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mention code transparency

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Wonderfall 2022-01-07 20:31:37 +01:00
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Unlike other repositories, F-Droid signs all the apps in the main repository wit
Normally, the developer is supposed to sign their own app prior to its upload on a distribution channel, whether that is a website or a traditional repository (or both). You don't have to trust the source (usually recommended by the developer) except for the first installation: future updates will have their authenticity cryptographically guaranteed. The issue with F-Droid is that all apps are signed by the same party (F-Droid) which is also not the developer. You're now adding another party you'll have to trust since you still have to trust the developer, which isn't ideal: **the fewer parties, the better**. Normally, the developer is supposed to sign their own app prior to its upload on a distribution channel, whether that is a website or a traditional repository (or both). You don't have to trust the source (usually recommended by the developer) except for the first installation: future updates will have their authenticity cryptographically guaranteed. The issue with F-Droid is that all apps are signed by the same party (F-Droid) which is also not the developer. You're now adding another party you'll have to trust since you still have to trust the developer, which isn't ideal: **the fewer parties, the better**.
On the other hand, Play Store now manages the app signing keys too, as [Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#app-signing-google-play) is required for app bundles which are required for new apps since August 2021. These signing keys can be uploaded or automatically generated, and are securely stored by [Google Cloud Key Management Service](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/security_whitepapers_march2018.pdf). It should be noted that the developer still has to sign the app with **an upload key** so that Google can verify its authenticity before signing it with the app signing key. For apps created before August 2021 that may have [not opted in Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#opt-out) yet, the developer still manages the private key and is responsible for its security, as a compromised private key can allow a third party to sign and distribute malicious code. On the other hand, Play Store now manages the app signing keys too, as [Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#app-signing-google-play) is required for app bundles which are required for new apps since August 2021. These signing keys can be uploaded or automatically generated, and are securely stored by [Google Cloud Key Management Service](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/security_whitepapers_march2018.pdf). It should be noted that the developer still has to sign the app with **an upload key** so that Google can verify its authenticity before signing it with the app signing key. For apps created before August 2021 that may have [not opted in Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#opt-out) yet, the developer still manages the private key and is responsible for its security, as a compromised private key can allow a third party to sign and distribute malicious code. Additionally, Google is pushing [code transparency for app bundles](https://developer.android.com/guide/app-bundle/code-transparency).
F-Droid also requires that the source code of the app is exempt from any proprietary library or ad service, according to their [inclusion policy](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Inclusion_Policy/). Usually, that means that some developers will have to maintain a slightly different version of their codebase that should comply with F-Droid's requirements. Besides, their "quality control" offers **close to no guarantees** as having access to the source code doesn't mean it can be easily proofread. Saying Play Store is filled with malicious apps is beyond the point: the **false sense of security** is a real issue. Users should not think of the F-Droid main repository as free of malicious apps, yet unfortunately many are inclined to believe this. F-Droid also requires that the source code of the app is exempt from any proprietary library or ad service, according to their [inclusion policy](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Inclusion_Policy/). Usually, that means that some developers will have to maintain a slightly different version of their codebase that should comply with F-Droid's requirements. Besides, their "quality control" offers **close to no guarantees** as having access to the source code doesn't mean it can be easily proofread. Saying Play Store is filled with malicious apps is beyond the point: the **false sense of security** is a real issue. Users should not think of the F-Droid main repository as free of malicious apps, yet unfortunately many are inclined to believe this.