seg|$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){5}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,2}|:$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){4}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,3}|:($ipv6seg:){0,1}$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){3}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,4}|:($ipv6seg:){0,2}$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){2}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,5}|:($ipv6seg:){0,3}$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|($ipv6seg:){1}(:|(:$ipv6seg){1,6}|:($ipv6seg:){0,4}$ipv4address)"
|
|
ipv6address+="|:((:$ipv6seg){1,7}|:($ipv6seg:){0,5}$ipv4address)"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Check that $1 contains an IPv4 address and nothing else
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ $ipv6address ]] && [[ "$1" == $BASH_REMATCH ]] && \
|
|
return 0 || \
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
join_by() {
|
|
# joins an array using a custom delimiter https://web.archive.org/web/20201222183540/https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1527049/how-can-i-join-elements-of-an-array-in-bash/17841619#17841619
|
|
local d=$1
|
|
shift
|
|
local f=$1
|
|
shift
|
|
printf %s "$f" "${@/#/$d}";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### END universal helper function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
###### START ServerHello/OpenSSL/F5 function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
#arg1: TLS 1.2 and below ciphers
|
|
#arg2: TLS 1.3 ciphers
|
|
#arg3: options (e.g., -V)
|
|
actually_supported_osslciphers() {
|
|
local ciphers="$1"
|
|
local tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS"
|
|
local options="$3 "
|
|
|
|
[[ "$2" != ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$2"
|
|
"$HAS_SECLEVEL" && [[ -n "$ciphers" ]] && ciphers="@SECLEVEL=0:$1"
|
|
# With OpenSSL 1.0.2 the only way to exclude SSLv2 ciphers is to use the -tls1 option.
|
|
# However, with newer versions of OpenSSL, the -tls1 option excludes TLSv1.2 ciphers.
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
options="${options//-no_ssl2 /-tls1 }"
|
|
else
|
|
options="${options//-no_ssl2 /}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $options $OSSL_CIPHERS_S -ciphersuites "$tls13_ciphers" "$ciphers" 2>/dev/null || echo ""
|
|
elif [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $options $OSSL_CIPHERS_S "$tls13_ciphers:$ciphers" 2>/dev/null || echo ""
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $options "$ciphers" 2>/dev/null || echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Given a protocol (arg1) and a list of ciphers (arg2) that is formatted as
|
|
# ", xx,xx, xx,xx, xx,xx, xx,xx" remove any TLSv1.3 ciphers if the protocol
|
|
# is less than 04 and remove any TLSv1.2-only ciphers if the protocol is less
|
|
# than 03.
|
|
strip_inconsistent_ciphers() {
|
|
local -i proto=0x$1
|
|
local cipherlist="$2"
|
|
|
|
[[ $proto -lt 4 ]] && cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 13,0[0-9a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
if [[ $proto -lt 3 ]]; then
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,3[b-fB-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,40/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,6[7-9a-dA-D]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,9[c-fC-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,[abAB][0-9a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,[cC][0-5]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 16,[bB][7-9aA]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,2[3-9a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,3[01278a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,[4-9aA][0-9a-fA-F]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC][cC],1[345]/}"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC][cC],[aA][89a-eA-E]/}"
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "$cipherlist"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# retrieve cipher from ServerHello (via openssl)
|
|
get_cipher() {
|
|
local cipher=""
|
|
local server_hello="$(cat -v "$1")"
|
|
# This and two other following instances are not best practice and normally a useless use of "cat", see
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20160711205930/http://porkmail.org/era/unix/award.html#uucaletter
|
|
# However there seem to be cases where the preferred $(< "$1") logic has a problem.
|
|
# Especially with bash 3.2 (Mac OS X) and when on the server side binary chars
|
|
# are returned, see https://stackoverflow.com/questions/7427262/how-to-read-a-file-into-a-variable-in-shell#22607352
|
|
# and https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1292
|
|
# Performance measurements showed no to barely measurable penalty (1s displayed in 9 tries).
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ Cipher\ *:\ ([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+|SSL_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]]; then
|
|
cipher="${BASH_REMATCH##* }"
|
|
elif [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", "(SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?(\/SSLv3)?)", Cipher is "([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]]; then
|
|
cipher="${BASH_REMATCH##* }"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$cipher"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# retrieve protocol from ServerHello (via openssl)
|
|
get_protocol() {
|
|
local protocol=""
|
|
local server_hello="$(cat -v "$1")"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ Protocol\ *:\ (SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?) ]]; then
|
|
protocol="${BASH_REMATCH##* }"
|
|
elif [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", TLSv1.3, Cipher is "TLS_[A-Z0-9_]+ ]]; then
|
|
# Note: When OpenSSL prints "New, <protocol>, Cipher is <cipher>", <cipher> is the
|
|
# negotiated cipher, but <protocol> is not the negotiated protocol. Instead, it is
|
|
# the SSL/TLS protocol that first defined <cipher>. Since the ciphers that were
|
|
# first defined for TLSv1.3 may only be used with TLSv1.3, this line may be used
|
|
# to determine whether TLSv1.3 was negotiated, but if another protocol is specified
|
|
# on this line, then this line does not indicate the actual protocol negotiated. Also,
|
|
# only TLSv1.3 cipher suites have names that begin with TLS_, which provides additional
|
|
# assurance that the above match will only succeed if TLSv1.3 was negotiated.
|
|
protocol="TLSv1.3"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$protocol"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# now some function for the integrated BIGIP F5 Cookie detector (see https://github.com/drwetter/F5-BIGIP-Decoder)
|
|
|
|
f5_hex2ip() {
|
|
debugme echo "$1"
|
|
echo $((16#${1:0:2})).$((16#${1:2:2})).$((16#${1:4:2})).$((16#${1:6:2}))
|
|
}
|
|
f5_hex2ip6() {
|
|
debugme echo "$1"
|
|
echo "[${1:0:4}:${1:4:4}:${1:8:4}:${1:12:4}.${1:16:4}:${1:20:4}:${1:24:4}:${1:28:4}]"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f5_determine_routeddomain() {
|
|
local tmp
|
|
tmp="${1%%o*}"
|
|
echo "${tmp/rd/}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f5_ip_oldstyle() {
|
|
local tmp
|
|
local a b c d
|
|
|
|
tmp="${1/%.*}" # until first dot
|
|
tmp="$(printf "%08x" "$tmp")" # convert the whole thing to hex, now back to ip (reversed notation:
|
|
tmp="$(f5_hex2ip $tmp)" # transform to ip with reversed notation
|
|
IFS="." read -r a b c d <<< "$tmp" # reverse it
|
|
echo $d.$c.$b.$a
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f5_port_decode() {
|
|
local tmp
|
|
|
|
tmp="$(strip_lf "$1")" # remove lf if there is one
|
|
tmp="${tmp/.0000/}" # to be sure remove trailing zeros with a dot
|
|
tmp="${tmp#*.}" # get the port
|
|
tmp="$(printf "%04x" "${tmp}")" # to hex
|
|
if [[ ${#tmp} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
:
|
|
elif [[ ${#tmp} -eq 3 ]]; then # fill it up with leading zeros if needed
|
|
tmp=0${tmp}
|
|
elif [[ ${#tmp} -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
tmp=00${tmp}
|
|
fi
|
|
echo $((16#${tmp:2:2}${tmp:0:2})) # reverse order and convert it from hex to dec
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### END universal helper function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
|
|
###### START scoring function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
# Sets the grade cap to ARG1
|
|
# arg1: A grade to set ("A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "M", or "T")
|
|
# arg2: A reason why (e.g. "Vulnerable to CRIME")
|
|
set_grade_cap() {
|
|
"$do_rating" || return 0
|
|
GRADE_CAP_REASONS+=("Grade capped to $1. $2")
|
|
|
|
# Always set special attributes. These are hard caps, due to name mismatch or cert being invalid
|
|
if [[ "$1" == T || "$1" == M ]]; then
|
|
GRADE_CAP="$1"
|
|
# Only keep track of the lowest grade cap, since a higher grade cap won't do anything (F = lowest, A = highest)
|
|
elif [[ ! "$GRADE_CAP" > "$1" ]]; then
|
|
GRADE_CAP="$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Sets a grade warning, as specified by the grade specification
|
|
# arg1: A warning message
|
|
set_grade_warning() {
|
|
"$do_rating" || return 0
|
|
GRADE_WARNINGS+=("$1")
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Sets the score for Category 2 (Key Exchange Strength)
|
|
# arg1: Short key algorithm ("EC", "DH", "RSA", ...), or "DHE" for ephemeral key size
|
|
# arg2: key size (number of bits)
|
|
set_key_str_score() {
|
|
local type=$1
|
|
local size=$2
|
|
|
|
"$do_rating" || return 0
|
|
|
|
if [[ $type == EC || $type == EdDSA ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $size -lt 110 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 20 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=20
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 123 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 40 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=40
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 163 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 80 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=80
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 225 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 90 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=90
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $size -lt 512 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 20 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=20
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 1024 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 40 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=40
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 2048 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 80 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=80
|
|
elif [[ $size -lt 4096 ]] && [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -ge 90 ]]; then
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=90
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Sets the best and worst bit size key, used to grade Category 3 (Cipher Strength)
|
|
# This function itself doesn't actually set a score; its just in the name to keep it logical (score == rating function)
|
|
# arg1: a bit size
|
|
set_ciph_str_score() {
|
|
local size=$1
|
|
|
|
"$do_rating" || return 0
|
|
|
|
[[ $size -gt $CIPH_STR_BEST ]] && CIPH_STR_BEST=$size
|
|
[[ $size -lt $CIPH_STR_WORST ]] && CIPH_STR_WORST=$size
|
|
|
|
[[ $size -lt 112 || $size == None ]] && set_grade_cap "F" "Using cipher suites weaker than 112 bits"
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### END scoring function definitions ######
|
|
|
|
##################### START output file formatting functions #########################
|
|
#################### START JSON file functions ####################
|
|
|
|
fileout_json_footer() {
|
|
if "$do_json"; then
|
|
if [[ "$SCAN_TIME" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
fileout_json_finding "scanTime" "WARN" "Scan interrupted" "" "" ""
|
|
elif [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -lt $LOW ]] ; then
|
|
# no scan time in --severity=low and above, also needed for Travis, hackish...
|
|
fileout_json_finding "scanTime" "INFO" $SCAN_TIME "" "" ""
|
|
fi
|
|
printf "]\n" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$do_pretty_json"; then
|
|
if [[ "$SCAN_TIME" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo -e " ],\n \"scanTime\" : \"Scan interrupted\"\n}" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e " ],\n \"scanTime\" : ${SCAN_TIME}\n}" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_json_section() {
|
|
case $1 in
|
|
0) echo -e " \"pretest\" : [" ;;
|
|
1) echo -e " \"singleCipher\" : [" ;;
|
|
2) echo -e ",\n \"protocols\" : [" ;;
|
|
3) echo -e ",\n \"grease\" : [" ;;
|
|
4) echo -e ",\n \"ciphers\" : [" ;;
|
|
5) echo -e ",\n \"serverPreferences\" : [" ;;
|
|
6) echo -e ",\n \"fs\" : [" ;;
|
|
7) echo -e ",\n \"serverDefaults\" : [" ;;
|
|
8) echo -e ",\n \"headerResponse\" : [" ;;
|
|
9) echo -e ",\n \"vulnerabilities\" : [" ;;
|
|
10) echo -e ",\n \"cipherTests\" : [" ;;
|
|
11) echo -e ",\n \"browserSimulations\": [" ;;
|
|
12) echo -e ",\n \"rating\" : [" ;;
|
|
*) echo "invalid section" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header() {
|
|
local str=""
|
|
"$2" && str="$(fileout_section_footer false)"
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && FIRST_FINDING=true && (printf "%s%s\n" "$str" "$(fileout_json_section "$1")") >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: whether to end object too
|
|
fileout_section_footer() {
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && FIRST_FINDING=false && printf "\n ]" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && "$1" && echo -e "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter() {
|
|
local parameter="$1"
|
|
local filler="$2"
|
|
local value="$3"
|
|
local not_last="$4"
|
|
local spaces=""
|
|
|
|
"$do_json" && \
|
|
spaces=" " || \
|
|
spaces=" "
|
|
if [[ -n "$value" ]] || [[ "$parameter" == finding ]]; then
|
|
printf -- "%b%b%b%b" "$spaces" "\"$parameter\"" "$filler" ": \"$value\"" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
"$not_last" && printf ",\n" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_json_finding() {
|
|
local target
|
|
local finding="$3"
|
|
local cve="$4"
|
|
local cwe="$5"
|
|
local hint="$6"
|
|
|
|
if "$do_json"; then
|
|
"$FIRST_FINDING" || echo -n "," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
echo -e " {" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "id" " " "$1" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "ip" " " "$NODE/$NODEIP" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "port" " " "$PORT" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "severity" " " "$2" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "cve" " " "$cve" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "cwe" " " "$cwe" true
|
|
"$GIVE_HINTS" && fileout_json_print_parameter "hint" " " "$hint" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "finding" " " "$finding" false
|
|
echo -e "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$do_pretty_json"; then
|
|
if [[ "$1" == service ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $SERVER_COUNTER -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
echo " ," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
elif ! "$FIRST_FINDING"; then
|
|
echo -n "," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
target="$NODE"
|
|
$do_mx_all_ips && target="$URI"
|
|
echo -e " {
|
|
\"targetHost\" : \"$target\",
|
|
\"ip\" : \"$NODEIP\",
|
|
\"port\" : \"$PORT\",
|
|
\"rDNS\" : \"$rDNS\",
|
|
\"service\" : \"$finding\"," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
$do_mx_all_ips && echo -e " \"hostname\" : \"$NODE\"," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
("$FIRST_FINDING" && echo -n " {" >> "$JSONFILE") || echo -n ",{" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
echo -e -n "\n" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "id" " " "$1" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "severity" " " "$2" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "cve" " " "$cve" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "cwe" " " "$cwe" true
|
|
"$GIVE_HINTS" && fileout_json_print_parameter "hint" " " "$hint" true
|
|
fileout_json_print_parameter "finding" " " "$finding" false
|
|
echo -e -n "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_pretty_json_banner() {
|
|
local target
|
|
|
|
if ! "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
[[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}"
|
|
# NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR is set now --> wrong place
|
|
target="$NODE"
|
|
$do_mx_all_ips && target="$URI"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo -e " \"Invocation\" : \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\",
|
|
\"at\" : \"$HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION\",
|
|
\"version\" : \"$VERSION $GIT_REL_SHORT\",
|
|
\"openssl\" : \"$OSSL_NAME $OSSL_VER from $OSSL_BUILD_DATE\",
|
|
\"startTime\" : \"$START_TIME\",
|
|
\"scanResult\" : ["
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_banner() {
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
# "$do_json" && # here we maybe should add a banner, too
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && FIRST_FINDING=true && (printf "%s\n" "$(fileout_pretty_json_banner)") >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_separator() {
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && echo " ," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
"$do_json" && echo -n "," >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_footer() {
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
fileout_json_footer
|
|
fi
|
|
# CSV: no footer
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_insert_warning() {
|
|
# See #815. Make sure we don't mess up the JSON PRETTY format if we complain with a client side warning.
|
|
# This should only be called if an *extra* warning will be printed (previously: 'fileout <extra_warning_ID> "WARN" '
|
|
# arg1: json identifier, arg2: normally "WARN", arg3: finding
|
|
#
|
|
# Also, we have to be careful with any form of mass testing so that a warning won't lead to an invalid JSON
|
|
# file. As any child will do any check as well (to be reconsidered later), we don't need also the parent to issue
|
|
# warnings upfront, see #1169. As a detection we'll use --file/-iL as in the children jobs it'll be removed:
|
|
[[ "$CMDLINE=" =~ --file ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ "$CMDLINE=" =~ -iL ]] && return 0
|
|
# Note we still have the message on screen + in HTML which is not as optimal as it could be
|
|
|
|
if "$do_pretty_json" && "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
echo -e " \"clientProblem${CLIENT_PROB_NO}\" : [" >>"$JSONFILE"
|
|
CLIENT_PROB_NO=$((CLIENT_PROB_NO + 1))
|
|
FIRST_FINDING=true # make sure we don't have a comma here
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$1" "$2" "$3"
|
|
if "$do_pretty_json"; then
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
echo -e "\n ]," >>"$JSONFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e ", " >>"$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
FIRST_FINDING=true
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fileout_csv_finding() {
|
|
safe_echo "\"$1\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$2\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$3\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$4\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$5\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$6\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
if "$GIVE_HINTS"; then
|
|
safe_echo "\"$7\"," >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
safe_echo "\"$8\"\n" >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
safe_echo "\"$7\"\n" >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ID, SEVERITY, FINDING, CVE, CWE, HINT
|
|
fileout() {
|
|
local severity="$2"
|
|
local cve="$4"
|
|
local cwe="$5"
|
|
local hint="$6"
|
|
|
|
if ( "$do_pretty_json" && [[ "$1" == service ]] ) || show_finding "$severity"; then
|
|
local finding=$(strip_lf "$(newline_to_spaces "$(strip_quote "$3")")") # additional quotes will mess up screen output
|
|
finding="${finding//\\n/ }"
|
|
[[ -e "$JSONFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$JSONFILE" ]] && fileout_json_finding "$1" "$severity" "$finding" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
"$do_csv" && [[ -n "$CSVFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$CSVFILE" ]] && \
|
|
fileout_csv_finding "$1" "$NODE/$NODEIP" "$PORT" "$severity" "$finding" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
"$FIRST_FINDING" && FIRST_FINDING=false
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
json_header() {
|
|
local fname_prefix
|
|
local filename_provided=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PARENT_JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$JSONFILE" ]] && fatal "Can't write to both $PARENT_JSONFILE and $JSONFILE" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
JSONFILE="$PARENT_JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$JSONFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$JSONFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true
|
|
# Similar to HTML: Don't create headers and footers in the following scenarios:
|
|
# * no JSON/CSV output is being created.
|
|
# * mass testing is being performed and each test will have its own file.
|
|
# * this is an individual test within a mass test and all output is being placed in a single file.
|
|
! "$do_json" && ! "$do_pretty_json" && JSONHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && JSONHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && [[ -n "$PARENT_JSONFILE" ]] && JSONHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
|
|
if "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="local-ciphers"
|
|
elif "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
:
|
|
elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}"
|
|
else
|
|
# ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set
|
|
! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}"
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
JSONFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".json)"
|
|
elif [[ -d "$JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
JSONFILE="$JSONFILE/${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".json)"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created
|
|
if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
APPEND=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$APPEND"; then
|
|
JSONHEADER=false
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -s "$JSONFILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" || fatal "non-empty \"$JSONFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
cp /dev/null "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$do_json" && echo "[" > "$JSONFILE"
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && echo "{" > "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
csv_header() {
|
|
local fname_prefix
|
|
local filename_provided=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PARENT_CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$CSVFILE" ]] && fatal "Can't write to both $PARENT_CSVFILE and $CSVFILE" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
CSVFILE="$PARENT_CSVFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$CSVFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$CSVFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true
|
|
# CSV similar to JSON
|
|
! "$do_csv" && CSVHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && CSVHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && [[ -n "$PARENT_CSVFILE" ]] && CSVHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
|
|
if "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="local-ciphers"
|
|
elif "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
:
|
|
elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}"
|
|
else
|
|
# ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set
|
|
! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}"
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
CSVFILE="${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".csv)"
|
|
elif [[ -d "$CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
CSVFILE="$CSVFILE/${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".csv)"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created
|
|
if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
APPEND=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$APPEND"; then
|
|
CSVHEADER=false
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -s "$CSVFILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" || fatal "non-empty \"$CSVFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
cp /dev/null "$CSVFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
touch "$CSVFILE"
|
|
if "$GIVE_HINTS"; then
|
|
fileout_csv_finding "id" "fqdn/ip" "port" "severity" "finding" "cve" "cwe" "hint"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout_csv_finding "id" "fqdn/ip" "port" "severity" "finding" "cve" "cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
################# END JSON file functions. START HTML functions ####################
|
|
|
|
html_header() {
|
|
local fname_prefix
|
|
local filename_provided=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PARENT_HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$HTMLFILE" ]] && fatal "Can't write to both $PARENT_HTMLFILE and $HTMLFILE" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
HTMLFILE="$PARENT_HTMLFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$HTMLFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$HTMLFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true
|
|
# Don't create HTML headers and footers in the following scenarios:
|
|
# * HTML output is not being created.
|
|
# * mass testing is being performed and each test will have its own HTML file.
|
|
# * this is an individual test within a mass test and all HTML output is being placed in a single file.
|
|
! "$do_html" && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && [[ -n "$PARENT_HTMLFILE" ]] && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0
|
|
|
|
if "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="local-ciphers"
|
|
elif "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
:
|
|
elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}"
|
|
else
|
|
# ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set
|
|
! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}"
|
|
fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
HTMLFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".html)"
|
|
elif [[ -d "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
HTMLFILE="$HTMLFILE/$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".html)"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created
|
|
if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
APPEND=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$APPEND"; then
|
|
HTMLHEADER=false
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -s "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" || fatal "non-empty \"$HTMLFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
cp /dev/null "$HTMLFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
html_out "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" ?>\n"
|
|
html_out "<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN\" \"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd\">\n"
|
|
html_out "<!-- This file was created with testssl.sh. https://testssl.sh -->\n"
|
|
html_out "<html xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\">\n"
|
|
html_out "<head>\n"
|
|
html_out "<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"application/xhtml+xml; charset=UTF-8\" />\n"
|
|
html_out "<title>testssl.sh</title>\n"
|
|
html_out "</head>\n"
|
|
html_out "<body>\n"
|
|
html_out "<pre>\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
html_banner() {
|
|
if "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$HTMLHEADER"; then
|
|
html_out "## Scan started as: \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\"\n"
|
|
html_out "## at $HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION\n"
|
|
html_out "## version testssl: $VERSION ${GIT_REL_SHORT} from $REL_DATE\n"
|
|
html_out "## version openssl: \"$OSSL_NAME $OSSL_VER\" from \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\")\n\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
html_footer() {
|
|
if "$HTMLHEADER"; then
|
|
html_out "</pre>\n"
|
|
html_out "</body>\n"
|
|
html_out "</html>\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
################# END HTML file functions ####################
|
|
|
|
prepare_logging() {
|
|
# arg1: for testing mx records name we put a name of logfile in here, otherwise we get strange file names
|
|
local fname_prefix="$1"
|
|
local filename_provided=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PARENT_LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && fatal "Can't write to both $PARENT_LOGFILE and $LOGFILE" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
LOGFILE="$PARENT_LOGFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$LOGFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true
|
|
|
|
# Similar to html_header():
|
|
! "$do_logging" && return 0
|
|
"$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && return 0
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && [[ -n "$PARENT_LOGFILE" ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$fname_prefix" ]] && fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
LOGFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".log)"
|
|
elif [[ -d "$LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
# actually we were instructed to place all files in a DIR instead of the current working dir
|
|
LOGFILE="$LOGFILE/$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".log)"
|
|
else
|
|
: # just for clarity: a log file was specified, no need to do anything else
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$APPEND"; then
|
|
if [[ -s "$LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" || fatal "non-empty \"$LOGFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
cp /dev/null "$LOGFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tmln_out "## Scan started as: \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\"" >>"$LOGFILE"
|
|
tmln_out "## at $HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION" >>"$LOGFILE"
|
|
tmln_out "## version testssl: $VERSION ${GIT_REL_SHORT} from $REL_DATE" >>"$LOGFILE"
|
|
tmln_out "## version openssl: \"$OSSL_VER\" from \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\")\n" >>"$LOGFILE"
|
|
exec > >(tee -a -i "$LOGFILE")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
################### END all file output functions #########################
|
|
|
|
# prints a string of n spaces (n < 80)
|
|
print_n_spaces() {
|
|
local -i n="$1"
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
|
|
out "${spaces:0:n}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# prints out multiple lines in $1, left aligned by spaces in $2
|
|
out_row_aligned() {
|
|
local first=true
|
|
|
|
while read line; do
|
|
"$first" && \
|
|
first=false || \
|
|
out "$2"
|
|
outln "$line"
|
|
done <<< "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# prints text over multiple lines, trying to make no line longer than $max_width.
|
|
# Each line is indented with $spaces.
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width() {
|
|
local text="$1"
|
|
local spaces="$2"
|
|
local -i max_width="$3"
|
|
local -i i len
|
|
local cr=$'\n'
|
|
local line
|
|
local first=true
|
|
|
|
max_width=$max_width-${#spaces}
|
|
len=${#text}
|
|
while true; do
|
|
if [[ $len -lt $max_width ]]; then
|
|
# If the remaining text to print is shorter than $max_width,
|
|
# then just print it.
|
|
i=$len
|
|
else
|
|
# Find the final space character in the text that is less than
|
|
# $max_width characters into the remaining text, and make the
|
|
# text up to that space character the next line to print.
|
|
line="${text:0:max_width}"
|
|
line="${line% *}"
|
|
i="${#line}"
|
|
if [[ $i -eq $max_width ]]; then
|
|
# If there are no space characters in the first $max_width
|
|
# characters of the remaining text, then make the text up
|
|
# to the first space the next line to print. If there are
|
|
# no space characters in the remaining text, make the
|
|
# remaining text the next line to print.
|
|
line="${text#* }"
|
|
i=$len-${#line}
|
|
[[ $i -eq 0 ]] && i=$len
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$first"; then
|
|
tm_out "${cr}${spaces}"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "${text:0:i}"
|
|
[[ $i -eq $len ]] && break
|
|
len=$len-$i-1
|
|
i+=1
|
|
text="${text:i:len}"
|
|
first=false
|
|
[[ $len -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry() {
|
|
local text="$1"
|
|
local spaces="$2"
|
|
local -i max_width="$3"
|
|
local print_function="$4"
|
|
local resp entry prev_entry=" "
|
|
|
|
resp="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$text" "$spaces" "$max_width")"
|
|
while read -d " " entry; do
|
|
if [[ -n "$entry" ]]; then
|
|
$print_function "$entry"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$prev_entry" ]]; then
|
|
outln; out " "
|
|
fi
|
|
out " "
|
|
prev_entry="$entry"
|
|
done <<< "$resp"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
print_fixed_width() {
|
|
local text="$1"
|
|
local -i len width="$2"
|
|
local print_function="$3"
|
|
|
|
len=${#text}
|
|
$print_function "$text"
|
|
print_n_spaces "$((width-len+1))"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# saves $TMPFILE or file supplied in $2 under name "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1".
|
|
# Note: after finishing $TEMPDIR will be removed unless DEBUG >=1
|
|
tmpfile_handle() {
|
|
local savefile="$2"
|
|
[[ -z "$savefile" ]] && savefile=$TMPFILE
|
|
#FIXME: make sure/find out if we do not need $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1" if debug=0. We would save fs access here
|
|
mv $savefile "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1" 2>/dev/null
|
|
[[ $ERRFILE =~ dev.null ]] && return 0 || \
|
|
mv $ERRFILE "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.${1//.txt/}.errorlog" 2>/dev/null
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: line with comment sign, tabs and so on
|
|
filter_input() {
|
|
sed -e 's/#.*$//' -e '/^$/d' <<< "$1" | tr -d '\n' | tr -d '\t' | tr -d '\r'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Dl's any URL (arg1) via HTTP 1.1 GET from port 80, arg2: file to store http body.
|
|
# Proxy is not honored yet (see cmd line switches) -- except when using curl or wget.
|
|
# There the environment variable is used automatically
|
|
# Currently it is being used by check_revocation_crl() only.
|
|
http_get() {
|
|
local proto z
|
|
local node="" query=""
|
|
local dl="$2"
|
|
local useragent="$UA_STD"
|
|
local jsonID="http_get"
|
|
|
|
"$SNEAKY" && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY"
|
|
|
|
if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
curl -s --noproxy '*' -A $''"$useragent"'' -o $dl "$1"
|
|
else
|
|
# for the sake of simplicity assume the proxy is using http
|
|
curl -s -x $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT -A $''"$useragent"'' -o $dl "$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $?
|
|
elif type -p wget &>/dev/null; then
|
|
# wget has no proxy command line. We need to use http_proxy instead. And for the sake of simplicity
|
|
# assume the GET protocol we query is using http -- http_proxy is the $ENV not for the connection TO
|
|
# the proxy, but for the protocol we query THROUGH the proxy
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
wget --no-proxy -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -z "$http_proxy" ]]; then
|
|
http_proxy=http://$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT wget -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1"
|
|
else
|
|
wget -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return $?
|
|
else
|
|
# Worst option: slower and hiccups with chunked transfers. Workaround for the
|
|
# latter is using HTTP/1.0. We do not support https here, yet.
|
|
# First the URL will be split
|
|
IFS=/ read -r proto z node query <<< "$1"
|
|
proto=${proto%:}
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != http ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "protocol $proto not supported yet"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "protocol $proto not supported yet"
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n $PROXY ]]; then
|
|
# PROXYNODE works better than PROXYIP on modern versions of squid. \
|
|
# We don't reuse the code in fd_socket() as there's initial CONNECT which makes problems
|
|
if ! exec 33<> /dev/tcp/${PROXYNODE}/${PROXYPORT}; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT"
|
|
return 6
|
|
else
|
|
printf -- "%b" "GET $proto://$node/$query HTTP/1.0\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nHost: $node\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n" >&33
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
IFS=/ read -r proto z node query <<< "$1"
|
|
exec 33<>/dev/tcp/$node/80
|
|
printf -- "%b" "GET /$query HTTP/1.0\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nHost: $node\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n" >&33
|
|
fi
|
|
# Strip HTTP header. When in Debug Mode we leave the raw data in place
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
cat <&33 >${dl}.raw
|
|
cat ${dl}.raw | sed '1,/^[[:space:]]*$/d' >${dl}
|
|
else
|
|
cat <&33 | sed '1,/^[[:space:]]*$/d' >${dl}
|
|
fi
|
|
exec 33<&-
|
|
exec 33>&-
|
|
[[ -s "$dl" ]] && return 0 || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Outputs the headers when downloading any URL (arg1) via HTTP 1.1 GET from port 80.
|
|
# Only works if curl or wget is available.
|
|
# There the environment variable is used automatically
|
|
# Currently it is being used by check_pwnedkeys() only.
|
|
http_get_header() {
|
|
local proto
|
|
local node="" query=""
|
|
local dl="$2"
|
|
local useragent="$UA_STD"
|
|
local jsonID="http_get_header"
|
|
local headers
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
|
|
"$SNEAKY" && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY"
|
|
|
|
if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
headers="$(curl --head -s --noproxy '*' -A $''"$useragent"'' "$1")"
|
|
else
|
|
# for the sake of simplicity assume the proxy is using http
|
|
headers="$(curl --head -s -x $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT -A $''"$useragent"'' "$1")"
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$headers"
|
|
return $ret
|
|
elif type -p wget &>/dev/null; then
|
|
# wget has no proxy command line. We need to use http_proxy instead. And for the sake of simplicity
|
|
# assume the GET protocol we query is using http -- http_proxy is the $ENV not for the connection TO
|
|
# the proxy, but for the protocol we query THROUGH the proxy
|
|
if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
headers="$(wget --no-proxy -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -z "$http_proxy" ]]; then
|
|
headers="$(http_proxy=http://$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT wget -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)"
|
|
else
|
|
headers="$(wget -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$headers"
|
|
# wget(1): "8: Server issued an error response.". Happens e.g. when 404 is returned. However also if the call wasn't correct (400)
|
|
# So we assume for now that everything is submitted correctly. We parse the error code too later
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 8 ]] && ret=0 && tm_out "$headers"
|
|
return $ret
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ldap_get() {
|
|
local ldif
|
|
local -i success
|
|
local crl="$1"
|
|
local tmpfile="$2"
|
|
local jsonID="$3"
|
|
|
|
if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then
|
|
# proxy handling?
|
|
ldif="$(curl -s "$crl")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || return 1
|
|
awk '/certificateRevocationList/ { print $2 }' <<< "$ldif" | $OPENSSL base64 -d -A -out "$tmpfile" 2>/dev/null
|
|
[[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] || return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
pr_litecyan " (for LDAP CRL check install \"curl\")"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "LDAP CRL revocation check needs \"curl\""
|
|
return 2
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# checks whether the public key in arg1 appears in the https://pwnedkeys.com/ database.
|
|
# arg1: file containing certificate
|
|
# arg2: public key algorithm
|
|
# arg3 key size
|
|
# Responses are as follows:
|
|
# 0 - not checked
|
|
# 1 - key not found in database
|
|
# 2 - key found in database
|
|
# 7 - network/proxy failure
|
|
check_pwnedkeys() {
|
|
local cert="$1"
|
|
local cert_key_algo="$2"
|
|
local -i cert_keysize="$3"
|
|
local pubkey curve response
|
|
|
|
"$PHONE_OUT" || return 0
|
|
|
|
# https://pwnedkeys.com only keeps records on 1024 bit and larger RSA keys,
|
|
# as well as elliptic-curve keys on the P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves.
|
|
if [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ RSA ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ rsa ]]; then
|
|
[[ $cert_keysize -ge 1024 ]] || return 0
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" == *ecPublicKey ]]; then
|
|
[[ $cert_keysize -eq 256 ]] || [[ $cert_keysize -eq 384 ]] || \
|
|
[[ $cert_keysize -eq 521 ]] || return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pubkey="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
# If it is an elliptic curve key, check that it is P-256, P-384, or P-521.
|
|
if [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" == *ecPublicKey ]]; then
|
|
curve="$($OPENSSL ec -pubin -text <<< "$pubkey" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
curve="${curve#*ASN1 OID: }"
|
|
[[ "$curve" == prime256v1* ]] || [[ "$curve" == secp384r1* ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$curve" == secp521r1* ]] || return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fingerprint="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -outform DER <<< "$pubkey" 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -hex 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
fingerprint="${fingerprint#*= }"
|
|
response="$(http_get_header "https://v1.pwnedkeys.com/$fingerprint")"
|
|
# Handle curl's/wget's connectivity exit codes
|
|
case $? in
|
|
4|5|7) return 7 ;;
|
|
1|2|3|6) return 0 ;;
|
|
# unknown codes we just say "not checked"
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ "$response" =~ "404 Not Found" ]]; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ "200 OK" ]]; then
|
|
return 2
|
|
else
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_revocation_crl() {
|
|
local crl="$1"
|
|
local jsonID="$2"
|
|
local tmpfile=""
|
|
local scheme retcode
|
|
local -i success
|
|
|
|
"$PHONE_OUT" || return 0
|
|
[[ -n "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] || return 0
|
|
scheme="$(tolower "${crl%%://*}")"
|
|
# The code for obtaining CRLs only supports LDAP, HTTP, and HTTPS URLs.
|
|
[[ "$scheme" == http ]] || [[ "$scheme" == https ]] || [[ "$scheme" == ldap ]] || return 0
|
|
tmpfile=$TEMPDIR/${NODE}-${NODEIP}.${crl##*\/} || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
if [[ "$scheme" == ldap ]]; then
|
|
ldap_get "$crl" "$tmpfile" "$jsonID"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
else
|
|
http_get "$crl" "$tmpfile"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ $success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_warning "retrieval of \"$crl\" failed"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "CRL retrieval from $crl failed"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# -crl_download could be more elegant but is supported from 1.0.2 onwards only
|
|
$OPENSSL crl -inform DER -in "$tmpfile" -outform PEM -out "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem" &>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "conversion of \"$tmpfile\" failed"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "conversion of CRL to PEM format failed"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem; then
|
|
$OPENSSL verify -crl_check -CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem") -untrusted $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem $HOSTCERT &> "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err"
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL verify -crl_check -CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem") $HOSTCERT &> "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not revoked"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not revoked"
|
|
else
|
|
retcode=$(awk '/error [1-9][0-9]? at [0-9]+ depth lookup:/ { if (!found) {print $2; found=1} }' "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err")
|
|
if [[ "$retcode" == 23 ]]; then # see verify_retcode_helper()
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "revoked"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "revoked"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Certificate revoked"
|
|
else
|
|
retcode="$(verify_retcode_helper "$retcode")"
|
|
out " $retcode"
|
|
retcode="${retcode#(}"
|
|
retcode="${retcode%)}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$retcode"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Issues with certificate $retcode"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
cat "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_revocation_ocsp() {
|
|
local uri="$1"
|
|
local stapled_response="$2"
|
|
local jsonID="$3"
|
|
local tmpfile=""
|
|
local -i success
|
|
local response=""
|
|
local host_header=""
|
|
|
|
"$PHONE_OUT" || [[ -n "$stapled_response" ]] || return 0
|
|
[[ -n "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] || return 0
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]] && ! "$IGN_OCSP_PROXY"; then
|
|
# see #1106 and https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6965
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_warning "revocation not tested as \"openssl ocsp\" doesn't support a proxy"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Revocation not tested as openssl ocsp doesn't support a proxy"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem || return 0
|
|
tmpfile=$TEMPDIR/${NODE}-${NODEIP}.${uri##*\/} || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
if [[ -n "$stapled_response" ]]; then
|
|
hex2binary "$stapled_response" > "$TEMPDIR/stapled_ocsp_response.dd"
|
|
$OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce -respin "$TEMPDIR/stapled_ocsp_response.dd" \
|
|
-issuer $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem -verify_other $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem \
|
|
-CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE") -cert $HOSTCERT -text &> "$tmpfile"
|
|
else
|
|
host_header=${uri##http://}
|
|
host_header=${host_header%%/*}
|
|
if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then
|
|
host_header="-header Host ${host_header}"
|
|
elif [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.0* ]] || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || \
|
|
[[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]]; then
|
|
host_header="-header Host=${host_header}"
|
|
else
|
|
host_header="-header Host ${host_header}"
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce ${host_header} -url "$uri" \
|
|
-issuer $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem -verify_other $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem \
|
|
-CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE") -cert $HOSTCERT -text &> "$tmpfile"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && grep -Fq "Response verify OK" "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
response="$(grep -F "$HOSTCERT: " "$tmpfile")"
|
|
response="${response#$HOSTCERT: }"
|
|
response="${response%\.}"
|
|
if [[ "$response" =~ good ]]; then
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not revoked"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not revoked"
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ revoked ]]; then
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "revoked"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "revoked"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Certificate revoked"
|
|
else
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_warning "error querying OCSP responder"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$response"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
cat "$tmpfile"
|
|
else
|
|
out " ($response)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] || response="empty ocsp response"
|
|
[[ -z "$response" ]] && response="$(awk '/Responder Error:/ { print $3 }' "$tmpfile")"
|
|
[[ -z "$response" ]] && grep -Fq "Response Verify Failure" "$tmpfile" && response="unable to verify response"
|
|
[[ -z "$response" ]] && response="$(awk -F':' '/Code/ { print $NF }' $tmpfile)"
|
|
out ", "
|
|
pr_warning "error querying OCSP responder"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$response"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
[[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] && cat "$tmpfile" || echo "empty ocsp response"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$response" ]]; then
|
|
out " ($response)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wait_kill(){
|
|
local pid=$1 # pid we wait for or kill
|
|
local maxsleep=$2 # how long we wait before killing
|
|
|
|
HAD_SLEPT=0
|
|
while true; do
|
|
if ! ps $pid >/dev/null ; then
|
|
return 0 # process terminated before didn't reach $maxsleep
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 6 ]] && ps $pid
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
maxsleep=$((maxsleep - 1))
|
|
HAD_SLEPT=$((HAD_SLEPT + 1))
|
|
test $maxsleep -le 0 && break
|
|
done # needs to be killed:
|
|
kill $pid >&2 2>/dev/null
|
|
wait $pid 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p)
|
|
return 3 # means killed
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Convert date formats -- we always use GMT=UTC here
|
|
# argv1: source date string
|
|
# argv2: dest date string
|
|
if "$HAS_GNUDATE"; then # Linux and NetBSD
|
|
parse_date() {
|
|
LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -d "$1" "$2"
|
|
}
|
|
elif "$HAS_FREEBSDDATE"; then # FreeBSD, OS X and newer (~6.6) OpenBSD versions
|
|
parse_date() {
|
|
LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -j -f "$3" "$2" "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
elif "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
# We basically echo it as a conversion as we want it is too difficult. Approach for that would be:
|
|
# printf '%s\n' "$1" | awk '{ printf "%04d%02d%02d\n", $4, $2, (index("JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec",$1)+2)/3}'
|
|
# 4: year, 1: month, 2: day, $3: time (e.g. "Dec 8 10:16:13 2016")
|
|
# This way we could also kind of convert args to epoch but as newer OpenBSDs "date" behave like FreeBSD
|
|
parse_date() {
|
|
local tmp=""
|
|
if [[ $2 == +%s* ]]; then
|
|
echo "${1// GMT}"
|
|
else
|
|
tmp="$(printf '%s\n' "$1" | awk '{ printf "%04d-%02d-%02d %08s\n", $4, (index("JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec",$1)+2)/3, $2, $3 }')"
|
|
echo "${tmp%:*}" # remove seconds, result now is in line with GNU date 2016-12-08 10:16
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
parse_date() {
|
|
LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -j "$2" "$1"
|
|
}
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Print $arg1 in binary format. arg1: An ASCII-HEX string
|
|
# The string represented by $arg1 may be binary data (a certificate or public
|
|
# key) or a text string (e.g., ASCII-encoded text).
|
|
hex2binary() {
|
|
local s="$1"
|
|
local -i i len remainder
|
|
|
|
len=${#s}
|
|
[[ $len%2 -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_XXD"; then
|
|
xxd -r -p <<< "$s"
|
|
else
|
|
for (( i=0; i <= len-16 ; i+=16 )); do
|
|
printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}\x${s:$((i+8)):2}\x${s:$((i+10)):2}\x${s:$((i+12)):2}\x${s:$((i+14)):2}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
remainder=$((len-i))
|
|
case $remainder in
|
|
2) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}" ;;
|
|
4) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}" ;;
|
|
6) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}" ;;
|
|
8) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}" ;;
|
|
10) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}\x${s:$((i+8)):2}" ;;
|
|
12) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}\x${s:$((i+8)):2}\x${s:$((i+10)):2}" ;;
|
|
14) printf -- "\x${s:i:2}\x${s:$((i+2)):2}\x${s:$((i+4)):2}\x${s:$((i+6)):2}\x${s:$((i+8)):2}\x${s:$((i+10)):2}\x${s:$((i+12)):2}" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# convert 414243 into ABC
|
|
hex2ascii() {
|
|
hex2binary $1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: text string
|
|
# Output a comma-separated ASCII-HEX string representation of the input string.
|
|
string_to_asciihex() {
|
|
local string="$1"
|
|
local -i i eos
|
|
local output=""
|
|
|
|
eos=${#string}-1
|
|
for (( i=0; i<eos; i++ )); do
|
|
output+="$(printf "%02x," "'${string:i:1}")"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -n "$string" ]] && output+="$(printf "%02x" "'${string:eos:1}")"
|
|
tm_out "$output"
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Adjust options to $OPENSSL s_client based on OpenSSL version and protocol version
|
|
s_client_options() {
|
|
local options=" $1"
|
|
local ciphers="notpresent" tls13_ciphers="notpresent"
|
|
|
|
# Extract the TLSv1.3 ciphers and the non-TLSv1.3 ciphers
|
|
if [[ " $options " =~ \ -cipher\ ]]; then
|
|
ciphers="${options#* -cipher }"
|
|
ciphers="${ciphers%% *}"
|
|
options="${options//-cipher $ciphers/}"
|
|
ciphers="${ciphers##\'}"
|
|
ciphers="${ciphers%%\'}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ " $options " =~ \ -ciphersuites\ ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers="${options#* -ciphersuites }"
|
|
tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers%% *}"
|
|
options="${options//-ciphersuites $tls13_ciphers/}"
|
|
tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers##\'}"
|
|
tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers%%\'}"
|
|
[[ "$tls13_ciphers" == ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Don't include the -servername option for an SSLv2 or SSLv3 ClientHello.
|
|
[[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ " $options " =~ \ -ssl[2|3]\ ]] && options="${options//$SNI/}"
|
|
|
|
# The server_name extension should not be included in the ClientHello unless
|
|
# the -servername option is provided. However, OpenSSL 1.1.1 will include the
|
|
# server_name extension unless the -noservername option is provided. So, if
|
|
# the command line doesn't include -servername and the -noservername option is
|
|
# supported, then add -noservername to the options.
|
|
"$HAS_NOSERVERNAME" && [[ ! " $options " =~ \ -servername\ ]] && options+=" -noservername"
|
|
|
|
# Newer versions of OpenSSL have dropped support for the -no_ssl2 option, so
|
|
# remove any -no_ssl2 option if the option isn't supported. (Since versions of
|
|
# OpenSSL that don't support -no_ssl2 also don't support SSLv2, the option
|
|
# isn't needed for these versions of OpenSSL.)
|
|
! "$HAS_NO_SSL2" && options="${options//-no_ssl2/}"
|
|
|
|
# The -enable_pha option causes the Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be sent.
|
|
# It is only supported by OpenSSL 1.1.1 and newer.
|
|
! "$HAS_ENABLE_PHA" && options="${options//-enable_pha/}"
|
|
|
|
# At least one server will fail under some circumstances if compression methods are offered.
|
|
# So, only offer compression methods if necessary for the test. In OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
|
|
# 1.1.1 compression is only offered if the "-comp" option is provided.
|
|
# OpenSSL 1.0.0, 1.0.1, and 1.0.2 offer compression unless the "-no_comp" option is provided.
|
|
# OpenSSL 0.9.8 does not support either the "-comp" or the "-no_comp" option.
|
|
if [[ " $options " =~ \ -comp\ ]]; then
|
|
# Compression is needed for the test. So, remove "-comp" if it isn't supported, but
|
|
# otherwise make no changes.
|
|
! "$HAS_COMP" && options="${options//-comp/}"
|
|
else
|
|
# Compression is not needed. So, specify "-no_comp" if that option is supported.
|
|
"$HAS_NO_COMP" && options+=" -no_comp"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If $OPENSSL is compiled with TLSv1.3 support and s_client is called without
|
|
# specifying a protocol, but specifying a list of ciphers that doesn't include
|
|
# any TLSv1.3 ciphers, then the command will always fail. So, if $OPENSSL supports
|
|
# TLSv1.3 and a cipher list is provided, but no protocol is specified, then add
|
|
# -no_tls1_3 if no TLSv1.3 ciphers are provided.
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] && \
|
|
( [[ "$tls13_ciphers" == notpresent ]] || [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers" ]] ) && \
|
|
[[ ! " $options " =~ \ -ssl[2|3]\ ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! " $options " =~ \ -tls1\ ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! " $options " =~ \ -tls1_[1|2|3]\ ]]; then
|
|
options+=" -no_tls1_3"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_SECLEVEL"; then
|
|
if [[ "$ciphers" == notpresent ]]; then
|
|
[[ ! " $options " =~ \ -tls1_3\ ]] && ciphers="@SECLEVEL=0:ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers="@SECLEVEL=0:$ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] || [[ "$tls13_ciphers" != notpresent ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
[[ "$ciphers" == notpresent ]] && ciphers=""
|
|
[[ "$tls13_ciphers" == notpresent ]] && tls13_ciphers=""
|
|
[[ -n "$ciphers" ]] && [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]] && ciphers=":$ciphers"
|
|
ciphers="$tls13_ciphers$ciphers"
|
|
options+=" -cipher $ciphers"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] && [[ -n "$ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
options+=" -cipher $ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tls13_ciphers" != notpresent ]] && [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
options+=" -ciphersuites $tls13_ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# OpenSSL's name for secp256r1 is prime256v1. So whenever we encounter this
|
|
# (e.g. client simulations) we replace it with the name which OpenSSL understands
|
|
# This shouldn't be needed. We have this here as a last resort
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ \ -curves\ ]]; then
|
|
! "$HAS_CURVES" && options="${options// -curves / -groups }"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ secp192r1 ]] && options="${options//secp192r1/prime192v1}"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ secp256r1 ]] && options="${options//secp256r1/prime256v1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# $keyopts may be set as an environment variable to enable client authentication (see PR #1383)
|
|
tm_out "$options $keyopts"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###### check code starts here ######
|
|
|
|
# determines whether the port has an HTTP service running or not (plain TLS, no STARTTLS)
|
|
# arg1 could be the protocol determined as "working". IIS6 needs that.
|
|
#
|
|
service_detection() {
|
|
local -i was_killed
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
# Using sockets is a lot slower than using OpenSSL, and it is
|
|
# not as reliable, but if OpenSSL can't connect to the server,
|
|
# trying with sockets is better than not even trying.
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "" "" false
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
plaintext="$(tm_out "$GET_REQ11" | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
plaintext="${plaintext%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
send_app_data "$plaintext"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
receive_app_data true
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || > "$TMPFILE"
|
|
else
|
|
> "$TMPFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
send_close_notify "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
else
|
|
> "$TMPFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# SNI is not standardized for !HTTPS but fortunately for other protocols s_client doesn't seem to care
|
|
tm_out "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$1 -quiet $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
was_killed=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
head $TMPFILE | grep -aq '^HTTP\/' && SERVICE=HTTP
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -waq "SMTP|ESMTP|Exim|IdeaSmtpServer|Kerio Connect|Postfix" && SERVICE=SMTP # I know some overlap here
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Ewaq "POP|Gpop|MailEnable POP3 Server|OK Dovecot|Cyrus POP3" && SERVICE=POP # I know some overlap here
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Ewaq "IMAP|IMAP4|Cyrus IMAP4IMAP4rev1|IMAP4REV1|Gimap" && SERVICE=IMAP # I know some overlap here
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -aq FTP && SERVICE=FTP
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqi "jabber|xmpp" && SERVICE=XMPP
|
|
[[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqw "Jive News|InterNetNews|NNRP|INN|Kerio Connect|NNTP Service|Kerio MailServer|NNTP server" && SERVICE=NNTP
|
|
# MongoDB port 27017 will respond to a GET request with a mocked HTTP response
|
|
[[ "$SERVICE" == HTTP ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqw "MongoDB" && SERVICE=MongoDB
|
|
debugme head -50 $TMPFILE | sed -e '/<HTML>/,$d' -e '/<html>/,$d' -e '/<XML/,$d' -e '/<xml/,$d' -e '/<\?XML/,$d' -e '/<\?xml/,$d' -e '/<\!DOCTYPE/,$d' -e '/<\!doctype/,$d'
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out " Service detected: $CORRECT_SPACES"
|
|
jsonID="service"
|
|
case $SERVICE in
|
|
HTTP)
|
|
out " $SERVICE"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "$SERVICE"
|
|
;;
|
|
IMAP|POP|SMTP|NNTP|MongoDB)
|
|
out " $SERVICE, thus skipping HTTP specific checks"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "$SERVICE, thus skipping HTTP specific checks"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]]; then
|
|
out " certificate-based authentication => skipping all HTTP checks"
|
|
echo "certificate-based authentication => skipping all HTTP checks" >$TMPFILE
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "certificate-based authentication => skipping all HTTP checks"
|
|
else
|
|
out " Couldn't determine what's running on port $PORT"
|
|
if "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
SERVICE=HTTP
|
|
out " -- ASSUME_HTTP set though"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "DEBUG" "Couldn't determine service -- ASSUME_HTTP set"
|
|
else
|
|
out ", assuming no HTTP service => skipping all HTTP checks"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "DEBUG" "Couldn't determine service, skipping all HTTP checks"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# 1: counter variable
|
|
# 2: threshold for this variable
|
|
# 3: string for first occurrence of problem
|
|
# 4: string for repeated occurrence of problem
|
|
#
|
|
connectivity_problem() {
|
|
if [[ $1 -lt $2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY" && ! "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
:
|
|
else
|
|
prln_warning " Oops: $3"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $1 -ge $2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$4" =~ openssl\ s_client\ connect ]] ; then
|
|
fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT "Consider increasing MAX_OSSL_FAIL (currently: $2)"
|
|
elif [[ "$4" =~ repeated\ TCP\ connect ]]; then
|
|
fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT "Consider increasing MAX_SOCKET_FAIL (currently: $2)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#problems not handled: chunked
|
|
run_http_header() {
|
|
local header
|
|
local referer useragent
|
|
local url redirect
|
|
local jsonID="HTTP_status_code"
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
|
|
HEADERFILE=$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.http_header.txt
|
|
if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# skip repeating this line if it's 2nd, 3rd,.. try
|
|
outln; pr_headlineln " Testing HTTP header response @ \"$URL_PATH\" "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -ge $MAX_HEADER_FAIL ]]; then
|
|
# signal to caller we have a problem
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " HTTP Status Code "
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && url="/" || url="$1"
|
|
tm_out "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$HEADERFILE 2>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Issue HTTP GET again as it properly finished within $HEADER_MAXSLEEP and didn't hang.
|
|
# Doing it again in the foreground to get an accurate header time
|
|
tm_out "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$HEADERFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
NOW_TIME=$(date "+%s")
|
|
HTTP_TIME=$(awk -F': ' '/^date:/ { print $2 } /^Date:/ { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE)
|
|
HTTP_AGE=$(awk -F': ' '/^[aA][gG][eE]: / { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE)
|
|
HAD_SLEPT=0
|
|
else
|
|
# 1st GET request hung and needed to be killed. Check whether it succeeded anyway:
|
|
if grep -Eiaq "XML|HTML|DOCTYPE|HTTP|Connection" $HEADERFILE; then
|
|
# correct by seconds we slept, HAD_SLEPT comes from wait_kill()
|
|
NOW_TIME=$(($(date "+%s") - HAD_SLEPT))
|
|
HTTP_TIME=$(awk -F': ' '/^date:/ { print $2 } /^Date:/ { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE)
|
|
HTTP_AGE=$(awk -F': ' '/^[aA][gG][eE]: / { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE)
|
|
else
|
|
prln_warning " likely HTTP header requests failed (#lines: $(wc -l $HEADERFILE | awk '{ print $1 }'))"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -lt 1 ]] && outln "Rerun with DEBUG>=1 and inspect $HEADERFILE\n"
|
|
fileout "HTTP_status_code" "WARN" "HTTP header request failed"
|
|
debugme cat $HEADERFILE
|
|
((NR_HEADER_FAIL++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
((NR_HEADER_FAIL++))
|
|
if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -ge $MAX_HEADER_FAIL ]]; then
|
|
# Now, try to give a hint whether it would make sense to try with OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1 instead
|
|
if [[ $CURVES_OFFERED == X448 ]] && ! "$HAS_X448" ; then
|
|
generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X448 curve." "${spaces}OpenSSL 1.1.1 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section."
|
|
elif [[ $CURVES_OFFERED == X25519 ]] && ! "$HAS_X25519" ; then
|
|
generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X25519 curve." "${spaces}OpenSSL 1.1.0 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section."
|
|
elif [[ $CURVES_OFFERED =~ X25519 ]] && [[ $CURVES_OFFERED =~ X448 ]] && ! "$HAS_X25519" && ! "$HAS_X448"; then
|
|
generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X25519/X448 curves." "${spaces}OpenSSL >=1.1.0 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section."
|
|
else
|
|
# we could give more hints but these are the most likely cases
|
|
generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero." "Skipping complete HTTP header section."
|
|
fi
|
|
KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=true
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "HTTP header reply empty. "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "HTTP header reply empty"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Populate vars for HTTP time
|
|
[[ -n "$HTTP_AGE" ]] && HTTP_AGE="$(strip_lf "$HTTP_AGE")"
|
|
[[ -n "$HTTP_TIME" ]] && HTTP_TIME="$(strip_lf "$HTTP_TIME")"
|
|
debugme echo "NOW_TIME: $NOW_TIME | HTTP_AGE: $HTTP_AGE | HTTP_TIME: $HTTP_TIME"
|
|
|
|
# Quit on first empty line to catch 98% of the cases. Next pattern is there because the SEDs tested
|
|
# so far seem not to be fine with header containing x0d x0a (CRLF) which is the usual case.
|
|
# So we also trigger also on any sign on a single line which is not alphanumeric (plus _)
|
|
sed -e '/^$/q' -e '/^[^a-zA-Z_0-9]$/q' $HEADERFILE >$HEADERFILE.tmp
|
|
# Now to be more sure we delete from '<' or '{' maybe with a leading blank until the end
|
|
sed -e '/^ *<.*$/d' -e '/^ *{.*$/d' $HEADERFILE.tmp >$HEADERFILE
|
|
debugme echo -e "---\n $(< $HEADERFILE) \n---"
|
|
|
|
HTTP_STATUS_CODE=$(awk '/^HTTP\// { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE 2>>$ERRFILE)
|
|
msg_thereafter=$(awk -F"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" '/^HTTP\// { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE 2>>$ERRFILE) # dirty trick to use the status code as a
|
|
msg_thereafter=$(strip_lf "$msg_thereafter") # field separator, otherwise we need a loop with awk
|
|
debugme echo "Status/MSG: $HTTP_STATUS_CODE $msg_thereafter"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" ]] && out " $HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter"
|
|
case $HTTP_STATUS_CODE in
|
|
301|302|307|308)
|
|
redirect=$(grep -a '^Location' $HEADERFILE | sed 's/Location: //' | tr -d '\r\n')
|
|
out ", redirecting to \""; pr_url "$redirect"; out "\""
|
|
if [[ $redirect =~ http:// ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high " -- Redirect to insecure URL (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "insecure_redirect" "HIGH" "Redirect to insecure URL: \"$redirect\""
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")"
|
|
;;
|
|
200|204|403|405)
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")"
|
|
;;
|
|
206)
|
|
out " -- WHAT?"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- WHAT?"
|
|
# partial content shouldn't happen
|
|
;;
|
|
400)
|
|
pr_cyan " (Hint: better try another URL)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- better try another URL"
|
|
;;
|
|
401)
|
|
grep -aq "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE && out " "; out "$(strip_lf "$(grep -a "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE)")"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- $(grep -a "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE)"
|
|
;;
|
|
404)
|
|
out " (Hint: supply a path which doesn't give a \"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter\")"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")"
|
|
;;
|
|
"")
|
|
prln_warning "No HTTP status code."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "No HTTP status code"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
pr_warning ". Oh, didn't expect \"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Unexpected $HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter @ \"$URL_PATH\""
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
# we don't call "tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt" as we need the header file in other functions!
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Borrowed from Glenn Jackman, see https://unix.stackexchange.com/users/4667/glenn-jackman
|
|
#
|
|
match_ipv4_httpheader() {
|
|
local octet="(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])"
|
|
local ipv4address="$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet"
|
|
local excluded_header="pagespeed|page-speed|^Content-Security-Policy|^MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices|^X-OWA-Version|^Location|^Server: "
|
|
local your_ip_msg="(check if it's your IP address or e.g. a cluster IP)"
|
|
local headers result
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local jsonID="ipv4_in_header"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-212"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Exclude some headers as they are mistakenly identified as ipv4 address. Issues #158, #323.
|
|
# Also facebook used to have a CSP rule for 127.0.0.1
|
|
headers="$(grep -Evai "$excluded_header" $HEADERFILE)"
|
|
if [[ "$headers" =~ $ipv4address ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " IPv4 address in header "
|
|
while read line; do
|
|
[[ "$line" =~ $ipv4address ]] || continue
|
|
result=$(strip_lf "$line")
|
|
if ! $first; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
your_ip_msg=""
|
|
else
|
|
first=false
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$result"
|
|
outln "\n$spaces$your_ip_msg"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "$result $your_ip_msg" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
done <<< "$headers"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_http_date() {
|
|
local difftime
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
jsonID="HTTP_clock_skew"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] || [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " HTTP clock skew "
|
|
if [[ -n "$HTTP_TIME" ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
# We won't normalize the date under an OpenBSD thus no subtraction is feasible
|
|
outln "remote: $HTTP_TIME"
|
|
out "${spaces}local: $(LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date "+%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z")"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_TIME - $(TZ=GMT date "+%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z")"
|
|
else
|
|
# modifying the global from string to a number
|
|
HTTP_TIME="$(parse_date "$HTTP_TIME" "+%s" "%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z" 2>>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
difftime=$((HTTP_TIME + HTTP_AGE - NOW_TIME))
|
|
[[ $difftime != "-"* ]] && [[ $difftime != "0" ]] && difftime="+$difftime"
|
|
# process was killed, so we need to add an error
|
|
[[ $HAD_SLEPT -ne 0 ]] && difftime="$difftime (± 1.5)"
|
|
out "$difftime sec from localtime";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$difftime seconds from localtime"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$HTTP_TIME" ]]; then
|
|
# out " (HTTP header time: $HTTP_TIME)"
|
|
fileout "HTTP_headerTime" "INFO" "$HTTP_TIME"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$HTTP_AGE" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_bold " HTTP Age"
|
|
out " (RFC 7234) $HTTP_AGE"
|
|
fileout "HTTP_headerAge" "INFO" "$HTTP_AGE seconds"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
out "Got no HTTP time, maybe try different URL?";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "Got no HTTP time, maybe try different URL?"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tm_out ", HTTP_TIME + HTTP_AGE in epoch: $HTTP_TIME / $HTTP_AGE"
|
|
outln
|
|
match_ipv4_httpheader "$1"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# HEADERFILE needs to contain the HTTP header (made sure by invoker)
|
|
# arg1: key=word to match
|
|
# arg2: hint for fileout() if double header
|
|
# arg3: indentation, i.e string w spaces
|
|
# arg4: whether we need a CR before "misconfiguration"
|
|
# returns:
|
|
# 0 if header not found
|
|
# 1-n nr of headers found, then in HEADERVALUE the first value from key
|
|
#
|
|
match_httpheader_key() {
|
|
local key="$1"
|
|
local spaces="$3"
|
|
local first=$4
|
|
local -i nr=0
|
|
|
|
nr=$(grep -Eaic "^ *$key:" $HEADERFILE)
|
|
if [[ $nr -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
HEADERVALUE=""
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ $nr -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(grep -Eia "^ *$key:" $HEADERFILE)"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="${HEADERVALUE#*:}" # remove leading part=key to colon
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(strip_lf "$HEADERVALUE")"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(strip_leading_space "$HEADERVALUE")"
|
|
"$first" || out "$spaces"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
"$first" || out "$spaces"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "misconfiguration: "
|
|
pr_italic "$key"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium " ${nr}x"
|
|
outln " -- checking first one only"
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(grep -Fai "$key:" $HEADERFILE | head -1)"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="${HEADERVALUE#*:}"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(strip_lf "$HEADERVALUE")"
|
|
HEADERVALUE="$(strip_leading_space "$HEADERVALUE")"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && tm_italic "$HEADERVALUE" && tm_out "\n$spaces"
|
|
fileout "${2}_multiple" "MEDIUM" "Multiple $2 headers. Using first header: $HEADERVALUE"
|
|
return $nr
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
includeSubDomains() {
|
|
if grep -aiqw includeSubDomains "$1"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good ", includeSubDomains"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
pr_litecyan ", just this domain"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
preload() {
|
|
if grep -aiqw preload "$1"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good ", preload"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_hsts() {
|
|
local hsts_age_sec
|
|
local hsts_age_days
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local jsonID="HSTS"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Strict Transport Security "
|
|
match_httpheader_key "Strict-Transport-Security" "HSTS" "$spaces" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "$HEADERVALUE" >$TMPFILE
|
|
hsts_age_sec="${HEADERVALUE//[^0-9]/}"
|
|
debugme echo "hsts_age_sec: $hsts_age_sec"
|
|
if [[ -n $hsts_age_sec ]]; then
|
|
hsts_age_days=$(( hsts_age_sec / 86400))
|
|
else
|
|
hsts_age_days=-1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $hsts_age_days -eq -1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "misconfiguration: HSTS max-age (recommended > $HSTS_MIN seconds = $((HSTS_MIN/86400)) days ) is required but missing"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "MEDIUM" "misconfiguration, parameter max-age (recommended > $HSTS_MIN seconds = $((HSTS_MIN/86400)) days) missing"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "HSTS max-age is misconfigured"
|
|
elif [[ $hsts_age_sec -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "HSTS max-age is set to 0. HSTS is disabled"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "LOW" "0. HSTS is disabled"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "HSTS is disabled"
|
|
elif [[ $hsts_age_sec -ge $HSTS_MIN ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hsts_age_days days" ; out "=$hsts_age_sec s"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "OK" "$hsts_age_days days (=$hsts_age_sec seconds) > $HSTS_MIN seconds"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$hsts_age_sec s = $hsts_age_days days is too short ( >= $HSTS_MIN seconds recommended)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_time" "MEDIUM" "max-age too short. $hsts_age_days days (=$hsts_age_sec seconds) < $HSTS_MIN seconds"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "HSTS max-age is too short"
|
|
fi
|
|
if includeSubDomains "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_subdomains" "OK" "includes subdomains"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_subdomains" "INFO" "only for this domain"
|
|
fi
|
|
if preload "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_preload" "OK" "domain IS marked for preloading"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_preload" "INFO" "domain is NOT marked for preloading"
|
|
#FIXME: To be checked against preloading lists,
|
|
# e.g. https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/manager/boot/src/nsSTSPreloadList.inc
|
|
# https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_low "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "not offered"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "HSTS is not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_hpkp() {
|
|
local -i hpkp_age_sec
|
|
local -i hpkp_age_days
|
|
local -i hpkp_nr_keys
|
|
local hpkp_spki hpkp_spki_hostcert
|
|
local -a backup_spki
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local spaces_indented=" "
|
|
local certificate_found=false
|
|
local -i i nrsaved
|
|
local first_hpkp_header
|
|
local spki
|
|
local ca_hashes="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/ca_hashes.txt"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Public Key Pinning "
|
|
grep -aiw '^Public-Key-Pins' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE # TMPFILE includes report-only
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE) -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "Misconfiguration, multiple Public-Key-Pins headers"
|
|
outln ", taking first line"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_error" "MEDIUM" "multiple Public-Key-Pins in header"
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE | head -1)"
|
|
# we only evaluate the keys here, unless they a not present
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
elif [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE) -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
outln "Multiple HPKP headers (Report-Only), taking first line"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_notice" "INFO" "multiple Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only in header"
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE | head -1)"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
elif [[ $(grep -Eaci '^Public-Key-Pins:|^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE) -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
outln "Public-Key-Pins + Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only detected. Continue with first one"
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
elif [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE) -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "Public-Key-Pins-Only detected"
|
|
first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "INFO" "Only Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# remove leading Public-Key-Pins* and convert it to multiline arg
|
|
sed -e 's/Public-Key-Pins://g' -e s'/Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only://' <<< "$first_hpkp_header" | \
|
|
tr ';' '\n' | sed -e 's/\"//g' -e 's/^ //' >$TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
hpkp_nr_keys=$(grep -ac pin-sha $TMPFILE)
|
|
if [[ $hpkp_nr_keys -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "Only one key pinned (NOT ok), means the site may become unavailable in the future, "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "HIGH" "Only one key pinned"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_nr_keys"
|
|
out " keys, "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "OK" "$hpkp_nr_keys keys pinned in header"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# print key=value pair with awk, then strip non-numbers, to be improved with proper parsing of key-value with awk
|
|
if "$HAS_SED_E"; then
|
|
hpkp_age_sec=$(awk -F= '/max-age/{max_age=$2; print max_age}' $TMPFILE | sed -E 's/[^[:digit:]]//g')
|
|
else
|
|
hpkp_age_sec=$(awk -F= '/max-age/{max_age=$2; print max_age}' $TMPFILE | sed -r 's/[^[:digit:]]//g')
|
|
fi
|
|
hpkp_age_days=$((hpkp_age_sec / 86400))
|
|
if [[ $hpkp_age_sec -ge $HPKP_MIN ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_age_days days" ; out "=$hpkp_age_sec s"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_age" "OK" "HPKP age is set to $hpkp_age_days days ($hpkp_age_sec sec)"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$hpkp_age_sec s = "
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$hpkp_age_days days (< $HPKP_MIN s = $((HPKP_MIN / 86400)) days is not good enough)"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_age" "MEDIUM" "age is set to $hpkp_age_days days ($hpkp_age_sec sec) < $HPKP_MIN s = $((HPKP_MIN / 86400)) days is not good enough."
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if includeSubDomains "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
fileout "HPKP_subdomains" "INFO" "is valid for subdomains as well"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "HPKP_subdomains" "INFO" "is valid for this domain only"
|
|
fi
|
|
if preload "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
fileout "HPKP_preload" "INFO" "IS marked for browser preloading"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "HPKP_preload" "INFO" "NOT marked for browser preloading"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Get the SPKIs first
|
|
spki=$(tr ';' '\n' < $TMPFILE | tr -d ' ' | tr -d '\"' | awk -F'=' '/pin.*=/ { print $2 }')
|
|
debugme tmln_out "\n$spki"
|
|
|
|
# Look at the host certificate first
|
|
if [[ ! -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then
|
|
get_host_cert || return 1
|
|
# no host certificate
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
hpkp_spki_hostcert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null | grep -v PUBLIC | \
|
|
$OPENSSL base64 -d 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -binary 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL base64 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
hpkp_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -issuer -noout 2>/dev/null |sed 's/^.*CN=//' | sed 's/\/.*$//')"
|
|
|
|
# Get keys/hashes from intermediate certificates
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
# Place the server's certificate in $HOSTCERT and any intermediate
|
|
# certificates that were provided in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
# https://backreference.org/2010/05/09/ocsp-verification-with-openssl/
|
|
awk -v n=-1 "/Certificate chain/ {start=1}
|
|
/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} }
|
|
inc { print > (\"$TEMPDIR/level\" n \".crt\") }
|
|
/---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }" $TMPFILE
|
|
nrsaved=$(count_words "$(echo $TEMPDIR/level?.crt 2>/dev/null)")
|
|
rm $TEMPDIR/level0.crt 2>/dev/null
|
|
|
|
printf ""> "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes"
|
|
if [[ $nrsaved -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
for cert_fname in $TEMPDIR/level?.crt; do
|
|
hpkp_spki_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert_fname" -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null | grep -v PUBLIC | $OPENSSL base64 -d 2>/dev/null |
|
|
$OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -binary 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL enc -base64 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
hpkp_name="$(get_cn_from_cert $cert_fname)"
|
|
hpkp_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $cert_fname -issuer -noout 2>/dev/null |sed 's/^.*CN=//' | sed 's/\/.*$//')"
|
|
[[ -n $hpkp_name ]] || hpkp_name=$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert_fname" -subject -noout 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^subject= //')
|
|
echo "$hpkp_spki_ca $hpkp_name" >> "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# This is where the matching magic starts. First host, intermediate, then root certificate from the supplied stores
|
|
spki_match=false
|
|
has_backup_spki=false
|
|
i=0
|
|
for hpkp_spki in $spki; do
|
|
certificate_found=false
|
|
# compare collected SPKIs against the host certificate
|
|
if [[ "$hpkp_spki_hostcert" == "$hpkp_spki" ]] || [[ "$hpkp_spki_hostcert" == "$hpkp_spki=" ]]; then
|
|
certificate_found=true # We have a match
|
|
spki_match=true
|
|
out "\n$spaces_indented Host cert: "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "OK" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches the host certificate"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tm_out "\n $hpkp_spki | $hpkp_spki_hostcert"
|
|
|
|
# Check for intermediate match
|
|
if ! "$certificate_found"; then
|
|
hpkp_matches=$(grep "$hpkp_spki" $TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes 2>/dev/null)
|
|
if [[ -n $hpkp_matches ]]; then # hpkp_matches + hpkp_spki + '='
|
|
# We have a match
|
|
certificate_found=true
|
|
spki_match=true
|
|
out "\n$spaces_indented Sub CA: "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki"
|
|
ca_cn="$(sed "s/^[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< $"$hpkp_matches" )"
|
|
pr_italic " $ca_cn"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "OK" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Intermediate CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned in the HPKP header"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# we compare now against a precompiled list of SPKIs against the ROOT CAs we have in $ca_hashes
|
|
if ! "$certificate_found"; then
|
|
hpkp_matches=$(grep -h "$hpkp_spki" $ca_hashes 2>/dev/null | sort -u)
|
|
if [[ -n $hpkp_matches ]]; then
|
|
certificate_found=true # root CA found
|
|
spki_match=true
|
|
if [[ $(count_lines "$hpkp_matches") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
# replace by awk
|
|
match_ca=$(sed "s/[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< "$hpkp_matches")
|
|
else
|
|
match_ca=""
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
ca_cn="$(sed "s/^[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< $"$hpkp_matches" )"
|
|
if [[ "$match_ca" == "$hpkp_ca" ]]; then # part of the chain
|
|
out "\n$spaces_indented Root CA: "
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki"
|
|
pr_italic " $ca_cn"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Root CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned. (Root CA part of the chain)"
|
|
else # not part of chain
|
|
match_ca=""
|
|
has_backup_spki=true # Root CA outside the chain --> we save it for unmatched
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Root CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned. (Root backup SPKI)"
|
|
backup_spki[i]="$(strip_lf "$hpkp_spki")" # save it for later
|
|
backup_spki_str[i]="$ca_cn" # also the name=CN of the root CA
|
|
i=$((i + 1))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# still no success --> it's probably a backup SPKI
|
|
if ! "$certificate_found"; then
|
|
# Most likely a backup SPKI, unfortunately we can't tell for what it is: host, intermediates
|
|
has_backup_spki=true
|
|
backup_spki[i]="$(strip_lf "$hpkp_spki")" # save it for later
|
|
backup_spki_str[i]="" # no root ca
|
|
i=$((i + 1))
|
|
fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki doesn't match anything. This is ok for a backup for any certificate"
|
|
# CSV/JSON output here for the sake of simplicity, rest we do en bloc below
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# now print every backup spki out we saved before
|
|
out "\n$spaces_indented Backups: "
|
|
|
|
# for i=0 manually do the same as below as there's other indentation here
|
|
if [[ -n "${backup_spki_str[0]}" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "${backup_spki[0]}"
|
|
#out " Root CA: "
|
|
prln_italic " ${backup_spki_str[0]}"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "${backup_spki[0]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# now for i=1
|
|
for ((i=1; i < ${#backup_spki[@]} ;i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ -n "${backup_spki_str[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
# it's a Root CA outside the chain
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$spaces_indented ${backup_spki[i]}"
|
|
#out " Root CA: "
|
|
prln_italic " ${backup_spki_str[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$spaces_indented ${backup_spki[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ ! -f "$ca_hashes" ]] && "$spki_match"; then
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
prln_warning "Attribution of further hashes couldn't be done as $ca_hashes could not be found"
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKImatch" "WARN" "Attribution of further hashes possible as $ca_hashes could not be found"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If all else fails...
|
|
if ! "$spki_match"; then
|
|
"$has_backup_spki" && out "$spaces" # we had a few lines with backup SPKIs already
|
|
prln_svrty_high " No matching key for SPKI found "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_SPKImatch" "HIGH" "None of the SPKI match your host certificate, intermediate CA or known root CAs. Bricked site?"
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$has_backup_spki"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high " No backup keys found. Loss/compromise of the currently pinned key(s) will lead to bricked site. "
|
|
fileout "HPKP_backup" "HIGH" "No backup keys found. Loss/compromise of the currently pinned key(s) will lead to bricked site."
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Problems with HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "HPKP" "INFO" "No support for HTTP Public Key Pinning"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
emphasize_stuff_in_headers(){
|
|
local html_brown="<span style=\\\"color:#8a7237;\\\">"
|
|
local html_yellow="<span style=\\\"color:#8a7237;font-weight:bold;\\\">"
|
|
local html_off="<\\/span>"
|
|
|
|
# see https://www.grymoire.com/Unix/Sed.html#uh-3
|
|
# outln "$1" | sed "s/[0-9]*/$brown&${off}/g"
|
|
tmln_out "$1" | sed -e "s/\([0-9]\)/${brown}\1${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Unix/${yellow}Unix${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Debian/${yellow}Debian${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Win32/${yellow}Win32${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Win64/${yellow}Win64${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Ubuntu/${yellow}Ubuntu${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/ubuntu/${yellow}ubuntu${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/buster/${yellow}buster${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/stretch/${yellow}stretch${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/jessie/${yellow}jessie${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/squeeze/${yellow}squeeze${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/wheezy/${yellow}wheezy${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/lenny/${yellow}lenny${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/SUSE/${yellow}SUSE${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Red Hat Enterprise Linux/${yellow}Red Hat Enterprise Linux${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Red Hat/${yellow}Red Hat${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/CentOS/${yellow}CentOS${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Via/${yellow}Via${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Forwarded/${yellow}X-Forwarded${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-TYPO3-Parsetime/${yellow}X-TYPO3-Parsetime${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Liferay-Portal/${yellow}Liferay-Portal${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Cache-Lookup/${yellow}X-Cache-Lookup${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Cache/${yellow}X-Cache${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Squid/${yellow}X-Squid${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Server/${yellow}X-Server${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Varnish/${yellow}X-Varnish${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-OWA-Version/${yellow}X-OWA-Version${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices/${yellow}MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Application-Context/${yellow}X-Application-Context${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Version/${yellow}X-Version${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Powered-By/${yellow}X-Powered-By${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-UA-Compatible/${yellow}X-UA-Compatible${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Link/${yellow}Link${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Rack-Cache/${yellow}X-Rack-Cache${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Runtime/${yellow}X-Runtime${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Pingback/${yellow}X-Pingback${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies/${yellow}X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-AspNet-Version/${yellow}X-AspNet-Version${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/x-note/${yellow}x-note${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/x-global-transaction-id/${yellow}x-global-transaction-id${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Global-Transaction-ID/${yellow}X-Global-Transaction-ID${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Alt-Svc/${yellow}Alt-Svc${off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/system-wsgw-management-loopback/${yellow}system-wsgw-management-loopback${off}/g"
|
|
|
|
if "$do_html"; then
|
|
if [[ $COLOR -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
html_out "$(tm_out "$1" | sed -e 's/\&/\&/g' \
|
|
-e 's/</\</g' -e 's/>/\>/g' -e 's/"/\"/g' -e "s/'/\'/g" \
|
|
-e "s/\([0-9]\)/${html_brown}\1${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Unix/${html_yellow}Unix${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Debian/${html_yellow}Debian${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Win32/${html_yellow}Win32${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Win64/${html_yellow}Win64${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Ubuntu/${html_yellow}Ubuntu${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/ubuntu/${html_yellow}ubuntu${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/buster/${html_yellow}buster${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/stretch/${html_yellow}stretch${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/jessie/${html_yellow}jessie${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/squeeze/${html_yellow}squeeze${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/wheezy/${html_yellow}wheezy${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/lenny/${html_yellow}lenny${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/SUSE/${html_yellow}SUSE${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Red Hat Enterprise Linux/${html_yellow}Red Hat Enterprise Linux${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Red Hat/${html_yellow}Red Hat${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/CentOS/${html_yellow}CentOS${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Via/${html_yellow}Via${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Forwarded/${html_yellow}X-Forwarded${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-TYPO3-Parsetime/${yellow}X-TYPO3-Parsetime${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Liferay-Portal/${html_yellow}Liferay-Portal${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Cache-Lookup/${html_yellow}X-Cache-Lookup${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Cache/${html_yellow}X-Cache${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Squid/${html_yellow}X-Squid${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Server/${html_yellow}X-Server${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Varnish/${html_yellow}X-Varnish${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-OWA-Version/${html_yellow}X-OWA-Version${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices/${html_yellow}MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Application-Context/${html_yellow}X-Application-Context${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Version/${html_yellow}X-Version${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Powered-By/${html_yellow}X-Powered-By${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-UA-Compatible/${html_yellow}X-UA-Compatible${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Link/${html_yellow}Link${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Runtime/${html_yellow}X-Runtime${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Rack-Cache/${html_yellow}X-Rack-Cache${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Pingback/${html_yellow}X-Pingback${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies/${html_yellow}X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-AspNet-Version/${html_yellow}X-AspNet-Version${html_off}/g")" \
|
|
-e "s/x-note/${html_yellow}x-note${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/X-Global-Transaction-ID/${html_yellow}X-Global-Transaction-ID${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/x-global-transaction-id/${html_yellow}x-global-transaction-id${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/Alt-Svc/${html_yellow}Alt-Svc${html_off}/g" \
|
|
-e "s/system-wsgw-management-loopback/${html_yellow}system-wsgw-management-loopback${html_off}/g"
|
|
#FIXME: this is double code. The pattern to emphasize would fit better into
|
|
# one function.
|
|
# Also we need another function like run_other_header as otherwise "Link" "Alt-Svc" will never be found.
|
|
# And: I matches case sensitive only which might not detect all banners. (sed ignorecase is not possible w/ BSD sed)
|
|
else
|
|
html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"
|
|
fi
|
|
html_out "\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_server_banner() {
|
|
local serverbanner
|
|
local jsonID="banner_server"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Server banner "
|
|
grep -ai '^Server' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
serverbanner=$(sed -e 's/^Server: //' -e 's/^server: //' $TMPFILE)
|
|
if [[ "$serverbanner" == $'\n' ]] || [[ "$serverbanner" == $'\r' ]] || [[ "$serverbanner" == $'\n\r' ]] || [[ -z "$serverbanner" ]]; then
|
|
outln "exists but empty string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "Server banner is empty"
|
|
else
|
|
emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$serverbanner"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$serverbanner"
|
|
if [[ "$serverbanner" == *Microsoft-IIS/6.* ]] && [[ $OSSL_VER == 1.0.2* ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning " It's recommended to run another test w/ OpenSSL 1.0.1 !"
|
|
# see https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "WARN" "IIS6_openssl_mismatch: Recommended to rerun this test w/ OpenSSL 1.0.1. See https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/
|
|
# https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/245030
|
|
else
|
|
outln "(no \"Server\" line in header, interesting!)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No Server banner line in header, interesting!"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_appl_banner() {
|
|
local line
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local appl_banners=""
|
|
local jsonID="banner_application"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Application banner "
|
|
grep -Eai '^X-Powered-By|^X-AspNet-Version|^X-Version|^Liferay-Portal|^X-TYPO3-Parsetime|^X-OWA-Version^|^MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No application banner found"
|
|
else
|
|
while IFS='' read -r line; do
|
|
line=$(strip_lf "$line")
|
|
if ! $first; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
appl_banners="${appl_banners}, ${line}"
|
|
else
|
|
appl_banners="${line}"
|
|
first=false
|
|
fi
|
|
emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$line"
|
|
done < "$TMPFILE"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$appl_banners"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_rp_banner() {
|
|
local line
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local rp_banners=""
|
|
local jsonID="banner_reverseproxy"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-200"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Reverse Proxy banner "
|
|
grep -Eai '^Via:|^X-Cache|^X-Squid|^X-Varnish:|^X-Server-Name:|^X-Server-Port:|^x-forwarded|^Forwarded' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "--" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
while read line; do
|
|
line=$(strip_lf "$line")
|
|
if $first; then
|
|
first=false
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$line"
|
|
rp_banners="${rp_banners}${line}"
|
|
done < $TMPFILE
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$rp_banners" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: multiline string w cookies
|
|
#
|
|
sub_f5_bigip_check() {
|
|
local allcookies="$1"
|
|
local ip port cookievalue cookiename
|
|
local routed_domain offset
|
|
local savedcookies=""
|
|
local spaces="$2"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-212"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
|
|
# taken from https://github.com/drwetter/F5-BIGIP-Decoder, more details see there
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -e "all cookies: >> $allcookies <<\n"
|
|
while true; do IFS='=' read cookiename cookievalue
|
|
[[ -z "$cookievalue" ]] && break
|
|
cookievalue=${cookievalue/;/}
|
|
debugme echo $cookiename : $cookievalue
|
|
if grep -Eq '[0-9]{9,10}\.[0-9]{3,5}\.0000' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
ip="$(f5_ip_oldstyle "$cookievalue")"
|
|
port="$(f5_port_decode $cookievalue)"
|
|
out "${spaces}F5 cookie (default IPv4 pool member): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is default IPv4 pool member ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif grep -Eq '^rd[0-9]{1,3}o0{20}f{4}[a-f0-9]{8}o[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
routed_domain="$(f5_determine_routeddomain "$cookievalue")"
|
|
offset=$(( 2 + ${#routed_domain} + 1 + 24))
|
|
port="${cookievalue##*o}"
|
|
ip="$(f5_hex2ip "${cookievalue:$offset:8}")"
|
|
out "${spaces}F5 cookie (IPv4 pool in routed domain "; pr_svrty_medium "$routed_domain"; out "): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is IPv4 pool member in routed domain $routed_domain ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif grep -Eq '^vi[a-f0-9]{32}\.[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
ip="$(f5_hex2ip6 ${cookievalue:2:32})"
|
|
port="${cookievalue##*.}"
|
|
port=$(f5_port_decode "$port")
|
|
out "${spaces}F5 cookie (default IPv6 pool member): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is default IPv6 pool member ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif grep -Eq '^rd[0-9]{1,3}o[a-f0-9]{32}o[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
routed_domain="$(f5_determine_routeddomain "$cookievalue")"
|
|
offset=$(( 2 + ${#routed_domain} + 1 ))
|
|
port="${cookievalue##*o}"
|
|
ip="$(f5_hex2ip6 ${cookievalue:$offset:32})"
|
|
out "${spaces}F5 cookie (IPv6 pool in routed domain "; pr_svrty_medium "$routed_domain"; out "): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is IPv6 pool member in routed domain $routed_domain ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif grep -Eq '^\!.*=$' <<< "$cookievalue"; then
|
|
if [[ "${#cookievalue}" -eq 81 ]] ; then
|
|
savedcookies="${savedcookies} ${cookiename}=${cookievalue:1:79}"
|
|
out "${spaces}Encrypted F5 cookie named "; pr_italic "${cookiename}"; outln " detected"
|
|
fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "INFO" "encrypted F5 cookie named ${cookiename}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$allcookies"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_cookie_flags() { # ARG1: Path
|
|
local -i nr_cookies
|
|
local -i nr_httponly nr_secure
|
|
local negative_word
|
|
local msg302="" msg302_=""
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" =~ 20 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" =~ [301|302] ]]; then
|
|
msg302=" -- maybe better try target URL of 30x"
|
|
msg302_=" (30x detected, better try target URL of 30x)"
|
|
else
|
|
msg302=" -- HTTP status $HTTP_STATUS_CODE signals you maybe missed the web application"
|
|
msg302_=" (maybe missed the application)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Cookie(s) "
|
|
grep -ai '^Set-Cookie' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "(none issued at \"$1\")$msg302"
|
|
fileout "cookie_count" "INFO" "0 at \"$1\"$msg302_"
|
|
else
|
|
nr_cookies=$(count_lines "$(cat $TMPFILE)")
|
|
out "$nr_cookies issued: "
|
|
fileout "cookie_count" "INFO" "$nr_cookies at \"$1\"$msg302_"
|
|
if [[ $nr_cookies -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
negative_word="NONE"
|
|
else
|
|
negative_word="NOT"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_secure=$(grep -iac secure $TMPFILE)
|
|
case $nr_secure in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_medium "$negative_word" ;;
|
|
[123456789]) pr_svrty_good "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies";;
|
|
esac
|
|
out " secure, "
|
|
if [[ $nr_cookies -eq $nr_secure ]]; then
|
|
fileout "cookie_secure" "OK" "All ($nr_cookies) at \"$1\" marked as secure"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "cookie_secure" "INFO" "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies at \"$1\" marked as secure"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_httponly=$(grep -cai httponly $TMPFILE)
|
|
case $nr_httponly in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_medium "$negative_word" ;;
|
|
[123456789]) pr_svrty_good "$nr_httponly/$nr_cookies";;
|
|
esac
|
|
out " HttpOnly"
|
|
if [[ $nr_cookies -eq $nr_httponly ]]; then
|
|
fileout "cookie_httponly" "OK" "All ($nr_cookies) at \"$1\" marked as HttpOnly$msg302_"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "cookie_httponly" "INFO" "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies at \"$1\" marked as HttpOnly$msg302_"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "$msg302"
|
|
allcookies="$(awk '/[Ss][Ee][Tt]-[Cc][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ii][Ee]:/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
sub_f5_bigip_check "$allcookies" "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_security_headers() {
|
|
local header header_output svrty header_and_svrty
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local have_header=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$1" || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Security headers "
|
|
# X-XSS-Protection is useless and at worst harmful, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20472947
|
|
for header_and_svrty in "X-Frame-Options OK" \
|
|
"X-Content-Type-Options OK" \
|
|
"Content-Security-Policy OK" \
|
|
"X-Content-Security-Policy OK" \
|
|
"X-WebKit-CSP OK" \
|
|
"Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only OK" \
|
|
"Expect-CT OK" \
|
|
"Permissions-Policy OK" \
|
|
"X-XSS-Protection INFO" \
|
|
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin INFO" \
|
|
"Upgrade INFO" \
|
|
"X-Served-By INFO" \
|
|
"Referrer-Policy INFO" \
|
|
"X-UA-Compatible INFO" \
|
|
"Cache-Control INFO" \
|
|
"Pragma INFO"; do
|
|
read header svrty <<< "${header_and_svrty}"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "testing \"$header\" (severity \"$svrty\")"
|
|
match_httpheader_key "$header" "$header" "$spaces" "$first"
|
|
if [[ $? -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
have_header=true
|
|
if "$first"; then
|
|
first=false
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$svrty" in
|
|
OK) pr_svrty_good "$header" ;;
|
|
LOW) pr_svrty_low "$header" ;;
|
|
INFO) out "$header" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# Include $header when determining where to insert line breaks, but print $header
|
|
# separately.
|
|
header_output="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "${header:2}: $HEADERVALUE" "$spaces " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
outln "${header_output#${header:2}}"
|
|
fileout "$header" "$svrty" "$HEADERVALUE"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
#TODO: I am not testing for the correctness or anything stupid yet, e.g. "X-Frame-Options: allowall" or Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|
|
|
|
if ! "$have_header"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "--"
|
|
fileout "security_headers" "MEDIUM" "--"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# #1: string with 2 openssl codes, output is same in NSS/ssllabs terminology
|
|
normalize_ciphercode() {
|
|
if [[ "${1:2:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$(tolower "x${1:7:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
tm_out "$(tolower "x${1:2:2}${1:7:2}${1:12:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prettyprint_local() {
|
|
local arg line
|
|
local hexc hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export
|
|
local re='^[0-9A-Fa-f]+$'
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$1" == 0x* ]] || [[ "$1" == 0X* ]]; then
|
|
fatal "pls supply x<number> instead" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then
|
|
pr_headline " Displaying all $OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS local ciphers ";
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headline " Displaying all local ciphers ";
|
|
# pattern provided; which one?
|
|
[[ $1 =~ $re ]] && \
|
|
pr_headline "matching number pattern \"$1\" " || \
|
|
pr_headline "matching word pattern "\"$1\"" (ignore case) "
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
neat_header
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then
|
|
while read -r hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export ; do
|
|
hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexcode)"
|
|
outln "$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc" "$export")"
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V") # -V doesn't work with openssl < 1.0
|
|
else
|
|
#for arg in $(echo $@ | sed 's/,/ /g'); do
|
|
for arg in ${*//,/ /}; do
|
|
while read -r hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export ; do
|
|
hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexcode)"
|
|
# for numbers we don't do word matching:
|
|
[[ $arg =~ $re ]] && \
|
|
line="$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc" "$export" | grep -ai "$arg")" || \
|
|
line="$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc" "$export" | grep -wai "$arg")"
|
|
[[ -n "$line" ]] && outln "$line"
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V") # -V doesn't work with openssl < 1.0
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Generic function for a rated output, no used yet.
|
|
# arg1: rating from 2 to -4 if available or not
|
|
# arg2: no/yes: decides whether positive or negative logic will be applied and "not" will be printed
|
|
# arg3: jsonID
|
|
#
|
|
rated_output() {
|
|
local jsonID=$3
|
|
local logic=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ $2 == no ]] || [[ $2 == negative ]]; then
|
|
logic="not "
|
|
fi
|
|
case $1 in
|
|
2) pr_svrty_best "${logic}offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "OK" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) pr_svrty_good "${logic}offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "OK" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
0) out "${logic}offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
-1) pr_svrty_low "${logic}offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "LOW" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
-2) pr_svrty_medium "${logic}offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "MEDIUM" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
-3) pr_svrty_high "${logic}offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "HIGH" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
-4) pr_svrty_critical "${logic}offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "${logic}offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_warning "FIXME: error around $LINENO, (please report this)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "WARN" "return condition $2 when $1 unclear"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl2rfc() {
|
|
local rfcname=""
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && rfcname="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ "$rfcname" == "-" ]] && rfcname=""
|
|
[[ -n "$rfcname" ]] && tm_out "$rfcname"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rfc2openssl() {
|
|
local ossl_name
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]} ]] && ossl_name="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ "$ossl_name" == "-" ]] && ossl_name=""
|
|
[[ -n "$ossl_name" ]] && tm_out "$ossl_name"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
openssl2hexcode() {
|
|
local hexc=""
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
hexc="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' | awk '/ '"$1"' / { print $1 }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
hexc="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -tls1 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' | awk '/ '"$1"' / { print $1 }')"
|
|
else
|
|
hexc="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' | awk '/ '"$1"' / { print $1 }')"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$hexc" ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_out "$hexc"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rfc2hexcode() {
|
|
local hexc=""
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]} ]] && hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$hexc" ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_out "$hexc"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
show_rfc_style(){
|
|
local rfcname="" hexcode
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
hexcode="$(toupper "$1")"
|
|
case ${#hexcode} in
|
|
3) hexcode="0x00,0x${hexcode:1:2}" ;;
|
|
5) hexcode="0x${hexcode:1:2},0x${hexcode:3:2}" ;;
|
|
7) hexcode="0x${hexcode:1:2},0x${hexcode:3:2},0x${hexcode:5:2}" ;;
|
|
*) return 1 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$hexcode" == ${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]} ]] && rfcname="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ "$rfcname" == "-" ]] && rfcname=""
|
|
[[ -n "$rfcname" ]] && tm_out "$rfcname"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
neat_header(){
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf -- "Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC) KeyExch. Encryption Bits")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && out "$(printf -- " Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)")"
|
|
outln
|
|
out "$(printf -- "%s------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && out "$(printf -- "---------------------------------------")"
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
out "$(printf -- "Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) KeyExch. Encryption Bits")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && out "$(printf -- " Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)")"
|
|
outln
|
|
out "$(printf -- "%s--------------------------------------------------------------------------")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && out "$(printf -- "---------------------------------------------------")"
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hexcode
|
|
# arg2: cipher in openssl notation
|
|
# arg3: keyexchange
|
|
# arg4: encryption (maybe included "export")
|
|
# arg5: "export" if the cipher is an export-quality cipher, empty otherwise.
|
|
# arg6: not a boolean!
|
|
# "true" : if the cipher's "quality" should be highlighted
|
|
# "false": if the line should be printed in light grey
|
|
# "" : if line should be returned as a string
|
|
|
|
neat_list(){
|
|
local hexcode="$1"
|
|
local ossl_cipher="$2" export="$5" tls_cipher=""
|
|
local kx enc strength line what_dh bits
|
|
local -i i len
|
|
local how2show="$6"
|
|
|
|
kx="${3//Kx=/}"
|
|
enc="${4//Enc=/}"
|
|
# In two cases LibreSSL uses very long names for encryption algorithms
|
|
# and doesn't include the number of bits.
|
|
[[ "$enc" == ChaCha20-Poly1305 ]] && enc="CHACHA20(256)"
|
|
[[ "$enc" == GOST-28178-89-CNT ]] && enc="GOST(256)"
|
|
|
|
strength="${enc//\)/}" # retrieve (). first remove trailing ")"
|
|
strength="${strength#*\(}" # exfiltrate (VAL
|
|
enc="${enc%%\(*}"
|
|
|
|
enc="${enc//POLY1305/}" # remove POLY1305
|
|
enc="${enc//\//}" # remove "/"
|
|
|
|
# For rating set bit size but only when cipher is supported by server.
|
|
if [[ $how2show == true ]]; then
|
|
set_ciph_str_score $strength
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ "$export" =~ export ]] && strength="$strength,exp"
|
|
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && tls_cipher="$(show_rfc_style "$hexcode")"
|
|
|
|
# global var SHOW_EACH_C determines whether we display all tested ciphers
|
|
if [[ "$how2show" != true ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
line="$(printf -- " %-7s %-49s %-10s %-12s%-8s" "$hexcode" "$tls_cipher" "$kx" "$enc" "$strength")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && line+="$(printf -- " %-33s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$ossl_cipher")"
|
|
else
|
|
line="$(printf -- " %-7s %-33s %-10s %-12s%-8s" "$hexcode" "$ossl_cipher" "$kx" "$enc" "$strength")"
|
|
[[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && line+="$(printf -- " %-49s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$tls_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$how2show" ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$line"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_deemphasize "$line"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$kx" =~ " " ]]; then
|
|
what_dh="${kx%% *}"
|
|
bits="${kx##* }"
|
|
else
|
|
what_dh="$kx"
|
|
bits=""
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf -- " %-7s %-49s " "$hexcode" "$tls_cipher")"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$(printf -- " %-7s %-33s " "$hexcode" "$ossl_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
out "$(printf -- " %-7s " "$hexcode")"
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
print_fixed_width "$tls_cipher" 49 pr_cipher_quality
|
|
else
|
|
print_fixed_width "$ossl_cipher" 33 pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$what_dh"
|
|
if [[ -n "$bits" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $what_dh == DH ]] || [[ $what_dh == EDH ]]; then
|
|
pr_dh_quality "$bits" " $bits"
|
|
elif [[ $what_dh == ECDH ]]; then
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" " $bits"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
len=${#kx}
|
|
print_n_spaces "$((10-len))"
|
|
out "$(printf -- " %-12s%-8s " "$enc" "$strength")"
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == rfc ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf -- "%-33s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$ossl_cipher")"
|
|
elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == openssl ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf -- "%-49s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$tls_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == rfc ]]; then
|
|
print_fixed_width "$ossl_cipher" 32 pr_cipher_quality
|
|
elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == openssl ]]; then
|
|
print_fixed_width "$tls_cipher" 48 pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$(printf -- "${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_cipher_match(){
|
|
local hexc n auth ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers s
|
|
local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg
|
|
local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 ciph2 rfc_ciph rfc_ciph2 ossl_supported
|
|
local -a -i index
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0
|
|
local -i num_bundles bundle_size bundle end_of_bundle
|
|
local dhlen has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local cipher proto protos_to_try
|
|
local available
|
|
local -i sclient_success
|
|
local re='^[0-9A-Fa-f]+$'
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
pr_headline " Testing ciphers with "
|
|
if [[ $1 =~ $re ]]; then
|
|
pr_headline "matching number pattern \"$1\" "
|
|
tjolines="$tjolines matching number pattern \"$1\"\n\n"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headline "word pattern "\"$1\"" (ignore case) "
|
|
tjolines="$tjolines word pattern \"$1\" (ignore case)\n\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl"
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "."
|
|
prln_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
neat_header
|
|
#for arg in $(echo $@ | sed 's/,/ /g'); do
|
|
for arg in ${*//, /}; do
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
hexc="$(tolower "$hexc")"
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $arg =~ $re ]]; then
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" | grep -qai "$arg"
|
|
else
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" | grep -qwai "$arg"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && ( "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" ); then # string matches, so we can ssl to it:
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}")"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
sslvers[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && \
|
|
( [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexc)"
|
|
# is argument a number?
|
|
if [[ $arg =~ $re ]]; then
|
|
neat_list "$hexc" "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" "${kx[nr_ciphers]}" "${enc[nr_ciphers]}" "${export2[nr_ciphers]}" | grep -qai "$arg"
|
|
else
|
|
neat_list "$hexc" "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" "${kx[nr_ciphers]}" "${enc[nr_ciphers]}" "${export2[nr_ciphers]}" | grep -qwai "$arg"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then # string matches, so we can ssl to it:
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$hexc"
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Test the SSLv2 ciphers, if any.
