x0rg/9x0rg.com
1
0
Fork 0
Code Releases Activity

precision

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Wonderfall 2022-01-08 23:02:03 +01:00
parent 4aea6d9ddb
commit b3d45d8912
1 changed files with 1 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
content/posts/fdroid-issues.md
View File

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ As a result of this philosophy, the main repository of F-Droid is filled with ob
## 4. General lack of good practices
The F-Droid client allows multiple repositories to coexist within the same app. Many of the issues highlighted above were focused on the main official repository which most of the F-Droid users will use anyway. However, having **other repositories in a single app also violates the security model of Android** which was not designed for this at all. As a matter of fact, the new unattended update API from Android 12 that allows seamless app updates for app repositories without [privileged access](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged/) to the system (such an approach is not compatible with the security model) won't work with F-Droid. It should be mentioned that [Droid-ify](https://github.com/Iamlooker/Droid-ify/issues/20) is trying to figure out a way to make it work, although the underlying issues about the F-Droid infrastructure remain.
Their client also lacks **TLS certificate pinning**, unlike Play Store which does that for all connections to Google. Certificate pinning is a way for apps to increase the security of their connection to services [by providing the hashes](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-config#CertificatePinning) of known-good certificates for these services instead of trusting pre-installed CAs. This can avoid some cases where an interception (*man-in-the-middle* attack) could be possible and lead to various security issues considering you're trusting the app to deliver you other apps.
Their client also lacks **TLS certificate pinning**, unlike Play Store which does that for all connections to Google. Certificate pinning is a way for apps to increase the security of their connection to services [by providing a set of public key hashes](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-config#CertificatePinning) of known-good certificates for these services instead of trusting pre-installed CAs. This can avoid some cases where an interception (*man-in-the-middle* attack) could be possible and lead to various security issues considering you're trusting the app to deliver you other apps.
It is an important security feature that is also straightforward to implement. See how GrapheneOS pins both root and CA certificates in [Auditor](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor) for their attestation service: