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Wonderfall 2022-01-03 17:36:14 +01:00
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@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ F-Droid also **doesn't enforce a minimum target SDK** for the official repositor
## 4. General lack of good practices
The F-Droid client allows multiple repositories to coexist within the same app. Many of the issues highlighted above were focused on the main official repository which most of the F-Droid users will use anyway. However, having **other repositories in a single app also violates the security model of Android** which was not designed for this at all. As a matter of fact, the new unattended update API from Android 12 that allows seamless updates for third-party clients without privileged access to the system won't work with F-Droid. It should be noted that [Droid-ify](https://github.com/Iamlooker/Droid-ify/issues/20) is trying to figure out a way to make it work, although the underlying issues about the F-Droid infrastructure remain.
Their client also lacks **TLS certificate pinning**, unlike Play Store which does that for all connections to Google. Certificate pinning is a way for apps to increase the security of their connection to services [by providing the hashes](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-config#CertificatePinning) of known-good certificates for these services instead of trusting pre-installed CAs. This can avoid some cases where an interception (*man-in-the-middle* attack) could be possible and lead to various security issues considering you're trusting the app to deliver you other apps. It is an important security feature.
Their client also lacks **TLS certificate pinning**, unlike Play Store which does that for all connections to Google. Certificate pinning is a way for apps to increase the security of their connection to services [by providing the hashes](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-config#CertificatePinning) of known-good certificates for these services instead of trusting pre-installed CAs. This can avoid some cases where an interception (*man-in-the-middle* attack) could be possible and lead to various security issues considering you're trusting the app to deliver you other apps.
See how GrapheneOS pins both root and CA certificates in [Auditor](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor) for their attestation service:
It is an important security feature that is also straightforward to implement. See how GrapheneOS pins both root and CA certificates in [Auditor](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor) for their attestation service:
```
<!-- res/xml/network_security_config.xml -->