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "${ciphers_to_test:2}" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ossl_supported[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != "SSLv2" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -tls1_2 -tls1_1 -tls1"
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$HAS_SSL3" && protos_to_try+=" -ssl3"
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_1 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=1
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != "SSLv2" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")"
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
[[ "${kx[i]}" == "Kx=any" ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
"${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C" || continue
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
available=""
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
available="available"
|
|
pr_cyan "available"
|
|
else
|
|
available="not a/v"
|
|
pr_deemphasize "not a/v"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fileout "cipher_${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "INFO" "$(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}") $available"
|
|
done
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
done
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0 # this is a single test for a cipher
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test for all ciphers locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad)
|
|
#
|
|
run_allciphers() {
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers_tested=0 nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0
|
|
local n auth mac hexc sslv2_ciphers="" s
|
|
local -a normalized_hexcode hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg ossl_supported
|
|
local -i i end_of_bundle bundle bundle_size num_bundles
|
|
local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2
|
|
local -i -a index
|
|
local proto protos_to_try
|
|
local dhlen available ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
# get a list of all the cipher suites to test
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
hexc="$(tolower "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")"
|
|
ciph[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
sslvers[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}"
|
|
kx[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=false
|
|
sigalg[i]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[i]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then
|
|
ossl_supported[i]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
hexcode[i]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
hexcode[i]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
sslv2_ciphers="$sslv2_ciphers, ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"; then
|
|
nr_ciphers_tested+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
nr_ciphers=$TLS_NR_CIPHERS
|
|
else
|
|
while read -r hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:7:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_ciphers=$nr_ciphers+1
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V")
|
|
nr_ciphers_tested=$nr_ciphers
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers:2}" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing $nr_ciphers_tested ciphers via OpenSSL plus sockets against the server, ordered by encryption strength "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing all $nr_ciphers_tested locally available ciphers against the server, ordered by encryption strength "
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl"
|
|
outln
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "."
|
|
prln_warning " Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
neat_header
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then
|
|
[[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && continue
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -tls1_2 -tls1_1 -tls1"
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$HAS_SSL3" && protos_to_try+=" -ssl3"
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_1 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=1
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ "$proto" != "-no_ssl2" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
[[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && continue
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")"
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
[[ "${kx[i]}" == "Kx=any" ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}" || ( "$SHOW_EACH_C" && ( "$using_sockets" || "${ossl_supported[i]}" ) ); then
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
available=""
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if ${ciphers_found[i]}; then
|
|
available="available"
|
|
pr_cyan "$available"
|
|
else
|
|
available="not a/v"
|
|
pr_deemphasize "$available"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fileout "cipher_${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "INFO" "$(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}") $available"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# test for all ciphers per protocol locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad)
|
|
# for the specified protocol, test for all ciphers locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they
|
|
# are good or bad) and list them in order to encryption strength.
|
|
ciphers_by_strength() {
|
|
local proto="$1" proto_hex="$2" proto_text="$3"
|
|
local using_sockets="$4" wide="$5" serverpref_known="$6"
|
|
local ossl_ciphers_proto
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers nr_ossl_ciphers nr_nonossl_ciphers success
|
|
local n sslvers auth mac hexc sslv2_ciphers="" cipher
|
|
local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph rfc_ciph kx enc export2
|
|
local -a hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2
|
|
local -i i bundle end_of_bundle bundle_size num_bundles
|
|
local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 sigalg ossl_supported index
|
|
local dhlen supported_sslv2_ciphers ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test addcmd temp
|
|
local available proto_supported=false
|
|
local id
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
|
|
# for local problem if it happens
|
|
"$wide" || out " "
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" && ! sclient_supported "$proto"; then
|
|
"$wide" && outln
|
|
pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL does not support $proto"
|
|
"$wide" && outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
"$wide" && outln "\n - "
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# get a list of all the cipher suites to test
|
|
nr_ciphers=0
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && "$wide" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && \
|
|
( [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
hexc="$(tolower "$hexc")"
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if ( "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" ); then
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]] && [[ "$proto" != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" == -tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ ${#hexc} -eq 14 ]] && [[ "$proto" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_ciphers+=", ${hexcode[nr_ciphers]}"
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else # no sockets, openssl!
|
|
# The OpenSSL ciphers function, prior to version 1.1.0, could only understand -ssl2, -ssl3, and -tls1.
|
|
if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then
|
|
ossl_ciphers_proto=""
|
|
elif [[ $proto == -ssl2 ]] || [[ $proto == -ssl3 ]] || \
|
|
[[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.0* ]] || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || \
|
|
[[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]]; then
|
|
ossl_ciphers_proto="$proto"
|
|
else
|
|
ossl_ciphers_proto="-tls1"
|
|
fi
|
|
while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == AEAD-* ]] || continue
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" == -tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-SHA256 ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-SHA384 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-CCM ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-CCM8 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" =~ CHACHA20-POLY1305 ]]; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(normalize_ciphercode "$hexc")"
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "$ossl_ciphers_proto -V")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $proto == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers:2}" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] ; then
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
if [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
proto_supported=true
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
"$wide" && outln
|
|
outln " protocol supported with no cipher "
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
"$wide" && outln "\n - "
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
proto_supported=true
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
"$wide" && outln "\n - "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else # no SSLv2
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers=0
|
|
if ( "$HAS_SSL3" || [[ $proto != -ssl3 ]] ) && ( "$HAS_TLS13" || [[ $proto != -tls1_3 ]] ); then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_ossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers
|
|
for (( success=0; success==0 ; 1 )); do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
success=1
|
|
if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]] || [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipher" ]]; then
|
|
success=0
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
proto_supported=true
|
|
"$wide" && [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if "$wide" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers=0
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So,
|
|
# test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less.
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
for (( success=0; success==0 ; 1 )); do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
success=1
|
|
if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then
|
|
if "$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
success=0
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
proto_supported=true
|
|
"$wide" && [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if "$wide" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$wide" && [[ "${FUNCNAME[1]}" == run_server_preference ]] && "$proto_supported"; then
|
|
if [[ $proto_ossl == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
outln " (no server order, thus listed by strength)"
|
|
elif ! "$serverpref_known"; then
|
|
outln " (listed by strength)"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_high " (no server order, thus listed by strength)"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$wide" && "$proto_supported" || [[ $proto != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
cipher=""
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" != - ]]; then
|
|
cipher+="${rfc_ciph[i]} "
|
|
else
|
|
cipher+="${ciph[i]} "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$wide" && ( "${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C" ); then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[i]="$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")"
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
available=""
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
available="available"
|
|
pr_cyan "$available"
|
|
else
|
|
available="not a/v"
|
|
pr_deemphasize "$available"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
id="cipher$proto"
|
|
id+="_${normalized_hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fileout "$id" "$(get_cipher_quality_severity "${ciph[i]}")" "$proto_text $(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}") $available"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $proto != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
# We handled SSLv2 above already
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipher" ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered $proto yes
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered $proto no
|
|
"$wide" && outln " -"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$wide" && [[ -n "$cipher" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
out "$(printf " %-10s " "$proto_text: ")"
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$cipher" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
else
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$cipher" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$cipher" ]] && fileout "supportedciphers_${proto_text//./_}" "INFO" "$cipher"
|
|
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}${proto}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
#FIXME: no error condition
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Test for all ciphers per protocol locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad)
|
|
#
|
|
run_cipher_per_proto() {
|
|
local proto proto_hex proto_text
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing ciphers per protocol via OpenSSL plus sockets against the server, ordered by encryption strength "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing all locally available ciphers per protocol against the server, ordered by encryption strength "
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl"
|
|
outln
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "."
|
|
prln_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
neat_header
|
|
while read proto proto_hex proto_text; do
|
|
pr_underline "$(printf -- "%b" "$proto_text")"
|
|
ciphers_by_strength "$proto" "$proto_hex" "$proto_text" "$using_sockets" "true" "false"
|
|
done <<< "$(tm_out " -ssl2 22 SSLv2\n -ssl3 00 SSLv3\n -tls1 01 TLS 1\n -tls1_1 02 TLS 1.1\n -tls1_2 03 TLS 1.2\n -tls1_3 04 TLS 1.3")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
#FIXME: no error condition
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1 is an ASCII-HEX encoded SSLv3 or TLS ClientHello.
|
|
# arg2: new key_share extension (only present to response to HelloRetryRequest)
|
|
# arg3: cookie extension (if needed for response to HelloRetryRequest)
|
|
#
|
|
# This function may be used to either modify a ClientHello for client simulation
|
|
# or to create a second ClientHello in response to a HelloRetryRequest.
|
|
# If arg2 is present, then this is a response to a HelloRetryRequest, so the
|
|
# function replaces the key_share extension with arg2 and adds the cookie
|
|
# extension, if present.
|
|
# If arg2 is not present, then this is an initial ClientHello for client simulation.
|
|
# In this case, if the provided ClientHello contains a server name extension,
|
|
# then either:
|
|
# 1) replace it with one corresponding to $SNI; or
|
|
# 2) remove it, if $SNI is empty
|
|
modify_clienthello() {
|
|
local tls_handshake_ascii="$1"
|
|
local new_key_share="$2" cookie="$3"
|
|
local -i len offset tls_handshake_ascii_len len_all len_clienthello
|
|
local -i len_extensions len_extension
|
|
local tls_content_type tls_version_reclayer handshake_msg_type tls_clientversion
|
|
local tls_random tls_sid tls_cipher_suites tls_compression_methods
|
|
local tls_extensions="" extension_type len_extensions_hex
|
|
local len_servername hexdump_format_str servername_hexstr
|
|
local len_servername_hex len_sni_listlen len_sni_ext
|
|
local tls_client_hello len_clienthello_hex tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex
|
|
local sni_extension_found=false
|
|
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}
|
|
|
|
tls_content_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}"
|
|
tls_version_reclayer="${tls_handshake_ascii:2:4}"
|
|
len_all=$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:6:4}")
|
|
|
|
handshake_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:10:2}"
|
|
len_clienthello=$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:12:6}")
|
|
tls_clientversion="${tls_handshake_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
tls_random="${tls_handshake_ascii:22:64}"
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:86:2}")+2
|
|
tls_sid="${tls_handshake_ascii:86:$len}"
|
|
offset=86+$len
|
|
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}")+4
|
|
tls_cipher_suites="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}"
|
|
offset=$offset+$len
|
|
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:2}")+2
|
|
tls_compression_methods="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}"
|
|
offset=$offset+$len
|
|
|
|
if [[ $offset -ge $tls_handshake_ascii_len ]]; then
|
|
# No extensions
|
|
tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
len_extensions=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}")
|
|
offset+=4
|
|
for (( 1; offset < tls_handshake_ascii_len; 1 )); do
|
|
extension_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}"
|
|
offset+=4
|
|
len_extension=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}")
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == 0000 ]] && [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then
|
|
# If this is an initial ClientHello, then either remove
|
|
# the SNI extension or replace it with the correct server name.
|
|
sni_extension_found=true
|
|
if [[ -n "$SNI" ]]; then
|
|
servername=${XMPP_HOST:-${NODE}}
|
|
# Create a server name extension that corresponds to $SNI
|
|
len_servername=${#servername}
|
|
hexdump_format_str="$len_servername/1 \"%02x\""
|
|
servername_hexstr=$(printf $servername | hexdump -v -e "${hexdump_format_str}")
|
|
# convert lengths we need to fill in from dec to hex:
|
|
len_servername_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_servername)
|
|
len_sni_listlen=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+3)))
|
|
len_sni_ext=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+5)))
|
|
tls_extensions+="000000${len_sni_ext}00${len_sni_listlen}0000${len_servername_hex}${servername_hexstr}"
|
|
fi
|
|
offset+=$len_extension+4
|
|
elif [[ "$extension_type" != 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR ]] || [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then
|
|
# If this is in response to a HelloRetryRequest, then do
|
|
# not copy over the old key_share extension, but
|
|
# all other extensions should be copied into the new ClientHello.
|
|
offset=$offset-4
|
|
len=$len_extension+8
|
|
tls_extensions+="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}"
|
|
offset+=$len
|
|
else
|
|
# This is the key_share extension, and the modified ClientHello
|
|
# is being created in response to a HelloRetryRequest. Replace
|
|
# the existing key_share extension with the new one.
|
|
tls_extensions+="$new_key_share"
|
|
offset+=$len_extension+4
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
tls_extensions+="$cookie"
|
|
|
|
if ! "$sni_extension_found" && [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
len_extensions=${#tls_extensions}/2
|
|
len_extensions_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extensions)
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_extensions_hex"
|
|
tls_extensions="${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_extensions}"
|
|
|
|
tls_client_hello="${tls_clientversion}${tls_random}${tls_sid}${tls_cipher_suites}${tls_compression_methods}${tls_extensions}"
|
|
len_clienthello=${#tls_client_hello}/2
|
|
len_clienthello_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_clienthello)
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_clienthello_hex"
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii="${handshake_msg_type}00${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_client_hello}"
|
|
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}/2
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $tls_handshake_ascii_len)
|
|
len2twobytes "$tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex"
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii="${tls_content_type}${tls_version_reclayer}${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_handshake_ascii}"
|
|
tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client_simulation_sockets() {
|
|
local -i len i ret=0
|
|
local -i save=0
|
|
local lines clienthello data=""
|
|
local cipher_list_2send=""
|
|
local sock_reply_file2 sock_reply_file3
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii next_packet hello_done=0
|
|
local -i sid_len offset1 offset2
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${1:0:4}" == 1603 ]]; then
|
|
clienthello="$(modify_clienthello "$1")"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${clienthello:10}"
|
|
else
|
|
clienthello="$1"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO=""
|
|
fi
|
|
len=${#clienthello}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
data+=", ${clienthello:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
# same as above. If a CIPHER_SUITES string was provided, then check that it is in the ServerHello
|
|
# this appeared 1st in yassl + MySQL (https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/784) but adds
|
|
# robustness to the implementation
|
|
# see also https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/797
|
|
if [[ "${1:0:4}" == 1603 ]]; then
|
|
# Extract list of cipher suites from SSLv3 or later ClientHello
|
|
sid_len=4*$(hex2dec "${data:174:2}")
|
|
offset1=178+$sid_len
|
|
offset2=182+$sid_len
|
|
len=4*$(hex2dec "${data:offset1:2}${data:offset2:2}")-2
|
|
offset1=186+$sid_len
|
|
code2network "$(tolower "${data:offset1:len}")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format
|
|
else
|
|
# Extract list of cipher suites from SSLv2 ClientHello
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${clienthello:12:2}")
|
|
for (( i=22; i < 22+len; i+=6 )); do
|
|
offset1=$i+2
|
|
offset2=$i+4
|
|
[[ "${clienthello:i:2}" == 00 ]] && cipher_list_2send+=", ${clienthello:offset1:2},${clienthello:offset2:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
code2network "$(tolower "${cipher_list_2send:2}")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format
|
|
fi
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$NW_STR"
|
|
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 6
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nsending client hello... "
|
|
socksend_clienthello "${data}"
|
|
sleep $USLEEP_SND
|
|
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
|
|
# Check if the response is a HelloRetryRequest.
|
|
resend_if_hello_retry_request "$clienthello" "$tls_hello_ascii"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]] || [[ $ret -eq 6 ]]; then
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd
|
|
return $ret
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:1}" != "8" ]]; then
|
|
check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
hello_done=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for(( 1 ; hello_done==1; 1 )); do
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
sock_reply_file2=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.2
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... "
|
|
socksend "" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
|
|
next_packet=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
next_packet="${next_packet%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
if [[ ${#next_packet} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# This shouldn't be necessary. However, it protects against
|
|
# getting into an infinite loop if the server has nothing
|
|
# left to send and check_tls_serverhellodone doesn't
|
|
# correctly catch it.
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
hello_done=0
|
|
else
|
|
tls_hello_ascii+="$next_packet"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
sock_reply_file3=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.3
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file3" #FIXME: we moved that already
|
|
mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
cat "$sock_reply_file3" >> "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
rm "$sock_reply_file3"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
hello_done=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello..."
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6
|
|
echo
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
parse_sslv2_serverhello "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "false"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "Protocol : SSLv2" > "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0200"
|
|
ret=0
|
|
else
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey" "$cipher_list_2send"
|
|
save=$?
|
|
|
|
if [[ $save -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
send_close_notify "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
# see https://secure.wand.net.nz/trac/libprotoident/wiki/SSL
|
|
lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" 2>$ERRFILE)")
|
|
tm_out " ($lines lines returned) "
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# determine the return value for higher level, so that they can tell what the result is
|
|
if [[ $save -eq 1 ]] || [[ $lines -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
ret=1 # NOT available
|
|
else
|
|
ret=0
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_client_simulation() {
|
|
# Runs browser simulations. Browser capabilities gathered from:
|
|
# https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/clients.html on 10 jan 2016
|
|
local names=()
|
|
local short=()
|
|
local protos=()
|
|
local ch_ciphers=()
|
|
local ciphersuites=()
|
|
local tlsvers=()
|
|
local ch_sni=()
|
|
local warning=()
|
|
local handshakebytes=()
|
|
local lowest_protocol=()
|
|
local highest_protocol=()
|
|
local service=()
|
|
local minDhBits=()
|
|
local maxDhBits=()
|
|
local minRsaBits=()
|
|
local maxRsaBits=()
|
|
local minEcdsaBits=()
|
|
local curves=()
|
|
local requiresSha2=()
|
|
local current=()
|
|
local i=0
|
|
local name tls proto cipher temp what_dh bits curve supported_curves
|
|
local has_dh_bits using_sockets=true
|
|
local client_service
|
|
local options
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local jsonID="clientsimulation"
|
|
local client_service=""
|
|
|
|
# source the external file
|
|
. "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/client-simulation.txt" 2>/dev/null
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "couldn't find client simulation data in $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/client-simulation.txt"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != "" ]]; then
|
|
client_service="$SERVICE"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]]; then
|
|
# Can we take the service from STARTTLS?
|
|
client_service=$(toupper "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL%s}") # strip trailing 's' in ftp(s), smtp(s), pop3(s), etc
|
|
elif "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
client_service="HTTP"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "Could not determine the protocol, only simulating generic clients."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headline " Running client simulations "
|
|
[[ "$client_service" == HTTP ]] && pr_headline "($client_service) "
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
pr_headlineln "via sockets "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_headline "via openssl "
|
|
prln_warning " -- pls note \"--ssl-native\" will return some false results"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "You shouldn't run this with \"--ssl-native\" as you will get false results"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
debugme echo
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]]; then
|
|
out " Browser Protocol Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) "
|
|
( "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS") && out "Forward Secrecy"
|
|
outln
|
|
out "--------------------------------------------------------------------------"
|
|
else
|
|
out " Browser Protocol Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC) "
|
|
( "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS") && out "Forward Secrecy"
|
|
outln
|
|
out "------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------"
|
|
fi
|
|
( "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS") && out "----------------------"
|
|
outln
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
# We can't use the connectivity checker here as of now the openssl reply is always empty (reason??)
|
|
save_max_ossl_fail=$MAX_OSSL_FAIL
|
|
nr_ossl_fail=$NR_OSSL_FAIL
|
|
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=100
|
|
fi
|
|
for name in "${short[@]}"; do
|
|
if "${current[i]}" || "$ALL_CLIENTS" ; then
|
|
# for ANY we test this service or if the service we determined from STARTTLS matches
|
|
if [[ "${service[i]}" == ANY ]] || [[ "${service[i]}" =~ $client_service ]]; then
|
|
out " $(printf -- "%-29s" "${names[i]}")"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
client_simulation_sockets "${handshakebytes[i]}"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" -lt ${lowest_protocol[i]} ]] || \
|
|
[[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" -gt ${highest_protocol[i]} ]]; then
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE >$ERRFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -n "${curves[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
# "$OPENSSL s_client" will fail if the -curves option includes any unsupported curves.
|
|
supported_curves=""
|
|
for curve in $(colon_to_spaces "${curves[i]}"); do
|
|
# Attention! secp256r1 = prime256v1 and secp192r1 = prime192v1
|
|
# We need to map two curves here as otherwise handshakes will go wrong if "-curves" are supplied
|
|
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/apps/ecparam.c#L221 + ./ssl/t1_lib.c
|
|
[[ "$curve" =~ secp256r1 ]] && curve="${curve//secp256r1/prime256v1}"
|
|
[[ "$curve" =~ secp192r1 ]] && curve="${curve//secp192r1/prime192v1}"
|
|
[[ "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES" =~ \ $curve\ ]] && supported_curves+=":$curve"
|
|
done
|
|
curves[i]=""
|
|
[[ -n "$supported_curves" ]] && curves[i]="-curves ${supported_curves:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
options="$(s_client_options "-cipher ${ch_ciphers[i]} -ciphersuites "\'${ciphersuites[i]}\'" ${curves[i]} ${protos[i]} $STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -connect $NODEIP:$PORT ${ch_sni[i]}")"
|
|
debugme echo "$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# If an ephemeral DH key was used, check that the number of bits is within range.
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE") # extract line
|
|
what_dh="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
bits="${temp##*, }"
|
|
# formatting
|
|
curve="${temp#*, }"
|
|
if [[ "$curve" == $bits ]]; then
|
|
curve=""
|
|
else
|
|
curve="${curve%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
bits="${bits/bits/}"
|
|
bits="${bits// /}"
|
|
if [[ "$what_dh" == X25519 ]] || [[ "$what_dh" == X448 ]]; then
|
|
curve="$what_dh"
|
|
what_dh="ECDH"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$what_dh" == DH ]]; then
|
|
[[ ${minDhBits[i]} -ne -1 ]] && [[ $bits -lt ${minDhBits[i]} ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
[[ ${maxDhBits[i]} -ne -1 ]] && [[ $bits -gt ${maxDhBits[i]} ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "No connection"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}-${short[i]}" "INFO" "No connection"
|
|
else
|
|
proto=$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)
|
|
# hack:
|
|
[[ "$proto" == TLSv1 ]] && proto="TLSv1.0"
|
|
[[ "$proto" == SSLv3 ]] && proto="SSLv3 "
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == TLSv1.2 ]] && ( ! "$using_sockets" || [[ -z "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]] ); then
|
|
# OpenSSL reports TLS1.2 even if the connection is TLS1.1 or TLS1.0. Need to figure out which one it is...
|
|
for tls in ${tlsvers[i]}; do
|
|
# If the handshake data includes TLS 1.3 we need to remove it, otherwise the
|
|
# simulation will fail with # 'Oops: openssl s_client connect problem'
|
|
# before/after trying another protocol. We only print a warning it in debug mode
|
|
# as otherwise we would need e.g. handle the curves in a similar fashion -- not
|
|
# to speak about ciphers
|
|
if [[ $tls =~ 1_3 ]] && ! "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
debugme pr_local_problem "TLS 1.3 not supported, "
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
options="$(s_client_options "$tls -cipher ${ch_ciphers[i]} -ciphersuites "\'${ciphersuites[i]}\'" ${curves[i]} $STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -connect $NODEIP:$PORT ${ch_sni[i]}")"
|
|
debugme echo "$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
case "$tls" in
|
|
"-tls1_2") break ;;
|
|
"-tls1_1") proto="TLSv1.1"
|
|
break ;;
|
|
"-tls1") proto="TLSv1.0"
|
|
break ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && ( [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == SSL_* ]] ); then
|
|
cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$cipher")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ "$cipher" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$cipher" != SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$proto "
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
out "$cipher"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_cipher_quality "$cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]]; then
|
|
print_n_spaces "$((34-${#cipher}))"
|
|
else
|
|
print_n_spaces "$((50-${#cipher}))"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$what_dh" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$curve" ]] && curve="($curve)"
|
|
if [[ "$what_dh" == ECDH ]]; then
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$(printf -- "%-12s" "$bits bit $what_dh") $curve"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_dh_quality "$bits" "$(printf -- "%-12s" "$bits bit $what_dh") $curve"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if "$HAS_DH_BITS" || ( "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]] ); then
|
|
out "No FS"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
if [[ -n "${warning[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
out " "
|
|
outln "${warning[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}-${short[i]}" "INFO" "$proto $cipher ${warning[i]}"
|
|
debugme cat $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi # correct service?
|
|
fi #current?
|
|
((i++))
|
|
done
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
# restore from above
|
|
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=$save_max_ossl_fail
|
|
NR_OSSL_FAIL=$nr_ossl_fail
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# generic function whether $1 is supported by s_client.
|
|
# Currently only used for protocols that's why we saved -connect $NXCONNECT.
|
|
sclient_supported() {
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
-ssl2)
|
|
"$HAS_SSL2" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
-ssl3)
|
|
"$HAS_SSL3" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
-tls1_3)
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" || return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
*) if $OPENSSL s_client "$1" </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# generic function whether $1 is supported by s_client ($2: string to display)
|
|
#TODO: we need to consider to remove the two instances from where this is called.
|
|
#
|
|
locally_supported() {
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$2" ]] && out "$2 "
|
|
sclient_supported "$1"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 7 ]] && prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client $1\""
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The protocol check in run_protocols needs to be redone. The using_sockets part there kind of sucks.
|
|
# 1) we need to have a variable where the results are being stored so that every other test doesn't have to do this again
|
|
# --> we have that but certain information like "downgraded" are not being passed. That's not ok for run_protocols()/
|
|
# for all other functions we can use it
|
|
# 2) the code is old and one can do that way better
|
|
# We should do what's available and faster (openssl vs. sockets). Keep in mind that the socket reply for SSLv2 returns the number # of ciphers!
|
|
#
|
|
# arg1: -ssl2|-ssl3|-tls1|-tls1_1|-tls1_2|-tls1_3
|
|
#
|
|
run_prototest_openssl() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local protos proto
|
|
|
|
sclient_supported "$1" || return 7
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
-ssl2) protos="-ssl2" ;;
|
|
-ssl3) protos="-ssl3" ;;
|
|
-tls1) protos="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1 -no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;;
|
|
-tls1_1) protos="-no_tls1_2 -no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;;
|
|
-tls1_2) protos="-no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;;
|
|
-tls1_3) protos="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
#FIXME: we have here HAS_SSL(2|3) and more but we don't use that
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state $protos $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>&1 </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme grep -E "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
if [[ $ret -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if grep -aq "no cipher list" $TMPFILE; then
|
|
ret=5 # <--- important indicator for SSL2 (maybe others, too)
|
|
else
|
|
# try again without $PROXY
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state $protos $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>&1 </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme grep -E "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
grep -aq "no cipher list" $TMPFILE && ret=5 # <--- important indicator for SSL2 (maybe others, too)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
proto=${proto/\./_}
|
|
proto=${proto/v/}
|
|
proto="-$(tolower $proto)"
|
|
[[ "$proto" != $1 ]] && ret=2
|
|
case "$proto" in
|
|
-ssl3) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0300" ;;
|
|
-tls1) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0301" ;;
|
|
-tls1_1) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0302" ;;
|
|
-tls1_2) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0303" ;;
|
|
-tls1_3) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}$1.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
|
|
# 0: offered
|
|
# 1: not offered
|
|
# 2: downgraded
|
|
# 5: protocol ok, but no cipher
|
|
# 7: no local support
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Idempotent function to add SSL/TLS protocols. It should accelerate testing.
|
|
# PROTOS_OFFERED can be e.g. "ssl2:no ssl3:no tls1_2:yes" which means that
|
|
# SSLv2 and SSLv3 was tested but not available, TLS 1.2 was tested and available
|
|
# TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.2 not tested yet
|
|
#
|
|
# arg1: protocol
|
|
# arg2: available (yes) or not (no)
|
|
add_proto_offered() {
|
|
# the ":" is mandatory here (and @ other places), otherwise e.g. tls1 will match tls1_2
|
|
if [[ "$2" == yes ]] && [[ "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $1:no ]]; then
|
|
# In rare cases, a protocol may be marked as not available even though it is
|
|
# (e.g., the connection fails with tls_sockets() but succeeds with $OPENSSL.
|
|
PROTOS_OFFERED="${PROTOS_OFFERED/$1:no/$1:$2}"
|
|
elif [[ ! "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $1: ]]; then
|
|
PROTOS_OFFERED+="${1}:$2 "
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# function which checks whether SSLv2 - TLS 1.2 is being offered, see add_proto_offered()
|
|
# arg1: protocol string or hex code for TLS protocol
|
|
# echos: 0 if proto known being offered, 1: known not being offered, 2: we don't know yet whether proto is being offered
|
|
# return value is always zero
|
|
has_server_protocol() {
|
|
local proto
|
|
local proto_val_pair
|
|
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
04) proto="tls1_3" ;;
|
|
03) proto="tls1_2" ;;
|
|
02) proto="tls1_1" ;;
|
|
01) proto="tls1" ;;
|
|
00) proto="ssl3" ;;
|
|
*) proto="$1" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $proto: ]]; then
|
|
for proto_val_pair in $PROTOS_OFFERED; do
|
|
if [[ $proto_val_pair =~ $proto: ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${proto_val_pair#*:} == yes ]]; then
|
|
echo 0
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
echo 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
# if empty echo 2, hinting to the caller to check at additional cost/connect
|
|
echo 2
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# the protocol check needs to be revamped. It sucks, see above
|
|
run_protocols() {
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local supported_no_ciph1="supported but couldn't detect a cipher (may need debugging)"
|
|
local supported_no_ciph2="supported but couldn't detect a cipher"
|
|
local latest_supported="" # version.major and version.minor of highest version supported by the server
|
|
local detected_version_string latest_supported_string
|
|
local key_share_extn_nr="$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR"
|
|
local lines nr_ciphers_detected
|
|
local tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
local i drafts_offered="" drafts_offered_str="" supported_versions debug_recomm=""
|
|
local tls12_detected_version
|
|
local -i ret=0 ret_val_ssl3 ret_val_tls1 ret_val_tls11 ret_val_tls12=0 ret_val_tls13=0
|
|
local offers_tls13=false
|
|
local jsonID="SSLv2"
|
|
|
|
outln; pr_headline " Testing protocols "
|
|
|
|
if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
using_sockets=false
|
|
prln_underline "via native openssl"
|
|
else
|
|
using_sockets=true
|
|
if [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]]; then
|
|
prln_underline "via sockets "
|
|
else
|
|
prln_underline "via sockets except NPN+ALPN "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -le 1 ]] && debug_recomm=", rerun with DEBUG>=2 or --ssl-native"
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " SSLv2 ";
|
|
if ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets
|
|
case $? in
|
|
6) # couldn't open socket
|
|
prln_fixme "couldn't open socket"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "couldn't be tested, socket problem"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
7) # strange reply, couldn't convert the cipher spec length to a hex number
|
|
pr_cyan "strange v2 reply "
|
|
outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" | head -1
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received a strange SSLv2 reply (rerun with DEBUG>=2)"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) # no sslv2 server hello returned, like in openlitespeed which returns HTTP!
|
|
prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
;;
|
|
0) # reset
|
|
prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "likely not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
3) lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" 2>/dev/null)")
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out " ($lines lines) "
|
|
if [[ "$lines" -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3))
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "SSLv2 is offered"
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq "$nr_ciphers_detected" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "supported but couldn't detect a cipher and vulnerable to CVE-2015-3197 ";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered, no cipher" "CVE-2015-3197" "CWE-310"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok), also VULNERABLE to DROWN attack";
|
|
outln " -- $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "vulnerable with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
debugme tmln_out
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-ssl2"
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) prln_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "SSLv2 is offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 no
|
|
;;
|
|
5) prln_svrty_high "CVE-2015-3197: $supported_no_ciph2";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered, no cipher" "CVE-2015-3197" "CWE-310"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "SSLv2 is offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl2\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " SSLv3 ";
|
|
jsonID="SSLv3"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_ssl3=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
ret_val_ssl3=$?
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-ssl3"
|
|
ret_val_ssl3=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
case $ret_val_ssl3 in
|
|
0) prln_svrty_high "offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_SSL3"; then
|
|
latest_supported="0300"
|
|
latest_supported_string="SSLv3"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "SSLv3 is offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 no
|
|
;;
|
|
2) if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 no
|
|
pr_warning "SSL downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SSL downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) pr_svrty_high "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "SSLv3 is offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with SSLv3"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl3\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1 ";
|
|
jsonID="TLS1"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_tls1=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
ret_val_tls1=$?
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-tls1"
|
|
ret_val_tls1=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
case $ret_val_tls1 in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_low "offered" ; outln " (deprecated)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered (deprecated)"
|
|
latest_supported="0301"
|
|
latest_supported_string="TLSv1.0"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "TLS 1.0 offered"
|
|
;; # nothing wrong with it -- per se
|
|
1) out "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 no
|
|
if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" # neither good or bad
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2) pr_svrty_medium "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 no
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- downgraded"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered, and downgraded to SSL"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) out "not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 no
|
|
pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "likely not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "TLS 1.0 offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.0"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1.1 ";
|
|
jsonID="TLS1_1"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_tls11=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "02" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
ret_val_tls11=$?
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_1"
|
|
ret_val_tls11=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
case $ret_val_tls11 in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_low "offered" ; outln " (deprecated)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered (deprecated)"
|
|
latest_supported="0302"
|
|
latest_supported_string="TLSv1.1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "TLS 1.1 offered"
|
|
;; # nothing wrong with it
|
|
1) out "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 no
|
|
if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" # neither good or bad
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2) out "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 no
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- downgraded"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "TLSv1.1 is not offered, and downgraded to a weaker protocol"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]] && [[ "$latest_supported" == 0301 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports TLSv1.0, but downgraded to SSLv3 (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to SSLv3 rather than TLSv1.0"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -gt 0x0302 ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) out "not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 no
|
|
pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "TLS 1.1 offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.1"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_1\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Now, we are doing a basic/pre test for TLS 1.2 and 1.3 in order not to penalize servers (medium)
|
|
# running TLS 1.3 only when TLS 1.2 is not offered. 0 and 5 are the return codes for
|
|
# TLS 1.3 support (kind of, including deprecated pre-versions of TLS 1.3)
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_tls12=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER"
|
|
ret_val_tls12=$?
|
|
tls12_detected_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_2"
|
|
ret_val_tls12=$?
|
|
tls12_detected_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ret_val_tls13=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
# Need to ensure that at most 128 ciphers are included in ClientHello.
|
|
# If the TLSv1.2 test in determine_optimal_sockets_params() was successful,
|
|
# then use the 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers plus the cipher selected in the TLSv1.2 test.
|
|
# If the TLSv1.2 test was not successful, then just use the 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers
|
|
# plus the list of ciphers used in all of the previous tests ($TLS_CIPHER).
|
|
if [[ -n "$TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test="$TLS13_CIPHER, $TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED, 00,ff"
|
|
else
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test="$TLS13_CIPHER,$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$tls13_ciphers_to_test"
|
|
ret_val_tls13=$?
|
|
else
|
|
run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_3"
|
|
ret_val_tls13=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret_val_tls13 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret_val_tls13 -eq 5 ]]; then
|
|
offers_tls13=true # This variable comes in handy for further if statements below
|
|
fi
|
|
# Done with pretesting TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1.2 ";
|
|
jsonID="TLS1_2"
|
|
case $ret_val_tls12 in
|
|
0) prln_svrty_best "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered"
|
|
latest_supported="0303"
|
|
latest_supported_string="TLSv1.2"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes
|
|
;; # GCM cipher in TLS 1.2: very good!
|
|
1) add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
if "$offers_tls13"; then
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
if "$offers_tls13"; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered" # TLS 1.3, no TLS 1.2 --> no GCM, penalty
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 are not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2) add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "TLS 1.2 is not offered"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol"
|
|
if [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 0300 ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="SSLv3"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$tls12_detected_version-0x0301))"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$tls12_detected_version -lt 0x$latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports $latest_supported_string, but downgraded to $detected_version_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to $detected_version_string rather than $latest_supported_string"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$tls12_detected_version -gt 0x0303 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ ${#tls12_detected_version} -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${tls12_detected_version:0:2}.${tls12_detected_version:2:2} (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${tls12_detected_version:0:2}.${tls12_detected_version:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${tls12_detected_version}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${tls12_detected_version}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) out "not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "TLS 1.2 is not offered"
|
|
pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_medium "not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "TLS 1.2 is not offered"
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected, but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.2"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_2\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS 1.3 ";
|
|
jsonID="TLS1_3"
|
|
case $ret_val_tls13 in
|
|
0) if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_best "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered"
|
|
else
|
|
# If TLS 1.3 is offered, then its support was detected
|
|
# by determine_optimal_sockets_params().
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3_rfc8446) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" 0304 "
|
|
else
|
|
for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12; do
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "$i")) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" 7F$i "
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="28"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
supported_versions=""
|
|
for i in 16 15 14 13 12; do
|
|
[[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]] || supported_versions+=",7f,$i"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$supported_versions" ]] && break
|
|
supported_versions="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3+1))), $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3))) $supported_versions"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "$supported_versions"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || break
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" ${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4} "
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[2-6] ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" ${BASH_REMATCH:8:4} "
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
supported_versions=""
|
|
for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17; do
|
|
[[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]] || supported_versions+=",7f,$i"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]] || supported_versions+=",03,04"
|
|
[[ -z "$supported_versions" ]] && break
|
|
supported_versions="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3+1))), $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3))) $supported_versions"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "$supported_versions"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || break
|
|
if [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00020304 ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" 0304 "
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[7-9A-C] ]]; then
|
|
drafts_offered+=" ${BASH_REMATCH:8:4} "
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="$key_share_extn_nr"
|
|
if [[ -n "$drafts_offered" ]]; then
|
|
for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12; do
|
|
if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$drafts_offered_str" ]] && drafts_offered_str+=", "
|
|
drafts_offered_str+="draft $(printf "%d" 0x$i)"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$drafts_offered_str" ]] && drafts_offered_str+=", "
|
|
drafts_offered_str+="final"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "offered (OK)"; outln ": $drafts_offered_str"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered with $drafts_offered_str"
|
|
else
|
|
out "offered (OK)"; outln ": $drafts_offered_str"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered with $drafts_offered_str"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "Unexpected results"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "unexpected results"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
latest_supported="0304"
|
|
latest_supported_string="TLSv1.3"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
;;
|
|
1) pr_svrty_low "not offered"
|
|
if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
;;
|
|
2) if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="SSLv3"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then
|
|
detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then
|
|
outln "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered + downgraded to weaker protocol"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -lt 0x$latest_supported ]]; then
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports $latest_supported_string, but downgraded to $detected_version_string"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to $detected_version_string rather than $latest_supported_string"
|
|
elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -gt 0x0304 ]]; then
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
;;
|
|
3) out "not offered "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"
|
|
;;
|
|
4) out "likely not offered, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1"
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
;;
|
|
7) if "$using_sockets" ; then
|
|
# can only happen in debug mode
|
|
prln_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.3"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_3\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "PROTOS_OFFERED: $PROTOS_OFFERED"
|
|
if [[ ! "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ yes ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame "You should not proceed as no protocol was detected. If you still really really want to, say \"YES\"" "YES"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# list ciphers (and makes sure you have them locally configured)
|
|
# arg[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list (or anything else)
|
|
# arg[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list
|
|
# arg[3]: protocol (e.g., -ssl2)
|
|
#
|
|
listciphers() {
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
local debugname=""
|
|
local ciphers="$1"
|
|
local tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS"
|
|
|
|
[[ "$2" != ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$2"
|
|
"$HAS_SECLEVEL" && [[ -n "$ciphers" ]] && ciphers="@SECLEVEL=0:$1"
|
|
if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $3 -ciphersuites "$tls13_ciphers" "$ciphers" &>$TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $3 "$tls13_ciphers:$ciphers" &>$TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $3 "$ciphers" &>$TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme cat $TMPFILE
|
|
debugname="$(sed -e s'/\!/not/g' -e 's/\:/_/g' <<< "$1")"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.${debugname}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# argv[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax
|
|
# argv[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax
|
|
# argv[3]: string on console / HTML or "finding"
|
|
# argv[4]: rating whether ok to offer
|
|
# argv[5]: string to be appended for fileout
|
|
# argv[6]: non-SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets
|
|
# argv[7]: SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets
|
|
# argv[8]: true if using sockets, false if not
|
|
# argv[9]: CVE
|
|
# argv[10]: CWE
|
|
#
|
|
sub_cipherlists() {
|
|
local -i i len sclient_success=1
|
|
local cipherlist sslv2_cipherlist detected_ssl2_ciphers
|
|
local singlespaces
|
|
local proto=""
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local jsonID="cipherlist"
|
|
local using_sockets="${8}"
|
|
local cve="${9}"
|
|
local cwe="${10}"
|
|
|
|
pr_bold "$3 "
|
|
[[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]] && proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
jsonID="${jsonID}_$5"
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || listciphers "$1" "$2" $proto; then
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets" || ( "$FAST" && listciphers "$1" "$2" -tls1 ); then
|
|
for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
# If $OPENSSL doesn't support TLSv1.3 or if no TLSv1.3
|
|
# ciphers are being tested, then a TLSv1.2 ClientHello
|
|
# was tested in the first iteration.
|
|
! "$HAS_TLS13" && continue
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && continue
|
|
fi
|
|
! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$proto" == -ssl3 ]] && continue
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
"$FAST" && continue
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "$1" -ciphersuites "\'$2\'" $BUGS $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $proto") 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
debugme cat $ERRFILE
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
# If $cipherlist doesn't contain any TLSv1.3 ciphers, then there is
|
|
# no reason to try a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
|
|
[[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$6" =~ 13,0 ]] && continue
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" ", $6")"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipherlist" ]] && [[ "$cipherlist" != 00,ff ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipherlist"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol ssl2) ]]; then
|
|
if ( [[ -z "$7" ]] || "$FAST" ) && "$HAS_SSL2" && listciphers "$1" "" -ssl2; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -cipher "$1" $BUGS $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
debugme cat $ERRFILE
|
|
elif [[ -n "$7" ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "$7" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_cipherlist="$(strip_spaces "${7//,/}")"
|
|
len=${#sslv2_cipherlist}
|
|
detected_ssl2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len; i+=6 )); do
|
|
[[ "$detected_ssl2_ciphers" =~ x${sslv2_cipherlist:i:6} ]] && sclient_success=0 && break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && $BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER; then
|
|
# If server failed with a known error, raise it to the user.
|
|
if [[ $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL == mysql ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "SERVER_ERROR: test inconclusive due to MySQL Community Edition (yaSSL) bug."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SERVER_ERROR, test inconclusive due to MySQL Community Edition (yaSSL) bug." "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "SERVER_ERROR: test inconclusive."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SERVER_ERROR, test inconclusive." "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
else
|
|
# Otherwise the error means the server doesn't support that cipher list.
|
|
case $4 in
|
|
7) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Strong is excellent to offer
|
|
pr_svrty_best "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
6) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# High is good to offer
|
|
pr_svrty_good "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
# FIXME: we don't penalize the absence of high, but perhaps
|
|
# we should if there is also no strong encryption (next)
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
5) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Neither good nor bad to offer
|
|
out "offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
4) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# medium is not that bad
|
|
pr_svrty_low "offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# bad but there is worse
|
|
pr_svrty_high "offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
# need a check for -eq 1 here
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
1) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# the ugly ones
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) # we shouldn't reach this
|
|
pr_warning "?: $4 (please report this)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "return condition $4 unclear" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Not a perfect place here. A new one should be picked in the future
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 && "$1" =~ (^|:)EXPORT(:|$) ]] && set_grade_cap "F" "Export suite offered"
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 && "$1" =~ AEAD ]] && set_grade_cap "B" "No AEAD ciphers offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.${5}.txt
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- $1"
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
singlespaces=$(sed -e 's/ \+/ /g' -e 's/^ //' -e 's/ $//g' -e 's/ //g' <<< "$3")
|
|
if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "No $singlespaces for SSLv2 configured in $OPENSSL"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_local_problem "No $singlespaces configured in $OPENSSL"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Cipher $3 ($1) not supported by local OpenSSL ($OPENSSL)"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#TODO: work with fixed lists here --> atm ok, as sockets are preferred. If there would be a single function for testing: yes.
|
|
run_cipherlists() {
|
|
local hexc hexcode strength
|
|
local -i i
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local ossl_null_ciphers null_ciphers sslv2_null_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_anon_ciphers anon_ciphers sslv2_anon_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_exp_ciphers exp_ciphers sslv2_exp_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_low_ciphers low_ciphers sslv2_low_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_tdes_ciphers tdes_ciphers sslv2_tdes_ciphers
|
|
local ossl_obsoleted_ciphers obsoleted_ciphers
|
|
local strong_ciphers
|
|
local cwe="CWE-327"
|
|
local cwe2="CWE-310"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing cipher categories "
|
|
outln
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
# conversion 2 byte ciphers via: echo "$@" | sed -e 's/[[:xdigit:]]\{2\},/0x&/g' -e 's/, /\n/g' | while read ci; do grep -wi $ci etc/cipher-mapping.txt; done
|
|
|
|
ossl_null_ciphers='NULL:eNULL'
|
|
null_ciphers="c0,10, c0,06, c0,15, c0,0b, c0,01, c0,3b, c0,3a, c0,39, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,b5, 00,b4, 00,2e, 00,2d, 00,b1, 00,b0, 00,2c, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, 00,82, 00,83, ff,87, 00,ff"
|
|
sslv2_null_ciphers="FF,80,10, 00,00,00"
|
|
|
|
ossl_anon_ciphers='aNULL:ADH'
|
|
anon_ciphers="c0,19, 00,a7, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, c0,47, c0,5b, c0,85, c0,18, 00,a6, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,46, c0,5a, c0,84, c0,16, 00,18, c0,17, 00,1b, 00,1a, 00,19, 00,17, c0,15, 00,ff"
|
|
sslv2_anon_ciphers="FF,80,10"
|
|
|
|
ossl_exp_ciphers='EXPORT:!ADH:!NULL'
|
|
# grep -i EXP etc/cipher-mapping.txt
|
|
exp_ciphers="00,63, 00,62, 00,61, 00,65, 00,64, 00,60, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e, 00,17, 00,03, 00,28, 00,2b, 00,ff"
|
|
sslv2_exp_ciphers="04,00,80, 02,00,80, 00,00,00"
|
|
|
|
ossl_low_ciphers='LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:MD5:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL:!AECDH'
|
|
# egrep -w '64|56|RC2|RC4|MD5' etc/cipher-mapping.txt | egrep -v 'Au=None|export'
|
|
low_ciphers="00,04, 00,05, 00,09, 00,0C, 00,0F, 00,12, 00,15, 00,1E, 00,20, 00,22, 00, 23, 00,24, 00,25, 00,66, 00,8A, 00,8E, 00,92, C0,02, C0,07, C0,0C, C0,11, C0,33, FF,00, FE,FE, FF,E1, 00,FF"
|
|
sslv2_low_ciphers="01,00,80, 03,00,80, 05,00,80, 06,00,40, 06,01,40, 07,00,c0, 08,00,80, FF,80,00"
|
|
|
|
ossl_tdes_ciphers='3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH:!MD5'
|
|
# egrep -w '3DES|IDEA' etc/cipher-mapping.txt | egrep -v "Au=None|MD5"
|
|
tdes_ciphers="00,07, 00,0A, 00,0D, 00,10, 00,13, 00,16, 00,1F, 00,21, 00,8B, 00,8F, 00,93, C0,03, C0,08, C0,0D, C0,12, C0,1A, C0,1B, C0,1C, C0,34, FE,FF, FF,E0, 00,FF"
|
|
sslv2_tdes_ciphers="07,01,c0"
|
|
|
|
# # Now all AES, CAMELLIA, ARIA and SEED CBC ciphers plus GOST
|
|
ossl_obsoleted_ciphers='HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL:!MD5'
|
|
# egrep -w "256|128" etc/cipher-mapping.txt | egrep -v "Au=None|AEAD|RC2|RC4|IDEA|MD5"
|
|
obsoleted_ciphers="00,2F, 00,30, 00,31, 00,32, 00,33, 00,35, 00,36, 00,37, 00,38, 00,39, 00,3C, 00,3D, 00,3E, 00,3F, 00,40, 00,41, 00,42, 00,43, 00,44, 00,45, 00,67, 00,68, 00,69, 00,6A, 00,6B, 00,84, 00,85, 00,86, 00,87, 00,88, 00,8C, 00,8D, 00,90, 00,91, 00,94, 00,95, 00,96, 00,97, 00,98, 00,99, 00,9A, 00,AE, 00,AF, 00,B2, 00,B3, 00,B6, 00,B7, 00,BA, 00,BB, 00,BC, 00,BD, 00,BE, 00,C0, 00,C1, 00,C2, 00,C3, 00,C4, C0,04, C0,05, C0,09, C0,0A, C0,0E, C0,0F, C0,13, C0,14, C0,1D, C0,1E, C0,1F, C0,20, C0,21, C0,22, C0,23, C0,24, C0,25, C0,26, C0,27, C0,28, C0,29, C0,2A, C0,35, C0,36, C0,37, C0,38, C0,3C, C0,3D, C0,3E, C0,3F, C0,40, C0,41, C0,42, C0,43, C0,44, C0,45, C0,48, C0,49, C0,4A, C0,4B, C0,4C, C0,4D, C0,4E, C0,4F, C0,64, C0,65, C0,66, C0,67, C0,68, C0,69, C0,70, C0,71, C0,72, C0,73, C0,74, C0,75, C0,76, C0,77, C0,78, C0,79, C0,94, C0,95, C0,96, C0,97, C0,98, C0,99, C0,9A, C0,9B"
|
|
# Workaround: If we use sockets and in order not to hit 131+1 ciphers we omit the GOST ciphers if SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG is true.
|
|
# This won't be supported by Cisco ACE anyway.
|
|
"$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" || obsoleted_ciphers="${obsoleted_ciphers}, 00,80, 00,81, FF,01, FF,02, FF,03, FF,85"
|
|
obsoleted_ciphers="${obsoleted_ciphers}, 00,FF"
|
|
|
|
ossl_good_ciphers='AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kEECDH:!kEDH:!kDHE:!kDHEPSK:!kECDHEPSK:!aNULL'
|
|
# grep AEAD etc/cipher-mapping.txt | egrep -v 'Au=None|TLS_ECDHE|TLS_DHE|TLS_PSK_DHE|TLSv1.3'
|
|
good_ciphers="00,9C, 00,9D, 00,A0, 00,A1, 00,A4, 00,A5, 00,A8, 00,A9, 00,AC, 00,AD, C0,2D, C0,2E, C0,31, C0,32, C0,50, C0,51, C0,54, C0,55, C0,58, C0,59, C0,5E, C0,5F, C0,62, C0,63, C0,6A, C0,6B, C0,6E, C0,6F, C0,7A, C0,7B, C0,7E, C0,7F, C0,82, C0,83, C0,88, C0,89, C0,8C, C0,8D, C0,8E, C0,8F, C0,92, C0,93, C0,9C, C0,9D, C0,A0, C0,A1, C0,A4, C0,A5, C0,A8, C0,A9, CC,AB, CC,AE, 00,FF"
|
|
|
|
ossl_strong_ciphers='AESGCM:CHACHA20:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM:!kPSK:!kRSAPSK:!kRSA:!kDH:!kECDH:!aNULL'
|
|
# grep AEAD etc/cipher-mapping.txt | egrep 'TLS_ECDHE|TLS_DHE|TLS_PSK_DHE|TLSv1.3'
|
|
strong_ciphers="00,9E, 00,9F, 00,A2, 00,A3, 00,AA, 00,AB, 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 16,B7, 16,B8, 16,B9, 16,BA, C0,2B, C0,2C, C0,2F, C0,30, C0,52, C0,53, C0,56, C0,57, C0,5C, C0,5D, C0,60, C0,61, C0,6C, C0,6D, C0,7C, C0,7D, C0,80, C0,81, C0,86, C0,87, C0,8A, C0,8B, C0,90, C0,91, C0,9E, C0,9F, C0,A2, C0,A3, C0,A6, C0,A7, C0,AA, C0,AB, C0,AC, C0,AD, C0,AE, C0,AF, CC,13, CC,14, CC,15, CC,A8, CC,A9, CC,AA, CC,AC, CC,AD, 00,FF"
|
|
|
|
# argv[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax
|
|
# argv[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax
|
|
# argv[3]: string on console / HTML or "finding"
|
|
# argv[4]: rating whether ok to offer
|
|
# argv[5]: string to be appended for fileout
|
|
# argv[6]: non-SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets
|
|
# argv[7]: SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets
|
|
# argv[8]: true if using sockets, false if not
|
|
# argv[9]: CVE
|
|
# argv[10]: CWE
|
|
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_null_ciphers" "" " NULL ciphers (no encryption) " 1 "NULL" "$null_ciphers" "$sslv2_null_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_anon_ciphers" "" " Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication) " 1 "aNULL" "$anon_ciphers" "$sslv2_anon_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_exp_ciphers" "" " Export ciphers (w/o ADH+NULL) " 1 "EXPORT" "$exp_ciphers" "$sslv2_exp_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_low_ciphers" "" " LOW: 64 Bit + DES, RC[2,4], MD5 (w/o export) " 2 "LOW" "$low_ciphers" "$sslv2_low_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_tdes_ciphers" "" " Triple DES Ciphers / IDEA " 3 "3DES_IDEA" "$tdes_ciphers" "$sslv2_tdes_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe2"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_obsoleted_ciphers" "" " Obsoleted CBC ciphers (AES, ARIA etc.) " 4 "AVERAGE" "$obsoleted_ciphers" "" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe2"
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_good_ciphers" "" " Strong encryption (AEAD ciphers) with no FS " 6 "GOOD" "$good_ciphers" "" "$using_sockets" "" ""
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
sub_cipherlists "$ossl_strong_ciphers" 'ALL' " Forward Secrecy strong encryption (AEAD ciphers)" 7 "STRONG" "$strong_ciphers" "" "$using_sockets" "" ""
|
|
ret=$((ret + $?))
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# The return value is an indicator of the quality of the DH key length in $1:
|
|
# 1 = pr_svrty_critical, 2 = pr_svrty_high, 3 = pr_svrty_medium, 4 = pr_svrty_low
|
|
# 5 = neither good nor bad, 6 = pr_svrty_good, 7 = pr_svrty_best
|
|
pr_dh_quality() {
|
|
local bits="$1"
|
|
local string="$2"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$bits" -le 600 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$string"
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 800 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$string"
|
|
return 2
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 1280 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$string"
|
|
return 3
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -ge 2048 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$string"
|
|
return 6
|
|
else
|
|
out "$string"
|
|
return 5
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# prints out dh group=prime and in round brackets DH bits and labels it accordingly
|
|
# arg1: name of dh group, arg2=bit length
|
|
pr_dh() {
|
|
local -i quality=0
|
|
|
|
pr_italic "$1"
|
|
out " ("
|
|
pr_dh_quality "$2" "$2 bits"
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
out ")"
|
|
return $quality
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality() {
|
|
local bits="$1"
|
|
local string="$2"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$bits" -le 80 ]]; then # has that ever existed?
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$string"
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 108 ]]; then # has that ever existed?
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$string"
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 163 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$string"
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 193 ]]; then # hmm, according to https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography it should ok
|
|
pr_svrty_low "$string" # but openssl removed it https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/299#issuecomment-220905416
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -le 224 ]]; then
|
|
out "$string"
|
|
elif [[ "$bits" -gt 224 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$string"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$string"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pr_ecdh_curve_quality() {
|
|
curve="$1"
|
|
local -i bits=0
|
|
|
|
case "$curve" in
|
|
"sect163k1") bits=163 ;;
|
|
"sect163r1") bits=162 ;;
|
|
"sect163r2") bits=163 ;;
|
|
"sect193r1") bits=193 ;;
|
|
"sect193r2") bits=193 ;;
|
|
"sect233k1") bits=232 ;;
|
|
"sect233r1") bits=233 ;;
|
|
"sect239k1") bits=238 ;;
|
|
"sect283k1") bits=281 ;;
|
|
"sect283r1") bits=282 ;;
|
|
"sect409k1") bits=407 ;;
|
|
"sect409r1") bits=409 ;;
|
|
"sect571k1") bits=570 ;;
|
|
"sect571r1") bits=570 ;;
|
|
"secp160k1") bits=161 ;;
|
|
"secp160r1") bits=161 ;;
|
|
"secp160r2") bits=161 ;;
|
|
"secp192k1") bits=192 ;;
|
|
"prime192v1") bits=192 ;;
|
|
"secp224k1") bits=225 ;;
|
|
"secp224r1") bits=224 ;;
|
|
"secp256k1") bits=256 ;;
|
|
"prime256v1") bits=256 ;;
|
|
"secp384r1") bits=384 ;;
|
|
"secp521r1") bits=521 ;;
|
|
"brainpoolP256r1") bits=256 ;;
|
|
"brainpoolP384r1") bits=384 ;;
|
|
"brainpoolP512r1") bits=512 ;;
|
|
"X25519") bits=253 ;;
|
|
"X448") bits=448 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$curve"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return a value that is an indicator of the quality of the cipher in $1:
|
|
# 0 = $1 is empty
|
|
# 1 = pr_svrty_critical, 2 = pr_svrty_high, 3 = pr_svrty_medium, 4 = pr_svrty_low
|
|
# 5 = neither good nor bad, 6 = pr_svrty_good, 7 = pr_svrty_best
|
|
#
|
|
# Please note this section isn't particular spot on. It needs to be reconsidered/redone
|
|
# SHA1, SSLv3 ciphers are some points which need to be considered.
|
|
# Hint: find out by "grep <pattern> etc/cipher-mapping.txt" but it' might be be easier
|
|
# to look out Enc= and Au= or Mac=
|
|
#
|
|
get_cipher_quality() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local ossl_cipher
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$cipher" != SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
# This must be the OpenSSL name for a cipher or for TLS 1.3 ($TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS)
|
|
# We can ignore them however as the OpenSSL and RFC names currently match
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# We have an OpenSSL name and can't convert it to the RFC name which is rarely
|
|
# the case, see "prepare_arrays()" and "./etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*NULL*|EXP*|ADH*|AECDH*|*anon*)
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
*RC4*|*RC2*|*MD5|*M1)
|
|
return 2
|
|
;;
|
|
AES256-GCM-SHA384|AES128-GCM-SHA256|AES256-CCM*|AES128-CCM*|ARIA256-GCM-SHA384|ARIA128-GCM-SHA256)
|
|
# RSA kx and e.g. GCM isn't certainly the best
|
|
return 6
|
|
;;
|
|
*CBC3*|*3DES*|*IDEA*)
|
|
return 3
|
|
;;
|
|
*DES*)
|
|
return 2
|
|
;;
|
|
PSK-*GCM*|PSK-*CCM*|RSA-PSK-*GCM*|RSA-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305|PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305)
|
|
# PSK kx and e.g. GCM isn't certainly the best
|
|
return 6
|
|
;;
|
|
DH-*GCM*|ECDH-*GCM*)
|
|
# static DH or ECDH kx and GCM isn't certainly the best
|
|
return 6
|
|
;;
|
|
*GCM*|*CCM*|*CHACHA20*)
|
|
return 7
|
|
;; #best ones
|
|
*AES*SHA*|*CAMELLIA*SHA*|*SEED*SHA*|*CBC*|*GOST*)
|
|
return 4
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
return 5
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
ossl_cipher="$cipher"
|
|
cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher="$ossl_cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now we look at the RFC cipher names. The sequence matters - as above.
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*NULL*|*EXP*|*_DES40_*|*anon*)
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
*RC4*|*RC2*|*MD5|*MD5_1)
|
|
return 2
|
|
;;
|
|
*_DES_*)
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" =~ EDE3 ]]; then
|
|
return 3
|
|
fi
|
|
return 2
|
|
;;
|
|
*CBC3*|*3DES*|*IDEA*)
|
|
return 3
|
|
;;
|
|
*CBC*|*GOST*)
|
|
return 4
|
|
;;
|
|
TLS_RSA_*|TLS_DH_*|TLS_ECDH_*|TLS_PSK_WITH_*)
|
|
# RSA, or static DH, ECDH, or PSK kx and e.g. GCM isn't certainly the best
|
|
return 6
|
|
;;
|
|
*GCM*|*CCM*|*CHACHA20*)
|
|
return 7
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
return 5
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Output the severity level associated with the cipher in $1.
|
|
get_cipher_quality_severity() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local -i quality
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
get_cipher_quality "$cipher"
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
case $quality in
|
|
1) tm_out "CRITICAL" ;;
|
|
2) tm_out "HIGH" ;;
|
|
3) tm_out "MEDIUM" ;;
|
|
4) tm_out "LOW" ;;
|
|
5) tm_out "INFO" ;;
|
|
6|7) tm_out "OK" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return $quality
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Print $2 based on the quality of the cipher in $1. If $2 is empty, just print $1.
|
|
# The return value is an indicator of the quality of the cipher in $1:
|
|
# 0 = $1 is empty
|
|
# 1 = pr_svrty_critical, 2 = pr_svrty_high, 3 = pr_svrty_medium, 4 = pr_svrty_low
|
|
# 5 = neither good nor bad, 6 = pr_svrty_good, 7 = pr_svrty_best
|
|
#
|
|
pr_cipher_quality() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local text="$2"
|
|
local -i quality
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ -z "$text" ]] && text="$cipher"
|
|
|
|
get_cipher_quality "$cipher"
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
case $quality in
|
|
1) pr_svrty_critical "$text" ;;
|
|
2) pr_svrty_high "$text" ;;
|
|
3) pr_svrty_medium "$text" ;;
|
|
4) pr_svrty_low "$text" ;;
|
|
5) out "$text" ;;
|
|
6) pr_svrty_good "$text" ;;
|
|
7) pr_svrty_best "$text" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return $quality
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: file with input for grepping the type of ephemeral DH key (DH ECDH)
|
|
read_dhtype_from_file() {
|
|
local temp kx
|
|
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$1") # extract line
|
|
kx="Kx=${temp%%,*}"
|
|
[[ "$kx" == "Kx=X25519" ]] && kx="Kx=ECDH"
|
|
[[ "$kx" == "Kx=X448" ]] && kx="Kx=ECDH"
|
|
tm_out "$kx"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: certificate file
|
|
read_sigalg_from_file() {
|
|
local sig_alg
|
|
|
|
sig_alg="$(strip_leading_space "$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -text -in "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; exit; }')")"
|
|
case "$sig_alg" in
|
|
1.3.101.112|ED25519) tm_out "Ed25519" ;;
|
|
1.3.101.113|ED448) tm_out "Ed448" ;;
|
|
*) tm_out "$sig_alg" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: file with input for grepping the bit length for ECDH/DHE
|
|
# arg2: whether to print warning "old fart" or not (empty: no)
|
|
read_dhbits_from_file() {
|
|
local bits what_dh temp curve=""
|
|
local add=""
|
|
local old_fart=" (your $OPENSSL cannot show DH bits)"
|
|
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$1") # extract line
|
|
what_dh="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
bits="${temp##*, }"
|
|
curve="${temp#*, }"
|
|
if [[ "$curve" == "$bits" ]]; then
|
|
curve=""
|
|
else
|
|
curve="${curve%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
bits="${bits/bits/}"
|
|
bits="${bits// /}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$what_dh" == X25519 ]] || [[ "$what_dh" == X448 ]]; then
|
|
curve="$what_dh"
|
|
what_dh="ECDH"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$2" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$curve" ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo ">$HAS_DH_BITS|$what_dh($curve)|$bits<"
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo ">$HAS_DH_BITS|$what_dh|$bits<"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$what_dh" ]] && HAS_DH_BITS=true # FIX 190
|
|
if [[ -z "$what_dh" ]] && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then
|
|
if [[ "$2" == "string" ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$old_fart"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$2" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "$old_fart"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$2" == quiet ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$bits"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && [[ -n "$bits" ]] && out ", "
|
|
if [[ $what_dh == DH ]] || [[ $what_dh == EDH ]]; then
|
|
add="bit DH"
|
|
[[ -n "$curve" ]] && add+=" ($curve)"
|
|
if [[ "$2" == string ]]; then
|
|
tm_out ", $bits $add"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_dh_quality "$bits" "$bits $add"
|
|
fi
|
|
# https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography, https://www.keylength.com/en/compare/
|
|
elif [[ $what_dh == ECDH ]]; then
|
|
add="bit ECDH"
|
|
[[ -n "$curve" ]] && add+=" ($curve)"
|
|
if [[ "$2" == string ]]; then
|
|
tm_out ", $bits $add"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$bits $add"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: ID or empty. If empty resumption by ticket will be tested, otherwise by ID
|
|
# return: 0: it has resumption, 1:nope, 2: nope (OpenSSL 1.1.1), 6: CLIENT_AUTH --> problem for resumption, 7: can't tell
|
|
#
|
|
# This is basically a short(?) version from Bulletproof SSL and TLS (p386). The version according to that would be e.g.
|
|
# echo | $OPENSSL s_client -connect testssl.sh:443 -servername testssl.sh -no_ssl2 -reconnect 2>&1 | grep -E 'New|Reused'
|
|
# echo | $OPENSSL s_client -connect testssl.sh:443 -servername testssl.sh -no_ssl2 -no_ticket -reconnect 2>&1 | grep -E 'New|Reused|Session-ID'
|
|
#
|
|
# FIXME: actually Ivan's version seems faster. Worth to check and since when -reconnect is a/v
|
|
#
|
|
sub_session_resumption() {
|
|
local ret ret1 ret2
|
|
local tmpfile=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/session_resumption.$NODEIP.XXXXXX)
|
|
local sess_data=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/sub_session_data_resumption.$NODEIP.XXXXXX)
|
|
local -a rw_line
|
|
local protocol="$1"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$2" == ID ]]; then
|
|
local byID=true
|
|
local addcmd="-no_ticket"
|
|
else
|
|
local byID=false
|
|
local addcmd=""
|
|
if ! "$TLS_TICKETS"; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]] && return 6
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$HAS_NO_SSL2"; then
|
|
addcmd+=" -no_ssl2"
|
|
else
|
|
protocol=${protocol/\./_}
|
|
protocol=${protocol/v/}
|
|
protocol="-$(tolower $protocol)"
|
|
# In some cases a server will not support session tickets, but will support session resumption
|
|
# by ID. In such a case, it may be more likely to support session resumption with TLSv1.2 than
|
|
# with TLSv1.3. So, if testing a server that does not support session tickets and that supports
|
|
# both TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.2 for session resumption by ID, then use a TLSv1.2 ClientHello. (Note that
|
|
# the line below assumes that if $protocol is -tls1_3, then the server either supports TLSv1.2 or
|
|
# is TLSv1.3-only.
|
|
! "$TLS_TICKETS" && "$byID" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_2") -eq 0 ]] && protocol="-tls1_2"
|
|
addcmd+=" $protocol"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $addcmd -sess_out $sess_data") </dev/null &>$tmpfile
|
|
ret1=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# MacOS and LibreSSL return 1 here, that's why we need to check whether the handshake contains e.g. a certificate
|
|
if [[ ! $(<$tmpfile) =~ -----.*\ CERTIFICATE----- ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "Couldn't connect #1 "
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$byID" && [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && \
|
|
( [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]] ) && \
|
|
[[ ! -s "$sess_data" ]]; then
|
|
# it seems OpenSSL indicates no Session ID resumption by just not generating output
|
|
debugme echo -n "No session resumption byID (empty file)"
|
|
# If we want to check the presence of session data:
|
|
# [[ ! $(<$sess_data) =~ -----.*\ SSL\ SESSION\ PARAMETERS----- ]]
|
|
ret=2
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $addcmd -sess_in $sess_data") </dev/null >$tmpfile 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
ret2=$?
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo -n "$ret1, $ret2, "
|
|
[[ -s "$sess_data" ]] && echo "not empty" || echo "empty"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret2 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ! $(<$tmpfile) =~ -----.*\ CERTIFICATE----- ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "Couldn't connect #2 "
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# "Reused" indicates session material was reused, "New": not
|
|
if grep -aq "^Reused" "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
new_sid=false
|
|
elif grep -aq "^New" "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
new_sid=true
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -n "Problem with 2nd ServerHello "
|
|
fi
|
|
# Now get the line and compare the numbers "read" and "written" as a second criteria.
|
|
# If the "read" number is bigger: a new session ID was probably used.
|
|
rw_line="$(awk '/^SSL handshake has read/ { print $5" "$(NF-1) }' "$tmpfile" )"
|
|
rw_line=($rw_line)
|
|
if [[ "${rw_line[0]}" -gt "${rw_line[1]}" ]]; then
|
|
new_sid2=true
|
|
else
|
|
new_sid2=false
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "${rw_line[0]}, ${rw_line[1]}"
|
|
|
|
if "$new_sid2" && "$new_sid"; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "No session resumption "
|
|
ret=1
|
|
elif ! "$new_sid2" && ! "$new_sid"; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "Session resumption "
|
|
ret=0
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -n "unclear status: $ret1, $ret2, $new_sid, $new_sid2 -- "
|
|
ret=5
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
"$byID" && echo "byID" || echo "by ticket"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
"$byID" && \
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.byID.log $tmpfile || \
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.byticket.log $tmpfile
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_server_preference() {
|
|
local cipher1="" cipher2="" tls13_cipher1="" tls13_cipher2="" default_proto=""
|
|
local default_cipher="" ciph
|
|
local limitedsense="" supported_sslv2_ciphers
|
|
local proto_ossl proto_txt proto_hex cipherlist i
|
|
local -i ret=0 j sclient_success
|
|
local list_fwd="DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:SEED-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RC4-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-SHA:AES128-SHA:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
|
|
local list_reverse="ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES256-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:RC4-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
|
|
tls_list_fwd="c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f, 00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a, 00,04, 00,05, 00,09, 00,0a, 00,9a, 00,96,
|
|
c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f, 00,ff"
|
|
tls_list_rev="00,2f, 00,35, 00,3c, 00,3d, 13,05, 13,04, 13,03, 13,02, 13,01, 00,9c, 00,9d, 00,33, c0,13, c0,09, 00,39, c0,14, 00,96, 00,9a, 00,0a, 00,09, 00,05, 00,04,
|
|
c0,0a, 00,67, c0,27, c0,23, 00,6b, c0,28, c0,24, 00,9e, c0,2f, c0,2b, cc,aa, cc,a8, cc,a9, 00,9f, c0,30, c0,2c, 00,ff"
|
|
local has_cipher_order=false has_tls13_cipher_order=false
|
|
local addcmd="" addcmd2=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local jsonID="cipher_order"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing server's cipher preferences "
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
addcmd="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
else
|
|
# the supplied openssl will send an SSLv2 ClientHello if $SNI is empty
|
|
# and the -no_ssl2 isn't provided.
|
|
addcmd="-no_ssl2 $SNI"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Determine negotiated protocol upfront
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
# Send similar list of cipher suites as OpenSSL 1.1.1 does
|
|
tls_sockets "04" \
|
|
"c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f, 00,9a, 00,96,
|
|
00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a,
|
|
c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,02,
|
|
13,03, 13,01, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f, 00,ff" \
|
|
"ephemeralkey"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
elif [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_success=0 # 2: downgraded
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0303) add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] ; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"
|
|
cipher0=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt")
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >"$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"; then
|
|
cipher0=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt")
|
|
debugme tm_out "0 --> $cipher0\n"
|
|
else
|
|
# 2 second try with $OPTIMAL_PROTO especially for intolerant IIS6 servers:
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >"$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt"; then
|
|
cipher0=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt")
|
|
debugme tm_out "0 --> $cipher0\n"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "Handshake error!"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && default_proto=$(get_protocol "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt")
|
|
[[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.0 ]] && default_proto="TLSv1"
|
|
# debugme tm_out " --> $default_proto\n"
|
|
|
|
# Some servers don't have a TLS 1.3 cipher order, see #1163
|
|
if [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "13,05, 13,04, 13,03, 13,02, 13,01, 00,ff"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1 && prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 1))"
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
tls13_cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
debugme tm_out "TLS 1.3: --> $tls13_cipher1\n"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 00,ff"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1 && prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 1))"
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
tls13_cipher2=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
debugme tm_out "TLS 1.3: --> $tls13_cipher2\n"
|
|
|
|
[[ $tls13_cipher1 == $tls13_cipher2 ]] && has_tls13_cipher_order=true
|
|
fi
|
|
# Check whether the server has a cipher order for SSLv3 - TLSv1.2
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_2") -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -ne 0 ]] && \
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1") -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Based on testing performed by determine_optimal_sockets_params(), it is believed that
|
|
# this server does not offer SSLv3 - TLSv1.2.
|
|
has_cipher_order="$has_tls13_cipher_order"
|
|
elif [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]]; then
|
|
[[ ! "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" =~ ssl ]] && addcmd2="$SNI"
|
|
[[ "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -tls1_3 ]] && addcmd2+=" $STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
else
|
|
addcmd2="-no_ssl2 $SNI"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo -e "\n Forward: ${list_fwd}"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -cipher $list_fwd $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd2") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if ! sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
list_fwd="$(actually_supported_osslciphers $list_fwd '' '-no_ssl2')"
|
|
pr_warning "no matching cipher in this list found (pls report this): "
|
|
outln "$list_fwd . "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Could not determine server cipher order, no matching cipher in list found (pls report this): $list_fwd"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
# we assume the problem is with testing here but it could be also the server side
|
|
else
|
|
cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) # cipher1 from 1st serverhello
|
|
debugme tm_out "1 --> $cipher1\n"
|
|
|
|
# second client hello with reverse list
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo -e "\n Reverse: ${list_reverse}"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -cipher $list_reverse $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd2") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
# first handshake worked above so no error handling here
|
|
cipher2=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) # cipher2 from 2nd serverhello
|
|
debugme tm_out "2 --> $cipher2\n"
|
|
|
|
[[ $cipher1 == $cipher2 ]] && has_cipher_order=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "has_cipher_order: $has_cipher_order"
|
|
debugme echo "has_tls13_cipher_order: $has_tls13_cipher_order"
|
|
|
|
# restore file from above
|
|
[[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]] || [[ -n "$cipher2" ]]; then
|
|
cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Sanity check: Handshake with no ciphers and one with forward list didn't overlap
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$cipher0" != $cipher1 ]]; then
|
|
limitedsense=" (matching cipher in list missing)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipher1" ]]; then
|
|
ciph="$cipher1"
|
|
else
|
|
ciph="$cipher0"
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && ( [[ "$ciph" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == SSL_* ]] ); then
|
|
default_cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$ciph")"
|
|
elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ "$ciph" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$ciph" != SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
default_cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$ciph")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$default_cipher" ]] && default_cipher="$ciph"
|
|
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
neat_header
|
|
while read proto_ossl proto_hex proto_txt; do
|
|
pr_underline "$(printf -- "%b" "$proto_txt")"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto_ossl") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
outln "\n - "
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
# TODO: Also the fact that a protocol is not supported seems not to be saved by cipher_pref_check()
|
|
# (./testssl.sh --wide -p -P -E vs ./testssl.sh --wide -P -E )
|
|
if [[ $proto_ossl == ssl2 ]] || \
|
|
( [[ $proto_ossl != tls1_3 ]] && ! "$has_cipher_order" ) || \
|
|
( [[ $proto_ossl == tls1_3 ]] && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order" ); then
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipher2" ]] && [[ $proto_ossl != ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_by_strength "-$proto_ossl" "$proto_hex" "$proto_txt" "$using_sockets" "true" "true"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_by_strength "-$proto_ossl" "$proto_hex" "$proto_txt" "$using_sockets" "true" "false"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
cipher_pref_check "$proto_ossl" "$proto_hex" "$proto_txt" "$using_sockets" "true"
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$(tm_out " ssl2 22 SSLv2\n ssl3 00 SSLv3\n tls1 01 TLSv1\n tls1_1 02 TLSv1.1\n tls1_2 03 TLSv1.2\n tls1_3 04 TLSv1.3\n")"
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Has server cipher order? "
|
|
jsonID="cipher_order"
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then
|
|
out "no (TLS 1.3 only)"
|
|
limitedsense=" (limited sense as client will pick)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not a cipher order for TLS 1.3 configured"
|
|
elif ! "$TLS13_ONLY" && [[ -z "$cipher2" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "unable to determine"
|
|
elif ! "$has_cipher_order" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then
|
|
# server used the different ends (ciphers) from the client hello
|
|
pr_svrty_high "no (NOT ok)"
|
|
limitedsense=" (limited sense as client will pick)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "NOT a cipher order configured"
|
|
elif "$has_cipher_order" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order" && [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "yes (OK)"; out " -- only for < TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server -- TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
elif ! "$has_cipher_order" && "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "no (NOT ok)"; out " -- only for TLS 1.3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "server -- < TLS 1.3 client determined"
|
|
else
|
|
if "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
out "yes (TLS 1.3 only)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "server (TLS 1.3)"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "yes (OK)"
|
|
out " -- TLS 1.3 and below"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# we don't have TLS 1.3 at all
|
|
pr_svrty_best "yes (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Negotiated protocol "
|
|
jsonID="protocol_negotiated"
|
|
|
|
case "$default_proto" in
|
|
*TLSv1.3)
|
|
prln_svrty_best $default_proto
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "Default protocol TLS1.3"
|
|
;;
|
|
*TLSv1.2)
|
|
prln_svrty_best $default_proto
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "Default protocol TLS1.2"
|
|
;;
|
|
*TLSv1.1)
|
|
prln_svrty_low $default_proto
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "Default protocol TLS1.1"
|
|
;;
|
|
*TLSv1)
|
|
prln_svrty_low $default_proto
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "Default protocol TLS1.0"
|
|
;;
|
|
*SSLv2)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical $default_proto
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "Default protocol SSLv2"
|
|
;;
|
|
*SSLv3)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical $default_proto
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "Default protocol SSLv3"
|
|
;;
|
|
"")
|
|
pr_warning "default proto empty"
|
|
if [[ $OSSL_VER == 1.0.2* ]]; then
|
|
outln " (Hint: if IIS6 give OpenSSL 1.0.1 a try)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Default protocol empty (Hint: if IIS6 give OpenSSL 1.0.1 a try)"
|
|
else
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Default protocol empty"
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
pr_warning "FIXME line $LINENO: $default_proto"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "FIXME line $LINENO: $default_proto"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Negotiated cipher "
|
|
jsonID="cipher_negotiated"
|
|
pr_cipher_quality "$default_cipher"
|
|
case $? in
|
|
1) fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.run_server_preference.txt" "string") $limitedsense"
|
|
;;
|
|
2) fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.run_server_preference.txt" "string") $limitedsense"
|
|
;;
|
|
3) fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.run_server_preference.txt" "string") $limitedsense"
|
|
;;
|
|
6|7) fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.run_server_preference.txt" "string") $limitedsense"
|
|
;; # best ones
|
|
4) fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.run_server_preference.txt" "string") (cbc) $limitedsense"
|
|
;; # it's CBC. --> lucky13
|
|
0) pr_warning "default cipher empty" ;
|
|
if [[ $OSSL_VER == 1.0.2* ]]; then
|
|
out " (Hint: if IIS6 give OpenSSL 1.0.1 a try)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Default cipher empty (if IIS6 give OpenSSL 1.0.1 a try) $limitedsense"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Default cipher empty $limitedsense"
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
*) fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.run_server_preference.txt" "string") $limitedsense"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ -n "$default_cipher" ]] && read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.run_server_preference.txt"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher0" != $cipher1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning " -- inconclusive test, matching cipher in list missing"
|
|
outln ", better see above"
|
|
#FIXME: This is ugly but the best we can do before rewrite this section
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$limitedsense"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
# end of run_server_preference()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: true if the list that is returned does not need to be ordered by preference.
|
|
check_tls12_pref() {
|
|
local unordered_list_ok="$1"
|
|
local chacha20_ciphers="" non_chacha20_ciphers=""
|
|
local batchremoved="-CAMELLIA:-IDEA:-KRB5:-PSK:-SRP:-aNULL:-eNULL"
|
|
local batchremoved_success=false
|
|
local tested_cipher="" cipher ciphers_to_test
|
|
local order=""
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers_found_r1=0 nr_ciphers_found_r2=0
|
|
|
|
# Place ChaCha20 ciphers at the end of the list to avoid accidentally
|
|
# triggering the server's PrioritizeChaCha setting.
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$(actually_supported_osslciphers "ALL:$batchremoved" "" "")"
|
|
for cipher in $(colon_to_spaces "$ciphers_to_test"); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher:" || non_chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher:"
|
|
done
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$non_chacha20_ciphers$chacha20_ciphers"
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test%:}"
|
|
|
|
while true; do
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "$ciphers_to_test$tested_cipher" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
order+=" $cipher"
|
|
tested_cipher="$tested_cipher:-$cipher"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found_r1+=1
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
else
|
|
debugme tmln_out "A: $tested_cipher"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
batchremoved="${batchremoved//-/}"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
# no ciphers from "ALL$tested_cipher:$batchremoved" left
|
|
# now we check $batchremoved, and remove the minus signs first:
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "$batchremoved" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then
|
|
batchremoved_success=true # signals that we have some of those ciphers and need to put everything together later on
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
order+=" $cipher"
|
|
batchremoved="$batchremoved:-$cipher"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found_r1+=1
|
|
debugme tmln_out "B1: $batchremoved"
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
else
|
|
debugme tmln_out "B2: $batchremoved"
|
|
break
|
|
# nothing left with batchremoved ciphers, we need to put everything together
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$batchremoved_success" && ! "$unordered_list_ok"; then
|
|
# now we combine the two cipher sets from both while loops
|
|
|
|
# Place ChaCha20 ciphers at the end of the list to avoid accidentally
|
|
# triggering the server's PrioritizeChaCha setting.
|
|
chacha20_ciphers=""; non_chacha20_ciphers=""
|
|
for cipher in $order; do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher " || non_chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher "
|
|
done
|
|
combined_ciphers="$non_chacha20_ciphers$chacha20_ciphers"
|
|
order="" ; tested_cipher=""
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for cipher in $combined_ciphers; do
|
|
[[ ! "$tested_cipher:" =~ :-$cipher: ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$cipher"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
order+=" $cipher"
|
|
tested_cipher="$tested_cipher:-$cipher"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found_r2+=1
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
else
|
|
# This shouldn't happen.
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if "$FAST" && [[ $nr_ciphers_found_r2 -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 14))"
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif ! "$FAST" && [[ $nr_ciphers_found_r2 -ne $nr_ciphers_found_r1 ]]; then
|
|
prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 16))"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$order"
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# At the moment only called from run_server_preference()
|
|
cipher_pref_check() {
|
|
local proto="$1" proto_hex="$2" proto_text="$3"
|
|
local using_sockets="$4"
|
|
local wide="$5" # at the moment always = true
|
|
local tested_cipher cipher order="" rfc_cipher rfc_order
|
|
local -i i nr_ciphers nr_nonossl_ciphers num_bundles bundle_size bundle end_of_bundle success
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers_found
|
|
local hexc ciphers_to_test cipher_list="" chacha20_ciphers non_chacha20_ciphers
|
|
local first_cipher first_chacha_cipher
|
|
local -a normalized_hexcode ciph kx enc export2 sigalg
|
|
local -a rfc_ciph hexcode ciphers_found ciphers_found2
|
|
local -a -i index
|
|
local ciphers_found_with_sockets=false prioritize_chacha=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ $proto == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl3\"";
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]] && ! "$HAS_TLS13" && ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_3\"";
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ( [[ $proto != tls1_3 ]] || "$HAS_TLS13" ) && ( [[ $proto != ssl3 ]] || "$HAS_SSL3" ); then
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_2 ]] && "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" && \
|
|
[[ "$(count_ciphers "$(actually_supported_osslciphers "ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL" "" "")")" -gt 127 ]]; then
|
|
order="$(check_tls12_pref "$wide")"
|
|
[[ "${order:0:1}" == \ ]] && order="${order:1}"
|
|
cipher_list="$order"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$wide" || [[ -z "$order" ]]; then
|
|
# Place ChaCha20 ciphers at the end of the list to avoid accidentally
|
|
# triggering the server's PrioritizeChaCha setting.
|
|
chacha20_ciphers=""; non_chacha20_ciphers=""
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
cipher_list="$(colon_to_spaces "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS")"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$cipher_list" ]]; then
|
|
cipher_list="$(colon_to_spaces "$(actually_supported_osslciphers "ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL" "" "")")"
|
|
fi
|
|
for cipher in $cipher_list; do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher " || non_chacha20_ciphers+="$cipher "
|
|
done
|
|
cipher_list="$non_chacha20_ciphers $chacha20_ciphers"
|
|
|
|
tested_cipher=""; order=""; nr_ciphers_found=0
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for cipher in $cipher_list; do
|
|
[[ ! "$tested_cipher:" =~ :-$cipher: ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$cipher"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if [[ $proto != tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="-cipher ${ciphers_to_test:1}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test="-ciphersuites ${ciphers_to_test:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -"$proto" $BUGS $ciphers_to_test -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break
|
|
order+="$cipher "
|
|
tested_cipher+=":-"$cipher
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
if "$wide"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && continue
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers_found]="$(normalize_ciphercode "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
[[ $proto == tls1_3 ]] && kx[nr_ciphers_found]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers_found]+=" $(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)"
|
|
fi
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers_found]=""
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers_found]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers=0
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=false
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ " $order " =~ \ ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}\ ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
# Only test ciphers that are relevant to the protocol.
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ $proto == tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
num_bundles=0
|
|
elif [[ $proto != tls1_2 ]] || ! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then
|
|
num_bundles=1
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
else
|
|
num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%128)) -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles+=1
|
|
|
|
bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles
|
|
[[ $((nr_nonossl_ciphers%num_bundles)) -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do
|
|
end_of_bundle=$(( (bundle+1)*bundle_size ))
|
|
[[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == ${rfc_ciph[i]} ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
ciphers_found_with_sockets=true
|
|
if [[ $proto != tls1_2 ]] || ! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then
|
|
# Throw out the results found so far and start over using just sockets
|
|
bundle=$num_bundles
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
done
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# If additional ciphers were found using sockets and there is no
|
|
# SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG, then just use sockets to find the cipher order.
|
|
# If there is a SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG, then use sockets to find the cipher
|
|
# order, but starting with the list of ciphers supported by the server.
|
|
if "$ciphers_found_with_sockets"; then
|
|
# Create an array of the ciphers to test with any ChaCha20
|
|
# listed last in order to avoid accidentally triggering the
|
|
# server's PriorizeChaCha setting.
|
|
order=""; nr_ciphers=0; nr_ciphers_found=0
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && continue
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && continue
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ $proto == tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] || [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] || continue
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
if [[ $proto == tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ $proto == tls1_2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && \
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$wide" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == ${rfc_ciph[i]} ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
if "$wide"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == ${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]} ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && continue
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers_found]="$(normalize_ciphercode "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
[[ $proto == tls1_3 ]] && kx[nr_ciphers_found]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers_found]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers_found]+=" $(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)"
|
|
fi
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers_found]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers_found]=""
|
|
"$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers_found]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
nr_ciphers_found+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$cipher")"
|
|
# If there is no OpenSSL name for the cipher, then use the RFC name
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
fi
|
|
order+="$cipher "
|
|
done
|
|
elif [[ -n "$order" ]] && [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
rfc_order=""
|
|
while read -d " " cipher; do
|
|
rfc_cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher" ]]; then
|
|
rfc_order+="$rfc_cipher "
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_order+="$cipher "
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$order"
|
|
order="$rfc_order"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the server supports at least one ChaCha20 cipher that is less
|
|
# preferred than a non-ChaCha20 cipher, then check if the server is
|
|
# configured to prioritize ChaCha20 if that cipher is listed first
|
|
# in the ClientHello.
|
|
first_cipher=""; first_chacha_cipher=""
|
|
for cipher in $order; do
|
|
[[ ! "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && first_cipher="$cipher" && break
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$first_cipher" ]]; then
|
|
# Search for first ChaCha20 cipher that comes after $first_cipher in $order.
|
|
for first_chacha_cipher in ${order#*$first_cipher}; do
|
|
[[ "$first_chacha_cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ! "${first_chacha_cipher}" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && first_chacha_cipher=""
|
|
if [[ -n "$first_cipher" ]] && [[ -n "$first_chacha_cipher" ]]; then
|
|
# $first_cipher is the first non-ChaCha20 cipher in $order and
|
|
# $first_chacha_cipher is the first ChaCha20 that comes after
|
|
# $first_cipher in $order. Check to see if the server will select
|
|
# $first_chacha_cipher if it appears before $first_cipher in the
|
|
# ClientHello.
|
|
if "$ciphers_found_with_sockets"; then
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
first_cipher="$(rfc2hexcode "$first_cipher")"
|
|
first_chacha_cipher="$(rfc2hexcode "$first_chacha_cipher")"
|
|
else
|
|
first_cipher="$(openssl2hexcode "$first_cipher")"
|
|
first_chacha_cipher="$(openssl2hexcode "$first_chacha_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
first_cipher="${first_cipher:2:2},${first_cipher:7:2}"
|
|
first_chacha_cipher="${first_chacha_cipher:2:2},${first_chacha_cipher:7:2}"
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "$first_chacha_cipher, $first_cipher, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
cipher="$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && prioritize_chacha=true
|
|
else
|
|
pr_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 5)) "
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then
|
|
first_cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$first_cipher")"
|
|
first_chacha_cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$first_chacha_cipher")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $proto != tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="-cipher $first_chacha_cipher:$first_cipher"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test="-ciphersuites $first_chacha_cipher:$first_cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -"$proto" $BUGS $ciphers_to_test -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
cipher="$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20 ]] && prioritize_chacha=true
|
|
else
|
|
pr_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 5)) "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$prioritize_chacha"; then
|
|
outln " (server order -- server prioritizes ChaCha ciphers when preferred by clients)"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$order" ]]; then
|
|
outln " (server order)"
|
|
else
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$order" ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered "$proto" yes
|
|
if "$wide"; then
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers_found; i++ )); do
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "true"
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
id="cipher-${proto}_${normalized_hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fileout "$id" "$(get_cipher_quality_severity "${ciph[i]}")" "$proto_text $(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}")"
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
outln
|
|
out "$(printf " %-10s " "$proto_text: ")"
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$order" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
else
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$order" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "cipherorder_${proto_text//./_}" "INFO" "$order"
|
|
[[ -n "$first_cipher" ]] && [[ -n "$first_chacha_cipher" ]] && fileout "prioritize_chacha_${proto_text//./_}" "INFO" "$prioritize_chacha"
|
|
else
|
|
# Order doesn't contain any ciphers, so we can safely unset the protocol and put a dash out
|
|
add_proto_offered "$proto" no
|
|
outln " -"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}-$proto.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1 is OpenSSL s_client parameter or empty
|
|
#
|
|
get_host_cert() {
|
|
local tmpvar=$TEMPDIR/${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt # change later to $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $1") 2>/dev/null </dev/null >$tmpvar
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $tmpvar; then
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' $tmpvar >$HOSTCERT
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "could not retrieve host certificate!"
