This moves the run_ticketbleed function to the socketsend_clienthello.
It is not working yet, see also #1535 why. This is just for the PoC,
I'll explain:
It has now a function named check_bytestream() which will be called
in debug mode 1 and checks whether the byte stream to be send via
bash sockets is properly formatted. It can detect bugs which otherwise
would be hard to discover.
DO NOT USE IT for anything else than the check
---snip:
code:
check_bytestream() {
local line=""
local -i i=0
# We do a search and replace so that \xaa\x29 becomes
# _xaa
# _x29
#
# "echo -e" helps us to get a multiline string
while read -r line; do
if [[ $i -eq 0 ]]; then
# first line is empty because this is a LF
:
elif [[ ${#line} -ne 4 ]] && [[ $i != 0 ]]; then
echo "length of byte $i called from $2 is not ok"
elif [[ ${line:0:1} != _ ]]; then
echo "char $i called from $2 doesn't start with a \"\\\""
elif [[ ${line:1:1} != x ]]; then
echo "char $i called from $2 doesn't have an x in second position"
elif [[ ${line:2:2} != [0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F] ]]; then
echo "byte $i called from $2 is not hex"
fi
i+=1
done < <( echo -e ${1//\\/\\n_})
}
socksend_clienthello() {
local data=""
code2network "$1"
data="$NW_STR"
if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]]; then
check_bytestream "$data" "${FUNCNAME[1]}"
[[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]] && echo && echo "\"$data\""
[..]
Result (./testssl.sh -q --debug=1 -U dev.testssl.sh):
Testing vulnerabilities
Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) not vulnerable (OK), no heartbeat extension
CCS (CVE-2014-0224) not vulnerable (OK)
Ticketbleed (CVE-2016-9244), experiment. length of byte 311 called from run_ticketbleed is not ok
length of byte 312 called from run_ticketbleed is not ok
length of byte 313 called from run_ticketbleed is not ok
length of byte 314 called from run_ticketbleed is not ok
length of byte 315 called from run_ticketbleed is not ok
length of byte 316 called from run_ticketbleed is not ok
length of byte 317 called from run_ticketbleed is not ok
[..]
---snap
Besides that:
* dec02hex was corrected (only being used for run_ticketbleed)
* dec04hex is still buggy and part of the problem
* some quotes removed from rhs of [[]]
This commit chamges a few functions / calls so that
the hexbyte syntax with leading x was changed to
one without. The calls then need to change from
socksend --> socksend_clienthello .
The goal is basically to remove socksend() at
some point. Also socksend_clienthello()'s use
of NW_STR should be reconsidered.
This PR removes also some blanks, at the right
hand side of some double square brackets and
at some empty lines
This function had before a mixture of sed and tr commands
which was now replaced by bash internal functions. It makes
the code better, performance gain in the LAN is neglectable (1s).
This brings code2network somewhat in line with socksend(). This
function does basically the same (and thus is probably prone
to extinction ;-) ). Albeit there the good thing is it does
conversion and sending in one shot.
.. as it may not be available everywhere, see #1521 (NixOS).
This commit replaces all instances from pwd or /bin/pwd by $PWD.
It is a bash internal and the fastest. Also it added some quotes
to PWD a it may contain white spaces in the future (currently
there's a check for it that it won't)
.. as it may not be everywhere available, see #1521 (NixOS).
This commit replaces all instances from pwd or /bin/pwd by `pwd -P`
(-P -> no symbolic link)
This commit addresses two bugs: #1506 and #1508.
First, the variable rDNS can contain multiple lines due to multiple PTR DNS
records, though this is not recommended. In those cases the multiple PTR DNS
were concatenated on the screen, without any blank.
Secondly - depending on the name server entries and on the output of the DNS
binaries used it can contain non-printable characters or characters which are
printable but later on interpreted on the output device (\032 was mentioned
in #1506) which on the screen was interpreted as octal 32 (decimal 26 = ▒,
try echo "\032"), so basically a terminal escape sequence was smuggled
from the DNS server to the screen of the users. In JSON pretty output we
had also this escape sequence which was fine for jsonlint but caused jq
to hiccup.
Fix: we use a loop to check for each FQDN returned. There we remove chars which
under those circumstances can show up. The blacklist is taken from RFC 1912
("Allowable characters in a label for a host name are only ASCII, letters, digits,
and the `-' character").
Hostnames can contain a trailing dot (and sometimes they should).
If they are supplied to testssl.sh however they will be also interpreted
as a URL PATH when the servive is HTTP.
This commit fixes that.
This switch had no effect. There was probably a regression
problem as it worked before.
Besides fixing that the large case statement in parse_cmd_line()
was simplified, in a sense that banner and help functions were
moved to a separate case statement.
For a fresh start it seemed a good idea to cleanup
the order of functions and some variables so that
those with the same functionality are somewhat grouped.
Some of the functions have now a header and a foooter
to make it easier to spot and use then. Also for added future
functions the hope is that they will be put where they better
fit
There's a check for >825 days certificate lifetime. That
check emits a debug statement when the lifetime is within
this limit. It does that also when the certificate expired.
This commit adds now the word "total"
DEBUG: all is fine with total certificate life time
to make sure the life time left not is what should be understood.
... by adding the formerly intruoced "DEBUG" statement as a filter.
Note: "DEBUG" can now / should now be taken preferably for extra
output on debug level 1.
Replacing badssl.com by testssl.net. The former needed almost 5 min
for a run, whereas one IP of testssl.net needs ~80 secs. With --fast
even less.
Several vulnerability checks add a time penalty when the server
side only support TLS 1.3 as The TLS 1.3 RFC 8446 and implementations
known so far don't support the flaws being checked for.
This PR adds "shortcut" checks for all TLS 1.3, assuming that the
TLS 1.3 implementation is correct which seems at this time a valid
assumpution. That either saves a TCP connect or at least some logic to
be executed. Also in some cases a TLS 1.3 only server emitted unnecessary
warnings, see #1444.
If $DEBUG -eq 1 then it outputs information that a shortcut was
used. It doesn't do that in other cases because the screen output
seems too obtrusive.
It also adds a shortcut for beast when SSL 3 or TLS 1.0 is is known
not to be supported.
This commit radds 747fb039ed which
was accidenially reverted in 45f28d8166.
It fixes#1462.
See also #1459.
This also makes a short exit when the server side
supports TLS 1.3 only as this protocol doesn't support
TLS renegotiation or compression.
Also it fixes the logic flaw from the previous
commit that "-no_tls1_3" has to be supplied.
Furthermore, it unifies the output presented to the user.
As noted in #1444 a few vulnerability checks don't make sense
or aren't working. This commit addresses the renegotiation checks.
Also a few redundant quotes in parse_tls_serverhello() and
run_crime() were removed.
The CA browser form agreed on a validity period of 825 days or less
(https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.5.3-redlined.pdf,
p4).
PR #1427 addressed that. However when an issuer signed/issued a certificate
with exactly 825 days, the check reported incorrectly that the life time
is too long.
This commit addressed that by adding a second to the calulation. Also the
output takes into account that it must be over ('>') 825 days, not '>='.
See #1070, kudos @poupas.
In addition it checks whether the first result was positive (in
terms of a finding). If so it does 4 rounds and checks the
result. So that other servers won't be penalized with 4 seconds.
Dirk Wetter