The standard separator after $FNAME_PREFIX is now '-'.
You can as well supply a different <fname_prefix> ending in '.', '_' or ',' , then
no no additional '-' will be appended.
Also a small bash function get_last_char() has been introduced which returns
the last char from a supplied string.
... for curl, wget and sockets. Tested and worked.
Furthermore: fd_socket() now is a bit more injection safe as
an echo statement was exchange by printf. For possible future
changes fd_socket now also has and arg1 for the file descriptor.
... previously it depended on the order of DNS replies otherwise. This was
one outcome of discussion in #1026 where it seemed more logical
to pick an IPv6 address as opposed to an abitrary (v4/v6) address.
This PR fixes checks where those two cmdline options were supplied
but errorneously also the IPv4 address was tested.
It also lables supplied IPv6 addresses as AAAA records
instead of A records.
Still, determine_ip_addresses() has space for improvements.
Some comparisons fixed strings popped up during debugging were polished
to avoid internal quoting
[[ $VAR == "teststr" ]]
will be otherwise expanded to
[[ $VAR == \t\e\s\t\s\t\r ]]
This PR changes run_logjam() so that it does not warn about the use of 2048-bit DH primes, even if the selected prime is a common prime.
This PR leaves two issues unaddressed. First, it does not detect servers that are vulnerable to Attack IV in https://weakdh.org/logjam.html. These are servers that use DH primes that are of sufficient length, but that are poorly generated, and so are still vulnerable to attack.
Second, it does not address the potential problem that use of a common prime could leak information about what server product is being used, even if this information is not leaked through other means (e.g., HTTP headers). This should not be an issue with common primes from an RFC (2409, 3526, 5114, 7919), but would be an issue with product-specific common primes.
This commit fixes a bug mentioned in #1084 where a server
with multiple host certificates wa missing a certificate
number the the host certificate itself.
It also adds a JSON object for the number of host certificates.
According to Section 7.4.2 of RFC 5246, when a server sends its certificate it MUST send a list in which the first certificate is the sender's certificate and "Each following certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it." testssl.sh currently assumes that the server has populated the list way and so places the second certificate in the list into $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem.
However, not all servers have been following this requirement, and so draft-ietf-tls-tls13 (soon to be RFC 8446) only says that servers SHOULD list the certificates in this way and says that clients "SHOULD be prepared to handle potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from any TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which MUST be first."
testssl.sh needs to place the correct certificate in $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem, since otherwise any OCSP request it sends will be incorrect, and any attempt to verify and OCSP response will be incorrect as well.
This PR changes extract_certificates() and parse_tls_serverhello() to populate $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem with the first certificate in certificate_list that has a subject DN that matches the issuer DN in the server's certificate, rather than simply populating $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem with the second certificate in the list.
In testing a random sampling of U.S. government servers, of 57 servers tested 5 reported "unauthorized" for the OCSP URI using the current testssl.sh and all 5 of these reported "not revoked" with this PR. This PR also corrects the same issue in some servers on the Alexa Top 1000, but this was only a problem for 12 of those 1000 servers.
In cases in which the server offers a stapled OCSP response, this commit extracts the OCSP response and then checks the response for the status of the server's certificate. The check is performed in the same way as when the certificate includes an OCSP URI and the "--phone-out" option is set, except that the OCSP response is received from the TLS server rather than coming directly from the OCSP responder. Since this only involves additional processing of data that testssl.sh is already receiving, the check is performed whether or not the "--phone-out" flag is set.
Reduce the offensive tests to 4: the others are "just" / mostly cipher
based checks which should not cause an IDS to block. (This maybe
subject to reconsider at a later time.)
Added a switch --ids-friendly
Updated VULN_COUNT accordingly
Added this (including PHONE_OUT to env debugging output)
Added help()
Manual section added
This PR fixes#615 for the case in which tls_sockets() is used by splitting the list of CBC ciphers into two lists, each with fewer than 128 ciphers and then testing each list separately.
For the --ssl-native case, no changes were needed. Even though $cbc_ciphers contains 154 ciphers, no version of OpenSSL supports all of these ciphers, and so the actual ClientHello sent by every version of OpenSSL contains fewer than 128 ciphers.
I did, however, add the -no_ssl2 flag to the "$OPENSSL s_client" command to prevent OpenSSL from sending an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello. As is noted in a comment in run_server_preference(), "the supplied openssl will send an SSLv2 ClientHello if $SNI is empty and the -no_ssl2 isn't provided."
The certificate from self-signed.badssl.com was about to expire
which raises a MEDIUM type issue in testssl.
This commit does a workaround for this, so that those certificates
will be ok in Travis CI.
(Same problem exists in 2.9.5)
This commit is a FIX for #1069, thus when running in
wide mode it corrects an additional line feed which
happened sometimes.
As @dcooper16 pointed out it also cleans up the needless
if-statements in run_rc4(), run_lucky13() and run_beast().
It also inserts for wide mode lines a blank so the alignment
is not at the left border anymore (check for leftovers
needed).
This PR fixes problems with check_revocation_crl() sometimes reporting that a certificate is revoked even when it isn't, and with check_revocation_ocsp() sometimes reporting "error querying OCSP responder" even if the OCSP responder provided a good response. The most common reason for this to happen is that OpenSSL cannot validate the server's certificate (even without status checking). PR #1051 attempted to get status checking to work even in cases in which the server's certificate could not be validated. This PR instead addresses the problem by not checking status if determine_trust() was unable to validate the server's certificate.
In some cases the server's certificate can be validated using some, but not all of the bundles of trusted certificates. For example, I have encountered some sites that can be validated using the Microsoft and Apple bundles, but not the Linux or Mozilla bundles.
This PR introduces GOOD_CA_BUNDLE to store a bundle that could be used to successfully validate the server's certificate. If there is no such bundle, then neither check_revocation_crl() nor check_revocation_ocsp() is run. When check_revocation_crl() and check_revocation_ocsp() are called, the status checks within them closely match the validation check in determine_trust(), which helps to ensure that if the check fails it is because of the status information.
As noted in #1057, at least one CA provides incorrect information when the CRL is downloaded, so validation could fail for a reason other than the certificate being revoked. So, this PR adds a check of the reason that validation failed and only reports "revoked" if the validation failed for that reason.
As noted in #1056, it is not possible to perform an OCSP query without access to the certificate issuer's public key. So, with this PR check_revocation_ocsp() is only called if the server's provided at least one intermediate certificate (i.e., the issuer's certificate, which contains the issuer's public key).
This PR improves the handling of error responses when checking status using OCSP. It can handle a few types of errors:
* When the responder just returns an error (e.g., "Responder error: unauthorized").
* When the response cannot be verified (e.g., invalid signature, expired certificate).
* When the response is valid ("Response verify OK"), but there is a problem with the response for the individual certificate (e.g., information is too old, or status is "unknown").
This PR fixes two issues with OCSP checking. First, the syntax for specifying a host header changed in OpenSSL between versions 1.0.2 and 1.1.0. With OpenSSL 1.0.2-chacha, 1.0.2o, and LibreSSL the syntax needs to be "-header HOST <hostname>". With OpenSSL 1.1.0h and 1.1.1 the syntax needs to be "-header HOST=<hostname>". I have not been able to test other versions of OpenSSL 1.0.2 or 1.1.0, but am assuming that all versions of OpenSSL 1.1.0 use the same syntax as 1.1.0h.
This PR also fixes a typo in the case of an error, which was causing $code to be set to "empty ocsp response" if the response was not empty rather than if it was empty.
Dirk
David Cooper
Jacco de Leeuw
David Cooper