|
|
fileout "host_certificate_Problem" "WARN" "Could not retrieve host certificate!"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
#tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
#return $((${PIPESTATUS[0]} + ${PIPESTATUS[1]}))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verify_retcode_helper() {
|
|
local ret=0
|
|
local -i retcode=$1
|
|
|
|
case $retcode in
|
|
# codes from ./doc/apps/verify.pod | verify(1ssl)
|
|
44) tm_out "(different CRL scope)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
|
|
26) tm_out "(unsupported certificate purpose)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
|
|
24) tm_out "(certificate unreadable)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
|
|
23) tm_out "(certificate revoked)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
|
|
21) tm_out "(chain incomplete, only 1 cert provided)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
|
|
20) tm_out "(chain incomplete)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
|
|
19) tm_out "(self signed CA in chain)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
|
|
18) tm_out "(self signed)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
|
|
10) tm_out "(expired)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
|
|
9) tm_out "(not yet valid)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
|
|
2) tm_out "(issuer cert missing)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
|
|
*) ret=1 ; tm_out " (unknown, pls report) $1" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: number of certificate if provided >1
|
|
determine_trust() {
|
|
local jsonID="$1"
|
|
local json_postfix="$2"
|
|
local -i i=1
|
|
local -i num_ca_bundles=0
|
|
local bundle_fname=""
|
|
local -a certificate_file verify_retcode trust
|
|
local ok_was=""
|
|
local notok_was=""
|
|
local all_ok=true
|
|
local some_ok=false
|
|
local code
|
|
local ca_bundles=""
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local -i certificates_provided=1+$(grep -c "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem)
|
|
local addtl_warning
|
|
|
|
# If $json_postfix is not empty, then there is more than one certificate
|
|
# and the output should should be indented by two more spaces.
|
|
[[ -n $json_postfix ]] && spaces=" "
|
|
|
|
case $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR in
|
|
1.0.2|1.1.0|1.1.1|2.[1-9].*|3.*) # 2.x is LibreSSL. 2.1.1 was tested to work, below is not sure
|
|
:
|
|
;;
|
|
*) addtl_warning="Your $OPENSSL <= 1.0.2 might be too unreliable to determine trust"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "$addtl_warning"
|
|
addtl_warning="(${addtl_warning})"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
debugme tmln_out
|
|
|
|
# if you run testssl.sh from a different path /you can set either TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR or CA_BUNDLES_PATH to find the CA BUNDLES
|
|
if [[ -z "$CA_BUNDLES_PATH" ]]; then
|
|
ca_bundles="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/*.pem"
|
|
else
|
|
ca_bundles="$CA_BUNDLES_PATH/*.pem"
|
|
fi
|
|
for bundle_fname in $ca_bundles; do
|
|
certificate_file[i]=$(basename ${bundle_fname//.pem})
|
|
if [[ ! -r $bundle_fname ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "\"$bundle_fname\" cannot be found / not readable"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme printf -- " %-12s" "${certificate_file[i]}"
|
|
# Set SSL_CERT_DIR to /dev/null so that $OPENSSL verify will only use certificates in $bundle_fname
|
|
# in a subshell because that should be valid here only
|
|
(export SSL_CERT_DIR="/dev/null"; export SSL_CERT_FILE="/dev/null"
|
|
if [[ $certificates_provided -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL verify $TRUSTED1ST -purpose sslserver -CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$bundle_fname") -untrusted $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem $HOSTCERT >$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 2>$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL verify $TRUSTED1ST -purpose sslserver -CAfile <(cat $ADDTL_CA_FILES "$bundle_fname") $HOSTCERT >$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 2>$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2
|
|
fi)
|
|
verify_retcode[i]=$(awk '/error [1-9][0-9]? at [0-9]+ depth lookup:/ { if (!found) {print $2; found=1} }' $TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 $TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2)
|
|
[[ -z "${verify_retcode[i]}" ]] && verify_retcode[i]=0
|
|
if [[ ${verify_retcode[i]} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
trust[i]=true
|
|
some_ok=true
|
|
[[ -z "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] && GOOD_CA_BUNDLE="$bundle_fname"
|
|
debugme tm_svrty_good "Ok "
|
|
debugme tmln_out "${verify_retcode[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
trust[i]=false
|
|
all_ok=false
|
|
debugme tm_svrty_high "not trusted "
|
|
debugme tmln_out "${verify_retcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
((i++))
|
|
done
|
|
num_ca_bundles=$((i - 1))
|
|
debugme tm_out " "
|
|
if "$all_ok"; then
|
|
# all stores ok
|
|
pr_svrty_good "Ok "; pr_warning "$addtl_warning"
|
|
# we did to stdout the warning above already, so we could stay here with OK:
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "passed. $addtl_warning"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "NOT ok"
|
|
if ! "$some_ok"; then
|
|
# ALL failed (we assume with the same issue), we're displaying the reason
|
|
out " "
|
|
code="$(verify_retcode_helper "${verify_retcode[1]}")"
|
|
if [[ "$code" =~ "pls report" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "$code"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$code"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "failed $code. $addtl_warning"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Issues with the chain of trust $code"
|
|
else
|
|
# alt least one ok and other(s) not ==> display the culprit store(s)
|
|
if "$some_ok"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical ":"
|
|
for (( i=1; i<=num_ca_bundles; i++ )); do
|
|
if ${trust[i]}; then
|
|
ok_was="${certificate_file[i]} $ok_was"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_high " ${certificate_file[i]} "
|
|
code="$(verify_retcode_helper "${verify_retcode[i]}")"
|
|
if [[ "$code" =~ "pls report" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "$code"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$code"
|
|
fi
|
|
notok_was="${certificate_file[i]} $code $notok_was"
|
|
if ! [[ ${certificate_file[i]} =~ Java ]]; then
|
|
# Exemption for Java AND rating, as this store doesn't seem to be as complete.
|
|
# We won't penalize this but we still need to raise a red flag. See #1648
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Issues with chain of trust $code"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
outln
|
|
# lf + green ones
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$spaces"
|
|
pr_svrty_good "OK: $ok_was"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "Some certificate trust checks failed -> $notok_was $addtl_warning, OK -> $ok_was"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$addtl_warning" ]] && out "\n$spaces" && pr_warning "$addtl_warning"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
# not handled: Root CA supplied ("contains anchor" in SSLlabs terminology)
|
|
|
|
tls_time() {
|
|
local difftime
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local jsonID="TLS_timestamp"
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS clock skew" ; out "$spaces"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=true # this is a switch whether we want to measure the remote TLS_TIME
|
|
tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER" # try first TLS 1.0 (most frequently used protocol)
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" # TLS 1.2
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "02" "$TLS_CIPHER" # TLS 1.1
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" # SSL 3
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$TLS_TIME" ]]; then # nothing returned a time!
|
|
difftime=$((TLS_TIME - TLS_NOW)) # TLS_NOW has been set in tls_sockets()
|
|
if [[ "${#difftime}" -gt 5 ]]; then
|
|
# openssl >= 1.0.1f fills this field with random values! --> good for possible fingerprint
|
|
out "Random values, no fingerprinting possible "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "random"
|
|
else
|
|
[[ $difftime != "-"* ]] && [[ $difftime != "0" ]] && difftime="+$difftime"
|
|
out "$difftime"; out " sec from localtime";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "off by $difftime seconds from your localtime"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tm_out "$TLS_TIME"
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
outln "SSLv3 through TLS 1.2 didn't return a timestamp"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "None returned by SSLv3 through TLSv1.2"
|
|
fi
|
|
TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=false # reset the switch to save calls to date and friend in tls_sockets()
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# core function determining whether handshake succeeded or not
|
|
# arg1: return value of "openssl s_client connect"
|
|
# arg2: temporary file with the server hello
|
|
# returns 0 if connect was successful, 1 if not
|
|
#
|
|
sclient_connect_successful() {
|
|
local server_hello="$(cat -v "$2")"
|
|
local connect_success=false
|
|
local re='Master-Key: ([^\
|
|
]*)'
|
|
|
|
[[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
if ! "$connect_success" && [[ "$server_hello" =~ $re ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
fi
|
|
! "$connect_success" && [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", "(SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?(\/SSLv3)?)", Cipher is "([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
if "$connect_success"; then
|
|
"$NO_SSL_SESSIONID" && [[ "$server_hello" =~ Session-ID:\ [a-fA-F0-9]{2,64} ]] && NO_SSL_SESSIONID=false
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
# what's left now is: master key empty and Session-ID not empty
|
|
# ==> probably client-based auth with x509 certificate. We handle that at other places
|
|
#
|
|
# For robustness we also detected here network / server connectivity problems:
|
|
# Just need to check whether $TMPFILE=$2 is empty
|
|
if [[ ! -s "$2" ]]; then
|
|
((NR_OSSL_FAIL++))
|
|
connectivity_problem $NR_OSSL_FAIL $MAX_OSSL_FAIL "openssl s_client connect problem" "repeated openssl s_client connect problem, doesn't make sense to continue"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extract_new_tls_extensions() {
|
|
local tls_extensions
|
|
|
|
# this is not beautiful (grep+sed)
|
|
# but maybe we should just get the ids and do a private matching, according to
|
|
# https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
|
|
tls_extensions=$(grep -a 'TLS server extension ' "$1" | \
|
|
sed -e 's/TLS server extension //g' -e 's/\" (id=/\/#/g' \
|
|
-e 's/,.*$/,/g' -e 's/),$/\"/g' \
|
|
-e 's/elliptic curves\/#10/supported_groups\/#10/g')
|
|
tls_extensions=$(echo $tls_extensions) # into one line
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]]; then
|
|
# check to see if any new TLS extensions were returned and add any new ones to TLS_EXTENSIONS
|
|
while read -d "\"" -r line; do
|
|
if [[ $line != "" ]] && [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ "$line" ]]; then
|
|
#FIXME: This is a string of quoted strings, so this seems to determine the output format already. Better e.g. would be an array
|
|
TLS_EXTENSIONS+=" \"${line}\""
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<<$tls_extensions
|
|
[[ "${TLS_EXTENSIONS:0:1}" == " " ]] && TLS_EXTENSIONS="${TLS_EXTENSIONS:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Note that since, at the moment, this function is only called by run_server_defaults()
|
|
# and run_heartbleed(), this function does not look for the status request or NPN
|
|
# extensions. For run_heartbleed(), only the heartbeat extension needs to be detected.
|
|
# For run_server_defaults(), the status request and NPN would already be detected by
|
|
# get_server_certificate(), if they are supported. In the case of the status extension,
|
|
# since including a status request extension in a ClientHello does not work for GOST
|
|
# only servers. In the case of NPN, since a server will not include both the NPN and
|
|
# ALPN extensions in the same ServerHello.
|
|
#
|
|
determine_tls_extensions() {
|
|
local addcmd
|
|
local -i success=1
|
|
local line params="" tls_extensions=""
|
|
local alpn_proto alpn="" alpn_list_len_hex alpn_extn_len_hex
|
|
local -i alpn_list_len alpn_extn_len
|
|
local cbc_cipher_list="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA256:CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA256:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:IDEA-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
local cbc_cipher_list_hex="c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,69, 00,68, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, c0,77, c0,73, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, c0,3d, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,43, c0,45, c0,49, c0,4b, c0,4d, c0,4f, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, 00,67, 00,40, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, c0,76, c0,72, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, c0,3c, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,42, c0,44, c0,48, c0,4a, c0,4c, c0,4e, c0,12, c0,08, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,62, 00,09, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,08, 00,06, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
[[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]] && return 0
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_extensions="00,01,00,01,02, 00,02,00,00, 00,04,00,00, 00,12,00,00, 00,16,00,00, 00,17,00,00"
|
|
if [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then
|
|
for alpn_proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do
|
|
alpn+=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")"
|
|
done
|
|
alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3
|
|
alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len)
|
|
alpn_extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2
|
|
alpn_extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_extn_len)
|
|
tls_extensions+=", 00,10,${alpn_extn_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ encrypt-then-mac ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$cbc_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff" "all" "$tls_extensions"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "all" "$tls_extensions"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $success -eq 2 ]] && success=0
|
|
[[ $success -eq 0 ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
if [[ -r "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ]]; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if "$HAS_ALPN" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then
|
|
params="-alpn \"${ALPN_PROTOs// /,}\"" # we need to replace " " by ","
|
|
elif "$HAS_NPN" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then
|
|
params="-nextprotoneg \"$NPN_PROTOs\""
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]] && [[ -z "$SNI" ]] && "$HAS_NO_SSL2"; then
|
|
addcmd="-no_ssl2"
|
|
else
|
|
addcmd="$SNI"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ encrypt-then-mac ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd $OPTIMAL_PROTO -tlsextdebug $params -cipher $cbc_cipher_list") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd $OPTIMAL_PROTO -tlsextdebug $params") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $success -eq 0 ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Keep it "on file" for debugging purposes
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && safe_echo "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" >"$TEMPDIR/$NODE.$NODEIP.tls_extensions.txt"
|
|
|
|
return $success
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return a list of the certificate compression methods supported (RFC 8879)
|
|
determine_cert_compression() {
|
|
# 1=zlib, 2=brotli, 3=zstd
|
|
local -a supported_compression_methods=("" "false" "false" "false")
|
|
local -i i len nr_compression_methods=3
|
|
local len1 len2 methods_to_test method_found method_nr methods_found=""
|
|
|
|
# Certificate compression is only supported by TLS 1.3.
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 1 ]] && tm_out "" && return 1
|
|
while true; do
|
|
methods_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= nr_compression_methods; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${supported_compression_methods[i]}" && methods_to_test+=" ,00,$(printf "%02x" $i)"
|
|
done
|
|
len=$((2*${#methods_to_test}/7))
|
|
# If there are no more compression methods remaining to be tested, then quit.
|
|
[[ $len -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
len1=$(printf "%02x" "$len")
|
|
len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((len+1))")
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,1b, 00,$len2, $len1$methods_to_test"
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
tm_out ""
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
method_found="$(awk '/Certificate Compression Algorithm: / { print $4 $5 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
[[ -z "$method_found" ]] && break
|
|
[[ -z "$methods_found" ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
method_found="${method_found//(//}"
|
|
method_found="${method_found//)/}"
|
|
method_nr="${method_found%%/*}"
|
|
supported_compression_methods[method_nr]=true
|
|
methods_found+=" $method_found"
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$methods_found" ]]; then
|
|
methods_found="${methods_found:1}"
|
|
else
|
|
methods_found="none"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$methods_found"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extract_certificates() {
|
|
local version="$1"
|
|
local savedir
|
|
local -i i success nrsaved=0
|
|
local issuerDN CAsubjectDN previssuerDN
|
|
|
|
# Place the server's certificate in $HOSTCERT and any intermediate
|
|
# certificates that were provided in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
savedir="$PWD"; cd $TEMPDIR
|
|
# https://backreference.org/2010/05/09/ocsp-verification-with-openssl/
|
|
if [[ "$version" == ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
awk -v n=-1 '/Server certificate/ {start=1}
|
|
/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} }
|
|
inc { print > ("level" n ".crt") }
|
|
/---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }' $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
awk -v n=-1 '/Certificate chain/ {start=1}
|
|
/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} }
|
|
inc { print > ("level" n ".crt") }
|
|
/---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }' $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -s level0.crt ]] && nrsaved=$(count_words "$(echo level?.crt 2>/dev/null)")
|
|
if [[ $nrsaved -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
success=1
|
|
else
|
|
success=0
|
|
CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false
|
|
mv level0.crt $HOSTCERT
|
|
if [[ $nrsaved -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
echo "" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
else
|
|
cat level?.crt > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
issuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -issuer 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
issuerDN="${issuerDN:8}"
|
|
previssuerDN="$issuerDN"
|
|
# The second certificate (level1.crt) SHOULD be issued to the CA
|
|
# that issued the server's certificate. But, according to RFC 8446
|
|
# clients SHOULD be prepared to handle cases in which the server
|
|
# does not order the certificates correctly.
|
|
for (( i=1; i < nrsaved; i++ )); do
|
|
CAsubjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "level$i.crt" -noout -subject 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
if [[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" == "$issuerDN" ]]; then
|
|
cp "level$i.crt" $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem
|
|
issuerDN="" # set to empty to prevent further matches
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" != "$previssuerDN" ]] && CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=true
|
|
"$CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM" && [[ -z "$issuerDN" ]] && break
|
|
previssuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "level$i.crt" -noout -issuer 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
previssuerDN="${previssuerDN:8}"
|
|
done
|
|
# This should never happen, but if more than one certificate was
|
|
# provided and none of them belong to the CA that issued the
|
|
# server's certificate, then the extra certificates should just
|
|
# be deleted. There is code elsewhere that assumes that if
|
|
# $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem is non-empty, then
|
|
# $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem is also present.
|
|
[[ -n "$issuerDN" ]] && echo "" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
rm level?.crt
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
cd "$savedir"
|
|
return $success
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extract_stapled_ocsp() {
|
|
local response="$(cat $TMPFILE)"
|
|
local ocsp tmp
|
|
local -i ocsp_len
|
|
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE=""
|
|
if [[ "$response" =~ CertificateStatus ]]; then
|
|
# This is OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1 and the response
|
|
# is TLS 1.2 or earlier.
|
|
ocsp="${response##*CertificateStatus}"
|
|
ocsp="16${ocsp#*16}"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp%%<<<*}"
|
|
ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp:8}"
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ TLS\ server\ extension\ \"status\ request\"\ \(id=5\)\,\ len=0 ]]; then
|
|
# This is not OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1, and the response
|
|
# is TLS 1.2 or earlier.
|
|
ocsp="${response%%OCSP response:*}"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp##*<<<}"
|
|
ocsp="16${ocsp#*16}"
|
|
ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp:8}"
|
|
elif [[ "$response" =~ TLS\ server\ extension\ \"status\ request\"\ \(id=5\)\,\ len= ]]; then
|
|
# This is OpenSSL 1.1.1 and the response is TLS 1.3.
|
|
ocsp="${response##*TLS server extension \"status request\" (id=5), len=}"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp%%<<<*}"
|
|
tmp="${ocsp%%[!0-9]*}"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp#$tmp}"
|
|
ocsp_len=2*$tmp
|
|
ocsp="$(awk ' { print $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 $11 $12 $13 $14 $15 $16 $17 } ' <<< "$ocsp" | sed 's/-//')"
|
|
ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")"
|
|
ocsp="${ocsp:0:ocsp_len}"
|
|
else
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
# Determine whether this is a single OCSP response or a sequence of
|
|
# responses and then extract just the response for the server's
|
|
# certificate.
|
|
if [[ "${ocsp:0:2}" == "01" ]]; then
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${ocsp:8}"
|
|
elif [[ "${ocsp:0:2}" == "02" ]]; then
|
|
ocsp_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:8:6}")
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${ocsp:14:ocsp_len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1 is "<OpenSSL cipher>"
|
|
# arg2 is a list of protocols to try (tls1_2, tls1_1, tls1, ssl3) or empty (if all should be tried)
|
|
get_server_certificate() {
|
|
local protocols_to_try proto
|
|
local success ret
|
|
local npn_params="" line
|
|
local ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (signature) public key
|
|
local -r a_rsa="cc,13, cc,15, c0,30, c0,28, c0,14, 00,9f, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,39, c0,77, 00,c4, 00,88, c0,45, c0,4d, c0,53, c0,61, c0,7d, c0,8b, 16,b7, 16,b9, c0,2f, c0,27, c0,13, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,67, 00,33, c0,76, 00,be, 00,9a, 00,45, c0,44, c0,4c, c0,52, c0,60, c0,7c, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,12, 00,16, 00,15, 00,14, c0,10"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (encryption) public key
|
|
local -r e_rsa="00,b7, c0,99, 00,ad, cc,ae, 00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, 00,95, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,69, c0,6f, c0,7b, c0,93, ff,01, 00,ac, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,b6, 00,96, 00,41, c0,98, 00,07, 00,94, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,68, c0,6e, c0,7a, c0,92, 00,05, 00,04, 00,92, 00,0a, 00,93, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,2e, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, ff,00"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DSA public key
|
|
local -r a_dss="00,a3, 00,6a, 00,38, 00,c3, 00,87, c0,43, c0,57, c0,81, 00,a2, 00,40, 00,32, 00,bd, 00,99, 00,44, c0,42, c0,56, c0,80, 00,66, 00,13, 00,63, 00,12, 00,65, 00,11"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DH public key
|
|
local -r a_dh="00,a5, 00,a1, 00,69, 00,68, 00,37, 00,36, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,86, 00,85, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,55, c0,59, c0,7f, c0,83, 00,a4, 00,a0, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,31, 00,30, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,98, 00,97, 00,43, 00,42, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,54, c0,58, c0,7e, c0,82, 00,10, 00,0d, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDH public key
|
|
local -r a_ecdh="c0,32, c0,2e, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, c0,4b, c0,4f, c0,5f, c0,63, c0,89, c0,8d, c0,31, c0,2d, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, c0,4a, c0,4e, c0,5e, c0,62, c0,88, c0,8c, c0,0c, c0,02, c0,0d, c0,03, c0,0b, c0,01"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDSA public key
|
|
local -r a_ecdsa="cc,14, c0,2c, c0,24, c0,0a, cc,a9, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,73, c0,49, c0,5d, c0,87, 16,b8, 16,ba, c0,2b, c0,23, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,72, c0,48, c0,5c, c0,86, c0,07, c0,08, c0,06"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a GOST public key
|
|
local -r a_gost="00,80, 00,81, 00,82, 00,83"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 1 ]] && return 1
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13" && "$HAS_SIGALGS" && [[ ! "$1" =~ tls1_3_EdDSA ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -tls1_3 -tlsextdebug -status -msg -sigalgs PSS+SHA256:PSS+SHA384") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -tls1_3 -tlsextdebug -status -msg -sigalgs ECDSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA384") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || return 1
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304"
|
|
extract_certificates "tls1_3"
|
|
extract_stapled_ocsp
|
|
success=$?
|
|
else
|
|
# For STARTTLS protocols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,10,00,0e,08,04,08,05,08,06,04,01,05,01,06,01,02,01"
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,0a,00,08,04,03,05,03,06,03,02,03"
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ tls1_3_EdDSA ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,06,00,04,08,07,08,08"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
success=$?
|
|
[[ $success -eq 0 ]] || return 1
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $success -eq 0 ]] && add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $success
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_NPN" && [[ -z "$STARTTLS" ]] && npn_params="-nextprotoneg \"$NPN_PROTOs\""
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$2" ]]; then
|
|
protocols_to_try="$2"
|
|
else
|
|
protocols_to_try="tls1_2 tls1_1 tls1 ssl3"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# throwing 1st every cipher/protocol at the server to know what works
|
|
success=7
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
success=1
|
|
sslv2_sockets "" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
mv $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt $TMPFILE
|
|
success=0
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $success
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1_2/03}"
|
|
protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1_1/02}"
|
|
protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1/01}"
|
|
protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/ssl3/00}"
|
|
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_rsa"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $e_rsa"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aDSS ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_dss"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aDH ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_dh"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aECDH ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_ecdh"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aECDSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_ecdsa"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ aGOST ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_gost"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && return 1
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test:2}"
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protocols_to_try; do
|
|
[[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol $proto) ]] && continue
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test, 00,ff" "all" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && success=0 && break
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 2 ]] && success=0 && break
|
|
done # this loop is needed for IIS6 and others which have a handshake size limitations
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then
|
|
# "-status" above doesn't work for GOST only servers, so we do another test without it and see whether that works then:
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test, 00,ff" "all" "00,12,00,00"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && success=0
|
|
[[ $ret -eq 2 ]] && success=0
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then
|
|
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
|
|
prln_warning "Strange, no SSL/TLS protocol seems to be supported (error around line $((LINENO - 6)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 7 # this is ugly, I know
|
|
else
|
|
GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
cp $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
# When "$2" is empty, get_server_certificate() is being called with SNI="".
|
|
# In case the extensions returned by the server differ depending on whether
|
|
# SNI is provided or not, don't collect extensions when SNI="" (unless
|
|
# no DNS name was provided at the command line).
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
# no sockets, openssl
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$1"
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]] && [[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/eRSA/}"
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/aRSA/}"
|
|
for ciph in $(colon_to_spaces $(actually_supported_osslciphers "aRSA")); do
|
|
[[ "$ciph" =~ -RSA- ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$ciph"
|
|
done
|
|
elif [[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/eRSA/}"
|
|
for ciph in $(colon_to_spaces $(actually_supported_osslciphers "aRSA")); do
|
|
[[ ! "$ciph" =~ -RSA- ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$ciph"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test:1}"
|
|
[[ $(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers "$ciphers_to_test")) -ge 1 ]] || return 1
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protocols_to_try; do
|
|
[[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol $proto) ]] && continue
|
|
[[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && continue
|
|
addcmd=""
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $ciphers_to_test -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -$proto -tlsextdebug $npn_params -status -msg") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
success=0
|
|
break # now we have the certificate
|
|
fi
|
|
done # this loop is needed for IIS6 and others which have a handshake size limitations
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then
|
|
# "-status" above doesn't work for GOST only servers, so we do another test without it and see whether that works then:
|
|
[[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && return 7
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $ciphers_to_test -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -$proto -tlsextdebug") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
if ! sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
|
|
prln_warning "Strange, no SSL/TLS protocol seems to be supported (error around line $((LINENO - 6)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 7 # this is ugly, I know
|
|
else
|
|
GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$proto" in
|
|
"tls1_2") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0303" ;;
|
|
"tls1_1") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0302" ;;
|
|
"tls1") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0301" ;;
|
|
"ssl3") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0300" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# When "$2" is empty, get_server_certificate() is being called with SNI="".
|
|
# In case the extensions returned by the server differ depending on whether
|
|
# SNI is provided or not, don't collect extensions when SNI="" (unless
|
|
# no DNS name was provided at the command line).
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
extract_certificates "$proto"
|
|
extract_stapled_ocsp
|
|
success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $success
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: path to certificate
|
|
# returns CN
|
|
get_cn_from_cert() {
|
|
local subject
|
|
|
|
# attention! openssl 1.0.2 doesn't properly handle online output from certificates from trustwave.com/github.com
|
|
#FIXME: use -nameopt oid for robustness
|
|
|
|
# for e.g. russian sites -esc_msb,utf8 works in an UTF8 terminal -- any way to check platform independent?
|
|
# see x509(1ssl):
|
|
subject="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $1 -noout -subject -nameopt multiline,-align,sname,-esc_msb,utf8,-space_eq 2>>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
echo "$(awk -F'=' '/CN=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$subject" | tr '\n' ' ')"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return 0 if the name provided in arg1 is a wildcard name
|
|
is_wildcard()
|
|
{
|
|
local certname="$1"
|
|
|
|
# If the first label in the DNS name begins "xn--", then assume it is an
|
|
# A-label and not a wildcard name (RFC 6125, Section 6.4.3).
|
|
[[ "${certname:0:4}" == "xn--" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Remove part of name preceding '*' or '.'. If no "*" appears in the
|
|
# left-most label, then it is not a wildcard name (RFC 6125, Section 6.4.3).
|
|
basename="$(echo -n "$certname" | sed 's/^[_a-zA-Z0-9\-]*//')"
|
|
[[ "${basename:0:1}" != "*" ]] && return 1 # not a wildcard name
|
|
|
|
# Check that there are no additional wildcard ('*') characters or any
|
|
# other characters that do not belong in a DNS name.
|
|
[[ -n $(echo -n "${basename:1}" | sed 's/^[_\.a-zA-Z0-9\-]*//') ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return 0 if the name provided in arg2 is a wildcard name and it matches the name provided in arg1.
|
|
wildcard_match()
|
|
{
|
|
local servername="$1"
|
|
local certname="$2"
|
|
local basename
|
|
local -i basename_offset len_certname len_part1 len_basename
|
|
local -i len_servername len_wildcard
|
|
|
|
len_servername=${#servername}
|
|
len_certname=${#certname}
|
|
|
|
# Use rules from RFC 6125 to perform the match.
|
|
|
|
# Assume the "*" in the wildcard needs to be replaced by one or more
|
|
# characters, although RFC 6125 is not clear about that.
|
|
[[ $len_servername -lt $len_certname ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
is_wildcard "$certname"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Comparisons of DNS names are case insensitive, so convert both names to uppercase.
|
|
certname="$(toupper "$certname")"
|
|
servername="$(toupper "$servername")"
|
|
|
|
# Extract part of name that comes after the "*"
|
|
basename="$(echo -n "$certname" | sed 's/^[_A-Z0-9\-]*\*//')"
|
|
len_basename=${#basename}
|
|
len_part1=$len_certname-$len_basename-1
|
|
len_wildcard=$len_servername-$len_certname+1
|
|
basename_offset=$len_servername-$len_basename
|
|
|
|
# Check that initial part of $servername matches initial part of $certname
|
|
# and that final part of $servername matches final part of $certname.
|
|
[[ "${servername:0:len_part1}" != "${certname:0:len_part1}" ]] && return 1
|
|
[[ "${servername:basename_offset:len_basename}" != "$basename" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# Check that part of $servername that matches "*" is all part of a single
|
|
# domain label.
|
|
[[ -n $(echo -n "${servername:len_part1:len_wildcard}" | sed 's/^[_A-Z0-9\-]*//') ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Compare the server name provided in arg1 to the CN and SAN in arg2 and return:
|
|
# 0, if server name provided does not match any of the names in the CN or SAN
|
|
# 1, if the server name provided matches a name in the SAN
|
|
# 2, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against a name in the SAN
|
|
# 4, if the server name provided matches the CN
|
|
# 5, if the server name provided matches the CN AND a name in the SAN
|
|
# 6, if the server name provided matches the CN AND is a wildcard match against a name in the SAN
|
|
# 8, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against the CN
|
|
# 9, if the server name provided matches a name in the SAN AND is a wildcard match against the CN
|
|
# 10, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against the CN AND a name in the SAN
|
|
|
|
compare_server_name_to_cert() {
|
|
local cert="$1"
|
|
local servername cns cn dns_sans ip_sans san dercert tag
|
|
local srv_id="" xmppaddr=""
|
|
local -i i len len1 cn_match=0
|
|
local -i subret=0 # no error condition, passing results
|
|
|
|
HAS_DNS_SANS=false
|
|
if [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then
|
|
# RFC 6120, Section 13.7.2.1, states that for XMPP the identity that
|
|
# should appear in the server's certificate is identity that appears
|
|
# in the the 'to' address that the client communicates in the initial
|
|
# stream header.
|
|
servername="$(toupper "$XMPP_HOST")"
|
|
else
|
|
servername="$(toupper "$NODE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check whether any of the DNS names in the certificate match the servername
|
|
dns_sans="$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$cert")"
|
|
while read san; do
|
|
if [[ -n "$san" ]]; then
|
|
HAS_DNS_SANS=true
|
|
[[ $(toupper "$san") == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$dns_sans"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Check whether any of the IP addresses in the certificate match the servername
|
|
ip_sans=$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE | grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" | \
|
|
tr ',' '\n' | grep "IP Address:" | sed -e 's/IP Address://g' -e 's/ //g')
|
|
while read san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ "$san" == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break
|
|
done <<< "$ip_sans"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then
|
|
# For XMPP hosts, in addition to checking for a matching DNS name,
|
|
# should also check for a matching SRV-ID or XmppAddr identifier.
|
|
dercert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
# Look for the beginning of the subjectAltName extension. It
|
|
# will begin with the OID (2.5.29.17 = 0603551D11). After the OID
|
|
# there may be an indication that the extension is critical (0101FF).
|
|
# Finally will be the tag indicating that the value of the extension is
|
|
# encoded as an OCTET STRING (04).
|
|
if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04 ]]; then
|
|
dercert="${dercert##*0603551D110101FF04}"
|
|
else
|
|
dercert="${dercert##*0603551D1104}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Skip over the encoding of the length of the OCTET STRING.
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:0:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
i="${dercert:1:1}"
|
|
i=2*$i+2
|
|
dercert="${dercert:i}"
|
|
else
|
|
dercert="${dercert:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Next byte should be a 30 (SEQUENCE).
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:0:2}" == "30" ]]; then
|
|
# Get the length of the subjectAltName extension and then skip
|
|
# over the encoding of the length.
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:2:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
case "${dercert:3:1}" in
|
|
1) len=2*0x${dercert:4:2}; dercert="${dercert:6}" ;;
|
|
2) len=2*0x${dercert:4:4}; dercert="${dercert:8}" ;;
|
|
3) len=2*0x${dercert:4:6}; dercert="${dercert:10}" ;;
|
|
*) len=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len=2*0x${dercert:2:2}
|
|
dercert="${dercert:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $len -lt ${#dercert} ]]; then
|
|
# loop through all the names and extract the SRV-ID and XmppAddr identifiers
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=len_name )); do
|
|
tag="${dercert:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:i:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
i+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:i:1}" in
|
|
1) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}; i+=2 ;;
|
|
2) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:4}; i+=4 ;;
|
|
3) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:6}; i+=4 ;;
|
|
*) len=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}
|
|
i+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tag" == "A0" ]]; then
|
|
# This is an otherName.
|
|
if [[ $len_name -gt 18 ]] && ( [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070807" ]] ); then
|
|
# According to the OID, this is either an SRV-ID or XmppAddr.
|
|
j=$i+20
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == "A0" ]]; then
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
j+=2*0x${dercert:j:1}+1
|
|
else
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
if ( [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" ]] && [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == "0C" ]] ) || \
|
|
( [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070807" ]] && [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == "16" ]] ); then
|
|
# XmppAddr should be encoded as UTF8STRING (0C) and
|
|
# SRV-ID should be encoded IA5STRING (16).
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:j:1}" in
|
|
1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;;
|
|
2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;;
|
|
3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;;
|
|
4) len1=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $len1 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
san="$(hex2binary "${dercert:j:len1}")"
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" ]]; then
|
|
xmppaddr+="$san "
|
|
else
|
|
srv_id+="$san "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$srv_id" ]] && HAS_DNS_SANS=true
|
|
[[ -n "$xmppaddr" ]] && HAS_DNS_SANS=true
|
|
while read -d " " san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ $(toupper "$san") == "_XMPP-SERVER.$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break
|
|
done <<< "$srv_id"
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
while read -d " " san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ $(toupper "$san") == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break
|
|
done <<< "$xmppaddr"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check whether any of the DNS names in the certificate are wildcard names
|
|
# that match the servername
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
while read san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] || continue
|
|
wildcard_match "$servername" "$san"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && subret=2 && break
|
|
done <<< "$dns_sans"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Get every CN from the subject field and compare against the server name.
|
|
cns="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $1 -noout -subject -nameopt multiline,-align,sname,-esc_msb,utf8,-space_eq 2>>$ERRFILE | awk -F'=' '/CN=/ { print $2 }')"
|
|
while read cn; do
|
|
# If the CN contains any characters that are not valid for a DNS name,
|
|
# then assume it does not contain a DNS name.
|
|
[[ -n "${cn//[_\.a-zA-Z0-9*\-]/}" ]] && continue
|
|
|
|
# Check whether the CN matches the servername
|
|
[[ $(toupper "$cn") == "$servername" ]] && cn_match=4 && break
|
|
|
|
# Check whether the CN is a wildcard name that matches the servername
|
|
# NOTE: Don't stop loop on a wildcard match in case there is another CN
|
|
# that is an exact match.
|
|
wildcard_match "$servername" "$cn"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && cn_match=8
|
|
done <<< "$cns"
|
|
subret+=$cn_match
|
|
return $subret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This function determines whether the certificate (arg3) contains "visibility
|
|
# information" (see Section 4.3.3 of
|
|
# https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103500_103599/10352303/01.02.01_60/ts_10352303v010201p.pdf.
|
|
etsi_ets_visibility_info() {
|
|
local jsonID="$1"
|
|
local spaces="$2"
|
|
local cert="$3"
|
|
local cert_txt="$4"
|
|
local dercert tag
|
|
local -a fingerprint=() access_description=()
|
|
local -i i j len len1 len_name nr_visnames=0
|
|
|
|
# If "visibility information" is present, it will appear in the subjectAltName
|
|
# extension (0603551D11) as an otherName with OID 0.4.0.3523.3.1 (060604009B430301).
|
|
# OpenSSL 1.1.1 and earlier displays all names of type otherName as "othername:<unsupported>".
|
|
# As certificates will rarely include a name encoded as an otherName, check the
|
|
# text version of the certificate for "othername:<unsupported>" before calling
|
|
# external functions to obtain the DER encoded certificate.
|
|
if [[ "$cert_txt" =~ X509v3\ Subject\ Alternative\ Name:.*othername:\<unsupported\> ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$cert_txt" =~ X509v3\ Subject\ Alternative\ Name:.*othername:\ 0.4.0.3523.3.1 ]]; then
|
|
dercert="$($OPENSSL x509 -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert" | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04[0-9A-F]*060604009B430301 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D1104[0-9A-F]*060604009B430301 ]]; then
|
|
# Look for the beginning of the subjectAltName extension. It
|
|
# will begin with the OID (2.5.29.17 = 0603551D11). After the OID
|
|
# there may be an indication that the extension is critical (0101FF).
|
|
# Finally will be the tag indicating that the value of the extension is
|
|
# encoded as an OCTET STRING (04).
|
|
if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04 ]]; then
|
|
dercert="${dercert##*0603551D110101FF04}"
|
|
else
|
|
dercert="${dercert##*0603551D1104}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Skip over the encoding of the length of the OCTET STRING.
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:0:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
i="${dercert:1:1}"
|
|
i=2*$i+2
|
|
dercert="${dercert:i}"
|
|
else
|
|
dercert="${dercert:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Next byte should be a 30 (SEQUENCE).
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:0:2}" == 30 ]]; then
|
|
# Get the length of the subjectAltName extension and then skip
|
|
# over the encoding of the length.
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:2:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
case "${dercert:3:1}" in
|
|
1) len=2*0x${dercert:4:2}; dercert="${dercert:6}" ;;
|
|
2) len=2*0x${dercert:4:4}; dercert="${dercert:8}" ;;
|
|
3) len=2*0x${dercert:4:6}; dercert="${dercert:10}" ;;
|
|
*) len=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len=2*0x${dercert:2:2}
|
|
dercert="${dercert:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $len -lt ${#dercert} ]]; then
|
|
# loop through all the names and extract the visibility information
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=len_name )); do
|
|
tag="${dercert:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:i:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
i+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:i:1}" in
|
|
1) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}; i+=2 ;;
|
|
2) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:4}; i+=4 ;;
|
|
3) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:6}; i+=4 ;;
|
|
*) len=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}
|
|
i+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$tag" == A0 ]] || continue
|
|
# This is an otherName.
|
|
[[ $len_name -gt 16 ]] || continue
|
|
[[ "${dercert:i:16}" == 060604009B430301 ]] || continue
|
|
# According to the OID, this is visibility information.
|
|
j=$i+16
|
|
# Skip over the tag (A0) and length for the otherName value.
|
|
[[ "${dercert:j:2}" == A0 ]] || continue
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
j+=2*0x${dercert:j:1}+1
|
|
else
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
# The value for this otherName is encoded as a SEQUENCE (30):
|
|
# VisibilityInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
# fingerprint OCTET STRING (SIZE(10)),
|
|
# accessDescription UTF8String }
|
|
[[ "${dercert:j:2}" == 30 ]] || continue
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == 8 ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:j:1}" in
|
|
1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;;
|
|
2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;;
|
|
3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;;
|
|
4) len1=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $len1 -ne 0 ]] || continue
|
|
# Next is the 10-byte fingerprint, encoded as an OCTET STRING (04)
|
|
[[ "${dercert:j:4}" == 040A ]] || continue
|
|
j+=4
|
|
fingerprint[nr_visnames]="$(hex2binary "${dercert:j:20}")"
|
|
j+=20
|
|
# Finally comes the access description, encoded as a UTF8String (0C).
|
|
[[ "${dercert:j:2}" == 0C ]] || continue
|
|
j+=2
|
|
if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then
|
|
j+=1
|
|
case "${dercert:j:1}" in
|
|
1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;;
|
|
2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;;
|
|
3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;;
|
|
4) len1=0 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}
|
|
j+=2
|
|
fi
|
|
access_description[nr_visnames]=""$(hex2binary "${dercert:j:len1}")""
|
|
nr_visnames+=1
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $nr_visnames -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln "not present"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not present"
|
|
else
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_visnames; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ $i -ne 0 ]] && out "$spaces"
|
|
outln "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "${fingerprint[i]} / ${access_description[i]}" "$spaces" $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "${fingerprint[i]} / ${access_description[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: arg3 must contain the text output of $HOSTCERT.
|
|
must_staple() {
|
|
local jsonID="cert_mustStapleExtension"
|
|
local json_postfix="$1"
|
|
local provides_stapling="$2"
|
|
local hostcert_txt="$3"
|
|
local cert extn
|
|
local -i extn_len
|
|
local supported=false
|
|
|
|
# Note this function is only looking for status_request (5) and not
|
|
# status_request_v2 (17), since OpenSSL seems to only include status_request (5)
|
|
# in its ClientHello when the "-status" option is used.
|
|
|
|
# OpenSSL 1.1.0 supports pretty-printing the "TLS Feature extension." For any
|
|
# previous versions of OpenSSL, OpenSSL can only show if the extension OID is present.
|
|
if grep -A 1 "TLS Feature:" <<< "$hostcert_txt" | grep -q "status_request"; then
|
|
# FIXME: This will indicate that must staple is supported if the
|
|
# certificate indicates status_request or status_request_v2. This is
|
|
# probably okay, since it seems likely that any TLS Feature extension
|
|
# that includes status_request_v2 will also include status_request.
|
|
supported=true
|
|
elif [[ "$hostcert_txt" =~ '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24:' ]]; then
|
|
cert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$HOSTCERT" -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
extn="${cert##*06082B06010505070118}"
|
|
# Check for critical bit, and skip over it if present.
|
|
[[ "${extn:0:6}" == "0101FF" ]] && extn="${extn:6}"
|
|
# Next is tag and length of extnValue OCTET STRING. Assume it is less than 128 bytes.
|
|
extn="${extn:4}"
|
|
# The TLS Feature is a SEQUENCE of INTEGER. Get the length of the SEQUENCE
|
|
extn_len=2*$(hex2dec "${extn:2:2}")
|
|
# If the extension include the status_request (5), then it supports must staple.
|
|
if [[ "${extn:4:extn_len}" =~ 020105 ]]; then
|
|
supported=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$supported"; then
|
|
if "$provides_stapling"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_good "supported"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "supported"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_high "requires OCSP stapling (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "extension detected but no OCSP stapling provided"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# TODO: This function checks for Certificate Transparency support based on RFC 6962.
|
|
# It will need to be updated to add checks for Certificate Transparency support based on 6962bis.
|
|
# return values are results, no error conditions
|
|
certificate_transparency() {
|
|
local cert_txt="$1"
|
|
local ocsp_response="$2"
|
|
local -i number_of_certificates=$3
|
|
local cipher="$4"
|
|
local sni_used="$5"
|
|
local tls_version="$6"
|
|
local sni=""
|
|
local ciphers=""
|
|
local extra_extns=""
|
|
local -i success
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (signature) public key
|
|
local -r a_rsa="cc,13, cc,15, c0,30, c0,28, c0,14, 00,9f, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,39, c0,77, 00,c4, 00,88, c0,45, c0,4d, c0,53, c0,61, c0,7d, c0,8b, 16,b7, 16,b9, c0,2f, c0,27, c0,13, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,67, 00,33, c0,76, 00,be, 00,9a, 00,45, c0,44, c0,4c, c0,52, c0,60, c0,7c, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,12, 00,16, 00,15, 00,14, c0,10"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (encryption) public key
|
|
local -r e_rsa="00,b7, c0,99, 00,ad, cc,ae, 00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, 00,95, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,69, c0,6f, c0,7b, c0,93, ff,01, 00,ac, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,b6, 00,96, 00,41, c0,98, 00,07, 00,94, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,68, c0,6e, c0,7a, c0,92, 00,05, 00,04, 00,92, 00,0a, 00,93, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,2e, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, ff,00"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DSA public key
|
|
local -r a_dss="00,a3, 00,6a, 00,38, 00,c3, 00,87, c0,43, c0,57, c0,81, 00,a2, 00,40, 00,32, 00,bd, 00,99, 00,44, c0,42, c0,56, c0,80, 00,66, 00,13, 00,63, 00,12, 00,65, 00,11"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DH public key
|
|
local -r a_dh="00,a5, 00,a1, 00,69, 00,68, 00,37, 00,36, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,86, 00,85, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,55, c0,59, c0,7f, c0,83, 00,a4, 00,a0, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,31, 00,30, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,98, 00,97, 00,43, 00,42, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,54, c0,58, c0,7e, c0,82, 00,10, 00,0d, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDH public key
|
|
local -r a_ecdh="c0,32, c0,2e, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, c0,4b, c0,4f, c0,5f, c0,63, c0,89, c0,8d, c0,31, c0,2d, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, c0,4a, c0,4e, c0,5e, c0,62, c0,88, c0,8c, c0,0c, c0,02, c0,0d, c0,03, c0,0b, c0,01"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDSA public key
|
|
local -r a_ecdsa="cc,14, c0,2c, c0,24, c0,0a, cc,a9, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,73, c0,49, c0,5d, c0,87, 16,b8, 16,ba, c0,2b, c0,23, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,72, c0,48, c0,5c, c0,86, c0,07, c0,08, c0,06"
|
|
# Cipher suites that use a certificate with a GOST public key
|
|
local -r a_gost="00,80, 00,81, 00,82, 00,83"
|
|
|
|
# First check whether signed certificate timestamps (SCT) are included in the
|
|
# server's certificate. If they aren't, check whether the server provided
|
|
# a stapled OCSP response with SCTs. If no SCTs were found in the certificate
|
|
# or OCSP response, check for an SCT TLS extension.
|
|
if [[ "$cert_txt" =~ CT\ Precertificate\ SCTs ]] || [[ "$cert_txt" =~ '1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2' ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "certificate extension"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ CT\ Certificate\ SCTs ]] || [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ '1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.5' ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "OCSP extension"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the server only has one certificate, then it is sufficient to check whether
|
|
# determine_tls_extensions() discovered an SCT TLS extension. If the server has more than
|
|
# one certificate, then it is possible that an SCT TLS extension is returned for some
|
|
# certificates, but not for all of them.
|
|
if [[ $number_of_certificates -eq 1 ]] && [[ "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ signed\ certificate\ timestamps ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "TLS extension"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $number_of_certificates -gt 1 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
if [[ "$tls_version" == 0304 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers=", 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05"
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == tls1_3_RSA ]]; then
|
|
extra_extns=", 00,0d,00,10,00,0e,08,04,08,05,08,06,04,01,05,01,06,01,02,01"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then
|
|
extra_extns=", 00,0d,00,0a,00,08,04,03,05,03,06,03,02,03"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aRSA ]] && ciphers+=", $a_rsa"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ eRSA ]] && ciphers+=", $e_rsa"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aDSS ]] && ciphers+=", $a_dss"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aDH ]] && ciphers+=", $a_dh"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aECDH ]] && ciphers+=", $a_ecdh"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aECDSA ]] && ciphers+=", $a_ecdsa"
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ aGOST ]] && ciphers+=", $a_gost"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers" ]] && return 1
|
|
ciphers+=", 00,ff"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && sni="$SNI" && SNI=""
|
|
tls_sockets "${tls_version:2:2}" "${ciphers:2}" "all" "00,12,00,00$extra_extns"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
[[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && SNI="$sni"
|
|
if ( [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]] ) && \
|
|
grep -a 'TLS server extension ' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | \
|
|
grep -aq "signed certificate timestamps"; then
|
|
tm_out "TLS extension"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]]; then
|
|
# At the moment Certificate Transparency only applies to HTTPS.
|
|
tm_out "N/A"
|
|
else
|
|
tm_out "--"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Shortcut for $OPENSSL x509 -noout -in $cert $ossl_command
|
|
# arg1 is the certificate
|
|
# arg2 is -serial | -fingerprint -sha1 | -fingerprint -sha256
|
|
# returns the serial or fingerprint as ASCII
|
|
#
|
|
determine_cert_fingerprint_serial() {
|
|
local cert="$1"
|
|
local ossl_command="$2"
|
|
local result=""
|
|
|
|
result="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout $ossl_command 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert")"
|
|
# remove strings in text output, colon only appear in fingerprints
|
|
result="${result//Fingerprint=}"
|
|
result="${result//serial=}"
|
|
result="${result//:/}"
|
|
result="${result//SHA1 /}"
|
|
result="${result//sha1 /}"
|
|
result="${result//SHA256 /}"
|
|
result="${result//sha256 /}"
|
|
# When the serial number is too large we'll get a 0x0a LF after 70 ASCII chars (see #2010).
|
|
# Thus we clean them here so that it is displayed correctly.
|
|
result="${result/[$'\n\r']/}"
|
|
result="${result//[\\]/}"
|
|
safe_echo "$result"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Returns startdate, enddate, diffseconds, days2expire as CSVs as strings
|
|
# arg1: human readable text string for certificate (openssl x509 -text -noout)
|
|
#
|
|
determine_dates_certificate() {
|
|
local cert_txt="$1"
|
|
local startdate enddate yearnow y m d yearstart clockstart yearend clockend
|
|
local diffseconds=0 days2expire=0
|
|
local -i secsaday=86400
|
|
|
|
startdate="${cert_txt#*Validity*Not Before: }"
|
|
# FreeBSD + OSX can't swallow the leading blank:
|
|
startdate="${startdate%%GMT*}GMT"
|
|
enddate="${cert_txt#*Validity*Not Before: *Not After : }"
|
|
enddate="${enddate%%GMT*}GMT"
|
|
# Now we have a normalized enddate and startdate like "Feb 27 10:03:20 2017 GMT" -- also for OpenBSD
|
|
if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
# Best we want to do under old versions of OpenBSD, first just remove the GMT and keep start/endate for later output
|
|
startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s")"
|
|
enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s")"
|
|
# Now we extract a date block and a time block which we need for later output
|
|
startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")"
|
|
enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")"
|
|
read -r yearstart clockstart <<< "$startdate"
|
|
read -r yearend clockend <<< "$enddate"
|
|
debugme echo "$yearstart, $clockstart"
|
|
debugme echo "$yearend, $clockend"
|
|
y=$(( ${yearend:0:4} - ${yearstart:0:4} ))
|
|
m=$(( ${yearend:5:1} - ${yearstart:5:1} + ${yearend:6:1} - ${yearstart:6:1} ))
|
|
d=$(( ${yearend:8:2} - ${yearstart:8:2} ))
|
|
# We take the year, month, days here as old OpenBSD's date is too difficult for real conversion
|
|
# see comment in parse_date(). In diffseconds then we have the estimated absolute validity period
|
|
diffseconds=$(( d + ((m*30)) + ((y*365)) ))
|
|
diffseconds=$((diffseconds * secsaday))
|
|
# Now we estimate the days left plus length of month/year:
|
|
yearnow="$(date -juz GMT "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M")"
|
|
y=$(( ${yearend:0:4} - ${yearnow:0:4} ))
|
|
m=$(( ${yearend:5:1} - ${yearnow:5:1} + ${yearend:6:1} - ${yearnow:6:1} ))
|
|
d=$(( ${yearend:8:2} - ${yearnow:8:2} ))
|
|
days2expire=$(( d + ((m*30)) + ((y*365)) ))
|
|
else
|
|
startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")"
|
|
enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")"
|
|
days2expire=$(( $(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') - $(LC_ALL=C date "+%s") )) # first in seconds
|
|
days2expire=$((days2expire / secsaday))
|
|
diffseconds=$(( $(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') - $(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') ))
|
|
fi
|
|
safe_echo "$startdate,$enddate,$diffseconds,$days2expire,$yearstart"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
certificate_info() {
|
|
local proto
|
|
local -i certificate_number=$1
|
|
local -i number_of_certificates=$2
|
|
local cert_txt="$3"
|
|
local intermediates="$4"
|
|
local cipher=$5
|
|
local cert_keysize=$6
|
|
local cert_type="$7"
|
|
local ocsp_response_binary="$8"
|
|
local ocsp_response=$9
|
|
local ocsp_response_status=${10}
|
|
local sni_used="${11}"
|
|
local ct="${12}"
|
|
local certificate_list_ordering_problem="${13}"
|
|
local cert_sig_algo cert_sig_hash_algo cert_key_algo cert_spki_info
|
|
local hostcert=""
|
|
local common_primes_file="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/common-primes.txt"
|
|
local -i lineno_matched=0
|
|
local cert_keyusage cert_ext_keyusage short_keyAlgo
|
|
local outok=true
|
|
local days2expire ocsp_uri crl
|
|
local startdate enddate issuer_CN issuer_C issuer_O issuer sans san all_san="" cn
|
|
local issuer_DC issuerfinding cn_nosni=""
|
|
local cert_fingerprint_sha1 cert_fingerprint_sha2 cert_serial cert
|
|
local -a intermediate_certs_txt=()
|
|
local policy_oid
|
|
local spaces=""
|
|
local -i trust_sni=0 trust_nosni=0 diffseconds=0
|
|
local has_dns_sans has_dns_sans_nosni
|
|
local trust_sni_finding
|
|
local -i i certificates_provided=0
|
|
local cn_finding trustfinding trustfinding_nosni
|
|
local cnok="OK"
|
|
local expfinding expok="OK"
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local json_postfix="" # string to place at the end of JSON IDs when there is more than one certificate
|
|
local jsonID="" # string to place at beginning of JSON IDs
|
|
local json_rating json_msg
|
|
local indent=""
|
|
local days2warn2=$DAYS2WARN2
|
|
local days2warn1=$DAYS2WARN1
|
|
local provides_stapling=false
|
|
local caa_node="" all_caa="" caa_property_name="" caa_property_value=""
|
|
local response=""
|
|
local yearstart
|
|
local gt_398=false gt_398warn=false
|
|
local gt_825=false gt_825warn=false
|
|
local -i secsaday=86400
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local badocsp=1
|
|
local len_cert_serial=0
|
|
|
|
if [[ $number_of_certificates -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $certificate_number -eq 1 ]] && outln
|
|
indent=" "
|
|
out "$indent"
|
|
pr_headline "Server Certificate #$certificate_number"
|
|
[[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && pr_underline " (in response to request w/o SNI)"
|
|
outln
|
|
json_postfix=" <hostCert#${certificate_number}>"
|
|
spaces=" "
|
|
else
|
|
spaces=" "
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
GOOD_CA_BUNDLE=""
|
|
cert_sig_algo="$(awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; if (++Match >= 1) exit; }' <<< "$cert_txt")"
|
|
cert_sig_algo="${cert_sig_algo// /}"
|
|
case "$cert_sig_algo" in
|
|
1.3.101.112|ED25519) cert_sig_algo="Ed25519" ;;
|
|
1.3.101.113|ED448) cert_sig_algo="Ed448" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
cert_key_algo="$(awk -F':' '/Public Key Algorithm:/ { print $2; if (++Match >= 1) exit; }' <<< "$cert_txt")"
|
|
cert_key_algo="${cert_key_algo// /}"
|
|
case "$cert_key_algo" in
|
|
1.3.101.112|E[Dd]25519) cert_key_algo="Ed25519"; cert_keysize=253 ;;
|
|
1.3.101.113|E[Dd]448) cert_key_algo="Ed448"; cert_keysize=456 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
out "$indent" ; pr_bold " Signature Algorithm "
|
|
jsonID="cert_signatureAlgorithm"
|
|
case $cert_sig_algo in
|
|
sha1WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "SHA1 with RSA"
|
|
if [[ "$SERVICE" == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
out " -- besides: users will receive a "; pr_svrty_high "strong browser WARNING"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "SHA1 with RSA"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Uses SHA1 algorithm"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha224WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
outln "SHA224 with RSA"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "SHA224 with RSA"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha256WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "SHA256 with RSA"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA256 with RSA"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha384WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "SHA384 with RSA"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA384 with RSA"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha512WithRSAEncryption)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "SHA512 with RSA"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA512 with RSA"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA1)
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "ECDSA with SHA1"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "ECDSA with SHA1"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Uses SHA1 algorithm"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA224)
|
|
outln "ECDSA with SHA224"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "ECDSA with SHA224"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA256)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA256"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA256"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA384)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA384"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA384"
|
|
;;
|
|
ecdsa-with-SHA512)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA512"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA512"
|
|
;;
|
|
dsaWithSHA1)
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "DSA with SHA1"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "DSA with SHA1"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Uses SHA1 algorithm"
|
|
;;
|
|
dsa_with_SHA224)
|
|
outln "DSA with SHA224"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "DSA with SHA224"
|
|
;;
|
|
dsa_with_SHA256)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "DSA with SHA256"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "DSA with SHA256"
|
|
;;
|
|
rsassaPss)
|
|
cert_sig_hash_algo="$(awk '/Signature Algorithm/ { getline; print $0; exit }' <<< "$cert_txt" | sed 's/^.*Hash Algorithm: //')"
|
|
case $cert_sig_hash_algo in
|
|
sha1)
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "RSASSA-PSS with SHA1"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA1"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Uses SHA1 algorithm"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha224)
|
|
outln "RSASSA-PSS with SHA224"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA224"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha256)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA256"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA256"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha384)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA384"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA384"
|
|
;;
|
|
sha512)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA512"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA512"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
out "RSASSA-PSS with $cert_sig_hash_algo"
|
|
prln_warning " (Unknown hash algorithm)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "DEBUG" "RSASSA-PSS with $cert_sig_hash_algo"
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
md2*)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "MD2"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD2"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Supports a insecure signature (MD2)"
|
|
;;
|
|
md4*)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "MD4"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD4"
|
|
;;
|
|
md5*)
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "MD5"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD5"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Supports a insecure signature (MD5)"
|
|
;;
|
|
Ed25519|Ed448)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "$cert_sig_algo"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "$cert_sig_algo"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
out "$cert_sig_algo ("
|
|
pr_warning "FIXME: can't tell whether this is good or not"
|
|
outln ")"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "DEBUG" "$cert_sig_algo"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# old, but still interesting: https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/754-Playing-with-the-EFF-SSL-Observatory.html
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server key size "
|
|
jsonID="cert_keySize"
|
|
if [[ -z "$cert_keysize" ]]; then
|
|
outln "(couldn't determine)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "cannot be determined"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
else
|
|
case $cert_key_algo in
|
|
*RSA*|*rsa*) short_keyAlgo="RSA";;
|
|
*ecdsa*|*ecPublicKey) short_keyAlgo="EC";;
|
|
*Ed25519*|*Ed448*) short_keyAlgo="EdDSA";;
|
|
*DSA*|*dsa*) short_keyAlgo="DSA";;
|
|
*GOST*|*gost*) short_keyAlgo="GOST";;
|
|
*dh*|*DH*) short_keyAlgo="DH" ;;
|
|
*) pr_fixme "don't know $cert_key_algo "
|
|
((ret++)) ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
out "$short_keyAlgo "
|
|
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492, https://www.keylength.com/en/compare/
|
|
# https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-001-0009-4
|
|
# see https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-4/final
|
|
# Table 2 @ chapter 5.6.1 (~ p66)
|
|
if [[ $cert_key_algo =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ ecPublicKey ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 110 ]]; then # a guess
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="CRITICAL"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 123 ]]; then # a guess
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="HIGH"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 163 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="MEDIUM"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 224 ]]; then
|
|
out "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="INFO"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 533 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="OK"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
else
|
|
out "keysize: $cert_keysize (not expected, FIXME)"
|
|
json_rating="DEBUG"; json_msg=" $cert_keysize bits (not expected)"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
|
|
set_key_str_score "$short_keyAlgo" "$cert_keysize"
|
|
elif [[ $cert_key_algo =~ RSA ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ rsa ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ dsa ]] || \
|
|
[[ $cert_key_algo =~ dhKeyAgreement ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo == X9.42\ DH ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 512 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$cert_keysize"
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
json_rating="CRITICAL"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 768 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$cert_keysize"
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
json_rating="HIGH"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 1024 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$cert_keysize"
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
json_rating="MEDIUM"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 2048 ]]; then
|
|
out "$cert_keysize bits"
|
|
json_rating="INFO"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 4096 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$cert_keysize"
|
|
json_rating="OK"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits"
|
|
out " bits"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "weird key size: $cert_keysize bits"; out " (could cause compatibility problems)"
|
|
json_rating="WARN"; json_msg="$cert_keysize bits (Odd)"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
set_key_str_score "$short_keyAlgo" "$cert_keysize"
|
|
elif [[ $cert_key_algo == Ed* ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$cert_key_algo"
|
|
json_rating="OK"; json_msg="$short_keyAlgo $cert_key_algo"
|
|
set_key_str_score "$short_keyAlgo" "$cert_keysize"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$cert_key_algo + $cert_keysize bits ("
|
|
pr_warning "FIXME: can't tell whether this is good or not"
|
|
out ")"
|
|
json_rating="WARN"; json_msg="Server keys $cert_keysize bits, unknown public key algorithm $cert_key_algo"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$short_keyAlgo" in
|
|
"RSA") cert_spki_info="${cert_txt##*Subject Public Key Info:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*Public Key Algorithm:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info#*Exponent:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(strip_leading_space "$cert_spki_info")"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info%%[[:space:]]*}"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_spki_info" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $cert_spki_info -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out " (exponent is "; pr_svrty_critical "$cert_spki_info"; out ")"
|
|
json_rating="CRITICAL"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "RSA certificate uses exponent of 1"
|
|
else
|
|
out " (exponent is $cert_spki_info)"
|
|
fi
|
|
json_msg+=" (exponent is $cert_spki_info)"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
"EC") cert_spki_info="${cert_txt##*Subject Public Key Info:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*Public Key Algorithm:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*ASN1 OID: }"
|
|
[[ "$cert_spki_info" =~ NIST\ CURVE:\ ]] && cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*NIST CURVE: }"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info%%[[:space:]]*}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(strip_lf "$(strip_spaces "$cert_spki_info")")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_spki_info" ]]; then
|
|
out " (curve $cert_spki_info)"
|
|
json_msg+=" (curve $cert_spki_info)"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
"DH") if [[ -s "$common_primes_file" ]]; then
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_txt##*Subject Public Key Info:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info##*Public Key Algorithm:}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(awk '/prime:|P:/,/generator:|G:/' <<< "$cert_spki_info" | grep -Ev "prime|P:|generator|G:")"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(strip_spaces "$(colon_to_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$cert_spki_info")")")"
|
|
[[ "${cert_spki_info:0:2}" == 00 ]] && cert_spki_info="${cert_spki_info:2}"
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(toupper "$cert_spki_info")"
|
|
lineno_matched=$(grep -n "$cert_spki_info" "$common_primes_file" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '{ print $1 }')
|
|
if [[ "$lineno_matched" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
cert_spki_info="$(awk "NR == $lineno_matched-1" "$common_primes_file" | awk -F'"' '{ print $2 }')"
|
|
out " ($cert_spki_info)"
|
|
json_msg+=" ($cert_spki_info)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "$json_rating" "$json_msg"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server key usage ";
|
|
outok=true
|
|
jsonID="cert_keyUsage"
|
|
cert_keyusage="$(strip_leading_space "$(awk '/X509v3 Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "$cert_txt")")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_keyusage" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$cert_keyusage"
|
|
if ( [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ RSASig\ ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ DSA\ ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ ECDSA\ ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ EdDSA\ ]] ) && \
|
|
[[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Digital\ Signature ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for digital signatures"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for digital signatures: \"$cert_keyusage\""
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ RSAKMK\ ]] && [[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Key\ Encipherment ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for key encipherment"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for key encipherment: \"$cert_keyusage\""
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if ( [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ DH\ ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ \ ECDH\ ]] ) && \
|
|
[[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ Key\ Agreement ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for key agreement"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for key agreement: \"$cert_keyusage\""
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No server key usage information"
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$outok"; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_keyusage"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server extended key usage ";
|
|
jsonID="cert_extKeyUsage"
|
|
outok=true
|
|
cert_ext_keyusage="$(strip_leading_space "$(awk '/X509v3 Extended Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "$cert_txt")")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_ext_keyusage" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$cert_ext_keyusage"
|
|
if [[ ! "$cert_ext_keyusage" =~ "TLS Web Server Authentication" ]] && [[ ! "$cert_ext_keyusage" =~ "Any Extended Key Usage" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for TLS Web Server Authentication"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for TLS Web Server Authentication: \"$cert_ext_keyusage\""
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No server extended key usage information"
|
|
outok=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$outok"; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_ext_keyusage"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
hostcert="$(<$HOSTCERT)"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Serial "
|
|
cert_serial="$(determine_cert_fingerprint_serial "$hostcert" "-serial")"
|
|
fileout "cert_serialNumber${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_serial"
|
|
out "$cert_serial"
|
|
|
|
len_cert_serial=${#cert_serial}
|
|
len_cert_serial=$(( len_cert_serial / 2 ))
|
|
|
|
if [[ $len_cert_serial -gt 20 ]]; then
|
|
# https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.2
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_svrty_low "${spaces}NOT ok: length must not exceed 20 bytes (is: $len_cert_serial bytes)"
|
|
fileout "cert_serialNumberLen${json_postfix}" "LOW" "$len_cert_serial is too long"
|
|
elif [[ $len_cert_serial -lt 8 ]] && [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]]; then
|
|
# We only want this check for browsers as this requirement comes from the CA browser forum,
|
|
# see e.g. https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.8.0.pdf
|
|
prln_svrty_low " NOT ok: length should be >= 64 bits entropy (is: $len_cert_serial bytes)"
|
|
fileout "cert_serialNumberLen${json_postfix}" "LOW" "$len_cert_serial is not enough entropy"
|
|
else
|
|
outln " (OK: length $len_cert_serial)"
|
|
fileout "cert_serialNumberLen${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$len_cert_serial"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Fingerprints "
|
|
cert_fingerprint_sha1="$(determine_cert_fingerprint_serial "$hostcert" "-fingerprint -sha1")"
|
|
outln "SHA1 $cert_fingerprint_sha1"
|
|
fileout "cert_fingerprintSHA1${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${cert_fingerprint_sha1}"
|
|
|
|
cert_fingerprint_sha2="$(determine_cert_fingerprint_serial "$hostcert" "-fingerprint -sha256")"
|
|
fileout "cert_fingerprintSHA256${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${cert_fingerprint_sha2}"
|
|
outln "${spaces}SHA256 ${cert_fingerprint_sha2}"
|
|
|
|
# " " needs to be converted back to lf in JSON/CSV output. watch out leading/ending line containing "CERTIFICATE"
|
|
fileout "cert${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$hostcert"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 ]] && \
|
|
CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2" ||
|
|
CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2 $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2"
|
|
[[ -z $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 ]] && \
|
|
( [[ $cert_key_algo =~ RSA ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ rsa ]] ) &&
|
|
RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Common Name (CN) "
|
|
cn_finding="Common Name (CN) : "
|
|
cn="$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cn" ]]; then
|
|
pr_italic "$cn"
|
|
cn_finding="$cn"
|
|
else
|
|
cn="no CN field in subject"
|
|
out "($cn)"
|
|
cn_finding="$cn"
|
|
cnok="INFO"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "cert_commonName${json_postfix}" "$cnok" "$cn_finding"
|
|
cn_finding=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$sni_used" ]]; then
|
|
if grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN" "$HOSTCERT.nosni"; then
|
|
cn_nosni="$(get_cn_from_cert "$HOSTCERT.nosni")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cn_nosni" ]] && cn_nosni="no CN field in subject"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme tm_out "\"$NODE\" | \"$cn\" | \"$cn_nosni\""
|
|
else
|
|
debugme tm_out "\"$NODE\" | \"$cn\""
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$sni_used" ]] || [[ "$(toupper "$cn_nosni")" == "$(toupper "$cn")" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
cn_finding="$cn"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$cn_nosni" ]]; then
|
|
out " (request w/o SNI didn't succeed";
|
|
cn_finding+="request w/o SNI didn't succeed"
|
|
if [[ $cert_sig_algo =~ ecdsa ]]; then
|
|
out ", usual for EC certificates"
|
|
cn_finding+=", usual for EC certificates"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln ")"
|
|
cn_finding+=""
|
|
elif [[ "$cn_nosni" == *"no CN field"* ]]; then
|
|
outln ", (request w/o SNI: $cn_nosni)"
|
|
cn_finding="$cn_nosni"
|
|
else
|
|
out " (CN in response to request w/o SNI: "; pr_italic "$cn_nosni"; outln ")"
|
|
cn_finding="$cn_nosni"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "cert_commonName_wo_SNI${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cn_finding"
|
|
|
|
sans=$(grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" <<< "$cert_txt" | \
|
|
grep -E "DNS:|IP Address:|email:|URI:|DirName:|Registered ID:" | tr ',' '\n' | \
|
|
sed -e 's/ *DNS://g' -e 's/ *IP Address://g' -e 's/ *email://g' -e 's/ *URI://g' -e 's/ *DirName://g' \
|
|
-e 's/ *Registered ID://g' \
|
|
-e 's/ *othername:<unsupported>//g' -e 's/ *X400Name:<unsupported>//g' -e 's/ *EdiPartyName:<unsupported>//g')
|
|
# ^^^ CACert
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " subjectAltName (SAN) "
|
|
jsonID="cert_subjectAltName"
|
|
if [[ -n "$sans" ]]; then
|
|
while read san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && all_san+="$san "
|
|
done <<< "$sans"
|
|
prln_italic "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$all_san" "$indent " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$all_san"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "missing (NOT ok)"; outln " -- Browsers are complaining"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "No SAN, browsers are complaining"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "missing"; outln " -- no SAN is deprecated"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "Providing no SAN is deprecated"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Determine the issuer now as we need them for host certificate warning
|
|
issuer="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -issuer -nameopt multiline,-align,sname,-esc_msb,utf8,-space_eq 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")"
|
|
issuer_CN="$(awk -F'=' '/CN=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")"
|
|
issuer_O="$(awk -F'=' '/O=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")"
|
|
issuer_C="$(awk -F'=' '/ C=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")"
|
|
issuer_DC="$(awk -F'=' '/DC=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Trust (hostname) "
|
|
compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT"
|
|
trust_sni=$?
|
|
|
|
# Find out if the subjectAltName extension is present and contains
|
|
# a DNS name, since Section 6.3 of RFC 6125 says:
|
|
# Security Warning: A client MUST NOT seek a match for a reference
|
|
# identifier of CN-ID if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID,
|
|
# SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types
|
|
# supported by the client.
|
|
has_dns_sans=$HAS_DNS_SANS
|
|
|
|
case $trust_sni in
|
|
0) trustfinding="certificate does not match supplied URI"
|
|
set_grade_cap "M" "Domain name mismatch"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) trustfinding="Ok via SAN" ;;
|
|
2) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard" ;;
|
|
4) if "$has_dns_sans"; then
|
|
trustfinding="via CN, but not SAN"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding="via CN only"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
5) trustfinding="Ok via SAN and CN" ;;
|
|
6) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard and CN"
|
|
;;
|
|
8) if "$has_dns_sans"; then
|
|
trustfinding="via CN wildcard, but not SAN"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding="via CN (wildcard) only"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
9) trustfinding="Ok via CN wildcard and SAN"
|
|
;;
|
|
10) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard and CN wildcard"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if [[ $trust_sni -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$trustfinding"
|
|
trust_sni_finding="HIGH"
|
|
elif [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=308330
|
|
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1245280
|
|
# https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/4981025180483584
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$trustfinding"; out " -- Browsers are complaining"
|
|
trust_sni_finding="HIGH"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$trustfinding"
|
|
trust_sni_finding="MEDIUM"
|
|
# we punish CN matching for non-HTTP as it is deprecated https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818#section-3.1
|
|
! "$has_dns_sans" && out " -- CN only match is deprecated"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$trustfinding"
|
|
trust_sni_finding="OK"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$cn_nosni" ]]; then
|
|
compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT.nosni"
|
|
trust_nosni=$?
|
|
has_dns_sans_nosni=$HAS_DNS_SANS
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# See issue #733.
|
|
if [[ -z "$sni_used" ]]; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=""
|
|
elif ( [[ $trust_sni -eq $trust_nosni ]] && [[ "$has_dns_sans" == "$has_dns_sans_nosni" ]] ) || \
|
|
( [[ $trust_sni -eq 0 ]] && [[ $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]] ); then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (same w/o SNI)"
|
|
elif [[ $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]]; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: certificate does not match supplied URI)"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (SNI mandatory)"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $trust_nosni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_nosni -eq 8 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]]; then
|
|
case $trust_nosni in
|
|
1) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN)" ;;
|
|
2) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard)" ;;
|
|
4) if "$has_dns_sans_nosni"; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: via CN, but not SAN)"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: via CN only)"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
5) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN and CN)" ;;
|
|
6) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard and CN)" ;;
|
|
8) if "$has_dns_sans_nosni"; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: via CN wildcard, but not SAN)"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: via CN (wildcard) only)"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
9) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via CN wildcard and SAN)" ;;
|
|
10) trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard and CN wildcard)" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
elif [[ $trust_sni -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (works w/o SNI)"
|
|
else
|
|
trustfinding_nosni=" (however, works w/o SNI)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$sni_used" ]] || [[ $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]] || ( [[ $trust_nosni -ne 4 ]] && [[ $trust_nosni -ne 8 ]] ); then
|
|
outln "$trustfinding_nosni"
|
|
elif [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "$trustfinding_nosni"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "$trustfinding_nosni"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
fileout "cert_trust${json_postfix}" "$trust_sni_finding" "${trustfinding}${trustfinding_nosni}"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Chain of trust"; out " "
|
|
jsonID="cert_chain_of_trust"
|
|
if [[ "$issuer_O" =~ StartCom ]] || [[ "$issuer_O" =~ WoSign ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" =~ StartCom ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" =~ WoSign ]]; then
|
|
# Shortcut for this special case here.
|
|
pr_italic "WoSign/StartCom"; out " are " ; prln_svrty_critical "not trusted anymore (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "Issuer not trusted anymore (WoSign/StartCom)"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Untrusted certificate chain"
|
|
else
|
|
# Also handles fileout, keep error if happened
|
|
determine_trust "$jsonID" "$json_postfix" || ((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# https://fahrplan.events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/attachments/1777_is-the-SSLiverse-a-safe-place.pdf, see p40+
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " EV cert"; out " (experimental) "
|
|
jsonID="cert_certificatePolicies_EV"
|
|
# only the first one, seldom we have two
|
|
policy_oid=$(awk '/ .Policy: / { print $2 }' <<< "$cert_txt" | awk 'NR < 2')
|
|
if grep -Eq 'Extended Validation|Extended Validated|EV SSL|EV CA' <<< "$issuer" || \
|
|
[[ 2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 2.16.840.1.114412.1.3.0.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 2.16.840.1.114412.2.1 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 2.16.578.1.26.1.3.3 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.17326.10.14.2.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.17326.10.8.12.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \
|
|
[[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.13177.10.1.3.10 == "$policy_oid" ]] ; then
|
|
out "yes "
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "yes"
|
|
else
|
|
out "no "
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "no"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -n "($(newline_to_spaces "$policy_oid"))"
|
|
outln
|
|
#TODO: check browser OIDs:
|
|
# https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/certverifier/ExtendedValidation.cpp
|
|
# https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/chromium/+/master/net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.cc
|
|
# https://certs.opera.com/03/ev-oids.xml
|
|
# see #967
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Validity (UTC) "
|
|
IFS=',' read -r startdate enddate diffseconds days2expire yearstart < <(determine_dates_certificate "$cert_txt")
|
|
|
|
# We adjust the thresholds by %50 for LE certificates, relaxing warnings for those certificates.
|
|
# . instead of \' because it does not break syntax highlighting in vim
|
|
if [[ "$issuer_O" =~ ^Let.s\ Encrypt ]] ; then
|
|
days2warn2=$((days2warn2 / 2))
|
|
days2warn1=$((days2warn1 / 2))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "(diffseconds: $diffseconds)"
|
|
if ! [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend 1 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "expired"
|
|
expfinding="expired"
|
|
expok="CRITICAL"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Certificate expired"
|
|
else
|
|
# low threshold first
|
|
if [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend $((secsaday*days2warn2)) 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
# high threshold
|
|
if [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend $((secsaday*days2warn1)) 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$days2expire >= $days2warn1 days"
|
|
expfinding+="$days2expire >= $days2warn1 days"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "expires < $days2warn1 days ($days2expire)"
|
|
expfinding+="expires < $days2warn1 days ($days2expire)"
|
|
expok="MEDIUM"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_high "expires < $days2warn2 days ($days2expire)"
|
|
expfinding+="expires < $days2warn2 days ($days2expire)"
|
|
expok="HIGH"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln " ($startdate --> $enddate)"
|
|
fileout "cert_expirationStatus${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$expfinding"
|
|
fileout "cert_notBefore${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$startdate" # we assume that the certificate has no start time in the future
|
|
fileout "cert_notAfter${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$enddate" # They are in UTC
|
|
|
|
# Internal certificates or those from appliances often have too high validity periods.
|
|
# We check for ~10 years and >~ 5 years
|
|
if [[ $diffseconds -ge $((secsaday*365*10)) ]]; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
prln_svrty_high ">= 10 years is way too long"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) days"
|
|
elif [[ $diffseconds -ge $((secsaday*365*5)) ]]; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
prln_svrty_medium ">= 5 years is too long"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) days"
|
|
elif [[ $diffseconds -ge $((secsaday*398 + 1)) ]]; then
|
|
# Also "official" certificates issued from september 1st 2020 (1598918400) aren't supposed
|
|
# to be valid longer than 398 days which is 34387200 in epoch seconds
|
|
gt_398=true
|
|
if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
if [[ 20200901 -le ${yearstart//-/} ]]; then
|
|
gt_398warn=true
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') -ge 1598918400 ]]; then
|
|
gt_398warn=true
|
|
fi
|
|
# Now, the verdict, depending on the issuing date
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
if "$gt_398warn" && "$gt_398"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "> 398 days issued after 2020/09/01 is too long"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) > 398 days"
|
|
elif "$gt_398"; then
|
|
outln ">= 398 days certificate life time but issued before 2020/09/01"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) =< 398 days"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $diffseconds -ge $((secsaday*825 + 1)) ]]; then
|
|
# Also "official" certificates issued from March 1st, 2018 (1517353200) aren't supposed
|
|
# to be valid longer than 825 days which is 1517353200 in epoch seconds
|
|
gt_825=true
|
|
if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then
|
|
if [[ 20180301 -le ${yearstart//-/} ]]; then
|
|
gt_825warn=true
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') -ge 1517353200 ]]; then
|
|
gt_825warn=true
|
|
fi
|
|
# Now, the verdict, depending on the issuing date
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
if "$gt_825warn" && "$gt_825"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "> 825 days issued after 2018/03/01 is too long"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) > 825 days"
|
|
elif "$gt_825"; then
|
|
outln ">= 825 days certificate life time but issued before 2018/03/01"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$((diffseconds / secsaday)) =< 825 days"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# All is fine with validity period
|
|
# We ignore for now certificates < 2018/03/01. On the screen we only show debug info
|
|
debugme echo "${spaces}DEBUG: all is fine with total certificate life time"
|
|
fileout "cert_extlifeSpan${json_postfix}" "OK" "certificate has no extended life time according to browser forum"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " ETS/\"eTLS\""
|
|
out ", visibility info "
|
|
jsonID="cert_eTLS"
|
|
etsi_ets_visibility_info "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "$spaces" "$hostcert" "$cert_txt"
|
|
# *Currently* this is even listed as a vulnerability (CWE-310, CVE-2019-919), see
|
|
# https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9191, https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-9191
|
|
# For now we leave this here. We may want to change that later or add infos to other sections (FS & vulnerability)
|
|
|
|
if "$PHONE_OUT"; then
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " In pwnedkeys.com DB "
|
|
check_pwnedkeys "$HOSTCERT" "$cert_key_algo" "$cert_keysize"
|
|
case "$?" in
|
|
0) outln "not checked"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not checked" ;;
|
|
1) outln "not in database"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not in database" ;;
|
|
2) pr_svrty_critical "NOT ok --"; outln " key appears in database"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "private key is known" ;;
|
|
7) prln_warning "error querying https://v1.pwnedkeys.com"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "WARN" "connection error" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Revocation List "
|
|
jsonID="cert_crlDistributionPoints"
|
|
# ~ get next 50 lines after pattern , strip until Signature Algorithm and retrieve URIs
|
|
crl="$(awk '/X509v3 CRL Distribution/{i=50} i&&i--' <<< "$cert_txt" | awk '/^$|^.*Name.*$|^.*Reasons.*$|^.*CRL Issuer.*$/,/^ [a-zA-Z0-9]+|^ Signature Algorithm:/' | awk -F'URI:' '/URI/ { print $2 }')"
|
|
if [[ -z "$crl" ]] ; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--"
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $(count_lines "$crl") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out "$crl"
|
|
if [[ "$expfinding" != "expired" ]]; then
|
|
check_revocation_crl "$crl" "cert_crlRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
ret=$((ret +$?))
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
else # more than one CRL
|
|
first_crl=true
|
|
while read -r line; do
|
|
if "$first_crl"; then
|
|
first_crl=false
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$line"
|
|
if [[ "$expfinding" != expired ]]; then
|
|
check_revocation_crl "$line" "cert_crlRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
ret=$((ret +$?))
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
done <<< "$crl"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$crl"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP URI "
|
|
jsonID="cert_ocspURL"
|
|
ocsp_uri="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -ocsp_uri 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$hostcert")"
|
|
if [[ -z "$ocsp_uri" ]]; then
|
|
outln "--"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $(count_lines "$ocsp_uri") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out "$ocsp_uri"
|
|
if [[ "$expfinding" != expired ]]; then
|
|
check_revocation_ocsp "$ocsp_uri" "" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$((ret +$?))
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
first_ocsp=true
|
|
while read -r line; do
|
|
if "$first_ocsp"; then
|
|
first_ocsp=false
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
out "$line"
|
|
if [[ "$expfinding" != expired ]]; then
|
|
check_revocation_ocsp "$line" "" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
ret=$((ret +$?))
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
done <<< "$ocsp_uri"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$ocsp_uri"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ocsp_uri" ]] && [[ -z "$crl" ]]; then
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
pr_svrty_high "NOT ok --"
|
|
outln " neither CRL nor OCSP URI provided"
|
|
fileout "cert_revocation${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Neither CRL nor OCSP URI provided"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP stapling "
|
|
jsonID="OCSP_stapling"
|
|
if grep -a "OCSP response" <<< "$ocsp_response" | grep -q "no response sent" ; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$ocsp_uri" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "not offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "LOW" "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
out "not offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if grep -a "OCSP Response Status" <<< "$ocsp_response_status" | grep -q successful; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "offered"
|
|
provides_stapling=true
|
|
check_revocation_ocsp "" "$ocsp_response_binary" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}"
|
|
elif [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ Responder\ Error: ]]; then
|
|
response="$(awk '/Responder Error:/ { print $3 }' <<< "$ocsp_response")"
|
|
pr_warning "stapled OCSP response contained an error response from OCSP responder: $response"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "stapled OCSP response contained an error response from OCSP responder: $response"
|
|
else
|
|
if $GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM; then
|
|
pr_warning "(GOST servers make problems here, sorry)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "(The GOST server made a problem here, sorry)"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
else
|
|
out "(response status unknown)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" " not sure what's going on here, '$ocsp_response'"
|
|
debugme grep -a -A20 -B2 "OCSP response" <<< "$ocsp_response"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP must staple extension ";
|
|
must_staple "$json_postfix" "$provides_stapling" "$cert_txt"
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " DNS CAA RR"; out " (experimental) "
|
|
jsonID="DNS_CAArecord"
|
|
caa_node="$NODE"
|
|
caa=""
|
|
while [[ -z "$caa" ]] && [[ -n "$caa_node" ]]; do
|
|
caa="$(get_caa_rr_record $caa_node)"
|
|
[[ $caa_node =~ '.'$ ]] || caa_node+="."
|
|
caa_node=${caa_node#*.}
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$caa" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "available"; out " - please check for match with \"Issuer\" below"
|
|
if [[ $(count_lines "$caa") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out ": "
|
|
else
|
|
outln; out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
while read caa; do
|
|
if [[ -n "$caa" ]]; then
|
|
all_caa+="$caa, "
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$caa"
|
|
all_caa=${all_caa%, } # strip trailing comma
|
|
pr_italic "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$all_caa" "$indent " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "$all_caa"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$NODNS" ]]; then
|
|
out "(instructed to minimize DNS queries)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "check skipped as instructed"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_low "not offered"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "LOW" "--"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Transparency ";
|
|
jsonID="certificate_transparency"
|
|
if [[ "$ct" =~ extension ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "yes"; outln " ($ct)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "yes ($ct)"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$ct"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$ct"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificates provided"
|
|
certificates_provided="$(grep -ac '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN\ CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-' <<< "$intermediates")"
|
|
((certificates_provided++)) # plus host certificate
|
|
out " $certificates_provided"
|
|
fileout "certs_countServer${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${certificates_provided}"
|
|
if "$certificate_list_ordering_problem"; then
|
|
prln_svrty_low " (certificate list ordering problem)"
|
|
fileout "certs_list_ordering_problem${json_postfix}" "LOW" "yes"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "certs_list_ordering_problem${json_postfix}" "INFO" "no"
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Issuer "
|
|
jsonID="cert_caIssuers"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$issuer_O" == issuer= ]] || [[ "$issuer_O" == issuer=\ ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" == "$cn" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "self-signed (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "selfsigned"
|
|
set_grade_cap "T" "Self-signed certificate"
|
|
else
|
|
issuerfinding="$issuer_CN"
|
|
pr_italic "$issuer_CN"
|
|
if [[ -z "$issuer_O" ]] && [[ -n "$issuer_DC" ]]; then
|
|
for san in $issuer_DC; do
|
|
if [[ -z "$issuer_O" ]]; then
|
|
issuer_O="${san}"
|
|
else
|
|
issuer_O="${san}.${issuer_O}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$issuer_O" ]]; then
|
|
issuerfinding+=" ("
|
|
out " ("
|
|
issuerfinding+="$issuer_O"
|
|
pr_italic "$issuer_O"
|
|
if [[ -n "$issuer_C" ]]; then
|
|
issuerfinding+=" from "
|
|
out " from "
|
|
issuerfinding+="$issuer_C"
|
|
pr_italic "$issuer_C"
|
|
fi
|
|
issuerfinding+=")"
|
|
out ")"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$issuerfinding"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Now we take care of the intermediate certificates. We basically (should) have them on disk
|
|
# as "intermediatecerts.pem" (which could be split into intermediatecert1.crt, intermediatecert2.crt, ..)
|
|
# However we do this in RAM which is better as it was passed to this function.
|
|
# We should keep in mind though this is somewhat redundant code. We do similar stuff elsewhere,
|
|
# e.g. in extract_certificates() and run_hpkp() but don't keep the certificates
|
|
|
|
# Store all of the text output of the intermediate certificates in an array so that they can
|
|
# be used later (e.g., to check their expiration dates).
|
|
for (( i=1; i < certificates_provided; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$intermediates" =~ \-\-\-\-\-BEGIN\ CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\- ]] || break
|
|
intermediates="${intermediates#*-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----}"
|
|
cert="${intermediates%%-----END CERTIFICATE-----*}"
|
|
intermediates="${intermediates#${cert}-----END CERTIFICATE-----}"
|
|
cert="-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----${cert}-----END CERTIFICATE-----"
|
|
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert"
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_fingerprintSHA256 <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$(determine_cert_fingerprint_serial "$cert" "-fingerprint -sha256")"
|
|
|
|
intermediate_certs_txt[i]="$($OPENSSL x509 -text -noout 2>/dev/null <<< "$cert")"
|
|
|
|
# We don't need every value here. For the sake of being consistent here we add the rest
|
|
IFS=',' read -r startdate enddate diffseconds days2expire yearstart < <(determine_dates_certificate "${intermediate_certs_txt[i]}")
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_notBefore <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$startdate"
|
|
|
|
if $first; then
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Intermediate cert validity "
|
|
first=false
|
|
else
|
|
out "$indent$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
out "#${i}: "
|
|
if ! [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend 1 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
cn_finding="expired!"
