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@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ F-Droid also has a problem regarding the adoption of **[new signature schemes](h
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It is worth mentioning that their website has (for some reason) always been hosting an [outdated APK of F-Droid](https://forum.f-droid.org/t/why-does-the-f-droid-website-nearly-always-host-an-outdated-f-droid-apk/6234), and this is still the case today, leading to many users wondering why they can't install F-Droid on their secondary user profile (due to the downgrade prevention enforced by Android). "Stability" seems to be the main reason mentioned on their part, which doesn't make sense: either your version isn't ready to be published in a stable channel, or it is and new users should be able to access it easily.
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It is worth mentioning that their website has (for some reason) always been hosting an [outdated APK of F-Droid](https://forum.f-droid.org/t/why-does-the-f-droid-website-nearly-always-host-an-outdated-f-droid-apk/6234), and this is still the case today, leading to many users wondering why they can't install F-Droid on their secondary user profile (due to the downgrade prevention enforced by Android). "Stability" seems to be the main reason mentioned on their part, which doesn't make sense: either your version isn't ready to be published in a stable channel, or it is and new users should be able to access it easily.
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F-Droid should enforce the approach of prefixing the package name of their alternate builds with `org.f-droid` for instance (or add a `.fdroid` suffix as some already have). Building and signing while **reusing the package name/ID** is bad practice as it causes **signature verification errors** when some users try to update/install these apps from other sources, even directly from the developer. That is again due to the security model of Android which enforces a signature check when installing app updates (or installing them again in a secondary user profile). Note that this going to be an issue with Play App Signing as well, and developers are encouraged to follow this approach should they intend to distribute their apps through different distribution channels.
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F-Droid should enforce the approach of prefixing the package name of their alternate builds with `org.f-droid` for instance (or add a `.fdroid` suffix as some already have). Building and signing while **reusing the package name/ID** is bad practice as it causes **signature verification errors** when some users try to update/install these apps from other sources, even directly from the developer. That is again due to the security model of Android which enforces a signature check when installing app updates (or installing them again in a secondary user profile). Note that this is going to be an issue with Play App Signing as well, and developers are encouraged to follow this approach should they intend to distribute their apps through different distribution channels.
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## 5. Misleading permissions approach
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## 5. Misleading permissions approach
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F-Droid shows a list of the [low-level permissions](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission) for each app: these low-level permissions are usually grouped in the standard high-level permissions (Location, Microphone, Camera, etc.) and special toggles (nearby Wi-Fi networks, Bluetooth devices, etc.) that are explicitly based on a type of sensitive data. While showing a list of low-level permissions could be useful information for a developer, it's often a **misleading** and inaccurate approach for the end-user. Apps have to [request the standard permissions at runtime](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview#runtime) and do not get them simply by being installed, so knowing all the "under the hood" permissions is not useful and makes the permission model unnecessarily confusing.
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F-Droid shows a list of the [low-level permissions](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission) for each app: these low-level permissions are usually grouped in the standard high-level permissions (Location, Microphone, Camera, etc.) and special toggles (nearby Wi-Fi networks, Bluetooth devices, etc.) that are explicitly based on a type of sensitive data. While showing a list of low-level permissions could be useful information for a developer, it's often a **misleading** and inaccurate approach for the end-user. Apps have to [request the standard permissions at runtime](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview#runtime) and do not get them simply by being installed, so knowing all the "under the hood" permissions is not useful and makes the permission model unnecessarily confusing.
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