RFC 8996, Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1, states that TLS clients MUST NOT send a TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 ClientHello and MUST respond to a TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 ServerHello with a "protocol_version" alert.
At the moment, all versions of OpenSSL support TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2. However, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are disabled in LibreSSL 3.8.1 and it is possible to compile OpenSSL without support for these protocols (using the configure options no-tls1, no-tls1_1, and no-tls1_2). This commit adds support for versions of $OPENSSL that do not support TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1.
As suggested in #2381 this parses strictly the value for mag-age
in the HSTS header line. While it is implemented only in run_hsts()
it could be extracted to a separate functioni in the future and used
elsewhere too.
The improvement is more strict and catches e.g. '==' signs and issues
a warning. See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797#section-6.1.1 .
Also it is picky regarding quotes now which are only allowed enclosing
the value.
As this option shows inconsistencies / wrong results and a fix would require
too much work at this moment this option is being hidden from the help. It
wasn't in the ~/doc .
See #849 , #2382, #1732 etc.
If we run with supplied binary AND /usr/bin/openssl supports TLS 1.3
we now have a variable OPENSSL2_HAS_TLS_1_3 which is set to true.
It can be used for subsequent changes where we need TLS 1.3 for or
where it would be better to use TLS 1.3.
If downloaded CRL file is already in PEM format, openssl command will fail as it is always trying to convert from a DER-encoded CRL.
This commit is for adding a test of the CRL format prior to running the openssl crl conversion.
Note: as the openssl verify command then assumes that a .pem tmpfile has been generated by the conversion, there would be an issue when the conversion was not needed (i.e. CRL already PEM-encoded) as that .pem would be missing; therefore I also added a copy of the .crl file to a .crl.pem file before the optional conversion.
See #2328, original PR #2295 from @w4ntun .
Formally testssl.sh returned an error when it wasn't not possible to determine IP
addresses through DNS resolution, even if --proxy and --ip=proxy flags are set.
The main function always tried to determine IP addresses via DNS and exits with
a fatal error if it cannot do it. Although the client cannot get the IP, the
proxy could, so the SSL/TLS analysis is still possible.
This PR allows the analysis for an HTTP service via a proxy server and the DNS
traffic can be sent directly or through the proxy using the flag --ip=proxy.
ATTENTION: This may be a breaking change for those who don't have a local resolver.
They now have to add --ip=proxy.
In addition:
* help() was amended to add --ip=proxy (was only in the ~i/doc dir before)
* amending ~/doc dir to document it's better to add --nodns=min when there's
no local resolver
This addresses the bug #2330 by implementing a function which removes
control characters from the file output format html,csv,json at the
output.
In every instance called there's a check before whether the string
contains control chars, hoping it'll save a few milli seconds.
A tr function is used, omitting LF.
It doesn't filter the terminal output and the log file output.
see #2325.
"whenever HTTP/1.1 is used then the Accept header uses "text/*" as a MIME type.
This causes some minor issues with some of the checks we are doing"
As noted in #2304, the way that the '&' character is treated in the string part of a pattern substitution changed in Bash 5.2. As a result, the change that was made in #1481 to accommodate older versions of Bash (e.g., on MacOS) now causes testssl.sh to produce incorrect HTML output when run on Bash 5.2.
This commit encodes the '&' characters in the substitution strings in a way that produces correct results on multiple versions of Bash (3.2 on MacOS, 5.2 on Ubuntu 23.10, 5.0 on Ubuntu 20.04).
There are two different scenarios. x0C is the buffsize reply from openldap-like servers
whereas AD servers probably have x84 and return also the OID. The following is kind of
hackish as ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse() in apps/s_client.c of openssl is kind of hard
to understand. It was deducted from a number of hosts.
Bottom line: We'll look at the 9th byte or at the 17th when retrieving the result code
AD:
30 84 00 00 00 7d 02 01 01 78 84 00 00 00 74 0a 01 34 04 00 04 55 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 3a 20 [ failed AD .. LdapErr + OID..]
30 84 00 00 00 28 02 01 01 78 84 00 00 00 1F 0A 01 00 04 00 04 00 8A 16 [.. OID ..]
^^ bufflen ^^ resultcode
30 0C 02 01 01 78 07 0A 01 00 04 00 04 00
^^ bufflen ^^ result code
When a server supports client authentication, extract_calist() extracts the list of supported certification authorities sent by the server. extract_calist() uses different code to extract the list from a TLS 1.3 response than from a TLS 1.2 or earlier response, since the CertificateRequest message was changed for TLS 1.3.
For TLS 1.2 and earlier, extract_calist() assumes that the CertificateRequest message is a sequence of certificate types, signature algorithms, and certification authorities. However, the signature algorithms field was added in TLS 1.2 and does not appear in TLS 1.1 and earlier. So, the current code does not work unless the server supports TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3.
This commit fixes the problem by checking whether the response is a TLS 1.2 response, and skipping over the extraction of the signature algorithms field if the response is neither TLS 1.2 nor TLS 1.3.
Some servers get confused if the signature_algorithms extension is too large. This commit addresses the problem by:
* For TLS 1.2, generally limiting the signature algoritms to those consistent with the key type being tested.
* For TLS 1.3, breaking the list of signature schemes in two, and testing each half of the list separately.