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "$cn_finding"
|
|
expok="CRITICAL"
|
|
elif ! [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend $((secsaday*20)) 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
cn_finding="expires <= 20 days"
|
|
pr_svrty_high "$cn_finding"
|
|
expok="HIGH"
|
|
elif ! [[ "$($OPENSSL x509 -checkend $((secsaday*40)) 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$cert")" =~ \ not\ ]]; then
|
|
cn_finding="expires <= 40 days"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$cn_finding"
|
|
expok="MEDIUM"
|
|
else
|
|
cn_finding="ok > 40 days"
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$cn_finding"
|
|
expok="OK"
|
|
fi
|
|
out " ($enddate). "
|
|
cn="$(awk -F= '/Subject:.*CN/ { print $NF }' <<< "${intermediate_certs_txt[i]}")"
|
|
issuer_CN="$(awk -F= '/Issuer:.*CN/ { print $NF }' <<< "${intermediate_certs_txt[i]}")"
|
|
pr_italic "$(strip_leading_space "$cn")"; out " <-- "; prln_italic "$(strip_leading_space "$issuer_CN")"
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_notAfter <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$enddate"
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_expiration <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$cn_finding"
|
|
fileout "intermediate_cert_chain <#${i}>${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cn <-- $issuer_CN"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Courtesy Hanno Böck (see https://github.com/hannob/badocspcert)
|
|
out "$indent"; pr_bold " Intermediate Bad OCSP"
|
|
out " (exp.) "
|
|
jsonID="intermediate_cert_badOCSP"
|
|
|
|
for (( i=1; i < certificates_provided; i++ )); do
|
|
cert_ext_keyusage="$(awk '/X509v3 Extended Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "${intermediate_certs_txt[i]}")"
|
|
[[ "$cert_ext_keyusage" =~ OCSP\ Signing ]] && badocsp=0 && break
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $badocsp -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "NOT ok"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "NOT ok is intermediate certificate ${i}"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_good "Ok"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "intermediate certificate(s) is/are ok"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_server_defaults() {
|
|
local ciph newhostcert sni
|
|
local match_found
|
|
local sessticket_lifetime_hint="" sessticket_proto="" lifetime unit
|
|
local -i i n
|
|
local -i certs_found=0
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local -a previous_hostcert previous_hostcert_txt previous_hostcert_type
|
|
local -a previous_hostcert_issuer previous_intermediates previous_ordering_problem keysize tested_cipher
|
|
local -a ocsp_response_binary ocsp_response ocsp_response_status sni_used tls_version ct
|
|
local -a ciphers_to_test certificate_type
|
|
local -a -i success
|
|
local cn_nosni cn_sni sans_nosni sans_sni san tls_extensions client_auth_ca
|
|
local cert_compression_methods=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
# Try each public key type once:
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[1]: cipher suites using certificates with RSA signature public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[2]: cipher suites using certificates with RSA key encipherment public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[3]: cipher suites using certificates with DSA signature public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[4]: cipher suites using certificates with DH key agreement public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[5]: cipher suites using certificates with ECDH key agreement public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[6]: cipher suites using certificates with ECDSA signature public keys
|
|
# ciphers_to_test[7]: cipher suites using certificates with GOST R 34.10 (either 2001 or 94) public keys
|
|
ciphers_to_test[1]="aRSA:eRSA"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[2]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[3]="aDSS:aDH:aECDH:aECDSA:aGOST"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[4]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[5]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[6]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[7]=""
|
|
ciphers_to_test[8]="tls1_3_RSA"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[9]="tls1_3_ECDSA"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[10]="tls1_3_EdDSA"
|
|
certificate_type[1]="" ; certificate_type[2]=""
|
|
certificate_type[3]=""; certificate_type[4]=""
|
|
certificate_type[5]="" ; certificate_type[6]=""
|
|
certificate_type[7]="" ; certificate_type[8]="RSASig"
|
|
certificate_type[9]="ECDSA" ; certificate_type[10]="EdDSA"
|
|
|
|
for (( n=1; n <= 17 ; n++ )); do
|
|
# Some servers use a different certificate if the ClientHello
|
|
# specifies TLSv1.1 and doesn't include a server name extension.
|
|
# So, for each public key type for which a certificate was found,
|
|
# try again, but only with TLSv1.1 and without SNI.
|
|
if [[ $n -ne 1 ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]=""
|
|
elif [[ $n -ge 11 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]=""
|
|
[[ ${success[n-10]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -ne 1 ]] && \
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="${ciphers_to_test[n-10]}" && certificate_type[n]="${certificate_type[n-10]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $n -ge 11 ]]; then
|
|
sni="$SNI"
|
|
SNI=""
|
|
get_server_certificate "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" "tls1_1"
|
|
success[n]=$?
|
|
SNI="$sni"
|
|
else
|
|
get_server_certificate "${ciphers_to_test[n]}"
|
|
success[n]=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${success[n]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then
|
|
[[ $n -ge 11 ]] && [[ ! -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]] && cp $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.get_server_certificate.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then
|
|
sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket life/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE)
|
|
sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $n -le 7 ]]; then
|
|
ciph="$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if [[ "$ciph" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$ciph" != SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
ciph="$(openssl2rfc "$ciph")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DHE_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_CECPQ1_RSA_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="RSASig"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aRSA/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aRSA"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == SSL_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_GOST*_RSA_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="RSAKMK"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/eRSA/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="eRSA"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DHE_DSS_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="DSA"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aDSS/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aDSS"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DH_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="DH"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aDH/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aDH"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDH_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="ECDH"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aECDH/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aECDH"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_CECPQ1_ECDSA_* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="ECDSA"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aECDSA/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aECDSA"
|
|
elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_GOST* ]]; then
|
|
certificate_type[n]="GOST"
|
|
if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aGOST/}"
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}"
|
|
[[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphers_to_test[n]="aGOST"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# check whether the host's certificate has been seen before
|
|
match_found=false
|
|
i=1
|
|
newhostcert=$(cat $HOSTCERT)
|
|
while [[ $i -le $certs_found ]]; do
|
|
if [[ "$newhostcert" == "${previous_hostcert[i]}" ]]; then
|
|
match_found=true
|
|
break;
|
|
fi
|
|
i=$((i + 1))
|
|
done
|
|
if ! "$match_found" && [[ $n -ge 11 ]] && [[ $certs_found -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# A new certificate was found using TLSv1.1 without SNI.
|
|
# Check to see if the new certificate should be displayed.
|
|
# It should be displayed if it is either a match for the
|
|
# $NODE being tested or if it has the same subject
|
|
# (CN and SAN) as other certificates for this host.
|
|
compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && success[n]=0 || success[n]=1
|
|
|
|
if [[ ${success[n]} -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
cn_nosni="$(toupper "$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)")"
|
|
sans_nosni="$(toupper "$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$HOSTCERT")")"
|
|
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert[1]}" > $HOSTCERT
|
|
cn_sni="$(toupper "$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)")"
|
|
|
|
# FIXME: Not sure what the matching rule should be. At
|
|
# the moment, the no SNI certificate is considered a
|
|
# match if the CNs are the same and the SANs (if
|
|
# present) contain at least one DNS name in common.
|
|
if [[ "$cn_nosni" == "$cn_sni" ]]; then
|
|
sans_sni="$(toupper "$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$HOSTCERT")")"
|
|
if [[ "$sans_nosni" == "$sans_sni" ]]; then
|
|
success[n]=0
|
|
else
|
|
while read -r san; do
|
|
[[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ " $sans_sni " =~ \ $san\ ]] && success[n]=0 && break
|
|
done <<< "$sans_nosni"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# If the certificate found for TLSv1.1 w/o SNI appears to
|
|
# be for a different host, then set match_found to true so
|
|
# that the new certificate will not be included in the output.
|
|
[[ ${success[n]} -ne 0 ]] && match_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$match_found"; then
|
|
certs_found=$(( certs_found + 1))
|
|
tested_cipher[certs_found]=${ciphers_to_test[n]}
|
|
keysize[certs_found]=$(awk '/Server public key/ { print $(NF-1) }' $TMPFILE)
|
|
# If an OCSP response was sent, then get the full
|
|
# response so that certificate_info() can determine
|
|
# whether it includes a certificate transparency extension.
|
|
ocsp_response_binary[certs_found]="$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE"
|
|
if grep -a "OCSP response:" $TMPFILE | grep -q "no response sent"; then
|
|
ocsp_response[certs_found]="$(grep -a "OCSP response" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
else
|
|
ocsp_response[certs_found]="$(awk -v n=2 '/OCSP response:/ {start=1; inc=2} /======================================/ { if (start) {inc--} } inc' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
ocsp_response_status[certs_found]=$(grep -a "OCSP Response Status" $TMPFILE)
|
|
previous_hostcert[certs_found]=$newhostcert
|
|
previous_hostcert_txt[certs_found]="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$newhostcert")"
|
|
previous_intermediates[certs_found]=$(cat $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem)
|
|
previous_hostcert_issuer[certs_found]=""
|
|
[[ -n "${previous_intermediates[certs_found]}" ]] && [[ -r $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem ]] && \
|
|
previous_hostcert_issuer[certs_found]=$(cat $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem)
|
|
previous_ordering_problem[certs_found]=$CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM
|
|
[[ $n -ge 11 ]] && sni_used[certs_found]="" || sni_used[certs_found]="$SNI"
|
|
tls_version[certs_found]="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
previous_hostcert_type[certs_found]=" ${certificate_type[n]}"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert[certs_found]}" > $TEMPDIR/host_certificate_$certs_found.pem
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert_txt[certs_found]}" > $TEMPDIR/host_certificate_$certs_found.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
previous_hostcert_type[i]+=" ${certificate_type[n]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
determine_tls_extensions
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.determine_tls_extensions.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then
|
|
sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket lifetime/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE)
|
|
sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
"$using_sockets" && cert_compression_methods="$(determine_cert_compression)"
|
|
[[ -n "$cert_compression_methods" ]] && [[ "$cert_compression_methods" != "none" ]] && \
|
|
extract_new_tls_extensions "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.determine_cert_compression.txt"
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && ! "$TLS13_ONLY" && [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13" && ( [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]] || [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -tls1_3 ]] ) ; then
|
|
# If a session ticket were sent in response to a TLSv1.3 ClientHello, then a session ticket
|
|
# would have been found by get_server_certificate(). So, try again with a TLSv1.2 ClientHello.
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -no_tls1_3 -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket lifetime/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE)
|
|
sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]] && TLS_TICKETS=false || TLS_TICKETS=true
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "# certificates found $certs_found"
|
|
# Now that all of the server's certificates have been found, determine for
|
|
# each certificate whether certificate transparency information is provided.
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= certs_found; i++ )); do
|
|
ct[i]="$(certificate_transparency "${previous_hostcert_txt[i]}" "${ocsp_response[i]}" "$certs_found" "${tested_cipher[i]}" "${sni_used[i]}" "${tls_version[i]}")"
|
|
# If certificate_transparency() called tls_sockets() and found a "signed certificate timestamps" extension,
|
|
# then add it to $TLS_EXTENSIONS, since it may not have been found by determine_tls_extensions().
|
|
[[ $certs_found -gt 1 ]] && [[ "${ct[i]}" == TLS\ extension ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing server defaults (Server Hello) "
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " TLS extensions (standard) "
|
|
if [[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]]; then
|
|
outln "(none)"
|
|
fileout "TLS_extensions" "INFO" "(none)"
|
|
else
|
|
#FIXME: we rather want to have the chance to print each ext in italics or another format.
|
|
# Atm is a string of quoted strings -- that needs to be fixed at the root then
|
|
# out_row_aligned_max_width() places line breaks at space characters.
|
|
# So, in order to prevent the text for an extension from being broken
|
|
# across lines, temporarily replace space characters within the text
|
|
# of an extension with "}", and then convert the "}" back to space in
|
|
# the output of out_row_aligned_max_width().
|
|
tls_extensions="${TLS_EXTENSIONS// /{}"
|
|
tls_extensions="${tls_extensions//\"{\"/\" \"}"
|
|
tls_extensions="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$tls_extensions" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
tls_extensions="${tls_extensions//{/ }"
|
|
outln "$tls_extensions"
|
|
fileout "TLS_extensions" "INFO" "$TLS_EXTENSIONS"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Session Ticket RFC 5077 hint "
|
|
jsonID="TLS_session_ticket"
|
|
if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then
|
|
outln "no -- no lifetime advertised"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "no -- no lifetime advertised"
|
|
# it MAY be given a hint of the lifetime of the ticket, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-5.6 .
|
|
# Sometimes it just does not -- but it then may also support TLS session tickets reuse
|
|
else
|
|
lifetime=$(grep -a lifetime <<< "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" | sed 's/[A-Za-z:() ]//g')
|
|
unit=$(grep -a lifetime <<< "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" | sed -e 's/^.*'"$lifetime"'//' -e 's/[ ()]//g')
|
|
out "$lifetime $unit"
|
|
if [[ $((3600 * 24)) -lt $lifetime ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_low " but: FS requires session ticket keys to be rotated < daily !"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "valid for $lifetime $unit (>daily)"
|
|
else
|
|
outln ", session tickets keys seems to be rotated < daily"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "valid for $lifetime $unit only (<daily)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " SSL Session ID support "
|
|
jsonID="SSL_sessionID_support"
|
|
if "$NO_SSL_SESSIONID"; then
|
|
outln "no"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "no"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "yes"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "yes"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Session Resumption "
|
|
jsonID="sessionresumption_ticket"
|
|
sub_session_resumption "$sessticket_proto"
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) out "Tickets: yes, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) out "Tickets no, "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) pr_warning "Ticket resumption test failed, pls report / "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, pls report"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
6) pr_warning "Client Auth: Ticket resumption test not supported / "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check couldn't be performed because of client authentication"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) pr_warning "Connect problem: Ticket resumption test not possible / "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed because of connect problem"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
jsonID="sessionresumption_ID"
|
|
if "$NO_SSL_SESSIONID"; then
|
|
outln "ID: no"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No Session ID, no resumption"
|
|
else
|
|
sub_session_resumption "$sessticket_proto" ID
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) outln "ID: yes"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
1|2) outln "ID: no"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
5) prln_warning "ID resumption test failed, pls report"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, pls report"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
6) prln_warning "Client Auth: ID resumption test not supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check couldn't be performed because of client authentication"
|
|
;;
|
|
7) prln_warning "ID resumption test failed"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed because of connect problem"
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tls_time
|
|
|
|
jsonID="cert_compression"
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
# At the moment support for certificate compression can only be
|
|
# tested using tls_sockets().
|
|
:
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
jsonID="certificate_compression"
|
|
pr_bold " Certificate Compression "
|
|
outln "$cert_compression_methods"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$cert_compression_methods"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "N/A"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
jsonID="clientAuth"
|
|
pr_bold " Client Authentication "
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == unknown ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -enable_pha\""
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$CLIENT_AUTH"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$CLIENT_AUTH"
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == optional ]] || [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]]; then
|
|
jsonID="clientAuth_CA_list"
|
|
pr_bold " CA List for Client Auth "
|
|
out_row_aligned "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST" " "
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST" == empty ]] || [[ $(count_lines "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST") -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST"
|
|
else
|
|
i=1
|
|
while read client_auth_ca; do
|
|
fileout "$jsonID #$i" "INFO" "$client_auth_ca"
|
|
i+=1
|
|
done <<< "$CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ $certs_found -ne 0 ]] && [[ ! -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]]; then
|
|
# no cipher suites specified here. We just want the default vhost subject
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
sni="$SNI" ; SNI=""
|
|
mv $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.save
|
|
# Send same list of cipher suites as OpenSSL 1.1.1 sends (but with
|
|
# all 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers offered.
|
|
tls_sockets "04" \
|
|
"c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f,
|
|
00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a,
|
|
c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,02,
|
|
13,03, 13,01, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f,
|
|
00,ff" \
|
|
"all+"
|
|
success[0]=$?
|
|
if [[ ${success[0]} -eq 0 ]] || [[ ${success[0]} -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -s $HOSTCERT ]]; then
|
|
mv $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
else
|
|
# The connection was successful, but the certificate could
|
|
# not be obtained (probably because the connection was TLS 1.3
|
|
# and $OPENSSL does not support the key exchange group that was
|
|
# selected). So, try again using OpenSSL (which will not use a TLS 1.3
|
|
# ClientHello).
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $OPTIMAL_PROTO") 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null | \
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' >$HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
>$HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
fi
|
|
mv $HOSTCERT.save $HOSTCERT
|
|
SNI="$sni"
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $OPTIMAL_PROTO") 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null | \
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' >$HOSTCERT.nosni
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $certs_found -eq 0 ]] && [[ -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
generic_nonfatal "Client problem, shouldn't happen: Host certificate found but we can't continue with \"server defaults\"."
|
|
elif [[ $certs_found -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
if $TLS13_ONLY; then
|
|
generic_nonfatal "Client problem: We need openssl supporting TLS 1.3. We can't continue with \"server defaults\" as we cannot retrieve the certificate. "
|
|
else
|
|
generic_nonfatal "Client problem: No server certificate could be retrieved. Thus we can't continue with \"server defaults\"."
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && [[ -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]] && $OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT.nosni -text -noout 2>>$ERRFILE > $HOSTCERT.nosni.txt
|
|
|
|
fileout "cert_numbers" "INFO" "$certs_found"
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= certs_found; i++ )); do
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert[i]}" > $HOSTCERT
|
|
echo "${previous_intermediates[i]}" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
echo "${previous_hostcert_issuer[i]}" > $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem
|
|
certificate_info "$i" "$certs_found" "${previous_hostcert_txt[i]}" "${previous_intermediates[i]}" \
|
|
"${tested_cipher[i]}" "${keysize[i]}" "${previous_hostcert_type[i]}" \
|
|
"${ocsp_response_binary[i]}" "${ocsp_response[i]}" \
|
|
"${ocsp_response_status[i]}" "${sni_used[i]}" "${ct[i]}" \
|
|
"${previous_ordering_problem[i]}"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ((ret++))
|
|
done
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
get_session_ticket_lifetime_from_serverhello() {
|
|
awk '/session ticket.*lifetime/ { print $(NF-1) "$1" }'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
get_san_dns_from_cert() {
|
|
echo "$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$1" -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE | \
|
|
grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "DNS:" | \
|
|
sed -e 's/DNS://g' -e 's/ //g')"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_fs() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success
|
|
local fs_offered=false ecdhe_offered=false ffdhe_offered=false
|
|
local fs_tls13_offered=false
|
|
local protos_to_try proto hexc dash fs_cipher sslvers auth mac export curve dhlen
|
|
local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph rfc_ciph kx enc ciphers_found sigalg ossl_supported
|
|
# generated from 'kEECDH:kEDH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!DES:!3DES:!RC4' with openssl 1.0.2i and openssl 1.1.0
|
|
local fs_cipher_list="DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8:DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8:DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
|
|
local fs_hex_cipher_list="" ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test
|
|
local ecdhe_cipher_list="" tls13_cipher_list="" ecdhe_cipher_list_hex="" ffdhe_cipher_list_hex=""
|
|
local curves_hex=("00,01" "00,02" "00,03" "00,04" "00,05" "00,06" "00,07" "00,08" "00,09" "00,0a" "00,0b" "00,0c" "00,0d" "00,0e" "00,0f" "00,10" "00,11" "00,12" "00,13" "00,14" "00,15" "00,16" "00,17" "00,18" "00,19" "00,1a" "00,1b" "00,1c" "00,1d" "00,1e")
|
|
local -a curves_ossl=("sect163k1" "sect163r1" "sect163r2" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "sect233k1" "sect233r1" "sect239k1" "sect283k1" "sect283r1" "sect409k1" "sect409r1" "sect571k1" "sect571r1" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "prime192v1" "secp224k1" "secp224r1" "secp256k1" "prime256v1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448")
|
|
local -a curves_ossl_output=("K-163" "sect163r1" "B-163" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "K-233" "B-233" "sect239k1" "K-283" "B-283" "K-409" "B-409" "K-571" "B-571" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "P-192" "secp224k1" "P-224" "secp256k1" "P-256" "P-384" "P-521" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448")
|
|
local -ai curves_bits=(163 162 163 193 193 232 233 238 281 282 407 409 570 570 161 161 161 192 192 225 224 256 256 384 521 256 384 512 253 448)
|
|
# Many curves have been deprecated, and RFC 8446, Appendix B.3.1.4, states
|
|
# that these curves MUST NOT be offered in a TLS 1.3 ClientHello.
|
|
local -a curves_deprecated=("true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "false" "false" "false" "true" "true" "true" "false" "false")
|
|
local -a ffdhe_groups_hex=("01,00" "01,01" "01,02" "01,03" "01,04")
|
|
local -a ffdhe_groups_output=("ffdhe2048" "ffdhe3072" "ffdhe4096" "ffdhe6144" "ffdhe8192")
|
|
local -a supported_curve
|
|
local -i nr_supported_ciphers=0 nr_curves=0 nr_ossl_curves=0 i j low high
|
|
local fs_ciphers curves_offered="" curves_to_test temp
|
|
local curves_option="" curves_list1="" curves_list2=""
|
|
local len1 len2 curve_found
|
|
local key_bitstring quality_str
|
|
local -i len_dh_p quality
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local jsonID="FS"
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headline " Testing robust forward secrecy (FS)"; prln_underline " -- omitting Null Authentication/Encryption, 3DES, RC4 "
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl"
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" && "$WIDE"; then
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "."
|
|
pr_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
fs_cipher="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if ( [[ "$fs_cipher" == "TLS_DHE_"* ]] || [[ "$fs_cipher" == "TLS_ECDHE_"* ]] || [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == "13" ]] ) && \
|
|
[[ ! "$fs_cipher" =~ NULL ]] && [[ ! "$fs_cipher" =~ DES ]] && [[ ! "$fs_cipher" =~ RC4 ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "$fs_cipher" =~ PSK ]] && ( "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" ); then
|
|
fs_hex_cipher_list+=", ${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
ciph[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_supported_ciphers]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_supported_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"
|
|
hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$using_sockets" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && "$WIDE" && ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]=false
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
while read -r hexc dash ciph[nr_supported_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_supported_ciphers] auth enc[nr_supported_ciphers] mac export; do
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_supported_ciphers]=false
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
sigalg[nr_supported_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers+=1
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers "$fs_cipher_list" "ALL" "-V")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# All TLSv1.3 cipher suites offer robust FS.
|
|
sclient_success=0
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "${fs_hex_cipher_list:2}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
# Sometimes a TLS 1.3 ClientHello will fail, but a TLS 1.2 ClientHello will succeed. See #2131.
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${fs_hex_cipher_list:2}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers
|
|
debugme echo $(actually_supported_osslciphers $fs_cipher_list "ALL")
|
|
if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -le "$CLIENT_MIN_FS" ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_local_problem "You only have $nr_supported_ciphers FS ciphers on the client side "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "tests skipped as you only have $nr_supported_ciphers FS ciphers on the client site. ($CLIENT_MIN_FS are required)"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# By default, OpenSSL 1.1.1 and above only include a few curves in the ClientHello, so in order
|
|
# to test all curves, the -curves option must be added. In addition, OpenSSL limits the number of
|
|
# curves that can be specified to 28. So, if more than 28 curves are supported, then the curves must
|
|
# be tested in batches.
|
|
curves_list1="$(strip_trailing_space "$(strip_leading_space "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES")")"
|
|
curves_list1="${curves_list1// / }"
|
|
if [[ "$(count_words "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES")" -gt 28 ]]; then
|
|
# Place the first 28 supported curves in curves_list1 and the remainder in curves_list2.
|
|
curves_list2="${curves_list1#* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * }"
|
|
curves_list1="${curves_list1%$curves_list2}"
|
|
curves_list1="$(strip_trailing_space "$curves_list1")"
|
|
curves_list2="${curves_list2// /:}"
|
|
fi
|
|
curves_list1="${curves_list1// /:}"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher $fs_cipher_list -ciphersuites ALL $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(grep -ac "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" $TMPFILE) -eq 0 ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
# Sometimes a TLS 1.3 ClientHello will fail, but a TLS 1.2 ClientHello will succeed. See #2131.
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
curves_option="-curves $curves_list1"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher $fs_cipher_list $curves_option $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(grep -ac "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" $TMPFILE) -eq 0 ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ -n "$curves_list2" ]]; then
|
|
curves_option="-curves $curves_list2"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher $fs_cipher_list $curves_option $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(grep -ac "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" $TMPFILE) -eq 0 ]] && sclient_success=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " No ciphers supporting Forward Secrecy (FS) offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "No ciphers supporting Forward Secrecy offered"
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "Forward Secrecy (FS) is not supported"
|
|
else
|
|
outln
|
|
fs_offered=true
|
|
fs_ciphers=""
|
|
pr_svrty_good " FS is offered (OK) "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered"
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
outln ", ciphers follow (client/browser support is important here) \n"
|
|
neat_header
|
|
else
|
|
out " "
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -no_tls1_3"
|
|
! "$using_sockets" && [[ -z "$curves_option" ]] && protos_to_try+=" curves1-no_tls1_3"
|
|
! "$using_sockets" && [[ -z "$curves_option" ]] && [[ -n "$curves_list2" ]] && protos_to_try+=" curves2-no_tls1_3"
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2"
|
|
! "$using_sockets" && [[ -z "$curves_option" ]] && protos_to_try+=" curves1-no_ssl2"
|
|
! "$using_sockets" && [[ -z "$curves_option" ]] && [[ -n "$curves_list2" ]] && protos_to_try+=" curves2-no_ssl2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
# If ECDHE ciphers were already found, then no need to try
|
|
# again with a different "-curves" option.
|
|
[[ "$proto" =~ curves1 ]] && "$ecdhe_offered" && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" =~ curves2 ]] && "$ecdhe_offered" && break
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if [[ "$proto" =~ curves1 ]]; then
|
|
curves_option="-curves $curves_list1"
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" =~ curves2 ]]; then
|
|
curves_option="-curves $curves_list2"
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-${proto#*-} -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $curves_option $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break
|
|
fs_cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$fs_cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$fs_cipher" == "${ciph[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_supported_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$fs_cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$fs_cipher" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$fs_cipher" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
fs_tls13_offered=true
|
|
"$WIDE" && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)"
|
|
elif [[ "$fs_cipher" == ECDHE-* ]]; then
|
|
ecdhe_offered=true
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for proto in 04 03; do
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "$proto" == "04" ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")"
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
fs_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$fs_cipher" == "${rfc_ciph[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_supported_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "${kx[i]}" == Kx=any ]]; then
|
|
fs_tls13_offered=true
|
|
"$WIDE" && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ! "$SHOW_EACH_C" && continue
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if ( [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]] ) || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "-" ]]; then
|
|
fs_cipher="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
else
|
|
fs_cipher="${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fs_ciphers+="$fs_cipher "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == ECDHE-* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${ciph[i]}" == AEAD-* ]] || ( "$using_sockets" && [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == TLS_ECDHE_* ]] ); then
|
|
ecdhe_offered=true
|
|
ecdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
tls13_cipher_list+=":$fs_cipher"
|
|
else
|
|
ecdhe_cipher_list+=":$fs_cipher"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == "DHE-"* ]] || ( "$using_sockets" && [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "TLS_DHE_"* ]] ); then
|
|
ffdhe_offered=true
|
|
ffdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
elif [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == AEAD-* ]]; then
|
|
ffdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
neat_list "$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
pr_cipher_quality "${rfc_ciph[i]}" "available"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_deemphasize "not a/v"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if ! "$WIDE"; then
|
|
if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then
|
|
out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$fs_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
else
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$fs_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_cipher_quality
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo $fs_offered
|
|
"$WIDE" || outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ciphers" "INFO" "$fs_ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# find out what elliptic curves are supported.
|
|
if "$ecdhe_offered"; then
|
|
for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_curves]=false
|
|
supported_curve[nr_curves]=false
|
|
[[ "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES" =~ \ $curve\ ]] && ossl_supported[nr_curves]=true && nr_ossl_curves+=1
|
|
nr_curves+=1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# OpenSSL limits the number of curves that can be specified in the
|
|
# "-curves" option to 28. So, break the list in two if there are more
|
|
# than 28 curves supported by OpenSSL.
|
|
for j in 1 2; do
|
|
if [[ $j -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_curves -le 28 ]]; then
|
|
low=0; high=$nr_curves
|
|
else
|
|
low=0; high=$nr_curves/2
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $nr_ossl_curves -le 28 ]]; then
|
|
continue # all curves tested in first round
|
|
else
|
|
low=$nr_curves/2; high=$nr_curves
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
if "$fs_tls13_offered"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -no_tls1_3"
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_tls1_3"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="-no_ssl2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
while true; do
|
|
curves_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=low; i < high; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" || ! "${curves_deprecated[i]}" || [[ "$proto" == "-no_tls1_3" ]]; then
|
|
"${ossl_supported[i]}" && ! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=":${curves_ossl[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ecdhe_cipher_list:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_cipher_list:1}\'" -curves "${curves_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE")
|
|
curve_found="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
if [[ "$curve_found" == ECDH ]]; then
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=low; i < high; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${supported_curve[i]}"; then
|
|
[[ "${curves_ossl_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "${curves_ossl[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $high ]] && break
|
|
supported_curve[i]=true
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$ecdhe_offered" && "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="03"
|
|
"$fs_tls13_offered" && protos_to_try="04 03"
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
ecdhe_cipher_list_hex="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "03" "$ecdhe_cipher_list_hex")"
|
|
[[ -z "$ecdhe_cipher_list_hex" ]] && continue
|
|
fi
|
|
while true; do
|
|
curves_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${curves_deprecated[i]}" || [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=", ${curves_hex[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
len1=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7))")
|
|
len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7+2))")
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ecdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" "00, 0a, 00, $len2, 00, $len1, ${curves_to_test:2}"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
curve_found="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
if [[ "$curve_found" == "ECDH" ]]; then
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${supported_curve[i]}" && [[ "${curves_ossl_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_curves ]] && break
|
|
supported_curve[i]=true
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$ecdhe_offered"; then
|
|
low=1000
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${supported_curve[i]}"; then
|
|
curves_offered+="${curves_ossl[i]} "
|
|
[[ ${curves_bits[i]} -lt $low ]] && low=${curves_bits[i]}
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$curves_offered" ]]; then
|
|
"$WIDE" && outln
|
|
pr_bold " Elliptic curves offered: "
|
|
out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$curves_offered" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_ecdh_curve_quality
|
|
outln
|
|
# severity ratings based on quality specified by
|
|
# pr_ecdh_quality() for shortest curve offered.
|
|
if [[ "$low" -le 163 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "MEDIUM" "$curves_offered"
|
|
elif [[ "$low" -le 193 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "LOW" "$curves_offered"
|
|
elif [[ "$low" -le 224 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "INFO" "$curves_offered"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "OK" "$curves_offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
CURVES_OFFERED="$curves_offered"
|
|
CURVES_OFFERED=$(strip_trailing_space "$CURVES_OFFERED")
|
|
# Keep it "on file" for debugging purposes
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && safe_echo "$CURVES_OFFERED" >"$TEMPDIR/$NODE.$NODEIP.curves_offered.txt"
|
|
|
|
# find out what groups are supported.
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && ( "$fs_tls13_offered" || "$ffdhe_offered" ); then
|
|
nr_curves=0
|
|
for curve in "${ffdhe_groups_output[@]}"; do
|
|
supported_curve[nr_curves]=false
|
|
[[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ $curve ]] && supported_curve[nr_curves]=true
|
|
nr_curves+=1
|
|
done
|
|
protos_to_try=""
|
|
"$fs_tls13_offered" && protos_to_try="04"
|
|
if "$ffdhe_offered"; then
|
|
if "$fs_tls13_offered"; then
|
|
protos_to_try="04 03"
|
|
else
|
|
protos_to_try="03"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
curve_found=""
|
|
for proto in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
while true; do
|
|
curves_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=", ${ffdhe_groups_hex[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
len1=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7))")
|
|
len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7+2))")
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ffdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" "00, 0a, 00, $len2, 00, $len1, ${curves_to_test:2}"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == "03" ]] && [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]] && [[ "$curve_found" =~ ffdhe ]]; then
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC7919/$curve_found"
|
|
DH_GROUP_LEN_P="${curve_found#ffdhe}"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ! "$curve_found" =~ ffdhe ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${supported_curve[i]}" && [[ "${ffdhe_groups_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_curves ]] && break
|
|
supported_curve[i]=true
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
curves_offered=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do
|
|
"${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_offered+="${ffdhe_groups_output[i]} "
|
|
done
|
|
curves_offered="$(strip_trailing_space "$curves_offered")"
|
|
if "$ffdhe_offered" && [[ -z "$curves_offered" ]] && [[ -z "$curve_found" ]]; then
|
|
# Some servers will fail if the supported_groups extension is present.
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${ffdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$curves_offered" ]] && [[ -n "$curve_found" ]]; then
|
|
# The server is not using one of the groups from RFC 7919.
|
|
if [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
# this global will get the name of the group either here or in run_logjam()
|
|
key_bitstring="$(awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt)"
|
|
get_common_prime "$jsonID" "$key_bitstring" ""
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) curves_offered="$DH_GROUP_OFFERED"
|
|
len_dh_p=$DH_GROUP_LEN_P ;;
|
|
2) pr_bold " DH or FF group offered : "
|
|
prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility."
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
curves_offered="$DH_GROUP_OFFERED"
|
|
len_dh_p=$DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$curves_offered" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ! "$curves_offered" =~ ffdhe ]] || [[ ! "$curves_offered" =~ \ ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " DH group offered: "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_bold " Finite field group: "
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$curves_offered" =~ ffdhe ]]; then
|
|
# ok not to display them in italics:
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$curves_offered"
|
|
quality=6
|
|
else
|
|
pr_dh "$curves_offered" "$len_dh_p"
|
|
quality=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$quality" in
|
|
1) quality_str="CRITICAL" ;;
|
|
2) quality_str="HIGH" ;;
|
|
3) quality_str="MEDIUM" ;;
|
|
4) quality_str="LOW" ;;
|
|
5) quality_str="INFO" ;;
|
|
6|7) quality_str="OK" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ "$curves_offered" =~ Unknown ]]; then
|
|
fileout "DH_groups" "$quality_str" "$curves_offered ($len_dh_p bits)"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "DH_groups" "$quality_str" "$curves_offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# good source for configuration and bugs: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
|
|
# good start to read: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Attacks_against_TLS.2FSSL
|
|
|
|
|
|
npn_pre(){
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it"
|
|
fileout "NPN" "WARN" "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$HAS_NPN"; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support NPN/SPDY";
|
|
fileout "NPN" "WARN" "not tested $OPENSSL doesn't support NPN/SPDY"
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
alpn_pre(){
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it"
|
|
fileout "ALPN" "WARN" "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$HAS_ALPN" && "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support ALPN/HTTP2";
|
|
fileout "ALPN" "WARN" "not tested as $OPENSSL does not support it"
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# modern browsers do not support it anymore but we should still test it at least for fingerprinting the server side
|
|
# Thus we don't label any support for NPN as good.
|
|
# FAST mode skips this test
|
|
run_npn() {
|
|
local tmpstr
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local jsonID="NPN"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0
|
|
"$FAST" && return 0
|
|
pr_bold " NPN/SPDY "
|
|
if ! npn_pre; then
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-connect $NODEIP:$PORT $BUGS $SNI -nextprotoneg "$NPN_PROTOs"") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1
|
|
tmpstr="$(grep -a '^Protocols' $TMPFILE | sed 's/Protocols.*: //')"
|
|
if [[ -z "$tmpstr" ]] || [[ "$tmpstr" == " " ]]; then
|
|
outln "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
else
|
|
# now comes a strange thing: "Protocols advertised by server:" is empty but connection succeeded
|
|
if [[ "$tmpstr" =~ [h2|spdy|http] ]]; then
|
|
out "$tmpstr"
|
|
outln " (advertised)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered with $tmpstr (advertised)"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_cyan "please check manually, server response was ambiguous ..."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "please check manually, server response was ambiguous ..."
|
|
((ret++))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# btw: nmap can do that too https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/tls-nextprotoneg.html
|
|
# nmap --script=tls-nextprotoneg #NODE -p $PORT is your friend if your openssl doesn't want to test this
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_alpn() {
|
|
local tmpstr alpn_extn len
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local has_alpn_proto=false
|
|
local alpn_finding=""
|
|
local jsonID="ALPN"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0
|
|
pr_bold " ALPN/HTTP2 "
|
|
if ! alpn_pre; then
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
for proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do
|
|
# for some reason OpenSSL doesn't list the advertised protocols, so instead try common protocols
|
|
if "$HAS_ALPN"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-connect $NODEIP:$PORT $BUGS $SNI -alpn $proto") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
alpn_extn="$(printf "%02x" ${#proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$proto")"
|
|
len="$(printf "%04x" $((${#proto}+1)))"
|
|
alpn_extn="${len:0:2},${len:2:2},$alpn_extn"
|
|
len="$(printf "%04x" $((${#proto}+3)))"
|
|
alpn_extn="00,10,${len:0:2},${len:2:2},$alpn_extn"
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "all+" "$alpn_extn"
|
|
if [[ -r "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ]]; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
echo "" > $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpstr="$(awk -F':' '/^ALPN protocol*:/ { print $2 }' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if [[ "$tmpstr" == *"$proto" ]]; then
|
|
if ! $has_alpn_proto; then
|
|
has_alpn_proto=true
|
|
else
|
|
out ", "
|
|
fi
|
|
# only h2 is what browser need to use HTTP/2.0 and brings a security,privacy and performance benefit
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == "h2" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "$proto"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_HTTP2" "OK" "$proto"
|
|
else
|
|
out "$proto"
|
|
alpn_finding+="$proto"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if $has_alpn_proto; then
|
|
outln " (offered)"
|
|
# if h2 is not the only protocol:
|
|
[[ -n "$alpn_finding" ]] && fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$alpn_finding"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "not offered"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: send string
|
|
# arg2: success string: an egrep pattern
|
|
# arg3: number of loops we should read from the buffer (optional, otherwise STARTTLS_SLEEP)
|
|
starttls_io() {
|
|
local nr_waits=$STARTTLS_SLEEP
|
|
local buffer=""
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$3" ]] && waitsleep=$3
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && echo "FIXME $((LINENO))"
|
|
|
|
# If there's a sending part it's IO. Postgres sends via socket and replies via
|
|
# strings "S". So there's no I part of IO ;-)
|
|
if [[ -n "$1" ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -en "C: $1"
|
|
echo -en "$1" >&5
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$2" == JUSTSEND ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -e "\n (only sent)\n"
|
|
dd of=/dev/null bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# This seems a bit dangerous but works. No blockings yet. "if=nonblock" doesn't work on BSDs
|
|
buffer="$(dd bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
|
|
for ((i=1; i < nr_waits; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && echo -en "\nS: " && echo $buffer
|
|
if [[ "$buffer" =~ $2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo " ---> reply matched \"$2\""
|
|
# the fd sometimes still seem to contain chars which confuses the following TLS handshake, trying to empty:
|
|
# dd of=/dev/null bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
# no match yet, more reading from fd helps.
|
|
buffer+=$(dd bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null)
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Line-based send with newline characters appended (arg2 empty)
|
|
# arg2: debug_string -- what we had in the caller previously
|
|
starttls_just_send(){
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "C: $1\r\n"
|
|
# We need cat here, otherwise the appended ELHO after STARTTLS will be in the next packet
|
|
printf "%b" "$1\r\n" | cat >&5
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo " > succeeded: $2"
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo " > failed: $2 ($ret)"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: (optional): wait time
|
|
starttls_just_read(){
|
|
local waitsleep=$STARTTLS_SLEEP
|
|
[[ -n "$1" ]] && waitsleep=$1
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo "=== just read banner ==="
|
|
cat <&5 &
|
|
else
|
|
dd of=/dev/null count=8 <&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
fi
|
|
wait_kill $! $waitsleep
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_full_read(){
|
|
local cont_pattern="$1"
|
|
local end_pattern="$2"
|
|
local starttls_regex="$3" # optional: pattern we search for in the server's response
|
|
local debug_str="$4" # optional
|
|
local starttls_read_data=()
|
|
local one_line=""
|
|
local ret=0
|
|
local ret_found=0
|
|
local debugpad=" > found: "
|
|
local oldIFS="$IFS"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== reading banner ... ==="
|
|
if [[ -n "$starttls_regex" ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "=== we'll have to search for \"$starttls_regex\" pattern ==="
|
|
# pre-set an error if we won't find the ~regex
|
|
ret_found=3
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
IFS=''
|
|
# Now read handshake line by line and act on the args supplied.
|
|
# Exit the subshell if timeout has been hit (-t $STARTTLS_SLEEP)
|
|
while read -r -t $STARTTLS_SLEEP one_line; ret=$?; (exit $ret); do
|
|
debugme tmln_out "S: ${one_line}"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 5 ]]; then
|
|
echo "end_pattern/cont_pattern: ${end_pattern} / ${cont_pattern}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$starttls_regex" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${one_line} =~ $starttls_regex ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_out "${debugpad} ${one_line} "
|
|
# We don't exit here as the buffer is not empty. So we continue reading but save the status:
|
|
ret_found=0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
starttls_read_data+=("${one_line}")
|
|
if [[ ${one_line} =~ ${end_pattern} ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_out "${debugpad} ${one_line} "
|
|
IFS="${oldIFS}"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! ${one_line} =~ ${cont_pattern} ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "=== full read syntax error, expected regex pattern ${cont_pattern} (cont) or ${end_pattern} (end) ==="
|
|
IFS="${oldIFS}"
|
|
ret_found=2
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done <&5
|
|
if [[ $ret_found -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Print the debug statement we previously had in the caller function
|
|
[[ -n "$debug_str" ]] && debugme echo " >> $debug_str"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $ret -ge 128 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "=== timeout reading ==="
|
|
ret_found=$ret
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
IFS="${oldIFS}"
|
|
return $ret_found
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_ftp_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local reSTARTTLS='^ AUTH'
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting ftp STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send 'FEAT' "sent FEAT" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^(211-| )' '^211 ' "${reSTARTTLS}" "received server features and checked STARTTLS availability" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send 'AUTH TLS' "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^234-' '^234 ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished ftp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# argv1: empty: SMTP, "lmtp" : LMTP
|
|
# argv2: payload for STARTTLS injection test
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_smtp_dialog() {
|
|
local greet_str="EHLO testssl.sh"
|
|
local proto="smtp"
|
|
local reSTARTTLS='^250[ -]STARTTLS'
|
|
local starttls="STARTTLS"
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
|
|
"$SNEAKY" && greet_str="EHLO google.com"
|
|
[[ -n "$2" ]] && starttls="$starttls\r\n$2" # this adds a payload if supplied
|
|
if [[ "$1" == lmtp ]]; then
|
|
proto="lmtp"
|
|
greet_str="LHLO"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting $proto STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
|
|
starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$greet_str" "sent $greet_str" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^250-' '^250 ' "${reSTARTTLS}" "received server capabilities and checked STARTTLS availability" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$starttls" "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished $proto STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# argv1: payload for STARTTLS injection test
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_pop3_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local starttls="STLS"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$1" ]] && starttls="$starttls\r\n$1" # this adds a payload if supplied
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting pop3 STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\+OK' '^\+OK' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$starttls" "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\+OK' '^\+OK' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished pop3 STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# argv1: payload for STARTTLS injection test
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_imap_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local reSTARTTLS='^\* CAPABILITY(( .*)? IMAP4rev1( .*)? STARTTLS(.*)?|( .*)? STARTTLS( .*)? IMAP4rev1(.*)?)$'
|
|
local starttls="a002 STARTTLS"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$1" ]] && starttls="$starttls\r\n$1" # this adds a payload if supplied
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting imap STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^\* OK ' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send 'a001 CAPABILITY' "sent CAPABILITY" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^a001 OK ' "${reSTARTTLS}" "received server capabilities and checked STARTTLS availability" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$starttls" "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^a002 OK ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished imap STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# argv1: payload for STARTTLS injection test
|
|
#
|
|
starttls_sieve_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local starttls="STARTTLS"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$1" ]] && starttls="$starttls\r\n$1" # this adds a payload if supplied
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting sieve STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '^"' '^OK ' '"STARTTLS"' "received server capabilities and checked STARTTLS availability" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send "$starttls" "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '^OK ' '^OK ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished sieve STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_xmpp_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting xmpp STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
[[ -z $XMPP_HOST ]] && XMPP_HOST="$NODE"
|
|
|
|
namespace="jabber:client"
|
|
[[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" == xmpp-server ]] && namespace="jabber:server"
|
|
|
|
starttls_io "<stream:stream xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' xmlns='"$namespace"' to='"$XMPP_HOST"' version='1.0'>" 'starttls(.*)features' 1 &&
|
|
starttls_io "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>" '<proceed' 1
|
|
# starttls_io "<stream:stream xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' xmlns='"$namespace"' to='"$XMPP_HOST"' version='1.0'>" 'JUSTSEND' 2
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished xmpp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_nntp_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting nntp STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
starttls_full_read '$^' '^20[01] ' '' "received server greeting" &&
|
|
starttls_just_send 'STARTTLS' "initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_full_read '$^' '^382 ' '' "received ack for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished nntp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_postgres_dialog() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local debugpad=" > "
|
|
local starttls_init=", x00, x00 ,x00 ,x08 ,x04 ,xD2 ,x16 ,x2F"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting postgres STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
socksend "${starttls_init}" 0 && debugme echo "${debugpad}initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_io "" S 1 && debugme echo "${debugpad}received ack (=\"S\") for STARTTLS"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished postgres STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# RFC 2830
|
|
starttls_ldap_dialog() {
|
|
local debugpad=" > "
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local result=""
|
|
local starttls_init=",
|
|
x30, x1d, x02, x01, # LDAP extendedReq
|
|
x01, # messageID: 1
|
|
x77, x18, x80, x16, x31, x2e, x33, x2e, x36, x2e, # ProtocolOP: extendedReq
|
|
x31, x2e, x34, x2e, x31, x2e, x31, x34, x36, x36, x2e, x32, x30, x30, x33, x37" # OID for STATRTTLS = "1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting LDAP STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
socksend "${starttls_init}" 0 && debugme echo "${debugpad}initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
result=$(sockread_fast 256)
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 6 ]] && safe_echo "$debugpad $result\n"
|
|
|
|
# response is typically 30 0c 02 01 01 78 07 0a 01 00 04 00 04 00
|
|
# ^^ == success! [9] is checked below
|
|
if [[ ${result:18:2} == 00 ]]; then
|
|
ret=0
|
|
elif [[ ${result:18:2} == 01 ]]; then
|
|
ret=1
|
|
else
|
|
ret=127
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished LDAP STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_mysql_dialog() {
|
|
local debugpad=" > "
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local starttls_init="
|
|
, x20, x00, x00, x01, # payload_length, sequence_id
|
|
x85, xae, xff, x00, # capability flags, CLIENT_SSL always set
|
|
x00, x00, x00, x01, # max-packet size
|
|
x21, # character set
|
|
x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, # string[23] reserved (all [0])
|
|
x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00,
|
|
x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting mysql STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
socksend "${starttls_init}" 0 && debugme echo "${debugpad}initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
starttls_just_read 1 "read succeeded"
|
|
# 1 is the timeout value which only MySQL needs. Note, there seems no response whether STARTTLS
|
|
# succeeded. We could try harder, see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/apps/s_client.c
|
|
# but atm this seems sufficient as later we will fail if there's no STARTTLS.
|
|
# BUT: there seem to be cases when the handshake fails (8S01Bad handshake --> 30 38 53 30 31 42 61 64 20 68 61 6e 64 73 68 61 6b 65).
|
|
# also there's a banner in the reply "<version><somebytes>mysql_native_password"
|
|
# TODO: We could detect if the server supports STARTTLS via the "Server Capabilities"
|
|
# bit field, but we'd need to parse the binary stream, with greater precision than regex.
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished mysql STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
starttls_telnet_dialog() {
|
|
local debugpad=" > "
|
|
local tnres=""
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local msg1="
|
|
, xff, xfb, x2e"
|
|
local msg2="
|
|
, xff, xfa, x2e, x01, xff, xf0
|
|
"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "=== starting telnet STARTTLS dialog ==="
|
|
socksend "${msg1}" 0 && debugme echo "${debugpad}initiated STARTTLS" &&
|
|
socksend "${msg2}" 1 &&
|
|
tnres=$(sockread_fast 20) && debugme echo "read succeeded"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 6 ]] && safe_echo "$debugpad $tnres\n"
|
|
# check for START_TLS and FOLLOWS
|
|
if [[ ${tnres:10:2} == 2E ]] && [[ ${tnres:12:2} == 01 ]]; then
|
|
ret=0
|
|
else
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "=== finished telnet STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ==="
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: fd for socket -- which we don't use yes as it is a hassle (not clear whether it works under every bash version)
|
|
# arg2: optional: for STARTTLS additional command to be injected
|
|
# returns 6 if opening the socket caused a problem, 1 if STARTTLS handshake failed, 0: all ok
|
|
#
|
|
fd_socket() {
|
|
local fd="$1"
|
|
local payload="$2"
|
|
local proyxline=""
|
|
local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # sockets do not need the square brackets we have of IPv6 addresses
|
|
# we just need do it here, that's all!
|
|
if [[ -t 5 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket because of a tty conflict"
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
# PROXYNODE works better than PROXYIP on modern versions of squid
|
|
if ! exec 5<> /dev/tcp/${PROXYNODE}/${PROXYPORT}; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT"
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$DNS_VIA_PROXY"; then
|
|
printf -- "%b" "CONNECT $NODE:$PORT HTTP/1.0\n\n" >&5
|
|
else
|
|
printf -- "%b" "CONNECT $nodeip:$PORT HTTP/1.0\n\n" >&5
|
|
fi
|
|
while true; do
|
|
read -t $PROXY_WAIT -r proyxline <&5
|
|
if [[ $? -ge 128 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "Proxy timed out. Unable to CONNECT via proxy. "
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
return 6
|
|
elif [[ "${proyxline%/*}" == HTTP ]]; then
|
|
proyxline=${proyxline#* }
|
|
if [[ "${proyxline%% *}" != 200 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "Unable to CONNECT via proxy. "
|
|
[[ "$PORT" != 443 ]] && prln_warning "Check whether your proxy supports port $PORT and the underlying protocol."
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$proyxline" == $'\r' ]] || [[ -z "$proyxline" ]] ; then
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
# For the following execs: 2>/dev/null would remove a potential error message, but disables debugging.
|
|
# First we check whether a socket connect timeout was specified. We exec the connect in a subshell,
|
|
# then we'll see whether we can connect. If not we take the emergency exit. If we're still alive we'll
|
|
# proceed with the "usual case", see below.
|
|
elif [[ -n "$CONNECT_TIMEOUT" ]]; then
|
|
if ! $TIMEOUT_CMD $CONNECT_TIMEOUT bash -c "exec 5<>/dev/tcp/$nodeip/$PORT"; then
|
|
((NR_SOCKET_FAIL++))
|
|
connectivity_problem $NR_SOCKET_FAIL $MAX_SOCKET_FAIL "TCP connect problem" "repeated TCP connect problems (connect timeout), giving up"
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "Unable to open a socket to $NODEIP:$PORT. "
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Now comes the usual case
|
|
if ! exec 5<>/dev/tcp/$nodeip/$PORT && [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
((NR_SOCKET_FAIL++))
|
|
connectivity_problem $NR_SOCKET_FAIL $MAX_SOCKET_FAIL "TCP connect problem" "repeated TCP connect problems, giving up"
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "Unable to open a socket to $NODEIP:$PORT. "
|
|
return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]]; then
|
|
case "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" in # port
|
|
ftp|ftps) # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4217, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc959
|
|
starttls_ftp_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
smtp|smtps) # SMTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc{2033,3207,5321}
|
|
starttls_smtp_dialog "" "$payload"
|
|
;;
|
|
lmtp|lmtps) # LMTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc{2033,3207,5321}
|
|
starttls_smtp_dialog lmtp
|
|
;;
|
|
pop3|pop3s) # POP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595
|
|
starttls_pop3_dialog "$payload"
|
|
;;
|
|
nntp|nntps) # NNTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4642
|
|
starttls_nntp_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
imap|imaps) # IMAP, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3501
|
|
starttls_imap_dialog "$payload"
|
|
;;
|
|
sieve) # MANAGESIEVE, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5804
|
|
starttls_sieve_dialog "$payload"
|
|
;;
|
|
irc|ircs) # IRC, https://ircv3.net/specs/extensions/tls-3.1.html, https://ircv3.net/specs/core/capability-negotiation.html
|
|
fatal "FIXME: IRC+STARTTLS not yet supported" $ERR_NOSUPPORT
|
|
;;
|
|
ldap|ldaps) # LDAP, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2830#section-2.1, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4511
|
|
# https://ldap.com/ldapv3-wire-protocol-reference-extended/
|
|
#fatal "FIXME: LDAP+STARTTLS over sockets not supported yet (try \"--ssl-native\")" $ERR_NOSUPPORT
|
|
starttls_ldap_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
acap|acaps) # ACAP = Application Configuration Access Protocol, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595
|
|
fatal "ACAP Easteregg: not implemented -- probably never will" $ERR_NOSUPPORT
|
|
;;
|
|
xmpp|xmpps|xmpp-server) # XMPP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6120
|
|
starttls_xmpp_dialog
|
|
# IM observatory: https://xmpp.net , XMPP server directory: https://xmpp.net/directory.php
|
|
;;
|
|
postgres) # Postgres SQL, see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/devel/protocol-message-formats.html
|
|
starttls_postgres_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
mysql) # MySQL, see https://dev.mysql.com/doc/internals/en/x-protocol-lifecycle-lifecycle.html#x-protocol-lifecycle-tls-extension
|
|
starttls_mysql_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
telnet) # captured from a tn3270 negotiation against z/VM 7.2. Also, see OpenSSL apps/s_client.c for the handling of PROTO_TELNET
|
|
starttls_telnet_dialog
|
|
;;
|
|
*) # we need to throw an error here -- otherwise testssl.sh treats the STARTTLS protocol as plain SSL/TLS which leads to FP
|
|
fatal "FIXME: STARTTLS protocol $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL is not supported yet" $ERR_NOSUPPORT
|
|
esac
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
case $ret in
|
|
0) return 0 ;;
|
|
3) fatal "No STARTTLS found in handshake" $ERR_CONNECT ;;
|
|
*) if [[ $ret -eq 2 ]] && [[ -n "$payload" ]]; then
|
|
# We don't want this handling for STARTTLS injection
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
((NR_STARTTLS_FAIL++))
|
|
# This are mostly timeouts here (code >=128). We give the client a chance to try again later. For cases
|
|
# where we have no STARTTLS in the server banner however - ret code=3 - we don't need to try again
|
|
connectivity_problem $NR_STARTTLS_FAIL $MAX_STARTTLS_FAIL "STARTTLS handshake failed (code: $ret)" "repeated STARTTLS problems, giving up ($ret)"
|
|
return 6 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
# Plain socket ok, yes or no?
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && return 0
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: socket fd but atm we use 5 anyway, see comment for fd_socket()
|
|
#
|
|
close_socket(){
|
|
local fd="$1"
|
|
|
|
exec 5<&-
|
|
exec 5>&-
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
send_close_notify() {
|
|
local detected_tlsversion="$1"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "sending close_notify..."
|
|
if [[ $detected_tlsversion == 0300 ]]; then
|
|
socksend ",x15, x03, x00, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0
|
|
else
|
|
socksend ",x15, x03, x01, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Format string properly for socket
|
|
# ARG1: any commented sequence of two bytes hex, separated by commas. It can contain comments, new lines, tabs and white spaces
|
|
# NW_STR holds the global with the string prepared for printf, like '\x16\x03\x03\'
|
|
code2network() {
|
|
NW_STR=$(sed -e 's/,/\\\x/g' <<< "$1" | sed -e 's/# .*$//g' -e 's/ //g' -e '/^$/d' | tr -d '\n' | tr -d '\t')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# sockets inspired by https://blog.chris007.de/using-bash-for-network-socket-operation/
|
|
# ARG1: hexbytes separated by commas, with a leading comma
|
|
# ARG2: seconds to sleep
|
|
socksend_clienthello() {
|
|
local data=""
|
|
|
|
code2network "$1"
|
|
data="$NW_STR"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]] && echo && echo "\"$data\""
|
|
if [[ -z "$PRINTF" ]] ;then
|
|
# We could also use "dd ibs=1M obs=1M" here but is seems to be at max 3% slower
|
|
printf -- "$data" | cat >&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
else
|
|
$PRINTF -- "$data" 2>/dev/null >&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
fi
|
|
sleep $USLEEP_SND
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ARG1: hexbytes -- preceded by x -- separated by commas, with a leading comma
|
|
# ARG2: seconds to sleep
|
|
socksend() {
|
|
local data line
|
|
|
|
# read line per line and strip comments (bash internal func can't handle multiline statements
|
|
data="$(while read line; do
|
|
printf "${line%%\#*}"
|
|
done <<< "$1" )"
|
|
data="${data// /}" # strip ' '
|
|
data="${data//,/\\}" # s&r , by \
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo && echo "\"$data\""
|
|
if [[ -z "$PRINTF" ]] ;then
|
|
printf -- "$data" | cat >&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
else
|
|
$PRINTF -- "$data" 2>/dev/null >&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
fi
|
|
sleep $2
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Reads from socket. Uses SOCK_REPLY_FILE global to save socket reply
|
|
# Not blocking, polling
|
|
# ARG1: blocksize for reading
|
|
#
|
|
sockread() {
|
|
[[ -z "$2" ]] && maxsleep=$MAX_WAITSOCK || maxsleep=$2
|
|
SOCK_REPLY_FILE=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7
|
|
dd bs=$1 of=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null &
|
|
wait_kill $! $maxsleep
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Reads from socket. Utilises a pipe. Output is ASCII.
|
|
# Faster as previous, blocks however when socket stream is empty
|
|
# ARG1: blocksize for reading
|
|
#
|
|
sockread_fast() {
|
|
dd bs=$1 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len2twobytes() {
|
|
local len_arg1=${#1}
|
|
[[ $len_arg1 -le 2 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "00, %02s \n" "$1")
|
|
[[ $len_arg1 -eq 3 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "0%s, %02s \n" "${1:0:1}" "${1:1:2}")
|
|
[[ $len_arg1 -eq 4 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "%02s, %02s \n" "${1:0:2}" "${1:2:2}")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_pub_key_size() {
|
|
local pubkey pubkeybits
|
|
local -i i len1 len
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_PKEY" || return 1
|
|
|
|
# OpenSSL displays the number of bits for RSA and ECC
|
|
pubkeybits=$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub 2>>$ERRFILE)
|
|
if [[ "$pubkeybits" =~ E[Dd]25519 ]]; then
|
|
echo "Server public key is 253 bit" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ "$pubkeybits" =~ E[Dd]448 ]]; then
|
|
echo "Server public key is 456 bit" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
pubkeybits=$(awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }' <<< "$pubkeybits")
|
|
if [[ -n $pubkeybits ]]; then
|
|
# remainder e.g. "256 bit)"
|
|
pubkeybits="${pubkeybits//\)/}"
|
|
echo "Server public key is $pubkeybits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
# This extracts the public key for DSA, DH, and GOST
|
|
pubkey=$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')
|
|
[[ -z "$pubkey" ]] && return 1
|
|
# Skip over tag and length of subjectPublicKeyInfo
|
|
i=2
|
|
len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
i+=2
|
|
else
|
|
len1=$((len1-0x80))
|
|
i+=$((2*len1+2))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Skip over algorithm field
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
i+=$((2*len1))
|
|
else
|
|
case $len1 in
|
|
129) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" ;;
|
|
130) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
131) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
132) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
i+=$((2+2*len))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Next is the public key BIT STRING. Skip over tag, length, and number of unused bits.
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
i+=4
|
|
else
|
|
len1=$((len1-0x80))
|
|
i+=$((2*len1+4))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now get the length of the public key
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
len=$len1
|
|
else
|
|
case $len1 in
|
|
129) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" ;;
|
|
130) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
131) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
132) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
len=$((8*len)) # convert from bytes to bits
|
|
pubkeybits="$(printf "%d" $len)"
|
|
echo "Server public key is $pubkeybits bit" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Extract the DH ephemeral key from the ServerKeyExchange message
|
|
get_dh_ephemeralkey() {
|
|
local tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="$1"
|
|
local -i tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len offset
|
|
local dh_p dh_g dh_y dh_param len1 key_bitstring
|
|
local -i i dh_p_len dh_g_len dh_y_len dh_param_len
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_PKEY" || return 1
|
|
|
|
tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=${#tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii}
|
|
dh_p_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:4}")
|
|
offset=4+$dh_p_len
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Subtract any leading 0 bytes
|
|
for (( i=4; i < offset; i+=2 )); do
|
|
[[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break
|
|
dh_p_len=$dh_p_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_p_len}"
|
|
|
|
dh_g_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
i=4+$offset
|
|
offset+=4+$dh_g_len
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# Subtract any leading 0 bytes
|
|
for (( 1; i < offset; i+=2 )); do
|
|
[[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break
|
|
dh_g_len=$dh_g_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_g="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_g_len}"
|
|
|
|
dh_y_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
i=4+$offset
|
|
offset+=4+$dh_y_len
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# Subtract any leading 0 bytes
|
|
for (( 1; i < offset; i+=2 )); do
|
|
[[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break
|
|
dh_y_len=$dh_y_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_y="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_y_len}"
|
|
|
|
# The following code assumes that all lengths can be encoded using at most 2 bytes,
|
|
# which just means that the encoded length of the public key must be less than
|
|
# 65,536 bytes. If the length is anywhere close to that, it is almost certainly an
|
|
# encoding error.
|
|
if [[ $dh_p_len+$dh_g_len+$dh_y_len -ge 131000 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# make ASN.1 INTEGER of p, g, and Y
|
|
[[ "0x${dh_p:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_p_len+=2 && dh_p="00$dh_p"
|
|
if [[ $dh_p_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_p_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_p_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_p_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_p_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p="02${len1}$dh_p"
|
|
|
|
[[ "0x${dh_g:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_g_len+=2 && dh_g="00$dh_g"
|
|
if [[ $dh_g_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_g_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_g_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_g_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_g_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_g="02${len1}$dh_g"
|
|
|
|
[[ "0x${dh_y:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_y_len+=2 && dh_y="00$dh_y"
|
|
if [[ $dh_y_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_y_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_y="02${len1}$dh_y"
|
|
|
|
# Make a SEQUENCE of p and g
|
|
dh_param_len=${#dh_p}+${#dh_g}
|
|
if [[ $dh_param_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_param_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_param="30${len1}${dh_p}${dh_g}"
|
|
|
|
# Make a SEQUENCE of the parameters SEQUENCE and the OID
|
|
dh_param_len=22+${#dh_param}
|
|
if [[ $dh_param_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_param_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_param_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_param="30${len1}06092A864886F70D010301${dh_param}"
|
|
|
|
# Encapsulate public key, y, in a BIT STRING
|
|
dh_y_len=${#dh_y}+2
|
|
if [[ $dh_y_len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $dh_y_len -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_y_len/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_y="03${len1}00$dh_y"
|
|
|
|
# Create the public key SEQUENCE
|
|
i=${#dh_param}+${#dh_y}
|
|
if [[ $i -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((i/2)))"
|
|
elif [[ $i -lt 512 ]]; then
|
|
len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((i/2)))"
|
|
else
|
|
len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((i/2)))"
|
|
fi
|
|
key_bitstring="30${len1}${dh_param}${dh_y}"
|
|
key_bitstring="$(hex2binary "$key_bitstring" | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -inform DER 2> $ERRFILE)"
|
|
[[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_out "$key_bitstring"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: name of file with socket reply
|
|
# arg2: true if entire server hello should be parsed
|
|
# return values: 0=no SSLv2 (reset)
|
|
# 1=no SSLv2 (plaintext reply like it happens with OLS webservers)
|
|
# 3=SSLv2 supported (in $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd is reply for further processing
|
|
# --> there could be checked whether ciphers e.g have been returned at all (or anything else)
|
|
# 4=looks like an STARTTLS 5xx message
|
|
# 6=socket couldn't be opened
|
|
# 7=strange reply we can't deal with
|
|
parse_sslv2_serverhello() {
|
|
local ret v2_hello_ascii v2_hello_initbyte v2_hello_length
|
|
local v2_hello_handshake v2_cert_type v2_hello_cert_length
|
|
local v2_hello_cipherspec_length
|
|
local -i certificate_len nr_ciphers_detected offset i
|
|
local ret=3
|
|
local parse_complete="false"
|
|
# SSLv2 server hello: in hex representation, see below
|
|
# byte 1+2: length of server hello 0123
|
|
# 3: 04=Handshake message, server hello 45
|
|
# 4: session id hit or not (boolean: 00=false, this 67
|
|
# is the normal case)
|
|
# 5: certificate type, 01 = x509 89
|
|
# 6+7 version (00 02 = SSLv2) 10-13
|
|
# 8+9 certificate length 14-17
|
|
# 10+11 cipher spec length 17-20
|
|
# 12+13 connection id length
|
|
# [certificate length] ==> certificate
|
|
# [cipher spec length] ==> ciphers GOOD: HERE ARE ALL CIPHERS ALREADY!
|
|
|
|
# Note: recent SSL/TLS stacks reply with a TLS alert on a SSLv2 client hello.
|
|
# The TLS error message is different and could be used for fingerprinting.
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$2" == "true" ]]; then
|
|
parse_complete=true
|
|
fi
|
|
"$parse_complete" && echo "======================================" > $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
v2_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' $1)
|
|
v2_hello_ascii="${v2_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$v2_hello_ascii"
|
|
if [[ -z "$v2_hello_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
ret=0 # 1 line without any blanks: no server hello received
|
|
debugme echo "server hello empty"
|
|
else
|
|
# now scrape two bytes out of the reply per byte
|
|
v2_hello_initbyte="${v2_hello_ascii:0:1}" # normally this belongs to the next, should be 8!
|
|
v2_hello_length="${v2_hello_ascii:1:3}" # + 0x8000 see above
|
|
v2_hello_handshake="${v2_hello_ascii:4:2}"
|
|
v2_cert_type="${v2_hello_ascii:8:2}"
|
|
v2_hello_cert_length="${v2_hello_ascii:14:4}"
|
|
v2_hello_cipherspec_length="${v2_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
|
|
V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH=$(printf "%d\n" "0x$v2_hello_cipherspec_length" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=7
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${v2_hello_ascii:0:2}" == "35" ]] && "$do_starttls"; then
|
|
# this could be a 500/5xx for some weird reason where the STARTTLS handshake failed
|
|
debugme echo "$(hex2ascii "$v2_hello_ascii")"
|
|
ret=4
|
|
elif [[ "${v2_hello_ascii:0:4}" == "1503" ]]; then
|
|
# Cloudflare does this, OpenSSL 1.1.1 and picoTLS. With different alert messages
|
|
# Just in case somebody's interested in the exact error, we deliver it ;-)
|
|
debugme echo -n ">TLS< alert message discovered: ${v2_hello_ascii} "
|
|
case "${v2_hello_ascii:10:2}" in
|
|
01) debugme echo "(01/warning: 0x"${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"/$(tls_alert "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;;
|
|
02) debugme echo "(02/fatal: 0x"${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"/$(tls_alert "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;;
|
|
*) debugme echo "("${v2_hello_ascii:10:2}" : "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
ret=0
|
|
elif [[ $v2_hello_initbyte != "8" ]] || [[ $v2_hello_handshake != "04" ]]; then
|
|
ret=1
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo "no correct server hello"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 server init byte: 0x0$v2_hello_initbyte"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 hello handshake : 0x$v2_hello_handshake"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo "SSLv2 server hello length: 0x0$v2_hello_length"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 certificate type: 0x$v2_cert_type"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 certificate length: 0x$v2_hello_cert_length"
|
|
echo "SSLv2 cipher spec length: 0x$v2_hello_cipherspec_length"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$parse_complete" && [[ $((2*$(hex2dec "$v2_hello_length"))) -ne $((${#v2_hello_ascii}-4)) ]]; then
|
|
ret=7
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$parse_complete" || return $ret
|
|
|
|
# not sure why we need this
|
|
rm -f $HOSTCERT
|
|
> $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "$v2_hello_cert_length")
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$v2_cert_type" == "01" ]] && [[ "$v2_hello_cert_length" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
hex2binary "${v2_hello_ascii:26:certificate_len}" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -out $HOSTCERT 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate in ServerHello."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
get_pub_key_size
|
|
echo "======================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Output list of supported ciphers
|
|
offset=$((certificate_len+26))
|
|
nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3))
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers_detected; i++ )); do
|
|
echo "Supported cipher: x$(tolower "${v2_hello_ascii:offset:6}")" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
offset=$((offset+6))
|
|
done
|
|
echo "======================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: text
|
|
hmac() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local key="$2" text="$3" output
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]]; then
|
|
output="$(hex2binary "$text" | $OPENSSL mac -macopt digest:"${hash_fn/-/}" -macopt hexkey:"$key" HMAC 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_lf "$output")"
|
|
else
|
|
output="$(hex2binary "$text" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -mac HMAC -macopt hexkey:"$key" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
tm_out "${output#*= }"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: transcript
|
|
# Compute the HMAC of the hash of the transcript
|
|
hmac-transcript() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local key="$2" transcript="$3" output
|
|
local -i ret
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR == 3 ]]; then
|
|
output="$(hex2binary "$transcript" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -binary 2>/dev/null | \
|
|
$OPENSSL mac -macopt digest:"${hash_fn/-/}" -macopt hexkey:"$key" HMAC 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
tm_out "$(toupper "$(strip_lf "$output")")"
|
|
else
|
|
output="$(hex2binary "$transcript" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -binary 2>/dev/null | \
|
|
$OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -mac HMAC -macopt hexkey:"$key" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
tm_out "$(toupper "${output#*= }")"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: pseudorandom key (PRK)
|
|
# arg2: info
|
|
# arg3: length of output keying material in octets
|
|
# See RFC 5869, Section 2.3
|
|
hkdf-expand() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local prk="$2" info="$3" output=""
|
|
local -i out_len="$4"
|
|
local -i i n hash_len ret
|
|
local counter
|
|
local ti tim1 # T(i) and T(i-1)
|
|
|
|
case "$hash_fn" in
|
|
"-sha256") hash_len=32 ;;
|
|
"-sha384") hash_len=48 ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
n=$out_len/$hash_len
|
|
[[ $((out_len%hash_len)) -ne 0 ]] && n+=1
|
|
|
|
tim1=""
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= n; i++ )); do
|
|
counter="$(printf "%02X\n" $i)"
|
|
ti="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$prk" "$tim1$info$counter")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
output+="$ti"
|
|
tim1="$ti"
|
|
done
|
|
out_len=$((2*out_len))
|
|
tm_out "${output:0:out_len}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: secret
|
|
# arg3: label
|
|
# arg4: context
|
|
# arg5: length
|
|
# See RFC 8446, Section 7.1
|
|
hkdf-expand-label() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local secret="$2" label="$3"
|
|
local context="$4"
|
|
local -i length="$5"
|
|
local hkdflabel hkdflabel_label hkdflabel_context
|
|
local hkdflabel_length
|
|
local -i len
|
|
|
|
hkdflabel_length="$(printf "%04X\n" "$length")"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
# "544c5320312e332c20" = "TLS 1.3, "
|
|
hkdflabel_label="544c5320312e332c20$label"
|
|
else
|
|
# "746c73313320" = "tls13 "
|
|
hkdflabel_label="746c73313320$label"
|
|
fi
|
|
len=${#hkdflabel_label}/2
|
|
hkdflabel_label="$(printf "%02X\n" "$len")$hkdflabel_label"
|
|
len=${#context}/2
|
|
hkdflabel_context="$(printf "%02X\n" "$len")$context"
|
|
hkdflabel="$hkdflabel_length$hkdflabel_label$hkdflabel_context"
|
|
|
|
hkdf-expand "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$hkdflabel" "$length"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: secret
|
|
# arg3: label
|
|
# arg4: ASCII-HEX of messages
|
|
# See RFC 8446, Section 7.1
|
|
derive-secret() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local secret="$2" label="$3" messages="$4"
|
|
local hash_messages
|
|
local -i hash_len retcode
|
|
|
|
case "$hash_fn" in
|
|
"-sha256") hash_len=32 ;;
|
|
"-sha384") hash_len=48 ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
hash_messages="$(hex2binary "$messages" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
hash_messages="${hash_messages#*= }"
|
|
hkdf-expand-label "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$label" "$hash_messages" "$hash_len"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: hash function
|
|
# arg2: secret
|
|
# arg3: purpose ("key" or "iv")
|
|
# arg4: length of the key
|
|
# See RFC 8446, Section 7.3
|
|
derive-traffic-key() {
|
|
local hash_fn="$1"
|
|
local secret="$2" purpose="$3"
|
|
local -i key_length="$4"
|
|
local key
|
|
|
|
key="$(hkdf-expand-label "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$purpose" "" "$key_length")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
tm_out "$key"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
#arg2: First ClientHello, if response was a HelloRetryRequest
|
|
#arg3: HelloRetryRequest, if one was sent
|
|
#arg4: Final (or only) ClientHello
|
|
#arg5: ServerHello
|
|
create-initial-transcript() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local clienthello1="$2" hrr="$3" clienthello2="$4" serverhello="$5"
|
|
local hash_clienthello1 msg_transcript
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$hrr" ]] && [[ "${serverhello:8:4}" == 7F12 ]]; then
|
|
msg_transcript="$clienthello1$hrr$clienthello2$serverhello"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$hrr" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
hash_len=32
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
hash_len=48
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
hash_clienthello1="$(hex2binary "$clienthello1" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
hash_clienthello1="${hash_clienthello1#*= }"
|
|
msg_transcript="FE0000$(printf "%02x" $((${#hash_clienthello1}/2)))$hash_clienthello1$hrr$clienthello2$serverhello"
|
|
else
|
|
msg_transcript="$clienthello2$serverhello"
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$msg_transcript"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
#arg2: file containing cipher name, public key, and private key
|
|
derive-handshake-secret() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local tmpfile="$2"
|
|
local -i retcode
|
|
local hash_fn
|
|
local pub_file priv_file tmpfile
|
|
local early_secret derived_secret shared_secret handshake_secret
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_PKUTIL" || return 1
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pub_file="$(mktemp "$TEMPDIR/pubkey.XXXXXX")" || return 7
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' \
|
|
"$tmpfile" > "$pub_file"
|
|
[[ ! -s "$pub_file" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
priv_file="$(mktemp "$TEMPDIR/privkey.XXXXXX")" || return 7
|
|
if grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN EC PARAMETERS" "$tmpfile"; then
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS/,/-----END EC PRIVATE KEY/ { print $0 }' \
|
|
"$tmpfile" > "$priv_file"
|
|
else
|
|
awk '/-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY/,/-----END PRIVATE KEY/ { print $0 }' \
|
|
"$tmpfile" > "$priv_file"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ! -s "$priv_file" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# early_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "000...000" "000...000")"
|
|
case "$hash_fn" in
|
|
"-sha256") early_secret="33ad0a1c607ec03b09e6cd9893680ce210adf300aa1f2660e1b22e10f170f92a"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
# "6465726976656420736563726574" = "derived secret"
|
|
# derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "6465726976656420736563726574" "")"
|
|
derived_secret="c1c0c36bf8fb1d1afa949fbd360e71af69a6244a4c2eaef5bbbb6442a7277d2c"
|
|
else
|
|
# "64657269766564" = "derived"
|
|
# derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "64657269766564" "")"
|
|
derived_secret="6f2615a108c702c5678f54fc9dbab69716c076189c48250cebeac3576c3611ba"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
"-sha384") early_secret="7ee8206f5570023e6dc7519eb1073bc4e791ad37b5c382aa10ba18e2357e716971f9362f2c2fe2a76bfd78dfec4ea9b5"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
# "6465726976656420736563726574" = "derived secret"
|
|
# derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "6465726976656420736563726574" "")"
|
|
derived_secret="54c80fa05ee9e0532ce3db8ddeca37a0365683bcd3b27bdc88d2b9fdc115ca4ebc8edc1f0b72a6a0861e803fc34761ef"
|
|
else
|
|
# "64657269766564" = "derived"
|
|
# derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "64657269766564" "")"
|
|
derived_secret="1591dac5cbbf0330a4a84de9c753330e92d01f0a88214b4464972fd668049e93e52f2b16fad922fdc0584478428f282b"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
shared_secret="$($OPENSSL pkeyutl -derive -inkey "$priv_file" -peerkey "$pub_file" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
rm "$pub_file" "$priv_file"
|
|
|
|
# For draft 18 use $early_secret rather than $derived_secret.
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4}" == "7F12" ]]; then
|
|
handshake_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "${shared_secret%%[!0-9A-F]*}")"
|
|
else
|
|
handshake_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$derived_secret" "${shared_secret%%[!0-9A-F]*}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$handshake_secret"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: handshake secret
|
|
# arg3: transcript
|
|
# arg4: "client" or "server"
|
|
derive-handshake-traffic-keys() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" handshake_secret="$2" transcript="$3"
|
|
local sender="$4"
|
|
local hash_fn
|
|
local -i hash_len key_len
|
|
local handshake_traffic_secret label key iv finished="0000"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
hash_len=32
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
hash_len=48
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *AES_128* ]]; then
|
|
key_len=16
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *AES_256* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == *CHACHA20_POLY1305* ]]; then
|
|
key_len=32
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$sender" == server ]]; then
|
|
# "7365727665722068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574" = "server handshake traffic secret"
|
|
label="7365727665722068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574"
|
|
else
|
|
# "636c69656e742068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574" = "client handshake traffic secret"
|
|
label="636c69656e742068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$sender" == server ]]; then
|
|
# "732068732074726166666963" = "s hs traffic"
|
|
label="732068732074726166666963"
|
|
else
|
|
# "632068732074726166666963" = "c hs traffic"
|
|
label="632068732074726166666963"
|
|
fi
|
|
handshake_traffic_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$handshake_secret" "$label" "$transcript")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
# "6b6579" = "key"
|
|
key="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$handshake_traffic_secret" "6b6579" "$key_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
# "6976" = "iv"
|
|
iv="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$handshake_traffic_secret" "6976" "12")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] || [[ "$sender" == client ]]; then
|
|
# "66696e6973686564" = "finished"
|
|
finished="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$handshake_traffic_secret" "66696e6973686564" "$hash_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$key $iv $finished"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
#arg2: handshake secret
|
|
derive-master-secret() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local handshake_secret="$2"
|
|
local -i retcode
|
|
local hash_fn
|
|
local derived_secret zeros master_secret
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
zeros="0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
zeros="000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4}" == 7F12 ]]; then
|
|
derived_secret="$handshake_secret"
|
|
elif [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$handshake_secret" "6465726976656420736563726574" "")"
|
|
else
|
|
derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$handshake_secret" "64657269766564" "")"
|
|
fi
|
|
master_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$derived_secret" "$zeros")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$master_secret"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: master secret
|
|
# arg3: transcript
|
|
# arg4: "client" or "server"
|
|
derive-application-traffic-keys() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" master_secret="$2" transcript="$3"
|
|
local sender="$4"
|
|
local hash_fn
|
|
local -i key_len
|
|
local application_traffic_secret_0 label key iv
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *AES_128* ]]; then
|
|
key_len=16
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *AES_256* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == *CHACHA20_POLY1305* ]]; then
|
|
key_len=32
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$sender" == server ]]; then
|
|
# "736572766572206170706c69636174696f6e207472616666696320736563726574" = "server application traffic secret"
|
|
label="736572766572206170706c69636174696f6e207472616666696320736563726574"
|
|
else
|
|
# "636c69656e74206170706c69636174696f6e207472616666696320736563726574" = "client application traffic secret"
|
|
label="636c69656e74206170706c69636174696f6e207472616666696320736563726574"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$sender" == server ]]; then
|
|
# "732061702074726166666963" = "s hs traffic"
|
|
label="732061702074726166666963"
|
|
else
|
|
# "632061702074726166666963" = "c hs traffic"
|
|
label="632061702074726166666963"
|
|
fi
|
|
application_traffic_secret_0="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$master_secret" "$label" "$transcript")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
# "6b6579" = "key"
|
|
key="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$application_traffic_secret_0" "6b6579" "$key_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
# "6976" = "iv"
|
|
iv="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$application_traffic_secret_0" "6976" "12")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_out "$key $iv"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Section 2.1
|
|
chacha20_Qround() {
|
|
local -i a="0x$1"
|
|
local -i b="0x$2"
|
|
local -i c="0x$3"
|
|
local -i d="0x$4"
|
|
local -i x y
|
|
|
|
a=$(((a+b) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
d=$((d^a))
|
|
# rotate d left 16 bits
|
|
x=$((d & 0xffff0000))
|
|
x=$((x >> 16))
|
|
y=$((d & 0x0000ffff))
|
|
y=$((y << 16))
|
|
d=$((x | y))
|
|
|
|
c=$(((c+d) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
b=$((b^c))
|
|
# rotate b left 12 bits
|
|
x=$((b & 0xfff00000))
|
|
x=$((x >> 20))
|
|
y=$((b & 0x000fffff))
|
|
y=$((y << 12))
|
|
b=$((x | y))
|
|
|
|
a=$(((a+b) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
d=$((d^a))
|
|
# rotate d left 8 bits
|
|
x=$((d & 0xff000000))
|
|
x=$((x >> 24))
|
|
y=$((d & 0x00ffffff))
|
|
y=$((y << 8))
|
|
d=$((x | y))
|
|
|
|
c=$(((c+d) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
b=$((b^c))
|
|
# rotate b left 7 bits
|
|
x=$((b & 0xfe000000))
|
|
x=$((x >> 25))
|
|
y=$((b & 0x01ffffff))
|
|
y=$((y << 7))
|
|
b=$((x | y))
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$(printf "%X" $a) $(printf "%X" $b) $(printf "%X" $c) $(printf "%X" $d)"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Section 2.3.1
|
|
chacha20_inner_block() {
|
|
local s0="$1" s1="$2" s2="$3" s3="$4"
|
|
local s4="$5" s5="$6" s6="$7" s7="$8"
|
|
local s8="$9" s9="${10}" s10="${11}" s11="${12}"
|
|
local s12="${13}" s13="${14}" s14="${15}" s15="${16}"
|
|
local res
|
|
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s0" "$s4" "$s8" "$s12")"
|
|
read -r s0 s4 s8 s12 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s1" "$s5" "$s9" "$s13")"
|
|
read -r s1 s5 s9 s13 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s2" "$s6" "$s10" "$s14")"
|
|
read -r s2 s6 s10 s14 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s3" "$s7" "$s11" "$s15")"
|
|
read -r s3 s7 s11 s15 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s0" "$s5" "$s10" "$s15")"
|
|
read -r s0 s5 s10 s15 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s1" "$s6" "$s11" "$s12")"
|
|
read -r s1 s6 s11 s12 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s2" "$s7" "$s8" "$s13")"
|
|
read -r s2 s7 s8 s13 <<< "$res"
|
|
res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s3" "$s4" "$s9" "$s14")"
|
|
read -r s3 s4 s9 s14 <<< "$res"
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$s0 $s1 $s2 $s3 $s4 $s5 $s6 $s7 $s8 $s9 $s10 $s11 $s12 $s13 $s14 $s15"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Sections 2.3 and 2.3.1
|
|
chacha20_block() {
|
|
local key="$1"
|
|
local counter="$2"
|
|
local nonce="$3"
|
|
local s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15
|
|
local ws0 ws1 ws2 ws3 ws4 ws5 ws6 ws7 ws8 ws9 ws10 ws11 ws12 ws13 ws14 ws15
|
|
local working_state
|
|
local -i i
|
|
|
|
# create the state variable
|
|
s0="61707865"; s1="3320646e"; s2="79622d32"; s3="6b206574"
|
|
s4="${key:6:2}${key:4:2}${key:2:2}${key:0:2}"
|
|
s5="${key:14:2}${key:12:2}${key:10:2}${key:8:2}"
|
|
s6="${key:22:2}${key:20:2}${key:18:2}${key:16:2}"
|
|
s7="${key:30:2}${key:28:2}${key:26:2}${key:24:2}"
|
|
s8="${key:38:2}${key:36:2}${key:34:2}${key:32:2}"
|
|
s9="${key:46:2}${key:44:2}${key:42:2}${key:40:2}"
|
|
s10="${key:54:2}${key:52:2}${key:50:2}${key:48:2}"
|
|
s11="${key:62:2}${key:60:2}${key:58:2}${key:56:2}"
|
|
s12="$counter"
|
|
s13="${nonce:6:2}${nonce:4:2}${nonce:2:2}${nonce:0:2}"
|
|
s14="${nonce:14:2}${nonce:12:2}${nonce:10:2}${nonce:8:2}"
|
|
s15="${nonce:22:2}${nonce:20:2}${nonce:18:2}${nonce:16:2}"
|
|
|
|
# Initialize working_state to state
|
|
working_state="$s0 $s1 $s2 $s3 $s4 $s5 $s6 $s7 $s8 $s9 $s10 $s11 $s12 $s13 $s14 $s15"
|
|
|
|
# compute the 20 rounds (10 calls to inner block function, each of which
|
|
# performs 8 quarter rounds).
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i < 10; i++ )); do
|
|
working_state="$(chacha20_inner_block $working_state)"
|
|
done
|
|
read -r ws0 ws1 ws2 ws3 ws4 ws5 ws6 ws7 ws8 ws9 ws10 ws11 ws12 ws13 ws14 ws15 <<< "$working_state"
|
|
|
|
# Add working state to state
|
|
s0="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s0+0x$ws0) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s1="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s1+0x$ws1) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s2="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s2+0x$ws2) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s3="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s3+0x$ws3) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s4="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s4+0x$ws4) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s5="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s5+0x$ws5) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s6="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s6+0x$ws6) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s7="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s7+0x$ws7) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s8="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s8+0x$ws8) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s9="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s9+0x$ws9) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s10="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s10+0x$ws10) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s11="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s11+0x$ws11) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s12="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s12+0x$ws12) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s13="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s13+0x$ws13) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s14="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s14+0x$ws14) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
s15="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s15+0x$ws15) & 0xffffffff)))"
|
|
|
|
# serialize the state
|
|
s0="${s0:6:2}${s0:4:2}${s0:2:2}${s0:0:2}"
|
|
s1="${s1:6:2}${s1:4:2}${s1:2:2}${s1:0:2}"
|
|
s2="${s2:6:2}${s2:4:2}${s2:2:2}${s2:0:2}"
|
|
s3="${s3:6:2}${s3:4:2}${s3:2:2}${s3:0:2}"
|
|
s4="${s4:6:2}${s4:4:2}${s4:2:2}${s4:0:2}"
|
|
s5="${s5:6:2}${s5:4:2}${s5:2:2}${s5:0:2}"
|
|
s6="${s6:6:2}${s6:4:2}${s6:2:2}${s6:0:2}"
|
|
s7="${s7:6:2}${s7:4:2}${s7:2:2}${s7:0:2}"
|
|
s8="${s8:6:2}${s8:4:2}${s8:2:2}${s8:0:2}"
|
|
s9="${s9:6:2}${s9:4:2}${s9:2:2}${s9:0:2}"
|
|
s10="${s10:6:2}${s10:4:2}${s10:2:2}${s10:0:2}"
|
|
s11="${s11:6:2}${s11:4:2}${s11:2:2}${s11:0:2}"
|
|
s12="${s12:6:2}${s12:4:2}${s12:2:2}${s12:0:2}"
|
|
s13="${s13:6:2}${s13:4:2}${s13:2:2}${s13:0:2}"
|
|
s14="${s14:6:2}${s14:4:2}${s14:2:2}${s14:0:2}"
|
|
s15="${s15:6:2}${s15:4:2}${s15:2:2}${s15:0:2}"
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$s0$s1$s2$s3$s4$s5$s6$s7$s8$s9$s10$s11$s12$s13$s14$s15"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Section 2.4
|
|
chacha20() {
|
|
local key="$1"
|
|
local -i counter=1
|
|
local nonce="$2"
|
|
local ciphertext="$3"
|
|
local -i i ciphertext_len num_blocks mod_check
|
|
local -i i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8 i9 i10 i11 i12 i13 i14 i15 i16
|
|
local keystream plaintext=""
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_CHACHA20"; then
|
|
plaintext="$(hex2binary "$ciphertext" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -chacha20 -K "$key" -iv "01000000$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext}
|
|
num_blocks=$ciphertext_len/128
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < num_blocks; i++)); do
|
|
i1=$((128*i)); i2=$((i1+8)); i3=$((i1+16)); i4=$((i1+24)); i5=$((i1+32)); i6=$((i1+40)); i7=$((i1+48)); i8=$((i1+56))
|
|
i9=$((i1+64)); i10=$((i1+72)); i11=$((i1+80)); i12=$((i1+88)); i13=$((i1+96)); i14=$((i1+104)); i15=$((i1+112)); i16=$((i1+120))
|
|
keystream="$(chacha20_block "$key" "$(printf "%08X" $counter)" "$nonce")"
|
|
plaintext+="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i1:8} ^ 0x${keystream:0:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i2:8} ^ 0x${keystream:8:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i3:8} ^ 0x${keystream:16:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i4:8} ^ 0x${keystream:24:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i5:8} ^ 0x${keystream:32:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i6:8} ^ 0x${keystream:40:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i7:8} ^ 0x${keystream:48:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i8:8} ^ 0x${keystream:56:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i9:8} ^ 0x${keystream:64:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i10:8} ^ 0x${keystream:72:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i11:8} ^ 0x${keystream:80:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i12:8} ^ 0x${keystream:88:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i13:8} ^ 0x${keystream:96:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i14:8} ^ 0x${keystream:104:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i15:8} ^ 0x${keystream:112:8}))" \
|
|
"$((0x${ciphertext:i16:8} ^ 0x${keystream:120:8}))")"
|
|
counter+=1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
mod_check=$ciphertext_len%128
|
|
if [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
keystream="$(chacha20_block "$key" "$(printf "%08X" $counter)" "$nonce")"
|
|
i1=$((128*num_blocks))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < mod_check; i+=2 )); do
|
|
plaintext+="$(printf "%02X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:2} ^ 0x${keystream:i:2}))")"
|
|
i1+=2
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Implement U8to32 from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna/blob/master/poly1305-donna-32.h
|
|
# Used to decode value encoded as 32-bit little-endian integer
|
|
u8to32() {
|
|
local p="$1"
|
|
|
|
tm_out "0x${p:6:2}${p:4:2}${p:2:2}${p:0:2}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Implement U32to8 from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna/blob/master/poly1305-donna-32.h
|
|
# Used to encode value as 32-bit little-endian integer
|
|
u32to8() {
|
|
local -i v="$1"
|
|
local p
|
|
|
|
v=$((v & 0xffffffff))
|
|
p="$(printf "%08X" $v)"
|
|
tm_out "${p:6:2}${p:4:2}${p:2:2}${p:0:2}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Used to encode value as 64-bit little-endian integer
|
|
u64to8() {
|
|
local -i v="$1"
|
|
local p
|
|
|
|
p="$(printf "%016X" "$v")"
|
|
tm_out "${p:14:2}${p:12:2}${p:10:2}${p:8:2}${p:6:2}${p:4:2}${p:2:2}${p:0:2}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: 32-byte key
|
|
# arg2: message to be authenticated
|
|
# See RFC 8439, Section 2.5
|
|
# Implementation based on https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
|
|
poly1305_mac() {
|
|
local key="$1" nonce="$2" ciphertext="$3" aad="$4"
|
|
local mac_key msg
|
|
local -i ciphertext_len aad_len
|
|
local -i bytes
|
|
local -i r0 r1 r2 r3 r4
|
|
local -i h0=0 h1=0 h2=0 h3=0 h4=0
|
|
local -i pad0 pad1 pad2 pad3
|
|
local -i s1 s2 s3 s4
|
|
local -i d0 d1 d2 d3 d4
|
|
local -i g0 g1 g2 g3 g4
|
|
local -i i c f blocksize hibit
|
|
|
|
# poly1305_key_gen - RFC 8439, Section 2.6
|
|
# The MAC key is actually just the first 64 characters (32 bytes) of the
|
|
# output of the chacha20_block function. However, there is no need to
|
|
# truncate the key, since the code below will ignore all but the first
|
|
# 64 characters.
|
|
mac_key="$(chacha20_block "$key" "00000000" "$nonce")"
|
|
|
|
# Construct message to be authenticated. RFC 8439, Section 2.8
|
|
msg="$aad"
|
|
aad_len=$((${#aad}/2))
|
|
bytes=$(( aad_len % 16 ))
|
|
if [[ $bytes -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=bytes; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
msg+="00"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
msg+="$ciphertext"
|
|
ciphertext_len=$((${#ciphertext}/2))
|
|
bytes=$(( ciphertext_len % 16 ))
|
|
if [[ $bytes -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=bytes; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
msg+="00"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
msg+="$(u64to8 $aad_len)$(u64to8 $ciphertext_len)"
|
|
bytes="${#msg}"
|
|
|
|
# poly1305_init
|
|
r0=$(( $(u8to32 "${mac_key:0:8}") & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
r1=$(( ($(u8to32 "${mac_key:6:8}") >> 2) & 0x3ffff03 ))
|
|
r2=$(( ($(u8to32 "${mac_key:12:8}") >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff ))
|
|
r3=$(( ($(u8to32 "${mac_key:18:8}") >> 6) & 0x3f03fff ))
|
|
r4=$(( ($(u8to32 "${mac_key:24:8}") >> 8) & 0x00fffff ))
|
|
|
|
s1=$((r1*5))
|
|
s2=$((r2*5))
|
|
s3=$((r3*5))
|
|
s4=$((r4*5))
|
|
|
|
pad0=$(u8to32 "${mac_key:32:8}")
|
|
pad1=$(u8to32 "${mac_key:40:8}")
|
|
pad2=$(u8to32 "${mac_key:48:8}")
|
|
pad3=$(u8to32 "${mac_key:56:8}")
|
|
|
|
# poly1305_update
|
|
for (( 1 ; bytes > 0; bytes=bytes-blocksize )); do
|
|
if [[ $bytes -ge 32 ]]; then
|
|
blocksize=32
|
|
hibit=0x1000000
|
|
else
|
|
blocksize=$bytes
|
|
hibit=0
|
|
msg+="01"
|
|
for (( i=bytes+2; i < 32; i+=2 )); do
|
|
msg+="00"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
h0+=$(( $(u8to32 "${msg:0:8}") & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h1+=$(( ($(u8to32 "${msg:6:8}") >> 2) & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h2+=$(( ($(u8to32 "${msg:12:8}") >> 4) & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h3+=$(( ($(u8to32 "${msg:18:8}") >> 6) & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h4+=$(( (($(u8to32 "${msg:24:8}") >> 8) & 0xffffff) | hibit ))
|
|
|
|
d0=$(( h0*r0 + h1*s4 + h2*s3 + h3*s2 + h4*s1 ))
|
|
d1=$(( h0*r1 + h1*r0 + h2*s4 + h3*s3 + h4*s2 ))
|
|
d2=$(( h0*r2 + h1*r1 + h2*r0 + h3*s4 + h4*s3 ))
|
|
d3=$(( h0*r3 + h1*r2 + h2*r1 + h3*r0 + h4*s4 ))
|
|
d4=$(( h0*r4 + h1*r3 + h2*r2 + h3*r1 + h4*r0 ))
|
|
|
|
c=$(( (d0 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h0=$(( d0 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
d1+=$c; c=$(( (d1 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h1=$(( d1 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
d2+=$c; c=$(( (d2 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h2=$(( d2 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
d3+=$c; c=$(( (d3 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h3=$(( d3 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
d4+=$c; c=$(( (d4 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h4=$(( d4 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h0+=$((c*5)); c=$(( (h0 >> 26) & 0x3fffffffff )); h0=$(( h0 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h1+=$c
|
|
|
|
msg="${msg:32}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# poly1305_finish
|
|
c=$(( (h0 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h1=$(( h1 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h2+=$c; c=$(( (h2 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h2=$(( h2 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h3+=$c; c=$(( (h3 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h3=$(( h3 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h4+=$c; c=$(( (h4 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h4=$(( h4 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h0+=$((c*5)); c=$(( (h0 >> 26) & 0x3f )); h0=$(( h0 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
h1+=$c
|
|
|
|
g0=$((h0+5)); c=$(( (g0 >> 26) & 0x3f )); g0=$(( g0 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
g1=$((h1+c)); c=$(( (g1 >> 26) & 0x3f )); g1=$(( g1 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
g2=$((h2+c)); c=$(( (g2 >> 26) & 0x3f )); g2=$(( g2 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
g3=$((h3+c)); c=$(( (g3 >> 26) & 0x3f )); g3=$(( g3 & 0x3ffffff ))
|
|
g4=$((h4+c-0x4000000))
|
|
|
|
if [[ $((g4 & 0x8000000000000000)) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
h0=$g0; h1=$g1; h2=$g2; h3=$g3; h4=$g4
|
|
fi
|
|
h0=$(( ( h0 | (h1 << 26)) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
h1=$(( ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20)) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
h2=$(( ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
h3=$(( ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8)) & 0xffffffff))
|
|
|
|
f=$(( h0+pad0 )); h0=$f
|
|
f=$(( h1+pad1+(f>>32) )); h1=$f
|
|
f=$(( h2+pad2+(f>>32) )); h2=$f
|
|
f=$(( h3+pad3+(f>>32) )); h3=$f
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$(u32to8 $h0)$(u32to8 $h1)$(u32to8 $h2)$(u32to8 $h3)"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: key
|
|
# arg2: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg3: ciphertext
|
|
# arg4: additional authenticated data
|
|
# arg5: expected tag
|
|
# arg6: true if authentication tag should be checked. false otherwise.
|
|
chacha20_aead_decrypt() {
|
|
local key="$1" nonce="$2" ciphertext="$3" aad="$4" expected_tag="$(toupper "$5")"
|
|
local compute_tag="$6"
|
|
local plaintext computed_tag
|
|
|
|
plaintext="$(chacha20 "$key" "$nonce" "$ciphertext")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
computed_tag="$(poly1305_mac "$key" "$nonce" "$ciphertext" "$aad")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
[[ "$computed_tag" == $expected_tag ]] || return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: key
|
|
# arg2: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg3: plaintext
|
|
# arg4: additional authenticated data
|
|
chacha20_aead_encrypt() {
|
|
local key="$1" nonce="$2" plaintext="$3" aad="$4"
|
|
local ciphertext computed_tag
|
|
|
|
ciphertext="$(chacha20 "$key" "$nonce" "$plaintext")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
computed_tag="$(poly1305_mac "$key" "$nonce" "$ciphertext" "$aad")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$ciphertext $computed_tag"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: nonce (must be 96 bits)
|
|
# arg2: number of blocks needed for plaintext/ciphertext
|
|
# Generate the sequence of counter blocks, which are to be encrypted and then
|
|
# XORed with either the plaintext or the ciphertext.
|
|
# See Section 6.1, Section 6.2, and Appendix A.3 of NIST SP 800-38C and
|
|
# Section 5.3 of RFC 5116.
|
|
generate-ccm-counter-blocks() {
|
|
local ctr="02${1}000000" ctr_msb blocks=""
|
|
local -i i ctr_lsb n="$2"
|
|
|
|
ctr_msb="${ctr:0:24}"
|
|
ctr_lsb=0x${ctr:24:8}
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i <= n; i+=1 )); do
|
|
blocks+="${ctr_msb}$(printf "%08X" "$ctr_lsb")"
|
|
ctr_lsb+=1
|
|
done
|
|
hex2binary "$blocks"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: an OpenSSL ecb cipher (e.g., -aes-128-ecb)
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: iv (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: additional authenticated data
|
|
# arg5: plaintext
|
|
# arg6: tag length (must be 16 or 32)
|
|
# Compute the CCM authentication tag
|
|
ccm-compute-tag() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" iv="$3" aad="$4" plaintext="$5"
|
|
local -i tag_len="$6"
|
|
local b tag
|
|
local -i i aad_len plaintext_len final_block_len nr_blocks
|
|
|
|
aad_len=$((${#aad}/2))
|
|
plaintext_len=$((${#plaintext}/2))
|
|
|
|
# Apply the formatting function to create b=B0B1B2... as in
|
|
# Appendix A.2 of NIST SP 800-38C.
|
|
|
|
# The first block consists of the flags, nonce, and length of plaintext
|
|
# See Section 5.3 of RFC 5116 for value of q.
|
|
if [[ $aad_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $tag_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
b="5A${iv}$(printf "%06X" $plaintext_len)"
|
|
else
|
|
b="7A${iv}$(printf "%06X" $plaintext_len)"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $tag_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
b="1A${iv}$(printf "%06X" $plaintext_len)"
|
|
else
|
|
b="3A${iv}$(printf "%06X" $plaintext_len)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Next comes any additional authenticated data
|
|
if [[ $aad_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $aad_len -lt 0xFF00 ]]; then
|
|
b+="$(printf "%04X" $aad_len)$aad"
|
|
final_block_len=$(( (aad_len+2) % 16 ))
|
|
elif [[ $aad_len -lt 0x100000000 ]]; then
|
|
b+="FFFE$(printf "%08X" $aad_len)$aad"
|
|
final_block_len=$(( (aad_len+6) % 16 ))
|
|
else
|
|
# AES-CCM supports lengths up to 2^64, but there doesn't
|
|
# seem to be any reason to try to support such lengths.
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
# Add padding to complete block
|
|
if [[ $final_block_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=final_block_len; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
b+="00"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Finally add the plaintext and any padding needed to complete block
|
|
b+="$plaintext"
|
|
final_block_len=$((plaintext_len % 16))
|
|
if [[ $final_block_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=final_block_len; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
b+="00"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Compute the authentication tag as described in
|
|
# Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of NIST SP 800-38C.
