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@ -85,6 +85,12 @@ Furthermore, F-Droid **doesn't enforce a minimum target SDK** for the official r
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While it may seem bothersome, it's a necessity to keep the **app ecosystem modern and healthy**. Here, F-Droid sends the wrong message to developers (and even users) because they should care about it, and this is why many of us think it may be even harmful to the FOSS ecosystem. Backward compatibility is often the enemy of security, and while there's a middle-ground for convenience and obsolescence, it shouldn't be exaggerated. As a result of this philosophy, the main repository of F-Droid is filled with obsolete apps from another era, just for these apps to be able to run on the more than ten years old Android 4.0 Ice Cream Sandwich. Let's not make the same mistake as the desktop platforms: instead, complain to your vendors for selling devices with no decent OS/firmware support.
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While it may seem bothersome, it's a necessity to keep the **app ecosystem modern and healthy**. Here, F-Droid sends the wrong message to developers (and even users) because they should care about it, and this is why many of us think it may be even harmful to the FOSS ecosystem. Backward compatibility is often the enemy of security, and while there's a middle-ground for convenience and obsolescence, it shouldn't be exaggerated. As a result of this philosophy, the main repository of F-Droid is filled with obsolete apps from another era, just for these apps to be able to run on the more than ten years old Android 4.0 Ice Cream Sandwich. Let's not make the same mistake as the desktop platforms: instead, complain to your vendors for selling devices with no decent OS/firmware support.
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There is little practical reason for developers not to increase the target SDK version (`targetSdkVersion`) along with each Android release. This attribute matches the version of the platform an app is targeting, and allows access to modern improvements, rules and features on a modern OS. The app can still ensure backwards compatibility in such a way that it can run on older platforms: the `minSdkversion` attribute informs the system about the minimum API level required for the application to run.
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At the time of writing:
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- Android 9 is the oldest Android version that is [getting security updates](https://endoflife.date/android).
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- ~80% of the Android devices used in the world are **at least** running 8.0 Oreo ([Android Studio](https://developer.android.com/about/dashboards)).
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## 4. General lack of good practices
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## 4. General lack of good practices
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The F-Droid client allows multiple repositories to coexist within the same app. Many of the issues highlighted above were focused on the main official repository which most of the F-Droid users will use anyway. However, having **other repositories in a single app also violates the security model of Android** which was not designed for this at all. The OS expects you to trust **an app repository as a single source** of apps, yet F-Droid isn't that by design as it mixes several repositories in one single app. This is important because the OS management APIs and features (such as [UserManager](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/UserManager)) are not meant for this and see F-Droid as a single source, so you're trusting the app client to not mess up far more than you should. It is also worth noting the repository metadata format isn't properly signed by lacking whole-file signing and key rotation.
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The F-Droid client allows multiple repositories to coexist within the same app. Many of the issues highlighted above were focused on the main official repository which most of the F-Droid users will use anyway. However, having **other repositories in a single app also violates the security model of Android** which was not designed for this at all. The OS expects you to trust **an app repository as a single source** of apps, yet F-Droid isn't that by design as it mixes several repositories in one single app. This is important because the OS management APIs and features (such as [UserManager](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/UserManager)) are not meant for this and see F-Droid as a single source, so you're trusting the app client to not mess up far more than you should. It is also worth noting the repository metadata format isn't properly signed by lacking whole-file signing and key rotation.
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@ -133,11 +139,13 @@ For example, the low-level permission `RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED` is referred to in
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> *Allows the app to have itself started as soon as the system has finished booting. This can make it take longer to start the phone and allow the app to slow down the overall phone by always running.*
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> *Allows the app to have itself started as soon as the system has finished booting. This can make it take longer to start the phone and allow the app to slow down the overall phone by always running.*
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In modern Android, the background restriction toggle is what really provides the ability for apps to run in the background. Some low-level permissions don't even have a security/privacy impact and shouldn't be misinterpreted as having one. Anyhow, you can be sure that each dangerous low-level permission has a **high-level representation** that is **disabled by default** and needs to be **granted dynamically** to the app.
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In modern Android, the background restriction toggle is what really provides the ability for apps to run in the background. Some low-level permissions don't even have a security/privacy impact and shouldn't be misinterpreted as having one. Anyhow, you can be sure that each dangerous low-level permission has a **high-level representation** that is **disabled by default** and needs to be **granted dynamically** to the app (by a toggle or user consent in general).
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Another example would be the `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` low-level permission, which is referred to as the *query all packages* permission that "allows an app to see all installed packages". While this is somewhat correct, this can also be misleading: apps do not need `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` to list other apps within the same user profile. Even without this permission, some apps are visible automatically (visibility is restricted by default [since Android 11](https://developer.android.com/training/package-visibility)). If an app needs more visibility, it will declare a `<queries>` element in its manifest file: in other words, `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` is only one way to achieve visibility. Again, this goes to show low-level manifest permissions are not intended to be interpreted as high-level permissions the user should fully comprehend.
