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add F-Droid privext information

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Wonderfall 2022-07-24 05:49:02 +02:00
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@ -96,7 +96,9 @@ At the time of writing:
*Overall statistics do not reflect real-world usage of a given app (people using old devices are not necessarily using your app). If anything, it should be viewed as an underestimation.*
## 4. General lack of good practices
The F-Droid client allows multiple repositories to coexist within the same app. Many of the issues highlighted above were focused on the main official repository which most of the F-Droid users will use anyway. However, having **other repositories in a single app also violates the security model of Android** which was not designed for this at all. The OS expects you to trust **an app repository as a single source** of apps, yet F-Droid isn't that by design as it mixes several repositories in one single app. This is important because the OS management APIs and features (such as [UserManager](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/UserManager)) are not meant for this and see F-Droid as a single source, so you're trusting the app client to not mess up far more than you should, especially when the privileged extension comes into the picture. This is also a problem with the OS first-party source feature.
The F-Droid client allows multiple repositories to coexist within the same app. Many of the issues highlighted above were focused on the main official repository which most of the F-Droid users will use anyway. However, having **other repositories in a single app also violates the security model of Android** which was not designed for this at all. The OS expects you to trust **an app repository as a single source** of apps, yet F-Droid isn't that by design as it mixes several repositories in one single app. This is important because the OS management APIs and features (such as [UserManager](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/UserManager) which can be used to prevent a user from installing third-party apps) are not meant for this and see F-Droid as a single source, so you're trusting the app client to not mess up far more than you should, especially when the **privileged extension** comes into the picture.
There is indeed a serious security issue with the OS first-party source feature being misused, as the privileged extension makes use of the `INSTALL_PACKAGES` [API](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#INSTALL_PACKAGES) in an insecure manner (i.e. not implementing it with the appropriate security checks). The privileged extension accepts any request from F-Droid, which again suffers from various bugs and security issues and allows user-defined repositories by design. A lot can go wrong, and bypassing security checks for powerful APIs should definitely not be taken lightly.
On that note, it is also worth noting the repository metadata format isn't properly signed by lacking whole-file signing and key rotation. [Their index v1](https://f-droid.org/2021/02/05/apis-for-all-the-things.html#the-repo-index) format [uses JAR signing](https://gitlab.com/fdroid/fdroidserver/-/blob/3182b77d180b2313f4fdb101af96c035380abfd7/fdroidserver/signindex.py) with `jarsigner`, which has serious security flaws. It seems that [work is in progress on a v2 format](https://gitlab.com/fdroid/fdroidserver/-/commit/3182b77d180b2313f4fdb101af96c035380abfd7) with support for `apksigner`, although the final implementation remains to be seen. This just seems to be an over-engineered and flawed approach since better suited tools such as `signify` could be used to sign the metadata JSON.