|
|
nr_blocks=$((${#b}/32))
|
|
tag="${b:0:32}"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_blocks; i++ )); do
|
|
# XOR current block with previous block and then encrypt
|
|
[[ $i -ne 0 ]] &&
|
|
tag="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${b:0:8} ^ 0x${tag:0:8}))" "$((0x${b:8:8} ^ 0x${tag:8:8}))" "$((0x${b:16:8} ^ 0x${tag:16:8}))" "$((0x${b:24:8} ^ 0x${tag:24:8}))")"
|
|
|
|
tag="$(hex2binary "$tag" | $OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
b="${b:32}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
tm_out "${tag:0:tag_len}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: AES-CCM TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: ciphertext
|
|
# arg5: additional authenticated data
|
|
# arg6: expected tag (must be 16 or 32 characters)
|
|
# arg7: true if authentication tag should be checked. false otherwise.
|
|
# See Section 6.2 of NIST SP 800-38C
|
|
ccm-decrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" nonce="$3" ciphertext="$4" aad="$5" enciphered_expected_tag="$6"
|
|
local compute_tag="$7"
|
|
local plaintext="" expected_tag computed_tag
|
|
local -i i i1 i2 i3 i4 tag_len
|
|
local -i ciphertext_len n mod_check
|
|
local s s0
|
|
|
|
[[ ${#nonce} -ne 24 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*AES_128*) cipher="-aes-128-ecb" ;;
|
|
*AES_256*) cipher="-aes-256-ecb" ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext}
|
|
n=$((ciphertext_len/32))
|
|
mod_check=$((ciphertext_len%32))
|
|
[[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n+=1
|
|
|
|
# generate keystream
|
|
s="$(generate-ccm-counter-blocks "$nonce" "$n" | $OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
|
|
# The first 16-bytes of the keystream ($s) are used to decrypt the
|
|
# authentication tag and the remaining bytes are used to decrypt the
|
|
# ciphertext.
|
|
s0="${s:0:32}"
|
|
s="${s:32}"
|
|
|
|
# XOR the ciphertext with the keystream ($s). For efficiency, work in blocks
|
|
# of 16 bytes at a time (but with each XOR operation working on 32 bits.
|
|
[[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n=$((n-1))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < n; i++ )); do
|
|
i1=$((32*i)); i2=$((i1+8)); i3=$((i1+16)); i4=$((i1+24))
|
|
plaintext+="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:8} ^ 0x${s:i1:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i2:8} ^ 0x${s:i2:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i3:8} ^ 0x${s:i3:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i4:8} ^ 0x${s:i4:8}))")"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# If the length of the ciphertext is not an even multiple of 16 bytes, then handle the final incomplete block.
|
|
if [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
i1=$((32*n))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < mod_check; i+=2 )); do
|
|
plaintext+="$(printf "%02X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:2} ^ 0x${s:i1:2}))")"
|
|
i1+=2
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
tag_len=${#enciphered_expected_tag}
|
|
|
|
# Decrypt the authentication tag that was provided with the message
|
|
if [[ $tag_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
expected_tag="$(printf "%08X%08X" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:0:8} ^ 0x${s0:0:8}))" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:8:8} ^ 0x${s0:8:8}))")"
|
|
elif [[ $tag_len -eq 32 ]]; then
|
|
expected_tag="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:0:8} ^ 0x${s0:0:8}))" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:8:8} ^ 0x${s0:8:8}))" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:16:8} ^ 0x${s0:16:8}))" "$((0x${enciphered_expected_tag:24:8} ^ 0x${s0:24:8}))")"
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# obtain the actual authentication tag for the decrypted message
|
|
computed_tag="$(ccm-compute-tag "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$aad" "$plaintext" "$tag_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$compute_tag" || [[ "$computed_tag" == $expected_tag ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: AES-CCM TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: plaintext
|
|
# arg5: additional authenticated data
|
|
# See Section 6.1 of NIST SP 800-38C
|
|
ccm-encrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" nonce="$3" plaintext="$4" aad="$5"
|
|
local -i tag_len
|
|
local ossl_cipher="-aes-128-ecb"
|
|
local ciphertext="" tag encrypted_tag
|
|
local -i i i1 i2 i3 i4
|
|
local -i plaintext_len n mod_check
|
|
local s s0
|
|
|
|
[[ ${#nonce} -ne 24 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) tag_len=32 ;;
|
|
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) tag_len=16 ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# compute the authentication tag
|
|
tag="$(ccm-compute-tag "$ossl_cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$aad" "$plaintext" "$tag_len")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
plaintext_len=${#plaintext}
|
|
n=$((plaintext_len/32))
|
|
mod_check=$((plaintext_len%32))
|
|
[[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n+=1
|
|
|
|
# generate keystream
|
|
s="$(generate-ccm-counter-blocks "$nonce" "$n" | $OPENSSL enc "$ossl_cipher" -K "$key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
|
|
# encrypt the authentication tag using the first 16 bytes of the keystrem ($s)
|
|
if [[ $tag_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
encrypted_tag="$(printf "%08X%08X" "$((0x${tag:0:8} ^ 0x${s:0:8}))" "$((0x${tag:8:8} ^ 0x${s:8:8}))")"
|
|
elif [[ $tag_len -eq 32 ]]; then
|
|
encrypted_tag="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${tag:0:8} ^ 0x${s:0:8}))" "$((0x${tag:8:8} ^ 0x${s:8:8}))" "$((0x${tag:16:8} ^ 0x${s:16:8}))" "$((0x${tag:24:8} ^ 0x${s:24:8}))")"
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# XOR the plaintext with the keystream ($s). For efficiency, work in blocks
|
|
# of 16 bytes at a time (but with each XOR operation working on 32 bits.
|
|
s="${s:32}"
|
|
[[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n=$((n-1))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < n; i++ )); do
|
|
i1=$((32*i)); i2=$((i1+8)); i3=$((i1+16)); i4=$((i1+24))
|
|
ciphertext+="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${plaintext:i1:8} ^ 0x${s:i1:8}))" "$((0x${plaintext:i2:8} ^ 0x${s:i2:8}))" "$((0x${plaintext:i3:8} ^ 0x${s:i3:8}))" "$((0x${plaintext:i4:8} ^ 0x${s:i4:8}))")"
|
|
done
|
|
# If the length of the plaintext is not an even multiple of 16 bytes, then handle the final incomplete block.
|
|
if [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
i1=$((32*n))
|
|
for (( i=0; i < mod_check; i+=2 )); do
|
|
ciphertext+="$(printf "%02X" "$((0x${plaintext:i1:2} ^ 0x${s:i1:2}))")"
|
|
i1+=2
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$ciphertext$encrypted_tag"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This function is based on gcm_mult in https://github.com/mko-x/SharedAES-GCM
|
|
# args 1-16: HL from gcm_ctx
|
|
# args 17-32: HH from gcm_ctx
|
|
# args 33-48: x - the input vector
|
|
gcm_mult() {
|
|
local -a gcm_ctx_hl=( "$1" "$2" "$3" "$4" "$5" "$6" "$7" "$8" "$9" "${10}" "${11}" "${12}" "${13}" "${14}" "${15}" "${16}" )
|
|
local -a gcm_ctx_hh=( "${17}" "${18}" "${19}" "${20}" "${21}" "${22}" "${23}" "${24}" "${25}" "${26}" "${27}" "${28}" "${29}" "${30}" "${31}" "${32}" )
|
|
local -a x=( "${33}" "${34}" "${35}" "${36}" "${37}" "${38}" "${39}" "${40}" "${41}" "${42}" "${43}" "${44}" "${45}" "${46}" "${47}" "${48}" )
|
|
local output
|
|
local -i i lo hi rem zh zl
|
|
local -r -a -i last4=(0x0000 0x1c20 0x3840 0x2460 0x7080 0x6ca0 0x48c0 0x54e0 0xe100 0xfd20 0xd940 0xc560 0x9180 0x8da0 0xa9c0 0xb5e0)
|
|
|
|
lo=$((0x${x[15]} & 0x0F))
|
|
hi=$((0x${x[15]} >> 4))
|
|
zh=0x${gcm_ctx_hh[$lo]}
|
|
zl=0x${gcm_ctx_hl[$lo]}
|
|
|
|
for (( i=15; i >=0; i=i-1 )); do
|
|
lo=$((0x${x[i]} & 0x0F))
|
|
hi=$((0x${x[i]} >> 4))
|
|
if [[ $i -ne 15 ]]; then
|
|
rem=$((zl & 0x0F))
|
|
zl=$(((zl >> 4) & 0x0fffffffffffffff))
|
|
zl=$(((zh << 60) | zl))
|
|
zh=$(((zh >> 4) & 0x0fffffffffffffff))
|
|
zh=$((zh^(last4[rem] << 48)))
|
|
zh=$((zh^0x${gcm_ctx_hh[$lo]}))
|
|
zl=$((zl^0x${gcm_ctx_hl[$lo]}))
|
|
fi
|
|
rem=$((zl & 0x0F))
|
|
zl=$(((zl >> 4) & 0x0fffffffffffffff))
|
|
zl=$(((zh << 60) | zl))
|
|
zh=$(((zh >> 4) & 0x0fffffffffffffff))
|
|
zh=$((zh^(last4[rem] << 48)))
|
|
zh=$((zh^0x${gcm_ctx_hh[$hi]}))
|
|
zl=$((zl^0x${gcm_ctx_hl[$hi]}))
|
|
done
|
|
output="$(printf "%016X" $zh)$(printf "%016X" $zl)"
|
|
tm_out "${output:0:2} ${output:2:2} ${output:4:2} ${output:6:2} ${output:8:2} ${output:10:2} ${output:12:2} ${output:14:2} ${output:16:2} ${output:18:2} ${output:20:2} ${output:22:2} ${output:24:2} ${output:26:2} ${output:28:2} ${output:30:2}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: nonce (must be 96 bits)
|
|
# arg2: number of blocks needed for plaintext/ciphertext
|
|
# Generate the sequence of counter blocks, which are to be encrypted and then
|
|
# XORed with either the plaintext or the ciphertext. The first block that is
|
|
# encrypted is used in computing the authentication tag.
|
|
generate_gcm_ctr() {
|
|
local -i nr_blocks="$1"
|
|
local nonce="$2"
|
|
local -i i
|
|
local ctr=""
|
|
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= nr_blocks; i++ )); do
|
|
ctr+="${nonce}$(printf "%08X" "$i")"
|
|
done
|
|
hex2binary "$ctr"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: an OpenSSL ecb cipher (e.g., -aes-128-ecb)
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: ciphertext
|
|
# arg5: aad
|
|
# arg6: mode
|
|
# arg7: true if authentication tag should be computed. false otherwise.
|
|
# This function is based on gcm_setkey, gcm_start, gcm_update, and gcm_finish
|
|
# in https://github.com/mko-x/SharedAES-GCM
|
|
gcm() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" aes_key="$2" nonce="$3" input="$4" aad="$5" mode="$6"
|
|
local compute_tag="$7"
|
|
local -a -i gcm_ctx_hl=(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0)
|
|
local -a -i gcm_ctx_hh=(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0)
|
|
local -a -i tag
|
|
local -a gcm_ctx_buf=("00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" "00" )
|
|
local -i i j hi lo vl vh t length
|
|
local h hl="" hh="" buf ectr base_ectr tmp
|
|
local -i input_len="$((${#input}/2))" aad_len="$((${#aad}/2))" use_len
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
# gcm_setkey - populate HL and HH from gcm_ctx
|
|
h+=$(printf "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"| \
|
|
$OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$aes_key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')
|
|
hi=0x${h:0:8}
|
|
lo=0x${h:8:8}
|
|
vh=$(((hi << 32) | lo))
|
|
|
|
hi=0x${h:16:8}
|
|
lo=0x${h:24:8}
|
|
vl=$(((hi << 32) | lo))
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx_hl[8]=$vl
|
|
gcm_ctx_hh[8]=$vh
|
|
gcm_ctx_hh[0]=0
|
|
gcm_ctx_hl[0]=0
|
|
|
|
for (( i=4; i > 0; i=i>>1 )); do
|
|
t=$(((vl & 1) * 0xe1000000))
|
|
vl=$(((vl >> 1) & 0x7fffffffffffffff))
|
|
vl=$(((vh << 63) | vl))
|
|
vh=$(((vh >> 1) & 0x7fffffffffffffff))
|
|
vh=$((vh ^ (t << 32)))
|
|
gcm_ctx_hl[i]=$vl
|
|
gcm_ctx_hh[i]=$vh
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for (( i=2; i < 16; i=i<<1 )); do
|
|
vh=${gcm_ctx_hh[i]}
|
|
vl=${gcm_ctx_hl[i]}
|
|
for (( j=1; j < i; j++ )); do
|
|
gcm_ctx_hh[$((i+j))]=$((vh ^ gcm_ctx_hh[j]))
|
|
gcm_ctx_hl[$((i+j))]=$((vl ^ gcm_ctx_hl[j]))
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# place HL and HH in strings so that can be passed to gcm_mult
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
hl+="$(printf "%016X" ${gcm_ctx_hl[i]}) "
|
|
hh+="$(printf "%016X" ${gcm_ctx_hh[i]}) "
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Feed any additional authenticated data into the computation for the authentication tag.
|
|
for (( i=0; i < aad_len; i+=use_len )); do
|
|
[[ $((aad_len-i)) -lt 16 ]] && use_len=$((aad_len-i)) || use_len=16
|
|
for (( j=0; j < use_len; j++ )); do
|
|
gcm_ctx_buf[j]="$(printf "%02X" $((0x${gcm_ctx_buf[j]} ^ 0x${aad:$((2*i+2*j)):2})))"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
buf="$(gcm_mult $hl $hh ${gcm_ctx_buf[0]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[1]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[2]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[3]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[4]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[5]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[6]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[7]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[8]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[9]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[10]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[11]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[12]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[13]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[14]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[15]})"
|
|
read -r gcm_ctx_buf[0] gcm_ctx_buf[1] gcm_ctx_buf[2] gcm_ctx_buf[3] gcm_ctx_buf[4] gcm_ctx_buf[5] gcm_ctx_buf[6] gcm_ctx_buf[7] gcm_ctx_buf[8] gcm_ctx_buf[9] gcm_ctx_buf[10] gcm_ctx_buf[11] gcm_ctx_buf[12] gcm_ctx_buf[13] gcm_ctx_buf[14] gcm_ctx_buf[15] <<< "$buf"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
j=$((1 + input_len/16))
|
|
[[ $((input_len%16)) -ne 0 ]] && j+=1
|
|
ectr="$(generate_gcm_ctr "$j" "$nonce" | $OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$aes_key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
base_ectr="${ectr:0:32}"
|
|
ectr="${ectr:32}"
|
|
|
|
# gcm_update
|
|
# Encrypt or decrypt the input and feed the ciphertext into the computation for the authentication tag.
|
|
for (( length=input_len; length > 0; length=length-use_len )); do
|
|
[[ $length -lt 16 ]] && use_len=$length || use_len=16
|
|
|
|
if [[ $use_len -eq 16 ]]; then
|
|
tmp="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${ectr:0:8} ^ 0x${input:0:8}))" "$((0x${ectr:8:8} ^ 0x${input:8:8}))" "$((0x${ectr:16:8} ^ 0x${input:16:8}))" "$((0x${ectr:24:8} ^ 0x${input:24:8}))")"
|
|
else
|
|
tmp=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < use_len; i++ )); do
|
|
tmp+="$(printf "%02X" $((0x${ectr:$((2*i)):2} ^ 0x${input:$((2*i)):2})))"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
output+="$tmp"
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
[[ $mode == decrypt ]] && tmp="${input:0:32}"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < use_len; i++ )); do
|
|
gcm_ctx_buf[i]="$(printf "%02X" $((0x${gcm_ctx_buf[i]} ^ 0x${tmp:$((2*i)):2})))"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
ectr="${ectr:32}"
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
tmp="$(gcm_mult $hl $hh ${gcm_ctx_buf[0]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[1]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[2]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[3]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[4]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[5]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[6]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[7]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[8]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[9]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[10]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[11]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[12]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[13]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[14]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[15]})"
|
|
read -r gcm_ctx_buf[0] gcm_ctx_buf[1] gcm_ctx_buf[2] gcm_ctx_buf[3] gcm_ctx_buf[4] gcm_ctx_buf[5] gcm_ctx_buf[6] gcm_ctx_buf[7] gcm_ctx_buf[8] gcm_ctx_buf[9] gcm_ctx_buf[10] gcm_ctx_buf[11] gcm_ctx_buf[12] gcm_ctx_buf[13] gcm_ctx_buf[14] gcm_ctx_buf[15] <<< "$tmp"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
input="${input:$((2*use_len))}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
# gcm_finish - feed the lengths of the ciphertext and additional authenticated data
|
|
# into the computation for the authentication tag.
|
|
input_len=$((8*input_len))
|
|
aad_len=$((8*aad_len))
|
|
output+=" "
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
tag[i]=0x${base_ectr:$((2*i)):2}
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $input_len -ne 0 ]] || [[ $aad_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
buf="$(printf "%016X" $aad_len)$(printf "%016X" $input_len)"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
gcm_ctx_buf[i]="$(printf "%02X" $((0x${gcm_ctx_buf[i]} ^ 0x${buf:$((2*i)):2})))"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
buf="$(gcm_mult $hl $hh ${gcm_ctx_buf[0]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[1]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[2]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[3]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[4]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[5]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[6]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[7]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[8]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[9]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[10]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[11]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[12]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[13]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[14]} ${gcm_ctx_buf[15]})"
|
|
read -r gcm_ctx_buf[0] gcm_ctx_buf[1] gcm_ctx_buf[2] gcm_ctx_buf[3] gcm_ctx_buf[4] gcm_ctx_buf[5] gcm_ctx_buf[6] gcm_ctx_buf[7] gcm_ctx_buf[8] gcm_ctx_buf[9] gcm_ctx_buf[10] gcm_ctx_buf[11] gcm_ctx_buf[12] gcm_ctx_buf[13] gcm_ctx_buf[14] gcm_ctx_buf[15] <<< "$buf"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
tag[i]=$((tag[i] ^ 0x${gcm_ctx_buf[i]}))
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 16; i++ )); do
|
|
output+="$(printf "%02X" ${tag[i]})"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
tm_out "$output"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: AES-GCM TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: ciphertext
|
|
# arg5: aad
|
|
# arg6: expected tag
|
|
# arg7: true if authentication tag should be checked. false otherwise.
|
|
gcm-decrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" nonce="$3" ciphertext="$4" aad="$5" expected_tag="$(toupper "$6")"
|
|
local compute_tag="$7"
|
|
local plaintext computed_tag tmp
|
|
|
|
[[ ${#nonce} -ne 24 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ]] && "$HAS_AES128_GCM" && ! "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
plaintext="$(hex2binary "$ciphertext" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -aes-128-gcm -K "$key" -iv "$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ]] && "$HAS_AES256_GCM" && ! "$compute_tag"; then
|
|
plaintext="$(hex2binary "$ciphertext" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -aes-256-gcm -K "$key" -iv "$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*AES_128*) cipher="-aes-128-ecb" ;;
|
|
*AES_256*) cipher="-aes-256-ecb" ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
tmp="$(gcm "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$ciphertext" "$aad" "decrypt" "$compute_tag")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
computed_tag="${tmp##* }"
|
|
plaintext="${tmp% $computed_tag}"
|
|
|
|
if ! "$compute_tag" || [[ "$computed_tag" == $expected_tag ]]; then
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: AES-GCM TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: plaintext
|
|
# arg5: aad
|
|
# See Section 7.2 of SP 800-38D
|
|
gcm-encrypt() {
|
|
local cipher
|
|
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
*AES_128*) cipher="-aes-128-ecb" ;;
|
|
*AES_256*) cipher="-aes-256-ecb" ;;
|
|
*) return 7
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ ${#3} -ne 24 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$(gcm "$cipher" "$2" "$3" "$4" "$5" "encrypt" true)"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: ciphertext
|
|
# arg5: additional authenticated data
|
|
sym-decrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1"
|
|
local key="$2" nonce="$3"
|
|
local ciphertext="$4"
|
|
local additional_data="$5"
|
|
local plaintext
|
|
local -i ciphertext_len tag_len
|
|
local compute_tag=false
|
|
|
|
case "$cipher" in
|
|
*CCM_8*)
|
|
tag_len=16 ;;
|
|
*CCM*|*GCM*|*CHACHA20_POLY1305*)
|
|
tag_len=32 ;;
|
|
*)
|
|
return 7 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# The final $tag_len characters of the ciphertext are the authentication tag
|
|
ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext}
|
|
[[ $ciphertext_len -lt $tag_len ]] && return 7
|
|
ciphertext_len=$((ciphertext_len-tag_len))
|
|
|
|
# In general there is no need to verify that the authentication tag is correct
|
|
# when decrypting, and performing the check is time consuming when the
|
|
# computations are performed in Bash. If the ciphertext is very long (e.g.,
|
|
# some application data), then trying to compute the authentication tag is
|
|
# too time consuming even for debug mode.
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && [[ $ciphertext_len -le 1024 ]] && compute_tag=true
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20_POLY1305 ]]; then
|
|
plaintext="$(chacha20_aead_decrypt "$key" "$nonce" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" "$additional_data" "${ciphertext:ciphertext_len:tag_len}" "$compute_tag")"
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" =~ CCM ]]; then
|
|
plaintext=$(ccm-decrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" "$additional_data" "${ciphertext:ciphertext_len:tag_len}" "$compute_tag")
|
|
else # GCM
|
|
plaintext=$(gcm-decrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" "$additional_data" "${ciphertext:ciphertext_len:tag_len}" "$compute_tag")
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$plaintext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS cipher
|
|
# arg2: key
|
|
# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length)
|
|
# arg4: plaintext
|
|
# arg5: additional authenticated data
|
|
sym-encrypt() {
|
|
local cipher="$1" key="$2" nonce="$3" plaintext="$4" additional_data="$5"
|
|
local ciphertext=""
|
|
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" =~ CCM ]]; then
|
|
ciphertext=$(ccm-encrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$plaintext" "$additional_data")
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" =~ GCM ]]; then
|
|
ciphertext=$(gcm-encrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "$plaintext" "$additional_data")
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20_POLY1305 ]]; then
|
|
ciphertext="$(chacha20_aead_encrypt "$key" "$nonce" "$plaintext" "$additional_data")"
|
|
else
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_spaces "$ciphertext")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: iv
|
|
# arg2: sequence number
|
|
get-nonce() {
|
|
local iv="$1"
|
|
local -i seq_num="$2"
|
|
local -i len lsb
|
|
local msb nonce
|
|
|
|
len=${#iv}
|
|
[[ $len -lt 8 ]] && return 7
|
|
i=$len-8
|
|
msb="${iv:0:i}"
|
|
lsb="0x${iv:i:8}"
|
|
nonce="${msb}$(printf "%08X" "$((lsb ^ seq_num))")"
|
|
tm_out "$nonce"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return:
|
|
# 0 if arg1 contains the entire server response.
|
|
# 1 if arg1 does not contain the entire server response.
|
|
# 2 if the response is malformed.
|
|
# 3 if (a) the response version is TLSv1.3;
|
|
# (b) arg1 contains the entire ServerHello (and appears to contain the entire response);
|
|
# (c) the entire response is supposed to be parsed; and
|
|
# (d) the key and IV have not been provided to decrypt the response.
|
|
# arg1: ASCII-HEX encoded reply
|
|
# arg2: whether to process the full request ("all") or just the basic request plus the ephemeral key if any ("ephemeralkey").
|
|
# arg3: TLS cipher for decrypting TLSv1.3 response
|
|
# arg4: handshake secret
|
|
# arg5: message transcript (up through ServerHello)
|
|
check_tls_serverhellodone() {
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii="$1"
|
|
local process_full="$2"
|
|
local cipher="$3"
|
|
local handshake_secret="$4"
|
|
local msg_transcript="$5"
|
|
local tls_handshake_ascii="" tls_alert_ascii=""
|
|
local -i i tls_hello_ascii_len tls_handshake_ascii_len tls_alert_ascii_len
|
|
local -i msg_len remaining tls_serverhello_ascii_len sid_len
|
|
local -i j offset tls_extensions_len extension_len
|
|
local tls_content_type tls_protocol tls_msg_type extension_type
|
|
local tls_err_level
|
|
local hash_fn handshake_traffic_keys key="" iv="" finished_key=""
|
|
local -i seq_num=0 plaintext_len
|
|
local plaintext decrypted_response="" additional_data
|
|
local include_headers=true
|
|
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$handshake_secret" ]]; then
|
|
handshake_traffic_keys="$(derive-handshake-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$handshake_secret" "$msg_transcript" "server")"
|
|
read -r key iv finished_key <<< "$handshake_traffic_keys"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$tls_hello_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
return 0 # no server hello received
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii}
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_hello_ascii_len; i+=msg_len )); do
|
|
remaining=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $remaining -lt 10 ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
tls_content_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
case "$tls_content_type" in
|
|
14|15|16|17) ;;
|
|
*) return 2 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
i+=2
|
|
tls_protocol="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
[[ -z "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol"
|
|
[[ "${tls_protocol:0:2}" != 03 ]] && return 2
|
|
i+=4
|
|
additional_data="$tls_content_type$tls_protocol${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}")
|
|
i+=4
|
|
remaining=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $msg_len -gt $remaining ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_content_type" == 16 ]]; then
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii+="${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}
|
|
decrypted_response+="$tls_content_type$tls_protocol$(printf "%04X" $((msg_len/2)))${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
# the ServerHello MUST be the first handshake message
|
|
[[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge 2 ]] && [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}" != 02 ]] && return 2
|
|
if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge 12 ]]; then
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="${tls_handshake_ascii:8:4}"
|
|
|
|
# In TLSv1.3 (starting with draft 22), the version field specifies TLSv1.2, but
|
|
# there is a supported_versions extension that specifies the actual version. So,
|
|
# if the version field specifies TLSv1.2, then check to see if there is a
|
|
# supported_versions extension.
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:76:2}")
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -gt 76+$sid_len ]]; then
|
|
# ServerHello contains extensions, so check for supported_versions extension
|
|
offset=84+$sid_len
|
|
tls_extensions_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
[[ $tls_extensions_len -ne $tls_serverhello_ascii_len-$sid_len-80 ]] && return 2
|
|
for (( j=0; j<tls_extensions_len; j+=8+extension_len )); do
|
|
[[ $tls_extensions_len-$j -lt 8 ]] && return 2
|
|
offset=88+$sid_len+$j
|
|
extension_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
offset=92+$sid_len+$j
|
|
extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
[[ $extension_len -gt $tls_extensions_len-$j-8 ]] && return 2
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == 002B ]]; then # supported_versions
|
|
[[ $extension_len -ne 4 ]] && return 2
|
|
offset=96+$sid_len+$j
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# A version of {0x7F, xx} represents an implementation of a draft version of TLS 1.3
|
|
if [[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]]; then
|
|
[[ 0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=0304
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -ge 0x0304 ]] && [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge $tls_serverhello_ascii_len+8 ]]; then
|
|
tm_out ""
|
|
return 0 # The entire ServerHello message has been received (and the rest isn't needed)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_content_type" == 15 ]]; then # TLS ALERT
|
|
tls_alert_ascii+="${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
decrypted_response+="$tls_content_type$tls_protocol$(printf "%04X" $((msg_len/2)))${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_content_type" == 17 ]] && [[ -n "$key" ]]; then # encrypted data
|
|
# The header information was added to additional data in TLSv1.3 draft 25.
|
|
"$include_headers" || additional_data=""
|
|
nonce="$(get-nonce "$iv" "$seq_num")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 2
|
|
plaintext="$(sym-decrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" "$additional_data")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 2
|
|
seq_num+=1
|
|
|
|
# Remove zeros from end of plaintext, if any
|
|
plaintext_len=${#plaintext}-2
|
|
while [[ "${plaintext:plaintext_len:2}" == 00 ]]; do
|
|
plaintext_len=$plaintext_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
tls_content_type="${plaintext:plaintext_len:2}"
|
|
decrypted_response+="${tls_content_type}0301$(printf "%04X" $((plaintext_len/2)))${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}"
|
|
case "$tls_content_type" in
|
|
15) tls_alert_ascii+="${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}" ;;
|
|
16) tls_handshake_ascii+="${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}" ;;
|
|
*) return 2 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# If there is a fatal alert, then we are done.
|
|
tls_alert_ascii_len=${#tls_alert_ascii}
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_alert_ascii_len; i+=4 )); do
|
|
remaining=$tls_alert_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $remaining -lt 4 ]] && return 1
|
|
tls_err_level=${tls_alert_ascii:i:2} # 1: warning, 2: fatal
|
|
[[ $tls_err_level == 02 ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" && tm_out "" && return 0
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# If there is a serverHelloDone or Finished, then we are done.
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_handshake_ascii_len; i+=msg_len )); do
|
|
remaining=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $remaining -lt 8 ]] && return 1
|
|
tls_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:6}")
|
|
i+=6
|
|
remaining=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i
|
|
[[ $msg_len -gt $remaining ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
# The ServerHello has already been added to $msg_transcript,
|
|
# but all other handshake messages need to be added.
|
|
if [[ -n "$key" ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" != 02 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 14 ]]; then
|
|
# Check the Finished message
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha256"
|
|
[[ $msg_len -eq 64 ]] || return 2
|
|
elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
hash_fn="-sha384"
|
|
[[ $msg_len -eq 96 ]] || return 2
|
|
else
|
|
return 2
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}" != $(hmac-transcript "$hash_fn" "$finished_key" "$msg_transcript") ]] && \
|
|
return 2
|
|
fi
|
|
msg_transcript+="$tls_msg_type${tls_handshake_ascii:$((i-6)):6}${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# For SSLv3 - TLS1.2 look for a ServerHelloDone message.
|
|
# For TLS 1.3 look for a Finished message.
|
|
[[ $tls_msg_type == 0E ]] && tm_out "" && return 0
|
|
[[ $tls_msg_type == 14 ]] && tm_out "$msg_transcript $decrypted_response" && return 0
|
|
done
|
|
# If the response is TLSv1.3 and the full response is to be processed, but the
|
|
# key and IV have not been provided to decrypt the response, then return 3 if
|
|
# the entire ServerHello has been received.
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0304 ]] && [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && \
|
|
[[ -z "$handshake_secret" ]] && [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
return 3
|
|
fi
|
|
# If we haven't encountered a fatal alert or a server hello done,
|
|
# then there must be more data to retrieve.
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: tls alert error/warning code
|
|
# returns: description
|
|
tls_alert() {
|
|
local tls_alert_text=""
|
|
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
00) tls_alert_text="close notify" ;;
|
|
0A) tls_alert_text="unexpected message" ;;
|
|
14) tls_alert_text="bad record mac" ;;
|
|
15) tls_alert_text="decryption failed" ;;
|
|
16) tls_alert_text="record overflow" ;;
|
|
1E) tls_alert_text="decompression failure" ;;
|
|
28) tls_alert_text="handshake failure" ;;
|
|
29) tls_alert_text="no certificate RESERVED" ;;
|
|
2A) tls_alert_text="bad certificate" ;;
|
|
2B) tls_alert_text="unsupported certificate" ;;
|
|
2C) tls_alert_text="certificate revoked" ;;
|
|
2D) tls_alert_text="certificate expired" ;;
|
|
2E) tls_alert_text="certificate unknown" ;;
|
|
2F) tls_alert_text="illegal parameter" ;;
|
|
30) tls_alert_text="unknown ca" ;;
|
|
31) tls_alert_text="access denied" ;;
|
|
32) tls_alert_text="decode error" ;;
|
|
33) tls_alert_text="decrypt error" ;;
|
|
3C) tls_alert_text="export restriction RESERVED" ;;
|
|
46) tls_alert_text="protocol version" ;;
|
|
47) tls_alert_text="insufficient security" ;;
|
|
50) tls_alert_text="internal error" ;;
|
|
56) tls_alert_text="inappropriate fallback" ;;
|
|
5A) tls_alert_text="user canceled" ;;
|
|
64) tls_alert_text="no renegotiation" ;;
|
|
6D) tls_alert_text="missing extension" ;;
|
|
6E) tls_alert_text="unsupported extension" ;;
|
|
6F) tls_alert_text="certificate unobtainable" ;;
|
|
70) tls_alert_text="unrecognized name" ;;
|
|
71) tls_alert_text="bad certificate status response" ;;
|
|
72) tls_alert_text="bad certificate hash value" ;;
|
|
73) tls_alert_text="unknown psk identity" ;;
|
|
74) tls_alert_text="certificate required" ;;
|
|
78) tls_alert_text="no application protocol" ;;
|
|
*) tls_alert_text="$(hex2dec "$1")";;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo "$tls_alert_text"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: ASCII-HEX encoded reply
|
|
# arg2: (optional): "all" or "all+" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages)
|
|
# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any)
|
|
# arg3: (optional): CIPHER_SUITES string (lowercase, and in the format output by code2network())
|
|
# If present, parse_tls_serverhello() will check that the cipher in the ServerHello appears in
|
|
# the CIPHER_SUITES string.
|
|
parse_tls_serverhello() {
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii="$1"
|
|
local process_full="$2"
|
|
local cipherlist="$3"
|
|
local tls_handshake_ascii="" tls_alert_ascii=""
|
|
local -i tls_hello_ascii_len tls_handshake_ascii_len tls_alert_ascii_len msg_len
|
|
local tls_serverhello_ascii="" tls_certificate_ascii=""
|
|
local tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="" tls_certificate_status_ascii=""
|
|
local tls_encryptedextensions_ascii="" tls_revised_certificate_msg=""
|
|
local -i tls_serverhello_ascii_len=0 tls_certificate_ascii_len=0
|
|
local -i tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=0 tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=0
|
|
local -i tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=0
|
|
local added_encrypted_extensions=false
|
|
local tls_alert_descrip tls_sid_len_hex issuerDN subjectDN CAissuerDN CAsubjectDN
|
|
local -i tls_sid_len offset extns_offset nr_certs=0
|
|
local tls_msg_type tls_content_type tls_protocol tls_protocol2 tls_hello_time
|
|
local tls_err_level tls_err_descr_no tls_cipher_suite rfc_cipher_suite tls_compression_method
|
|
local tls_extensions="" extension_type named_curve_str="" named_curve_oid
|
|
local cert_compression_method="" cert_compression_method_str=""
|
|
local -i i j extension_len extn_len tls_extensions_len ocsp_response_len=0 ocsp_response_list_len ocsp_resp_offset
|
|
local -i certificate_list_len certificate_len cipherlist_len
|
|
local -i curve_type named_curve
|
|
local -i dh_bits=0 msb mask
|
|
local hostcert_issuer=""
|
|
local len1 len2 len3 key_bitstring="" pem_certificate
|
|
local dh_p dh_param ephemeral_param rfc7919_param
|
|
local -i dh_p_len dh_param_len
|
|
local peering_signing_digest=0 peer_signature_type=0
|
|
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=""
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && echo > $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo $tls_hello_ascii # one line without any blanks
|
|
|
|
# Client messages, including handshake messages, are carried by the record layer.
|
|
# First, extract the handshake and alert messages.
|
|
# see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_record
|
|
# byte 0: content type: 0x14=CCS, 0x15=TLS alert x16=Handshake, 0x17 Application, 0x18=HB
|
|
# byte 1+2: TLS version word, major is 03, minor 00=SSL3, 01=TLS1 02=TLS1.1 03=TLS 1.2
|
|
# byte 3+4: fragment length
|
|
# bytes 5...: message fragment
|
|
tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii}
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "TLS message fragments:"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_hello_ascii_len; i+=msg_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len-$i -lt 10 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
# The entire server response should have been retrieved.
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
# This could just be a result of the server's response being
|
|
# split across two or more packets.
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_content_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
tls_protocol="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
i+=4
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}")
|
|
i+=4
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo " protocol (rec. layer): 0x$tls_protocol"
|
|
echo -n " tls_content_type: 0x$tls_content_type"
|
|
case $tls_content_type in
|
|
14) tmln_out " (change cipher spec)" ;;
|
|
15) tmln_out " (alert)" ;;
|
|
16) tmln_out " (handshake)" ;;
|
|
17) tmln_out " (application data)" ;;
|
|
*) tmln_out ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo " msg_len: $((msg_len/2))"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$do_starttls" ; then
|
|
if [[ $tls_content_type == 35 ]] || [[ $tls_content_type == 34 ]]; then
|
|
# STARTTLS handshake failed and server replied plaintext with a 5xx or 4xx
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && printf "%s\n" "400/500: $(hex2ascii "$tls_hello_ascii" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 4
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_hello_ascii" =~ 6130303220 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && printf "%s\n" "probably IMAP plaintext reply \"$(hex2ascii "${tls_hello_ascii:0:32}" 2>/dev/null)\""
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 3
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $tls_content_type != 14 ]] && [[ $tls_content_type != 15 ]] && \
|
|
[[ $tls_content_type != 16 ]] && [[ $tls_content_type != 17 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Content type other than alert, handshake, change cipher spec, or application data detected."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "${tls_protocol:0:2}" != 03 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Protocol record_version.major is not 03."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=$tls_protocol
|
|
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-$i ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 7
|
|
else
|
|
# This could just be a result of the server's response being split
|
|
# across two or more packets. Just grab the part that is available.
|
|
msg_len=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$tls_content_type" in
|
|
15) tls_alert_ascii="$tls_alert_ascii${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" ;;
|
|
16) tls_handshake_ascii="$tls_handshake_ascii${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Now check the alert messages.
|
|
tls_alert_ascii_len=${#tls_alert_ascii}
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ $tls_alert_ascii_len%4 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $tls_alert_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "CONNECTED(00000003)" > $TMPFILE
|
|
debugme echo "TLS alert messages:"
|
|
for (( i=0; i+3 < tls_alert_ascii_len; i+=4 )); do
|
|
tls_err_level=${tls_alert_ascii:i:2} # 1: warning, 2: fatal
|
|
j=$i+2
|
|
tls_err_descr_no=${tls_alert_ascii:j:2}
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tm_out " tls_err_descr_no: 0x${tls_err_descr_no} / = $(hex2dec ${tls_err_descr_no})"
|
|
tls_alert_descrip="$(tls_alert "$tls_err_descr_no")"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out " ($tls_alert_descrip)"
|
|
tm_out " tls_err_level: ${tls_err_level}"
|
|
fi
|
|
case $tls_err_level in
|
|
01) echo -n "warning " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
debugme tmln_out " (warning)" ;;
|
|
02) echo -n "fatal " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
debugme tmln_out " (fatal)" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo "alert $tls_alert_descrip" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_err_level" != 01 ]] && [[ "$tls_err_level" != 02 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Unexpected AlertLevel (0x$tls_err_level)."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_err_level" == 02 ]]; then
|
|
# Fatal alert
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now extract just the server hello, certificate, certificate status,
|
|
# and server key exchange handshake messages.
|
|
tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "TLS handshake messages:"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_handshake_ascii_len; i+=msg_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i -lt 8 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
# The entire server response should have been retrieved.
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
# This could just be a result of the server's response being
|
|
# split across two or more packets.
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
i+=2
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:6}")
|
|
i+=6
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tm_out " handshake type: 0x${tls_msg_type}"
|
|
case $tls_msg_type in
|
|
00) tmln_out " (hello_request)" ;;
|
|
01) tmln_out " (client_hello)" ;;
|
|
02) tmln_out " (server_hello)" ;;
|
|
03) tmln_out " (hello_verify_request)" ;;
|
|
04) tmln_out " (new_session_ticket)" ;;
|
|
05) tmln_out " (end_of_early_data)" ;;
|
|
06) tmln_out " (hello_retry_request)" ;;
|
|
08) tmln_out " (encrypted_extensions)" ;;
|
|
0B) tmln_out " (certificate)" ;;
|
|
0C) tmln_out " (server_key_exchange)" ;;
|
|
0D) tmln_out " (certificate_request)" ;;
|
|
0E) tmln_out " (server_hello_done)" ;;
|
|
0F) tmln_out " (certificate_verify)" ;;
|
|
10) tmln_out " (client_key_exchange)" ;;
|
|
14) tmln_out " (finished)" ;;
|
|
15) tmln_out " (certificate_url)" ;;
|
|
16) tmln_out " (certificate_status)" ;;
|
|
17) tmln_out " (supplemental_data)" ;;
|
|
18) tmln_out " (key_update)" ;;
|
|
19) tmln_out " (compressed_certificate)" ;;
|
|
FE) tmln_out " (message_hash)" ;;
|
|
*) tmln_out ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo " msg_len: $((msg_len/2))"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
# This could just be a result of the server's response being
|
|
# split across two or more packets. Just grab the part that
|
|
# is available.
|
|
msg_len=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 02 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_serverhello_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one ServerHello handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 08 ]]; then
|
|
# Add excrypted extensions (now decrypted) to end of extensions in ServerHello
|
|
tls_encryptedextensions_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -lt 2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained a malformed encrypted extensions message"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0B ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one Certificate handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
elif ( [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]] ) && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0C ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one ServerKeyExchange handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0F ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained malformed certificate_verify message."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# Extract just the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm from the CertificateVerify message.
|
|
peering_signing_digest="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}"
|
|
peer_signature_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:$((i+2)):2}"
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 16 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_status_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one certificate_status handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_certificate_status_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}"
|
|
tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=$msg_len
|
|
elif [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 19 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one Certificate handshake message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
cert_compression_method="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
case $cert_compression_method in
|
|
0001) cert_compression_method_str="ZLIB" ;;
|
|
0002) cert_compression_method_str="Brotli" ;;
|
|
0003) cert_compression_method_str="Zstandard" ;;
|
|
*) cert_compression_method_str="unrecognized" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out " Certificate Compression Algorithm: $cert_compression_method ($cert_compression_method_str)"
|
|
offset=$((i+4))
|
|
tmln_out " Uncompressed certificate length: $(printf "%d" 0x${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:6})"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"compress_certificate\" (id=27), len=0\n"
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && "$HAS_ZLIB" && [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:4}" == 0001 ]]; then
|
|
offset=$((i+4))
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii_len=2*0x${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:6}
|
|
offset=$((i+16))
|
|
len1=$((msg_len-16))
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii="$(hex2binary "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:len1}" | $OPENSSL zlib -d 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii="${tls_certificate_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
if [[ ${#tls_certificate_ascii} -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Length of uncompressed certificates did not match specified length."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "server hello empty, TCP connection closed"
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="closed TCP connection "
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1 # no server hello received
|
|
elif [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt 76 ]]; then
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="reply malformed"
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}" != 02 ]]; then
|
|
# the ServerHello MUST be the first handshake message
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="reply contained no ServerHello"
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "The first handshake protocol message is not a ServerHello."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $tls_alert_ascii_len -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "CONNECTED(00000003)" > $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
echo "CONNECTED(00000003)" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# First parse the server hello handshake message
|
|
# byte 0+1: 03, TLS version word see byte 1+2
|
|
# byte 2-5: TLS timestamp for OpenSSL <1.01f
|
|
# byte 6-33: random, 28 bytes
|
|
# byte 34: session id length
|
|
# byte 35+36+sid-len: cipher suite!
|
|
# byte 37+sid-len: compression method: 00: none, 01: deflate, 64: LZS
|
|
# byte 38+39+sid-len: extension length
|
|
tls_protocol2="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:4}"
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol2"
|
|
[[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304"
|
|
if [[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" != 03 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "server_version.major in ServerHello is not 03."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
tls_hello_time="${tls_serverhello_ascii:4:8}"
|
|
[[ "$TLS_DIFFTIME_SET" || "$DEBUG" ]] && TLS_TIME=$(hex2dec "$tls_hello_time")
|
|
tls_sid_len_hex="${tls_serverhello_ascii:68:2}"
|
|
tls_sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "$tls_sid_len_hex")
|
|
offset=$((tls_sid_len+70))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt 76+$tls_sid_len ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
offset=68
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tls_cipher_suite="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
offset=$((tls_sid_len+74))
|
|
tls_compression_method="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}"
|
|
extns_offset=$((tls_sid_len+76))
|
|
else
|
|
extns_offset=72
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -gt $extns_offset ]] && \
|
|
( [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]] || \
|
|
( [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]] && [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -gt "0x03" ]] ) ); then
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt $extns_offset+4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_extensions_len=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}")*2
|
|
if [[ $tls_extensions_len -ne $tls_serverhello_ascii_len-$extns_offset-4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i<tls_extensions_len; i+=8+extension_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_extensions_len-$i -lt 8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+i+4))
|
|
extension_type="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+i+8))
|
|
extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -gt $tls_extensions_len-$i-8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed response"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
|
|
case $extension_type in
|
|
0000) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server name\" (id=0), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0001) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"max fragment length\" (id=1), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0002) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client certificate URL\" (id=2), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0003) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"trusted CA keys\" (id=3, len=$extension_len\n)" ;;
|
|
0004) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"truncated HMAC\" (id=4), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0005) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"status request\" (id=5), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -gt 0 ]] && [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
# In TLSv1.3 the status_request extension contains the CertificateStatus message, unlike
|
|
# TLSv1.2 and below where CertificateStatus appears in its own handshake message. So, if
|
|
# the status_request extension is not empty, extract the value and place it in
|
|
# $tls_certificate_status_ascii.
|
|
tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=$extension_len
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
tls_certificate_status_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:tls_certificate_status_ascii_len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0006) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"user mapping\" (id=6), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0007) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client authz\" (id=7), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0008) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server authz\" (id=8), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0009) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cert type\" (id=9), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000A) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"supported_groups\" (id=10), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported groups extension."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -n "Supported groups: " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt $len1+4 ]] || [[ $len1 -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported groups extension."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((offset+4))
|
|
for (( j=0; j < len1; j+=4 )); do
|
|
[[ $j -ne 0 ]] && echo -n ", " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
case "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}" in
|
|
"0017") echo -n "secp256r1" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0018") echo -n "secp384r1" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0019") echo -n "secp521r1" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"001D") echo -n "X25519" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"001E") echo -n "X448" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0100") echo -n "ffdhe2048" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0101") echo -n "ffdhe3072" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0102") echo -n "ffdhe4096" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0103") echo -n "ffdhe6144" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
"0104") echo -n "ffdhe8192" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
*) echo -n "unknown (${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4})" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
offset=$((offset+4))
|
|
done
|
|
echo "" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
000B) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"EC point formats\" (id=11), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000C) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"SRP\" (id=12), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000D) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"signature algorithms\" (id=13), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000E) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"use SRTP\" (id=14), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
000F) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"heartbeat\" (id=15), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0010) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"application layer protocol negotiation\" (id=16), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -n "ALPN protocol: " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
j=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -ne $j+4 ]] || [[ $j -lt 2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((offset+4))
|
|
j=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -ne $j+6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((offset+2))
|
|
hex2binary "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:j}" >> "$TMPFILE"
|
|
echo "" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0011) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"certificate status version 2\" (id=17), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0012) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"signed certificate timestamps\" (id=18), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0013) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client certificate type\" (id=19), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0014) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server certificate type\" (id=20), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0015) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"TLS padding\" (id=21), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0016) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"encrypt-then-mac\" (id=22), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0017) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"extended master secret\" (id=23), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0018) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"token binding\" (id=24), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0019) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cached info\" (id=25), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0023) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"session ticket\" (id=35), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0028|0033)
|
|
# The key share extension was renumbered from 40 to 51 in TLSv1.3 draft 23 since a few
|
|
# implementations have been using 40 for the extended_random extension. Since the
|
|
# server's version may not yet have been determined, assume that both values represent the
|
|
# key share extension.
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == "00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" ]]; then
|
|
tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"key share\""
|
|
else
|
|
tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"unrecognized extension\""
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == 0028 ]]; then
|
|
tls_extensions+=" (id=40), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_extensions+=" (id=51), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed key share extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
named_curve=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+16+i))
|
|
msg_len=2*"$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")"
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -ne $extension_len-8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed key share extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
case $named_curve in
|
|
21) dh_bits=224 ; named_curve_str="P-224" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040021" ;;
|
|
23) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="P-256" ; named_curve_oid="06082a8648ce3d030107" ;;
|
|
24) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="P-384" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040022" ;;
|
|
25) dh_bits=521 ; named_curve_str="P-521" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040023" ;;
|
|
29) dh_bits=253 ; named_curve_str="X25519" ;;
|
|
30) dh_bits=448 ; named_curve_str="X448" ;;
|
|
256) dh_bits=2048 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe2048" ;;
|
|
257) dh_bits=3072 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe3072" ;;
|
|
258) dh_bits=4096 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe4096" ;;
|
|
259) dh_bits=6144 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe6144" ;;
|
|
260) dh_bits=8192 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe8192" ;;
|
|
*) named_curve_str="" ; named_curve_oid="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+20+i))
|
|
if ! "$HAS_PKEY"; then
|
|
# The key can't be extracted without the pkey utility.
|
|
key_bitstring=""
|
|
elif [[ $named_curve -eq 29 ]]; then
|
|
key_bitstring="302a300506032b656e032100${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
elif [[ $named_curve -eq 30 ]]; then
|
|
key_bitstring="3042300506032b656f033900${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
elif [[ $named_curve -lt 256 ]] && [[ -n "$named_curve_oid" ]]; then
|
|
len1="$(printf "%02x" $((msg_len/2+1)))"
|
|
[[ "0x${len1}" -ge "0x80" ]] && len1="81${len1}"
|
|
key_bitstring="03${len1}00${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
len2="$(printf "%02x" $((${#named_curve_oid}/2+9)))"
|
|
len3="$(printf "%02x" $((${#named_curve_oid}/2+${#key_bitstring}/2+11)))"
|
|
[[ "0x${len3}" -ge "0x80" ]] && len3="81${len3}"
|
|
key_bitstring="30${len3}30${len2}06072a8648ce3d0201${named_curve_oid}${key_bitstring}"
|
|
elif [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]] && [[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ "BEGIN" ]]; then
|
|
dh_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubout -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')"
|
|
|
|
# First is the length of the public-key SEQUENCE, and it is always encoded in four bytes (3082xxxx)
|
|
# Next is the length of the parameters SEQUENCE, and it is also always encoded in four bytes (3082xxxx)
|
|
dh_param_len=8+2*"$(hex2dec "${dh_param:12:4}")"
|
|
dh_param="${dh_param:8:dh_param_len}"
|
|
if [[ "0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}" -ge 0x80 ]]; then
|
|
key_bitstring="00${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
msg_len+=2
|
|
else
|
|
key_bitstring="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
len1="$(printf "%04x" $((msg_len/2)))"
|
|
key_bitstring="0282${len1}$key_bitstring"
|
|
len1="$(printf "%04x" $((${#key_bitstring}/2+1)))"
|
|
key_bitstring="${dh_param}0382${len1}00$key_bitstring"
|
|
len1="$(printf "%04x" $((${#key_bitstring}/2)))"
|
|
key_bitstring="3082${len1}$key_bitstring"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then
|
|
key_bitstring="$(hex2binary "$key_bitstring" | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -inform DER 2>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
if [[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$named_curve_str" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support $named_curve_str"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_warning "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support named curve $named_curve"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0029) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"pre-shared key\" (id=41), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002A) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"early data\" (id=42), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002B) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"supported versions\" (id=43), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -ne 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported versions extension."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
tls_protocol2="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}"
|
|
DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol2"
|
|
[[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304"
|
|
;;
|
|
002C) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cookie\" (id=44), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002D) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"psk key exchange modes\" (id=45), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002E) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"ticket early data info\" (id=46), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
002F) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"certificate authorities\" (id=47), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0030) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"oid filters\" (id=48), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
0031) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"post handshake auth\" (id=49), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
3374) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"next protocol\" (id=13172), len=$extension_len\n"
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
local -i protocol_len
|
|
echo -n "Protocols advertised by server: " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+12+i))
|
|
for (( j=0; j<extension_len; j+=protocol_len+2 )); do
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt $j+2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed next protocol extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
protocol_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}")
|
|
if [[ $extension_len -lt $j+$protocol_len+2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed next protocol extension."
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
offset=$((offset+2))
|
|
hex2binary "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:protocol_len}" >> "$TMPFILE"
|
|
offset=$((offset+protocol_len))
|
|
[[ $j+$protocol_len+2 -lt $extension_len ]] && echo -n ", " >> $TMPFILE
|
|
done
|
|
echo "" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
FF01) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"renegotiation info\" (id=65281), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
*) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"unrecognized extension\" (id=$(printf "%d\n\n" "0x$extension_type")), len=$extension_len\n" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# After processing all of the extensions in the ServerHello message,
|
|
# if it has been determined that the response is TLSv1.3 and the
|
|
# response was decrypted, then modify $tls_serverhello_ascii by adding
|
|
# the extensions from the EncryptedExtensions and Certificate messages
|
|
# and then process them.
|
|
if ! "$added_encrypted_extensions" && [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0304" ]] && \
|
|
[[ $((i+8+extension_len)) -eq $tls_extensions_len ]]; then
|
|
# Note that the encrypted extensions have been added so that
|
|
# the aren't added a second time.
|
|
added_encrypted_extensions=true
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len+=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len-4
|
|
tls_extensions_len+=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len-4
|
|
tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len/2-2
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+4))
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:extns_offset}$(printf "%04X" $((0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}+tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len)))${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset}${tls_encryptedextensions_ascii:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
# In TLS 1.3, the Certificate message begins with a zero length certificate_request_context.
|
|
# In addition, certificate_list is now a list of (certificate, extension) pairs rather than
|
|
# just certificates. So, extract the extensions and add them to $tls_serverhello_ascii and
|
|
# create a new $tls_certificate_ascii that only contains a list of certificates.
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${tls_certificate_ascii:0:2}" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -lt 8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
certificate_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
if [[ $certificate_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len-8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( j=8; j < tls_certificate_ascii_len; j+=extn_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$j -lt 6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:j:6}")
|
|
if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$j-6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
len1=$certificate_len+6
|
|
tls_revised_certificate_msg+="${tls_certificate_ascii:j:len1}"
|
|
j+=$len1
|
|
extn_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:j:4}")
|
|
j+=4
|
|
# TODO: Should only the extensions associated with the EE certificate be added to $tls_serverhello_ascii?
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii_len+=$extn_len
|
|
tls_extensions_len+=$extn_len
|
|
offset=$((extns_offset+4))
|
|
tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:extns_offset}$(printf "%04X" $(( 0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}+extn_len/2)) )${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset}${tls_certificate_ascii:j:extn_len}"
|
|
done
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii_len=${#tls_revised_certificate_msg}+6
|
|
tls_certificate_ascii="$(printf "%06X" $(( tls_certificate_ascii_len/2-3)) )$tls_revised_certificate_msg"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]] && [[ $tls_sid_len -gt 0 ]] && NO_SSL_SESSIONID=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0300" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Protocol : SSLv3" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
echo "Protocol : TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${tls_cipher_suite:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${tls_cipher_suite:0:4}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${tls_cipher_suite:0:2},0x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')"
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${tls_cipher_suite:0:2},0x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')"
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "Cipher : $rfc_cipher_suite" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: DH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X25519" ]] || [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X448" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
else
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then
|
|
echo "$key_bitstring" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ "BEGIN" ]] && \
|
|
echo "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
case $tls_compression_method in
|
|
00) echo "Compression: NONE" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
01) echo "Compression: zlib compression" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
40) echo "Compression: LZS compression" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
*) echo "Compression: unrecognized compression method" >> $TMPFILE ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_compression_method" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Certificate Compression Algorithm: $cert_compression_method ($cert_compression_method_str)" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]] && echo -e "$tls_extensions" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo "TLS server hello message:"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
echo " tls_protocol: 0x$tls_protocol2"
|
|
[[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]] && echo " tls_sid_len: 0x$tls_sid_len_hex / = $((tls_sid_len/2))"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " tls_hello_time: 0x$tls_hello_time "
|
|
parse_date "$TLS_TIME" "+%Y-%m-%d %r" "%s" # in debugging mode we don't mind the cycles and don't use TLS_DIFFTIME_SET
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -n " tls_cipher_suite: 0x$tls_cipher_suite"
|
|
if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher_suite" ]]; then
|
|
echo " ($rfc_cipher_suite)"
|
|
else
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]]; then
|
|
echo " dh_bits: DH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
elif [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X25519" ]] || [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X448" ]]; then
|
|
echo " dh_bits: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
else
|
|
echo " dh_bits: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " tls_compression_method: 0x$tls_compression_method "
|
|
case $tls_compression_method in
|
|
00) echo "(NONE)" ;;
|
|
01) echo "(zlib compression)" ;;
|
|
40) echo "(LZS compression)" ;;
|
|
*) echo "(unrecognized compression method)" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " tls_extensions: "
|
|
newline_to_spaces "$(grep -a 'TLS server extension ' $TMPFILE | \
|
|
sed -e 's/TLS server extension //g' -e 's/\" (id=/\/#/g' \
|
|
-e 's/,.*$/,/g' -e 's/),$/\"/g' \
|
|
-e 's/elliptic curves\/#10/supported_groups\/#10/g')"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ supported_groups ]]; then
|
|
echo " Supported Groups: $(grep "Supported groups:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/Supported groups: //')"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ application\ layer\ protocol\ negotiation ]]; then
|
|
echo " ALPN protocol: $(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ next\ protocol ]]; then
|
|
echo " NPN protocols: $(grep "Protocols advertised by server:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/Protocols advertised by server: //')"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If a CIPHER_SUITES string was provided, then check that $tls_cipher_suite is in the string.
|
|
# this appeared in yassl + MySQL (https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/784) but adds robustness
|
|
# to the implementation
|
|
if [[ -n "$cipherlist" ]]; then
|
|
tls_cipher_suite="$(tolower "$tls_cipher_suite")"
|
|
tls_cipher_suite="${tls_cipher_suite:0:2}\\x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2}"
|
|
cipherlist_len=${#cipherlist}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < cipherlist_len; i+=8 )); do
|
|
# At the right hand side we need the quotes here!
|
|
[[ "${cipherlist:i:6}" == "$tls_cipher_suite" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $cipherlist_len ]]; then
|
|
BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER=true
|
|
debugme echo "The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the ClientHello included a supported_versions extension, then check that the
|
|
# $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION appeared in the list offered in the ClientHello.
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:0:2}" == 01 ]]; then
|
|
# get position of cipher lists (just after session id)
|
|
offset=78+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:76:2}")
|
|
# get position of compression methods
|
|
offset+=4+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}")
|
|
# get position of extensions
|
|
extns_offset=$offset+6+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:2}")
|
|
len1=${#TLS_CLIENT_HELLO}
|
|
for (( i=extns_offset; i < len1; i+=8+extension_len )); do
|
|
extension_type="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:i:4}"
|
|
offset=4+$i
|
|
extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ "$extension_type" == 002b ]]; then
|
|
offset+=6
|
|
tls_protocol2="$(tolower "$tls_protocol2")"
|
|
for (( j=0; j < extension_len-2; j+=4 )); do
|
|
[[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}" == $tls_protocol2 ]] && break
|
|
offset+=4
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $j -eq $extension_len-2 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "The ServerHello specifies a version that wasn't offered in the ClientHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now parse the Certificate message.
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
# not sure why we need this
|
|
[[ -e "$HOSTCERT" ]] && rm "$HOSTCERT"
|
|
[[ -e "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem" ]] && > "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# The first certificate is the server's certificate. If there are anything
|
|
# subsequent certificates, they are intermediate certificates.
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -lt 12 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
certificate_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:0:6}")
|
|
if [[ $certificate_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len-6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Place server's certificate in $HOSTCERT
|
|
certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:6:6}")
|
|
if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-12 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
hex2binary "${tls_certificate_ascii:12:certificate_len}" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -out "$HOSTCERT" 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
get_pub_key_size
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "---" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "Certificate chain" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
subjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -subject 2>>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
issuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -issuer 2>>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
echo " $nr_certs s:${subjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo " i:${issuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
cat "$HOSTCERT" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
echo "" > "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem"
|
|
# Place any additional certificates in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem
|
|
CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false
|
|
CAissuerDN="$issuerDN"
|
|
for (( i=12+certificate_len; i<tls_certificate_ascii_len; i+=certificate_len )); do
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$i -lt 6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:i:6}")
|
|
i+=6
|
|
if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$i ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
pem_certificate="$(hex2binary "${tls_certificate_ascii:i:certificate_len}" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM 2>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_certs+=1
|
|
CAsubjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -subject 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$pem_certificate")"
|
|
# Check that this certificate certifies the one immediately preceding it.
|
|
[[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" != "${CAissuerDN:8}" ]] && CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=true
|
|
CAissuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -issuer 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$pem_certificate")"
|
|
echo " $nr_certs s:${CAsubjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo " i:${CAissuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "$pem_certificate" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "$pem_certificate" >> "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem"
|
|
if [[ -z "$hostcert_issuer" ]] && [[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" == "${issuerDN:8}" ]]; then
|
|
# The issuer's certificate is needed if there is a stapled OCSP response,
|
|
# and it may be needed if check_revocation_ocsp() will later be called
|
|
# with the OCSP URI in the server's certificate.
|
|
hostcert_issuer="$TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem"
|
|
echo "$pem_certificate" > "$hostcert_issuer"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
echo "---" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "Server certificate" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "subject=${subjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "issuer=${issuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "---" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now parse the certificate status message
|
|
if [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -lt 8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:0:2}" == "01" ]]; then
|
|
# This is a certificate status message of type "ocsp"
|
|
ocsp_response_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
if [[ $ocsp_response_len -ne $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len-8 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
ocsp_resp_offset=8
|
|
elif [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:0:2}" == "02" ]]; then
|
|
# This is a list of OCSP responses, but only the first one is needed
|
|
# since the first one corresponds to the server's certificate.
|
|
ocsp_response_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:2:6}")
|
|
if [[ $ocsp_response_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len-8 ]] || [[ $ocsp_response_list_len -lt 6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
ocsp_response_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:8:6}")
|
|
if [[ $ocsp_response_len -gt $ocsp_response_list_len-6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
ocsp_resp_offset=14
|
|
fi
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE=""
|
|
if [[ $ocsp_response_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${tls_certificate_status_ascii:ocsp_resp_offset:ocsp_response_len}"
|
|
echo "OCSP response:" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ -n "$hostcert_issuer" ]]; then
|
|
hex2binary "$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce -CAfile $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem -issuer $hostcert_issuer -cert $HOSTCERT -respin /dev/stdin -resp_text >> $TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
else
|
|
hex2binary "$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL ocsp -respin /dev/stdin -resp_text >> $TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
echo "OCSP response: no response sent" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now parse the server key exchange message
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_ECDHE_ ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_ECDH_anon ]] || \
|
|
[[ $rfc_cipher_suite == ECDHE* ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == AECDH* ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt 6 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
curve_type=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:2}")
|
|
if [[ $curve_type -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
# named_curve - the curve is identified by a 2-byte number
|
|
named_curve=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:2:4}")
|
|
# https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8
|
|
case $named_curve in
|
|
1) dh_bits=163 ; named_curve_str="K-163" ;;
|
|
2) dh_bits=162 ; named_curve_str="sect163r1" ;;
|
|
3) dh_bits=163 ; named_curve_str="B-163" ;;
|
|
4) dh_bits=193 ; named_curve_str="sect193r1" ;;
|
|
5) dh_bits=193 ; named_curve_str="sect193r2" ;;
|
|
6) dh_bits=232 ; named_curve_str="K-233" ;;
|
|
7) dh_bits=233 ; named_curve_str="B-233" ;;
|
|
8) dh_bits=238 ; named_curve_str="sect239k1" ;;
|
|
9) dh_bits=281 ; named_curve_str="K-283" ;;
|
|
10) dh_bits=282 ; named_curve_str="B-283" ;;
|
|
11) dh_bits=407 ; named_curve_str="K-409" ;;
|
|
12) dh_bits=409 ; named_curve_str="B-409" ;;
|
|
13) dh_bits=570 ; named_curve_str="K-571" ;;
|
|
14) dh_bits=570 ; named_curve_str="B-571" ;;
|
|
15) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160k1" ;;
|
|
16) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160r1" ;;
|
|
17) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160r2" ;;
|
|
18) dh_bits=192 ; named_curve_str="secp192k1" ;;
|
|
19) dh_bits=192 ; named_curve_str="P-192" ;;
|
|
20) dh_bits=225 ; named_curve_str="secp224k1" ;;
|
|
21) dh_bits=224 ; named_curve_str="P-224" ;;
|
|
22) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="secp256k1" ;;
|
|
23) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="P-256" ;;
|
|
24) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="P-384" ;;
|
|
25) dh_bits=521 ; named_curve_str="P-521" ;;
|
|
26) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP256r1" ;;
|
|
27) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP384r1" ;;
|
|
28) dh_bits=512 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP512r1" ;;
|
|
29) dh_bits=253 ; named_curve_str="X25519" ;;
|
|
30) dh_bits=448 ; named_curve_str="X448" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then
|
|
# Skip over the public key to get to the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
# This is TLS 1.2-only, as this field does not appear in earlier versions.
|
|
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:6:2}")
|
|
offset=$((len1+8))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ge $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
|
# The SignatureAndHashAlgorithm won't be present in an anonymous
|
|
# key exchange.
|
|
peering_signing_digest="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:2}"
|
|
peer_signature_type="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:$((offset+2)):2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && [[ $named_curve -ne 29 ]] && [[ $named_curve -ne 30 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
elif [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits"
|
|
echo "Server Temp Key: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_DHE_ ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_DH_anon ]] || \
|
|
[[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "DHE-"* ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "EDH-"* ]] || \
|
|
[[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "EXP1024-DHE-"* ]]; then
|
|
# For DH ephemeral keys the first field is p, and the length of
|
|
# p is the same as the length of the public key.
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:4}")
|
|
offset=4+$dh_p_len
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Subtract any leading 0 bytes
|
|
for (( i=4; i < offset; i+=2 )); do
|
|
[[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break
|
|
dh_p_len=$dh_p_len-2
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_p_len}"
|
|
|
|
dh_bits=4*$dh_p_len
|
|
msb=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}")
|
|
for (( mask=128; msb < mask; mask/=2 )); do
|
|
dh_bits=$dh_bits-1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
key_bitstring="$(get_dh_ephemeralkey "$tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && echo "$key_bitstring" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
|
|
# Check to see whether the ephemeral public key uses one of the groups from
|
|
# RFC 7919 for parameters
|
|
case $dh_bits in
|
|
2048) named_curve=256; named_curve_str=" ffdhe2048," ;;
|
|
3072) named_curve=257; named_curve_str=" ffdhe3072," ;;
|
|
4096) named_curve=258; named_curve_str=" ffdhe4096," ;;
|
|
6144) named_curve=259; named_curve_str=" ffdhe6144," ;;
|
|
8192) named_curve=260; named_curve_str=" ffdhe8192," ;;
|
|
*) named_curve=0; named_curve_str="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && named_curve=0 && named_curve_str=""
|
|
if "$HAS_PKEY" && [[ $named_curve -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ BEGIN ]]; then
|
|
ephemeral_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$key_bitstring")"
|
|
# OpenSSL 3.0.0 outputs the group name rather than the actual parameter values for some named groups.
|
|
if [[ "$ephemeral_param" =~ GROUP: ]]; then
|
|
ephemeral_param="${ephemeral_param#*GROUP: }"
|
|
rfc7919_param="${named_curve_str# }"
|
|
rfc7919_param="${rfc7919_param%,}"
|
|
[[ "$ephemeral_param" =~ $rfc7919_param ]] || named_curve_str=""
|
|
else
|
|
ephemeral_param="$(grep -EA 1000 "prime:|P:" <<< "$ephemeral_param")"
|
|
rfc7919_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" | grep -EA 1000 "prime:|P:")"
|
|
[[ "$ephemeral_param" != "$rfc7919_param" ]] && named_curve_str=""
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits"
|
|
[[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo "Server Temp Key: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then
|
|
# Skip over the public key (P, G, Y) to get to the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
# This is TLS 1.2-only, as this field does not appear in earlier versions.
|
|
offset=$((dh_p_len+4))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
offset+=$((len1+4))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello."
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}")
|
|
offset+=$((len1+4))
|
|
if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ge $((offset+4)) ]]; then
|
|
# The SignatureAndHashAlgorithm won't be present in an anonymous
|
|
# key exchange.
|
|
peering_signing_digest="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:2}"
|
|
peer_signature_type="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:$((offset+2)):2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -eq 8 ]] && \
|
|
[[ 0x$peer_signature_type -ge 4 ]] && [[ 0x$peer_signature_type -le 11 ]]; then
|
|
case $peer_signature_type in
|
|
04) peering_signing_digest="SHA256"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
|
05) peering_signing_digest="SHA384"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
|
06) peering_signing_digest="SHA512"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
|
07) peering_signing_digest=""; peer_signature_type="Ed25519" ;;
|
|
08) peering_signing_digest=""; peer_signature_type="Ed448" ;;
|
|
09) peering_signing_digest="SHA256"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
|
0A) peering_signing_digest="SHA384"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
|
0B) peering_signing_digest="SHA512"; peer_signature_type="RSA-PSS" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ -n "$peering_signing_digest" ]]; then
|
|
echo "Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest"
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type\n"
|
|
elif [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -ge 1 ]] && [[ 0x$peering_signing_digest -le 6 ]] && \
|
|
[[ 0x$peer_signature_type -ge 1 ]] && [[ 0x$peer_signature_type -le 3 ]]; then
|
|
case $peering_signing_digest in
|
|
01) peering_signing_digest="MD5" ;;
|
|
02) peering_signing_digest="SHA1" ;;
|
|
03) peering_signing_digest="SHA224" ;;
|
|
04) peering_signing_digest="SHA256" ;;
|
|
05) peering_signing_digest="SHA384" ;;
|
|
06) peering_signing_digest="SHA512" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
case $peer_signature_type in
|
|
01) peer_signature_type="RSA" ;;
|
|
02) peer_signature_type="DSA" ;;
|
|
03) peer_signature_type="ECDSA" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo "Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signing digest: $peering_signing_digest"
|
|
echo "Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type" >> $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " Peer signature type: $peer_signature_type\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
|
|
TLS_SERVER_HELLO="02$(printf "%06x" $(( tls_serverhello_ascii_len/2)) )${tls_serverhello_ascii}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ASCII-HEX encoded session ticket
|
|
parse_tls13_new_session_ticket() {
|
|
local tls_version="$1"
|
|
local new_session_ticket="$2"
|
|
local -i len ticket_lifetime ticket_age_add min_len remainder
|
|
local ticket_nonce ticket extensions
|
|
local has_nonce=true
|
|
|
|
[[ "${new_session_ticket:0:2}" == 04 ]] || return 7
|
|
# Prior to draft 21 the NewSessionTicket did not include a ticket_nonce.
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -le 20 ]] && has_nonce=false
|
|
|
|
# Set min_len to the minimum length that a session ticket can be.
|
|
min_len=28
|
|
"$has_nonce" || min_len=$((min_len-2))
|
|
|
|
remainder=$((2*0x${new_session_ticket:2:6}))
|
|
[[ $remainder -ge $min_len ]] || return 7
|
|
[[ ${#new_session_ticket} -ge $((remainder + 8)) ]] || return 7
|
|
|
|
ticket_lifetime=0x${new_session_ticket:8:8}
|
|
ticket_age_add=0x${new_session_ticket:16:8}
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:24}"
|
|
remainder=$((remainder-16))
|
|
|
|
if "$has_nonce"; then
|
|
len=$((2*0x${new_session_ticket:0:2}))
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:2}"
|
|
[[ $remainder -ge $((len + 12)) ]] || return 7
|
|
ticket_nonce="${new_session_ticket:0:len}"
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:len}"
|
|
remainder=$((remainder-len-2))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
len=$((2*0x${new_session_ticket:0:4}))
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:4}"
|
|
[[ $remainder -ge $((len + 8)) ]] || return 7
|
|
ticket="${new_session_ticket:0:len}"
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:len}"
|
|
remainder=$((remainder-len-4))
|
|
|
|
len=$((2*0x${new_session_ticket:0:4}))
|
|
new_session_ticket="${new_session_ticket:4}"
|
|
[[ $remainder -eq $((len + 4)) ]] || return 7
|
|
extensions="${new_session_ticket:0:len}"
|
|
|
|
echo " TLS session ticket lifetime hint: $ticket_lifetime (seconds)" > $TMPFILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt $TMPFILE
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#arg1 (optional): list of ciphers suites or empty
|
|
#arg2 (optional): "true" if full server response should be parsed.
|
|
# return: 6: couldn't open socket, 3(!): sslv2 handshake succeeded, 0=no SSLv2
|
|
# 1,4,6,7: see return value of parse_sslv2_serverhello()
|
|
sslv2_sockets() {
|
|
local ret
|
|
local cipher_suites="$1"
|
|
local client_hello len_client_hello
|
|
local len_ciph_suites
|
|
local server_hello sock_reply_file2 foo
|
|
local -i len_ciph_suites_byte response_len server_hello_len
|
|
local parse_complete=false
|
|
|
|
# this could be empty so we use '=='
|
|
if [[ "$2" == true ]]; then
|
|
parse_complete=true
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$cipher_suites" ]]; then
|
|
cipher_suites="
|
|
05,00,80, # 1st cipher 9 cipher specs, only classical V2 ciphers are used here, see FIXME below
|
|
03,00,80, # 2nd there are v3 in v2!!! : https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101#appendix-E
|
|
01,00,80, # 3rd Cipher specifications introduced in version 3.0 can be included in version 2.0 client hello messages using
|
|
07,00,c0, # 4th the syntax below. [..] # V2CipherSpec (see Version 3.0 name) = { 0x00, CipherSuite }; !!!!
|
|
08,00,80, # 5th
|
|
06,00,40, # 6th
|
|
04,00,80, # 7th
|
|
02,00,80, # 8th
|
|
06,01,40, # 9
|
|
07,01,c0, # 10
|
|
FF,80,00, # 11
|
|
FF,80,10, # 12
|
|
00,00,00" # 13
|
|
# FIXME: also SSLv3 ciphers, see
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20170310142840/http://max.euston.net/d/tip_sslciphers.html
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
code2network "$cipher_suites" # convert CIPHER_SUITES
|
|
cipher_suites="$NW_STR" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next
|
|
len_ciph_suites_byte=${#cipher_suites}
|
|
|
|
len_ciph_suites_byte+=2
|
|
len_ciph_suites=$(printf "%02x\n" $(( len_ciph_suites_byte / 4 )))
|
|
len_client_hello=$(printf "%02x\n" $((0x$len_ciph_suites + 0x19)))
|
|
|
|
client_hello="
|
|
,80,$len_client_hello # length
|
|
,01 # Client Hello
|
|
,00,02 # SSLv2
|
|
,00,$len_ciph_suites # cipher spec length
|
|
,00,00 # session ID length
|
|
,00,10 # challenge length
|
|
,$cipher_suites
|
|
,29,22,be,b3,5a,01,8b,04,fe,5f,80,03,a0,13,eb,c4" # Challenge
|
|
# https://idea.popcount.org/2012-06-16-dissecting-ssl-handshake/ (client)
|
|
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 6
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend_clienthello "$client_hello"
|
|
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
if "$parse_complete"; then
|
|
if [[ -s "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
server_hello=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
server_hello_len=$((2 + $(hex2dec "${server_hello:1:3}") ))
|
|
foo="$(wc -c "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")"
|
|
response_len="${foo% *}"
|
|
for (( 1; response_len < server_hello_len; 1 )); do
|
|
sock_reply_file2=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.2
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... "
|
|
socksend "" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
|
|
[[ ! -s "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ]] && break
|
|
cat "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" >> "$sock_reply_file2"
|
|
mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
foo="$(wc -c "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")"
|
|
response_len="${foo% *}"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello... "
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -6
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
parse_sslv2_serverhello "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$parse_complete"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: supported groups extension
|
|
# arg2: "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages)
|
|
# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any)
|
|
# Given the supported groups extension, create a key_share extension that includes a key share for
|
|
# each group listed in the supported groups extension.
|
|
generate_key_share_extension() {
|
|
local supported_groups
|
|
local -i i len supported_groups_len group
|
|
local extn_len list_len
|
|
local key_share key_shares=""
|
|
local -i nr_key_shares=0
|
|
|
|
supported_groups="${1//\\x/}"
|
|
[[ "${supported_groups:0:4}" != "000a" ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
supported_groups_len=${#supported_groups}
|
|
[[ $supported_groups_len -lt 16 ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:4:4}")
|
|
[[ $len+8 -ne $supported_groups_len ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:8:4}")
|
|
[[ $len+12 -ne $supported_groups_len ]] && return 1
|
|
|
|
for (( i=12; i<supported_groups_len; i+=4 )); do
|
|
group=$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:i:4}")
|
|
# If the Supported groups extensions lists more than one group,
|
|
# then don't include the larger key shares in the extension.
|
|
[[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -gt 256 ]] && continue
|
|
|
|
# Versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 cannot perform operations
|
|
# with X25519 keys, so don't include the X25519 key share
|
|
# if the server's response needs to be decrypted and an
|
|
# older version of OpenSSL is being used.
|
|
[[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -eq 29 ]] && [[ "$2" == all ]] && ! "$HAS_X25519" && continue
|
|
|
|
# Versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1 cannot perform operations
|
|
# with X448 keys, so don't include the X448 key share
|
|
# if the server's response needs to be decrypted and an
|
|
# older version of OpenSSL is being used.
|
|
[[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -eq 30 ]] && [[ "$2" == all ]] && ! "$HAS_X448" && continue
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: The public keys could be extracted from the private keys
|
|
# (TLS13_KEY_SHARES) using $OPENSSL, but only OpenSSL 1.1.0 and newer can
|
|
# extract the public key from an X25519 private key, and only
|
|
# OpenSSL 1.1.1 can extract the public key from an X448 private key.
|
|
key_share="${TLS13_PUBLIC_KEY_SHARES[group]}"
|
|
if [[ ${#key_share} -gt 4 ]]; then
|
|
key_shares+=",$key_share"
|
|
nr_key_shares+=1
|
|
# Don't include more than two keys, so that the extension isn't too large.
|
|
[[ $nr_key_shares -ge 2 ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$key_shares" ]] && tm_out "" && return 0
|
|
|
|
len=${#key_shares}/3
|
|
list_len="$(printf "%04x" "$len")"
|
|
len+=2
|
|
extn_len="$(printf "%04x" "$len")"
|
|
tm_out "00,$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR,${extn_len:0:2},${extn_len:2:2},${list_len:0:2},${list_len:2:2}$key_shares"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ARG1: TLS version low byte (00: SSLv3, 01: TLS 1.0, 02: TLS 1.1, 03: TLS 1.2)
|
|
# ARG2: CIPHER_SUITES string (lowercase, and in the format output by code2network())
|
|
# ARG3: "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages)
|
|
# "all+" - same as "all", but do not offer any curves with TLSv1.3 that are not supported by
|
|
# $OPENSSL, since response MUST be decrypted.
|
|
# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any)
|
|
# ARG4: (optional) additional request extensions
|
|
# ARG5: (optional): "true" if ClientHello should advertise compression methods other than "NULL"
|
|
# ARG6: (optional): "false" if prepare_tls_clienthello() should not open a new socket
|
|
#
|
|
prepare_tls_clienthello() {
|
|
local tls_low_byte="$1" tls_legacy_version="$1"
|
|
local process_full="$3"
|
|
local new_socket=true
|
|
local tls_word_reclayer="03, 01" # the first TLS version number is the record layer and always 0301
|
|
# -- except: SSLv3 and second ClientHello after HelloRetryRequest
|
|
local servername_hexstr len_servername len_servername_hex
|
|
local hexdump_format_str part1 part2
|
|
local all_extensions=""
|
|
local -i i j len_ciph_suites_byte len_extension len_padding_extension len_all len_session_id
|
|
local len_sni_listlen len_sni_ext len_extension_hex len_padding_extension_hex
|
|
local cipher_suites len_ciph_suites len_ciph_suites_word
|
|
local len_client_hello_word len_all_word
|
|
local ecc_cipher_suite_found=false
|
|
local extension_signature_algorithms extension_heartbeat session_id
|
|
local extension_session_ticket extension_next_protocol
|
|
local extension_supported_groups="" extension_supported_point_formats=""
|
|
local extensions_key_share="" extn_type supported_groups_c2n="" extn_psk_mode=""
|
|
local extra_extensions extra_extensions_list="" extension_supported_versions=""
|
|
local offer_compression=false compression_methods
|
|
|
|
# TLSv1.3 ClientHello messages MUST specify only the NULL compression method.
|
|
[[ "$5" == true ]] && [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -le "0x03" ]] && offer_compression=true
|
|
[[ "$6" == false ]] && new_socket=false
|
|
|
|
cipher_suites="$2" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next
|
|
len_ciph_suites_byte=${#cipher_suites}
|
|
len_ciph_suites_byte+=2
|
|
|
|
# we have additional 2 chars \x in each 2 byte string and 2 byte ciphers, so we need to divide by 4:
|
|
len_ciph_suites=$(printf "%02x\n" $(( len_ciph_suites_byte / 4 )))
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_ciph_suites"
|
|
len_ciph_suites_word="$LEN_STR"
|
|
#[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_ciph_suites_word
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
# Add extensions
|
|
|
|
# Check to see if any ECC cipher suites are included in cipher_suites
|
|
# (not needed for TLSv1.3)
|
|
if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -le "0x03" ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len_ciph_suites_byte; i+=8 )); do
|
|
j=$i+4
|
|
part1="0x${cipher_suites:$i:2}"
|
|
part2="0x${cipher_suites:$j:2}"
|
|
if [[ "$part1" == 0xc0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$part2" -ge 0x01 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x19 ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x23 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x3b ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x48 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x4f ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x5c ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x63 ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x70 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x79 ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x86 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x8d ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x9a ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x9b ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0xac ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0xaf ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$part1" == 0xcc ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$part2" == 0xa8 ]] || [[ "$part2" == 0xa9 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$part2" == 0xac ]] || [[ "$part2" == 0x13 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$part2" == 0x14 ]]; then
|
|
ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$SNI" ]]; then
|
|
#formatted example for SNI
|
|
#00 00 # extension server_name
|
|
#00 1a # length = the following +2 = server_name length + 5
|
|
#00 18 # server_name list_length = server_name length +3
|
|
#00 # server_name type (hostname)
|
|
#00 15 # server_name length
|
|
#66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 66 66 66 target.mydomain1.tld # server_name target
|
|
servername=${XMPP_HOST:-${NODE}}
|
|
len_servername=${#servername}
|
|
hexdump_format_str="$len_servername/1 \"%02x,\""
|
|
servername_hexstr=$(printf $servername | hexdump -v -e "${hexdump_format_str}" | sed 's/,$//')
|
|
# convert lengths we need to fill in from dec to hex:
|
|
len_servername_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_servername)
|
|
len_sni_listlen=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+3)))
|
|
len_sni_ext=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+5)))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -le 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
extension_signature_algorithms="
|
|
00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 5246 and RFC 8422
|
|
00, 30, 00,2e, # lengths
|
|
06,01, 06,02, 06,03, 05,01, 05,02, 05,03, 04,01, 04,02, 04,03,
|
|
03,01, 03,02, 03,03, 02,01, 02,02, 02,03,
|
|
08,04, 08,05, 08,06, 08,07, 08,08, 08,09, 08,0a, 08,0b"
|
|
else
|
|
extension_signature_algorithms="
|
|
00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 8446
|
|
00, 22, 00, 20, # lengths
|
|
04,03, 05,03, 06,03, 08,04, 08,05, 08,06,
|
|
04,01, 05,01, 06,01, 08,09, 08,0a, 08,0b,
|
|
08,07, 08,08, 02,01, 02,03"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
extension_heartbeat="
|
|
00, 0f, 00, 01, 01"
|
|
|
|
extension_session_ticket="
|
|
00, 23, 00, 00"
|
|
|
|
extension_next_protocol="
|
|
33, 74, 00, 00"
|
|
|
|
extn_psk_mode="
|
|
00, 2d, 00, 02, 01, 01"
|
|
|
|
if "$ecc_cipher_suite_found"; then
|
|
# Supported Groups Extension
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492
|
|
00, 42, 00, 40, # lengths
|
|
00, 0e, 00, 0d, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b,
|
|
00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08,
|
|
00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13,
|
|
00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11, 01, 00, 01, 01"
|
|
elif [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
# Supported Groups Extension
|
|
if [[ ! "$process_full" =~ all ]] || ( "$HAS_X25519" && "$HAS_X448" ); then
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,10, 00,0e, # lengths
|
|
00,1d, 00,17, 00,1e, 00,18, 00,19,
|
|
01,00, 01,01"
|
|
# OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1 does not support X448, so list it as the least
|
|
# preferred option if the response needs to be decrypted, and do not
|
|
# list it at all if the response MUST be decrypted.
|
|
elif "$HAS_X25519" && [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]]; then
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,0e, 00,0c, # lengths
|
|
00,1d, 00,17, 00,18, 00,19,
|
|
01,00, 01,01"
|
|
elif "$HAS_X25519"; then
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,10, 00,0e, # lengths
|
|
00,1d, 00,17, 00,18, 00,19,
|
|
01,00, 01,01, 00,1e"
|
|
# OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 does not support either X25519 or X448,
|
|
# so list them as the least referred options if the response
|
|
# needs to be decrypted, and do not list them at all if the
|
|
# response MUST be decrypted.
|
|
elif [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]]; then
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,0c, 00,0a, # lengths
|
|
00,17, 00,18, 00,19,
|
|
01,00, 01,01"
|
|
else
|
|
extension_supported_groups="
|
|
00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446
|
|
00,10, 00,0e, # lengths
|
|
00,17, 00,18, 00,19,
|
|
01,00, 01,01, 00,1d, 00,1e"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
code2network "$extension_supported_groups"
|
|
supported_groups_c2n="$NW_STR"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$ecc_cipher_suite_found" || [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
# Supported Point Formats Extension.
|
|
extension_supported_point_formats="
|
|
00, 0b, # Type: Supported Point Formats , see RFC 4492
|
|
00, 02, # len
|
|
01, 00"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Each extension should appear in the ClientHello at most once. So,
|
|
# find out what extensions were provided as an argument and only use
|
|
# the provided values for those extensions.
|
|
extra_extensions="$(tolower "$4")"
|
|
code2network "$extra_extensions"
|
|
len_all=${#NW_STR}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len_all; i+=16+4*0x$len_extension_hex )); do
|
|
part2=$i+4
|
|
extn_type="${NW_STR:i:2}${NW_STR:part2:2}"
|
|
extra_extensions_list+=" $extn_type "
|
|
j=$i+8
|
|
part2=$j+4
|
|
len_extension_hex="${NW_STR:j:2}${NW_STR:part2:2}"
|
|
if [[ "$extn_type" == "000a" ]] && [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
j=14+4*0x$len_extension_hex
|
|
supported_groups_c2n="${NW_STR:i:j}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
extensions_key_share="$(generate_key_share_extension "$supported_groups_c2n" "$process_full")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0000\ ]]; then
|
|
all_extensions="
|
|
00, 00 # extension server_name
|
|
,00, $len_sni_ext # length SNI EXT
|
|
,00, $len_sni_listlen # server_name list_length
|
|
,00 # server_name type (hostname)
|
|
,00, $len_servername_hex # server_name length. We assume len(hostname) < FF - 9
|
|
,$servername_hexstr" # server_name target
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -ge 0x04 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 002b\ ]]; then
|
|
# Add supported_versions extension listing all TLS/SSL versions
|
|
# from the one specified in $tls_low_byte to SSLv3.
|
|
for (( i=0x$tls_low_byte; i >=0; i=i-1 )); do
|
|
if [[ 0x$i -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
# FIXME: The ClientHello currently advertises support for various
|
|
# draft versions of TLSv1.3. Eventually it should only advertise
|
|
# support for the final version (0304).
|
|
if [[ "$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" == 33 ]]; then
|
|
extension_supported_versions+=", 03, 04, 7f, 1c, 7f, 1b, 7f, 1a, 7f, 19, 7f, 18, 7f, 17"
|
|
else
|
|
extension_supported_versions+=", 7f, 16, 7f, 15, 7f, 14, 7f, 13, 7f, 12"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
extension_supported_versions+=", 03, $(printf "%02x" $i)"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
# FIXME: Adjust the lengths ("+15" and "+14") when the draft versions of TLSv1.3 are removed.
|
|
if [[ "$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" == 33 ]]; then
|
|
all_extensions+="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+15))), $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+14)))$extension_supported_versions"
|
|
else
|
|
all_extensions+="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+11))), $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+10)))$extension_supported_versions"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# There does not seem to be any reason to include this extension. However, it appears that
|
|
# OpenSSL, Firefox, and Chrome include it in TLS 1.3 ClientHello messages, and there is at
|
|
# least one server that will fail the connection if it is absent
|
|
# (see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/990).
|
|
if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -ge 0x04 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 002d\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extn_psk_mode"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0023\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_session_ticket"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the ClientHello will include the ALPN extension, then don't include the NPN extension.
|
|
if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 3374\ ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0010\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_next_protocol"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# RFC 5246 says that clients MUST NOT offer the signature algorithms
|
|
# extension if they are offering TLS versions prior to 1.2.
|
|
if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -ge 0x03 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 000d\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_signature_algorithms"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$extension_supported_groups" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 000a\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_supported_groups"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$extensions_key_share" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extensions_key_share"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$extension_supported_point_formats" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 000b\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_supported_point_formats"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -ge 0x04 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 001b\ ]]; then
|
|
# If the response needs to be decrypted, then indicate support
|
|
# for ZLIB certificate compression if $OPENSSL can decompress
|
|
# the result. If the response does not need to be decrypted,
|
|
# then indicate support for all certificate compression methods,
|
|
# as the response does not need to be decompressed.
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_ZLIB"; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="00,1b,00,03,02,00,01"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="00,1b,00,07,06,00,01,00,02,00,03"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$extra_extensions" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extra_extensions"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Make sure that a non-empty extension goes last (either heartbeat or padding).
|
|
# See PR #792 and https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg19720.html.
|
|
if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 000f\ ]]; then
|
|
[[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+=","
|
|
all_extensions+="$extension_heartbeat"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
code2network "$all_extensions" # convert extensions
|
|
all_extensions="$NW_STR" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next
|
|
len_extension=${#all_extensions}
|
|
len_extension+=2
|
|
len_extension=$len_extension/4
|
|
len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension)
|
|
|
|
# If the length of the Client Hello would be between 256 and 511 bytes,
|
|
# then add a padding extension (see RFC 7685)
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + 0x2b + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2))
|
|
"$offer_compression" && len_all+=2
|
|
[[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]] && len_all+=32 # TLSv1.3 ClientHello includes a 32-byte session id
|
|
if [[ $len_all -ge 256 ]] && [[ $len_all -le 511 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0015\ ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $len_all -ge 508 ]]; then
|
|
len_padding_extension=1 # Final extension cannot be empty: see PR #792
|
|
else
|
|
len_padding_extension=$((508 - len_all))
|
|
fi
|
|
len_padding_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_padding_extension)
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_padding_extension_hex"
|
|
all_extensions="$all_extensions\\x00\\x15\\x${LEN_STR:0:2}\\x${LEN_STR:4:2}"
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len_padding_extension; i++ )); do
|
|
all_extensions="$all_extensions\\x00"
|
|
done
|
|
len_extension=$len_extension+$len_padding_extension+0x4
|
|
len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension)
|
|
elif [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ \ 0015\ ]] && ( [[ $((len_all%256)) -eq 10 ]] || [[ $((len_all%256)) -eq 14 ]] ); then
|
|
# Some servers fail if the length of the ClientHello is 522, 778, 1034, 1290, ... bytes.
|
|
# A few servers also fail if the length is 526, 782, 1038, 1294, ... bytes.
|
|
# So, if the ClientHello would be one of these length, add a 5-byte padding extension.
|
|
all_extensions="$all_extensions\\x00\\x15\\x00\\x01\\x00"
|
|
len_extension+=5
|
|
len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension)
|
|
fi
|
|
len2twobytes "$len_extension_hex"
|
|
all_extensions="
|
|
,$LEN_STR # first the len of all extensions.
|
|
,$all_extensions"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
# TLSv1.3 calls for sending a random 32-byte session id in middlebox compatibility mode.
|
|
session_id="20,44,b8,92,56,af,74,52,9e,d8,cf,52,14,c8,af,d8,34,0b,e7,7f,eb,86,01,84,50,5d,e4,a1,6a,09,3b,bf,6e"
|
|
len_session_id=32
|
|
else
|
|
session_id="00"
|
|
len_session_id=0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# RFC 3546 doesn't specify SSLv3 to have SNI, openssl just ignores the switch if supplied
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x27))
|
|
else
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x27 + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2))
|
|
fi
|
|
"$offer_compression" && len_all+=2
|
|
len2twobytes $(printf "%02x\n" $len_all)
|
|
len_client_hello_word="$LEN_STR"
|
|
#[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_client_hello_word
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x2b))
|
|
else
|
|
len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x2b + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2))
|
|
fi
|
|
"$offer_compression" && len_all+=2
|
|
len2twobytes $(printf "%02x\n" $len_all)
|
|
len_all_word="$LEN_STR"
|
|
#[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_all_word
|
|
|
|
# if we have SSLv3, the first occurrence of TLS protocol -- record layer -- is SSLv3, otherwise TLS 1.0,
|
|
# except in the case of a second ClientHello in TLS 1.3, in which case it is TLS 1.2.
|
|
[[ $tls_low_byte == "00" ]] && tls_word_reclayer="03, 00"
|
|
|
|
[[ 0x$tls_legacy_version -ge 0x04 ]] && tls_legacy_version="03"
|
|
|
|
if "$offer_compression"; then
|
|
# See https://www.iana.org/assignments/comp-meth-ids/comp-meth-ids.xhtml#comp-meth-ids-2
|
|
compression_methods="03,01,40,00" # Offer NULL, DEFLATE, and LZS compression
|
|
else
|
|
compression_methods="01,00" # Only offer NULL compression (0x00)
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="
|
|
# TLS header ( 5 bytes)
|
|
,16, $tls_word_reclayer # TLS Version: in wireshark this is always 01 for TLS 1.0-1.2
|
|
,$len_all_word # Length <---
|
|
# Handshake header:
|
|
,01 # Type (x01 for ClientHello)
|
|
,00, $len_client_hello_word # Length ClientHello
|
|
,03, $tls_legacy_version # TLS version ClientHello
|
|
,54, 51, 1e, 7a # Unix time since see www.moserware.com/2009/06/first-few-milliseconds-of-https.html
|
|
,de, ad, be, ef # Random 28 bytes
|
|
,31, 33, 07, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00
|
|
,cf, bd, 39, 04, cc, 16, 0b, 85
|
|
,03, 90, 9f, 77, 04, 33, d4, de
|
|
,$session_id
|
|
,$len_ciph_suites_word # Cipher suites length
|
|
,$cipher_suites
|
|
,$compression_methods"
|
|
|
|
if "$new_socket"; then
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 6
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend_clienthello "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO$all_extensions" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" -gt 0x03 ]]; then
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="$(tolower "$NW_STR")"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x0\\/\\x00\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x1\\/\\x01\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x2\\/\\x02\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x3\\/\\x03\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x4\\/\\x04\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x5\\/\\x05\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x6\\/\\x06\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x7\\/\\x07\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x8\\/\\x08\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x9\\/\\x09\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xa\\/\\x0a\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xb\\/\\x0b\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xc\\/\\x0c\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xd\\/\\x0d\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xe\\/\\x0e\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xf\\/\\x0f\\}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x/}"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:10}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: The original ClientHello
|
|
# arg2: The server's response
|
|
# Return 0 if the response is not a HelloRetryRequest.
|
|
# Return 1 if the response is a malformed HelloRetryRequest or if a new ClientHello cannot be sent.
|
|
# Return 2 if the response is a HelloRetryRequest, and sending a new ClientHello succeeded.
|
|
# Return 6 if the response is a HelloRetryRequest, and sending a new ClientHello failed.
|
|
resend_if_hello_retry_request() {
|
|
local original_clienthello="$1"
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii="$2"
|
|
local msg_type server_version cipher_suite rfc_cipher_suite
|
|
local key_share="" new_key_share="" cookie="" second_clienthello data=""
|
|
local -i i j msg_len tls_hello_ascii_len sid_len
|
|
local -i extns_offset hrr_extns_len len_extn
|
|
local extn_type
|
|
local sha256_hrr="CF21AD74E59A6111BE1D8C021E65B891C2A211167ABB8C5E079E09E2C8A8339C"
|
|
|
|
tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii}
|
|
# A HelloRetryRequest is at least 13 bytes long
|
|
[[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 26 ]] && return 0
|
|
# A HelloRetryRequest is a handshake message (16) with a major record version of 03.
|
|
[[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" != 1603 ]] && return 0
|
|
msg_type="${tls_hello_ascii:10:2}"
|
|
if [[ "$msg_type" == 02 ]]; then
|
|
# A HRR is a ServerHello with a Random value equal to the
|
|
# SHA-256 hash of "HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
[[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 76 ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ "${tls_hello_ascii:22:64}" != $sha256_hrr ]] && return 0
|
|
elif [[ "$msg_type" != 06 ]]; then
|
|
# The handshake type for hello_retry_request in draft versions was 06.
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# This appears to be a HelloRetryRequest message.
|
|
debugme echo "reading hello retry request... "
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6
|
|
echo
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$tls_hello_ascii" # one line without any blanks
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check the length of the handshake message
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:6:4}")
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-10 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# The HelloRetryRequest message may be followed by something
|
|
# else (e.g., a change cipher spec message). Ignore anything
|
|
# that follows.
|
|
tls_hello_ascii_len=$msg_len+10
|
|
|
|
# Check the length of the HelloRetryRequest message.
|
|
msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:12:6}")
|
|
if [[ $msg_len -ne $tls_hello_ascii_len-18 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$msg_type" == 06 ]]; then
|
|
server_version="${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
if [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f13 ]]; then
|
|
# Starting with TLSv1.3 draft 19, a HelloRetryRequest is at least 15 bytes long
|
|
[[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 30 ]] && return 0
|
|
cipher_suite="${tls_hello_ascii:22:2},${tls_hello_ascii:24:2}"
|
|
extns_offset=26
|
|
else
|
|
extns_offset=22
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:86:2}")
|
|
i=88+$sid_len
|
|
j=90+$sid_len
|
|
cipher_suite="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2},${tls_hello_ascii:j:2}"
|
|
extns_offset=94+$sid_len
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check the length of the extensions.
|
|
hrr_extns_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:extns_offset:4}")
|
|
if [[ $hrr_extns_len -ne $tls_hello_ascii_len-$extns_offset-4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Parse HelloRetryRequest extensions
|
|
for (( i=extns_offset+4; i < tls_hello_ascii_len; i+=8+len_extn )); do
|
|
extn_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}"
|
|
j=$i+4
|
|
len_extn=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}")
|
|
j+=4
|
|
if [[ $len_extn -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-$j ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$extn_type" == 002C ]]; then
|
|
# If the HRR includes a cookie extension, then it needs to be
|
|
# included in the next ClientHello.
|
|
j=8+$len_extn
|
|
cookie="${tls_hello_ascii:i:j}"
|
|
elif [[ "$extn_type" == 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR ]]; then
|
|
# If the HRR includes a key_share extension, then it specifies the
|
|
# group to be used in the next ClientHello. So, create a key_share
|
|
# extension that specifies this group.
|
|
if [[ $len_extn -ne 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed key share extension in HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
key_share="${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}"
|
|
new_key_share="$(generate_key_share_extension "000a00040002$key_share" "ephemeralkey")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1
|
|
[[ -z "$new_key_share" ]] && return 1
|
|
new_key_share="${new_key_share//,/}"
|
|
elif [[ "$extn_type" == 002B ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $len_extn -ne 4 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo "malformed supported versions extension in HelloRetryRequest"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
server_version="${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo "TLS message fragments:"
|
|
echo " tls_protocol (reclyr): 0x${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}"
|
|
echo " tls_content_type: 0x16 (handshake)"
|
|
echo " msg_len: $(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:6:4}")"
|
|
echo
|
|
echo "TLS handshake message:"
|
|
echo -n " handshake type: 0x$msg_type "
|
|
case "$msg_type" in
|
|
02) echo "(hello_retry_request formatted as server_hello)" ;;
|
|
06) echo "(hello_retry_request)" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
echo " msg_len: $(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:12:6}")"
|
|
echo
|
|
echo "TLS hello retry request message:"
|
|
echo " server version: $server_version"
|
|
if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f13 ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " cipher suite: $cipher_suite"
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${cipher_suite:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${cipher_suite:3:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${cipher_suite:0:2}${cipher_suite:3:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${cipher_suite:0:2},0x${cipher_suite:3:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')"
|
|
else
|
|
rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${cipher_suite:0:2},0x${cipher_suite:3:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher_suite" ]]; then
|
|
echo " ($rfc_cipher_suite)"
|
|
else
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -n "$key_share" ]] && echo " key share: 0x$key_share"
|
|
[[ -n "$cookie" ]] && echo " cookie: $cookie"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Starting with TLSv1.3 draft 24, the second ClientHello should specify a record layer version of 0x0303
|
|
if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f18 ]]; then
|
|
original_clienthello="160303${original_clienthello:6}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f16 ]]; then
|
|
# Send a dummy change cipher spec for middlebox compatibility.
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending dummy change cipher spec... "
|
|
socksend ", x14, x03, x03 ,x00, x01, x01" 0
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending second client hello... "
|
|
second_clienthello="$(modify_clienthello "$original_clienthello" "$new_key_share" "$cookie")"
|
|
TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${second_clienthello:10}"
|
|
msg_len=${#second_clienthello}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < msg_len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
data+=", ${second_clienthello:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend_clienthello "$data" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
return 2
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: TLS version low byte
|
|
# (00: SSLv3, 01: TLS 1.0, 02: TLS 1.1, 03: TLS 1.2)
|
|
# arg2: (optional) list of cipher suites
|
|
# arg3: (optional): "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages)
|
|
# "all+" - same as "all", but do not offer any curves with TLSv1.3 that are not supported by
|
|
# $OPENSSL, since response MUST be decrypted.
|
|
# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any)
|
|
# arg4: (optional) additional request extensions
|
|
# arg5: (optional) "true" if ClientHello should advertise compression methods other than "NULL"
|
|
# arg6: (optional) "false" if the connection should not be closed before the function returns.
|
|
# return: 0: successful connect | 1: protocol or cipher not available | 2: as (0) but downgraded
|
|
# 6: couldn't open socket | 7: couldn't open temp file
|
|
tls_sockets() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local -i save=0
|
|
local lines
|
|
local tls_low_byte
|
|
local cipher_list_2send
|
|
local sock_reply_file2 sock_reply_file3
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii next_packet
|
|
local clienthello1 original_clienthello hrr=""
|
|
local process_full="$3" offer_compression=false skip=false
|
|
local close_connection=true include_headers=true
|
|
local -i i len tag_len hello_done=0
|
|
local cipher="" tls_version handshake_secret="" res
|
|
local initial_msg_transcript msg_transcript finished_msg aad="" data=""
|
|
local handshake_traffic_keys key iv finished_key
|
|
local master_secret master_traffic_keys
|
|
|
|
[[ "$5" == true ]] && offer_compression=true
|
|
[[ "$6" == false ]] && close_connection=false
|
|
tls_low_byte="$1"
|
|
if [[ -n "$2" ]]; then # use supplied string in arg2 if there is one
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$2"
|
|
else # otherwise use std ciphers then
|
|
if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$TLS12_CIPHER"
|
|
else
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
code2network "$(tolower "$cipher_list_2send")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format
|
|
cipher_list_2send="$NW_STR"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending client hello... "
|
|
prepare_tls_clienthello "$tls_low_byte" "$cipher_list_2send" "$process_full" "$4" "$offer_compression"
|
|
ret=$? # 6 means opening socket didn't succeed, e.g. timeout
|
|
|
|
# if sending didn't succeed we don't bother
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
clienthello1="$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO"
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
"$TLS_DIFFTIME_SET" && TLS_NOW=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s")
|
|
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%140303000101}"
|
|
|
|
# Check if the response is a HelloRetryRequest.
|
|
original_clienthello="160301$(printf "%04x" "${#clienthello1}")$clienthello1"
|
|
resend_if_hello_retry_request "$original_clienthello" "$tls_hello_ascii"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
hrr="${tls_hello_ascii:10}"
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]] || [[ $ret -eq 6 ]]; then
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd
|
|
return $ret
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# The server's response may span more than one packet. If only the
|
|
# first part of the response needs to be processed, this isn't an
|
|
# issue. However, if the entire response needs to be processed or
|
|
# if the ephemeral key is needed (which comes last for TLS 1.2 and
|
|
# below), then we need to check if response appears to be complete,
|
|
# and if it isn't then try to get another packet from the server.
|
|
if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then
|
|
hello_done=1; skip=true
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( 1 ; hello_done==1; 1 )); do
|
|
if ! "$skip"; then
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
sock_reply_file2=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... "
|
|
socksend "" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
|
|
next_packet=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
next_packet="${next_packet%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ${#next_packet} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# This shouldn't be necessary. However, it protects against
|
|
# getting into an infinite loop if the server has nothing
|
|
# left to send and check_tls_serverhellodone doesn't
|
|
# correctly catch it.
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
hello_done=0
|
|
else
|
|
tls_hello_ascii+="$next_packet"
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
sock_reply_file3=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7
|
|
mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file3"
|
|
mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
cat "$sock_reply_file3" >> "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
rm "$sock_reply_file3"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
skip=false
|
|
if [[ $hello_done -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
res="$(check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "$process_full" "$cipher" "$handshake_secret" "$initial_msg_transcript")"
|
|
hello_done=$?
|
|
if [[ "$hello_done" -eq 0 ]] && [[ -n "$res" ]]; then
|
|
read -r msg_transcript tls_hello_ascii <<< "$res"
|
|
tls_hello_ascii="$(toupper "$tls_hello_ascii")"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$hello_done" -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
hello_done=1; skip=true
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello..."
|
|
parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
ret=$?
|
|
if [[ "$ret" -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$ret" -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
if [[ -n "$hrr" ]]; then
|
|
initial_msg_transcript="$(create-initial-transcript "$cipher" "$clienthello1" "$hrr" "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO" "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO")"
|
|
else
|
|
initial_msg_transcript="$(create-initial-transcript "$cipher" "" "" "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO" "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO")"
|
|
fi
|
|
handshake_secret="$(derive-handshake-secret "$cipher" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && hello_done=2
|
|
else
|
|
hello_done=2
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello..."
