There are two different scenarios. x0C is the buffsize reply from openldap-like servers
whereas AD servers probably have x84 and return also the OID. The following is kind of
hackish as ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse() in apps/s_client.c of openssl is kind of hard
to understand. It was deducted from a number of hosts.
Bottom line: We'll look at the 9th byte or at the 17th when retrieving the result code
AD:
30 84 00 00 00 7d 02 01 01 78 84 00 00 00 74 0a 01 34 04 00 04 55 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 3a 20 [ failed AD .. LdapErr + OID..]
30 84 00 00 00 28 02 01 01 78 84 00 00 00 1F 0A 01 00 04 00 04 00 8A 16 [.. OID ..]
^^ bufflen ^^ resultcode
30 0C 02 01 01 78 07 0A 01 00 04 00 04 00
^^ bufflen ^^ result code
When a server supports client authentication, extract_calist() extracts the list of supported certification authorities sent by the server. extract_calist() uses different code to extract the list from a TLS 1.3 response than from a TLS 1.2 or earlier response, since the CertificateRequest message was changed for TLS 1.3.
For TLS 1.2 and earlier, extract_calist() assumes that the CertificateRequest message is a sequence of certificate types, signature algorithms, and certification authorities. However, the signature algorithms field was added in TLS 1.2 and does not appear in TLS 1.1 and earlier. So, the current code does not work unless the server supports TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3.
This commit fixes the problem by checking whether the response is a TLS 1.2 response, and skipping over the extraction of the signature algorithms field if the response is neither TLS 1.2 nor TLS 1.3.
Some servers get confused if the signature_algorithms extension is too large. This commit addresses the problem by:
* For TLS 1.2, generally limiting the signature algoritms to those consistent with the key type being tested.
* For TLS 1.3, breaking the list of signature schemes in two, and testing each half of the list separately.
This commit modifies run_fs() to show the signature algorithms the server supports in the ServerKeyExchange message for TLS 1.2 and in the CertificateVerify message for TLS 1.3.
Signature algorithms are not shown for TLS 1.1 and earlier, since for those protocol versions the signature algorithm to use is specified by the protocol. While the signature algorithm used in TLS 1.1 and earlier is weak, testssl.sh already warns if these protocol versions are supported.
This commit fixes#1747 by converting PEM encoded certificates that are sent to fileout() to a single line. As suggested in #1747, '\n' is added after the '----- BEGIN ... -----' line and before the '------ END ... ------' line.
In order to ensure that '\n' appears in the string in the JSON and CSV files, '\\n' is sent to fileout() so that 'printf -- "%b"' converts '\\n' to '\n' rather than converting '\n' to a newline character.
In order to prevent fileout() from converting '\\n' to '\ ', this commit move the fix for #2049 (see PR #2050) from fileout() to fatal().
As a first cleanup action I removed in run_server_preference()
the line with Negotiated Protocol and Negotiated Cipher as
the don't have any real information, see #2235 , comment below:
https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/2235
This commit fixes#2271 by adding the `-no_ssl2` option to the call to get_host_cert() in run_drown(). There is at least one server that causes OpenSSL to hang if this call to get_host_cert() results in an SSLv2 ClientHello being sent. Since this call to get_host_cert() only needs to find the server's certificate in cases in which the server does not support SSLv2, there is no need to send an SSLv2 ClientHello.
This commit simplifies the adding of padding data in a few places. Rather than adding one or two bytes at a time in a "for" loop, all of the padding is added in one step by extracting it from a long padding string. (The one exception is in run_robot(), where a "for" loop is used to add additional padding in case in which the RSA modulus is longer than the pre-defined padding string.)
Extracting the padding from a long string is faster than using a "for" loop and it makes the debugging file a little cleaner.
The idea is the same as PR #1940.
This commit fixes an infinite loop in run_fs() that occurs in cases in which $OPENSSL supports TLS 1.3 and the server supports all of the non-TLS 1.3 FS ciphers that $OPENSSL supports but not all of the TLS 1.3 ciphers that $OPENSSL supports.
The problem is that testing for supported ciphers using $OPENSSL, testing should stop if there are no more ciphers to test (because all of the ciphers supported by $OPENSSL have been determined to be supported by the server). However, currently testing only stops if both the list of TLS 1.3 ciphers and non-TLS 1.3 ciphers is empty. In the problematic case, only the list of non-TLS 1.3 ciphers is empty. Instead of stopping, s_client_options() is called with a -cipher option with an empty list, and s_client_options() simply removes the -cipher option from the command, resulting in a call to $OPENSSL s_client with a full list of non-TLS 1.3 ciphers. Since this call succeeds, the loop continues.
This commit fixes the problem by stopping TLS 1.3 ClientHello testing when the list of TLS 1.3 ciphers is empty and stopping non-TLS 1.3 ClientHello testing when the list of non-TLS 1.3 ciphers is empty.
This commit fileout() calls to ciphers_by_strength() and cipher_pref_check() to indicate whether or not the server enforces a cipher order for a protocol version.
This commit fixes#1311 by only rating the lack of a server-enforced ciper order negatively if there is a difference in the quality rating of the ciphers offered for a particular protocol.