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Play Store for instance conveys the permissions in a way less misleading way: the main low-level permissions are first grouped in their high-level user-facing toggles, and the rest is shown under "Other". This permission list can only be accessed by taping "About this app" then "App permissions - See more" at the bottom of the page. Play Store will tell the app may request access to the following permissions: this kind of wording is more important than it seems.
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Play Store for instance conveys the permissions in a way less misleading way: the main low-level permissions are first grouped in their high-level user-facing toggles, and the rest is shown under "Other". This permission list can only be accessed by taping "About this app" then "App permissions - See more" at the bottom of the page. Play Store will tell the app may request access to the following permissions: this kind of wording is more important than it seems.
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Moreover, [Play Store restricts the use of highly invasive permissions](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9888170) such as `MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` which allows apps to opt out of scoped storage if they can't work with more privacy friendly approaches (like a file explorer). Apps that can't justify their use of this permission (which again has to be granted dynamically) may be removed from Play Store. This is where an app repository can actually be useful in their review process to protect end-users from installing poorly made apps that might compromise their privacy. Not that it matters much if these apps target very old API levels that are inclined to require invasive permissions in the first place...
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Moreover, [Play Store restricts the use of highly invasive permissions](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9888170) such as `MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` which allows apps to opt out of scoped storage if they can't work with [more privacy friendly approaches](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/providers/document-provider) (like a file explorer). Apps that can't justify their use of this permission (which again has to be granted dynamically) may be removed from Play Store. This is where an app repository can actually be useful in their review process to protect end-users from installing poorly made apps that might compromise their privacy. Not that it matters much if these apps target very old API levels that are inclined to require invasive permissions in the first place...
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## Conclusion: what should you do?
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## Conclusion: what should you do?
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F-Droid **weakens the security model of Android substantially** for all of the reasons above. While they could easily make some improvements, I don't think F-Droid is in an ideal situation to solve all of these issues because some of them are **inherent flaws** in their architecture. I'd also argue that their core philosophy is not aligned with some security principles expressed in this article. In any case, I can only wish for them to improve since they're one of the most popular alternatives to commercial app repositories, and are therefore trusted by a large userbase.
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F-Droid **weakens the security model of Android substantially** for all of the reasons above. While they could easily make some improvements, I don't think F-Droid is in an ideal situation to solve all of these issues because some of them are **inherent flaws** in their architecture. I'd also argue that their core philosophy is not aligned with some security principles expressed in this article. In any case, I can only wish for them to improve since they're one of the most popular alternatives to commercial app repositories, and are therefore trusted by a large userbase.
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@ -174,7 +182,7 @@ No app should be unnecessarily entrusted with any kind of permission. It is only
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> Isn't Google evil? Isn't Play Store spyware?
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> Isn't Google evil? Isn't Play Store spyware?
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Some people tend to exaggerate the importance of Google in their threat model, at the cost of pragmatism and security/privacy good practices. Play Store isn't spyware and can run unprivileged like it does on GrapheneOS (including with unattended updates support). For instance, unprivileged apps have always had the ability to [query installed packages](https://developer.android.com/training/package-visibility) on a given user profile. On the vast majority of devices though, Google Play is a privileged app and a core part of the OS that provides low-level system modules. In that case, the trust issues involved with Play App Signing could be considered less important since Google Play is already trusted as a privileged component.
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Some people tend to exaggerate the importance of Google in their threat model, at the cost of pragmatism and security/privacy good practices. Play Store isn't spyware and can run unprivileged like it does on GrapheneOS (including with unattended updates support). On the vast majority of devices though, Google Play is a privileged app and a core part of the OS that provides low-level system modules. In that case, the trust issues involved with Play App Signing could be considered less important since Google Play is already trusted as a privileged component.
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**Play Store evidently has some privacy issues** given it's a proprietary service which requires an account (this cannot be circumvented), and Google services have a history of nagging users to enable privacy-invasive features. Again, some of these privacy issues can be mitigated by setting up the [Play services compatibility layer from GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) which runs Play services and Play Store in the regular app sandbox (the `untrusted_app` domain). This solution could very well be ported to other Android-based operating systems. If you want to go further, consider using a properly configured account with the least amount of personally indentifiable information possible (note that the phone number requirement appears to be region-dependent).
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**Play Store evidently has some privacy issues** given it's a proprietary service which requires an account (this cannot be circumvented), and Google services have a history of nagging users to enable privacy-invasive features. Again, some of these privacy issues can be mitigated by setting up the [Play services compatibility layer from GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) which runs Play services and Play Store in the regular app sandbox (the `untrusted_app` domain). This solution could very well be ported to other Android-based operating systems. If you want to go further, consider using a properly configured account with the least amount of personally indentifiable information possible (note that the phone number requirement appears to be region-dependent).
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