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6
|
|
echo
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "$process_full" "$cipher_list_2send"
|
|
save=$?
|
|
if "$close_connection" && [[ $save == 0 ]]; then
|
|
send_close_notify "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
# see https://secure.wand.net.nz/trac/libprotoident/wiki/SSL
|
|
lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" 2>$ERRFILE)")
|
|
tm_out " ($lines lines returned) "
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$close_connection" && [[ $save == 0 ]] && \
|
|
[[ -n "$handshake_secret" ]] && [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]]; then
|
|
tls_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then
|
|
tls_version="${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4}"
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[0-9A-F] ]]; then
|
|
tls_version="${BASH_REMATCH:8:4}"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
|
|
handshake_traffic_keys="$(derive-handshake-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$handshake_secret" "$initial_msg_transcript" "client")"
|
|
read -r key iv finished_key <<< "$handshake_traffic_keys"
|
|
if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then
|
|
finished_msg="14000020$(hmac-transcript "-sha256" "$finished_key" "$msg_transcript")"
|
|
else
|
|
finished_msg="14000030$(hmac-transcript "-sha384" "$finished_key" "$msg_transcript")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CCM_8 ]] && tag_len=8 || tag_len=16
|
|
aad="170303$(printf "%04X" "$(( ${#finished_msg}/2 + tag_len + 1 ))")"
|
|
if "$include_headers"; then
|
|
# The header information was added to additional data in TLSv1.3 draft 25.
|
|
finished_msg="$(sym-encrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$(get-nonce "$iv" 0)" "${finished_msg}16" "$aad")"
|
|
else
|
|
finished_msg="$(sym-encrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$(get-nonce "$iv" 0)" "${finished_msg}16" "")"
|
|
fi
|
|
finished_msg="$aad$finished_msg"
|
|
|
|
len=${#finished_msg}
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
data+=", ${finished_msg:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nsending finished..."
|
|
socksend_clienthello "${data}"
|
|
sleep $USLEEP_SND
|
|
|
|
# Compute application traffic keys and IVs.
|
|
master_secret="$(derive-master-secret "$cipher" "$handshake_secret")"
|
|
master_traffic_keys="$(derive-application-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$master_secret" "$msg_transcript" server)"
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="$tls_version $cipher $master_traffic_keys 0 "
|
|
master_traffic_keys="$(derive-application-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$master_secret" "$msg_transcript" client)"
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO+="$master_traffic_keys 0"
|
|
|
|
# Some servers send new session tickets as soon as the handshake is complete.
|
|
[[ -s "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_new_session_ticket.txt" ]] && \
|
|
rm "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_new_session_ticket.txt"
|
|
receive_app_data
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ -s "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_new_session_ticket.txt" ]] && \
|
|
echo -n "Ticket: " && cat "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_new_session_ticket.txt"
|
|
[[ -s $TMPFILE ]] && echo -n "Unexpected response: " && cat "$TMPFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# determine the return value for higher level, so that they can tell what the result is
|
|
if [[ $save -eq 1 ]] || [[ $lines -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
ret=1 # NOT available
|
|
elif [[ $save -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
# only for IMAP currently 'a002 NO Starttls'
|
|
ret=3
|
|
elif [[ $save -eq 8 ]]; then
|
|
# odd return, we just pass this from parse_tls_serverhello() back
|
|
ret=8
|
|
elif [[ $save -eq 4 ]]; then
|
|
# STARTTLS problem passing back
|
|
ret=4
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ 03$tls_low_byte -eq $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION ]]; then
|
|
ret=0 # protocol available, TLS version returned equal to the one send
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -n "protocol send: 0x03$tls_low_byte, returned: 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION"
|
|
ret=2 # protocol NOT available, server downgraded to $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo "stuck on sending: $ret"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$close_connection" && close_socket 5
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Send application data over a TLS 1.3 channel that has already been created.
|
|
send_app_data() {
|
|
local plaintext="$1"
|
|
local tls_version cipher client_key client_iv server_key server_iv
|
|
local aad res data
|
|
local -i i client_seq server_seq tag_len len
|
|
local include_headers=true
|
|
|
|
read -r tls_version cipher server_key server_iv server_seq client_key client_iv client_seq <<< "$APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO"
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
[[ "$cipher" =~ CCM_8 ]] && tag_len=8 || tag_len=16
|
|
|
|
aad="170303$(printf "%04X" "$(( ${#plaintext}/2 + tag_len + 1 ))")"
|
|
if "$include_headers"; then
|
|
res="$(sym-encrypt "$cipher" "$client_key" "$(get-nonce "$client_iv" $client_seq)" "${plaintext}17" "$aad")"
|
|
else
|
|
res="$(sym-encrypt "$cipher" "$client_key" "$(get-nonce "$client_iv" $client_seq)" "${plaintext}17" "")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || return 1
|
|
client_seq+=1
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="$tls_version $cipher $server_key $server_iv $server_seq $client_key $client_iv $client_seq"
|
|
|
|
res="$aad$res"
|
|
len=${#res}
|
|
data=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
data+=",x${res:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
socksend "$data" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Receive application data from a TLS 1.3 channel that has already been created.
|
|
# arg1: true if only the first block of application data should be decrypted.
|
|
# This can save a lot of time if the server sends a lot a data (e.g., a
|
|
# big home page), but only the first part of the data is needed. However,
|
|
# no further data may be received over this connection as the message
|
|
# sequence number will not be correct.
|
|
receive_app_data() {
|
|
local plaintext=""
|
|
local tls_version cipher client_key client_iv server_key server_iv
|
|
local aad ciphertext="" res="" data
|
|
local -i client_seq server_seq len msg_len
|
|
local include_headers=true
|
|
local first_block_only=false
|
|
|
|
[[ "$1" == true ]] && first_block_only=true
|
|
|
|
read -r tls_version cipher server_key server_iv server_seq client_key client_iv client_seq <<< "$APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO"
|
|
[[ "${tls_version:0:2}" == 7F ]] && [[ 0x${tls_version:2:2} -lt 25 ]] && include_headers=false
|
|
|
|
sleep $USLEEP_REC
|
|
while true; do
|
|
len=${#ciphertext}
|
|
if [[ $len -ge 10 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${ciphertext:0:5}" == 17030 ]] || break
|
|
msg_len=$((2*0x${ciphertext:6:4}))
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $len -lt 10 ]] || [[ $len -lt $((msg_len+10)) ]]; then
|
|
if "$FAST_SOCKET"; then
|
|
res="$(sockread_fast 32768)"
|
|
else
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
res="$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")"
|
|
fi
|
|
res="${res%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
[[ -z "$res" ]] && break
|
|
ciphertext+="$res"
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
"$include_headers" && aad="${ciphertext:0:10}" || aad=""
|
|
data="$(sym-decrypt "$cipher" "$server_key" "$(get-nonce "$server_iv" "$server_seq")" "${ciphertext:10:msg_len}" "$aad")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || return 1
|
|
|
|
len=${#data}-2
|
|
while [[ "${data:len:2}" == 00 ]]; do
|
|
len=$((len-2))
|
|
done
|
|
content_type="${data:len:2}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$content_type" == 16 ]] && [[ "${data:0:2}" == 04 ]]; then
|
|
# This is a new_session_ticket
|
|
parse_tls13_new_session_ticket "$tls_version" "${data:0:len}"
|
|
elif [[ "$content_type" == 17 ]]; then
|
|
# This really is application data.
|
|
plaintext+="${data:0:len}"
|
|
"$first_block_only" && break
|
|
fi
|
|
ciphertext=${ciphertext:$((msg_len+10))}
|
|
server_seq+=1
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphertext" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
APP_TRAF_KEY_INFO="$tls_version $cipher $server_key $server_iv $server_seq $client_key $client_iv $client_seq"
|
|
hex2binary "$plaintext" > "$TMPFILE"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
####### Vulnerabilities follow #######
|
|
# General overview which browser "supports" which vulnerability:
|
|
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Web_browsers
|
|
|
|
# mainly adapted from https://gist.github.com/takeshixx/10107280
|
|
#
|
|
run_heartbleed(){
|
|
local tls_hexcode
|
|
local heartbleed_payload
|
|
local -i n lines_returned
|
|
local append=""
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii=""
|
|
local jsonID="heartbleed"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-0160"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-119"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for heartbleed vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " Heartbleed"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]] && determine_tls_extensions
|
|
if [[ ! "${TLS_EXTENSIONS}" =~ heartbeat ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no heartbeat extension"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no heartbeat extension" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x01"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x02"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x03"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x00"
|
|
else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in
|
|
*1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03" ; add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
*1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02" ; add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01" ; add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00" ; add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode"
|
|
|
|
heartbleed_payload=", x18, $tls_hexcode, x00, x03, x01, x40, x00"
|
|
tls_sockets "${tls_hexcode:6:2}" "" "ephemeralkey" "" "" "false"
|
|
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && tmln_out "\nsending payload with TLS version $tls_hexcode:"
|
|
socksend "$heartbleed_payload" 1
|
|
sockread 16384 $HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
append=", timed out"
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$append"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $append" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
# server reply should be (>=SSLv3): 18030x in case of a heartBEAT reply -- which we take as a positive result
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
debugme echo "tls_content_type: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}"
|
|
debugme echo "tls_protocol: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}"
|
|
|
|
lines_returned=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -ve '16/1 "%02x " " \n"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")")
|
|
debugme echo "lines HB reply: $lines_returned"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out "\nheartbleed reply: "
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20
|
|
[[ $lines_returned -gt 20 ]] && tmln_out "[...]"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $lines_returned -gt 1 ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" == 1803 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ ftp ]]; then
|
|
# check possibility of weird vsftpd reply, see #426, despite "1803" seems very unlikely...
|
|
if grep -q '500 OOPS' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ; then
|
|
append=", successful weeded out vsftpd false positive"
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$append"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $append" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out "likely "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -lt 3 ]] && tm_out ", use debug >=3 to confirm"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to Heartbleed"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# helper function
|
|
ok_ids(){
|
|
prln_svrty_best "\n ok -- something reset our ccs packets"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
|
|
# mainly adapted from Ramon de C Valle's C code from https://gist.github.com/rcvalle/71f4b027d61a78c42607
|
|
#FIXME: At a certain point ccs needs to be changed and make use of code2network using a file, then tls_sockets
|
|
#
|
|
run_ccs_injection(){
|
|
local tls_hexcode ccs_message client_hello byte6
|
|
local -i retval ret=0
|
|
local tls_hello_ascii=""
|
|
local jsonID="CCS"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-0224"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CCS injection vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " CCS"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x01"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x02"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x03"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x00"
|
|
else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in
|
|
*1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03" ; add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
*1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02" ; add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01" ; add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00" ; add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode"
|
|
|
|
ccs_message=", x14, $tls_hexcode ,x00, x01, x01"
|
|
|
|
client_hello="
|
|
# TLS header (5 bytes)
|
|
,x16, # content type (x16 for handshake)
|
|
x03, x01, # TLS version in record layer is always TLS 1.0 (except SSLv3)
|
|
x00, x93, # length
|
|
# Handshake header
|
|
x01, # type (x01 for ClientHello)
|
|
x00, x00, x8f, # length
|
|
$tls_hexcode, # TLS version
|
|
# Random (32 byte)
|
|
x53, x43, x5b, x90, x9d, x9b, x72, x0b,
|
|
xbc, x0c, xbc, x2b, x92, xa8, x48, x97,
|
|
xcf, xbd, x39, x04, xcc, x16, x0b, x85,
|
|
x03, x90, x9f, x77, x04, x33, xd4, xde,
|
|
x00, # session ID length
|
|
x00, x68, # cipher suites length
|
|
# Cipher suites (51 suites)
|
|
xc0, x13, xc0, x12, xc0, x11, xc0, x10,
|
|
xc0, x0f, xc0, x0e, xc0, x0d, xc0, x0c,
|
|
xc0, x0b, xc0, x0a, xc0, x09, xc0, x08,
|
|
xc0, x07, xc0, x06, xc0, x05, xc0, x04,
|
|
xc0, x03, xc0, x02, xc0, x01, x00, x39,
|
|
x00, x38, x00, x37, x00, x36, x00, x35, x00, x34,
|
|
x00, x33, x00, x32, x00, x31, x00, x30,
|
|
x00, x2f, x00, x16, x00, x15, x00, x14,
|
|
x00, x13, x00, x12, x00, x11, x00, x10,
|
|
x00, x0f, x00, x0e, x00, x0d, x00, x0c,
|
|
x00, x0b, x00, x0a, x00, x09, x00, x08,
|
|
x00, x07, x00, x06, x00, x05, x00, x04,
|
|
x00, x03, x00, x02, x00, x01, x01, x00"
|
|
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 1
|
|
|
|
# we now make a standard handshake ...
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend "$client_hello" 1
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello... "
|
|
sockread 32768
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20
|
|
tmln_out "[...]"
|
|
tm_out "\nsending payload #1 with TLS version $tls_hexcode: "
|
|
fi
|
|
rm "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
# ... and then send the change cipher spec message
|
|
socksend "$ccs_message" 1 || ok_ids
|
|
sockread 4096 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out "\n1st reply: "
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
tm_out "sending payload #2 with TLS version $tls_hexcode: "
|
|
fi
|
|
rm "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
|
|
socksend "$ccs_message" 2 || ok_ids
|
|
sockread 4096 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
retval=$?
|
|
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
byte6="${tls_hello_ascii:12:2}"
|
|
debugme echo "tls_content_type: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2} | tls_protocol: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4} | byte6: $byte6"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out "\n2nd reply: "
|
|
hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# in general, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Alert_protocol
|
|
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2
|
|
#
|
|
# not ok for CCSI: 15 | 0301 | 00 02 | 02 15
|
|
# ALERT | TLS 1.0 | Length=2 | Decryption failed (21)
|
|
#
|
|
# ok: nothing: ==> RST
|
|
#
|
|
# 0A: Unexpected message
|
|
# 28: Handshake failure
|
|
if [[ -z "${tls_hello_ascii:0:12}" ]]; then
|
|
# empty reply
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
if [[ $retval -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable (timed out)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" == "1503" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ! "${tls_hello_ascii:5:2}" =~ [03|02|01|00] ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "test failed "
|
|
out "no proper TLS reply (debug info: protocol sent: 1503${tls_hexcode#x03, x}, reply: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:14}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around line $LINENO, debug info (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
elif [[ "$byte6" == "15" ]]; then
|
|
# decryption failed received
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to CCS injection"
|
|
elif [[ "$byte6" == "0A" ]] || [[ "$byte6" == "28" ]]; then
|
|
# Unexpected message / Handshake failure received
|
|
pr_warning "likely "
|
|
out "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
out " - alert description type: $byte6"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "probably not vulnerable but received 0x${byte6} instead of 0x15" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
elif [[ "$byte6" == "14" ]]; then
|
|
# bad_record_mac -- this is not "not vulnerable"
|
|
out "likely "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
out ", suspicious \"bad_record_mac\" ($byte6)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "likely VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
# other errors, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2
|
|
out "likely "
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
out ", suspicious error code \"$byte6\" returned. Please report"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "likely VULNERABLE with $byte6" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL == "mysql" ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:14:12}" == "233038533031" ]]; then
|
|
# MySQL community edition (yaSSL) returns a MySQL error instead of a TLS Alert
|
|
# Error: #08S01 Bad handshake
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
out ", looks like MySQL community edition (yaSSL)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable (MySQL community edition (yaSSL) detected)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ "$byte6" == [0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:2:2}" != "03" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "test failed"
|
|
out ", probably read buffer too small (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, probably read buffer too small (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "test failed "
|
|
out "around line $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:12},$byte6)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around line $LINENO, debug info (${tls_hello_ascii:0:12},$byte6)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub_session_ticket_tls() {
|
|
local tls_proto="$1"
|
|
local sessticket_tls=""
|
|
#FIXME: we likely have done this already before (either @ run_server_defaults() or at least the output
|
|
# from a previous handshake) --> would save 1x connect. We have TLS_TICKET but not yet the ticket itself #FIXME
|
|
#ATTENTION: we DO NOT use SNI here as we assume ticketbleed is a vulnerability of the TLS stack. If we'd do SNI here, we'd also need
|
|
# it in the ClientHello of run_ticketbleed() otherwise the ticket will be different and the whole thing won't work!
|
|
#
|
|
sessticket_tls="$($OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$BUGS $tls_proto $PROXY -connect $NODEIP:$PORT") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE | awk '/TLS session ticket:/,/^$/' | awk '!/TLS session ticket/')"
|
|
sessticket_tls="$(sed -e 's/^.* - /x/g' -e 's/ .*$//g' <<< "$sessticket_tls" | tr '\n' ',')"
|
|
sed -e 's/ /,x/g' -e 's/-/,x/g' <<< "$sessticket_tls"
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# see https://blog.filippo.io/finding-ticketbleed/ | https://filippo.io/ticketbleed/
|
|
run_ticketbleed() {
|
|
local tls_hexcode tls_proto=""
|
|
local session_tckt_tls=""
|
|
local -i len_ch=300 # fixed len of prepared clienthello below
|
|
local sid="x00,x0B,xAD,xC0,xDE,x00," # some arbitrary bytes
|
|
local len_sid="$(( ${#sid} / 4))"
|
|
local xlen_sid="$(dec02hex $len_sid)"
|
|
local -i len_tckt_tls=0 nr_sid_detected=0
|
|
local xlen_tckt_tls="" xlen_handshake_record_layer="" xlen_handshake_ssl_layer=""
|
|
local -i len_handshake_record_layer=0
|
|
local i
|
|
local -a memory sid_detected
|
|
local early_exit=true
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local jsonID="ticketbleed"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2016-9244"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-200"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Ticketbleed vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " Ticketbleed"; out " ($cve), experiment. "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$SERVICE" != HTTP ]] && [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]]; then
|
|
outln "-- (applicable only for HTTPS)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not applicable, not HTTP" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# highly unlikely that it is NOT supported. We may loose time here but it's more solid
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]] && determine_tls_extensions
|
|
if [[ ! "${TLS_EXTENSIONS}" =~ "session ticket" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no session ticket extension"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "no session ticket extension" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x01"; tls_proto="-tls1"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x02"; tls_proto="-tls1_1"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x03"; tls_proto="-tls1_2"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="x03, x00"; tls_proto="-ssl3"
|
|
else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && tls_proto="-no_tls1_3"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $tls_proto -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in
|
|
*1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03"; tls_proto="-tls1_2" ; add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
*1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02"; tls_proto="-tls1_1" ; add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01"; tls_proto="-tls1" ; add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00"; tls_proto="-ssl3" ; add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode"
|
|
|
|
session_tckt_tls="$(sub_session_ticket_tls "$tls_proto")"
|
|
if [[ "$session_tckt_tls" == "," ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no session tickets"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
debugme echo " session ticket TLS \"$session_tckt_tls\""
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
len_tckt_tls=${#session_tckt_tls}
|
|
len_tckt_tls=$(( len_tckt_tls / 4))
|
|
xlen_tckt_tls="$(dec02hex $len_tckt_tls)"
|
|
len_handshake_record_layer="$(( len_sid + len_ch + len_tckt_tls ))"
|
|
xlen_handshake_record_layer="$(dec04hex "$len_handshake_record_layer")"
|
|
len_handshake_ssl_layer="$(( len_handshake_record_layer + 4 ))"
|
|
xlen_handshake_ssl_layer="$(dec04hex "$len_handshake_ssl_layer")"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
echo "len_tckt_tls (hex): $len_tckt_tls ($xlen_tckt_tls)"
|
|
echo "sid: $sid"
|
|
echo "len_sid (hex) $len_sid ($xlen_sid)"
|
|
echo "len_handshake_record_layer: $len_handshake_record_layer ($xlen_handshake_record_layer)"
|
|
echo "len_handshake_ssl_layer: $len_handshake_ssl_layer ($xlen_handshake_ssl_layer)"
|
|
echo "session_tckt_tls: $session_tckt_tls"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
client_hello="
|
|
# TLS header (5 bytes)
|
|
,x16, # Content type (x16 for handshake)
|
|
x03,x01, # TLS version record layer
|
|
# Length Secure Socket Layer follows:
|
|
$xlen_handshake_ssl_layer,
|
|
# Handshake header
|
|
x01, # Type (x01 for ClientHello)
|
|
# Length of ClientHello follows:
|
|
x00, $xlen_handshake_record_layer,
|
|
$tls_hexcode, # TLS Version
|
|
# Random (32 byte) Unix time etc, see www.moserware.com/2009/06/first-few-milliseconds-of-https.html
|
|
xee, xee, x5b, x90, x9d, x9b, x72, x0b,
|
|
xbc, x0c, xbc, x2b, x92, xa8, x48, x97,
|
|
xcf, xbd, x39, x04, xcc, x16, x0b, x85,
|
|
x03, x90, x9f, x77, x04, x33, xff, xff,
|
|
$xlen_sid, # Session ID length
|
|
$sid
|
|
x00, x6a, # Cipher suites length 106
|
|
# 53 Cipher suites
|
|
xc0,x14, xc0,x13, xc0,x0a, xc0,x21,
|
|
x00,x39, x00,x38, x00,x88, x00,x87,
|
|
xc0,x0f, xc0,x05, x00,x35, x00,x84,
|
|
xc0,x12, xc0,x08, xc0,x1c, xc0,x1b,
|
|
x00,x16, x00,x13, xc0,x0d, xc0,x03,
|
|
x00,x0a, xc0,x13, xc0,x09, xc0,x1f,
|
|
xc0,x1e, x00,x33, x00,x32, x00,x9a,
|
|
x00,x99, x00,x45, x00,x44, xc0,x0e,
|
|
xc0,x04, x00,x2f, x00,x96, x00,x41,
|
|
xc0,x11, xc0,x07, xc0,x0c, xc0,x02,
|
|
x00,x05, x00,x04, x00,x15, x00,x12,
|
|
xc0,x30, xc0,x2f, x00,x9d, x00,x9c,
|
|
x00,x3d, x00,x3c, x00,x9f, x00,x9e,
|
|
x00,xff,
|
|
x01, # Compression methods length
|
|
x00, # Compression method (x00 for NULL)
|
|
x01,x5b, # Extensions length ####### 10b + x14 + x3c
|
|
# Extension Padding
|
|
x00,x15,
|
|
# length:
|
|
x00,x38,
|
|
x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00,
|
|
x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00,
|
|
x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00,
|
|
# Extension: ec_point_formats
|
|
x00,x0b,
|
|
# length:
|
|
x00,x04,
|
|
# data:
|
|
x03,x00, x01,x02,
|
|
# Extension: elliptic_curves
|
|
x00,x0a,
|
|
# length
|
|
x00,x34,
|
|
x00,x32,
|
|
# data:
|
|
x00,x0e, x00,x0d, x00,x19, x00,x0b, x00,x0c,
|
|
x00,x18, x00,x09, x00,x0a, x00,x16,
|
|
x00,x17, x00,x08, x00,x06, x00,x07,
|
|
x00,x14, x00,x15, x00,x04, x00,x05,
|
|
x00,x12, x00,x13, x00,x01, x00,x02,
|
|
x00,x03, x00,x0f, x00,x10, x00,x11,
|
|
# Extension: Signature Algorithms
|
|
x00,x0d,
|
|
# length:
|
|
x00,x10,
|
|
# data:
|
|
x00,x0e ,x04,x01, x05,x01 ,x02,x01, x04,x03, x05,x03,
|
|
x02,x03, x02,x02,
|
|
# Extension: SessionTicket TLS
|
|
x00, x23,
|
|
# length of SessionTicket TLS
|
|
x00, $xlen_tckt_tls,
|
|
# data, Session Ticket
|
|
$session_tckt_tls # here we have the comma already
|
|
# Extension: Heartbeat
|
|
x00, x0f, x00, x01, x01"
|
|
|
|
# we do 3 client hellos, then see whether different memory is returned
|
|
for i in 1 2 3; do
|
|
fd_socket 5 || return 6
|
|
debugme echo -n "sending client hello... "
|
|
socksend "$client_hello" 0
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "reading server hello (ticketbleed reply)... "
|
|
if "$FAST_SOCKET"; then
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(sockread_fast 32768)
|
|
else
|
|
sockread 32768 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$tls_hello_ascii"
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then
|
|
echo "============================="
|
|
echo "$tls_hello_ascii"
|
|
echo "============================="
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" == 15 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "TLS Alert ${tls_hello_ascii:10:4} (TLS version: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}) -- "
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
break
|
|
elif [[ -z "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
out ", reply empty"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
break
|
|
elif [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" == 16 ]]; then
|
|
early_exit=false
|
|
debugme echo -n "Handshake (TLS version: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}), "
|
|
if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:10:6}" == 020000 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -n "ServerHello -- "
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -n "Message type: ${tls_hello_ascii:10:6} -- "
|
|
fi
|
|
sid_input=$(sed -e 's/x//g' -e 's/,//g' <<< "$sid")
|
|
sid_detected[i]="${tls_hello_ascii:88:32}"
|
|
memory[i]="${tls_hello_ascii:$((88+ len_sid*2)):$((32 - len_sid*2))}"
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 3 ]]; then
|
|
echo
|
|
echo "TLS version, record layer: ${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
echo "Session ID: ${sid_detected[i]}"
|
|
echo "memory: ${memory[i]}"
|
|
echo -n "$sid_input in SID: " ;
|
|
[[ "${sid_detected[i]}" =~ $sid_input ]] && echo "yes" || echo "no"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo $tls_hello_ascii >$TEMPDIR/${FUNCNAME[0]}.tls_hello_ascii${i}.txt
|
|
else
|
|
ret=1
|
|
pr_warning "test failed"
|
|
out " around line $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}, ${tls_hello_ascii:2:10})"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}, ${tls_hello_ascii:2:10})" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if ! "$early_exit"; then
|
|
# here we test the replies if a TLS server hello was received >1x
|
|
for i in 1 2 3 ; do
|
|
if [[ "${sid_detected[i]}" =~ $sid_input ]]; then
|
|
# was our faked TLS SID returned?
|
|
nr_sid_detected+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $nr_sid_detected -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${memory[1]} != ${memory[2]} ]] && [[ ${memory[2]} != ${memory[3]} ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to Ticketbleed"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
out ", session IDs were returned but potential memory fragments do not differ"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, returned potential memory fragments do not differ" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo
|
|
pr_warning "test failed, non reproducible results!"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "test failed, non reproducible results!"
|
|
out " Please run again w \"--debug=2\" (# of faked TLS SIDs detected: $nr_sid_detected)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, non reproducible results. $nr_sid_detected TLS Session IDs $nr_sid_detected, ${sid_detected[1]},${sid_detected[2]},${sid_detected[3]}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Overview @ http://www.exploresecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/custom/SSL_manual_cheatsheet.html
|
|
#
|
|
run_renego() {
|
|
local legacycmd="" proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
local sec_renego sec_client_renego
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local cve=""
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID=""
|
|
local ssl_reneg_attempts=$SSL_RENEG_ATTEMPTS
|
|
# No SNI needed here as there won't be two different SSL stacks for one IP
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && [[ -z "$proto" ]] && proto="-no_tls1_3"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Renegotiation vulnerabilities " && outln
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) "
|
|
jsonID="secure_renego"
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
# https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2018/02/08/tlsv1.3/
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
# first fingerprint for the Line "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" or "Secure Renegotiation IS "
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") 2>&1 </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
grep -iaq "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" $TMPFILE
|
|
sec_renego=$? # 0= Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
|
|
# grep -iaq "Secure Renegotiation IS supported"
|
|
#FIXME: didn't occur to me yet but why not also to check on "Secure Renegotiation IS supported"
|
|
case $sec_renego in
|
|
0) prln_svrty_critical "Not supported / VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_warning "Secure renegotiation is not supported"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) prln_svrty_best "supported (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "supported" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_renego"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "FIXME (bug) $sec_renego" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
prln_warning "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# FIXME: Basically this can be done with sockets and we might have that information already
|
|
# see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.4: 'The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info"
|
|
# extension, or the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV signaling cipher suite value in the ClientHello. [..]
|
|
# When a ServerHello is received, the client MUST check if it includes the "renegotiation_info" extension:
|
|
# If the extension is not present, the server does not support secure renegotiation'
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation "
|
|
jsonID="secure_client_renego"
|
|
cve="CVE-2011-1473"
|
|
# see: https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks
|
|
# https://blog.ivanristic.com/2009/12/testing-for-ssl-renegotiation.html -- head/get doesn't seem to be needed though
|
|
# https://archive.fo/20130415224936/http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/
|
|
# https://vincent.bernat.ch/en/blog/2011-ssl-dos-mitigation
|
|
case "$OSSL_VER" in
|
|
0.9.8*) # we need this for Mac OSX unfortunately
|
|
case "$OSSL_VER_APPENDIX" in
|
|
[a-l])
|
|
prln_local_problem " Your $OPENSSL cannot test this secure renegotiation vulnerability"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "your $OPENSSL cannot test this secure renegotiation vulnerability" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
[m-z])
|
|
;; # all ok
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
1.0.1*|1.0.2*)
|
|
legacycmd="-legacy_renegotiation"
|
|
;;
|
|
0.9.9*|1.0*|1.1*)
|
|
;; # all ok
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
|
|
sec_client_renego=1
|
|
else
|
|
# We need up to two tries here, as some LiteSpeed servers don't answer on "R" and block. Thus first try in the background
|
|
# msg enables us to look deeper into it while debugging
|
|
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS $legacycmd $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "likely not vulnerable (OK)"; outln ", timed out" # it hung
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "likely not vulnerable (timed out)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
sec_client_renego=1
|
|
else
|
|
# second try in the foreground as we are sure now it won't hang
|
|
echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
sec_client_renego=$?
|
|
# 0 means client is renegotiating & doesn't return an error --> vuln!
|
|
# 1 means client tried to renegotiating but the server side errored then. You still see RENEGOTIATING in the output
|
|
if tail -5 $TMPFILE| grep -qa '^closed'; then
|
|
# Exemption from above: server closed the connection but return value was zero
|
|
# See https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1725 and referenced issue @haproxy
|
|
sec_client_renego=1
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$sec_client_renego" in
|
|
0) # We try again if server is HTTP. This could be either a node.js server or something else.
|
|
# Mitigations (default values) for:
|
|
# - node.js allows 3x R and then blocks. So then 4x should be tested.
|
|
# - F5 BIG-IP ADS allows 5x R and then blocks. So then 6x should be tested.
|
|
# This way we save a couple seconds as we weeded out the ones which are more robust
|
|
# Amount of times tested before breaking is set in SSL_RENEG_ATTEMPTS.
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", potential DoS threat"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, potential DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
(for ((i=0; i < ssl_reneg_attempts; i++ )); do echo R; sleep 1; done) | \
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
case $? in
|
|
0) pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", DoS threat ($ssl_reneg_attempts attempts)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
;;
|
|
1) pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " -- mitigated (disconnect within $ssl_reneg_attempts)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, mitigated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_client_renego ($ssl_reneg_attempts tries)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "FIXME (bug $ssl_reneg_attempts tries) $sec_client_renego" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
1)
|
|
prln_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_client_renego"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "FIXME (bug) $sec_client_renego - Please report" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
#pr_bold " Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation " # pre-RFC 5746, CVE-2009-3555
|
|
#jsonID="insecure_client_renego"
|
|
#
|
|
# https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#y2009. It can only be tested with OpenSSL <=0.9.8k
|
|
# Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation is missing ==> sockets. When we complete the handshake ;-)
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_crime() {
|
|
local -i ret=0 sclient_success
|
|
local addcmd=""
|
|
local cve="CVE-2012-4929"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
|
|
# In a nutshell: don't offer TLS/SPDY compression. This tests for CRIME Vulnerability on HTTPS only,
|
|
# not SPDY or ALPN (yet). Please note that it is an attack where you need client side control, so in
|
|
# regular situations this # means anyway "game over", with or without CRIME.
|
|
#
|
|
# https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2012/09/14/crime-information-leakage-attack-against-ssltls
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CRIME vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " CRIME, TLS " ; out "($cve) "
|
|
jsonID="CRIME_TLS"
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no compression in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$HAS_ZLIB"; then
|
|
if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks zlib support"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "CRIME, TLS: Not tested. $OPENSSL lacks zlib support" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "" "" "true"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$OSSL_VER" == 0.9.8* ]] && addcmd="-no_ssl2"
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]] && addcmd+=" -no_tls1_3"
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -comp $addcmd $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null &>$TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed, couldn't connect" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
elif grep -a Compression $TMPFILE | grep -aq NONE >/dev/null; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]]; then
|
|
out " (not using HTTP anyway)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable (not using HTTP anyway)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE but not using HTTP: probably no exploit known"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, but not using HTTP. Probably no exploit known" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
# not clear whether a protocol != HTTP offers the ability to repeatedly modify the input
|
|
# which is done e.g. via javascript in the context of HTTP
|
|
fi
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "Vulnerable to CRIME"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
# this needs to be re-done i order to remove the redundant check for spdy
|
|
|
|
# weed out starttls, spdy-crime is a web thingy
|
|
# if [[ "x$STARTTLS" != "x" ]]; then
|
|
# echo
|
|
# return $ret
|
|
# fi
|
|
|
|
# weed out non-webports, spdy-crime is a web thingy. there's a catch thoug, you see it?
|
|
# case $PORT in
|
|
# 25|465|587|80|110|143|993|995|21)
|
|
# echo
|
|
# return $ret
|
|
# esac
|
|
|
|
# if "$HAS_NPN"; then
|
|
# $OPENSSL s_client -host $NODE -port $PORT -nextprotoneg $NPN_PROTOs $SNI </dev/null 2>/dev/null >$TMPFILE
|
|
# if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# echo
|
|
# pr_bold "CRIME Vulnerability, SPDY " ; outln "($cve): "
|
|
|
|
# STR=$(grep Compression $TMPFILE )
|
|
# if echo $STR | grep -q NONE >/dev/null; then
|
|
# pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
# ret=$((ret + 0))
|
|
# else
|
|
# pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
# ret=$((ret + 1))
|
|
# fi
|
|
# fi
|
|
# fi
|
|
# [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] tmln_out "$STR"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# As the name says. It expects as arg1 a GET command string. It returns 1
|
|
# when GET command was stalled or killed (which is no not always used)
|
|
# and echos "warn_*". It return 0 when everything went ok and echos the
|
|
# compression if any.
|
|
sub_breach_helper() {
|
|
local get_command="$1"
|
|
local detected_compression=""
|
|
local -i was_killed=0
|
|
|
|
safe_echo "$get_command" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 1>$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
was_killed=$? # !=0 when it was killed
|
|
detected_compression=$(grep -ia ^Content-Encoding: $TMPFILE)
|
|
detected_compression="$(strip_lf "$detected_compression")"
|
|
detected_compression="${detected_compression#*:}"
|
|
detected_compression="$(strip_spaces "$detected_compression")"
|
|
if [[ ! -s $TMPFILE ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $was_killed -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo "warn_stalled"
|
|
else
|
|
echo "warn_killed"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ -z $detected_compression ]]; then
|
|
echo "no_compression"
|
|
else
|
|
echo "$detected_compression"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# BREACH is a HTTP-level compression & an attack which works against any cipher suite and is agnostic to the
|
|
# version of TLS/SSL, more: http://www.breachattack.com/ . External referrers are the important thing here!
|
|
# Mitigation: see https://community.qualys.com/message/20360
|
|
# Any URL can be vulnerable. Here only the given URL is tested. See also $when_makesense
|
|
#
|
|
run_breach() {
|
|
local header
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local referer useragent
|
|
local url="$1"
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local disclaimer=""
|
|
local when_makesense=" Can be ignored for static pages or if no secrets in the page"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2013-3587"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint="" c=""
|
|
local jsonID="BREACH"
|
|
local compressions="gzip deflate compress br"
|
|
local has_compression=()
|
|
local detected_compression=""
|
|
local get_command=""
|
|
|
|
[[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" != required ]] && return 7
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for BREACH (HTTP compression) vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " BREACH"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
if [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == required ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$url" ]] && url="/"
|
|
disclaimer=" - only supplied \"$url\" tested"
|
|
|
|
referer="https://google.com/"
|
|
[[ "$NODE" =~ google ]] && referer="https://yandex.ru/" # otherwise we have a false positive for google.com
|
|
useragent="$UA_STD"
|
|
$SNEAKY && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY"
|
|
|
|
# Assemble the GET command with all available compressions and send them all, initially.
|
|
# If the result is negative: we can just tell the finding and return. If it's
|
|
# positive: We already have identified 1x compression
|
|
get_command="GET $url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nReferer: $referer\r\nConnection: Close\r\nAccept-encoding: ${compressions// /,}\r\nAccept: text/*\r\n\r\n"
|
|
detected_compression=$(sub_breach_helper "$get_command")
|
|
case "$detected_compression" in
|
|
warn_stalled)
|
|
pr_warning "First request failed (HTTP header request stalled and was terminated)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as first HTTP request stalled and was terminated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
warn_failed)
|
|
pr_warning "First request failed (HTTP header request was empty)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as first HTTP response was empty" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
no_compression)
|
|
pr_svrty_good "no gzip/deflate/compress/br HTTP compression (OK) "
|
|
outln "$disclaimer"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no gzip/deflate/compress/br HTTP compression $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=0
|
|
;;
|
|
*) # Now assemble the remaining compressions in $compressions and loop through them
|
|
has_compression+=("$detected_compression:yes")
|
|
compressions="${compressions//$detected_compression/}"
|
|
for c in $compressions; do
|
|
get_command="GET $url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nReferer: $referer\r\nConnection: Close\r\nAccept-encoding: ${c}\r\nAccept: text/*\r\n\r\n"
|
|
detected_compression=$(sub_breach_helper "$get_command")
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# This failure unlikely here. The initial request must have succeeded and this one then
|
|
# failed but we'd rather treat this correctly (e.d. IDS which triggers later). Not also
|
|
# we exit on the first stalled request. So if the first one with all compressions failed,
|
|
# we don't get here. It seems very unlikely the first failed and subsequent will succeed.
|
|
has_compression+=("$c:$compressions")
|
|
elif [[ "$detected_compression" =~ no_compression ]]; then
|
|
has_compression+=("$c:no")
|
|
debugme echo "has_compression: $c: no"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$detected_compression" ]]; then
|
|
has_compression+=("$c:yes")
|
|
debugme echo "has_compression: $c: yes"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_fixme "strange reply around line $((LINENO)) from sub_breach_helper()"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Final verdict (if not happened preemptively before). We reuse $detected_compression here
|
|
detected_compression=""
|
|
if [[ ${has_compression[@]} =~ warn ]]; then
|
|
# warn_empty / warn_stalled
|
|
if [[ ${has_compression[@]} =~ warn_empty ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "At least 1/4 checks failed (HTTP header request was empty, debug: ${has_compression[@]}"
|
|
out ", debug: ${has_compression[@]})"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP response was empty, debug: ${has_compression[@]}" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else # warn_stalled
|
|
pr_warning "At least 1/4 checks failed (HTTP header request stalled and was terminated"
|
|
out ", debug: ${has_compression[@]})"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP request stalled and was terminated" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
for c in ${has_compression[@]}; do
|
|
if [[ $c =~ yes ]]; then
|
|
detected_compression+="${c%:*} "
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
detected_compression="$(strip_trailing_space "$detected_compression")"
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "potentially NOT ok, \"$detected_compression\" HTTP compression detected."
|
|
outln "$disclaimer"
|
|
outln "${spaces}${when_makesense}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "potentially VULNERABLE, $detected_compression HTTP compression detected $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme outln "${spaces}has_compression: ${has_compression[@]}"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# SWEET32 (https://sweet32.info/). Birthday attacks on 64-bit block ciphers.
|
|
# In a nutshell: don't use 3DES ciphers anymore (DES, RC2 and IDEA too).
|
|
# Please note as opposed to RC4 (stream cipher) RC2 is a block cipher.
|
|
#
|
|
run_sweet32() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success=1
|
|
local sweet32_ciphers="IDEA-CBC-SHA:IDEA-CBC-MD5:RC2-CBC-MD5:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DES-CFB-M1:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
local sweet32_ciphers_hex="00,07, 00,21, 00,25, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, 00,1e, 00,22, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
local ssl2_sweet32_ciphers='RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:IDEA-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC3-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CFB-M1'
|
|
local ssl2_sweet32_ciphers_hex='03,00,80, 04,00,80, 05,00,80, 06,00,40, 06,01,40, 07,00,C0, 07,01,C0, FF,80,00'
|
|
local nr_cipher_minimal=21
|
|
local proto
|
|
local cve="CVE-2016-2183 CVE-2016-6329"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-327"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local -i nr_sweet32_ciphers=0 nr_supported_ciphers=0 nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers=0 nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers=0
|
|
local ssl2_sweet=false
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local tls1_1_vulnerable=false
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SWEET32 (Birthday Attacks on 64-bit Block Ciphers) " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " SWEET32"; out " (${cve// /, }) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
# Unfortunately there's no restriction using TLS 1.2 with $sweet32_ciphers
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", TLS 1.3 doesn't offer such ciphers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing).
|
|
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here.
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for proto in 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${sweet32_ciphers_hex}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "$ssl2_sweet32_ciphers_hex"
|
|
case $? in
|
|
3) ssl2_sweet=true
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes ;;
|
|
0) ;; # ssl2_sweet=false
|
|
1|4|6|7) debugme "${FUNCNAME[0]}: test problem we don't handle here"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
nr_sweet32_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $sweet32_ciphers)
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $sweet32_ciphers))
|
|
debugme echo "$nr_sweet32_ciphers / $nr_supported_ciphers"
|
|
|
|
nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers)
|
|
nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers))
|
|
debugme echo "$nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers / $nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $(( nr_supported_ciphers + nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers )) -le $nr_cipher_minimal ]]; then
|
|
pr_local_problem "Only ${nr_supported_ciphers}+${nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers} \"SWEET32 ciphers\" found in your $OPENSSL."
|
|
outln " Test skipped"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "Not tested, lack of local support ($((nr_supported_ciphers + nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) ciphers only)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do
|
|
[[ $nr_supported_ciphers -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$proto" == -ssl3 ]] && continue
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
"$FAST" && break
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
fi
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $proto -cipher $sweet32_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
[[ $proto == -tls1_1 && $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && tls1_1_vulnerable=true
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
if [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -ssl2 -cipher $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ssl2_sweet=true
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
debugme tm_warning "Can't test with SSLv2 here as $OPENSSL lacks support"
|
|
# we omit adding a string for DEBUG==0 here as using sockets is the default and the following elif statement becomes ugly
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && "$ssl2_sweet" ; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers for SSLv2 and above"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers for SSLv2 and above" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
"$tls1_1_vulnerable" && set_grade_cap "C" "Uses 64 bit block ciphers with TLS 1.1 (vulnerable to SWEET32)"
|
|
elif [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
"$tls1_1_vulnerable" && set_grade_cap "C" "Uses 64 bit block ciphers with TLS 1.1 (vulnerable to SWEET32)"
|
|
elif "$ssl2_sweet"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers with SSLv2 only"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers with SSLv2 only" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)";
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 38 ]]; then
|
|
# Likely only PSK/KRB5 ciphers are missing: display discrepancy but no warning
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers) local ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers) local ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "not vulnerable but ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) local ciphers only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "not vulnerable but ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers) local ciphers only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption, in a nutshell: don't use CBC Ciphers in SSLv3
|
|
run_ssl_poodle() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success=0
|
|
local cbc_ciphers="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:AES256-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA:ADH-SEED-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:AES128-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:IDEA-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
local cbc_ciphers_hex="c0,14, c0,0a, c0,22, c0,21, c0,20, 00,91, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,19, 00,3a, 00,89, c0,0f, c0,05, 00,35, c0,36, 00,84, 00,95, 00,8d, c0,13, c0,09, c0,1f, c0,1e, c0,1d, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,18, 00,34, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,0e, c0,04, 00,2f, c0,35, 00,90, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, 00,94, 00,8c, 00,21, 00,25, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,1e, 00,22, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local -i nr_cbc_ciphers=0
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-3566"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local jsonID="POODLE_SSL"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SSLv3 POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " POODLE, SSL"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY" || [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
# one condition should normally suffice but we don't know when run_poddle() was called
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no SSLv3 support"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSLv3" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK and KRB5 ciphers are typically missing).
|
|
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "$cbc_ciphers_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
else
|
|
if ! "$HAS_SSL3"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support SSLv3"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_cbc_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $cbc_ciphers)
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $cbc_ciphers))
|
|
# SNI not needed as SSLv3 has none:
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-ssl3 $STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $cbc_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -eq 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
POODLE=0
|
|
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; out ", uses SSLv3+CBC (check TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mitigation below)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, uses SSLv3+CBC" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "Vulnerable to POODLE"
|
|
else
|
|
POODLE=1
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)";
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 83 ]]; then
|
|
# Likely only KRB and PSK cipher are missing: display discrepancy but no warning
|
|
out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# for appliance which use padding, no fallback needed
|
|
run_tls_poodle() {
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-8730"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local jsonID="POODLE_TLS"
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " POODLE, TLS"; out " ($cve), experimental "
|
|
#FIXME
|
|
prln_warning "#FIXME"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not yet implemented #FIXME" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
# set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to POODLE TLS"
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#FIXME: fileout needs to be patched according to new scheme. Postponed as otherwise merge fails ??
|
|
#
|
|
# This isn't a vulnerability check per se, but checks for the existence of
|
|
# the countermeasure to protect against protocol downgrade attacks.
|
|
#
|
|
run_tls_fallback_scsv() {
|
|
local -i ret=0 debug_level
|
|
local high_proto="" low_proto=""
|
|
local p high_proto_str protos_to_try
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local jsonID="fallback_SCSV"
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV Protection " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV"; out " (RFC 7507) "
|
|
|
|
# First check we have support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in our local OpenSSL
|
|
if ! "$HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV" && ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL lacks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# First determine the highest protocol that the server supports (not including TLSv1.3).
|
|
if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "No fallback possible, SSLv2 is the only protocol"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "SSLv2 is the only protocol"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
for p in tls1_2 tls1_1 tls1 ssl3; do
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
high_proto="$p"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$p" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3"; then
|
|
"$using_sockets" || continue
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
high_proto="$p"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 yes
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 no
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-$p $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
high_proto="$p"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
case "$high_proto" in
|
|
"tls1_2")
|
|
high_proto_str="TLS 1.2"
|
|
protos_to_try="tls1_1 tls1 ssl3" ;;
|
|
"tls1_1")
|
|
high_proto_str="TLS 1.1"
|
|
protos_to_try="tls1 ssl3" ;;
|
|
"tls1")
|
|
high_proto_str="TLS 1"
|
|
protos_to_try="ssl3" ;;
|
|
"ssl3")
|
|
prln_svrty_high "No fallback possible, SSLv3 is the only protocol"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "only SSLv3 supported"
|
|
return 0
|
|
;;
|
|
*) if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# If the server supports TLS 1.3, and does not support TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1,
|
|
# then assume it does not support SSLv3, even if SSLv3 cannot be tested.
|
|
pr_svrty_good "No fallback possible (OK)"; outln ", TLS 1.3 is the only protocol"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "only TLS 1.3 supported"
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 1 ]] && \
|
|
( [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]] || "$HAS_SSL3" ); then
|
|
# TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, TLS 1, and SSLv3 are all not supported.
|
|
# This may be an SSLv2-only server, if $OPENSSL does not support SSLv2.
|
|
prln_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed. (couldn't connect)"
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
# If the server does not support TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1, and
|
|
# support for SSLv3 cannot be tested, then treat it as HIGH severity, since
|
|
# it is very likely that SSLv3 is the only supported protocol.
|
|
pr_svrty_high "NOT ok, no fallback possible"; outln ", TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.1 and 1.0 not supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.1, 1.0 not supported"
|
|
else
|
|
# TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 are not supported, but can't tell whether TLS 1.3 is supported.
|
|
# This could be a TLS 1.3 only server, an SSLv3 only server (if SSLv3 support cannot be tested),
|
|
# or a server that does not support SSLv3 or any TLS protocol. So, don't report a severity,
|
|
# since this could either be good or bad.
|
|
outln "No fallback possible, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 not supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 not supported"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Next find a second protocol that the server supports.
|
|
for p in $protos_to_try; do
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
low_proto="$p"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$p" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3"; then
|
|
"$using_sockets" || continue
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
low_proto="$p"
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 yes
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl3 no
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-$p $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
low_proto="$p"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if ! "$HAS_SSL3" && ! "$using_sockets" && \
|
|
( [[ "$low_proto" == ssl3 ]] || \
|
|
( [[ "$high_proto" == tls1 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 2 ]] ) ); then
|
|
# If the protocol that the server would fall back to is SSLv3, but $OPENSSL does
|
|
# not support SSLv3, then the test cannot be performed. So, if $OPENSSL does not
|
|
# support SSLv3 and it is known that SSLv3 is the fallback protocol ($low_proto), then
|
|
# the test cannot be performed. Similarly, if SSLv3 could be the fallback protocol, but
|
|
# support for SSLv3 is unknown, then the test cannot be performed.
|
|
# NOTE: This check assumes that any server that supports SSLv3 and either TLS 1.2 or
|
|
# TLS 1.1 would also support TLS 1. So, if $high_proto is not TLS 1, then it is assumed
|
|
# that either (1) $low_proto has already been set (to TLS1.1 or TLS 1) or (2) no protocol
|
|
# lower than $high_proto is offered.
|
|
prln_local_problem "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support SSLv3"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support SSLv3"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$low_proto" ]]; then
|
|
case "$high_proto" in
|
|
"tls1_2")
|
|
pr_svrty_good "No fallback possible (OK)"; outln ", no protocol below $high_proto_str offered"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) outln "No fallback possible, no protocol below $high_proto_str offered (OK)"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "no protocol below $high_proto_str offered"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
case "$low_proto" in
|
|
"tls1_1")
|
|
p="-no_tls1_2" ;;
|
|
"tls1")
|
|
p="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1" ;;
|
|
"ssl3")
|
|
p="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1 -no_tls1" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
"$HAS_TLS13" && p+=" -no_tls1_3"
|
|
debugme echo "Simulating fallback from $high_proto to $low_proto"
|
|
|
|
# ...and do the test (we need to parse the error here!)
|
|
if "$HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV" && sclient_supported "-$low_proto"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $p -fallback_scsv") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
else
|
|
# Need to ensure that $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt contains the results of the
|
|
# most recent calls to tls_sockets even if tls_sockets is not successful. Setting $DEBUG to
|
|
# a non-zero value ensures this. Setting it to 1 prevents any extra information from being
|
|
# displayed.
|
|
debug_level="$DEBUG"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -eq 0 ]] && DEBUG=1
|
|
> "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt"
|
|
|
|
# tls_sockets() needs to parse the full response since the following code is
|
|
# looking for "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" when the TLS connection is successful. It
|
|
# may be possible to speed up this code by having the following code check
|
|
# the return value from tls_sockets() to determine whether the connection was
|
|
# successful rather than looking for "BEGIN CERTIFICATE".
|
|
case "$low_proto" in
|
|
"tls1_1")
|
|
tls_sockets "02" "56,00, $TLS_CIPHER" "all" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"tls1")
|
|
tls_sockets "01" "56,00, $TLS_CIPHER" "all" "" "true" ;;
|
|
"ssl3")
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "56,00, $TLS_CIPHER" "all" "" "true" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
mv "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" "$TMPFILE"
|
|
DEBUG=$debug_level
|
|
fi
|
|
if grep -q "CONNECTED(00" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
if grep -qa "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
if [[ -z "$POODLE" ]]; then
|
|
pr_warning "Rerun including POODLE SSL check. "
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "NOT supported. Pls rerun with POODLE SSL check"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
elif [[ "$POODLE" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported and vulnerable to POODLE SSL"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "NOT supported and vulnerable to POODLE SSL"
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "Vulnerable to POODLE"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "NOT supported"
|
|
fi
|
|
set_grade_cap "A" "Does not support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV"
|
|
|
|
elif grep -qa "alert inappropriate fallback" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "Downgrade attack prevention supported (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "supported"
|
|
elif grep -qa "alert handshake failure" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "Probably OK. "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "Probably oK"
|
|
# see RFC 7507, https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/121
|
|
# other case reported by Nicolas was F5 and at costumer of mine: the same
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "But received non-RFC-compliant \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "received non-RFC-compliant \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\""
|
|
elif grep -qa "ssl handshake failure" "$TMPFILE"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "some unexpected \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\""
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "some unexpected \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\" (likely: warning)"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "Check failed, unexpected result "
|
|
out ", run $PROG_NAME -Z --debug=1 and look at $TEMPDIR/*tls_fallback_scsv.txt"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed, unexpected result, run $PROG_NAME -Z --debug=1 and look at $TEMPDIR/*tls_fallback_scsv.txt"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed. (couldn't connect)"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Factoring RSA Export Keys: don't use EXPORT RSA ciphers, see https://freakattack.com/
|
|
run_freak() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success=0
|
|
local -i i nr_supported_ciphers=0 len
|
|
# with correct build it should list these 9 ciphers (plus the two latter as SSLv2 ciphers):
|
|
local exportrsa_cipher_list="EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP1024-RC4-SHA:EXP1024-RC4-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC4-MD5"
|
|
local exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex="00,62, 00,61, 00,64, 00,60, 00,14, 00,0E, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03"
|
|
local exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex="04,00,80, 02,00,80, 00,00,00"
|
|
local detected_ssl2_ciphers
|
|
local addtl_warning="" hexc
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2015-0204"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="FREAK"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for FREAK attack " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " FREAK"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", TLS 1.3 only server"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_words "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex")+$(count_words "$exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex")
|
|
else
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportrsa_cipher_list))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case $nr_supported_ciphers in
|
|
0) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't have any EXPORT RSA ciphers configured"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not tested. $OPENSSL doesn't have any EXPORT RSA ciphers configured" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
;;
|
|
1|2|3)
|
|
addtl_warning=" ($magenta""tested only with $nr_supported_ciphers out of 9 ciphers only!$off)" ;;
|
|
4|5|6|7)
|
|
addtl_warning=" (tested with $nr_supported_ciphers/9 ciphers)" ;;
|
|
8|9|10|11)
|
|
addtl_warning="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
|
|
# TLS handshake failed with ciphers above. Now we check SSLv2 -- unless we know it's not available
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "$exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex="$(strip_spaces "${exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex//,/}")"
|
|
len=${#exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex}
|
|
detected_ssl2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len; i+=6 )); do
|
|
[[ "$detected_ssl2_ciphers" =~ x${exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex:i:6} ]] && sclient_success=0 && break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportrsa_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -no_ssl2") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
debugme grep -Ea "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportrsa_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; out ", uses EXPORT RSA ciphers"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE, uses EXPORT RSA ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$addtl_warning"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for hexc in ${exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex//, / } ${exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex//, / }; do
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 5 ]]; then
|
|
hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2},0x${hexc:6:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$hexc" == ${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]} ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && tm_out "$hexc " || tm_out "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} "
|
|
done
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
else
|
|
actually_supported_osslciphers $exportrsa_cipher_list
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ARGs see below
|
|
# Sets the global DH_GROUP_OFFERED, start value: "", after this function:
|
|
# DH_GROUP_OFFERED=""
|
|
# DH_GROUP_OFFERED="<name of group>"
|
|
# return: 1: common primes file problem, 2: no pkey support, 0: went w/o error
|
|
get_common_prime() {
|
|
local jsonID2="$1"
|
|
local key_bitstring="$2"
|
|
local spaces="$3"
|
|
local pubkey dh_p=""
|
|
local -i subret=0
|
|
local common_primes_file="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/common-primes.txt"
|
|
local -i lineno_matched=0
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_PKEY" || return 2
|
|
pubkey="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$key_bitstring")"
|
|
if [[ "$pubkey" =~ GROUP: ]]; then
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED="${pubkey#*GROUP: }"
|
|
case "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" in
|
|
modp_1536) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 5" ;;
|
|
modp_2048) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 14" ;;
|
|
modp_3072) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 15" ;;
|
|
modp_4096) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 16" ;;
|
|
modp_6144) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 17" ;;
|
|
modp_8192) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 18" ;;
|
|
dh_1024_160) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/1024-bit DSA group with 160-bit prime order subgroup" ;;
|
|
dh_2048_224) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/2048-bit DSA group with 224-bit prime order subgroup" ;;
|
|
dh_2048_256) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/2048-bit DSA group with 256-bit prime order subgroup" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
pubkey="$(awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }' <<< "$pubkey")"
|
|
DH_GROUP_LEN_P="${pubkey%% bit*}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
dh_p="$(awk '/prime:|P:/,/generator:|G:/' <<< "$pubkey" | grep -Ev "prime|P:|generator|G:")"
|
|
dh_p="$(strip_spaces "$(colon_to_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$dh_p")")")"
|
|
[[ "${dh_p:0:2}" == "00" ]] && dh_p="${dh_p:2}"
|
|
DH_GROUP_LEN_P="$((4*${#dh_p}))"
|
|
debugme tmln_out "len(dh_p): $DH_GROUP_LEN_P | dh_p: $dh_p"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -gt 1 ]] && echo "$dh_p" > $TEMPDIR/dh_p.txt
|
|
if [[ ! -s "$common_primes_file" ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "couldn't read common primes file $common_primes_file"
|
|
out "${spaces}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "WARN" "couldn't read common primes file $common_primes_file"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
dh_p="$(toupper "$dh_p")"
|
|
# In the previous line of the match is basically the hint we want to echo
|
|
# the most elegant thing to get the previous line [ awk '/regex/ { print x }; { x=$0 }' ] doesn't work with gawk
|
|
lineno_matched=$(grep -n "$dh_p" "$common_primes_file" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '{ print $1 }')
|
|
if [[ "$lineno_matched" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED="$(awk "NR == $lineno_matched-1" "$common_primes_file" | awk -F'"' '{ print $2 }')"
|
|
#subret=1 # vulnerable: common prime
|
|
else
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED="Unknown DH group"
|
|
:
|
|
#subret=0 # not vulnerable: no known common prime
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# helper function for run_logjam see below
|
|
#
|
|
out_common_prime() {
|
|
local jsonID2="$1"
|
|
local cve="$2"
|
|
local cwe="$3"
|
|
|
|
[[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" == ffdhe* ]] && [[ ! "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ \ ]] && DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC7919/$DH_GROUP_OFFERED"
|
|
if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ ffdhe ]] && [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ \ ]]; then
|
|
out "common primes detected: "; pr_italic "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
# Now (below) size matters -- i.e. the bit size. As this is about a known prime we label it more strict.
|
|
# This needs maybe needs another thought as it could appear inconsistent with run_fs and elsewhere.
|
|
# for now we label the bit size similar in the screen, but distinguish the leading text for logjam before
|
|
elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 800 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " common prime: "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "CRITICAL" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1024 ]]; then
|
|
# really? Here we assume that 1024-bit common prime for nation states are worth and possible to precompute (TBC)
|
|
# otherwise 1024 are just medium
|
|
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " common prime: "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "HIGH" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1536 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "common prime: "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "LOW" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
else
|
|
out "common prime with $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits detected: "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# see https://weakdh.org/logjam.html
|
|
run_logjam() {
|
|
local -i sclient_success=0
|
|
local exportdh_cipher_list="EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
local exportdh_cipher_list_hex="00,63, 00,65, 00,14, 00,11"
|
|
local all_dh_ciphers="cc,15, 00,b3, 00,91, c0,97, 00,a3, 00,9f, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,39, 00,38, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,88, 00,87, 00,a7, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, 00,ab, cc,ad, c0,a7, c0,43, c0,45, c0,47, c0,53, c0,57, c0,5b, c0,67, c0,6d, c0,7d, c0,81, c0,85, c0,91, 00,a2, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,aa, c0,a6, 00,67, 00,40, 00,33, 00,32, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,45, 00,44, 00,a6, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, 00,b2, 00,90, c0,96, c0,42, c0,44, c0,46, c0,52, c0,56, c0,5a, c0,66, c0,6c, c0,7c, c0,80, c0,84, c0,90, 00,66, 00,18, 00,8e, 00,16, 00,13, 00,1b, 00,8f, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,1a, 00,65, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,17, 00,b5, 00,b4, 00,2d" # 93 ciphers
|
|
local -i i nr_supported_ciphers=0 server_key_exchange_len=0 ephemeral_pub_len=0
|
|
local addtl_warning="" hexc
|
|
local -i ret=0 subret=0
|
|
local server_key_exchange key_bitstring=""
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local vuln_exportdh_ciphers=false
|
|
local openssl_no_expdhciphers=false
|
|
local str=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2015-4000"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="LOGJAM"
|
|
local jsonID2="${jsonID}-common_primes"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for LOGJAM vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " LOGJAM"; out " ($cve), experimental "
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# Also as the openssl binary distributed has everything we need measurements show that
|
|
# there's no impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here
|
|
if ! "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportdh_cipher_list))
|
|
debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers
|
|
case $nr_supported_ciphers in
|
|
0) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't have any DH EXPORT ciphers configured"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not tested. $OPENSSL doesn't support any DH EXPORT ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
openssl_no_expdhciphers=true
|
|
;;
|
|
1|2|3) addtl_warning=" ($magenta""tested w/ $nr_supported_ciphers/4 ciphers only!$off)" ;;
|
|
4) ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# test for DH export ciphers first
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$exportdh_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && vuln_exportdh_ciphers=true
|
|
elif [[ $nr_supported_ciphers -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportdh_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && vuln_exportdh_ciphers=true
|
|
debugme grep -Ea "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for hexc in ${exportdh_cipher_list_hex//, / }; do
|
|
hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2}"
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$hexc" == ${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]} ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && tm_out "$hexc " || tm_out "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} "
|
|
done
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
else
|
|
echo $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportdh_cipher_list)
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Try all ciphers that use an ephemeral DH key. If successful, check whether the key uses a weak prime.
|
|
if [[ -n "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ Unknown ]]; then
|
|
subret=0 # no common DH key detected
|
|
else
|
|
subret=1 # known prime/DH key
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$all_dh_ciphers, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE
|
|
key_bitstring="$(awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
# FIXME: determine # of ciphers supported, 48 only are the shipped binaries
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher kEDH -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && grep -q ServerKeyExchange $TMPFILE; then
|
|
# Example: '<<< TLS 1.0 Handshake [length 010b], ServerKeyExchange'
|
|
# get line with ServerKeyExchange, cut from the beginning to "length ". cut from the end to ']'
|
|
str="$(awk '/<<< TLS 1.[0-2].*ServerKeyExchange$/' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
if [[ -z "$str" ]] ; then
|
|
str="$(awk '/<<< SSL [2-3].*ServerKeyExchange$/' $TMPFILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
str="${str#<*length }"
|
|
str="${str%]*}"
|
|
server_key_exchange_len=$(hex2dec "$str")
|
|
server_key_exchange_len=2+$server_key_exchange_len/16
|
|
server_key_exchange="$(grep -A $server_key_exchange_len ServerKeyExchange $TMPFILE | tail -n +2)"
|
|
server_key_exchange="$(toupper "$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$server_key_exchange")")")"
|
|
server_key_exchange="${server_key_exchange%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
server_key_exchange_len=${#server_key_exchange}
|
|
[[ $server_key_exchange_len -gt 8 ]] && [[ "${server_key_exchange:0:2}" == "0C" ]] && ephemeral_pub_len=$(hex2dec "${server_key_exchange:2:6}")
|
|
[[ $ephemeral_pub_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $ephemeral_pub_len -le $server_key_exchange_len ]] && key_bitstring="$(get_dh_ephemeralkey "${server_key_exchange:8}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
get_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$key_bitstring" "$spaces"
|
|
ret=$? # no common primes file would be ret=1 --> we should treat that some place else before
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ Unknown ]]; then
|
|
subret=0 # no common DH key detected
|
|
else
|
|
subret=1 # known prime/DH key
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
subret=3
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now if we have DH export ciphers we print them out first
|
|
if "$vuln_exportdh_ciphers"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " uses DH EXPORT ciphers"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, uses DH EXPORT ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
out ", no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2"
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out "\n${spaces}"
|
|
out_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
out " no common primes detected"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "--" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out "FIXME 1"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
out_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
if ! "$openssl_no_expdhciphers"; then
|
|
outln ","
|
|
out "${spaces}but no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK):"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
out ", no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "no DH key with <= TLS 1.2" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK):"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
# we issue a special warning if there's no common prime but the bit length is too low
|
|
if [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1024 ]]; then
|
|
out "\n${spaces}But: "
|
|
pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
case $? in
|
|
1) fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe" ;;
|
|
2) fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe";;
|
|
3) fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe";;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
out ", no common prime detected"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "--" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "partly not vulnerable:"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -gt 0 ]] && set_key_str_score "DHE" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption, more @ https://drownattack.com/
|
|
run_drown() {
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers_detected ret=0
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local cert_fingerprint_sha2=""
|
|
local cve="CVE-2016-0800 CVE-2016-0703"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="DROWN"
|
|
local censys_host_url="https://search.censys.io/search?resource=hosts&virtual_hosts=INCLUDE"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing for DROWN vulnerability "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
# if we want to use OPENSSL: check for < openssl 1.0.2g, openssl 1.0.1s if native openssl
|
|
pr_bold " DROWN"; out " (${cve// /, }) "
|
|
|
|
# Any fingerprint that is placed in $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is also added to
|
|
# to $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2, so if $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is not empty, but
|
|
# $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is empty, then the server doesn't have an RSA certificate.
|
|
if [[ -z "$CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2" ]]; then
|
|
get_host_cert "-cipher aRSA"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && cert_fingerprint_sha2="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -in $HOSTCERT -fingerprint -sha256 2>>$ERRFILE | sed -e 's/^.*Fingerprint=//' -e 's/://g' )"
|
|
else
|
|
cert_fingerprint_sha2="$RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2"
|
|
cert_fingerprint_sha2=${cert_fingerprint_sha2/SHA256 /}
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
censys_host_url="$censys_host_url&q=$cert_fingerprint_sha2"
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets
|
|
else
|
|
[[ aaa == bbb ]] # provoke return code=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case $? in
|
|
7) # strange reply, couldn't convert the cipher spec length to a hex number
|
|
pr_fixme "strange v2 reply "
|
|
outln " (rerun with DEBUG >=2)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" | head -1
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received a strange SSLv2 reply (rerun with DEBUG>=2)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
ret=1
|
|
;;
|
|
3) # vulnerable, [[ -n "$cert_fingerprint_sha2" ]] test is not needed as we should have RSA certificate here
|
|
lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" 2>/dev/null)")
|
|
debugme tm_out " ($lines lines) "
|
|
add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
if [[ "$lines" -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3))
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq "$nr_ciphers_detected" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_high "CVE-2015-3197: SSLv2 supported but couldn't detect a cipher (NOT ok)";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "SSLv2 offered, but could not detect a cipher. Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see $censys_host_url" "$cve CVE-2015-3197" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok), SSLv2 offered with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers";
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE, SSLv2 offered with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers. Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see $censys_host_url" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to DROWN"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "$spaces Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see:"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
pr_url "$censys_host_url"
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*) prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable on this host and port (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable on this host and port" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
if [[ -n "$cert_fingerprint_sha2" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$spaces make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services, see"
|
|
out "$spaces "
|
|
pr_url "$censys_host_url"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_hint" "INFO" "Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services, see $censys_host_url" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "$spaces no RSA certificate, thus certificate can't be used with SSLv2 elsewhere"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_hint" "INFO" "no RSA certificate, can't be used with SSLv2 elsewhere" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS: don't use CBC Ciphers in SSLv3 TLSv1.0
|
|
run_beast(){
|
|
local hexc dash cbc_cipher sslvers auth mac
|
|
local -a ciph hexcode normalized_hexcode kx enc export2
|
|
local proto proto_hex
|
|
local -i i subret nr_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0
|
|
local detected_cbc_ciphers="" ciphers_to_test
|
|
local higher_proto_supported=""
|
|
local vuln_beast=false
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local cr=$'\n'
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local continued=false
|
|
local cbc_cipher_list="EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:IDEA-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:ADH-SEED-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
|
|
local cbc_ciphers_hex="00,06, 00,07, 00,08, 00,09, 00,0A, 00,0B, 00,0C, 00,0D, 00,0E, 00,0F, 00,10, 00,11, 00,12, 00,13, 00,14, 00,15, 00,16, 00,19, 00,1A, 00,1B, 00,1E, 00,1F, 00,21, 00,22, 00,23, 00,25, 00,26, 00,27, 00,29, 00,2A, 00,2F, 00,30, 00,31, 00,32, 00,33, 00,34, 00,35, 00,36, 00,37, 00,38, 00,39, 00,3A, 00,41, 00,42, 00,43, 00,44, 00,45, 00,46, 00,61, 00,62, 00,63, 00,84, 00,85, 00,86, 00,87, 00,88, 00,89, 00,8B, 00,8C, 00,8D, 00,8F, 00,90, 00,91, 00,93, 00,94, 00,95, 00,96, 00,97, 00,98, 00,99, 00,9A, 00,9B, 00,AE, 00,AF, 00,B2, 00,B3, 00,B6, 00,B7, C0,03, C0,04, C0,05, C0,08, C0,09, C0,0A, C0,0D, C0,0E, C0,0F, C0,12, C0,13, C0,14, C0,17, C0,18, C0,19, C0,1A, C0,1B, C0,1C, C0,1D, C0,1E, C0,1F, C0,21, C0,22, C0,34, C0,35, C0,36, C0,37, C0,38, C0,64, C0,65, C0,66, C0,67, C0,68, C0,69, C0,70, C0,71, C0,94, C0,95, C0,96, C0,97, C0,98, C0,99, C0,9A, C0,9B, FE,FE, FE,FF, FF,E0, FF,E1"
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2011-3389"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-20"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="BEAST"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing for BEAST vulnerability "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " BEAST"; out " ($cve) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY" || ( [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 1 ]] ); then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln ", no SSL3 or TLS1"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# $cbc_ciphers_hex has 126 ciphers, we omitted SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA bc the trailing 00,ff below will pose
|
|
# a problem for ACE loadbalancers otherwise. So in case we know this is not true, we'll re-add it
|
|
! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" && "$using_sockets" && cbc_ciphers_hex="$cbc_ciphers_hex, C0,20"
|
|
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}"
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]] && [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ CBC ]] && \
|
|
[[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]]; then
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && "$WIDE" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && \
|
|
( [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
# no sockets, openssl
|
|
while read hexc dash ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
if [[ ":${cbc_cipher_list}:" =~ :${ciph[nr_ciphers]}: ]]; then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == "00" ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-tls1 -V")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# first determine whether it's mitigated by higher protocols
|
|
for proto in tls1_1 tls1_2; do
|
|
subret=$(has_server_protocol "$proto")
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
case $proto in
|
|
tls1_1) higher_proto_supported+=" TLSv1.1" ;;
|
|
tls1_2) higher_proto_supported+=" TLSv1.2" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state -"${proto}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null
|
|
if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
higher_proto_supported+=" $(get_protocol $TMPFILE)"
|
|
add_proto_offered "$proto" yes
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for proto in ssl3 tls1; do
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$using_sockets" && ! locally_supported "-${proto}"; then
|
|
continued=true
|
|
out " "
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
subret=$(has_server_protocol "$proto")
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_success=0
|
|
elif [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
sclient_success=1
|
|
elif [[ "$proto" != "ssl3" ]] || "$HAS_SSL3"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-"$proto" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then # protocol supported?
|
|
if "$continued"; then # second round: we hit TLS1
|
|
if "$HAS_SSL3" || "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" ; outln ", no SSL3 or TLS1"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_good "no TLS1 (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
else # protocol not succeeded but it's the first time
|
|
continued=true
|
|
continue # protocol not supported, so we do not need to check each cipher with that protocol
|
|
fi
|
|
fi # protocol succeeded
|
|
add_proto_offered "$proto" yes
|
|
|
|
# now we test in one shot with the precompiled ciphers
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
case "$proto" in
|
|
"ssl3") proto_hex="00" ;;
|
|
"tls1") proto_hex="01" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "$cbc_ciphers_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] || continue
|
|
else
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-"$proto" -cipher "$cbc_cipher_list" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || continue
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers=""
|
|
for ((i=0; i<nr_ciphers; i++)); do
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
done
|
|
while true; do
|
|
[[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && break
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && "${ossl_supported[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" -"${proto}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break
|
|
cbc_cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cbc_cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cbc_cipher" == "${ciph[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == - ]]; then
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers+="${ciph[i]} "
|
|
else
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers+="${rfc_ciph[i]} "
|
|
fi
|
|
vuln_beast=true
|
|
if "$WIDE" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
done
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break
|
|
cbc_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cbc_cipher" == "${rfc_ciph[i]}" ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if ( [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "${ciph[i]}" != - ]] ) || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == - ]]; then
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers+="${ciph[i]} "
|
|
else
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers+="${rfc_ciph[i]} "
|
|
fi
|
|
vuln_beast=true
|
|
if "$WIDE" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$WIDE" && [[ -n "$detected_cbc_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
out "\n "; pr_underline "$(toupper $proto):\n";
|
|
if "$first"; then
|
|
neat_header
|
|
fi
|
|
first=false
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
neat_list "$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_low "available"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "available"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pr_deemphasize "not a/v"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$WIDE"; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$detected_cbc_ciphers" ]]; then
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_CBC_$(toupper $proto)" "MEDIUM" "$detected_cbc_ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
! "$first" && out "$spaces"
|
|
out "$(toupper $proto): "
|
|
[[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]] && \
|
|
pr_svrty_low "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$detected_cbc_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)" || \
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$detected_cbc_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
outln
|
|
detected_cbc_ciphers="" # empty for next round
|
|
first=false
|
|
else
|
|
[[ $proto == tls1 ]] && ! $first && echo -n "$spaces "
|
|
prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto) (OK)"
|
|
first=false
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if ! "$vuln_beast" ; then
|
|
prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto) (OK)"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}_CBC_$(toupper $proto)" "OK" "No CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto)" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done # for proto in ssl3 tls1
|
|
|
|
if "$vuln_beast"; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]]; then
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
outln; out " "
|
|
# NOT ok seems too harsh for me if we have TLS >1.0
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"
|
|
outln " -- but also supports higher protocols (possible mitigation) $higher_proto_supported"
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"
|
|
outln " -- but also supports higher protocols $higher_proto_supported (likely mitigated)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "VULNERABLE -- but also supports higher protocols $higher_proto_supported (likely mitigated)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
else
|
|
out "$spaces"
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE"
|
|
outln " -- and no higher protocols as mitigation supported"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE -- and no higher protocols as mitigation supported" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "Vulnerable to BEAST"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
"$first" && ! "$vuln_beast" && prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers found for any protocol (OK)"
|
|
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This is a quick test for Winshock, MS14-066, a vulnerability in the TLS stack of Microsoft which leads to RCE.
|
|
# This vulnerability affected all SChannel services -- most notably RDP (port 3398 normally). See
|
|
# https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2992611/ms14-066-vulnerability-in-schannel-could-allow-remote-code-execution-n
|
|
# and http://www.securitysift.com/exploiting-ms14-066-cve-2014-6321-aka-winshock for "exploiting"/crashing lsass.exe.
|
|
# What we do here is giving a strong hint.
|
|
#
|
|
# First we check whether TLS 1.3 is available. Then with the fix MS introduced came additional ciphers
|
|
# TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|
|
# = DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 AES256-GCM-SHA384 AES128-GCM-SHA256.
|
|
# We also check for the absence of ciphers which came in way later (ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 / ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384), or
|
|
# more ciphers like ARIA, CCM, CAMELLIA and CHACHAPOLY. (Those ciphers could also be retrieved from our array TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]
|
|
# and using TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]. We may want to # do that later. We check for all this in sockets only to avoid overhead.)
|
|
# Then we check for absence of elliptical curves and TLS extensions.
|
|
# That all should minimize false # positives because of middle boxes, proxies and later Windows versions.
|
|
# The last straw then is to check for webserver banners (http.sys, IIS/8.0 and IIS/8.5).
|
|
#
|
|
run_winshock() {
|
|
local wsfixed_ciphers='00,9F, 00,9D, 00,9E, 00,9C'
|
|
local aria_ciphers='C0,3D,C0,3F,C0,41,C0,43,C0,45,C0,47,C0,49,C0,4B,C0,4D,C0,4F,C0,51,C0,53,C0,55,C0,57,C0,59,C0,5B,C0,5D,C0,5F,C0,61,C0,63,C0,65,C0,67,C0,69,C0,6B,C0,6D,C0,6F,C0,71,C0,3C,C0,3E,C0,40,C0,42,C0,44,C0,46,C0,48,C0,4A,C0,4C,C0,4E,C0,50,C0,52,C0,54,C0,56,C0,58,C0,5A,C0,5C,C0,5E,C0,60,C0,62,C0,64,C0,66,C0,68,C0,6A,C0,6C,C0,6E,C0,70'
|
|
local camellia_ciphers='C0,9B,C0,99,C0,97,C0,95,C0,77,C0,73,00,C4,00,C3,00,C2,00,C1,00,88,00,87,00,86,00,85,00,C5,00,89,C0,79,C0,75,00,C0,00,84,C0,7B,C0,7D,C0,7F,C0,81,C0,83,C0,85,C0,87,C0,89,C0,8B,C0,8D,C0,8F,C0,91,C0,93,C0,76,C0,72,00,BE,00,BD,00,BC,00,BB,00,45,00,44,00,43,00,42,00,BF,00,46,C0,78,C0,74,00,BA,00,41,C0,9A,C0,98,C0,96,C0,94,C0,7A,C0,7C,C0,7E,C0,80,C0,82,C0,84,C0,86,C0,88,C0,8A,C0,8C,C0,8E,C0,90,C0,92'
|
|
local chacha_ccm_ciphers='CC,14,CC,13,CC,15,CC,A9,CC,A8,CC,AA,C0,AF,C0,AD,C0,A3,C0,9F,CC,AE,CC,AD,CC,AC,C0,AB,C0,A7,C0,A1,C0,9D,CC,AB,C0,A9,C0,A5,16,B7,16,B8,13,04,13,05,C0,AE,C0,AC,C0,A2,C0,9E,C0,AA,C0,A6,C0,A0,C0,9C,C0,A8,C0,A4'
|
|
# TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 / TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 / ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
|
|
# came in Server 2016, see https://notsomany.com/2016/08/26/achieve-a-on-sslabs-iis-8-5-windows-2012-r2/
|
|
# https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/cipher-suites-in-schannel
|
|
local more_excluded_ciphers='C0,2F, C0,30'
|
|
# These are the three NIST curves allowed only. Keep in mind prime256v1=secp256r1 and MS labels them as P256, P384 and P521
|
|
local allowed_curves="prime256v1 secp384r1 secp521r1"
|
|
local curve="" tls_ext=""
|
|
local -i sclient_success=0
|
|
local server_banner=""
|
|
local check_patches=" - check patches locally to confirm"
|
|
local cve="CVE-2014-6321"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-94"
|
|
local jsonID="winshock"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing for winshock vulnerability "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " Winshock"; out " ($cve), experimental "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -eq 0 ]] ; then
|
|
# There's no MS server supporting TLS 1.3. Winshock was way back in time
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
debugme echo " - TLS 1.3 found"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable " "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
outln
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now we check whether any CAMELLIA, ARIA, CCM or CHACHA cipher is available.
|
|
# We do this in two shots in order to stay below the 128 cipher limit
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${aria_ciphers},${chacha_ccm_ciphers}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" ; outln " - ARIA, CHACHA or CCM ciphers found"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable " "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${camellia_ciphers},${more_excluded_ciphers}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - CAMELLIA or ECDHE_RSA GCM ciphers found"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable " "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now we need to check the fixed ciphers
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${wsfixed_ciphers}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
# has rollup ciphers
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - GCM rollup ciphers found"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ $sclient_success -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "check failed, connect problem"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, connect problem" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Basic idea: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_TLS_implementations#Supported_elliptic_curves
|
|
# [[ -z "$CURVES_OFFERED" ]] && sub_check_curves
|
|
if [[ -n "$CURVES_OFFERED" ]]; then
|
|
# Check whether there are any additional curves besides $allowed_curves
|
|
for curve in $CURVES_OFFERED; do
|
|
if ! [[ $allowed_curves =~ $curve ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - curve $curve detected"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - curve $curve detected" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
#FIXME: The catch is that when a user didn't invoke run_fs() before, this wasn't processed + CURVES_OFFERED
|
|
# is empty. So we could call it like above but need to move curves detection into a separate function
|
|
# (~ sub_check_curves) which is some work. But also for the sake of clean code this needs to be done.
|
|
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]] && determine_tls_extensions
|
|
# Basis of the following https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_TLS_implementations#Extensions
|
|
# Our standard: https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
|
|
|
|
# According to Wikipedia above these are the ones which can be detected unders version of Windows
|
|
# Secure Renegotiation, Server Name Indication, Certificate Status Request, Supplemental Data, Extended Master Secret, ALPN
|
|
# supplemental_data(23) (RFC 4680) seems to have been overwritten by extended master secret(23) RFC 7627
|
|
# local -a allowed_tls_ext=("server name" "status_request" "extended master secret" "application layer protocol negotiation")
|
|
# Instead we rather focus on the ones which according to that source weren't available
|
|
# Encrypt-then-MAC, Maximum Fragment Length, Keying Material Exporter, TLS Fallback SCSV, ClientHello Padding
|
|
# Padding is client side. Don't know what they mean by the fallback SCSV. That is not an extension
|
|
local -a forbidden_tls_ext=("encrypt-then-mac" "max fragment length")
|
|
# Open whether ec_point_formats, supported_groups(=elliptic_curves), heartbeat are supported under windows <=2012
|
|
# key_share and supported_versions are extensions which came with TLS 1.3. We checked the protocol before.
|
|
if [[ -n "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]]; then
|
|
# Check whether there are any TLS extension which should not be available under <= Windows 2012 R2
|
|
for tls_ext in $TLS_EXTENSIONS; do
|
|
# We use the whole array, got to be careful when the array becomes bigger (unintended match)
|
|
if [[ ${forbidden_tls_ext[@]} =~ $tls_ext ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - TLS extension $tls_ext detected"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - TLS extension $tls_ext detected" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# More would be possible if we look @ the following:
|
|
# See also https://github.com/cisco/joy/blob/master/fingerprinting/resources/fingerprint_db.json.gz
|
|
# https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/Presentation/2019_017_001_539902.pdf
|
|
# https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisco/joy/master/doc/using-joy-fingerprinting-00.pdf
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Now the solid determination more or less done. What's left now is to detect the service
|
|
# and perform an educated guess.
|
|
|
|
# Next we weed out is whether we run HTTP or RDP (on standard port).
|
|
# Using the experimental flag we can test it also on other ports / services
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ $PORT != 3389 ]] && ! "$EXPERIMENTAL"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; outln " - no HTTP or RDP"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - no HTTP or RDP" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && [[ $PORT == 3389 ]]; then
|
|
# We take a security guess here (better safe than sorry) for RDP as we don't have a banner
|
|
out "probably "; pr_svrty_critical "vulnerable (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "probably vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now we have potentially vulnerable HTTP servers left where we grab the server banner.
|
|
# First choice for that is the HTTP header # file which we retrieved in a default run.
|
|
# From the service detection we also should have a header though as a fall back.
|
|
if [[ -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then
|
|
server_banner="$(grep -Eai '^Server:' $HEADERFILE)"
|
|
elif [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.service_detection.txt" ]]; then
|
|
server_banner="$(grep -Eai '^Server:' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.service_detection.txt")"
|
|
elif "$EXPERIMENTAL"; then
|
|
# If testing e.g. an SMTP server
|
|
:
|
|
else
|
|
# We can't use run_http_header here as it messes up the screen. We could automatically
|
|
# run it when --winshock is requested though but this should suffice here.
|
|
prln_warning "check failed, rerun with cmd line option --header "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, connect problem" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-IIS\/8.5 ]]; then
|
|
# Windows 2012 R2 is less likely than Windows 2012
|
|
out "probably "; pr_svrty_critical "vulnerable (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "probably vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
elif [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-IIS\/8.0 ]]; then
|
|
out "likely "; pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "likely vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
elif [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-HTTPAPI\/2.0 ]]; then
|
|
# This is http.sys. It may or may not indicate a 2012 server. IIS is not yet configured though.
|
|
# So we have a peek on port 80
|
|
http_get $NODE "$TEMPDIR/$NODE.$NODEIP.http-header.txt"
|
|
server_banner="$(grep -Eai '^Server:' $TEMPDIR/$NODE.$NODEIP.http-header.txt)"
|
|
if [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-IIS\/8.5 ]]; then
|
|
out "probably "; pr_svrty_critical "vulnerable (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "probably vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
elif [[ $server_banner =~ Microsoft-IIS\/8.0 ]]; then
|
|
out "likely "; pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "likely vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
else
|
|
out "likely "; prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$EXPERIMENTAL"; then
|
|
out "seems "; pr_svrty_critical "vulnerable (NOT ok)"; outln "$check_patches"
|
|
fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "seems vulnerable (NOT OK) $check_patches"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
outln " - doesn't seem to be IIS 8.x"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable - doesn't seem to be IIS 8.x" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20200324101422/http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html
|
|
# Paper: https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2013.42
|
|
# in a nutshell: don't offer CBC suites (again). MAC as a fix for padding oracles is not enough. Best: TLS v1.2+ AES GCM
|
|
run_lucky13() {
|
|
local spaces=" "
|
|
local cbc_ciphers="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA256:ADH-AES256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA256:ADH-AES128-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ADH-SEED-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:IDEA-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
|
|
cbc_ciphers_hex1="c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, c0,22, c0,21, c0,20, 00,b7, 00,b3, 00,91, c0,9b, c0,99, c0,97, 00,af, c0,95, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,69, 00,68, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, c0,77, c0,73, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,19, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, c0,38, c0,36, 00,84, 00,95, 00,8d, c0,3d, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,43, c0,45, c0,47, c0,49, c0,4b, c0,4d, c0,4f, c0,65, c0,67, c0,69, c0,71, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, c0,1f, c0,1e, c0,1d, 00,67, 00,40, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, c0,76, c0,72, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,18, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba"
|
|
cbc_ciphers_hex2="c0,37, c0,35, 00,b6, 00,b2, 00,90, 00,96, 00,41, c0,9a, c0,98, c0,96, 00,ae, c0,94, 00,07, 00,94, 00,8c, 00,21, 00,25, c0,3c, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,42, c0,44, c0,46, c0,48, c0,4a, c0,4c, c0,4e, c0,64, c0,66, c0,68, c0,70, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, 00,1e, 00,22, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e"
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS"
|
|
local -i nr_supported_ciphers=0 sclient_success
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2013-0169"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="LUCKY13"
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Testing for LUCKY13 vulnerability "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " LUCKY13"; out " ($cve), experimental "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no CBC ciphers in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
# The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing).
|
|
# Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${cbc_ciphers_hex1}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "${cbc_ciphers_hex2}, 00,ff"
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
nr_cbc_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $cbc_ciphers)
|
|
nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $cbc_ciphers))
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -no_ssl2 -cipher $cbc_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -eq 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
out "potentially "
|
|
pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS. Check patches"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "potentially vulnerable, uses TLS CBC ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
# the CBC padding which led to timing differences during MAC processing has been solved in openssl (https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20130205.txt)
|
|
# and other software. However we can't tell with reasonable effort from the outside. Thus we still issue a warning and label it experimental
|
|
else
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)";
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 133 ]]; then
|
|
# Likely only PSK/KRB5 ciphers are missing: display discrepancy but no warning
|
|
out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7465 REQUIRES that TLS clients and servers NEVER negotiate the use of RC4 cipher suites!
|
|
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#RC4_attacks
|
|
# https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html
|
|
#
|
|
run_rc4() {
|
|
local -i rc4_offered=0
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0
|
|
local n auth mac hexc sslv2_ciphers_hex="" sslv2_ciphers_ossl="" s
|
|
local -a normalized_hexcode hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg ossl_supported
|
|
local -i i
|
|
local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2
|
|
local -i -a index
|
|
local dhlen available="" ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers proto
|
|
local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" rc4_detected=""
|
|
local using_sockets=true
|
|
local cve="CVE-2013-2566 CVE-2015-2808"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="RC4"
|
|
|
|
"$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false
|
|
"$FAST" && using_sockets=false
|
|
[[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Checking for vulnerable RC4 Ciphers "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " RC4"; out " (${cve// /, }) "
|
|
|
|
if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no RC4 support in TLS 1.3 only servers"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Get a list of all the cipher suites to test. #FIXME: This is rather ineffective as RC4 ciphers won't change.
|
|
# We should instead build a fixed list here like @ other functions
|
|
if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ RC4 ]] && ( "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" ); then
|
|
hexc="$(tolower "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")"
|
|
ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}"
|
|
sslvers[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}"
|
|
kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}"
|
|
enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}"
|
|
export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}"
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && "$WIDE" && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" &&
|
|
( [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}"
|
|
sslv2_ciphers_hex+=", ${hexcode[nr_ciphers]}"
|
|
sslv2_ciphers_ossl+=":${ciph[nr_ciphers]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do
|
|
if [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" =~ RC4 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:7:2}")"
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}")"
|
|
sslv2_ciphers_ossl+=":${ciph[nr_ciphers]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
sigalg[nr_ciphers]=""
|
|
ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true
|
|
nr_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' '' '-V')
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "$sslv2_ciphers_hex" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers_hex:2}" "true"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
rc4_offered=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_SSL2" && [[ -n "$sslv2_ciphers_ossl" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -cipher "${sslv2_ciphers_ossl:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)"
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s"
|
|
rc4_offered=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if "${ossl_supported[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != SSLv2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_ossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do
|
|
[[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$proto" == -ssl3 ]] && continue
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ossl_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null
|
|
sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)
|
|
[[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ossl_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
rc4_offered=1
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if "$WIDE" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")"
|
|
|
|
# If you use RC4 with newer protocols, you are punished harder
|
|
if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_1 ]]; then
|
|
set_grade_cap "C" "RC4 ciphers offered on TLS 1.1"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$using_sockets"; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != SSLv2 ]]; then
|
|
ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false
|
|
hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}"
|
|
rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}"
|
|
index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i
|
|
nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for proto in 03 02 01 00; do
|
|
[[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue
|
|
while true; do
|
|
ciphers_to_test=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_nonossl_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break
|
|
if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
sclient_success=$?
