* open: generation of intermediate certificate files. We do that
at several places. But for some reasons I do not understand currently
we remove those files.
* we don't name the offending certificate
Moved the sentence ~i "A grade better than T would lead to a false sense of security"
to the documentation. No reason for excuses in the output. ;-) Explanation fits
better in the doc.
See also #1657
This commit adds a function for querying the TXT DNS record, so
that subsequently we'll can build on top of that a function for
checking MTA-STS, see #1073.
Also it modifies a local variable mxs in get_mx_record() which
was declared as mx but mxs was used. (That is pending an backport
to 3.0.)
This commit saves more or less time for a detection of the compression.
First it assembles the GET command with all available compressions and send them all.
If the result is negative: we can just tell the finding and return. If it's
positive: We already have identified 1x compression. Then we cycle through the
remaining compressions with single GET requests.
In order to not duplicate code we introduced a helper function sub_breach_helper()
which takes care sending the request and analysis the result.
We treat now failed requests differently: When the first fails we don't
continue anymore.
This commit tries to enummerate through all possible compressions
instead of just raising the arm because of the first one detected.
As far as the performance is concerned there's room for improvements
which subsequent commits will address.
.. see also #1559.
It "mkdirs" the needed etc and bin directories first, then copies
stuff over. It also reduces a few layers.
Also it corrects a mistake in the Readme.md (docker exec --> run)
Thanks for the discussion @Alex131089
There was a empty variable in determine_optimal_proto() which prevented to save
STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO. This is fixed.
The buffers and return codes for XMPP in starttls_io() were under not every
circumstances correct. This fixes those cases and making that in general more
robust (hopefully). (There's still code commented out which I'll leave it for
now).
When openssl did not support -starttls xmpp-server there was a copy
and paste error saying that -xmpphost option was not supported.
... in cases where the protcol section has not been run before.
Also add " -\n" on the screen/html if protocol is not supported. Also for
SSLv2 which can be supported but at the same time not offer any ciphers
mention there will be an output on the screen.
In order not to provide redundant information run_allciphers() is
now not being run via default (1). Therefore run_server_preference()
runs always in wide mode.
In order to archieve that cipher_pref_check() was modified to
accept a fifth argument whether it'll run in wide mode. As
of now cipher_pref_check() is only called by run_server_preference(),
so the code referring to non-wide mode in cipher_pref_check() may also
be deleted in the future.
To provide a better view the run_fs() section is now being run after
run_server_preference().
(1) saves also 5-6 seconds
See #1580.
This commit brings:
* If there's no cipher for a protocol it adds a "\n - \n" (also for run_cipher_per_proto() )
* further output improvements
* Cipher order --> Cipher listing per protocol
* make some conditional statement easier to read (at least for me)
New open points:
- cipher_pref_check() doesn't save to PROTOS_OFFERED (was there before)
(just stumbled over this but how about we also use get_protocol() / parse_tls_serverhello()
- do we want run_allciphers() to be started by default?
- $WIDE per default for run_cipher_per_proto() ?
- probably better not to display text in round square brackets when there's no cipher:
Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) KeyExch. Encryption Bits Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSLv2 (listed by strength)
SSLv3 (server order)
TLSv1 (server order)
TLSv1.1 (server order)
TLSv1.2 (server order)
xc02c ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH 256 AESGCM 256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
[..]
- when a server has no preference at all it shows in wide mode:
Has server cipher order? no (NOT ok) -- only for TLS 1.3
Negotiated protocol TLSv1.3
Negotiated cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
Cipher listing per protocol
Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) KeyExch. Encryption Bits Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSLv2
-
SSLv3
-
TLSv1 (no server order, thus listed by strength)
xc014 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA ECDH 521 AES 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
[..]
e.g. dev.testssl.sh
Dirk