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@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ F-Droid requires that the source code of the app is exempt from any proprietary
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*A tempting idea would be to compare F-Droid to the desktop Linux model where users trust their distribution maintainers out-of-the-box (this can be sane if you're already trusting the OS anyway), but the desktop platform is intrinsically chaotic and heterogeneous for better and for worse. It really shouldn't be compared to the Android platform in any way.*
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While we'ven seen that F-Droid controls the signing servers (much like Play App Signing), F-Droid also fully controls the build servers that run the disposable VMs used for building apps. And [as of July 2022](https://gitlab.com/groups/fdroid/-/milestones/5#tab-issues), their guest VM image officially runs a version of Debian which reached EOL. Undoubtedly, this raises questions about their whole infrastructure security.
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> How can you be sure that the app repository can be held to account for the code it delivers?
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F-Droid's answer, interesting yet largely unused, is [build reproducibility](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/). While deterministic builds are a neat idea in theory, it requires the developer to make their toolchain match with what F-Droid provides. It's additional work on both ends sometimes resulting in [apps severely lagging behind in updates](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/issues/1612), so reproducible builds are not as common as we would have wanted. It should be noted that reproducible builds in the main repository can be exclusively developer-signed.
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@ -50,11 +52,11 @@ Huawei AppGallery seems to have a [similar approach](https://developer.huawei.co
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## 2. Slow and irregular updates
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Since you're adding one more party to the mix, that party is now responsible for delivering proper builds of the app: it's a common thing among traditional Linux distributions and their packaging system. They have to catch up with *upstream* on a regular basis, but very few do it well (Arch Linux comes to my mind). Others, like Debian, prefer making extensive *downstream* changes and delivering security fixes for a subset of vulnerabilities assigned to a CVE (yeah, it's as bad as it sounds, but that's another topic).
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Not only does F-Droid require specific changes for the app to comply with its inclusion policy, which often leads to more maintenance work, it also has a rather strange way of triggering new builds. Part of its build process seems to be [automated](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/FAQ_-_App_Developers/), which is the least you could expect. Now here's the thing: app signing keys are on an **air-gapped system** (meaning it's disconnected from any network), which forces an irregular update cycle where a human has to manually trigger the signing process. It is far from an ideal situation, and you may argue it's the least to be expected since by entrusting all the signing keys to one party, you could also introduce a single point of failure. Should their system be compromised, it could lead to serious security issues affecting plenty of users.
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Not only does F-Droid require specific changes for the app to comply with its inclusion policy, which often leads to more maintenance work, it also has a rather strange way of triggering new builds. Part of its build process seems to be [automated](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/FAQ_-_App_Developers/), which is the least you could expect. Now here's the thing: app signing keys are on an **air-gapped server** (meaning it's disconnected from any network, at least that's what they claim: see [their recommendations](https://f-droid.org/docs/Building_a_Signing_Server/) for reference), which forces an irregular update cycle where a human has to manually trigger the signing process. It is far from an ideal situation, and you may argue it's the least to be expected since by entrusting all the signing keys to one party, you could also introduce a single point of failure. Should their system be compromised (whether from the inside or the outside), this could lead to serious security issues affecting plenty of users.
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*This is one of the main reasons why Signal refused to support the inclusion of a third-party build in the F-Droid official repository. While [this GitHub issue](https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/127) is quite old, many points still hold true today.*
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Considering all this, and the fact that their build process is often broken using outdated tools (and [as of July 2022](https://gitlab.com/groups/fdroid/-/milestones/5#tab-issues), their guest VM officially runs a version of Debian which reached EOL), you have to expect **far slower updates** compared to a traditional distribution system. Slow updates mean that you will be exposed to security vulnerabilities more often than you should've been. It would be unwise to have a full browser updated through the F-Droid official repository, for instance. F-Droid third-party repositories somewhat mitigate the issue of slow updates since they can be managed directly by the developer. It isn't ideal either as you will see below.
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Considering all this, and the fact that their build process is often broken using outdated tools, you have to expect **far slower updates** compared to a traditional distribution system. Slow updates mean that you will be exposed to security vulnerabilities more often than you should've been. It would be unwise to have a full browser updated through the F-Droid official repository, for instance. F-Droid third-party repositories somewhat mitigate the issue of slow updates since they can be managed directly by the developer. It isn't ideal either as you will see below.
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## 3. Low target API level (SDK) for client & apps
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SDK stands for *Software Development Kit* and is the collection of software to build apps for a given platform. On Android, a higher SDK level means you'll be able to make use of modern API levels of which each iteration brings **security and privacy improvements**. For instance, API level 31 makes use of all these improvements on Android 12.
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