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break
|
|
cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
for (( i=0; i < nr_nonossl_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $i -eq $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && break
|
|
rc4_offered=1
|
|
i=${index[i]}
|
|
ciphers_found[i]=true
|
|
if "$WIDE" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then
|
|
dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet)
|
|
kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \
|
|
sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ $rc4_offered -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
"$WIDE" || pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok): "
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
neat_header
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do
|
|
if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ! "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
continue # no successful connect AND not verbose displaying each cipher
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$WIDE"; then
|
|
neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${export2[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}"
|
|
if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
pr_svrty_high "available"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_deemphasize "not a/v"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "${sigalg[i]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then
|
|
if ( [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]] ) || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "-" ]]; then
|
|
rc4_detected+="${ciph[i]} "
|
|
else
|
|
rc4_detected+="${rfc_ciph[i]} "
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
! "$WIDE" && pr_svrty_high "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$rc4_detected" " " $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
outln
|
|
"$WIDE" && out " " && prln_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, Detected ciphers: $rc4_detected" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "RC4 ciphers offered"
|
|
elif [[ $nr_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "No RC4 Ciphers configured in $OPENSSL"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "RC4 ciphers not supported by local OpenSSL ($OPENSSL)"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_good "no RC4 ciphers detected (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
"$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits"
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
[[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_youknowwho() {
|
|
local cve="CVE-2013-2566"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-310"
|
|
# NOT FIXME as there's no code: https://web.archive.org/web/20191008002003/http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/index.html
|
|
# Paper and presentation: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/paper/alFardan
|
|
# https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/12/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in/
|
|
return 0
|
|
# in a nutshell: don't use RC4, really not!
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_tls_truncation() {
|
|
# https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/workshop-program/presentation/smyth
|
|
# https://secure-resumption.com/tlsauth.pdf
|
|
#FIXME: difficult to test, is there any test available: pls let me know
|
|
:
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# see https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/
|
|
#
|
|
run_starttls_injection() {
|
|
local uds=""
|
|
local openssl_bin=""
|
|
local -i socat_pid
|
|
local -i openssl_pid
|
|
local vuln=false
|
|
local cve="CVE-2011-0411 CVE-2021-38084 CVE-2021-33515 CVE-2020-15955 CVE-2021-37844 CVE-2021-37845 CVE-2021-37846 CVE-2020-29548 CVE-2020-15955 CVE-2020-29547"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-74"
|
|
local hint=""
|
|
local jsonID="starttls_injection"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_headlineln " Checking for STARTTLS injection "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold " STARTTLS injection" ; out " (CVE-2011-0411, exp.) "
|
|
|
|
# We'll do a soft fail here, also no warning, as I do not expect everybody to have socat installed
|
|
if [[ -z "$SOCAT" ]]; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Need socat for this" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
outln "Need socat for this check"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$HAS_UDS2" ]] && [[ -z "$HAS_UDS" ]]; then
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Need OpenSSL with Unix-domain socket s_client support for this check" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
outln "Need an OpenSSL with Unix-domain socket s_client support for this check"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case $SERVICE in
|
|
smtp) fd_socket 5 "EHLO google.com"
|
|
;;
|
|
pop3) fd_socket 5 "CAPA"
|
|
;;
|
|
imap) five_random=$(tr -dc '[:upper:]' < /dev/urandom | dd bs=5 count=1 2>/dev/null)
|
|
fd_socket 5 "$five_random NOOP"
|
|
;;
|
|
*) outln "STARTTLS injection test doesn't work for $SERVICE, yet"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "STARTTLS injection test doesn't work for $SERVICE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
uds="$TEMPDIR/uds"
|
|
$SOCAT FD:5 UNIX-LISTEN:$uds &
|
|
socat_pid=$!
|
|
|
|
if "$HAS_UDS"; then
|
|
openssl_bin="$OPENSSL"
|
|
elif "$HAS_UDS2"; then
|
|
openssl_bin="$OPENSSL2"
|
|
fi
|
|
# normally the interesting fallback we grep later for is in fd2 but we'll catch also stdout here
|
|
$openssl_bin s_client -unix $uds >$TMPFILE 2>&1 &
|
|
openssl_pid=$!
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && tail $TMPFILE
|
|
#FIXME: is the pattern sufficient for SMTP / POP / IMAP?
|
|
case $SERVICE in
|
|
# Mind all ' ' here!
|
|
smtp) grep -Eqa '^250-|^503 ' $TMPFILE && vuln=true ;;
|
|
pop3) grep -Eqa '^USER|^PIPELINING|^\+OK ' $TMPFILE && vuln=true ;;
|
|
imap) grep -Eqa ' OK NOOP ' $TMPFILE && vuln=true ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if "$vuln"; then
|
|
out "likely "
|
|
prln_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
kill $socat_pid 2>/dev/null
|
|
kill $openssl_pid 2>/dev/null
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test for various server implementation errors that aren't tested for elsewhere.
|
|
# Inspired by RFC 8701.
|
|
run_grease() {
|
|
local -i success
|
|
local bug_found=false
|
|
local normal_hello_ok=false
|
|
local cipher_list proto selected_cipher selected_cipher_hex="" extn rnd_bytes
|
|
local alpn_proto alpn alpn_list_len_hex extn_len_hex
|
|
local selected_alpn_protocol grease_selected_alpn_protocol
|
|
local ciph list temp curve_found
|
|
local -i i j rnd alpn_list_len extn_len debug_level=""
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
# Note: The following values were taken from RFC 8701.
|
|
# These arrays may need to be updated if the values change in the final version of this document.
|
|
local -a -r grease_cipher_suites=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" )
|
|
local -a -r grease_supported_groups=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" )
|
|
local -a -r grease_extn_values=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" )
|
|
local -r ecdhe_ciphers="cc,14, cc,13, c0,30, c0,2c, c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, c0,9b, cc,a9, cc,a8, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,77, c0,73, c0,19, cc,ac, c0,38, c0,36, c0,49, c0,4d, c0,5d, c0,61, c0,71, c0,87, c0,8b, c0,2f, c0,2b, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,76, c0,72, c0,18, c0,37, c0,35, c0,9a, c0,48, c0,4c, c0,5c, c0,60, c0,70, c0,86, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,07, c0,16, c0,33, c0,12, c0,08, c0,17, c0,34, c0,10, c0,06, c0,15, c0,3b, c0,3a, c0,39"
|
|
local jsonID="GREASE"
|
|
|
|
outln; pr_headline " Testing for server implementation bugs "; outln "\n"
|
|
|
|
# Many of the following checks work by modifying the "basic" call to
|
|
# tls_sockets() and assuming the tested-for bug is present if the
|
|
# connection fails. However, this only works if the connection succeeds
|
|
# with the "basic" call. So, keep trying different "basic" calls until
|
|
# one is found that succeeds.
|
|
for (( i=0; i < 5; i++ )); do
|
|
case $i in
|
|
0) proto="03" ; cipher_list="$TLS12_CIPHER" ;;
|
|
2) proto="02" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;;
|
|
3) proto="01" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;;
|
|
4) proto="00" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
selected_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do
|
|
[[ "$selected_cipher" == "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" ]] && selected_cipher_hex="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break
|
|
done
|
|
elif "$HAS_SSL2"; then
|
|
selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -tls1 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then
|
|
selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL'| awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')"
|
|
else
|
|
selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL'| awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$selected_cipher_hex" ]]; then
|
|
normal_hello_ok=true
|
|
selected_cipher_hex="${selected_cipher_hex:2:2},${selected_cipher_hex:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
proto="03"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Test for yaSSL bug - server only looks at second byte of each cipher
|
|
# suite listed in ClientHello (see issue #793). First check to see if
|
|
# server ignores the ciphers in the ClientHello entirely, then check to
|
|
# see if server only looks at second byte of each offered cipher.
|
|
|
|
# Send a list of non-existent ciphers where the second byte does not match
|
|
# any existing cipher.
|
|
|
|
# Need to ensure that $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt contains the results of the
|
|
# most recent calls to tls_sockets even if tls_sockets is not successful. Setting $DEBUG to
|
|
# a non-zero value ensures this. Setting it to 1 prevents any extra information from being
|
|
# displayed.
|
|
debug_level="$DEBUG"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -eq 0 ]] && DEBUG=1
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with non-existent ciphers."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "de,d0, de,d1, d3,d2, de,d3, 00,ff"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
elif grep -q "The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server responded with a ServerHello rather than an alert even though it doesn't support any of the client-offered cipher suites."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server responded with a ServerHello rather than an alert even though it doesn't support any of the client-offered cipher suites."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
else
|
|
# Send a list of non-existent ciphers such that for each cipher that
|
|
# is defined, there is one in the list that matches in the second byte
|
|
# (but make sure list contains at more 127 ciphers).
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with non-existent ciphers, but that match existing ciphers in second byte."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "de,01, de,02, de,03, de,04, de,05, de,06, de,07, de,08, de,09, de,0a, de,0b, de,0c, de,0d, de,0e, de,0f, de,10, de,11, de,12, de,13, de,14, de,15, de,16, de,17, de,18, de,19, de,1a, de,1b, de,23, de,24, de,25, de,26, de,27, de,28, de,29, de,2a, de,2b, de,2c, de,2d, de,2e, de,2f, de,30, de,31, de,32, de,33, de,34, de,35, de,36, de,37, de,38, de,39, de,3a, de,3b, de,3c, de,3d, de,3e, de,3f, de,40, de,41, de,42, de,43, de,44, de,45, de,46, de,60, de,61, de,62, de,63, de,64, de,65, de,66, de,67, de,68, de,69, de,6a, de,6b, de,6c, de,6d, de,72, de,73, de,74, de,75, de,76, de,77, de,78, de,79, de,84, de,85, de,86, de,87, de,88, de,89, de,96, de,97, de,98, de,99, de,9a, de,9b, de,9c, de,9d, de,9e, de,9f, de,a0, de,a1, de,a2, de,a3, de,a4, de,a5, de,a6, de,a7, de,ba, de,bb, de,bc, de,bd, de,be, de,bf, de,c0, de,c1, de,c2, de,c3, de,c4, de,c5, 00,ff"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
elif grep -q " The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server only compares against second byte in each cipher suite in ClientHello."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server only compares against second byte in each cipher suite in ClientHello."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
DEBUG="$debug_level"
|
|
|
|
# Check that server ignores unrecognized extensions
|
|
# see RFC 8701
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
# Try multiple different randomly-generated GREASE extensions,
|
|
# but make final test use zero-length extension value, just to
|
|
# be sure that works before testing server with a zero-length
|
|
# extension as the final extension.
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= 5; i++ )); do
|
|
# Create a random extension using one of the GREASE values.
|
|
rnd=$RANDOM%${#grease_extn_values[@]}
|
|
extn="${grease_extn_values[rnd]}"
|
|
if [[ $i -eq 5 ]]; then
|
|
extn_len=0
|
|
else
|
|
# Not sure what a good upper bound is here, but a key_share
|
|
# extension with an ffdhe8192 would be over 1024 bytes.
|
|
extn_len=$RANDOM%1024
|
|
fi
|
|
extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len)
|
|
extn+=",${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2}"
|
|
for (( j=0; j <= extn_len-2; j+=2 )); do
|
|
rnd_bytes="$(printf "%04x" $RANDOM)"
|
|
extn+=",${rnd_bytes:0:2},${rnd_bytes:2:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $j -lt $extn_len ]]; then
|
|
rnd_bytes="$(printf "%04x" $RANDOM)"
|
|
extn+=",${rnd_bytes:0:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then
|
|
echo -en "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized extension"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -n ": $extn"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" "$extn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an unrecognized extension."
|
|
outln " extension used in failed test: $extn"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains an unrecognized extension: $extn"
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
else
|
|
# Check for inability to handle empty last extension (see PR #792 and
|
|
# https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg19720.html).
|
|
# (Since this test also uses an unrecognized extension, only run this
|
|
# test if the previous test passed, and use the final extension value
|
|
# from that test to ensure that the only difference is the location
|
|
# of the extension.)
|
|
|
|
# The "extra extensions" parameter needs to include the padding and
|
|
# heartbeat extensions, since otherwise prepare_tls_clienthello()
|
|
# will add these extensions to the end of the ClientHello.
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with empty last extension."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" "
|
|
00,0f, 00,01, 01,
|
|
00,15, 00,56,
|
|
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
|
|
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
|
|
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
|
|
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
|
|
$extn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if last extension in ClientHello is empty."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if last extension in ClientHello is empty."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check for SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG.
|
|
# Send a ClientHello with 129 cipher suites (including 0x00,0xff) to see
|
|
# if adding a 129th cipher to the list causes a failure.
|
|
#TODO: we need to clarify whether the mit is hit at 128 or 129 ciphers.
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with 129 cipher suites."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "00,27, $cipher_list"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello includes more than 128 cipher suites."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello includes more than 128 cipher suites."
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=true
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check for ClientHello size bug. According to RFC 7586 "at least one TLS
|
|
# implementation is known to hang the connection when [a] ClientHello
|
|
# record [with a length between 256 and 511 bytes] is received."
|
|
# If the length of the host name is more than 75 bytes (which would make
|
|
# $SNI more than 87 bytes), then the ClientHello would be more than 511
|
|
# bytes if the server_name extension were included. Removing the SNI
|
|
# extension, however, may not be an option, since the server may reject the
|
|
# connection attempt for that reason.
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" != 00 ]] && [[ ${#SNI} -le 87 ]]; then
|
|
# Normally prepare_tls_clienthello() will add a padding extension with a length
|
|
# that will make the ClientHello be 512 bytes in length. Providing an "extra
|
|
# extensions" parameter with a short padding extension prevents that.
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with length between 256 and 511 bytes."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" "00,15,00,01,00"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello is between 256 and 511 bytes in length."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello is between 256 and 511 bytes in length."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check that server ignores unrecognized cipher suite values
|
|
# see RFC 8701
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok"; then
|
|
list=""
|
|
for ciph in "${grease_cipher_suites[@]}"; do
|
|
list+=", $ciph"
|
|
done
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized cipher suite values."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "${list:2}, $selected_cipher_hex, 00,ff"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains unrecognized cipher suite values."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains unrecognized cipher suite values."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check that servers that support ECDHE cipher suites ignore
|
|
# unrecognized named group values.
|
|
# see RFC 8701
|
|
if [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
# Send a ClientHello that lists all of the ECDHE cipher suites
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$ecdhe_ciphers, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
# Send the same ClientHello as before but with an unrecognized
|
|
# named group value added. Make the unrecognized value the first
|
|
# one in the list replacing one of the values in the original list,
|
|
# but don't replace the value that was selected by the server.
|
|
rnd=$RANDOM%${#grease_supported_groups[@]}
|
|
temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")
|
|
curve_found="${temp%%,*}"
|
|
if [[ "$curve_found" == "ECDH" ]]; then
|
|
curve_found="${temp#*, }"
|
|
curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$curve_found" == "B-571" ]]; then
|
|
extn="
|
|
00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492
|
|
00, 3e, 00, 3c, # lengths
|
|
${grease_supported_groups[rnd]}, 00, 0e, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b,
|
|
00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08,
|
|
00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13,
|
|
00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11"
|
|
else
|
|
extn="
|
|
00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492
|
|
00, 3e, 00, 3c, # lengths
|
|
${grease_supported_groups[rnd]}, 00, 0d, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b,
|
|
00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08,
|
|
00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13,
|
|
00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized named group value in supported_groups extension."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$ecdhe_ciphers, 00,ff" "" "$extn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains a supported_groups extension with an unrecognized named group value (${grease_supported_groups[rnd]})."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains a supported_groups extension with an unrecognized named group value (${grease_supported_groups[rnd]})."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check that servers that support the ALPN extension ignore
|
|
# unrecognized ALPN values.
|
|
# see RFC 8701
|
|
if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]] && [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then
|
|
for alpn_proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do
|
|
alpn+=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")"
|
|
done
|
|
alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3
|
|
alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len)
|
|
extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2
|
|
extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len)
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "all" "00,10,${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
else
|
|
selected_alpn_protocol="$(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')"
|
|
# If using a "normal" ALPN extension worked, then add an unrecognized
|
|
# ALPN value to the beginning of the extension and try again.
|
|
alpn_proto="ZZ" # "ZZ" = "{0x5A,0x5A}"
|
|
alpn=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")$alpn"
|
|
alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3
|
|
alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len)
|
|
extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2
|
|
extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len)
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized ALPN value in application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "all" "00,10,${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn"
|
|
success=$?
|
|
if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension with an unrecognized ALPN value."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension with an unrecognized ALPN value."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
else
|
|
grease_selected_alpn_protocol="$(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')"
|
|
if [[ -z "$grease_selected_alpn_protocol" ]] && [[ -n "$selected_alpn_protocol" ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server did not ignore unrecognized ALPN value in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server did not ignore unrecognized ALPN value in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
elif [[ "$grease_selected_alpn_protocol" == $alpn_proto ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " Server selected GREASE ALPN value ($alpn_proto) in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server selected GREASE ALPN value ($alpn_proto) in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension."
|
|
bug_found=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers ignore
|
|
# an unrecognized named group value along with a corresponding
|
|
# unrecognized key share
|
|
# see https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22322.html
|
|
# and https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22319.html
|
|
|
|
# TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers ignore unrecognized
|
|
# values in the supported_versions extension.
|
|
# see https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22319.html
|
|
|
|
# TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers don't require the
|
|
# psk_key_exchange_modes extension to be present in the ClientHello.
|
|
|
|
if ! "$bug_found"; then
|
|
outln " No bugs found."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "No bugs found."
|
|
#return 0
|
|
else
|
|
#return 1
|
|
:
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
#FIXME: No client side error cases where we want to return 1?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# If the server supports any non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport,
|
|
# check if the server is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) attacks.
|
|
# See "Return Of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)" by Hanno Böck,
|
|
# Juraj Somorovsky, and Craig Young (https://robotattack.org).
|
|
#
|
|
run_robot() {
|
|
local tls_hexcode="03"
|
|
# A list of all non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport
|
|
local cipherlist="00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,7b, ff,00, ff,01, ff,02, ff,03, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,7a, 00,05, 00,04, 00,0a, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01"
|
|
# A list of all non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport and that use AES in either GCM or CBC mode.
|
|
local aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist="00,9d, 00,9c, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,3c, 00,2f"
|
|
local padded_pms encrypted_pms cke_prefix client_key_exchange rnd_pad
|
|
local rnd_pms="aa112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899"
|
|
local change_cipher_spec finished resp
|
|
local -a response
|
|
local -i i subret len iteration testnum pubkeybytes
|
|
local pubkeybits
|
|
local vulnerable=false send_ccs_finished=true
|
|
local -i start_time end_time robottimeout=$MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
local cve="CVE-2017-17382 CVE-2017-17427 CVE-2017-17428 CVE-2017-13098 CVE-2017-1000385 CVE-2017-13099 CVE-2016-6883 CVE-2012-5081 CVE-2017-6168"
|
|
local cwe="CWE-203"
|
|
local jsonID="ROBOT"
|
|
|
|
[[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) vulnerability " && outln
|
|
pr_bold " ROBOT "
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! "$HAS_PKUTIL" ]]; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkeyutl utility."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkeyutl utility." "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_PKEY"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility." "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="03"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="02"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="01"
|
|
elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="00"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Some hosts are only vulnerable with GCM. First send a list of
|
|
# ciphers that use AES in GCM or CBC mode, with the GCM ciphers
|
|
# listed first, and then try all ciphers that use RSA key transport
|
|
# if there is no connection on the first try.
|
|
tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist, 00,ff"
|
|
subret=$?
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] || [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
cipherlist="$aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist"
|
|
tls_hexcode="${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$tls_hexcode" != "03" ]]; then
|
|
cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$tls_hexcode" ", $cipherlist")"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$cipherlist, 00,ff"
|
|
subret=$?
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
tls_hexcode="${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}"
|
|
cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$tls_hexcode" ", $cipherlist")"
|
|
cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}"
|
|
elif [[ $subret -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_svrty_best "Server does not support any cipher suites that use RSA key transport"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no RSA key transport cipher" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Run the tests in two iterations. In iteration 0, send 5 different client
|
|
# key exchange (CKE) messages followed by change cipher spec (CCS) and
|
|
# Finished messages, and check whether the server provided the same
|
|
# response in each case. If the server didn't provide the same response
|
|
# for all five messages in iteration 0, then it is vulnerable. Otherwise
|
|
# try a second time (iteration 1) with the same CKE messages, but without
|
|
# sending the CCS or Finished messages.
|
|
# Iterations 0 and 1 are run with a short timeout waiting for the server
|
|
# to respond to the CKE message. If the server was found to be potentially
|
|
# vulnerable in iteration 0 or 1 and testssl.sh timed out waiting for a
|
|
# response in some cases, then retry the test using a longer timeout value.
|
|
for (( iteration=0; iteration < 3; iteration++ )); do
|
|
if [[ $iteration -eq 1 ]]; then
|
|
# If the server was found to be vulnerable in iteration 0, then
|
|
# there's no need to try the alternative message flow.
|
|
"$vulnerable" && continue
|
|
send_ccs_finished=false
|
|
elif [[ $iteration -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
# The tests are being rerun, so reset the vulnerable flag.
|
|
vulnerable=false
|
|
fi
|
|
for (( testnum=0; testnum < 5; testnum++ )); do
|
|
response[testnum]="untested"
|
|
done
|
|
for (( testnum=0; testnum < 5; testnum++ )); do
|
|
tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$cipherlist, 00,ff" "all" "" "" "false"
|
|
|
|
# Create the padded premaster secret to encrypt. The padding should be
|
|
# of the form "00 02 <random> 00 <TLS version> <premaster secret>."
|
|
# However, for each test except testnum=0 the padding will be
|
|
# made incorrect in some way, as specified below.
|
|
|
|
# Determine the length of the public key and create the <random> bytes.
|
|
# <random> should be a length that makes total length of $padded_pms
|
|
# the same as the length of the public key. <random> should contain no 00 bytes.
|
|
pubkeybits="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | \
|
|
$OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub 2>>$ERRFILE | awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }')"
|
|
pubkeybits="${pubkeybits%%bit*}"
|
|
pubkeybytes=$pubkeybits/8
|
|
[[ $((pubkeybits%8)) -ne 0 ]] && pubkeybytes+=1
|
|
rnd_pad=""
|
|
for (( len=0; len < pubkeybytes-52; len+=2 )); do
|
|
rnd_pad+="abcd"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $len -eq $pubkeybytes-52 ]] && rnd_pad+="ab"
|
|
|
|
case "$testnum" in
|
|
# correct padding
|
|
0) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}00${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}${rnd_pms}" ;;
|
|
# wrong first two bytes
|
|
1) padded_pms="4117${rnd_pad}00${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}${rnd_pms}" ;;
|
|
# 0x00 on a wrong position
|
|
2) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}11${rnd_pms}0011" ;;
|
|
# no 0x00 in the middle
|
|
3) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}111111${rnd_pms}" ;;
|
|
# wrong version number (according to Klima / Pokorny / Rosa paper)
|
|
4) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}000202${rnd_pms}" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Encrypt the padded premaster secret using the server's public key.
|
|
encrypted_pms="$(hex2binary "$padded_pms" | \
|
|
$OPENSSL pkeyutl -encrypt -certin -inkey $HOSTCERT -pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:none 2>/dev/null | \
|
|
hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02x"')"
|
|
if [[ -z "$encrypted_pms" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0300" ]]; then
|
|
socksend ",x15, x03, x00, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0
|
|
else
|
|
socksend ",x15, x03, x01, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0
|
|
fi
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
prln_fixme "Conversion of public key failed around line $((LINENO - 9))"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Conversion of public key failed around line $((LINENO - 10)) "
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Create the client key exchange message.
|
|
len=${#encrypted_pms}/2
|
|
cke_prefix="16${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}$(printf "%04x" $((len+6)))10$(printf "%06x" $((len+2)))$(printf "%04x" $len)"
|
|
encrypted_pms="$cke_prefix$encrypted_pms"
|
|
len=${#encrypted_pms}
|
|
client_key_exchange=""
|
|
for (( i=0; i<len; i+=2 )); do
|
|
client_key_exchange+=", x${encrypted_pms:i:2}"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# The contents of change cipher spec are fixed.
|
|
change_cipher_spec=", x14, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}, x00, x01, x01"
|
|
|
|
# Send an arbitrary Finished message.
|
|
finished=", x16, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}
|
|
, x00, x40, x6e, x49, x65, x68, x00, x46, x79, xfd, x5a, x57, xdc
|
|
, x3e, xef, xb2, xd2, xac, xe0, x8c, x54, x2d, x5f, x00, x87, xdb
|
|
, xb6, xe3, x77, x2c, x9d, x88, x27, x38, x98, x7d, xcd, x7e, xac
|
|
, xdd, x5d, x72, xbe, x24, x0d, x20, x36, x14, x0e, x94, x51, xde
|
|
, xa0, xb6, xc7, x56, x28, xd8, xa1, xcb, x24, xb9, x03, xd0, x7c, x50"
|
|
|
|
if "$send_ccs_finished"; then
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending client key exchange, change cipher spec, finished... "
|
|
socksend "$client_key_exchange$change_cipher_spec$finished" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo -en "\nsending client key exchange... "
|
|
socksend "$client_key_exchange" $USLEEP_SND
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo "reading server error response..."
|
|
start_time=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s")
|
|
sockread 32768 $robottimeout
|
|
subret=$?
|
|
if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
end_time=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s")
|
|
resp=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02x"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")
|
|
response[testnum]="${resp%%[!0-9A-F]*}"
|
|
# The first time a response is received to a client key
|
|
# exchange message, measure the amount of time it took to
|
|
# receive a response and set the timeout value for future
|
|
# tests to 2 seconds longer than it took to receive a response.
|
|
[[ $iteration -ne 2 ]] && [[ $robottimeout -eq $MAX_WAITSOCK ]] && \
|
|
[[ $((end_time-start_time)) -lt $((MAX_WAITSOCK-2)) ]] && \
|
|
robottimeout=$((end_time-start_time+2))
|
|
else
|
|
response[testnum]="Timeout waiting for alert"
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nresponse[$testnum] = ${response[testnum]}"
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && parse_tls_serverhello "${response[testnum]}"
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
|
|
# Don't continue testing if it has already been determined that
|
|
# tests need to be rerun with a longer timeout.
|
|
if [[ $iteration -ne 2 ]]; then
|
|
for (( i=1; i <= testnum; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ "${response[i]}" != "${response[$((i-1))]}" ]] && \
|
|
( [[ "${response[i]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[$((i-1))]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] ); then
|
|
vulnerable=true
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
"$vulnerable" && break
|
|
fi
|
|
# Don't continue testing if it has already been determined that the server is
|
|
# strongly vulnerable.
|
|
if [[ $testnum -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${response[1]}" != "${response[2]}" ]] && break
|
|
elif [[ $testnum -eq 3 ]]; then
|
|
[[ "${response[2]}" != "${response[3]}" ]] && break
|
|
[[ "${response[0]}" != "${response[1]}" ]] && break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
# If the server provided the same error message for all tests, then this
|
|
# is an indication that the server is not vulnerable.
|
|
if [[ "${response[0]}" != "${response[1]}" ]] || [[ "${response[1]}" != "${response[2]}" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[2]}" != "${response[3]}" ]] || [[ "${response[3]}" != "${response[4]}" ]]; then
|
|
vulnerable=true
|
|
|
|
# If the test was run with a short timeout and was found to be
|
|
# potentially vulnerable due to some tests timing out, then
|
|
# verify the results by rerunning with a longer timeout.
|
|
if [[ $robottimeout -eq $MAX_WAITSOCK ]]; then
|
|
break
|
|
elif [[ "${response[0]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[1]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[2]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[3]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \
|
|
[[ "${response[4]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]]; then
|
|
robottimeout=10
|
|
else
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
! "$vulnerable" && [[ $iteration -eq 1 ]] && break
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$vulnerable"; then
|
|
if [[ "${response[1]}" == "${response[2]}" ]] && [[ "${response[2]}" == "${response[3]}" ]]; then
|
|
pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln " - weakly vulnerable as the attack would take too long"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, but the attack would take too long" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Vulnerable to ROBOT"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
old_fart() {
|
|
out "Get precompiled bins or compile "
|
|
pr_url "https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl"
|
|
outln "."
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "old_fart" "WARN" "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is an old fart... . It doesn\'t make much sense to proceed. Get precompiled bins or compile https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl ."
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is an old fart... . It doesn't make much sense to proceed." $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# try very hard to determine the install path to get ahold of the mapping file and the CA bundles
|
|
# TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR can be supplied via environment so that the cipher mapping and CA bundles can be found
|
|
# www.carbonwind.net/TLS_Cipher_Suites_Project/tls_ssl_cipher_suites_simple_table_all.htm
|
|
get_install_dir() {
|
|
[[ -z "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" ]] && TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -r "$RUN_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]]; then
|
|
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$RUN_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -z "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" ]] && TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$RUN_DIR" # probably TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
[[ -r "$RUN_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$RUN_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# we haven't found the cipher file yet...
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p readlink &>/dev/null ; then
|
|
readlink -f ls &>/dev/null && \
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(readlink -f "$(basename "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" || \
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(readlink "$(basename "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")"
|
|
# not sure whether Darwin has -f
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# still no cipher mapping file:
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p realpath &>/dev/null ; then
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(realpath "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")"
|
|
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# still no cipher mapping file (and realpath is not present):
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p readlink &>/dev/null ; then
|
|
readlink -f ls &>/dev/null && \
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" || \
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(readlink "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")"
|
|
# not sure whether Darwin has -f
|
|
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
[[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl-only"
|
|
debugme echo "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE"
|
|
prln_warning "\nATTENTION: No cipher mapping file found!"
|
|
outln "Please note from 2.9 on $PROG_NAME needs files in \"\$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/\" to function correctly."
|
|
outln
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame "Type \"yes\" to ignore this warning and proceed at your own risk" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
TLS_DATA_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/tls_data.txt"
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$TLS_DATA_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "\nATTENTION: No TLS data file found -- needed for socket-based handshakes"
|
|
outln "Please note from 2.9 on $PROG_NAME needs files in \"\$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/\" to function correctly."
|
|
outln
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame "Type \"yes\" to ignore this warning and proceed at your own risk" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
else
|
|
: # see #705, in a nutshell: not portable to initialize a global array inside a function. Thus it'll be done in main part below
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_openssl_suffix() {
|
|
local naming_ext="$(uname).$(uname -m)"
|
|
local uname_arch="$(uname -m)"
|
|
local myarch_suffix=""
|
|
|
|
[[ $uname_arch =~ 64 ]] && myarch_suffix=64 || myarch_suffix=32
|
|
if [[ -f "$1/openssl" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl" ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$1/openssl"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ -f "$1/openssl.$naming_ext" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl.$naming_ext" ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$1/openssl.$naming_ext"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ -f "$1/openssl.$uname_arch" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl.$uname_arch" ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$1/openssl.$uname_arch"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif [[ -f "$1/openssl$myarch_suffix" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl$myarch_suffix" ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$1/openssl$myarch_suffix"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
find_openssl_binary() {
|
|
local s_client_has=$TEMPDIR/s_client_has.txt
|
|
local s_client_has2=$TEMPDIR/s_client_has2.txt
|
|
local s_client_starttls_has=$TEMPDIR/s_client_starttls_has.txt
|
|
local s_client_starttls_has2=$TEMPDIR/s_client_starttls_has2
|
|
local openssl_location cwd=""
|
|
local ossl_wo_dev_info
|
|
local curve
|
|
local -a curves_ossl=("sect163k1" "sect163r1" "sect163r2" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "sect233k1" "sect233r1" "sect239k1" "sect283k1" "sect283r1" "sect409k1" "sect409r1" "sect571k1" "sect571r1" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "prime192v1" "secp224k1" "secp224r1" "secp256k1" "prime256v1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448" "ffdhe2048" "ffdhe3072" "ffdhe4096" "ffdhe6144" "ffdhe8192")
|
|
|
|
# 0. check environment variable whether it's executable
|
|
if [[ -n "$OPENSSL" ]] && [[ ! -x "$OPENSSL" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "\ncannot find specified (\$OPENSSL=$OPENSSL) binary."
|
|
tmln_out " Looking some place else ..."
|
|
elif [[ -x "$OPENSSL" ]]; then
|
|
: # 1. all ok supplied $OPENSSL was found and has executable bit set -- testrun comes below
|
|
elif [[ -e "/mnt/c/Windows/System32/bash.exe" ]] && test_openssl_suffix "$(dirname "$(type -p openssl)")"; then
|
|
# 2. otherwise, only if on Bash on Windows, use system binaries only.
|
|
SYSTEM2="WSL"
|
|
# Workaround for delayed responses of Windows DNS when using "invalid.", see #1738, #1812.
|
|
[[ $NXCONNECT == invalid. ]] && NXCONNECT=127.0.0.1:0
|
|
elif test_openssl_suffix "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR"; then
|
|
: # 3. otherwise try openssl in path of testssl.sh
|
|
elif test_openssl_suffix "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/bin"; then
|
|
: # 4. otherwise here, this is supposed to be the standard --platform independent path in the future!!!
|
|
elif test_openssl_suffix "$(dirname "$(type -p openssl)")"; then
|
|
: # 5. we tried hard and failed, so now we use the system binaries
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ ! -x "$OPENSSL" ]] && fatal "cannot exec or find any openssl binary" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
|
|
# The former detection only was flawed, because when the system supplied openssl.cnf file
|
|
# couldn't be parsed by our openssl it bailed out here with a misleading error, see #1982.
|
|
# Now we try with another version of the config file and if it still fails we bail out.
|
|
if ! $OPENSSL version -d >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf"
|
|
if ! $OPENSSL version -d >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
|
|
fatal "cannot exec or find any openssl binary" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
else
|
|
debugme1 echo "We provide our own openssl.cnf file as the one from your system cannot be used"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html
|
|
# https://web.archive.org/web/20150815130800/http://openssl.org/news/openssl-notes.html
|
|
OSSL_NAME=$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
OSSL_VER=$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null | awk -F' ' '{ print $2 }')
|
|
OSSL_VER_MAJOR="${OSSL_VER%%\.*}"
|
|
ossl_wo_dev_info="${OSSL_VER%%-*}"
|
|
OSSL_VER_MINOR="${ossl_wo_dev_info#$OSSL_VER_MAJOR\.}"
|
|
OSSL_VER_MINOR="${OSSL_VER_MINOR%%[a-zA-Z]*}"
|
|
OSSL_VER_APPENDIX="${OSSL_VER#$OSSL_VER_MAJOR\.$OSSL_VER_MINOR}"
|
|
OSSL_VER_PLATFORM=$($OPENSSL version -p 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^platform: //')
|
|
OSSL_BUILD_DATE=$($OPENSSL version -a 2>/dev/null | grep '^built' | sed -e 's/built on//' -e 's/: ... //' -e 's/: //' -e 's/ UTC//' -e 's/ +0000//' -e 's/.000000000//')
|
|
|
|
# see #190, reverting logic: unless otherwise proved openssl has no dh bits
|
|
case "$OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR" in
|
|
1.0.2|1.1.0|1.1.1|3.*) HAS_DH_BITS=true ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then
|
|
[[ ${OSSL_VER//./} -ge 210 ]] && HAS_DH_BITS=true
|
|
if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_warning "LibreSSL in native ssl mode is not a good choice for testing INSECURE features!"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
initialize_engine
|
|
|
|
openssl_location="$(type -p $OPENSSL)"
|
|
[[ -n "$GIT_REL" ]] && \
|
|
cwd="$PWD" || \
|
|
cwd="$RUN_DIR"
|
|
if [[ "$openssl_location" == ${PWD}/bin ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL_LOCATION="\$PWD/bin/$(basename "$openssl_location")"
|
|
elif [[ "$openssl_location" =~ $cwd ]] && [[ "$cwd" != '.' ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL_LOCATION="${openssl_location%%$cwd}"
|
|
else
|
|
OPENSSL_LOCATION="$openssl_location"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
OSSL_CIPHERS_S=""
|
|
HAS_SSL2=false
|
|
HAS_SSL3=false
|
|
HAS_TLS13=false
|
|
HAS_X448=false
|
|
HAS_X25519=false
|
|
HAS_SIGALGS=false
|
|
HAS_NO_SSL2=false
|
|
HAS_NOSERVERNAME=false
|
|
HAS_CIPHERSUITES=false
|
|
HAS_SECLEVEL=false
|
|
HAS_COMP=false
|
|
HAS_NO_COMP=false
|
|
HAS_CURVES=false
|
|
OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES=""
|
|
HAS_PKEY=false
|
|
HAS_PKUTIL=false
|
|
HAS_ALPN=false
|
|
HAS_NPN=false
|
|
HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=false
|
|
HAS_PROXY=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER=false
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER2=false
|
|
HAS_POSTGRES=false
|
|
HAS_MYSQL=false
|
|
HAS_LMTP=false
|
|
HAS_SIEVE=false
|
|
HAS_NNTP=false
|
|
HAS_IRC=false
|
|
HAS_CHACHA20=false
|
|
HAS_AES128_GCM=false
|
|
HAS_AES256_GCM=false
|
|
HAS_ZLIB=false
|
|
HAS_UDS=false
|
|
HAS_UDS2=false
|
|
TRUSTED1ST=""
|
|
HAS_ENABLE_PHA=false
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers -s 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || OSSL_CIPHERS_S="-s"
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -ssl2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_SSL2=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -ssl3 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_SSL3=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -tls1_3 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_TLS13=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -no_ssl2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_NO_SSL2=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL genpkey -algorithm X448 2>&1 | grep -aq "not found" || HAS_X448=true
|
|
$OPENSSL genpkey -algorithm X25519 2>&1 | grep -aq "not found" || HAS_X25519=true
|
|
$OPENSSL pkey -help 2>&1 | grep -q Error || HAS_PKEY=true
|
|
$OPENSSL pkeyutl 2>&1 | grep -q Error || HAS_PKUTIL=true
|
|
|
|
# Below and at other occurrences we do a little trick using "$NXCONNECT" to avoid plain and
|
|
# link level DNS lookups. See issue #1418 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6761#section-6.4
|
|
if "$HAS_TLS13"; then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -tls1_3 -sigalgs PSS+SHA256:PSS+SHA384 -connect $NXCONNECT </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_SIGALGS=true
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -noservername </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_NOSERVERNAME=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -ciphersuites </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_CIPHERSUITES=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL ciphers @SECLEVEL=0:ALL > /dev/null 2> /dev/null && HAS_SECLEVEL=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -comp </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_COMP=true
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -no_comp </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || HAS_NO_COMP=true
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS=$(count_ciphers "$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' 'ALL')")
|
|
|
|
# The following statement works with OpenSSL 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0 and LibreSSL 3.4
|
|
if $OPENSSL s_client -curves </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then
|
|
# This is e.g. for LibreSSL (tested with version 3.4.1): WSL users will get "127.0.0.1:0" here,
|
|
# all other "invalid.:0". We need a port here, in any case!
|
|
# The $OPENSSL connect call deliberately fails: when the curve isn't available with
|
|
# "getaddrinfo: Name or service not known", newer LibreSSL with "Failed to set groups".
|
|
for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -groups $curve -connect ${NXCONNECT%:*}:0 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -Eiaq "Error with command|unknown option|Failed to set groups"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES+=" $curve "
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
HAS_CURVES=true
|
|
for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do
|
|
# Same as above, we just don't need a port for invalid.
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -curves $curve -connect $NXCONNECT </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -Eiaq "Error with command|unknown option"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES+=" $curve "
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# For the following we feel safe enough to query the s_client help functions.
|
|
# That was not good enough for the previous lookups
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -help 2>$s_client_has
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client -starttls foo </dev/null 2>$s_client_starttls_has
|
|
|
|
grep -q '\-proxy' $s_client_has && HAS_PROXY=true
|
|
grep -qw '\-alpn' $s_client_has && HAS_ALPN=true
|
|
grep -qw '\-nextprotoneg' $s_client_has && HAS_NPN=true
|
|
|
|
grep -qw '\-fallback_scsv' $s_client_has && HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=true
|
|
|
|
grep -q 'xmpp' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_XMPP=true
|
|
grep -q 'xmpp-server' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_XMPP_SERVER=true
|
|
|
|
grep -q 'postgres' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_POSTGRES=true
|
|
grep -q 'mysql' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_MYSQL=true
|
|
grep -q 'lmtp' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_LMTP=true
|
|
grep -q 'sieve' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_SIEVE=true
|
|
grep -q 'nntp' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_NNTP=true
|
|
grep -q 'irc' $s_client_starttls_has && HAS_IRC=true
|
|
|
|
grep -q 'Unix-domain socket' $s_client_has && HAS_UDS=true
|
|
|
|
grep -q '\-enable_pha' $s_client_has && HAS_ENABLE_PHA=true
|
|
|
|
# Now check whether the standard $OPENSSL has Unix-domain socket and xmpp-server support. If
|
|
# not check /usr/bin/openssl -- if available. This is more a kludge which we shouldn't use for
|
|
# every openssl feature. At some point we need to decide which with openssl version we go.
|
|
OPENSSL2=/usr/bin/openssl
|
|
if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ ! $OSSL_VER =~ 1.1.1 ]] && [[ ! $OSSL_VER_MAJOR =~ 3 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -x $OPENSSL2 ]]; then
|
|
$OPENSSL2 s_client -help 2>$s_client_has2
|
|
$OPENSSL2 s_client -starttls foo 2>$s_client_starttls_has2
|
|
grep -q 'Unix-domain socket' $s_client_has2 && HAS_UDS2=true
|
|
grep -q 'xmpp-server' $s_client_starttls_has2 && HAS_XMPP_SERVER2=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -chacha20 -K 12345678901234567890123456789012 -iv 01000000123456789012345678901234 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_CHACHA20=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -aes-128-gcm -K 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef -iv 0123456789abcdef01234567 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_AES128_GCM=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL enc -aes-256-gcm -K 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef -iv 0123456789abcdef01234567 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_AES256_GCM=true
|
|
|
|
[[ "$(echo -e "\x78\x9C\xAB\xCA\xC9\x4C\xE2\x02\x00\x06\x20\x01\xBC" | $OPENSSL zlib -d 2>/dev/null)" == zlib ]] && HAS_ZLIB=true
|
|
|
|
$OPENSSL verify -trusted_first </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -q '^usage' || TRUSTED1ST="-trusted_first"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$CONNECT_TIMEOUT" ]] || [[ -n "$OPENSSL_TIMEOUT" ]]; then
|
|
# We don't set a general timeout as we might not have "timeout" installed and we only
|
|
# do what is instructed. Thus we check first what the command line params were,
|
|
# then we proceed
|
|
if type -p timeout >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
# There are different versions of "timeout". Check whether --preserve-status is supported
|
|
if timeout --help 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'preserve-status'; then
|
|
TIMEOUT_CMD="timeout --preserve-status"
|
|
else
|
|
TIMEOUT_CMD="timeout"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
TIMEOUT_CMD=""
|
|
outln
|
|
fatal "You specified a connect or openssl timeout but the binary \"timeout\" couldn't be found " $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
if [[ -n $OPENSSL_TIMEOUT ]]; then
|
|
OPENSSL="$TIMEOUT_CMD $OPENSSL_TIMEOUT $OPENSSL"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
find_socat() {
|
|
local result""
|
|
|
|
result=$(type -p socat)
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ -x $result ]] && $result -V 2>&1 | grep -iaq 'socat version' ; then
|
|
SOCAT=$result
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
check4openssl_oldfarts() {
|
|
case "$OSSL_VER" in
|
|
0.9.7*|0.9.6*|0.9.5*)
|
|
# 0.9.5a was latest in 0.9.5 an released 2000/4/1, that'll NOT suffice for this test
|
|
old_fart ;;
|
|
0.9.8)
|
|
case $OSSL_VER_APPENDIX in
|
|
a|b|c|d|e) old_fart;; # no SNI!
|
|
# other than that we leave this for MacOSX and FreeBSD but it's a pain and likely gives false negatives/positives
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then ## mm: Patch for libressl
|
|
prln_warning " Your \"$OPENSSL\" is way too old (<version 1.0) !"
|
|
case $SYSTEM in
|
|
*BSD|Darwin)
|
|
out " Please use binary provided in \$INSTALLDIR/bin/ or from ports/brew or compile from "
|
|
pr_url "github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl"; outln "."
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "too_old_openssl" "WARN" "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is way too old. Please use binary provided in \$INSTALLDIR/bin/ or from ports/brew or compile from github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl ." ;;
|
|
*) out " Update openssl binaries or compile from "
|
|
pr_url "https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl"; outln "."
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "too_old_openssl" "WARN" "Update openssl binaries or compile from https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl .";;
|
|
esac
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to accept false negatives or positives" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# FreeBSD needs to have /dev/fd mounted. This is a friendly hint, see #258
|
|
check_bsd_mount() {
|
|
if [[ "$(uname)" == FreeBSD ]]; then
|
|
if ! mount | grep -q "^devfs"; then
|
|
outln "you seem to run $PROG_NAME= in a jail. Hopefully you're did \"mount -t fdescfs fdesc /dev/fd\""
|
|
elif mount | grep '/dev/fd' | grep -q fdescfs; then
|
|
:
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "You need to mount fdescfs on FreeBSD: \"mount -t fdescfs fdesc /dev/fd\"" $ERR_OTHERCLIENT
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# It's important to avoid certain locales as the impact bash's pattern matching, see #1860
|
|
# and comment in #2100
|
|
#
|
|
setup_lc_collate() {
|
|
local l=""
|
|
local msg='locale(1) support for any of "C, POSIX, C.UTF-8, en_US.UTF-8, en_GB.UTF-8" missing'
|
|
local found=false
|
|
|
|
type -p locale &> /dev/null && HAS_LOCALE=true
|
|
if ! "$HAS_LOCALE"; then
|
|
# likely docker container or any other minimal environment. This should work(tm)
|
|
LC_COLLATE=C
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
for l in C POSIX C.UTF-8 en_US.UTF-8 en_GB.UTF-8; do
|
|
locale -a | grep -q $l
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && continue
|
|
export LC_COLLATE=$l
|
|
found=true
|
|
break
|
|
done
|
|
if ! "$found"; then
|
|
prln_local_problem "$msg\n"
|
|
# we can't use fileout yet as it messes up JSON output, see #2103
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This sets the PRINTF command for writing into TCP sockets. It is needed because
|
|
# The shell builtin printf flushes the write buffer at every \n, ("\x0a") which
|
|
# in turn means a new TCP fragment. That causes a slight performance penalty and
|
|
# some F5s to hiccup, see #1113. Unfortunately this can be used only with GNU's
|
|
# and OpenBSD's /usr/bin/printf -- FreeBSD + OS X can't do this. Thus here we need
|
|
# to pipe through dd or cat, see socksend() and socksend_clienthello(). An empty
|
|
# $PRINTF signals the bash internal printf which then uses cat as a stdout buffer.
|
|
# A better solution needs to follow.
|
|
#
|
|
choose_printf() {
|
|
local p ptf
|
|
|
|
ptf="$(type -aP printf)"
|
|
if [[ -n "$ptf" ]]; then
|
|
for p in $ptf; do
|
|
if $p "\xc0\x14\xc0\xff\xee" | hexdump -C | grep -q 'c0 14 c0 ff ee'; then
|
|
PRINTF=$p
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if type -t printf >/dev/null; then
|
|
PRINTF=""
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fatal "Neither external printf nor shell internal found. " $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
help() {
|
|
cat << EOF
|
|
|
|
"$PROG_NAME [options] <URI>" or "$PROG_NAME <options>"
|
|
|
|
"$PROG_NAME <option>", where <option> is mostly standalone and one of:
|
|
|
|
--help what you're looking at
|
|
-b, --banner displays banner + version of $PROG_NAME
|
|
-v, --version same as previous
|
|
-V, --local [pattern] pretty print all local ciphers (of openssl only). If search pattern supplied: it is an
|
|
an ignore case word pattern of cipher hexcode or any other string in its name, kx or bits
|
|
|
|
"$PROG_NAME [options] <URI>", where <URI> is:
|
|
|
|
<URI> host|host:port|URL|URL:port port 443 is default, URL can only contain HTTPS as a protocol
|
|
|
|
and [options] is/are:
|
|
|
|
-t, --starttls <protocol> Does a run against a STARTTLS enabled service which is one of ftp, smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap,
|
|
sieve, xmpp, xmpp-server, telnet, ldap, nntp, postgres, mysql
|
|
--xmpphost <to_domain> For STARTTLS xmpp or xmpp-server checks it supplies the domainname (like SNI)
|
|
--mx <domain/host> Tests MX records from high to low priority (STARTTLS, port 25)
|
|
--file/-iL <fname> Mass testing option: Reads one testssl.sh command line per line from <fname>.
|
|
Can be combined with --serial or --parallel. Implicitly turns on "--warnings batch".
|
|
Text format 1: Comments via # allowed, EOF signals end of <fname>
|
|
Text format 2: nmap output in greppable format (-oG), 1 port per line allowed
|
|
--mode <serial|parallel> Mass testing to be done serial (default) or parallel (--parallel is shortcut for the latter)
|
|
--warnings <batch|off> "batch" doesn't continue when a testing error is encountered, off continues and skips warnings
|
|
--connect-timeout <seconds> useful to avoid hangers. Max <seconds> to wait for the TCP socket connect to return
|
|
--openssl-timeout <seconds> useful to avoid hangers. Max <seconds> to wait before openssl connect will be terminated
|
|
|
|
single check as <options> ("$PROG_NAME URI" does everything except -E and -g):
|
|
-e, --each-cipher checks each local cipher remotely
|
|
-E, --cipher-per-proto checks those per protocol
|
|
-s, --std, --categories tests standard cipher categories by strength
|
|
-f, --fs, --nsa checks forward secrecy settings
|
|
-p, --protocols checks TLS/SSL protocols (including SPDY/HTTP2)
|
|
-g, --grease tests several server implementation bugs like GREASE and size limitations
|
|
-S, --server-defaults displays the server's default picks and certificate info
|
|
-P, --server-preference displays the server's picks: protocol+cipher
|
|
-x, --single-cipher <pattern> tests matched <pattern> of ciphers
|
|
(if <pattern> not a number: word match)
|
|
-c, --client-simulation test client simulations, see which client negotiates with cipher and protocol
|
|
-h, --header, --headers tests HSTS, HPKP, server/app banner, security headers, cookie, reverse proxy, IPv4 address
|
|
|
|
-U, --vulnerable tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities (if applicable)
|
|
-H, --heartbleed tests for Heartbleed vulnerability
|
|
-I, --ccs, --ccs-injection tests for CCS injection vulnerability
|
|
-T, --ticketbleed tests for Ticketbleed vulnerability in BigIP loadbalancers
|
|
--BB, --robot tests for Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) vulnerability
|
|
--SI, --starttls-injection tests for STARTTLS injection issues
|
|
-R, --renegotiation tests for renegotiation vulnerabilities
|
|
-C, --compression, --crime tests for CRIME vulnerability (TLS compression issue)
|
|
-B, --breach tests for BREACH vulnerability (HTTP compression issue)
|
|
-O, --poodle tests for POODLE (SSL) vulnerability
|
|
-Z, --tls-fallback checks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mitigation
|
|
-W, --sweet32 tests 64 bit block ciphers (3DES, RC2 and IDEA): SWEET32 vulnerability
|
|
-A, --beast tests for BEAST vulnerability
|
|
-L, --lucky13 tests for LUCKY13
|
|
-WS, --winshock tests for winshock vulnerability
|
|
-F, --freak tests for FREAK vulnerability
|
|
-J, --logjam tests for LOGJAM vulnerability
|
|
-D, --drown tests for DROWN vulnerability
|
|
-4, --rc4, --appelbaum which RC4 ciphers are being offered?
|
|
|
|
tuning / connect options (most also can be preset via environment variables):
|
|
--fast omits some checks: using openssl for all ciphers (-e), show only first preferred cipher.
|
|
-9, --full includes tests for implementation bugs and cipher per protocol (could disappear)
|
|
--bugs enables the "-bugs" option of s_client, needed e.g. for some buggy F5s
|
|
--assume-http if protocol check fails it assumes HTTP protocol and enforces HTTP checks
|
|
--ssl-native fallback to checks with OpenSSL where sockets are normally used
|
|
--openssl <PATH> use this openssl binary (default: look in \$PATH, \$RUN_DIR of $PROG_NAME)
|
|
--proxy <host:port|auto> (experimental) proxy connects via <host:port>, auto: values from \$env (\$http(s)_proxy)
|
|
-6 also use IPv6. Works only with supporting OpenSSL version and IPv6 connectivity
|
|
--ip <ip> a) tests the supplied <ip> v4 or v6 address instead of resolving host(s) in URI
|
|
b) arg "one" means: just test the first DNS returns (useful for multiple IPs)
|
|
-n, --nodns <min|none> if "none": do not try any DNS lookups, "min" queries A, AAAA and MX records
|
|
--sneaky leave less traces in target logs: user agent, referer
|
|
--user-agent <user agent> set a custom user agent instead of the standard user agent
|
|
--ids-friendly skips a few vulnerability checks which may cause IDSs to block the scanning IP
|
|
--phone-out allow to contact external servers for CRL download and querying OCSP responder
|
|
--add-ca <CA files|CA dir> path to <CAdir> with *.pem or a comma separated list of CA files to include in trust check
|
|
--basicauth <user:pass> provide HTTP basic auth information.
|
|
--reqheader <header> add custom http request headers
|
|
|
|
output options (can also be preset via environment variables):
|
|
--quiet don't output the banner. By doing this you acknowledge usage terms normally appearing in the banner
|
|
--wide wide output for tests like RC4, BEAST. FS also with hexcode, kx, strength, RFC name
|
|
--show-each for wide outputs: display all ciphers tested -- not only succeeded ones
|
|
--mapping <openssl| openssl: use the OpenSSL cipher suite name as the primary name cipher suite name form (default)
|
|
iana|rfc -> use the IANA/(RFC) cipher suite name as the primary name cipher suite name form
|
|
no-openssl| -> don't display the OpenSSL cipher suite name, display IANA/(RFC) names only
|
|
no-iana|no-rfc> -> don't display the IANA/(RFC) cipher suite name, display OpenSSL names only
|
|
--color <0|1|2|3> 0: no escape or other codes, 1: b/w escape codes, 2: color (default), 3: extra color (color all ciphers)
|
|
--colorblind swap green and blue in the output
|
|
--debug <0-6> 1: screen output normal but keeps debug output in /tmp/. 2-6: see "grep -A 5 '^DEBUG=' testssl.sh"
|
|
--disable-rating Explicitly disables the rating output
|
|
|
|
file output options (can also be preset via environment variables)
|
|
--log, --logging logs stdout to '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.log' in current working directory (cwd)
|
|
--logfile|-oL <logfile> logs stdout to 'dir/\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.log'. If 'logfile' is a dir or to a specified 'logfile'
|
|
--json additional output of findings to flat JSON file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.json' in cwd
|
|
--jsonfile|-oj <jsonfile> additional output to the specified flat JSON file or directory, similar to --logfile
|
|
--json-pretty additional JSON structured output of findings to a file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.json' in cwd
|
|
--jsonfile-pretty|-oJ <jsonfile> additional JSON structured output to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile
|
|
--csv additional output of findings to CSV file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.csv' in cwd or directory
|
|
--csvfile|-oC <csvfile> additional output as CSV to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile
|
|
--html additional output as HTML to file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.html'
|
|
--htmlfile|-oH <htmlfile> additional output as HTML to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile
|
|
--out(f,F)ile|-oa/-oA <fname> log to a LOG,JSON,CSV,HTML file (see nmap). -oA/-oa: pretty/flat JSON.
|
|
"auto" uses '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}'. If fname if a dir uses 'dir/\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}'
|
|
--hints additional hints to findings
|
|
--severity <severity> severities with lower level will be filtered for CSV+JSON, possible values <LOW|MEDIUM|HIGH|CRITICAL>
|
|
--append if (non-empty) <logfile>, <csvfile>, <jsonfile> or <htmlfile> exists, append to file. Omits any header
|
|
--overwrite if <logfile>, <csvfile>, <jsonfile> or <htmlfile> exists it overwrites it without any warning
|
|
--outprefix <fname_prefix> before '\${NODE}.' above prepend <fname_prefix>
|
|
|
|
|
|
Options requiring a value can also be called with '=' e.g. testssl.sh -t=smtp --wide --openssl=/usr/bin/openssl <URI>.
|
|
<URI> always needs to be the last parameter.
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
# Set HTMLHEADER and JSONHEADER to false so that the cleanup() function won't
|
|
# try to write footers to the HTML and JSON files.
|
|
HTMLHEADER=false
|
|
JSONHEADER=false
|
|
#' Fix syntax highlight on sublime
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && kill -s USR1 $PPID
|
|
exit $1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
maketempf() {
|
|
TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/testssl.XXXXXX 2>/dev/null)
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
# For e.g. devices where we can't write to /tmp we chose $PWD but we can't
|
|
# allow every char as we haven't quoted all strings depending on it, see #1445
|
|
if [[ $PWD =~ [^A-Za-z0-9\.,/_-] ]]; then
|
|
fatal "\$PWD contains illegal chars: \"$BASH_REMATCH\"" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
fi
|
|
TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d "$PWD/testssl.XXXXXX") || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
fi
|
|
TMPFILE=$TEMPDIR/tempfile.txt || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
ERRFILE="/dev/null"
|
|
else
|
|
ERRFILE=$TEMPDIR/errorfile.txt || exit $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
fi
|
|
HOSTCERT=$TEMPDIR/host_certificate.pem
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prepare_debug() {
|
|
if [[ $DEBUG -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
cat >$TEMPDIR/environment.txt << EOF
|
|
|
|
|
|
GIT_REL: $GIT_REL
|
|
|
|
PID: $$
|
|
commandline: "$CMDLINE"
|
|
bash version: ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}.${BASH_VERSINFO[1]}.${BASH_VERSINFO[2]}
|
|
status: ${BASH_VERSINFO[4]}
|
|
machine: ${BASH_VERSINFO[5]}
|
|
operating system: $SYSTEM $SYSTEMREV
|
|
os constraint: $SYSTEM2
|
|
shellopts: $SHELLOPTS
|
|
printf: $PRINTF
|
|
NO_ITALICS: $NO_ITALICS
|
|
|
|
$($OPENSSL version -a 2>/dev/null)
|
|
OSSL_VER_MAJOR: $OSSL_VER_MAJOR
|
|
OSSL_VER_MINOR: $OSSL_VER_MINOR
|
|
OSSL_VER_APPENDIX: $OSSL_VER_APPENDIX
|
|
OSSL_BUILD_DATE: $OSSL_BUILD_DATE
|
|
OSSL_VER_PLATFORM: $OSSL_VER_PLATFORM
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS: $OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF: $OPENSSL_CONF
|
|
HAS_CURVES: $HAS_CURVES
|
|
OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES: $OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES
|
|
|
|
HAS_IPv6: $HAS_IPv6
|
|
HAS_SSL2: $HAS_SSL2
|
|
HAS_SSL3: $HAS_SSL3
|
|
HAS_TLS13: $HAS_TLS13
|
|
HAS_X448: $HAS_X448
|
|
HAS_X25519: $HAS_X25519
|
|
HAS_SIGALGS: $HAS_SIGALGS
|
|
HAS_NO_SSL2: $HAS_NO_SSL2
|
|
HAS_SPDY: $HAS_SPDY
|
|
HAS_ALPN: $HAS_ALPN
|
|
HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV: $HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV
|
|
HAS_COMP: $HAS_COMP
|
|
HAS_NO_COMP: $HAS_NO_COMP
|
|
HAS_CIPHERSUITES: $HAS_CIPHERSUITES
|
|
HAS_SECLEVEL: $HAS_SECLEVEL
|
|
HAS_PKEY: $HAS_PKEY
|
|
HAS_PKUTIL: $HAS_PKUTIL
|
|
HAS_PROXY: $HAS_PROXY
|
|
HAS_XMPP: $HAS_XMPP
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER: $HAS_XMPP_SERVER
|
|
HAS_XMPP_SERVER2: $HAS_XMPP_SERVER2
|
|
HAS_POSTGRES: $HAS_POSTGRES
|
|
HAS_MYSQL: $HAS_MYSQL
|
|
HAS_LMTP: $HAS_LMTP
|
|
HAS_SIEVE: $HAS_SIEVE
|
|
HAS_NNTP: $HAS_NNTP
|
|
HAS_IRC: $HAS_IRC
|
|
HAS_UDS: $HAS_UDS
|
|
HAS_UDS2: $HAS_UDS2
|
|
HAS_ENABLE_PHA: $HAS_ENABLE_PHA
|
|
|
|
HAS_DIG: $HAS_DIG
|
|
HAS_HOST: $HAS_HOST
|
|
HAS_DRILL: $HAS_DRILL
|
|
HAS_NSLOOKUP: $HAS_NSLOOKUP
|
|
HAS_IDN: $HAS_IDN
|
|
HAS_IDN2: $HAS_IDN2
|
|
HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE: $HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE
|
|
HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT: $HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT
|
|
HAS_DIG_R: $HAS_DIG_R
|
|
HAS_XXD: $HAS_XXD
|
|
|
|
PATH: $PATH
|
|
PROG_NAME: $PROG_NAME
|
|
TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR: $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR
|
|
RUN_DIR: $RUN_DIR
|
|
CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE: $CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE
|
|
|
|
CAPATH: $CAPATH
|
|
COLOR: $COLOR
|
|
COLORBLIND: $COLORBLIND
|
|
TERM_WIDTH: $TERM_WIDTH
|
|
INTERACTIVE: $INTERACTIVE
|
|
HAS_GNUDATE: $HAS_GNUDATE
|
|
HAS_FREEBSDDATE: $HAS_FREEBSDDATE
|
|
HAS_OPENBSDDATE: $HAS_OPENBSDDATE
|
|
HAS_SED_E: $HAS_SED_E
|
|
HAS_LOCALE: $HAS_LOCALE
|
|
|
|
SHOW_EACH_C: $SHOW_EACH_C
|
|
SSL_NATIVE: $SSL_NATIVE
|
|
ASSUME_HTTP $ASSUME_HTTP
|
|
BASICAUTH: $BASICAUTH
|
|
REQHEADER: $REQHEADER
|
|
SNEAKY: $SNEAKY
|
|
OFFENSIVE: $OFFENSIVE
|
|
PHONE_OUT: $PHONE_OUT
|
|
|
|
DEBUG: $DEBUG
|
|
|
|
HSTS_MIN: $HSTS_MIN
|
|
HPKP_MIN: $HPKP_MIN
|
|
CLIENT_MIN_FS: $CLIENT_MIN_FS
|
|
DAYS2WARN1: $DAYS2WARN1
|
|
DAYS2WARN2: $DAYS2WARN2
|
|
|
|
HEADER_MAXSLEEP: $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
MAX_WAITSOCK: $MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK: $HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK: $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK
|
|
USLEEP_SND $USLEEP_SND
|
|
USLEEP_REC $USLEEP_REC
|
|
|
|
SOCAT: $SOCAT
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
type -p locale &>/dev/null && locale >>$TEMPDIR/environment.txt || echo "locale doesn't exist" >>$TEMPDIR/environment.txt
|
|
actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' 'ALL' "-V" &>$TEMPDIR/all_local_ciphers.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
# see also $TEMPDIR/s_client_has.txt from find_openssl_binary
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
prepare_arrays() {
|
|
local hexc mac ossl_ciph
|
|
local ossl_supported_tls="" ossl_supported_sslv2=""
|
|
local -i i=0
|
|
|
|
if [[ -e "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then
|
|
"$HAS_SSL2" && ossl_supported_sslv2="$($OPENSSL ciphers -ssl2 -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 2>$ERRFILE)"
|
|
ossl_supported_tls="$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-no_ssl2 -V")"
|
|
TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS=""
|
|
while read hexc n TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i] TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i] TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i] TLS_CIPHER_KX[i] TLS_CIPHER_AUTH[i] TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i] mac TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]; do
|
|
TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]="$hexc"
|
|
TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=false
|
|
if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then
|
|
# >= SSLv3 ciphers
|
|
if [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ ":${ossl_supported_tls}:" =~ :${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}: ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true
|
|
else
|
|
ossl_ciph="$(awk '/'"$hexc"'/ { print $3 }' <<< "$ossl_supported_tls")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$ossl_ciph" ]]; then
|
|
TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true
|
|
[[ "$ossl_ciph" != ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]="$ossl_ciph"
|
|
[[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS+=":$ossl_ciph"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ ":${ossl_supported_sslv2}:" =~ :${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}: ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$ossl_supported_sslv2" =~ $hexc ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true
|
|
fi
|
|
i+=1
|
|
done < "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
TLS_NR_CIPHERS=i
|
|
TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS="${TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS:1}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
mybanner() {
|
|
local bb1 bb2 bb3
|
|
|
|
"$QUIET" && return
|
|
"$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && return
|
|
OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS=$(count_ciphers "$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL')")
|
|
bb1=$(cat <<EOF
|
|
|
|
###########################################################
|
|
$PROG_NAME $VERSION from
|
|
EOF
|
|
)
|
|
bb2=$(cat <<EOF
|
|
|
|
This program is free software. Distribution and
|
|
modification under GPLv2 permitted.
|
|
USAGE w/o ANY WARRANTY. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK!
|
|
|
|
Please file bugs @
|
|
EOF
|
|
)
|
|
bb3=$(cat <<EOF
|
|
|
|
###########################################################
|
|
EOF
|
|
)
|
|
pr_bold "$bb1 "
|
|
pr_boldurl "$SWURL"; outln
|
|
if [[ -n "$GIT_REL" ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " ("
|
|
pr_litegrey "$GIT_REL"
|
|
prln_bold ")"
|
|
fi
|
|
pr_bold "$bb2 "
|
|
pr_boldurl "https://testssl.sh/bugs/"; outln
|
|
pr_bold "$bb3"
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
outln " Using \"$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null)\" [~$OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS ciphers]"
|
|
out " on $HNAME:"
|
|
outln "$OPENSSL_LOCATION"
|
|
outln " (built: \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\", platform: \"$OSSL_VER_PLATFORM\")\n"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
calc_scantime() {
|
|
END_TIME=$(date +%s)
|
|
SCAN_TIME=$(( END_TIME - START_TIME ))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup() {
|
|
# If parallel mass testing is being performed, then the child tests need
|
|
# to be killed before $TEMPDIR is deleted. Otherwise, error messages
|
|
# will be created if testssl.sh is stopped before all testing is complete.
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && [[ $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS -gt 0 ]] && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do
|
|
if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ne 0 ]] && \
|
|
ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then
|
|
kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null
|
|
wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p)
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "stopped"
|
|
else
|
|
# If a test had already completed, but its output wasn't yet processed,
|
|
# then process it now.
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed"
|
|
fi
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
tm_underline "DEBUG (level $DEBUG): see files in $TEMPDIR"
|
|
tmln_out
|
|
else
|
|
[[ -d "$TEMPDIR" ]] && rm -rf "$TEMPDIR";
|
|
fi
|
|
outln
|
|
# No shorthand expression to avoid errors when $CMDLINE_PARSED haven't been filled yet.
|
|
if [[ $CMDLINE_PARSED == true ]]; then
|
|
"$SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED" && fileout_section_footer true
|
|
html_footer
|
|
fileout_footer
|
|
fi
|
|
# debugging off, see above
|
|
grep -q xtrace <<< "$SHELLOPTS" && ! "$DEBUG_ALLINONE" && exec 2>&42 42>&-
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# see https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/57940/trap-int-term-exit-really-necessary
|
|
sig_cleanup() {
|
|
trap '' EXIT
|
|
cleanup
|
|
exit 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
child_error() {
|
|
cleanup
|
|
exit $ERR_CHILD
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Program terminates prematurely, with error code
|
|
# arg1: string to print / to write to file
|
|
# arg2: global error code, see ERR_* above
|
|
# arg3: an optional hint (string)
|
|
#
|
|
fatal() {
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1" >&2
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
if [[ -n "$3" ]]; then
|
|
outln "$3" >&2
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && outln "$3" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
# Make sure we don't try to write into files when not created yet.
|
|
# No shorthand expression to avoid errors when $CMDLINE_PARSED haven't been filled yet.
|
|
[[ $CMDLINE_PARSED == true ]] && fileout "scanProblem" "FATAL" "$1"
|
|
exit $2
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This OTOH doesn't exit but puts a fatal error to the screen but continues with the next
|
|
# IP/hostname. It should only be used if a single IP/Hostname in a scan is not reachable.
|
|
# arg1: string to print / to write to file
|
|
#
|
|
ip_fatal() {
|
|
outln
|
|
prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1, proceeding with next IP (if any)" >&2
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1, proceeding with next IP (if any)" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "scanProblem" "FATAL" "$1, proceeding with next IP (if any)"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This generic function outputs an error onto the screen and handles logging.
|
|
# arg1: string to print / to write to file, arg2 (optional): additional hint to write
|
|
#
|
|
generic_nonfatal() {
|
|
prln_magenta "$1" >&2
|
|
[[ -n $2 ]] && outln "$2"
|
|
[[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "$1" >>$LOGFILE && [[ -n $2 ]] && outln "$2" >>$LOGFILE
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "scanProblem" "WARN" "$1"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
initialize_engine(){
|
|
# for now only GOST engine
|
|
grep -q '^# testssl config file' "$OPENSSL_CONF" 2>/dev/null && \
|
|
return 0 # We have been here already
|
|
if "$NO_ENGINE"; then
|
|
# Avoid potential conflicts also -- manual hook, see #1117
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF=''
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif $OPENSSL engine gost -v 2>&1 | grep -Eq 'invalid command|no such engine'; then
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln && pr_warning "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"; outln
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "engine_problem" "WARN" "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF=''
|
|
return 1
|
|
elif ! $OPENSSL engine gost -vvvv -t -c 2>/dev/null >/dev/null; then
|
|
# check for openssl 1.1.1 config -- not this may not be reliable. We only use this
|
|
# to suppress the warning (confuses users), see #1119
|
|
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b524b808a1d1ba204dbdcbb42de4e3bddb3472ac
|
|
if ! grep -q 'using the .include directive' /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf; then
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln && pr_warning "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"; outln
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout_insert_warning "engine_problem" "WARN" "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"
|
|
# Avoid clashes of OpenSSL 1.1.1 config file with our openssl 1.0.2. This is for Debian 10
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF=''
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
# we have engine support. But we want to check whether an external OPENSSL_CONF was supplied.
|
|
# $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf is an internal presetting, see #1982
|
|
if [[ -n "$OPENSSL_CONF" ]] && [[ "$OPENSSL_CONF" != "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "For now I am providing the config file to have GOST support"
|
|
else
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF=$TEMPDIR/gost.conf
|
|
# see https://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-users@openssl.org/msg65395.html
|
|
cat >$OPENSSL_CONF << EOF
|
|
# testssl config file for openssl
|
|
|
|
openssl_conf = openssl_def
|
|
|
|
[ openssl_def ]
|
|
engines = engine_section
|
|
|
|
[ engine_section ]
|
|
gost = gost_section
|
|
|
|
[ gost_section ]
|
|
engine_id = gost
|
|
default_algorithms = ALL
|
|
CRYPT_PARAMS = id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
|
|
|
|
EOF
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
export OPENSSL_CONF
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: text to display before "-->"
|
|
# arg2: arg needed to accept to continue
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame() {
|
|
local a
|
|
|
|
[[ "$WARNINGS" == off ]] && return 0
|
|
[[ "$WARNINGS" == batch ]] && return 1
|
|
tm_warning "$1 --> "
|
|
read a
|
|
if [[ "$2" == "$(toupper "$2")" ]]; then
|
|
# all uppercase requested
|
|
if [[ "$a" == "$2" ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$2" == "$(tolower "$a")" ]]; then
|
|
# we normalize the word to continue
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: URI
|
|
parse_hn_port() {
|
|
local tmp_port
|
|
local node_tmp=""
|
|
|
|
NODE="$1"
|
|
NODE="${NODE/https\:\/\//}" # strip "https"
|
|
NODE="${NODE%%/*}" # strip trailing urlpath
|
|
NODE="${NODE%%.}" # strip trailing "." if supplied
|
|
if grep -q ':$' <<< "$NODE"; then
|
|
if grep -wq http <<< "$NODE"; then
|
|
fatal "\"http\" is not what you meant probably" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "\"$1\" is not a valid URI" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Was an IPv6 address supplied like [AA:BB:CC::]:port ?
|
|
if grep -q ']' <<< "$NODE"; then
|
|
tmp_port=$(printf "$NODE" | sed 's/\[.*\]//' | sed 's/://')
|
|
# determine v6 port, supposed it was supplied additionally
|
|
if [[ -n "$tmp_port" ]]; then
|
|
PORT=$tmp_port
|
|
NODE=$(sed "s/:$PORT//" <<< "$NODE")
|
|
fi
|
|
NODE=$(sed -e 's/\[//' -e 's/\]//' <<< "$NODE")
|
|
else
|
|
# determine v4 port, supposed it was supplied additionally
|
|
grep -q ':' <<< "$NODE" && \
|
|
PORT=$(sed 's/^.*\://' <<< "$NODE") && NODE=$(sed 's/\:.*$//' <<< "$NODE")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# We check for non-ASCII chars now. If there are some we'll try to convert it if IDN/IDN2 is installed
|
|
# If not, we'll continue. Hoping later that dig can use it. If not the error handler will tell
|
|
# Honestly we don't care whether it's IDN2008 or IDN2003 or Emoji domains as long as it works.
|
|
# So we try to resolve anything supplied. If it can't our resolver error handler takes care
|
|
if [[ "$NODE" == *[![:ascii:]]* ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_IDN2" && ! "$HAS_IDN"; then
|
|
prln_warning " URI contains non-ASCII characters and libidn/libidn2 not available."
|
|
outln " Trying to feed the resolver without converted \"$NODE\" ...\n"
|
|
#ToDo: fileout is missing
|
|
node_tmp="$NODE"
|
|
elif "$HAS_IDN2"; then
|
|
node_tmp="$(idn2 "$NODE" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_IDN" && [[ -z "$node_tmp" ]]; then
|
|
node_tmp="$(idn "$NODE" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$node_tmp" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning " URI contains non-ASCII characters and IDN conversion failed."
|
|
outln " Trying to feed the resolver without converted \"$NODE\" ...\n"
|
|
#ToDo: fileout is missing
|
|
node_tmp="$NODE"
|
|
fi
|
|
NODE="$node_tmp"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debugme echo $NODE:$PORT
|
|
if [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then
|
|
# XMPP host is set, force SNI to be that
|
|
SNI="-servername $XMPP_HOST"
|
|
else
|
|
SNI="-servername $NODE"
|
|
fi
|
|
URL_PATH=$(sed 's/https:\/\///' <<< "$1" | sed 's/'"${NODE}"'//' | sed 's/.*'"${PORT}"'//') # remove protocol and node part and port
|
|
URL_PATH=$(sed 's/\/\//\//g' <<< "$URL_PATH") # we rather want // -> /
|
|
URL_PATH=${URL_PATH%%.} # strip trailing "." so that it is not interpreted as URL
|
|
[[ -z "$URL_PATH" ]] && URL_PATH="/"
|
|
debugme echo "URL_PATH: $URL_PATH"
|
|
return 0 # NODE, URL_PATH, PORT is set now
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# args: string containing ip addresses
|
|
filter_ip6_address() {
|
|
local a
|
|
|
|
for a in "$@"; do
|
|
if ! is_ipv6addr "$a"; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_SED_E"; then
|
|
sed -E 's/^abcdeABCDEFf0123456789:]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d' -e '/^;;/d'
|
|
else
|
|
sed -r 's/[^abcdefABCDEF0123456789:]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d' -e '/^;;/d'
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
filter_ip4_address() {
|
|
local a
|
|
|
|
for a in "$@"; do
|
|
if ! is_ipv4addr "$a"; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_SED_E"; then
|
|
sed -E 's/[^[:digit:].]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d'
|
|
else
|
|
sed -r 's/[^[:digit:].]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d'
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# For security testing sometimes we have local entries. Getent is BS under Linux for localhost: No network, no resolution
|
|
# arg1 is the entry we want to look up in the host file
|
|
get_local_aaaa() {
|
|
local ip6=""
|
|
local etchosts="/etc/hosts /c/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts"
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$1" ]] && echo "" && return 1
|
|
# Also multiple records should work fine
|
|
ip6=$(grep -wih "$1" $etchosts 2>/dev/null | grep ':' | grep -Ev '^#|\.local' | grep -Ei "[[:space:]]$1" | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
if is_ipv6addr "$ip6"; then
|
|
echo "$ip6"
|
|
else
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
get_local_a() {
|
|
local ip4=""
|
|
local etchosts="/etc/hosts /c/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts"
|
|
|
|
ip4=$(grep -wih "$1" $etchosts 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev ':|^#|\.local' | grep -Ei "[[:space:]]$1" | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$ip4"; then
|
|
echo "$ip4"
|
|
else
|
|
echo ""
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Does a hard exit if no lookup binary is provided
|
|
# Checks for IDN capabilities also
|
|
#
|
|
check_resolver_bins() {
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
type -p dig &> /dev/null && HAS_DIG=true
|
|
type -p host &> /dev/null && HAS_HOST=true
|
|
type -p drill &> /dev/null && HAS_DRILL=true
|
|
type -p nslookup &> /dev/null && HAS_NSLOOKUP=true
|
|
type -p avahi-resolve &>/dev/null && HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE=true
|
|
type -p idn &>/dev/null && HAS_IDN=true
|
|
type -p idn2 &>/dev/null && HAS_IDN2=true
|
|
|
|
if ! "$HAS_DIG" && ! "$HAS_HOST" && ! "$HAS_DRILL" && ! "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
fatal "Neither \"dig\", \"host\", \"drill\" or \"nslookup\" is present" $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
# Old dig versions don't have an option to ignore $HOME/.digrc
|
|
if ! dig -h | grep -qE '\-r.*~/.digrc'; then
|
|
HAS_DIG_R=false
|
|
DIG_R=""
|
|
fi
|
|
if dig -h | grep -Eq idnout; then
|
|
HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: a host name. Returned will be 0-n IPv4 addresses
|
|
# watch out: $1 can also be a cname! --> all checked
|
|
get_a_record() {
|
|
local ip4=""
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
[[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && return 0 # if no DNS lookup was instructed, leave here
|
|
if [[ "$1" == localhost ]]; then
|
|
# This is a bit ugly but prevents from doing DNS lookups which could fail
|
|
echo 127.0.0.1
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$1"; then
|
|
# This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachable DNS
|
|
echo $1
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(avahi-resolve -4 -n "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(dig $DIG_R @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 +short -t a +notcp "$1" 2>/dev/null | sed '/^;;/d'))
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "Local hostname given but no 'avahi-resolve' or 'dig' available." $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(dig +search $DIG_R +short +timeout=2 +tries=2 $noidnout -t a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1 }'))
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(host -t a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/address/ { print $NF }'))
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(drill a "$1" | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/,/AUTHORITY SECTION/ { print $NF }' | awk '/^[0-9]/'))
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(strip_lf "$(nslookup -querytype=a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^Name/ { getline; print $NF }')"))
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
echo "$ip4"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: a host name. Returned will be 0-n IPv6 addresses
|
|
# watch out: $1 can also be a cname! --> all checked
|
|
get_aaaa_record() {
|
|
local ip6=""
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
[[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && return 0 # if no DNS lookup was instructed, leave here
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
if is_ipv6addr "$1"; then
|
|
# This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachable DNS
|
|
echo "$1"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif is_ipv4addr "$1"; then
|
|
# we need also this here as get_aaaa_record is always called after get_a_record and we want to handle this at a low level
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(avahi-resolve -6 -n "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(dig $DIG_R @ff02::fb -p 5353 -t aaaa +short +notcp "$NODE"))
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "Local hostname given but no 'avahi-resolve' or 'dig' available." $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(dig +search $DIG_R +short +timeout=2 +tries=2 $noidnout -t aaaa "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1 }'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(host -t aaaa "$1" | awk '/address/ { print $NF }'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(drill aaaa "$1" | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/,/AUTHORITY SECTION/ { print $NF }' | awk '/^[0-9]/'))
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=aaaa "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/'"^${a}"'.*AAAA/ { print $NF }')"))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
echo "$ip6"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# RFC6844: DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record
|
|
# arg1: domain to check for
|
|
get_caa_rr_record() {
|
|
local raw_caa=""
|
|
local hash len line
|
|
local -i len_caa_property
|
|
local caa_property_name
|
|
local caa_property_value
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local all_caa=""
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$NODNS" ]] && return 0 # if minimum DNS lookup was instructed, leave here
|
|
# if there's a type257 record there are two output formats here, mostly depending on age of distribution
|
|
# roughly that's the difference between text and binary format
|
|
# 1) 'google.com has CAA record 0 issue "symantec.com"'
|
|
# 2) 'google.com has TYPE257 record \# 19 0005697373756573796D616E7465632E636F6D'
|
|
# for dig +short the output always starts with '0 issue [..]' or '\# 19 [..]' so we normalize thereto to keep caa_flag, caa_property
|
|
# caa_property then has key/value pairs, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-3
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF=""
|
|
if "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(dig $DIG_R +search +short +timeout=3 +tries=3 $noidnout type257 "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1" "$2" "$3 }')"
|
|
# empty if no CAA record
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(drill $1 type257 | awk '/'"^${1}"'.*CAA/ { print $5,$6,$7 }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(host -t type257 $1)"
|
|
if grep -Ewvq "has no CAA|has no TYPE257" <<< "$raw_caa"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(sed -e 's/^.*has CAA record //' -e 's/^.*has TYPE257 record //' <<< "$raw_caa")"
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=type257 $1 | grep -w rdata_257)")"
|
|
if [[ -n "$raw_caa" ]]; then
|
|
raw_caa="$(sed 's/^.*rdata_257 = //' <<< "$raw_caa")"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
# No dig, drill, host, or nslookup --> complaint was elsewhere already
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
debugme echo $raw_caa
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$raw_caa" =~ \#\ [0-9][0-9] ]]; then
|
|
# for posteo we get this binary format returned e.g. for old dig versions:
|
|
# \# 19 0005697373756567656F74727573742E636F6D
|
|
# \# 23 0009697373756577696C6467656F74727573742E636F6D
|
|
# \# 34 0005696F6465666D61696C746F3A686F73746D617374657240706F73 74656F2E6465
|
|
# # len caaflag <more_see_below> @ p o s t e o . d e
|
|
while read hash len line ;do
|
|
if [[ "${line:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then # probably the caa flag, always 00, so we don't keep this
|
|
len_caa_property=$(printf "%0d" "$((10#${line:2:2}))") # get len and do type casting, for posteo we have 05 or 09 here as a string
|
|
len_caa_property=$((len_caa_property*2)) # =>word! Now get name from 4th and value from 4th+len position...
|
|
line="${line/ /}" # especially with iodefs there's a blank in the string which we just skip
|
|
caa_property_name="$(hex2ascii ${line:4:$len_caa_property})"
|
|
caa_property_value="$(hex2ascii "${line:$((4+len_caa_property)):100}")"
|
|
# echo "${caa_property_name}=${caa_property_value}"
|
|
all_caa+="${caa_property_name}=${caa_property_value}\n"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "please report unknown CAA RR $line with flag @ $NODE"
|
|
return 7
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$raw_caa"
|
|
sort <<< "$(safe_echo "$all_caa")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
elif grep -q '"' <<< "$raw_caa"; then
|
|
raw_caa=${raw_caa//\"/} # strip all ". Now we should have flag, name, value
|
|
#caa_property_name="$(awk '{ print $2 }' <<< "$raw_caa")"
|
|
#caa_property_value="$(awk '{ print $3 }' <<< "$raw_caa")"
|
|
safe_echo "$(sort <<< "$(awk '{ print $2"="$3 }' <<< "$raw_caa")")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
# no caa record
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# to do:
|
|
# 4: check whether $1 is a CNAME and take this
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: domain to check for. Returned will be the MX record as a string
|
|
get_mx_record() {
|
|
local mx=""
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
# we need the last two columns here
|
|
if "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
mx="$(host -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/is handled by/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
mx="$(dig $DIG_R +search +short $noidnout -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1" "$2 }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
mx="$(drill mx $1 | awk '/IN[ \t]MX[ \t]+/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
mx="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/mail exchanger/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')")"
|
|
else
|
|
# shouldn't reach this, as we checked in the top
|
|
fatal "No dig, host, drill or nslookup" $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf"
|
|
echo "$mx"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# arg1: domain / hostname. Returned will be the TXT record as a string which can be multilined
|
|
# (one entry per line), for e.g. non-MTA-STS records.
|
|
# Is supposed to be used by MTA STS in the future like get_txt_record _mta-sts.DOMAIN.TLD
|
|
get_txt_record() {
|
|
local record=""
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local noidnout=""
|
|
|
|
"$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout"
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
# we need the last two columns here and strip any remaining double quotes later
|
|
if "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
record="$(host -t TXT "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F\" '/descriptive text/ { print $(NF-1) }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
record="$(dig $DIG_R +search +short $noidnout -t TXT "$1" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
record="$(drill txt $1 | awk -F\" '/^[a-z0-9].*TXT/ { print $(NF-1) }')"
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
record="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F= '/text/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')")"
|
|
else
|
|
# shouldn't reach this, as we checked in the top
|
|
fatal "No dig, host, drill or nslookup" $ERR_DNSBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf"
|
|
echo "${record//\"/}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# set IPADDRs and IP46ADDRs
|
|
#
|
|
determine_ip_addresses() {
|
|
local ip4=""
|
|
local ip6=""
|
|
|
|
ip4="$(get_a_record "$NODE")"
|
|
ip6="$(get_aaaa_record "$NODE")"
|
|
IP46ADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4 $ip6")
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$CMDLINE_IP" ]]; then
|
|
# command line has supplied an IP address or "one"
|
|
if [[ "$CMDLINE_IP" == one ]]; then
|
|
# use first IPv6 or IPv4 address
|
|
if "$HAS_IPv6" && [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="$(head -1 <<< "$ip6")"
|
|
else
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="$(head -1 <<< "$ip4")"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
NODEIP="$CMDLINE_IP"
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$NODEIP"; then
|
|
ip4="$NODEIP"
|
|
elif is_ipv6addr "$NODEIP"; then
|
|
ip6="$NODEIP"
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "couldn't identify supplied \"CMDLINE_IP\"" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
fi
|
|
elif is_ipv4addr "$NODE"; then
|
|
ip4="$NODE" # only an IPv4 address was supplied as an argument, no hostname
|
|
SNI="" # override Server Name Indication as we test the IP only
|
|
else
|
|
ip4=$(get_local_a "$NODE") # is there a local host entry?
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]]; then # empty: no (LOCAL_A is predefined as false)
|
|
ip4=$(get_a_record "$NODE")
|
|
else
|
|
LOCAL_A=true # we have the ip4 from local host entry and need to signal this to testssl
|
|
fi
|
|
# same now for ipv6
|
|
ip6=$(get_local_aaaa "$NODE")
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
ip6=$(get_aaaa_record "$NODE")
|
|
else
|
|
LOCAL_AAAA=true # we have a local ipv6 entry and need to signal this to testssl
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# IPv6 only address
|
|
if [[ -z "$ip4" ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_IPv6"; then
|
|
IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip6")
|
|
IP46ADDRs="$IPADDRs" # IP46ADDRs are the ones to display, IPADDRs the ones to test
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if "$HAS_IPv6" && [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
if is_ipv6addr "$CMDLINE_IP"; then
|
|
IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip6")
|
|
else
|
|
IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4 $ip6")
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4")
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "$IPADDRs" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then
|
|
fatal "Only IPv6 address(es) for \"$NODE\" available, maybe add \"-6\" to $0" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "No IPv4/IPv6 address(es) for \"$NODE\" available" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0 # IPADDR and IP46ADDR is set now
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
determine_rdns() {
|
|
local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF"
|
|
local nodeip="" rdns="" line=""
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$NODNS" ]] && rDNS="(instructed to minimize DNS queries)" && return 0 # PTR records were not asked for
|
|
local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # for DNS we do not need the square brackets of IPv6 addresses
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then
|
|
if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(avahi-resolve -a $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }')
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(dig $DIG_R -x $nodeip @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 +notcp +noall +answer +short | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$HAS_DIG"; then
|
|
# 1+2 should suffice. It's a compromise for if e.g. network is down but we have a docker/localhost server
|
|
rDNS=$(dig $DIG_R -x $nodeip +timeout=1 +tries=2 +noall +answer +short | awk '{ print $1 }') # +short returns also CNAME, e.g. openssl.org
|
|
elif "$HAS_HOST"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(host -t PTR $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '/pointer/ { print $NF }')
|
|
elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(drill -x ptr $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/ { getline; print $NF }')
|
|
elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then
|
|
rDNS=$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=PTR $nodeip 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'canonical name =' | grep 'name = ' | awk '{ print $NF }' | sed 's/\.$//')")
|
|
fi
|
|
OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134
|
|
# First, rDNS can contain multilines due to multiple PTR DNS records, though this is not recommended.
|
|
# So we use a loop to check for each FQDN returned. There we remove chars which under weird
|
|
# circumstances (see #1506) can show up here. The blacklist is taken from RFC 1912 ("Allowable characters in a
|
|
# label for a host name are only ASCII, letters, digits, and the `-' character")
|
|
while read -r line; do
|
|
line="$(tr -dc '[a-zA-Z0-9-_.]' <<< "$line")"
|
|
[[ -z "$rdns" ]] && rdns="$line" || rdns="$rdns $line"
|
|
done <<< "$rDNS"
|
|
rDNS="$rdns"
|
|
[[ -z "$rDNS" ]] && rDNS="--"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# We need to get the IP address of the proxy so we can use it in fd_socket
|
|
#
|
|
check_proxy() {
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_PROXY"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL is too old to support the \"-proxy\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$PROXY" == auto ]]; then
|
|
# Get $ENV https_proxy is the one we care about for connects
|
|
PROXY="${https_proxy#*\/\/}"
|
|
# Fallback:
|
|
[[ -z "$PROXY" ]] && PROXY="${http_proxy#*\/\/}"
|
|
[[ -z "$PROXY" ]] && fatal "you specified \"--proxy=auto\" but \"\$http(s)_proxy\" is empty" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
# strip off http/https part if supplied:
|
|
PROXY="${PROXY/http\:\/\//}"
|
|
PROXY="${PROXY/https\:\/\//}" # this shouldn't be needed
|
|
PROXYNODE="${PROXY%:*}"
|
|
PROXYPORT="${PROXY#*:}"
|
|
is_number "$PROXYPORT" || fatal "Proxy port cannot be determined from \"$PROXY\"" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
|
|
#if is_ipv4addr "$PROXYNODE" || is_ipv6addr "$PROXYNODE" ; then
|
|
# IPv6 via openssl -proxy: that doesn't work. Sockets does
|
|
#FIXME: finish this with LibreSSL which supports an IPv6 proxy
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$PROXYNODE"; then
|
|
PROXYIP="$PROXYNODE"
|
|
else
|
|
PROXYIP="$(get_a_record "$PROXYNODE" 2>/dev/null | grep -v alias | sed 's/^.*address //')"
|
|
[[ -z "$PROXYIP" ]] && fatal "Proxy IP cannot be determined from \"$PROXYNODE\"" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
PROXY="-proxy $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Given the ASCII-HEX of a DER-encoded distinguished name, return the string
|
|
# representation of the name.
|
|
print_dn() {
|
|
local dn="$1"
|
|
local cert name
|
|
local -i len
|
|
|
|
# Use $OPENSSL to print the DN by creating a certificate containing the DN
|
|
# as the issuer and then having $OPENSSL print the issuer field in the
|
|
# resulting certificate.
|
|
|
|
# Create the to-be-signed portion of the certificate: version || serialNumber || signature || issuer || validity || subject || subjectPublicKeyInfo
|
|
# with the DN to be printed being the issuer.
|
|
cert="A003020102020100300A06082A8648CE3D040302${dn}301E170D3139303830353038333030305A170D3139303830353038333030305A30003019301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107030200FF"
|
|
|
|
# Make a SEQUENCE of the to-be-signed portion of the certificate.
|
|
len=$((${#cert}/2))
|
|
if [[ $len -lt 128 ]]; then
|
|
cert="30$(printf "%02x" $len)$cert"
|
|
elif [[ $len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
cert="3081$(printf "%02x" $len)$cert"
|
|
else
|
|
cert="3082$(printf "%04x" $len)$cert"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Append a signature algorithm and signature value to the end of the
|
|
# to-be-signed portion of the certificate and then make a SEQUENCE of
|
|
# the result.
|
|
cert+="300A06082A8648CE3D040302030200FF"
|
|
len=$((${#cert}/2))
|
|
if [[ $len -lt 128 ]]; then
|
|
cert="30$(printf "%02x" $len)$cert"
|
|
elif [[ $len -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
cert="3081$(printf "%02x" $len)$cert"
|
|
else
|
|
cert="3082$(printf "%04x" $len)$cert"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Use the LDAP String Representation of Distinguished Names (RFC 2253),
|
|
# The current specification is in RFC 4514.
|
|
name="$(hex2binary "$cert" | $OPENSSL x509 -issuer -noout -inform DER -nameopt RFC2253 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
name="${name#issuer=}"
|
|
tm_out "$(strip_leading_space "$name")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Given the OpenSSL output of a response from a TLS server (with the -msg option)
|
|
# in which the response includes a CertificateRequest message, return the list of
|
|
# distinguished names that are in the CA list.
|
|
extract_calist() {
|
|
local response="$1"
|
|
local is_tls13=false
|
|
local certreq calist="" certtypes sigalgs dn
|
|
local calist_string=""
|
|
local -i len type
|
|
|
|
# Determine whether this is a TLS 1.3 response, since the information
|
|
# is encoded in a different place for TLS 1.3.
|
|
[[ "$response" =~ \<\<\<\ TLS\ 1.3[\,]?\ Handshake\ \[length\ [0-9a-fA-F]*\]\,\ CertificateRequest ]] && is_tls13=true
|
|
|
|
# Extract just the CertificateRequest message as an ASCII-HEX string.
|
|
certreq="${response##*CertificateRequest}"
|
|
certreq="0d${certreq#*0d}"
|
|
certreq="${certreq%%<<<*}"
|
|
certreq="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$certreq")")"
|
|
certreq="${certreq:8}"
|
|
|
|
# Get the list of DNs from the CertificateRequest message.
|
|
if "$is_tls13"; then
|
|
# struct {
|
|
# opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
|
|
# Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
# } CertificateRequest;
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:2}")
|
|
certreq="${certreq:$((len+2))}"
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:4}")
|
|
certreq="${certreq:4}"
|
|
while true; do
|
|
[[ -z "$certreq" ]] && break
|
|
type=$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:4}")
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:4:4}")
|
|
if [[ $type -eq 47 ]]; then
|
|
# This is the certificate_authorities extension
|
|
calist="${certreq:8:len}"
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${calist:0:4}")
|
|
calist="${calist:4:len}"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
certreq="${certreq:$((len+8))}"
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
# struct {
|
|
# ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
# SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
# supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>;
|
|
# DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
# } CertificateRequest;
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:2}")
|
|
certtypes="${certreq:2:len}"
|
|
certreq="${certreq:$((len+2))}"
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:4}")
|
|
sigalgs="${certreq:4:len}"
|
|
certreq="${certreq:$((len+4))}"
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${certreq:0:4}")
|
|
calist="${certreq:4:len}"
|
|
fi
|
|
# Convert each DN to a string.
|
|
while true; do
|
|
[[ -z "$calist" ]] && break
|
|
len=2*$(hex2dec "${calist:0:4}")
|
|
dn="${calist:4:len}"
|
|
calist_string+="$(print_dn "$dn")\n"
|
|
calist="${calist:$((len+4))}"
|
|
done
|
|
[[ -z "$calist_string" ]] && calist_string="empty"
|
|
tm_out "$calist_string"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This is only being called from determine_optimal_proto() in order to check whether we have a server with
|
|
# client authentication, a server with no SSL session ID switched off -- and as the name indicates a protocol.
|
|
# ARG1 is the openssl s_client connect return value. (Darwin or LibreSSL may return 1 here)
|
|
# ARG2 is the server hello file name
|
|
#
|
|
sclient_auth() {
|
|
local server_hello="$(cat -v "$2")"
|
|
local re='Master-Key: ([^\
|
|
]*)'
|
|
local connect_success=false
|
|
|
|
[[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
|
|
! "$connect_success" && [[ "$server_hello" =~ $re ]] && \
|
|
[[ -n "${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" ]] && connect_success=true
|
|
! "$connect_success" && \
|
|
[[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)\,\ (SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?(\/SSLv3)?)\,\ Cipher\ is\ ([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]] && \
|
|
connect_success=true
|
|
|
|
if "$connect_success"; then
|
|
[[ "$server_hello" =~ Session-ID:\ [a-fA-F0-9]{2,64} ]] && NO_SSL_SESSIONID=false
|
|
# we needed to set this for later
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ \<\<\<\ (SSL\ [23]|TLS\ 1)(\.[0-3])?[\,]?\ Handshake\ \[length\ [0-9a-fA-F]*\]\,\ CertificateRequest ]]; then
|
|
# CertificateRequest message in -msg
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH="required"
|
|
[[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && CLIENT_AUTH="optional"
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH_CA_LIST="$(extract_calist "$server_hello")"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && return 0
|
|
if [[ "$server_hello" =~ \-\-\-BEGIN\ CERTIFICATE\-\-\-.*\-\-\-END\ CERTIFICATE\-\-\- ]]; then
|
|
# This should be already set but just to be sure
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH="none"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Determine the best parameters to use with tls_sockets():
|
|
# For TLSv1.3, determine what extension number to use for the key_share extension.
|
|
# For TLSv1.2, determine what cipher list to send, since there are more than 128
|
|
# TLSv1.2 ciphers and some servers fail if the ClientHello contains too many ciphers.
|
|
# If both TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.2 ClientHello messages result in failed connection attempts,
|
|
# then try to determine whether:
|
|
# (1) This is an SSLv2-only server
|
|
# (2) This server supports some protocol in SSLv3 - TLSv1.1, but cannot handle version negotiation.
|
|
# (3) This is not a TLS/SSL enabled server.
|
|
# This information can be used by determine_optimal_proto() to help distinguish between a server
|
|
# that is not TLS/SSL enabled and one that is not compatible with the version of OpenSSL being used.
|
|
determine_optimal_sockets_params() {
|
|
local -i ret1=1 ret2=1 ret3=1
|
|
local i proto cipher_offered
|
|
local all_failed=true
|
|
|
|
# If a STARTTLS protocol is specified and $SSL_NATIVE is true, then skip this test, since
|
|
# $SSL_NATIVE may have been set to true as a result of tls_sockets() not supporting the STARTTLS
|
|
# protocol.
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]] && "$SSL_NATIVE" && return 0
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: The following code is only needed as long as draft versions of TLSv1.3 prior to draft 23
|
|
# are supported. It is used to determine whether a draft 23 or pre-draft 23 ClientHello should be
|
|
# sent.
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "00, 2b, 00, 0f, 0e, 03,04, 7f,1c, 7f,1b, 7f,1a, 7f,19, 7f,18, 7f,17"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
else
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="28"
|
|
tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "00, 2b, 00, 0b, 0a, 7f,16, 7f,15, 7f,14, 7f,13, 7f,12"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 yes
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3 no
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! "$all_failed"; then
|
|
# Determine which version of TLS 1.3 was offered. For drafts 18-21 the
|
|
# version appears in the ProtocolVersion field of the ServerHello. For
|
|
# drafts 22-28 and the final TLS 1.3 the ProtocolVersion field contains
|
|
# 0303 and the actual version appears in the supported_versions extension.
|
|
if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2}") yes
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00020304 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3_rfc8446 yes
|
|
elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[2-9A-C] ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "${BASH_REMATCH:10:2}") yes
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Need to determine which set of ciphers is best to use with
|
|
# a TLSv1.2 ClientHello since there are far more than 128 ciphers
|
|
# that can be used.
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER"
|
|
ret1=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret1 -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0303) add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes ;;
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Try again with a different, less common, set of cipher suites
|
|
# see #807 and #806. If using these cipher suites results in a
|
|
# successful connection, then change $TLS12_CIPHER to these
|
|
# cipher suites so that later tests will use this list of cipher
|
|
# suites.
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY"
|
|
ret2=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret2 -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret2 -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ $ret1 -ne 2 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Try a third time with cipher suites not in $TLS12_CIPHER or
|
|
# $TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY. If using these cipher suites results in a
|
|
# successful connection, then change $TLS12_CIPHER to these
|
|
# cipher suites so that later tests will use this list of cipher
|
|
# suites.
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]] && [[ $ret2 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER_3RD_TRY"
|
|
ret3=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret3 -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 yes
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_3RD_TRY"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered tls1_2 no
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret3 -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
[[ $ret1 -ne 2 ]] && [[ $ret2 -ne 2 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_3RD_TRY"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret2 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret3 -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
cipher_offered="$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")"
|
|
if [[ "$cipher_offered" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher_offered" == SSL_* ]]; then
|
|
cipher_offered="$(rfc2hexcode "$cipher_offered")"
|
|
else
|
|
cipher_offered="$(openssl2hexcode "$cipher_offered")"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ${#cipher_offered} -eq 9 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="${cipher_offered:2:2},${cipher_offered:7:2}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if "$all_failed"; then
|
|
# One of the following must be true:
|
|
# * This is not a TLS/SSL enabled server.
|
|
# * The server only supports SSLv2
|
|
# * The server does not handle version negotiation correctly.
|
|
for proto in 01 00 02; do
|
|
tls_sockets "$proto" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true"
|
|
ret1=$?
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
case $proto in
|
|
02) add_proto_offered tls1_1 no ;;
|
|
01) add_proto_offered tls1 no ;;
|
|
00) add_proto_offered ssl3 no ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret1 -eq 2 ]]; then
|
|
case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in
|
|
0302) add_proto_offered tls1_1 yes ;;
|
|
0301) add_proto_offered tls1 yes ;;
|
|
0300) add_proto_offered ssl3 yes ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
OPTIMAL_SOCKETS_PROTO="$proto"
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$all_failed"; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets
|
|
[[ $? -eq 3 ]] && all_failed=false && add_proto_offered ssl2 yes
|
|
fi
|
|
ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS="$all_failed"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This function determines (STARTTLS_)OPTIMAL_PROTO. It is basically a workaround function as under certain
|
|
# circumstances a ClientHello without specifying a protocol will fail.
|
|
# Circumstances observed so far: 1.) IIS 6 and openssl 1.0.2 as opposed to 1.0.1 2.) starttls + dovecot imap.
|
|
# Independent on the server side it seems reasonable to to know upfront which protocol always works
|
|
#
|
|
# arg1: if empty: no STARTTLS, else: STARTTLS protocol
|
|
# The first try in the loop is empty as we prefer not to specify always a protocol if we can get along w/o it
|
|
#
|
|
determine_optimal_proto() {
|
|
local all_failed=true
|
|
local tmp=""
|
|
local proto optimal_proto
|
|
local jsonID="optimal_proto"
|
|
|
|
"$do_tls_sockets" && return 0
|
|
|
|
>$ERRFILE
|
|
if [[ -n "$1" ]]; then
|
|
# STARTTLS workaround needed see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/188 -- kind of odd
|
|
for STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO in -tls1_2 -tls1 -ssl3 -tls1_1 -tls1_3 -ssl2; do
|
|
case $STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO in
|
|
-tls1_3) "$HAS_TLS13" || continue ;;
|
|
-ssl3) "$HAS_SSL3" || continue ;;
|
|
-ssl2) "$HAS_SSL2" || continue ;;
|
|
*) ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" $PROXY -msg $STARTTLS $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
if sclient_auth $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
add_proto_offered "${STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO/-/}" yes
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
"$all_failed" && STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
optimal_proto="$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
debugme echo "STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO: $STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
else
|
|
# No STARTTLS
|
|
for proto in '' -tls1_2 -tls1 -tls1_3 -ssl3 -tls1_1 -ssl2; do
|
|
case $proto in
|
|
-tls1_3) "$HAS_TLS13" || continue ;;
|
|
-ssl3) "$HAS_SSL3" || continue ;;
|
|
-ssl2) "$HAS_SSL2" || continue ;;
|
|
*) ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# Only send $GET_REQ11 in case of a non-empty $URL_PATH, as it
|
|
# is not needed otherwise. Also, sending $GET_REQ11 may cause
|
|
# problems if the server being tested is not an HTTPS server,
|
|
# and $URL_PATH should be empty for non-HTTPS servers.
|
|
# With TLS 1.3 it is only possible to test for client authentication
|
|
# if $OPENSSL supports post-handshake authentication. So, don't send try
|
|
# to send $GET_REQ11 after a TLS 1.3 ClientHello to a TLS 1.3 server if
|
|
# $ENABLE_PHA is false.
|
|
if [[ -z "$URL_PATH" ]] || [[ "$URL_PATH" == / ]] || \
|
|
( "$HAS_TLS13" && ! "$HAS_ENABLE_PHA" && ( [[ -z "$proto" ]] || [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]] ) && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -ne 1 ]] ); then
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
else
|
|
safe_echo "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI -ign_eof -enable_pha") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# Issue HTTP GET again as it properly finished within $HEADER_MAXSLEEP and didn't hang.
|
|
# Doing it again in the foreground to get an accurate return code.
|
|
safe_echo "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI -ign_eof -enable_pha") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
else
|
|
# Issuing HTTP GET caused $OPENSSL to hang, so just try to determine
|
|
# protocol support without also trying to collect information about
|
|
# client authentication.
|
|
$OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if sclient_auth $? $TMPFILE; then
|
|
# we use the successful handshake at least to get one valid protocol supported -- it saves us time later
|
|
if [[ -z "$proto" ]]; then
|
|
# convert to openssl terminology
|
|
tmp=$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)
|
|
tmp=${tmp/\./_}
|
|
tmp=${tmp/v/}
|
|
tmp="$(tolower $tmp)"
|
|
add_proto_offered "${tmp}" yes
|
|
debugme echo "one proto determined: $tmp"
|
|
OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
else
|
|
add_proto_offered "${proto/-/}" yes
|
|
OPTIMAL_PROTO="$proto"
|
|
fi
|
|
all_failed=false
|
|
# If a $URL_PATH is specified and a TLS 1.3 server is being
|
|
# tested using an $OPENSSL that supports TLS 1.3 but not
|
|
# post-handshake authentication, then test for client
|
|
# authentication using a protocol version earlier than
|
|
# TLS 1.3 (unless the server only is TLS 1.3-only).
|
|
if [[ "$tmp" == tls1_3 ]] && [[ -n "$URL_PATH" ]] && [[ "$URL_PATH" != / ]] && ! "$HAS_ENABLE_PHA"; then
|
|
if [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -eq 0 ]] || \
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1")" -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
safe_echo "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI -ign_eof -no_tls1_3") >$TEMPDIR/client_auth_test.txt 2>>$ERRFILE &
|
|
wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP
|
|
# If the HTTP properly finished within $HEADER_MAXSLEEP and didn't hang, then
|
|
# do it again in the foreground to get an accurate return code. If it did hang,
|
|
# there is no way to test for client authentication, so don't try.
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
safe_echo "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI -ign_eof -no_tls1_3") >$TEMPDIR/client_auth_test.txt 2>>$ERRFILE
|
|
sclient_auth $? $TEMPDIR/client_auth_test.txt
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$CLIENT_AUTH" == none ]]; then
|
|
# This is a TLS 1.3-only server and $OPENSSL does not support -enable_pha, so it is not
|
|
# possible to test for client authentication.
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH="unknown"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
"$all_failed" && OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
optimal_proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
|
|
debugme echo "OPTIMAL_PROTO: $OPTIMAL_PROTO"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ "$optimal_proto" != -ssl2 ]] && ! "$all_failed" && grep -q '^Server Temp Key' $TMPFILE && HAS_DH_BITS=true # FIX #190
|
|
if [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -ne 0 ]] &&
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1")" -ne 0 ]] &&
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
TLS13_ONLY=true
|
|
elif [[ -z "$TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED" ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" == TLSv1.2 ]]; then
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)"
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="$(openssl2hexcode "$TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED")"
|
|
[[ ${#TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED} -eq 9 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="${TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED:2:2},${TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED:7:2}" || TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED=""
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$optimal_proto" == -ssl2 ]]; then
|
|
prln_magenta "$NODEIP:$PORT appears to only support SSLv2."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODEIP:$PORT appears to only support SSLv2."
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept false negatives or positives" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
elif "$all_failed" && ! "$ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS"; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$TLS13_ONLY"; then
|
|
pr_magenta " $NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY. You better use --openssl=<path_to_openssl_supporting_TLS_1.3>"
|
|
if ! "$OSSL_SHORTCUT" || [[ ! -x /usr/bin/openssl ]] || /usr/bin/openssl s_client -tls1_3 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY, but $OPENSSL does not support TLS 1.3"
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept all scan problems" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=10
|
|
else
|
|
# dirty hack but an idea for the future to be implemented upfront: Now we know, we'll better off
|
|
# with the OS supplied openssl binary. We need to initialize variables / arrays again though.
|
|
# And the service detection can't be made up for now
|
|
outln ", \n proceeding with /usr/bin/openssl"
|
|
OPENSSL=/usr/bin/openssl
|
|
find_openssl_binary
|
|
prepare_arrays
|
|
fi
|
|
elif ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -ne 0 ]] && \
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -ne 0 ]] &&
|
|
[[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1")" -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
prln_magenta " $NODE:$PORT appears to support SSLv3 ONLY. You better use --openssl=<path_to_openssl_supporting_SSL_3>"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODE:$PORT appears to support SSLv3 ONLY, but $OPENSSL does not support SSLv3."
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept all scan problems" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
MAX_OSSL_FAIL=10
|
|
else
|
|
prln_bold " Your OpenSSL cannot connect to $NODEIP:$PORT"
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Your OpenSSL cannot connect to $NODEIP:$PORT."
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " The results might look ok but they could be nonsense. Really proceed ? (\"yes\" to continue)" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
fi
|
|
elif "$all_failed"; then
|
|
outln
|
|
if "$HAS_IPv6"; then
|
|
pr_bold " Your $OPENSSL is not IPv6 aware, or $NODEIP:$PORT "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Your $OPENSSL is not IPv6 aware, or $NODEIP:$PORT doesn't seem to be a TLS/SSL enabled server."
|
|
else
|
|
pr_bold " $NODEIP:$PORT "
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$NODEIP:$PORT doesn't seem to be a TLS/SSL enabled server."
|
|
fi
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
prln_bold "doesn't seem to be a TLS/SSL enabled server";
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " The results might look ok but they could be nonsense. Really proceed ? (\"yes\" to continue)" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
elif ! "$all_failed" && "$ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS" && ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then
|
|
# For some reason connecting with tls_sockets/sslv2_sockets didn't work, but connecting
|
|
# with $OPENSSL s_client did.
|
|
# FIXME: Should we include some sort of "please report" note here?
|
|
prln_magenta " Testing with $NODE:$PORT only worked using $OPENSSL."
|
|
prln_magenta " Test results may be somewhat better if the --ssl-native option is used."
|
|
fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Testing with $NODE:$PORT only worked using $OPENSSL."
|
|
ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept false negatives or positives" "yes"
|
|
[[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1 (optional): ftp smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap, sieve, xmpp, xmpp-server, telnet, ldap, postgres, mysql, irc, nntp (maybe with trailing s)
|
|
#
|
|
determine_service() {
|
|
local ua
|
|
local protocol
|
|
local basicauth_header=""
|
|
local reqheader=""
|
|
|
|
# Check if we can connect to $NODEIP:$PORT. Attention: This ALWAYS uses sockets. Thus timeouts for --ssl-=native do not apply
|
|
if ! fd_socket 5; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
fatal "You're sure $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT allows tunneling here? Can't connect to \"$NODEIP:$PORT\"" $ERR_CONNECT
|
|
else
|
|
if "$MULTIPLE_CHECKS"; then
|
|
ip_fatal "Couldn't connect to $NODEIP:$PORT"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "Can't connect to \"$NODEIP:$PORT\"\nMake sure a firewall is not between you and your scanning target!" $ERR_CONNECT
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
close_socket 5
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then
|
|
# no STARTTLS.
|
|
determine_optimal_sockets_params
|
|
$SNEAKY && \
|
|
ua="$UA_SNEAKY" || \
|
|
ua="$UA_STD"
|
|
if [[ -n "$BASICAUTH" ]]; then
|
|
basicauth_header="Authorization: Basic $(safe_echo "$BASICAUTH" | $OPENSSL base64 2>/dev/null)\r\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$REQHEADERS" ]]; then
|
|
reqheader="$(join_by "\r\n" "${REQHEADERS[@]}")\r\n" #Add all required custom http headers to one string with newlines
|
|
fi
|
|
GET_REQ11="GET $URL_PATH HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $ua\r\n${basicauth_header}${reqheader}Accept-Encoding: identity\r\nAccept: text/*\r\nConnection: Close\r\n\r\n"
|
|
determine_optimal_proto
|
|
# returns always 0:
|
|
service_detection $OPTIMAL_PROTO
|
|
else # STARTTLS
|
|
if [[ "$1" == postgres ]] || [[ "$1" == sieve ]]; then
|
|
protocol="$1"
|
|
else
|
|
protocol=${1%s} # strip trailing 's' in ftp(s), smtp(s), pop3(s), etc
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$protocol" in
|
|
ftp|smtp|lmtp|pop3|imap|sieve|xmpp|xmpp-server|telnet|ldap|postgres|mysql|nntp)
|
|
STARTTLS="-starttls $protocol"
|
|
if [[ "$protocol" == xmpp ]] || [[ "$protocol" == xmpp-server ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then
|
|
if ! "$HAS_XMPP"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-xmpphost\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
STARTTLS="$STARTTLS -xmpphost $XMPP_HOST" # small hack -- instead of changing calls all over the place
|
|
# see https://xmpp.org/rfcs/rfc3920.html
|
|
else
|
|
if is_ipv4addr "$NODE"; then
|
|
# XMPP needs a jabber domainname
|
|
if [[ -n "$rDNS" ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning " IP address doesn't work for XMPP, trying PTR record $rDNS"
|
|
# remove trailing .
|
|
NODE=${rDNS%%.}
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "No DNS supplied and no PTR record available which I can try for XMPP" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$HAS_XMPP"; then
|
|
# small hack -- instead of changing calls all over the place
|
|
STARTTLS="$STARTTLS -xmpphost $NODE"
|
|
else
|
|
# If the XMPP name cannot be provided using -xmpphost,
|
|
# then it needs to be provided to the -connect option
|
|
NODEIP="$NODE"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$protocol" == xmpp-server ]] && ! "$HAS_XMPP_SERVER"; then
|
|
#FIXME: make use of HAS_XMPP_SERVER2
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls xmpp-server\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == postgres ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports postgres.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_POSTGRES"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls postgres\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == mysql ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports mysql.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_MYSQL"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls mysql\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == lmtp ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports lmtp.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_LMTP"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls lmtp\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == sieve ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports sieve.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_SIEVE"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls sieve\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [[ "$protocol" == nntp ]]; then
|
|
# Check if openssl version supports lmtp.
|
|
if ! "$HAS_NNTP"; then
|
|
fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls nntp\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
determine_optimal_sockets_params
|
|
determine_optimal_proto "$1"
|
|
|
|
out " Service set:$CORRECT_SPACES STARTTLS via "
|
|
out "$(toupper "$protocol")"
|
|
[[ "$protocol" == mysql ]] && out " (experimental)"
|
|
fileout "service" "INFO" "$protocol"
|
|
[[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]] && out " (XMPP domain=\'$XMPP_HOST\')"
|
|
outln
|
|
;;
|
|
*) outln
|
|
fatal "momentarily only ftp, smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap, sieve, xmpp, xmpp-server, telnet, ldap, nntp, postgres and mysql allowed" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
# It comes handy later also for STARTTLS injection to define this global. When we do banner grabbing
|
|
# or replace service_detection() we might not need that anymore
|
|
SERVICE=$protocol
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt
|
|
return 0 # OPTIMAL_PROTO, GET_REQ*/HEAD_REQ* is set now
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Sets SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG to true or false, depending on whether we hit the 128 cipher limit.
|
|
# Return value is 0 unless we have a problem executing
|
|
#
|
|
determine_sizelimitbug() {
|
|
# overflow_cipher must be some cipher that does not appear in TLS12_CIPHER.
|
|
local overflow_cipher='C0,86'
|
|
local -i nr_ciphers
|
|
|
|
# For STARTTLS protocols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP)
|
|
# Fixme: find out whether we can't skip this in general for STARTTLS
|
|
[[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]] && return 0
|
|
|
|
# Only with TLS 1.2 offered at the server side it is possible to hit this bug, in practice. Thus
|
|
# we assume if TLS 1.2 is not supported, the server has no cipher size limit bug. It still may,
|
|
# theoretically, but in a regular check with testssl.sh we won't hit this limit with lower protocols.
|
|
# Upon calling this function we already know whether TLS 1.2 is supported. If TLS 1.2 is supported, we
|
|
# send 129 ciphers (including 00FF) and check whether it works.
|
|
|
|
if [[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol 03) ]]; then
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
nr_ciphers="$(tr ' ' '\n' <<< "${overflow_cipher}, $TLS12_CIPHER" | sed -e '/^$/d' | wc -l)"
|
|
if [[ $nr_ciphers -ne 129 ]]; then
|
|
prln_warning "FIXME line $LINENO, ${FUNCNAME[0]} sending $nr_ciphers ciphers rather than 129."
|
|
else
|
|
debugme echo "${FUNCNAME[0]} sending $nr_ciphers ciphers"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
tls_sockets 03 "${overflow_cipher}, ${TLS12_CIPHER}"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false
|
|
else
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=true
|
|
fi
|
|
debugme echo -e "\nSERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG: $SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then
|
|
out " Pre-test: "
|
|
prln_svrty_medium "128 cipher limit bug"
|
|
fileout "pre_128cipher" "MEDIUM" "128 cipher limit bug"
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln " Pre-test: No 128 cipher limit bug"
|
|
fileout "pre_128cipher" "INFO" "No 128 cipher limit bug"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
display_rdns_etc() {
|
|
local ip further_ip_addrs=""
|
|
local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # for displaying IPv6 addresses we don't need []
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then
|
|
out " Via Proxy: $CORRECT_SPACES"
|
|
outln "$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT "
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $(count_words "$IP46ADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then
|
|
out " Further IP addresses: $CORRECT_SPACES"
|
|
for ip in $IP46ADDRs; do
|
|
if [[ "$ip" == "$NODEIP" ]] || [[ "[$ip]" == "$NODEIP" ]]; then
|
|
continue
|
|
else
|
|
further_ip_addrs+="$ip "
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
outln "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$further_ip_addrs" " $CORRECT_SPACES" $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$LOCAL_A"; then
|
|
outln " A record via: $CORRECT_SPACES /etc/hosts "
|
|
elif "$LOCAL_AAAA"; then
|
|
outln " AAAA record via: $CORRECT_SPACES /etc/hosts "
|
|
elif [[ -n "$CMDLINE_IP" ]]; then
|
|
if is_ipv6addr $"$CMDLINE_IP"; then
|
|
outln " AAAA record via: $CORRECT_SPACES supplied IP \"$CMDLINE_IP\""
|
|
else
|
|
outln " A record via: $CORRECT_SPACES supplied IP \"$CMDLINE_IP\""
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$rDNS" =~ instructed ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf " %-23s " "rDNS ($nodeip):")"
|
|
out "$rDNS"
|
|
elif [[ -n "$rDNS" ]]; then
|
|
out "$(printf " %-23s " "rDNS ($nodeip):")"
|
|
out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$rDNS" " $CORRECT_SPACES" $TERM_WIDTH)"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
datebanner() {
|
|
local scan_time_f=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$1" =~ Done ]] ; then
|
|
scan_time_f="$(printf "%04ss" "$SCAN_TIME")" # 4 digits because of windows
|
|
pr_reverse "$1 $(date +%F) $(date +%T) [$scan_time_f] -->> $NODEIP:$PORT ($NODE) <<--"
|
|
else
|
|
pr_reverse "$1 $(date +%F) $(date +%T) -->> $NODEIP:$PORT ($NODE) <<--"
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "\n"
|
|
[[ "$1" =~ Start ]] && display_rdns_etc
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# one line with char $1 over screen width $2
|
|
draw_line() {
|
|
out "$(printf -- "$1"'%.s' $(eval "echo {1.."$(($2))"}"))"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
run_mx_all_ips() {
|
|
local mxs mx
|
|
local mxport
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local word=""
|
|
|
|
STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="smtp"
|
|
# test first higher priority servers
|
|
mxs=$(get_mx_record "$1" | sort -n | sed -e 's/^.* //' -e 's/\.$//' | tr '\n' ' ')
|
|
if [[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]]; then
|
|
word="as instructed one" # with highest priority
|
|
mxs=${mxs%% *}
|
|
else
|
|
word="the only"
|
|
fi
|
|
mxport=${2:-25}
|
|
if [[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] || [[ -n "$PARENT_LOGFILE" ]]; then
|
|
prepare_logging
|
|
else
|
|
prepare_logging "${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "$mxs" ]] && [[ "$mxs" != ' ' ]]; then
|
|
[[ $(count_words "$mxs") -gt 1 ]] && MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true
|
|
if "$MULTIPLE_CHECKS"; then
|
|
pr_bold "Testing all MX records (on port $mxport): "
|
|
else
|
|
pr_bold "Testing $word MX record (on port $mxport): "
|
|
fi
|
|
outln "$mxs"
|
|
[[ $mxport == 465 ]] && STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="" # no starttls for tcp 465, all other ports are starttls
|
|
for mx in $mxs; do
|
|
draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3))
|
|
outln
|
|
parse_hn_port "$mx:$mxport"
|
|
determine_ip_addresses || continue
|
|
if [[ $(count_words "$IPADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then # we have more than one ipv4 address to check
|
|
MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true
|
|
pr_bold "Testing all IPv4 addresses (port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs"
|
|
for ip in $IPADDRs; do
|
|
NODEIP="$ip"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
done
|
|
else
|
|
NODEIP="$IPADDRs"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
fi
|
|
ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
done
|
|
draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3))
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_bold "Done testing all MX records (on port $mxport): "; outln "$mxs"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_bold " $1 has no MX records(s)"
|
|
fi
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# If run_mass_testing() is being used, then create the command line
|
|
# for the test based on the global command line (all elements of the
|
|
# command line provided to the parent, except the --file/-iL option) and the
|
|
# specific command line options for the test to be run. Each argument
|
|
# in the command line needs to be a separate element in an array in order
|
|
# to deal with word splitting within file names (see #702).
|
|
#
|
|
# If run_mass_testing_parallel() is being used, then in addition to the above,
|
|
# modify global command line for child tests so that if all (JSON, CSV, HTML)
|
|
# output is to go into a single file, each child will have its output placed in
|
|
# a separate, named file, so that the separate files can be concatenated
|
|
# together once they are complete to create the single file.
|
|
#
|
|
# If run_mass_testing() is being used, then "$1" is "serial". If
|
|
# run_mass_testing_parallel() is being used, then "$1" is "parallel XXXXXXXX"
|
|
# where XXXXXXXX is the number of the test being run.
|
|
#
|
|
create_mass_testing_cmdline() {
|
|
local testing_type="$1"
|
|
local cmd test_number
|
|
local outfile_arg
|
|
local -i nr_cmds=0 i=0
|
|
local skip_next=false
|
|
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE=()
|
|
[[ "$testing_type" =~ parallel ]] && read -r testing_type test_number <<< "$testing_type"
|
|
|
|
# Start by adding the elements from the global command line to the command line for the
|
|
# test. If run_mass_testing_parallel(), then modify the command line so that, when
|
|
# required, each child process sends its test results to a separate file. If a cmd
|
|
# uses '=' for supplying a value we just skip next parameter (we don't use 'parse_opt_equal_sign' here)
|
|
debugme echo "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}"
|
|
for cmd in "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}"; do
|
|
"$skip_next" && skip_next=false && i+=1 && continue
|
|
if [[ "$cmd" =~ --file ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -iL ]]; then
|
|
# Don't include the "--file[=...] or -iL argument in the child's command
|
|
# line, but do include "--warnings=batch".
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--warnings=batch"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
# next is the file itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --file ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -iL ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif [[ "$testing_type" == serial ]]; then
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --jsonfile-pretty ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oJ ]] ); then
|
|
>"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
# next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile-pretty ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oJ ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$JSONHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --jsonfile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oj ]] ); then
|
|
>"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
# next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oj ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$CSVHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --csvfile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oC ]] ); then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$outfile_arg"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --csvfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oC ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$HTMLHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --htmlfile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oH ]] ); then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$outfile_arg"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --htmlfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oH ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif [[ "$cmd" =~ --logfile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oL ]]; then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--logfile-parent=$outfile_arg"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --logfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oL ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$JSONHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --outFile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oA ]] ); then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
>"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$outfile_arg.csv"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$outfile_arg.html"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --outFile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oA ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
elif "$JSONHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --outfile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oa ]] ); then
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
>"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$outfile_arg.csv"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$outfile_arg.html"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --outfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oa ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
else
|
|
case "$cmd" in
|
|
--jsonfile|--jsonfile=*|-oj|-oj=*)
|
|
# If <jsonfile> is a file, then have provide a different
|
|
# file name to each child process. If <jsonfile> is a
|
|
# directory, then just pass it on to the child processes.
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json"
|
|
# next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oj ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--jsonfile-pretty|--jsonfile-pretty=*|-oJ|-oJ=*)
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json"
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile-pretty ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oJ ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--csvfile|--csvfile=*|-oC|-oC=*)
|
|
if "$CSVHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv"
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --csvfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oC ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--htmlfile|--htmlfile=*|-oH|-oH=*)
|
|
if "$HTMLHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html"
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --htmlfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oH ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--logfile|--logfile=*|-oL|-oL=*)
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[i+1]}")"
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--logfile-parent=$outfile_arg"
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --logfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oL ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--outfile|--outfile=*|-oa|-oa=*)
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --outfile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oa ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--outFile|--outFile=*|-oA|-oA=*)
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER"; then
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty-parent=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile-parent=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html"
|
|
# next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == --outFile ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
[[ "$cmd" == -oA ]] && skip_next=true
|
|
else
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
fi
|
|
i+=1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Now add the command line arguments for the specific test to the command line.
|
|
# Skip the first argument sent to this function, since it specifies the type of testing being performed.
|
|
shift
|
|
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|
MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$1"
|
|
nr_cmds+=1
|
|
shift
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
ports2starttls() {
|
|
local tcp_port=$1
|
|
local ret=0
|
|
|
|
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_TCP_and_UDP_port_numbers
|
|
case $tcp_port in
|
|
21) echo "-t ftp " ;;
|
|
23) echo "-t telnet " ;;
|
|
119|433) echo "-t nntp " ;; # to come
|
|
25|587) echo "-t smtp " ;;
|
|
110) echo "-t pop3 " ;;
|
|
143) echo "-t imap " ;;
|
|
389) echo "-t ldap ";;
|
|
3306) echo "-t mysql " ;;
|
|
5222) echo "-t xmpp " ;; # domain of jabber server maybe needed
|
|
5432) echo "-t postgres " ;;
|
|
4190) echo "-t sieve " ;;
|
|
563) ;; # NNTPS
|
|
636) ;; # LDAP
|
|
1443|8443|443|981) ;; # HTTPS
|
|
465) ;; # HTTPS | SMTP
|
|
631) ;; # CUPS
|
|
853) ;; # DNS over TLS
|
|
995|993) ;; # POP3|IMAP
|
|
3389) ;; # RDP
|
|
*) ret=1 ;; # we don't know this ports so we rather do not scan it
|
|
esac
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nmap_to_plain_file() {
|
|
local target_fname=""
|
|
local oneline=""
|
|
local ip hostdontcare round_brackets ports_specs starttls
|
|
local tmp port host_spec protocol ssl_hint dontcare dontcare1
|
|
#FIXME: IPv6 is missing here
|
|
|
|
# Ok, since we are here we are sure to have an nmap file. To avoid questions we make sure it's the right format too
|
|
if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ ( -oG )(.*) ]] || [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ ( -oA )(.*) ]] ; then
|
|
# yes, greppable
|
|
if [[ $(grep -c Status "$FNAME") -ge 1 ]]; then
|
|
[[ $(grep -c '\/open\/' "$FNAME") -eq 0 ]] && \
|
|
fatal "Nmap file $FNAME should contain at least one open port" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "strange, nmap grepable misses \"Status\"" -1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
fatal "Nmap file $FNAME is not in grep(p)able format (-oG filename.g(n)map)" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
fi
|
|
# create ${FNAME%.*}.txt in $TEMPDIR
|
|
target_fname="${FNAME%.*}.txt"
|
|
target_fname="${target_fname##*\/}" # strip path (Unix)
|
|
target_fname="${target_fname##*\\}" # strip path (Dos)
|
|
target_fname="$TEMPDIR/$target_fname"
|
|
> "${target_fname}" || fatal "Cannot create \"${target_fname}\"" $ERR_FCREATE
|
|
|
|
# Line x: "Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Status: Up"
|
|
# Line x+1: "Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Ports: 443/open/tcp//https///"
|
|
# (or): Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Ports: 22/open/tcp//ssh//<banner>/, 25/open/tcp//smtp//<banner>/, 443/open/tcp//ssl|http//<banner>
|
|
while read -r hostdontcare ip round_brackets tmp ports_specs; do
|
|
[[ "$ports_specs" =~ "Status: " ]] && continue # we don't need this
|
|
[[ "$ports_specs" =~ '/open/tcp/' ]] || continue # no open tcp at all for this IP --> move
|
|
host_spec="$ip"
|
|
fqdn="${round_brackets/\(/}"
|
|
fqdn="${fqdn/\)/}"
|
|
if [[ -n "$fqdn" ]]; then
|
|
tmp="$(get_a_record "$fqdn")"
|
|
debugme echo "$tmp \?= $ip"
|
|
if [[ "$tmp" == "$ip" ]]; then
|
|
host_spec="$fqdn"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
while read -r oneline; do
|
|
# 25/open/tcp//smtp//<banner>/,
|
|
[[ "$oneline" =~ '/open/tcp/' ]] || continue # no open tcp for this port on this IP --> move on
|
|
IFS=/ read -r port dontcare protocol ssl_hint dontcare1 <<< "$oneline"
|
|
if [[ "$ssl_hint" =~ ^(ssl|https) ]] || [[ "$dontcare1" =~ ^(ssl|https) ]]; then
|
|
echo "${host_spec}:${port}" >>"$target_fname"
|
|
else
|
|
starttls="$(ports2starttls $port)"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 1 ]] && continue # nmap got a port but we don't know how to speak to
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo "${starttls}$host_spec:$port"
|
|
echo "${starttls}${host_spec}:${port}" >>"$target_fname"
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(tr ',' '\n' <<< "$ports_specs")
|
|
done < "$FNAME"
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo
|
|
|
|
[[ -s "$target_fname" ]] || \
|
|
fatal "Couldn't find any open port in $FNAME" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
export FNAME=$target_fname
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_mass_testing() {
|
|
local cmdline=""
|
|
local first=true
|
|
local gnmapadd=""
|
|
local saved_fname="$FNAME"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$FNAME" ]] && "$IKNOW_FNAME"; then
|
|
fatal "Can't read file \"$FNAME\"" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ (Nmap [4-8])(.*)( scan initiated )(.*) ]]; then
|
|
gnmapadd="grep(p)able nmap "
|
|
nmap_to_plain_file
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_reverse "====== Running in file batch mode with ${gnmapadd}file=\"$saved_fname\" ======"; outln "\n"
|
|
while read -r cmdline; do
|
|
cmdline="$(filter_input "$cmdline")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cmdline" ]] && continue
|
|
[[ "$cmdline" == EOF ]] && break
|
|
# Create the command line for the child in the form of an array (see #702)
|
|
create_mass_testing_cmdline "serial" $cmdline
|
|
draw_line "=" $((TERM_WIDTH / 2)); outln;
|
|
outln "$(create_cmd_line_string "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}")"
|
|
# we call ourselves here. $do_mass_testing is the parent, $CHILD_MASS_TESTING... you figured
|
|
if [[ -z "$(type -p "$0")" ]]; then
|
|
CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$RUN_DIR/$PROG_NAME" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}"
|
|
else
|
|
CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER" && [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" ]]; then
|
|
# Need to ensure that a separator is only added if the test
|
|
# produced some JSON output.
|
|
"$first" || fileout_separator # this is needed for appended output, see #687
|
|
first=false
|
|
cat "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
FIRST_FINDING=false
|
|
fi
|
|
done < "${FNAME}"
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# This function is called when it has been determined that the next child
|
|
# process has completed or it has been stopped. If the child process completed,
|
|
# then this process prints the child process's output to the terminal and, if
|
|
# appropriate, adds any JSON, CSV, and HTML output it has created to the
|
|
# appropriate file. If the child process was stopped, then a message indicating
|
|
# that is printed, but the incomplete results are not used.
|
|
#
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result() {
|
|
draw_line "=" $((TERM_WIDTH / 2)); outln;
|
|
outln "${PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]}"
|
|
if [[ "$1" == completed ]]; then
|
|
cat "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).log"
|
|
if "$JSONHEADER" && [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).json" ]]; then
|
|
# Need to ensure that a separator is only added if the test
|
|
# produced some JSON output.
|
|
"$FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT" || fileout_separator # this is needed for appended output, see #687
|
|
FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT=false
|
|
FIRST_FINDING=false
|
|
cat "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).json" >> "$JSONFILE"
|
|
fi
|
|
"$CSVHEADER" && cat "$TEMPDIR/csvfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).csv" >> "$CSVFILE"
|
|
"$HTMLHEADER" && cat "$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).html" >> "$HTMLFILE"
|
|
elif [[ "$1" == "stopped" ]]; then
|
|
outln "\nTest was stopped before it completed.\n"
|
|
else
|
|
outln "\nTest timed out before it completed.\n"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#FIXME: not called/tested yet
|
|
run_mass_testing_parallel() {
|
|
local cmdline=""
|
|
local -i i nr_active_tests=0
|
|
local -a -i start_time=()
|
|
local -i curr_time wait_time
|
|
local gnmapadd=""
|
|
local saved_fname="$FNAME"
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -r "$FNAME" ]] && $IKNOW_FNAME; then
|
|
fatal "Can't read file \"$FNAME\"" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ (Nmap [4-8])(.*)( scan initiated )(.*) ]]; then
|
|
gnmapadd="grep(p)able nmap "
|
|
nmap_to_plain_file
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_reverse "====== Running in file batch mode with ${gnmapadd}file=\"$saved_fname\" ======"; outln "\n"
|
|
while read -r cmdline; do
|
|
cmdline="$(filter_input "$cmdline")"
|
|
[[ -z "$cmdline" ]] && continue
|
|
[[ "$cmdline" == "EOF" ]] && break
|
|
# Create the command line for the child in the form of an array (see #702)
|
|
create_mass_testing_cmdline "parallel $(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS)" $cmdline
|
|
|
|
# fileout() won't include the "service" information in the JSON file for the child process
|
|
# if the JSON file doesn't already exist.
|
|
"$JSONHEADER" && >"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).json"
|
|
PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]="$(create_cmd_line_string "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}")"
|
|
if [[ -z "$(type -p "$0")" ]]; then
|
|
CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$RUN_DIR/$PROG_NAME" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}" > "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).log" 2>&1 &
|
|
else
|
|
CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}" > "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).log" 2>&1 &
|
|
fi
|
|
PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]=$!
|
|
start_time[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]=$(date +%s)
|
|
if "$INTERACTIVE"; then
|
|
echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
echo -n "Started test #$NR_PARALLEL_TESTS" 1>&2
|
|
[[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]] && \
|
|
echo -n " (waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish)" 1>&2
|
|
fi
|
|
NR_PARALLEL_TESTS+=1
|
|
nr_active_tests+=1
|
|
sleep $PARALLEL_SLEEP
|
|
# Get the results of any completed tests
|
|
while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do
|
|
if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
elif ! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1
|
|
else
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ $nr_active_tests -ge $MAX_PARALLEL ]]; then
|
|
curr_time=$(date +%s)
|
|
while true; do
|
|
# Check to see if any test completed
|
|
for (( i=NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH; i < NR_PARALLEL_TESTS; i++ )); do
|
|
if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]} -ne 0 ]] && \
|
|
! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]} >/dev/null ; then
|
|
PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]=0
|
|
nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
[[ $nr_active_tests -lt $MAX_PARALLEL ]] && break
|
|
if [[ $curr_time-${start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]]; then
|
|
# No test completed in the allocated time, so the first one to
|
|
# start will be killed.
|
|
kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null
|
|
wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p)
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "timeout"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
# Wake up to increment the counter every second (so that the counter
|
|
# appears to users as if it is operating smoothly), but check the
|
|
# status of the $MAX_PARALLEL active processes less often, since the
|
|
# ps command is expensive.
|
|
for (( i=0; i <= $((MAX_PARALLEL/5)); i++ )); do
|
|
wait_time=$((curr_time-start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]))
|
|
[[ $wait_time -gt $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && wait_time=$MAX_WAIT_TEST
|
|
if "$INTERACTIVE"; then
|
|
echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
echo -n "Waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish" 1>&2
|
|
if [[ $((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) -le 60 ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " ($((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) seconds to timeout)" 1>&2
|
|
else
|
|
echo -n " ($wait_time seconds)" 1>&2
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $wait_time -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && break
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
curr_time=$(date +%s)
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
done < "$FNAME"
|
|
|
|
# Wait for remaining tests to finish
|
|
curr_time=$(date +%s)
|
|
while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do
|
|
if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -eq 0 ]] || \
|
|
! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
elif [[ $curr_time-${start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]]; then
|
|
kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null
|
|
wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p)
|
|
"$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "timeout"
|
|
NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1
|
|
else
|
|
# Here it is okay to check process status every second, since the
|
|
# status of only one process is being checked.
|
|
if "$INTERACTIVE"; then
|
|
echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2
|
|
wait_time=$((curr_time-start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]))
|
|
[[ $wait_time -gt $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && wait_time=$MAX_WAIT_TEST
|
|
echo -n "Waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish" 1>&2
|
|
if [[ $((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) -le 60 ]]; then
|
|
echo -n " ($((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) seconds to timeout)" 1>&2
|
|
else
|
|
echo -n " ($wait_time seconds)" 1>&2
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
curr_time=$(date +%s)
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
return $?
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
run_rating() {
|
|
local pre_cap_grade final_grade
|
|
local -i c1_score c2_score c3_score c1_wscore c2_wscore c3_wscore final_score
|
|
local -i c1_worst c1_best
|
|
local -i c3_worst c3_best c3_worst_cb c3_best_cb
|
|
local old_ifs=$IFS sorted_reasons sorted_warnings
|
|
local -i reason_nr=0 warning_nr=0
|
|
|
|
outln "\n";
|
|
pr_headlineln " Rating (experimental) "
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
[[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]] && set_grade_cap "T" "Encryption via STARTTLS is not mandatory (opportunistic)."
|
|
|
|
# Sort the reasons. This is just nicer to read in general
|
|
IFS=$'\n' sorted_reasons=($(sort -ru <<<"${GRADE_CAP_REASONS[*]}"))
|
|
IFS=$'\n' sorted_warnings=($(sort -u <<<"${GRADE_WARNINGS[*]}"))
|
|
IFS=$old_ifs
|
|
pr_bold " Rating specs"; out " (not complete) "; outln "SSL Labs's 'SSL Server Rating Guide' (version 2009q from 2020-01-30)"
|
|
pr_bold " Specification documentation "; pr_url "https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-Server-Rating-Guide"
|
|
outln
|
|
fileout "rating_spec" "INFO" "SSL Labs's 'SSL Server Rating Guide' (version 2009q from 2020-01-30)"
|
|
fileout "rating_doc" "INFO" "https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-Server-Rating-Guide"
|
|
|
|
# No point in calculating a score, if a cap of "F", "T", or "M" has been set
|
|
if [[ $GRADE_CAP == F || $GRADE_CAP == T || $GRADE_CAP == M ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " Protocol Support"; out " (weighted) "; outln "0 (0)"
|
|
pr_bold " Key Exchange"; out " (weighted) "; outln "0 (0)"
|
|
pr_bold " Cipher Strength"; out " (weighted) "; outln "0 (0)"
|
|
pr_bold " Final Score "; outln "0"
|
|
pr_bold " Overall Grade "; prln_svrty_critical "$GRADE_CAP"
|
|
|
|
fileout "protocol_support_score" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "protocol_support_score_weighted" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "key_exchange_score" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "key_exchange_score_weighted" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "cipher_strength_score" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "cipher_strength_score_weighted" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "final_score" "INFO" "0"
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "CRITICAL" "$GRADE_CAP"
|
|
else
|
|
## Category 1
|
|
# get best score, by searching for the best protocol, until a hit occurs
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 || $(has_server_protocol "tls1_2") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_best=100
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_best=95
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_best=90
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_best=80
|
|
# If the best protocol offered is SSLv3, cap to F. It is easier done here
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "SSLv3 is the best protocol offered"
|
|
else # SSLv2 gives 0 points
|
|
c1_best=0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# get worst score, by searching for the worst protocol, until a hit occurs
|
|
if [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_worst=0
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_worst=80
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_worst=90
|
|
elif [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
c1_worst=95
|
|
else # TLS1.2 and TLS1.3 both give 100 points
|
|
c1_worst=100
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
c1_score=$(( (c1_best+c1_worst)/2 )) # Gets the category score
|
|
c1_wscore=$((c1_score*30/100)) # Gets the weighted score for category (30%)
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Protocol Support "; out "(weighted) "; outln "$c1_score ($c1_wscore)"
|
|
fileout "protocol_support_score" "INFO" "$c1_score"
|
|
fileout "protocol_support_score_weighted" "INFO" "$c1_wscore"
|
|
|
|
## Category 2
|
|
if [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -le 40 ]]; then
|
|
set_grade_cap "F" "Using an insecure public key and/or ephemeral key"
|
|
elif [[ $KEY_EXCH_SCORE -le 80 ]]; then
|
|
set_grade_cap "B" "Using a weak public key and/or ephemeral key"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
c2_score=$KEY_EXCH_SCORE
|
|
c2_wscore=$((c2_score*30/100))
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Key Exchange "; out " (weighted) "; outln "$c2_score ($c2_wscore)"
|
|
fileout "key_exchange_score" "INFO" "$c2_score"
|
|
fileout "key_exchange_score_weighted" "INFO" "$c2_wscore"
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Category 3
|
|
# Get the cipher bits sizes for the best cipher, and the worst cipher
|
|
c3_best_cb=$CIPH_STR_BEST
|
|
c3_worst_cb=$CIPH_STR_WORST
|
|
|
|
# Determine score for the best key
|
|
if [[ $c3_best_cb -ge 256 ]]; then
|
|
c3_best=100
|
|
elif [[ $c3_best_cb -ge 128 ]]; then
|
|
c3_best=80
|
|
elif [[ $c3_best_cb -ge 0 ]]; then
|
|
c3_best=20
|
|
else
|
|
c3_best=0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Determine the score for the worst key
|
|
if [[ $c3_worst_cb -gt 0 && $c3_worst_cb -lt 128 ]]; then
|
|
c3_worst=20
|
|
elif [[ $c3_worst_cb -ge 128 && $c3_worst_cb -lt 256 ]]; then
|
|
c3_worst=80
|
|
elif [[ $c3_worst_cb -ge 256 ]]; then
|
|
c3_worst=100
|
|
else
|
|
c3_worst=0
|
|
fi
|
|
c3_score=$(( (c3_best+c3_worst)/2 )) # Gets the category score
|
|
c3_wscore=$((c3_score*40/100)) # Gets the weighted score for category (40%)
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Cipher Strength "; out " (weighted) "; outln "$c3_score ($c3_wscore)"
|
|
fileout "cipher_strength_score" "INFO" "$c3_score"
|
|
fileout "cipher_strength_score_weighted" "INFO" "$c3_wscore"
|
|
|
|
## Calculate final score and grade
|
|
# If any category resulted in a score of 0, push final grade to 0
|
|
if [[ $c1_score -eq 0 || $c2_score -eq 0 || $c3_score -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
final_score=0
|
|
else
|
|
final_score=$((c1_wscore+c2_wscore+c3_wscore))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Final Score "; outln $final_score
|
|
fileout "final_score" "INFO" "$final_score"
|
|
|
|
# Calculate the pre-cap grade
|
|
if [[ $final_score -ge 80 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="A"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -ge 65 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="B"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -ge 50 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="C"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -ge 35 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="D"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -ge 20 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="E"
|
|
elif [[ $final_score -lt 20 ]]; then
|
|
pre_cap_grade="F"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If the calculated grade is bigger than the grade cap, then set grade as the cap
|
|
if [[ -n "$GRADE_CAP" && ! $pre_cap_grade > $GRADE_CAP ]]; then
|
|
final_grade=$GRADE_CAP
|
|
# For "exceptional" config, an "A+" is awarded, or "A-" for slightly less "exceptional"
|
|
elif [[ -z "$GRADE_CAP" && $pre_cap_grade == A ]]; then
|
|
if [[ ${#sorted_warnings[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
final_grade="A+"
|
|
else
|
|
final_grade="A-"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
final_grade=$pre_cap_grade
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
pr_bold " Overall Grade "
|
|
case "$final_grade" in
|
|
A*) prln_svrty_best $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "OK" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
B) prln_svrty_medium $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "MEDIUM" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
C) prln_svrty_medium $final_grade
|
|
fileout "grade" "MEDIUM" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
D) prln_svrty_high $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "HIGH" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
E) prln_svrty_high $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "HIGH" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
F) prln_svrty_critical $final_grade
|
|
fileout "overall_grade" "CRITICAL" "$final_grade"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Pretty print - again, it's just nicer to read
|
|
for reason in "${sorted_reasons[@]}"; do
|
|
if [[ $reason_nr -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " Grade cap reasons "; outln "$reason"
|
|
else
|
|
outln " $reason"
|
|
fi
|
|
((reason_nr++))
|
|
fileout "grade_cap_reason_${reason_nr}" "INFO" "$reason"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
for warning in "${sorted_warnings[@]}"; do
|
|
if [[ $warning_nr -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
pr_bold " Grade warning "; prln_svrty_medium "$warning"
|
|
else
|
|
prln_svrty_medium " $warning"
|
|
fi
|
|
((warning_nr++))
|
|
fileout "grade_cap_warning_${warning_nr}" "INFO" "$warning"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Checks whether rating can be done or not.
|
|
# Rating needs a mix of certificate and vulnerabilities checks, in order to give out proper grades.
|
|
# This function disables rating, if not all required checks are enabled
|
|
# Returns "0" if rating is enabled, and "1" if rating is disabled
|
|
set_rating_state() {
|
|
local gbl
|
|
local -i nr_enabled=0
|
|
|
|
# All of these should be enabled
|
|
for gbl in do_protocols do_cipherlists do_fs do_server_defaults do_header \
|
|
do_heartbleed do_ccs_injection do_ticketbleed do_robot do_renego \
|
|
do_crime do_ssl_poodle do_tls_fallback_scsv do_drown do_beast \
|
|
do_rc4 do_logjam; do
|
|
"${!gbl}" && ((nr_enabled++))
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# ... at least one of these has to be set
|
|
[[ "$do_allciphers" || "$do_cipher_per_proto" ]] && ((nr_enabled++))
|
|
|
|
# ... else we can't do rating
|
|
if [[ $nr_enabled -lt 18 ]]; then
|
|
do_rating=false
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This initializes boolean global do_* variables. They keep track of what to do
|
|
# -- as the name insinuates
|
|
initialize_globals() {
|
|
do_allciphers=false
|
|
do_vulnerabilities=false
|
|
do_beast=false
|
|
do_lucky13=false
|
|
do_breach=false
|
|
do_ccs_injection=false
|
|
do_ticketbleed=false
|
|
do_robot=false
|
|
do_cipher_per_proto=false
|
|
do_crime=false
|
|
do_freak=false
|
|
do_logjam=false
|
|
do_drown=false
|
|
do_header=false
|
|
do_heartbleed=false
|
|
do_mx_all_ips=false
|
|
do_mass_testing=false
|
|
do_logging=false
|
|
do_json=false
|
|
do_pretty_json=false
|
|
do_csv=false
|
|
do_html=false
|
|
do_fs=false
|
|
do_protocols=false
|
|
do_rc4=false
|
|
do_starttls_injection=false
|
|
do_winshock=false
|
|
do_grease=false
|
|
do_renego=false
|
|
do_cipherlists=false
|
|
do_server_defaults=false
|
|
do_server_preference=false
|
|
do_ssl_poodle=false
|
|
do_sweet32=false
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=false
|
|
do_cipher_match=false
|
|
do_tls_sockets=false
|
|
do_client_simulation=false
|
|
do_display_only=false
|
|
do_starttls=false
|
|
do_rating=false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Set default scanning options for the boolean global do_* variables.
|
|
set_scanning_defaults() {
|
|
do_allciphers=false
|
|
do_vulnerabilities=true
|
|
do_beast=true
|
|
do_lucky13=true
|
|
do_breach=true
|
|
do_heartbleed="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_ccs_injection="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_ticketbleed="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_robot="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_crime=true
|
|
do_freak=true
|
|
do_logjam=true
|
|
do_drown=true
|
|
do_ssl_poodle=true
|
|
do_sweet32=true
|
|
do_header=true
|
|
do_fs=true
|
|
do_rc4=true
|
|
do_starttls_injection=true
|
|
do_winshock=true
|
|
do_protocols=true
|
|
do_renego=true
|
|
do_cipherlists=true
|
|
do_server_defaults=true
|
|
do_server_preference=true
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=true
|
|
do_client_simulation=true
|
|
if "$OFFENSIVE"; then
|
|
VULN_COUNT=17
|
|
else
|
|
VULN_COUNT=13
|
|
fi
|
|
do_rating=true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# returns number of $do variables set = number of run_funcs() to perform
|
|
count_do_variables() {
|
|
local gbl
|
|
local -i true_nr=0
|
|
|
|
for gbl in do_allciphers do_vulnerabilities do_beast do_lucky13 do_breach do_ccs_injection do_ticketbleed do_cipher_per_proto do_crime \
|
|
do_freak do_logjam do_drown do_header do_heartbleed do_mx_all_ips do_fs do_protocols do_rc4 do_starttls_injection do_grease do_robot do_renego \
|
|
do_cipherlists do_server_defaults do_server_preference do_ssl_poodle do_tls_fallback_scsv do_winshock \
|
|
do_sweet32 do_client_simulation do_cipher_match do_tls_sockets do_mass_testing do_display_only do_rating; do
|
|
"${!gbl}" && ((true_nr++))
|
|
done
|
|
return $true_nr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
debug_globals() {
|
|
local gbl
|
|
|
|
for gbl in do_allciphers do_vulnerabilities do_beast do_lucky13 do_breach do_ccs_injection do_ticketbleed do_cipher_per_proto do_crime \
|
|
do_freak do_logjam do_drown do_header do_heartbleed do_mx_all_ips do_fs do_protocols do_rc4 do_starttls_injection do_grease do_robot do_renego \
|
|
do_cipherlists do_server_defaults do_server_preference do_ssl_poodle do_tls_fallback_scsv do_winshock \
|
|
do_sweet32 do_client_simulation do_cipher_match do_tls_sockets do_mass_testing do_display_only do_rating; do
|
|
printf "%-22s = %s\n" $gbl "${!gbl}"
|
|
done
|
|
# ${!var} is an indirect expansion, see https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html_node/Shell-Parameter-Expansion.html
|
|
# Example: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/8515411/what-is-indirect-expansion-what-does-var-mean#8515492
|
|
printf "%-22s : %s\n" URI: "$URI"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This is determining the tests which should be skipped by --no-* or --disable-* a a cmdline arg.
|
|
# It achieves that by setting the do_<variables> according to the global array $SKIP_TESTS
|
|
#
|
|
set_skip_tests() {
|
|
local t
|
|
|
|
for t in ${SKIP_TESTS[@]} ; do
|
|
t="do_${t}"
|
|
# declare won't do it here --> local scope
|
|
eval "$t"=false
|
|
debugme printf '%s\n' "set $t: ${!t}"
|
|
done
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1: either switch+value (=) or switch
|
|
# arg2: value (if no = provided)
|
|
parse_opt_equal_sign() {
|
|
if [[ "$1" == *=* ]]; then
|
|
echo ${1#*=}
|
|
return 1 # = means we don't need to shift args!
|
|
else
|
|
echo "$2"
|
|
return 0 # we need to shift
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Create the command line string for printing purposes
|
|
# See https://stackoverflow.com/questions/10835933/preserve-quotes-in-bash-arguments
|
|
create_cmd_line_string() {
|
|
local arg
|
|
local -a allargs=()
|
|
local chars='[ !"#$&()*,;<>?\^`{|}]'
|
|
|
|
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|
if [[ $1 == *\'* ]]; then
|
|
arg=\""$1"\"
|
|
elif [[ $1 == *$chars* ]]; then
|
|
arg="'$1'"
|
|
else
|
|
arg="$1"
|
|
fi
|
|
allargs+=("$arg") # ${allargs[@]} is to be used only for printing
|
|
shift
|
|
done
|
|
printf '%s\n' "${allargs[*]}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_base_requirements() {
|
|
local binary=''
|
|
local whitelist=' hexdump grep awk sed '
|
|
|
|
for binary in 'hexdump' 'dd' 'grep' 'awk' 'tr' 'sed' 'wc' 'date' 'cat' 'ps' 'kill' 'head' 'tail' 'dirname'; do
|
|
if ! type -p "${binary}" &> /dev/null; then
|
|
fatal "You need to install ${binary} for this program to work" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ ${whitelist} =~ \ ${binary}\ ]] && continue
|
|
"${binary}" --help 2>&1 | grep -iq busybox
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
fatal "${binary} is from busybox. Please install a regular binary" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
# testssl.sh works without xxd, but using xxd is faster. The following checks that the xxd
|
|
# binary is available and (just to be safe) that "xxd -r -p" works as expected.
|
|
if type -p xxd &> /dev/null && [[ "$(xxd -r -p <<< "30313233343536373839" 2>/dev/null)" == 0123456789 ]]; then
|
|
HAS_XXD=true
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parse_cmd_line() {
|
|
local outfile_arg=""
|
|
local cipher_mapping
|
|
local -i subret=0
|
|
|
|
CMDLINE="$(create_cmd_line_string "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}")"
|
|
CMDLINE_PARSED=false
|
|
|
|
case $1 in
|
|
--help|"")
|
|
help 0
|
|
;;
|
|
-b|--banner|-v|--version)
|
|
maketempf
|
|
get_install_dir
|
|
find_openssl_binary
|
|
prepare_debug
|
|
mybanner
|
|
exit $ALLOK
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# set all do_* globals to false
|
|
initialize_globals
|
|
|
|
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|
case $1 in
|
|
--help|-b|--banner|-v|--version)
|
|
fatal "$1 is a standalone command line option" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
;;
|
|
--mx)
|
|
do_mx_all_ips=true
|
|
PORT=25
|
|
;;
|
|
--mx465) # doesn't work with major ISPs
|
|
do_mx_all_ips=true
|
|
PORT=465
|
|
;;
|
|
--mx587) # doesn't work with major ISPs
|
|
do_mx_all_ips=true
|
|
PORT=587
|
|
;;
|
|
--ip|--ip=*)
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
if [[ "$CMDLINE_IP" == proxy ]]; then
|
|
DNS_VIA_PROXY=true
|
|
unset CMDLINE_IP
|
|
fi
|
|
# normalize any IPv6 address
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="${CMDLINE_IP//[/}" # fix vim syntax highlighting "]
|
|
CMDLINE_IP="${CMDLINE_IP//]/}"
|
|
;;
|
|
-n|--nodns|-n=*|--nodns=*)
|
|
NODNS="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
if [[ "$NODNS" != none ]] && [[ "$NODNS" != min ]]; then
|
|
fatal "Value for nodns switch can be either \"min\" or \"none\"" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
-V|-V=*|--local|--local=*) # attention, this could have a value or not!
|
|
do_display_only=true
|
|
PATTERN2SHOW="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
subret=$?
|
|
if [[ "$PATTERN2SHOW" == -* ]]; then
|
|
unset PATTERN2SHOW # we hit the next command ==> not our value
|
|
else # it was ours, point to next arg
|
|
[[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
-x|-x=*|--single[-_]cipher|--single[-_]cipher=*)
|
|
do_cipher_match=true
|
|
single_cipher=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
-t|-t=*|--starttls|--starttls=*)
|
|
do_starttls=true
|
|
STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL in
|
|
ftp|smtp|lmtp|pop3|imap|sieve|xmpp|xmpp-server|telnet|ldap|irc|nntp|postgres|mysql) ;;
|
|
ftps|smtps|lmtps|pop3s|imaps|xmpps|telnets|ldaps|ircs|nntps|mysqls) ;;
|
|
*) tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized STARTTLS protocol \"$1\", see help" 1>&2
|
|
help 1 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--xmpphost|--xmpphost=*)
|
|
XMPP_HOST=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
-e|--each-cipher)
|
|
do_allciphers=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-E|--cipher-per-proto|--cipher_per_proto)
|
|
do_cipher_per_proto=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-p|--protocols)
|
|
do_protocols=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-s|--std|--standard|--categories)
|
|
# --standard is deprecated
|
|
do_cipherlists=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-S|--server[-_]defaults)
|
|
do_server_defaults=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-P|--server[_-]preference|--preference)
|
|
do_server_preference=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-h|--header|--headers)
|
|
do_header=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-c|--client-simulation)
|
|
do_client_simulation=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-U|--vulnerable|--vulnerabilities)
|
|
# Lookahead function: If the order of the cmdline is '-U --ids-friendly'
|
|
# then we need to make sure we catch --ids-friendly. Normally we do not,
|
|
# see #1717. The following statement makes sure. In the do-while + case-esac
|
|
# loop it will be execute again, but it does not hurt
|
|
if [[ "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}" =~ --ids-friendly ]]; then
|
|
OFFENSIVE=false
|
|
fi
|
|
do_vulnerabilities=true
|
|
do_heartbleed="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_ccs_injection="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_ticketbleed="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_robot="$OFFENSIVE"
|
|
do_renego=true
|
|
do_crime=true
|
|
do_breach=true
|
|
do_ssl_poodle=true
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=true
|
|
do_sweet32=true
|
|
do_freak=true
|
|
do_drown=true
|
|
do_logjam=true
|
|
do_beast=true
|
|
do_lucky13=true
|
|
do_winshock=true
|
|
do_rc4=true
|
|
do_starttls_injection=true
|
|
if "$OFFENSIVE"; then
|
|
VULN_COUNT=17
|
|
else
|
|
VULN_COUNT=13
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--ids-friendly)
|
|
OFFENSIVE=false
|
|
;;
|
|
-H|--heartbleed)
|
|
do_heartbleed=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-I|--ccs|--ccs[-_]injection)
|
|
do_ccs_injection=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-T|--ticketbleed)
|
|
do_ticketbleed=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-BB|--BB|--robot)
|
|
do_robot=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-R|--renegotiation)
|
|
do_renego=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-C|--compression|--crime)
|
|
do_crime=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-B|--breach)
|
|
do_breach=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-O|--poodle)
|
|
do_ssl_poodle=true
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-Z|--tls[_-]fallback|tls[_-]fallback[_-]scs)
|
|
do_tls_fallback_scsv=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-W|--sweet32)
|
|
do_sweet32=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-F|--freak)
|
|
do_freak=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-D|--drown)
|
|
do_drown=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-J|--logjam)
|
|
do_logjam=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-A|--beast)
|
|
do_beast=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-L|--lucky13)
|
|
do_lucky13=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-WS|--winshock)
|
|
do_winshock=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-4|--rc4|--appelbaum)
|
|
do_rc4=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-SI|--SI|--starttls[-_]injection)
|
|
do_starttls_injection=true
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
;;
|
|
-f|--fs|--nsa|--forward-secrecy)
|
|
do_fs=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-g|--grease)
|
|
do_grease=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--disable-rating|--no-rating)
|
|
SKIP_TESTS+=("rating")
|
|
# TODO: a generic thing would be --disable-* / --no-* ,
|
|
# catch $1 and add it to the array ( #1502 )
|
|
;;
|
|
-9|--full)
|
|
set_scanning_defaults
|
|
do_allciphers=false
|
|
do_grease=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--add-ca|--add-CA|--add-ca=*|--add-CA=*)
|
|
ADDTL_CA_FILES="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--devel) echo -e "\nthis is a development feature and may disappear at any time"
|
|
# arg1: SSL/TLS protocol (SSLv2=22)
|
|
# arg2: list of cipher suites / hostname/ip
|
|
# arg3: hostname/ip
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 04 "13,02, 13,01" google.com --> TLS 1.3
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 03 "cc, 13, c0, 13" google.de --> TLS 1.2, old CHACHA/POLY
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 03 "cc,a8, cc,a9, cc,aa, cc,ab, cc,ac" blog.cloudflare.com --> new CHACHA/POLY
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 01 yandex.ru --> TLS 1.0
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 00 <host which supports SSLv3>
|
|
# DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 22 <host which still supports SSLv2>
|
|
HEX_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER"
|
|
TLS_LOW_BYTE="$2"
|
|
if [[ $# -eq 4 ]]; then # protocol AND ciphers specified
|
|
HEX_CIPHER="$3"
|
|
shift
|
|
fi
|
|
shift
|
|
do_tls_sockets=true
|
|
outln "\nTLS_LOW_BYTE, HEX_CIPHER: \"${TLS_LOW_BYTE}\", \"${HEX_CIPHER}\""
|
|
;;
|
|
--wide)
|
|
WIDE=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--assuming[_-]http|--assume[-_]http)
|
|
ASSUME_HTTP=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--sneaky)
|
|
SNEAKY=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--user-agent|--user-agent=*)
|
|
UA_STD="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
-q|--quiet)
|
|
QUIET=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--file|--file=*|-iL|-iL=*)
|
|
# no shift here as otherwise URI is empty and it bails out
|
|
FNAME="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
IKNOW_FNAME=true
|
|
WARNINGS="batch" # set this implicitly!
|
|
do_mass_testing=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--mode|--mode=*)
|
|
MASS_TESTING_MODE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case "$MASS_TESTING_MODE" in
|
|
serial|parallel) ;;
|
|
*) tmln_magenta "\nmass testing mode can be either \"serial\" or \"parallel\"" 1>&2
|
|
help 1
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--serial)
|
|
MASS_TESTING_MODE=serial
|
|
;;
|
|
--parallel)
|
|
MASS_TESTING_MODE=parallel
|
|
;;
|
|
--warnings|--warnings=*)
|
|
WARNINGS=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case "$WARNINGS" in
|
|
batch|off) ;;
|
|
*) tmln_magenta "\nwarnings can be either \"batch\", or \"off\"" 1>&2
|
|
help 1
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--show[-_]each)
|
|
SHOW_EACH_C=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--fast)
|
|
FAST=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--bugs)
|
|
BUGS="-bugs"
|
|
;;
|
|
--debug|--debug=*)
|
|
DEBUG=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case $DEBUG in
|
|
[0-6]) ;;
|
|
*) tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized debug value \"$1\", must be between 0..6" 1>&2
|
|
help 1
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--color|--color=*)
|
|
COLOR="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case $COLOR in
|
|
[0-3]) ;;
|
|
*) COLOR=2
|
|
tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized color: \"$1\", must be between 0..3" 1>&2
|
|
help 1
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--colorblind)
|
|
COLORBLIND=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--log|--logging)
|
|
"$do_logging" && fatal "two --log* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;; # DEFINITION of LOGFILE if no arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port()
|
|
# following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location
|
|
--logfile|--logfile=*|-oL|-oL=*)
|
|
"$do_logging" && fatal "two --log* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
LOGFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--logfile-parent|--logfile-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_LOGFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--json)
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && fatal "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_json" && fatal "--json and --jsonfile are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
if [[ "$2" =~ \.(json|JSON)$ ]]; then
|
|
fatal "No file name allowed after \"--json\" (use \"--jsonfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
do_json=true
|
|
;; # DEFINITION of JSONFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port()
|
|
# following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location
|
|
--jsonfile|--jsonfile=*|-oj|-oj=*)
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && fatal "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_json" && fatal "--json and --jsonfile are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--jsonfile-parent|--jsonfile-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--json-pretty)
|
|
"$do_json" && fatal "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && fatal "--json-pretty and --jsonfile-pretty are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
if [[ "$2" =~ \.(json|JSON)$ ]]; then
|
|
fatal "No file name allowed after \"--json\" (use \"--jsonfile-pretty\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
do_pretty_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--jsonfile-pretty|--jsonfile-pretty=*|-oJ|-oJ=*)
|
|
"$do_json" && fatal "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_pretty_json" && fatal "--json-pretty and --jsonfile-pretty are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_pretty_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--jsonfile-pretty-parent|--jsonfile-pretty-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_pretty_json=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--severity|--severity=*)
|
|
set_severity_level "$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--hints)
|
|
GIVE_HINTS=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--csv)
|
|
"$do_csv" && fatal "two --csv* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
if [[ "$2" =~ \.(csv|CSV)$ ]]; then
|
|
fatal "No file name allowed after \"--csv\" (use \"--csvfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
;; # DEFINITION of CSVFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port()
|
|
# following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location
|
|
--csvfile|--csvfile=*|-oC|-oC=*)
|
|
"$do_csv" && fatal "two --csv* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
CSVFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--csvfile-parent|--csvfile-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_CSVFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--html)
|
|
"$do_html" && fatal "two --html* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
if [[ "$2" =~ \.(htm|html|HTM|HTML)$ ]]; then
|
|
fatal "No file name allowed after \"--html\" (use \"--htmlfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
;; # DEFINITION of HTMLFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port()
|
|
# following does the same but additionally we can specify a file location
|
|
--htmlfile|--htmlfile=*|-oH|-oH=*)
|
|
"$do_html" && fatal "two --html* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
HTMLFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--htmlfile-parent|--htmlfile-parent=*)
|
|
if ! "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING"; then
|
|
tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
fi
|
|
PARENT_HTMLFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--outfile|--outfile=*|-oa|-oa=*)
|
|
( "$do_html" || "$do_json" || "$do_pretty_json" || "$do_csv" || "$do_logging" ) && fatal "check your arguments four multiple file output options" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
if [[ "$outfile_arg" != "auto" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -d "$outfile_arg" ]]; then
|
|
HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
CSVFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
JSONFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
LOGFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
else
|
|
HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg.html"
|
|
CSVFILE="$outfile_arg.csv"
|
|
JSONFILE="$outfile_arg.json"
|
|
LOGFILE="$outfile_arg.log"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
do_json=true
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--outFile|--outFile=*|-oA|-oA=*)
|
|
( "$do_html" || "$do_json" || "$do_pretty_json" || "$do_csv" || "$do_logging" ) && fatal "check your arguments four multiple file output options" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
if [[ "$outfile_arg" != "auto" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -d "$outfile_arg" ]]; then
|
|
HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
CSVFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
JSONFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
LOGFILE="$outfile_arg"
|
|
else
|
|
HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg.html"
|
|
CSVFILE="$outfile_arg.csv"
|
|
JSONFILE="$outfile_arg.json"
|
|
LOGFILE="$outfile_arg.log"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
do_html=true
|
|
do_pretty_json=true
|
|
do_csv=true
|
|
do_logging=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--overwrite)
|
|
"$APPEND" && fatal "using --overwrite and --append is contradicting" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
OVERWRITE=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--append)
|
|
"$OVERWRITE" && fatal "using --append and --overwrite is contradicting" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
APPEND=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--outprefix)
|
|
FNAME_PREFIX="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
shift
|
|
case "$(get_last_char "$FNAME_PREFIX")" in
|
|
'.') ;;
|
|
'-') ;;
|
|
'_') ;;
|
|
*) FNAME_PREFIX="${FNAME_PREFIX}-" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
--openssl|--openssl=*)
|
|
OPENSSL="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--openssl-timeout|--openssl-timeout=*)
|
|
OPENSSL_TIMEOUT="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--connect-timeout|--connect-timeout=*)
|
|
CONNECT_TIMEOUT="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--mapping|--mapping=*)
|
|
cipher_mapping="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
case "$cipher_mapping" in
|
|
no-openssl) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="rfc-only" ;;
|
|
no-rfc|no-iana) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl-only" ;;
|
|
openssl) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl" ;;
|
|
rfc|iana) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="rfc" ;;
|
|
*) tmln_warning "\nmapping can only be \"no-openssl\", \"no-iana\"(\"no-rfc\"), \"openssl\" or \"iana\"(\"rfc\")" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1 ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
--proxy|--proxy=*)
|
|
PROXY="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--phone-out)
|
|
PHONE_OUT=true
|
|
;;
|
|
-6) # doesn't work automagically. My versions have -DOPENSSL_USE_IPV6, CentOS/RHEL/FC do not
|
|
HAS_IPv6=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--has[-_]dhbits|--has[_-]dh[-_]bits)
|
|
# Should work automagically. Helper switch for CentOS,RHEL+FC w openssl server temp key backport (version 1.0.1), see #190
|
|
HAS_DH_BITS=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--ssl_native|--ssl-native)
|
|
SSL_NATIVE=true
|
|
;;
|
|
--basicauth|--basicauth=*)
|
|
BASICAUTH="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
;;
|
|
--reqheader|--reqheader=*)
|
|
REQHEADER="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")"
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift
|
|
REQHEADERS+=("$REQHEADER")
|
|
;;
|
|
(--) shift
|
|
break
|
|
;;
|
|
(-*) tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2;
|
|
help 1
|
|
;;
|
|
(*) break
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
shift
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Show usage if no further options were specified
|
|
if [[ -z "$1" ]] && [[ -z "$FNAME" ]] && ! "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
fatal "URI missing" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
else
|
|
# What is left here should be the URI.
|
|
URI="$1"
|
|
[[ -n "$2" ]] && fatal "URI comes last" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Now spot some incompatibilities in cmdlines
|
|
[[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]] && [[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && fatal "\"--ip=one\" and \"--nodns=none\" don't work together" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
[[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]] && ( is_ipv4addr "$URI" || is_ipv6addr "$URI" ) && fatal "\"--ip=one\" plus supplying an IP address doesn't work" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
"$do_mx_all_ips" && [[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && fatal "\"--mx\" and \"--nodns=none\" don't work together" $ERR_CMDLINE
|
|
|
|
if [[ -d $ADDTL_CA_FILES ]]; then
|
|
ADDTL_CA_FILES="$ADDTL_CA_FILES/*.pem"
|
|
else
|
|
ADDTL_CA_FILES="${ADDTL_CA_FILES//,/ }"
|
|
fi
|
|
for fname in $ADDTL_CA_FILES; do
|
|
[[ -s "$fname" ]] || fatal "CA file \"$fname\" does not exist" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
grep -q "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" "$fname" || fatal "\"$fname\" is not CA file in PEM format" $ERR_RESOURCE
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if "$do_starttls_injection" && [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ smtp ]]; then
|
|
((VULN_COUNT++))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
count_do_variables
|
|
[[ $? -eq 0 ]] && set_scanning_defaults
|
|
set_skip_tests
|
|
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && debug_globals
|
|
|
|
# Unless explicit disabled, check if rating can be enabled
|
|
# Should be called after set_scanning_defaults
|
|
! "$do_rating" && set_rating_state
|
|
|
|
CMDLINE_PARSED=true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# connect call from openssl needs ipv6 in square brackets
|
|
nodeip_to_proper_ip6() {
|
|
local len_nodeip=0
|
|
|
|
if is_ipv6addr $NODEIP; then
|
|
${UNBRACKTD_IPV6} || NODEIP="[$NODEIP]"
|
|
len_nodeip=${#NODEIP}
|
|
CORRECT_SPACES="$(printf -- " "'%.s' $(eval "echo {1.."$((len_nodeip - 17))"}"))"
|
|
# IPv6 addresses are longer, this variable takes care that "further IP" and "Service" is properly aligned
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
reset_hostdepended_vars() {
|
|
NR_SOCKET_FAIL=0
|
|
NR_OSSL_FAIL=0
|
|
NR_STARTTLS_FAIL=0
|
|
NR_HEADER_FAIL=0
|
|
TLS_EXTENSIONS=""
|
|
PROTOS_OFFERED=""
|
|
TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED=""
|
|
CURVES_OFFERED=""
|
|
KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=false
|
|
TLS13_ONLY=false
|
|
CLIENT_AUTH="none"
|
|
NO_SSL_SESSIONID=true
|
|
DH_GROUP_OFFERED=""
|
|
DH_GROUP_LEN_P=0
|
|
KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33"
|
|
BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER=false
|
|
GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=false
|
|
OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO=""
|
|
ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS=true
|
|
SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false
|
|
SERVICE=""
|
|
CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2=""
|
|
RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2=""
|
|
TLS_TIME=""
|
|
GRADE_CAP=""
|
|
GRADE_CAP_REASONS=()
|
|
GRADE_WARNINGS=()
|
|
KEY_EXCH_SCORE=100
|
|
CIPH_STR_BEST=0
|
|
CIPH_STR_WORST=100000
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Rough estimate, in the future we maybe want to make use of nano secs (%N). Note this
|
|
# is for performance debugging purposes (MEASURE_TIME=yes), eye candy is not important.
|
|
#
|
|
stopwatch() {
|
|
local new_delta
|
|
local column=$((COLUMNS - 0)) # for future adjustments
|
|
|
|
"$MEASURE_TIME" || return
|
|
new_delta=$(( $(date +%s) - LAST_TIME ))
|
|
printf "%${column}s" "$1: $new_delta"
|
|
[[ -e "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && echo "$1 : $new_delta " >> "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE"
|
|
LAST_TIME=$(( new_delta + LAST_TIME ))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# arg1(optional): "init" --> just initializing. Or: STARTTLS protocol
|
|
lets_roll() {
|
|
local -i ret=0
|
|
local section_number=0
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$1" == init ]]; then
|
|
# called once upfront to be able to measure preparation time b4 everything starts
|
|
START_TIME=$(date +%s)
|
|
LAST_TIME=$START_TIME
|
|
[[ -n "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && >"$MEASURE_TIME_FILE"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
stopwatch initialized
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$NODEIP" ]] && fatal "$NODE doesn't resolve to an IP address" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
nodeip_to_proper_ip6
|
|
reset_hostdepended_vars
|
|
determine_rdns # Returns always zero or has already exited if fatal error occurred
|
|
stopwatch determine_rdns
|
|
|
|
((SERVER_COUNTER++))
|
|
datebanner " Start"
|
|
determine_service "$1" # STARTTLS service? Other will be determined here too. Returns 0 if test connect was ok or has already exited if fatal error occurred
|
|
# determine_service() can return 1, it indicates that this IP cannot be reached but there are more IPs to check
|
|
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] ; then
|
|
# "secret" devel options --devel:
|
|
if "$do_tls_sockets"; then
|
|
if [[ "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" == 22 ]]; then
|
|
sslv2_sockets "" "true"
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" == 04 ]]; then
|
|
if "$CERT_COMPRESSION"; then
|
|
# See PR #1279
|
|
[[ $DEBUG -eq 3 ]] && tmln_out "including TLS extension certificate compression"
|
|
tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "all+" "00,1b, 00,03, 02, 00,01"
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "ephemeralkey"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "all"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
echo $?
|
|
exit $ALLOK;
|
|
fi
|
|
if "$do_cipher_match"; then
|
|
# we will have an invalid JSON with no if statement
|
|
((section_number++))
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number false
|
|
run_cipher_match ${single_cipher}
|
|
stopwatch run_cipher_match
|
|
else
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number false && ((section_number++))
|
|
determine_sizelimitbug
|
|
fileout_section_footer false
|
|
|
|
((section_number++))
|
|
# all top level functions now following have the prefix "run_"
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number false && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_protocols" && {
|
|
run_protocols; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_protocols;
|
|
run_npn; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_npn;
|
|
run_alpn; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_alpn;
|
|
}
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_grease" && { run_grease; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_grease; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_cipherlists" && { run_cipherlists; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_cipherlists; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_server_preference" && { run_server_preference; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_server_preference; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_fs" && { run_fs; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_fs; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_server_defaults" && { run_server_defaults; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_server_defaults; }
|
|
|
|
if "$do_header"; then
|
|
#TODO: refactor this into functions
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]]; then
|
|
run_http_header "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_http_date "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_hsts "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_hpkp "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_server_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_appl_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_cookie_flags "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_security_headers "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
run_rp_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret))
|
|
stopwatch do_header
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
((section_number++))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# vulnerabilities
|
|
if [[ $VULN_COUNT -gt $VULN_THRESHLD ]] || "$do_vulnerabilities"; then
|
|
outln; pr_headlineln " Testing vulnerabilities "
|
|
outln
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
|
|
"$do_heartbleed" && { run_heartbleed; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_heartbleed; }
|
|
"$do_ccs_injection" && { run_ccs_injection; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ccs_injection; }
|
|
"$do_ticketbleed" && { run_ticketbleed; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ticketbleed; }
|
|
"$do_robot" && { run_robot; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_robot; }
|
|
"$do_renego" && { run_renego; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_renego; }
|
|
"$do_crime" && { run_crime; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_crime; }
|
|
"$do_breach" && { run_breach "$URL_PATH" ; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_breach; }
|
|
"$do_ssl_poodle" && { run_ssl_poodle; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ssl_poodle; }
|
|
"$do_tls_fallback_scsv" && { run_tls_fallback_scsv; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_tls_fallback_scsv; }
|
|
"$do_sweet32" && { run_sweet32; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_sweet32; }
|
|
"$do_freak" && { run_freak; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_freak; }
|
|
"$do_drown" && { run_drown ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_drown; }
|
|
"$do_logjam" && { run_logjam; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_logjam; }
|
|
"$do_beast" && { run_beast; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_beast; }
|
|
"$do_lucky13" && { run_lucky13; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_lucky13; }
|
|
"$do_winshock" && { run_winshock; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_winshock; }
|
|
"$do_rc4" && { run_rc4; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_rc4; }
|
|
"$do_starttls_injection" && { run_starttls_injection; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_starttls_injection; }
|
|
outln
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_allciphers" && { run_allciphers; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_allciphers; }
|
|
"$do_cipher_per_proto" && { run_cipher_per_proto; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_cipher_per_proto; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_client_simulation" && { run_client_simulation; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_client_simulation; }
|
|
|
|
fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++))
|
|
"$do_rating" && { run_rating; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_rating; }
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout_section_footer true
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
outln
|
|
calc_scantime
|
|
datebanner " Done"
|
|
|
|
"$MEASURE_TIME" && printf "$1: %${COLUMNS}s\n" "$SCAN_TIME"
|
|
[[ -e "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && echo "Total : $SCAN_TIME " >> "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE"
|
|
|
|
return $ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
################# main #################
|
|
|
|
|
|
RET=0 # this is a global as we can have a function main(), see #705. Should we toss then all local $ret?
|
|
ip=""
|
|
stopwatch start
|
|
|
|
lets_roll init
|
|
initialize_globals
|
|
check_base_requirements # needs to come after $do_html is defined
|
|
parse_cmd_line "$@"
|
|
# CMDLINE_PARSED has been set now. Don't put a function immediately after this which calls fatal().
|
|
# Rather put it after csv_header below.
|
|
# html_header() needs to be called early! Otherwise if html_out() is called before html_header() and the
|
|
# command line contains --htmlfile <htmlfile> or --html, it'll make problems with html output, see #692.
|
|
# json_header and csv_header could be called later but for context reasons we'll leave it here
|
|
html_header
|
|
json_header
|
|
csv_header
|
|
get_install_dir
|
|
# see #705, we need to source TLS_DATA_FILE here instead of in get_install_dir(), see #705
|
|
[[ -r "$TLS_DATA_FILE" ]] && . "$TLS_DATA_FILE"
|
|
set_color_functions
|
|
maketempf
|
|
find_openssl_binary
|
|
find_socat
|
|
choose_printf
|
|
check_resolver_bins
|
|
prepare_debug ; stopwatch parse
|
|
prepare_arrays ; stopwatch prepare_arrays
|
|
mybanner
|
|
check_proxy
|
|
check4openssl_oldfarts
|
|
check_bsd_mount
|
|
setup_lc_collate
|
|
|
|
if "$do_display_only"; then
|
|
prettyprint_local "$PATTERN2SHOW"
|
|
exit $?
|
|
fi
|
|
fileout_banner
|
|
|
|
if "$do_mass_testing"; then
|
|
prepare_logging
|
|
if [[ "$MASS_TESTING_MODE" == parallel ]]; then
|
|
run_mass_testing_parallel
|
|
else
|
|
run_mass_testing
|
|
fi
|
|
exit $?
|
|
fi
|
|
html_banner
|
|
|
|
#TODO: there shouldn't be the need for a special case for --mx, only the ip addresses we would need upfront and the do-parser
|
|
if "$do_mx_all_ips"; then
|
|
#FIXME: do we need this really here?
|
|
count_do_variables # if we have just 1x "do_*" --> we do a standard run -- otherwise just the one specified
|
|
[[ $? -eq 1 ]] && set_scanning_defaults
|
|
run_mx_all_ips "${URI}" $PORT # we should reduce run_mx_all_ips to what's necessary as below we have similar code
|
|
exit $?
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}" # NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDRs and IP46ADDR is set now
|
|
prepare_logging
|
|
|
|
if ! determine_ip_addresses; then
|
|
fatal "No IP address could be determined" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $(count_words "$IPADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then # we have more than one ipv4 address to check
|
|
MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true
|
|
pr_bold "Testing all IPv4 addresses (port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs"
|
|
for ip in $IPADDRs; do
|
|
draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3))
|
|
outln
|
|
NODEIP="$ip"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
RET=$((RET + $?)) # RET value per IP address
|
|
done
|
|
draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3))
|
|
outln
|
|
pr_bold "Done testing now all IP addresses (on port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs"
|
|
else # Just 1x ip4v to check, applies also if CMDLINE_IP was supplied
|
|
NODEIP="$IPADDRs"
|
|
lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}"
|
|
RET=$?
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
exit $RET
|